INSTITUTE OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
| WP No. | Author | Title | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| 320 | Joachim Rosenmüller, Peter Sudhölter | Cartels via the Modiclus | Nov. 2000 |
| 319 | Joachim Rosenmüller, Peter Sudhölter | Formation of Cartels in Glove Markets and the Modiclus | Sep. 2000 |
| 318 | Joachim Rosenmüller | The Endogenous Formation of Cartels | April 2000 |
| 317 | Wulf Albers, Robin Pope, Reinhard Selten and Bodo Vogt | Experimental Evidence for Attractions to Chance | Dec. 1999 |
| 316 | Laurent Vidu | The Minimal Quota for a Complete and Transitive Majority Relation | Dec. 1999 |
| 315 | Bodo Vogt | Full Information, Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Principal-Agent Games | Nov. 1999 |
| 314 | Axel Ostmann and Martha Saboyá | Symmetric Homogeneous Local Interaction | Nov. 1999 |
| 313 | Peter Sudhölter, Jos Potters | The Semireactive Bargaining Set of a Cooperative Game | Nov. 1999 |
| 312 | Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann | Do Monopolies Justifiably Fear Environmental Tax Reforms? | Oct. 1999 |
| 311 | Claus-Jochen Haake, Matthias G.Raith, Francis E. Su | Bidding for Envy-freeness: A Procedural Approach to n-Player Fair-Division Problems | Sep. 1999 |
| 310 | Walter Trockel | A Universal Meta Bargaining Realization of the Nash Solution | Sep. 1999 |
| 309 | Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann | Strategic Environmental Trade Policy Under Free Entry of Firms | Aug. 1999 |
| 308 | Walter Trockel | Unique Nash Implementation for a Class of Bargaining Solutions | May. 1999 |
| 307 | Nikolai S. Kukushkin | Some Classes of Potential and Semi-Potential Games | Mar. 1999 |
| 306 | Walter Trockel | On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution | Mar. 1999 |
| 305 | Walter Trockel | Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory | Jan. 1999 |
| 304 | Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann Matthias G. Raith | Should High-Tax Countries Pursue Revenue-Neutral Ecological Tax Reforms? | Dec. 1998 |
| 303 | Joachim Rosenmüller | Mechanisms in the Core of a Fee Game | Nov. 1998 |
| 302 | Joachim Rosenmüller, Benyamin Shitovitz | A Characterization of vNM-Stable Sets for Linear Production Games | Nov. 1998 |
| 301 | Claus-Jochen Haake | Implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies | Oct. 1998 |
| 300 | Matthias G. Raith | Fair-Negotiation Procedures | July 1998 |
| 299 | Matthias G. Raith | Supporting Cooperative Multi-Issue Negotiations | June 1998 |
| 298 | Matthias G. Raith, Helge Wilker | ARTUS: The Adaptable Round Table with a User-specific Surface | May 1998 |
| 297 | Yan-An Hwang,Peter Sudhölter | An Axiomatization of the Core | Mar. 1998 |
| 296 | Nikolai S. Kukushkin | Symmetries of Game with Public and Private Objectives | Feb. 1998 |
| 295 | Matthias G. Raith, Andreas Welzel | Adjusted Winner: An Algorithm for Implementing Bargaining Solutions in Multi-Issue Negotiations | Feb. 1998 |
| 294 | Nikolai S. Kukushkin | System of Decreasing Reactions and their Fixed Points | Feb. 1998 |
| 293 | Joachim Rosenmüller | Large Totally Balanced Games | Feb. 1998 |
| 292 | Bezalel Peleg,Peter Sudhölter | The Positive Prekernel of a Cooperative Game | Feb. 1998 |
| 291 | Walter Trockel | Rationalizability of the Nash Bargaining Solution | Feb. 1998 |
| 290 | Bezalel Peleg,Peter Sudhölter | Single-Peakness and Coalition-Proofness | Feb. 1998 |
| 289 | Elvira Thelichmann | An Algorithm for Incentive Compatible Mechanisms of Fee-Games | Jan. 1998 |
| 288 | Wulf Albers | The Complexity of a Number as a Quantitative Predictor of the Frequencies of Responses under Decimal Perception - A Contribution to the Theory of Prominence | Jan. 1998 |
| 287 | Wulf Albers, Andreas Uphaus, Bodo Vogt | A Model of the Concession Behavior in the Sequence of Offers of the German Electronic Stock Exchange Trading Market(IBIS) Based on the Prominence Structure of the Bid Ask Spread | Jan. 1998 |
| 286 | Wulf Albers, Andreas Güntzel | The Boundedly Rational Decision Process Creating Probability Responses - Empirical Results Confirming the Theory of Prominence | Jan. 1998 |
| 285 | Wulf Albers | Money Equivalent versus Market Value - An Experimental Study of Differences and Common Principles of Evaluation | Jan. 1998 |
| 284 | Wulf Albers | Evaluation of Lotteries with Two Alternatives by the Theory of Prominence - A Normative Benchmark of Risk Neutrality that Predicts Median Behavior of Subjects | Jan. 1998 |
| 283 | Bodo Vogt | Connection Between Ultimatum Behavior and Reciprocity in a Combined Ultimatum-Reciprocity Game | Jan. 1998 |
| 282 | Fred Fegel, Bodo Vogt, Wulf Albers | The Price Response Function and Logarithmic Perception of Prices and Quantities | Jan. 1998 |
| 281 | Bodo Vogt | Criteria For Fair Divisions in Ultimatum Games | Jan. 1998 |
| 280 | Andreas Uphaus, Bodo Vogt, Wulf Albers | Stock Price Clustering and Numerical Perception | Jan. 1998 |
| 279 | Bodo Vogt | The Strength of Reciprocity in Reciprocity Game | Jan. 1998 |
| 278 | Anke Gerber | Reference Functions and Solutions to Bargaining Problems with Claims | Oct. 1997 |
| 277 | Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg | The Averaging Mechanism | Oct. 1997 |
| 276 | Jörg Naeve | The Nash Bargaining Solution is Nash Implementable | Sep. 1997 |
| 275 | Jean-Michel Coulomb | On the Value of Discounted Stochastic Games | Aug. 1997 |
| 274 | Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann and Matthias Raith | Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend:A Drawback for a Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform | July 1997 |
| 273 | Anke Gerber | An Extension of the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution to Bargaining Problems with Claims | June 1997 |
| 272 | Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers | Selection between Pareto-Optimal Outcomes in 2-Person Bargaining | Feb.1997 |
| 271 | Wulf Albers | Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System, PART V: Operations on Scales, and Evaluation of Prospects | Jan. 1997 |
| 270 | Wulf Albers | Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System, PART IV: Task-Dependence of Smallest Perceived Money Unit, Nonexistence of General Utility Functions, and Related Paradoxa | Jan. 1997 |
| 269 | Wulf Albers | Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System, PART III: Perception of Numerical Information, and Relations to Traditional Solution Concepts | Jan. 1997 |
| 268 | Wulf Albers and Bodo Vogt | The Selection of Mixed Strategies in 2x2 Bimatrix Games | Jan. 1997 |
| 267 | Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers | Equilibrium Selection in 2x2 Bimatrix Games with Preplay Communication | Jan. 1997 |
| 266 | Wulf Albers | Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System, PART II: Exactness Selection Rule, and Confirming Results | Jan. 1997 |
| 265 | Wulf Albers | Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System, PART I: Numerical Response as a Process, Exactness, and Structure of Scales | Jan. 1997 |
| 264 | Anke Gerber | Coalition Formation in General NTU Games | Dec. 1996 |
| 263 | Bernd Korthues | Characterizations of Two Extended Walras Solutions for Open Economies | Sep.1996 |
| 262 | Peter Sudhölter and Bezalel Peleg | Nucleoli as Maximizers of Collective Satisfaction Functions | Sep. 1996 |
| 261 | Robert Samuel Simon | An Improvement on the Existence Proof of Joint Plan Equilibria | Sep. 1996 |
| 260 | Robert Samuel Simon | The Difference Between Common Knowledge of Formulas and Sets: Part II | Aug. 1996 |
| 259 | Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann | The Welfare Implications of an Ecological Tax Reform under Monopoly | Jul. 1996 |
| 258 | Bezalel Peleg | A Note on Existence of Equilibria in Generalized Economies | Jun. 1996 |
| 257 | Peter Sudhölter, Joachim Rosenmüller | The Canonical Extensive Form of a Game Form: Part II - Representation | Jun. 1996 |
| 256 | Bernd Korthues | Consistency and its Converse. An Approach for Economies | Jun. 1996 |
| 255 | Robert S. Simon | The Existence of Nash Equilibria in Two-Person, Infinitely Repeated Undiscounted Games of Incomplete Information: A Survey | Jun. 1996 |
| 254 | Bezalel Peleg | Partial Equilibrium in Pure Exchange Economies | May 1996 |
| 253 | Bezalel Peleg, Joachim Rosenmüller,Peter Sudhölter | The Canonical Extensive Form of a Game Form: Part I - Symmetries | Apr. 1996 |
| 252 | Robert Samuel Simon | The Difference Between Common Knowledge of Formulas and Sets: Part I | Mar. 1996 |
| 251 | Yakar Kannai and Myrna H.Wooders | A Further Extension of the KKMS Theorem | Feb. 1996 |
| 250 | Peter Sudhölter | Axiomatizations of Game Theoretical Solutions for One-Output Cost Sharing Problems | Dec. 1995 |
| 249 | Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann | Two Games of Interjurisdictional Competition where Local Governments Provide Industrial Public Goods | Dec. 1995 |
| 248 | Nikolai S. Kukushkin | Separable Aggregation and the Existence of Nash Equilibrium | Nov. 1995 |
| 247 | Bezalel Peleg | A Formal Approach to Nash's Program | Nov. 1995 |
| 246 | Jos Potters andPeter Sudhölter | Airport Problems and Consistent Solution Rules | Oct. 1995 |
| 245 | Walter Trockel | An Exact Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies | Sep. 1995 |
| 244 | Anke Gerber | The Nash Solution as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Function on Bargaining Games | Aug.1995 |
| 243 | Till Requate | Pigouvian Taxes May Fail Even in a Perfect World | Jun. 1995 |
| 242 | Robert S. Simon | Alienated Extensions and Common Knowledge Worlds | Apr. 1995 |
| 241 | Bernd Korthues | Existence of Generalized Walras Equilibria for Generalized Economies | Apr. 1995 |
| 240 | Diethard Pallaschke and Joachim Rosenmüller | The Shapley Value for Countably Many Players | Mar. 1995 |
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