Before we examine the details of the 11th Air Assault Division and the eventual deployment of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), it is important to remember that during this period the Aviation School, Transportation School, Signal School, and Aberdeen Proving Ground, as well as many other Army agencies, devoted their considerable talents and manpower to improving and supporting the concept of airmobility. Space and time do not permit detailing even a portion of this effort, but I would not want any omission here to leave the impression that the air assault tests were the sum and substance of the U. S. Army progress during this period.

The Howze Board had laid the foundations and suggested the means to finish the job that it had begun so well. Now it was up to the Army as a whole to turn the major Howze Board recommendation into fact.

To maintain the Howze Board momentum and to meet one of its major recommendations, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations on 7 January 1963 issued the initial plan for the organization, training, and testing of an air assault division and an air transport brigade. Cadres of the test units were activated on 15 February at Fort Benning, Georgia. The test division was named the 11th Air Assault Division to revive the colors of that proud World War H airborne division. At first it was represented by just an infantry battalion, plus a few personnel in the division headquarters and the necessary combat support and logistical support elements. Concurrently, the 10th Air Transport Brigade was activated around a battalion-size unit. The overall strength of these initial test units was 191 officers, 187 warrant officers, and 2,645 enlisted men for a total of 3,023 personnel. Of the 154 aircraft provided, 125 were helicopters and 29 were fixed-wing. It was visualized that the units

would be progressively expanded to full strength beginning in Fiscal Year 1964.

Within the Army staff there was considerable anxiety that the Army would be pushed into joint testing of these new organizations before they were sufficiently organized and trained. General Barksdale Hamlett, then Vice Chief of Staff, stated on 11 February 1963 that his chief concern at the moment was whether the Army would "be permitted to pursue an orderly program without being forced into premature joint testing." He believed that "within our airmobile concept the principal targets for the opposition appeared to be the Mohawk, the Caribou, and the armed helicopter together with our plans for the utilization of these aircraft." Later events were to prove that General Hamlett's concern was well founded.

Those who were assigned to the new test units throughout the year and a half of the formation and testing of the 11th Air Assault Division and the 10th Air Transport Brigade almost universally regarded this period as one of the high points of their lives. It was one of the few times in the Army up until that point in time that a group of officers and men have been pulled together with the job of developing and proving a concept with very little in the way of approved doctrine, systems, equipment, methods of operations, and any of the vast documentation and regulations which normally prescribe the formation of new military organizations. For example, at the time of the formation of the 11th Air Assault Division, it was actually against Army regulations for helicopters to fly in formation except under the most unusual circumstances. The infantryman had to adjust to new methods of entering into combat and new tactics and techniques of closing with the enemy. The artillery man had to provide his proven support with new airmobile artillery and aerial rocket artillery. The aviation elements had to broaden their training to include much work in the nap-of-the-earth, formation flying, night formations, jury rigging of weapons on Hueys and Mohawks, and forward area refueling. It was a time of innovation at all levels.

Brigadier General Harry W. O. Kinnard had been selected to lead the 11th Air Assault Division during this critical period. He in turn handpicked his key personnel and gave them the widest latitude in accomplishing their particular portion of the mission. Commanders at all levels were free to pursue vigorously any advancement of the airmobile concept as they saw it. At division headquarters, General Kinnard established "an idea center" to insure that any suggestion however bold or radical would receive careful and detailed consideration. Civilian industry was briefed on the

test program and submitted a varied array of new equipment items for testing. Aviation weather minimums were relaxed to permit the launching of airmobile operations depending on the state of training and the skill of the flight crews. Particular attention was given to night operations.

Lieutenant Colonel John B. Stockton's 227th Assault Helicopter Battalion—the first in the Army—spent much of its time experimenting with methods of moving long distances through very low weather and improving their own lighting systems for tight formation flying at night. The Chinook battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin S. Silver, Jr. struggled with a newly developed machine, with the attending problems of maintenance and spare parts, to find new methods of moving artillery and key supplies. The 10th Air Transport Brigade, under Colonel Delbert L. Bristol, with a combination of Caribous and Chinooks devised the first workable air line of communications.

While the test units were being formed and organized, considerable thought was being given to the methodology that would have to be developed to objectively test such large organizations. There had been no tests of this type since the years just prior to World War II, when the Army tested its "new" triangular division concept. And even this test never approached the scope of the Air Assault Tests. There had been, of course, many large unit field exercises, but these took the form of training tests rather than concept tests. Furthermore, the evaluation of exercises of this type had been based solely on military judgment and opinion.¹

Lieutenant General C. W. G. Rich, who was assigned the overall responsibility as test director on 1 August 1964, was given the mission to test a concept, and base the evaluation of this concept on scientific principles. He charged the Test Evaluation and Control Group, headed by General Williams, to establish a new methodology based on evaluation of the combat systems and how these systems interacted with each other. A scientific element, staffed by systems analysts from the Combat Operations Research Group, advised and assisted the evaluation group. In the final phases of evaluation there were 376 permanent members of the Test and Evaluation Group as well as 1,596 temporary personnel.

The main problem facing the Test and Evaluation Group was the difficulty of isolating what was being tested. Test units were developing procedures, detailed tactics, and techniques through

1. Extensive tests of the "Pentomic Division" were made at Fort Benning in the mid-1950's, but they differed in magnitude and approach.

the period of observation. Thus, a system and its associated procedures which was observed one day would not necessarily agree with an observation of the "same" system the following day. To further compound this problem, the testing units had to train concurrently with the testing, so the test findings had to be analyzed as to whether they were the result of unit training problems or actual deficiencies in the system itself.

Throughout the early formation and training period of the 11th Air Assault test units, there was a continuous and intentional cross-feed of people, information, equipment, and ideas between what was going on in Vietnam and what was going on at Fort Benning. Members of the 11th Air Assault paid frequent visits to units in Vietnam for cross-fertilization of ideas, and many of the members of the 11th Air Assault in its latter stages were Vietnam returnees. In addition, the test division had the added mission of forming, training, and equipping a total of six airmobile companies that were sent to Vietnam during the testing period. The airmobile concept was not growing in isolation either in Southeast Asia or the United States.

It was not until three months before the final test, labeled AIR ASSAULT II, that either the division or the air transport brigade existed as essentially anything more than a strong cadre organization. Between 1 July 1964 and 1 September 1964 both units were levied for complete units with aircraft and personnel for shipment overseas. This requirement skimmed off the cream of highly qualified individuals from all units in the division. Temporary duty aircraft and aviators were brought into the testing units during the month of September and continued to join the testing units up to and during the final exercise which took place from 14 October to 12 November 1964.

AIR ASSAULT II involved some 35,000 personnel and covered over four million acres through the Carolinas. The exercise was a controlled field test where a test scenario listed by time certain actions or events that were required to occur. Maximum freedom of player action was permitted with sufficient control to allow adequate observation for those events which were necessary for evaluation. The 82d Airborne Division (augmented) acted as the aggressor force.

As fate would have it, the weather at the beginning of AIR ASSAULT II was incredibly bad. Hurricane Isabell, out in the Atlantic, had low flying scud and rain blanketing out the whole of the eastern seaboard. Ceilings ranged from 50 to 200 feet and visibility was sometimes less than one eighth of a mile. These condi-

tions were worsened by gusty winds and low-hanging haze and fog. All the airlines on the eastern seacoast had ceased operating since turbulence above 1,000 feet was so severe that instrument flying was not feasible. Despite this, this operation jumped off only one hour behind schedule with the movement of one air assault infantry brigade by 120 helicopters over a distance of 100 nautical miles precisely on their objective. A year and a half of training had paid off.

For four weeks the test units maneuvered throughout the Carolinas in offensive, defensive, and retrograde movements. The umpires were hard-pressed to keep up with the tempo and the collection of "hard data," by being in the right spot at the right time, became their primary concern. So much was happening concurrently over such a large area that control of the enthusiastic units being tested was a constant problem. It was a tribute to both the tested units and the umpire personnel that the scenario remained recognizable. To compound the problem, hundreds of distinguished visitors wanted to witness this critical testing period.

It is interesting to compare the comments of the two major commanders of the units in AIR ASSAULT II, Major General Robert H. York, who commanded the aggressor force of the 82d Airborne Division, and General Kinnard, who commanded the 11th Air Assault Division and attached units.

General York said:

General Kinnard looked beyond the scenario of AIR ASSAULT II and said:

On 1 December 1964 General Rich forwarded his interim report of the Air Assault test to the Commanding General, Combat Developments Command. He noted that this examination of a particular division slice had not set the lower or upper limits to the airmobility potential but it had provided clear indications of the possible and practical advantages to be gained. His recommendations were as follows:

Though not part of the formal report, General Rich made one further observation on the fundamental concept of airmobility.

As early as 17 January 1963 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had envisioned testing the airmobile concept under the supervision of U. S. Strike Command. It was originally conceived that this would be a complete comparative evaluation of the Army and Air Force airmobility concepts to include division-size joint exercises. General Rosson was designated by General Paul D. Adams, Commanding General U. S. Strike Command, to form a joint Test and Evaluation Task Force to plan and fulfill this requirement. As mentioned earlier, the Army was concerned that it would be pushed into such a test before it had fully organized and trained its own airmobile units. The Air Force, on the other hand, had been pushing for a joint test of its own concepts ever since the Disosway report on the Howze Board.

At the heart of the Air Force concept was the contention that within a joint force the Army Reorganization Objective Army division supported by Air Force tactical air offered a more practical and economical means for enhancing the mobility and combat effectiveness of Army units than did the Army air assault division. Selective tailoring of the Reorganization Objective Army division was seen as permitting varying degrees of airtransportability and combat capability ranging from a relatively light mobile force to one capable of sustained combat, all without recourse to specialized Army airmobile units. As visualized by the Air Force, neither Army fixed-wing aircraft or medium helicopters were required for tactical movement of troops or delivery of supplies. It was their contention that the Air Force C-130 could do the majority of the air transport mission while other Air Force aircraft provided reconnaissance and firepower.

On 5 March 1964 a decision by the Secretary of Defense produced far-reaching effects on the U. S. Strike Command test and evaluation effort. This decision allowed the Army to proceed with its unilateral tests during the latter part of calendar year 1964. Thereafter, the Army was to recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff what aspect, if any, warranted validation by joint testing.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff would then determine if there was a requirement for joint testing of the Army's concept during calendar year 1965.

Meanwhile Strike Command was left with the responsibility for conducting joint training and testing of the Air Force concept through division level. The 1st Infantry Division subsequently was made available for this purpose.

The Strike Command-sponsored joint test and evaluation exercise, GOLD FIRE I, was conducted in Missouri at about the same time that the Army was conducting its final test program with the air assault division. It soon became evident that the Air Force concept, rather than dealing in innovations, embraced improving streamlined sustained execution of a long-established concept; namely, tactical air support of ground forces. It proved that with overwhelming use of dedicated Air Force support, a standard Army division had increased potential. The joint exercise provided few surprises.

General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, United States Army, in discussing the differences between the tests of the 11th Air Assault Division and the test sponsored by Strike Command of an Army division supported by the Air Force, remarked: "I had the rare privilege of seeing the 11th Air Assault one week and the other concept at the early part of the following week, and I would make a comparison of perhaps a gazelle and an elephant. The two are not comparable. Each of them has its role to play, and it is important that we continue to pursue in this area where we have made such significant strides the gains that we already have."

At the last moment, General Rosson was told by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 September 1964 to carry out an independent U. S. Strike Command evaluation of the Army's AIR ASSAULT II and on 6 October 1964 the guidance was modified to state that a comparative evaluation of GOLD FIRE I and AIR ASSAULT II would not be undertaken but rather directed a separate and independent evaluation of the Army exercise.

The interim final report on the tests of the 11th Air Assault which was submitted on 1 December 1964 essentially wrapped up twenty-one months of intensive, almost feverish, activity by thousands of highly specialized personnel. General Rich's final plea had been that this organization not be dispersed to the winds. It was now up to the Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine its future.

The Army had convinced itself, and a large body of people throughout the military establishment, that further large scale

tests were unnecessary to make the critical decision as to whether to keep such an organization as the air assault division in being. Strike Command was unsatisfied with the unresolved joint operational problems associated with these new units, but no funds had been programmed for major tests during calendar year 1965. As thousands of pilots, mechanics and technicians returned to their home stations from temporary duty, the remainder of the test personnel finished writing annexes to the final test report, completing documentation of side tests of new equipment, and pulling long over-due maintenance on their tired aircraft.

On balance, it must be said that the continuation of active service of the 11th Air Assault hinged not only on the test results per se, but also the events in Vietnam which made the deployment of such a division extremely attractive. In the spring of 1965 many planners in the Pentagon were considering the deployment of this division as one of the possible options to counter a worsening situation-one in which the Viet Cong seemed likely to cut South Vietnam in half through the II Corps Tactical Zone.

In March 1965 the tentative decision was made to convert the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) to a full-fledged member of the force structure. General Creighton W. Abrams, who was then the Vice Chief of Staff, said after the decision briefing, "Is it not fortuitous that we happen to have this organization in existence at this point in time?" Those who had been fighting for such an organization for over a decade could not help but sense the irony of this remark. It was decided that the new division would carry the colors of the 1st Cavalry Division which was then deployed in Korea. This decision was made for a variety of reasons, some of them emotional and some pragmatic.

On 1 July 1965 the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was officially activated pursuant to General Order 185, Headquarters Third U. S. Army, and was made up of the resources of the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) and the 2d Infantry Division. Despite a crippling loss of personnel by reassignment throughout the division, its personnel were able to retrain, re-equip, and deploy this major force to combat in ninety days. This effort is a major story in itself. Almost 50 percent of the original personnel were ineligible for overseas deployment. Replacement pilots had to be trained on new aircraft and new standing operating procedures, and the original structure itself received major modification. For example, the

Mohawk attack aircraft had been eliminated² (six Mohawks were retained for reconnaissance and surveillance). A full brigade of the division were to be qualified paratroopers, the Little John battalion had been deleted, and the aviation group had been drastically modified. A chart of the 1st Cavalry Division as deployed is shown on page 59.

The division staged out of Mobile, Alabama, and Jacksonville, Florida, on the USS Boxer and three Military Sea Transportation Service ships. Approximately 80,000 man hours were required to process all the aircraft aboard the four vessels. The USS Boxer proceeded via the Suez Canal while the three smaller vessels traveled the Pacific.

An advance party landed in the Republic of Vietnam on 25 August 1965 and arrived at An Khe shortly thereafter. (Map 1) The men immediately began clearing the "golf course," which was to become the world's largest helipad. The 1st Cavalry Division was about to write a new chapter to its proud history.

2. The air assault division included 24 armed Mohawks in its table of organization and equipment. Nothing could have raised a brighter red flag in front of those proponents of complete Air Force control of all aspects of air support. An unbelievable amount of time and effort was devoted to the roles and missions aspect of the Mohawk during this period. General Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, remarked during the course of the air assault tests that he devoted more than 60 percent of his time in the joint arena to this one relatively small system. Indeed he felt that the whole future of the Army airmobile concept might be jeopardized by the Army's unwarranted concentration on hanging a few machine guns on a twin-turbine airplane. General Johnson described the Mohawk as the "barber pole of the air assault division." After being asked what he meant by this phrase, he replied that when one looks for a barber shop he finds it by looking for a barber pole; and one could find an air assault division in a theater by looking for the armed Mohawks.