General Westmoreland, Commander Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in his report on the war in Vietnam, stated:

The United States had already made a large commitment of airmobility assets to Vietnam in support of Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces. Now U. S. ground forces would test the airmobility concept for the first time in combat. Propinquity dictated that the first major combat unit of the U. S. Army to be deployed would be the airborne brigade stationed in Okinawa. On 5 May 1965 the 173d Airborne Brigade, comprised of two battalions of infantry and one of artillery, arrived from Okinawa to provide security for the major air base at Bien Hoa and the airfield at Vung Tau. It would not be long before this brigade would be committed to major offensive action.¹

Brigadier General Ellis W. Williamson, the commander of the 173d, had taken immediate action to prepare his troops for the peculiar environment in Vietnam and especially highlighted their training in counter-ambush. By 10 May 1965, he noted:

1. A Marine Expeditionary Brigade had arrived in Da Nang on 8 March with the primary mission of securing the large air base in the northern province.

Two days later in a note to the troops, General Williamson said:

During the month of June the 173d was joined by the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment. The Australians would be working directly with the Brigade for some months and would soon be joined by a field artillery battery from New Zealand.

On 28 June the 173d Airborne Brigade participated in the largest troop lift operation conducted in the Republic of South Vietnam up to that time. Over 144 Army aircraft, including 77 troop transport helicopters, lifted two battalions of the Vietnamese 2d Airborne Brigade and the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 503d Infantry deep into War Zone D. In all, nine battalions were involved: five infantry; one artillery; one support; a composite battalion of cavalry, armor, and engineers; and the Australian battalion. This was the first time any large-size force of friendly troops had operated in this area for more than a year. Many caches of weapons and rice were destroyed. Twenty-five Viet Cong were killed and fifty or more wounded. On D+2, the forces were extracted.

On 6 July the 173d returned to War Zone D and conducted one of its most successful operations since its arrival in Vietnam. In conjunction with the battalion of Australians and units of the 43d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment, multiple air assaults were made just north of the Song Dong Nai River. Some 1,494 helicopter sorties were flown in support of this operation. Fifty-six Viet Cong were killed by actual body count. Twenty-eight prisoners of war were taken and one hundred tons of rice plus literally tons of documents were captured.

One of the most valuable tools of a commander is the immediate review of a combat operation with his subordinate commanders

and staff. With the events fresh in mind, they discuss what went right and what went wrong-not for the historian, but rather to improve the next operation. In the earlier U. S. operations these critiques were particularly important, as is shown from the following excerpts of the meeting after the assault of the 173d into War Zone D.

In his critique of the operation, General Williamson said:

The 173d found that they had to go to unusual lengths to clear new landing zones for medical evacuation. The commanding officer of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry, told how one of his company commanders tried to hack out an emergency landing zone in the jungle. "They used over 100 pounds of C-4 explosive that they had with them, and they had a couple of axes and hacked away with their machetes. The C-4 took the bark off and made a few splinters, and that was about it. These trees were almost totally resistant to the charges."

The S-3 of the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment, noted one problem as he saw it in working with the helicopters. "I would like someone to make an assessment to what extent do we lose the initiative by the excessive use of helicopters. By the use of them, the enemy can determine where you are, and the strength you are in."

The Air Force liaison officer remarked:

Lieutenant Colonel Lee E. Surut, Commanding Officer of the 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, closed the critique on a wry note: "Gentlemen, we are rapidly approaching the time when the critiques will be as long as the exercises. Once again the artillery lent dignity to what would otherwise have been a vulgar brawl . . . The artillery fired 4,857 rounds of 105mm ammunition during the four-day exercise . . . The Artillery put a lot of bullets on the target and accounted for significant destruction and VC casualties."

The early experience of the 173d Airborne Brigade pointed out some of the advantages of attached airmobility. During its first three months in Vietnam the brigade was supported by the 145th Aviation Battalion. In September, a helicopter company was attached and collocated. Aviation support by attached aviation was so much better than support on a mission basis that the brigade staff was highly laudatory of the aviation company and the advantages of attachment.

A study of this relationship was made by the Combat Developments Command during this period. The study concluded:

The early operations of the 173d demonstrated the absolute necessity of "orchestrating" an air assault operation. As General Williamson had pointed out, an airmobile operation was no simple matter of moving troops from point "A" to point "B" if you really wanted to exploit the potential of the helicopter. It took training and time to integrate tactical air, helicopter gunships, field artillery, reconnaissance, and troop maneuver elements into a single swift operation.

The early operations of the 173d would not have been possible had not the helicopter assets been in place and trained before their arrival. During this time we were "robbing Peter to pay Paul" throughout our worldwide inventory. In Vietnam as U. S. troop strength grew, we had to reduce our helicopter support to Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces to give priority to the U. S. Army ground units. It would not be until the arrival of the 1st Cavalry Division that any significant number of organic helicopters would arrive with their parent unit.

On 20 July 1965 the U. S. Army Support Command, Vietnam was redesignated U. S. Army, Vietnam, and General Norton was designated Deputy Commanding General. This change was indicative of the growing presence of U. S. ground troops and the necessity for better command and control procedures. On 28 July, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced that our forces in Vietnam would be raised from 75,000 to 125,000 and that additional forces would be sent as requested. On 29 July, the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division arrived in Vietnam following a brigade of the 1st Infantry Division which had arrived a few days earlier. The Marine strength continued to grow in the I Corps Tactical Zone as well as the theater logistical base to support the U. S. buildup.

The problems involved in this buildup can be described by a short review of the deployment of the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division. During the period 6 July to 29 July 1965 the Brigade moved from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Vietnam. On 29 July through 21 August 1965 the Brigade manned a defensive perimeter in the Cam Ranh Bay area and began to establish a base camp. From 10 to 21 August the Brigade conducted operations southwest of Nha Trang and on 22 August, the Brigade moved north by sea and air with a mission to sweep clear the An Khe area of Binh Dinh Province to provide security for the arrival of the

1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). During this deployment and subsequent operations, the Brigade had reconfigured to a new Table of Organization and Equipment and conducted major training in airmobile operations. They found that many of the items that they had brought in country such as camouflage nets were completely extraneous and many things they had not brought, such as additional water trucks, were absolutely essential.

When the Brigade was alerted at Fort Campbell, there was no positive assurance this would be a permanent move or a temporary duty move, and personal problems of families, quarters, etc., placed an undue administrative burden on the unit. The advance party moved on two old C-124 aircraft which, because of mechanical and administrative difficulties, required seven days to close in Nha Trang. The main body of over 3,600 troops was shipped aboard the USNS General Leroy Eltinge which had a normal troop capacity of 2,200 men. The 21-day voyage was a miserable period plagued by plumbing, lighting, and ventilation problems.

The movement of the 1st Brigade, 101st, to secure the An Khe base area for the soon-to-arrive 1st Cavalry Division was entitled Operation HIGHLAND and spanned the period 22 August until 2 October. One battalion conducted an airmobile assault in conjunction with a battalion-size ground attack to open the An Khe Pass and to clear and secure Route 19 from Qui Nhon to An Khe. To secure the division base area, the Brigade conducted eight airmobile assaults and many large ground operations. A special task force was organized to secure convoy movement along Route 19. This task force established strong points along the critical terrain bordering the route from Qui Nhon to the An Khe Pass. Tactical air cover was provided for all convoys. During this period, enemy losses totaled 692 killed in action as opposed to the 1st Brigade losses of 21.

Meanwhile, the newly designated 1st Cavalry Division was feverishly preparing for deployment. The movement of over 400 aircraft, nearly 16,000 personnel, over 1,600 vehicles, and training for combat in just eight weeks was a momentous task.

The early model Chinooks needed 1,334 modifications for safety of flight and the Hueys nearly 2,000. New armored seats were installed in the UH-1D's and the aircraft were moved to two different staging areas at Brookley Air Force Base, Mobile, Alabama, and Mayport Naval Base near Jacksonville, Florida. The USS

Boxer and three Military Sea Transportation Service ships had been designated to move the division. All the Hueys were cocooned with "spraylat" and the other aircraft had separate preservative techniques applied. As mentioned earlier, a "crash effort" was required to process all the aircraft aboard the four ships. Since only the USS Boxer had adequate fire-fighting and servicing equipment aboard, Army equipment had to be acquired for shipment aboard other vessels to insure adequate fire protection and servicing prior to off-loading at destination.

One tends to forget the strategic mobility problems in moving such a force as the 1st Cavalry Division throughout the world and concentrates on the tactical mobility of the smaller units. This deployment was a non-tactical move and the Division did not land ready to fight. The following firsthand account by Colonel Stockton, who commanded the Air Cavalry Squadron, gives special insight into this problem:

The 1st Cavalry Division had dispatched by Air Force transport a 1,000 man advance party under the command of Brigadier General John M. Wright, Jr., which arrived in An Khe on 27 August. As mentioned earlier, security for the advance party was provided by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. September was spent in clearing away the semi-jungle area that was to become known as the "Golf Course."

When the ships with the main body arrived at Qui Nhon, the aircraft prepared for flight while on board the carriers. Only the Mohawks and two non-flyable Hueys were off-loaded by floating crane. The Chinooks quickly became the prime movers for troops and equipment between Qui Nhon and An Khe.

Although the Division did not completely reach An Khe until 3 October, it had assumed responsibility for its own security on 28 September, and elements of the division had already seen combat in support of the 1st Brigade of the 101st. In the first week of October, the 1st Cavalry was assigned a tactical area of responsibility which was essentially a private hunting domain in which the Division could operate by simply notifying any friendly forces that were in that area. This area soon grew to a zone approximately 150 by 150 miles. The 3d Brigade was given the populous coastal province of Binh Dinh, the 2d Brigade Kontum Province, and the 1st Brigade operated in the highland province of Pleiku which included the Chu Pong Mountains. The Cavalry Squadron was charged with a wide-sweeping reconnaissance mission throughout the entire area, but most particularly around the Special Forces camps at Pleime, Duc Co, Plei Djereng, Plei Murong, and Dak To that dotted the western highlands.

Major General Harry W. O. Kinnard recognized the vulnerability of the base camp at An Khe and consequently made it as small and compact as it could be so that it could be defended with a minimum number of forces. A 100 meter cleared perimeter completely encircled the camp with obstacles and surveillance devices. Artillery was positioned to develop quick fire concentrations on all likely enemy mortar sites and infantry patrols and ambushes were habitually employed out to enemy mortar range. One Air Cavalry troop was normally retained in the base camp area and aerial rocket artillery aircraft were kept on night strip alert to augment the fire of conventional artillery.

The establishment of the An Khe "hub of the wheel" for the

early 1st Cavalry operations was done for several reasons, not the least of which was the maintenance requirement.

It has often been said, with a certain amount of truth, that the Army refused to face up to the price that must be paid for airmobility. As a consequence, its organizations have usually been short of the necessary maintenance, supply, and security personnel. Part of this chronic shortage resulted from a long-standing battle between the "user" and the logisticians. Understandably since the early concept of an airmobile division, the tactical commander has wanted organic maintenance detachments down to the battalion level. This gives him the maximum responsiveness and a great deal of flexibility. From a logistician's viewpoint, such decentralization is a fragmentation of scarce skills and expensive special tools.

The tests of the 11th Air Assault Division included an extensive evaluation of what was known as the A-B-C maintenance concept. In this concept, the A-level was organic to the battalion and was designed to do all that repair which would return a helicopter to operable status within four hours. The B-level was organic to the division and could do all echelons of maintenance short of depot repair. The C-level provided that echelon of aircraft repair beyond the capability of the direct support levels.

While the 11th Air Assault tests conceded that the ABC system worked, the logisticians convinced the Department of the Army that it was impractical to field the 1st Cavalry Division in the time required using this maintenance concept. As a consequence, An Khe became a sophisticated fixed maintenance and supply depot which would inhibit tactical planning for some time to come.

By mid-October 1965, the North Vietnamese Army had begun its major operation in the Central Highlands. There is every reason to believe that it planned to cut South Vietnam in two at this time, for three North Vietnamese Army regiments had assembled in western Pleiku Province and adjacent Cambodia. On 19 October, the enemy opened his campaign with an attack on the Pleime Special Forces Camp twenty-five miles southwest of Pleiku. On 27 October, General Westmoreland directed General Kinnard to move his 1st Cavalry Division and seek out and destroy this enemy force consisting of the 32d, 33d, and 66th North Vietnamese Army Regiments. This became the month-long campaign known as The Battle of the IA Drang Valley.

Initially the 1st Cavalry Division reinforced the South Vietnamese Army in relieving the Pleime Camp, and the North Viet-

namese Army regiments broke contact and disappeared into the jungle. Little was known about the enemy's direction of movement except to speculate that they had gone west toward the Cambodian border. The 1st Brigade of the 1st Cavalry was given the mission of organizing a systematic search for the elusive enemy.

It was apparent that the Pleime Camp had been hit—and hit hard—by the enemy and it seemed inconceivable to the Air Cavalry Squadron that thousands of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers could completely disappear. On 1 November, Captain William P. Gillette, the Air Cavalry Squadron intelligence officer, spotted some unusual activity just eight kilometers west of the Pleime Camp and the Squadron was quick to capitalize on this information. Before the day was over, the Cavalry Squadron had committed most of its rifle and gunship platoons into the skirmish that developed. They killed 78 of the enemy and captured 57 prisoners, all of whom were regular North Vietnamese soldiers carrying identity cards issued in Hanoi. During the encounter the squadron lost five troopers killed and another seventeen wounded. It was evident that the Cavalry had uncovered a major enemy hos-

pital area since case upon case of penicillin, quinine, morphine, and other valuable drugs lay piled four feet high over an area of more than a hundred square meters. Three complete sets of surgical instruments were mixed in with the medicine.

In this first skirmish of the Ia Drang Valley campaign, the Cavalry troopers were initially taken back at the almost suicidal short ranges at which they came to grips with the enemy. The bulk of the enemy attack force was within less than twenty meters of their perimeter before it was discovered and the enemy's "bear hug" tactics made supporting fires extremely difficult to place safely. Emergency medical evacuation landing zones had to be literally hacked out of the jungle with hand axes. Infantry reinforcements arrived at the site too late to take full advantage of this enemy contact.

The next day Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles, the Assistant Division Commander, met with Colonel Stockton to plot the strategy for further exploitation of this contact. The best estimate was that the major enemy force had moved along the IA Drang Valley close to the base of the Chu Pong Mountains and the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry was given the mission of establishing an ambush in this area. A site was chosen called landing zone MARY, and the Cavalry Squadron fought its major battle in this area.

Landing zone MARY was unique in that it was the first time that the 1st Cavalry Division had mounted a successful night ambush and reinforced their attack with a night lift of an Infantry company. Also, they had developed their fire procedures to the point that armed helicopters were able to fire within fifty meters of the friendly troops during night operations.

By 4 November, the Cavalry Squadron had developed the battle to a point where it could be turned over to the infantry battalions. Over 150 enemy casualties had been accounted for with a loss of 4 U. S. soldiers killed and 25 wounded. The IA Drang Valley Campaign was now fully underway.

On 9 November the 1st Brigade was relieved by the 3d, commanded by Colonel Thomas W. Brown. The 3d Brigade was given the mission of continuing the search south and southeast of Pleime. Colonel Brown continued his search in the densely wooded area south of the IA Drang River at the base of the Chu Pong massif. He decided that the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry was in the best position to make the initial air assaults.

On 14 November the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore, began the pivotal operation of the IA Drang Campaign. He had chosen landing zone

X-RAY (Map 2) out of the possible landing zones as the best potential position for the initial air assault. The cavalry section had confirmed that landing zone X-RAY could take eight to ten UH-1D's at one time. No signs of enemy activity were detected. Two artillery batteries were in position to support the landing.

Preparatory fire began at 1017 hours precisely where required and was timed with the lead elements of the assault company. The aerial artillery came on the heels of the tube artillery fire and worked over the area for 30 seconds expending half their load, then went into a orbit nearby to be on call. The lift battalion gunships took up the fire and were immediately ahead of the troop trans-

port Hueys. The terrain was flat with scrub trees up to 100 feet high, thick elephant grass varying in height from one to five feet, and ant hills up to eight feet high. Along the western edge of the landing zone, the trees and grass were especially thick and extended through the jungles to the foothills of the Chu Pong Mountains. Company B made the initial assault.

The commander of Company B, Captain John D. Herren, secured the landing zone by having his 1st platoon dispatch its squads into different areas 50 to 100 meters off the landing zone to reconnoiter while he retained the balance of his company concealed near the center as an offensive striking force. The first prisoner, taken at 1120, stated that there were three battalions of the enemy on the mountain above the landing zone who were just waiting for an opportunity to attack. Company A commanded by Captain Ramon A. Nadal, II, followed Company B into the landing zone unopposed and the perimeter expanded.

At 1330, B Company reported that it had been heavily attacked by at least two companies and its 2d platoon was in danger of being surrounded and cut off. Then 60-mm and 81-mm mortar fire began falling in the landing zone and on Company B. Company C arrived and its commander, Captain Robert H. Edwards, was ordered to take up blocking positions to the south and southwest of the landing zone to protect it from being overrun from that direction. The company commanders, the forward observers, the forward air controller, and the artillery liaison officer were all having difficulty getting coordinated as to the location of the forward elements of the company. There was no well-defined terrain feature to help identify positions and the air was heavy with smoke and dust. Company B seemed to be in the worst position since it had one platoon separated from the rest of the company in the jungle and could not precisely pinpoint its location to bring in fire support. By midafternoon the battalion knew it was in a major battle and fighting for its very existence. The enemy was coining from all sides.

As the lead elements of D Company landed, the helicopters took numerous hits, but none was shot down. One radio operator was killed before lie could dismount from the helicopter and the door gunner and pilot were wounded. Colonel Moore stopped the other eight UH-1D's from landing by radio. Those who had landed from D Company immediately became engaged in the fire fight near A Company. The fighting became more intense. Colonel Moore decided to pull back A and B Companies under the cover of heavy supporting fire and smoke to the fringe of the landing zone and set up a tight defensive perimeter for the night. White

phosphorus artillery was brought in and caused a temporary lull in the enemy firing that enabled some of the friendly forces to retrieve their dead and wounded and regroup. Both A and B Companies had numerous wounded and killed in action, while C Company had taken a few casualties but was in good shape. Company D had hardly been hit. During the afternoon Colonel Moore asked for assistance. The only company immediately available was Company B, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, which landed in the landing zone by 1800. By 1900, the organization of the perimeter was completed. Units were tied in for the night and defensive artillery and mortar fires were registered.

A major problem that had developed throughout the day was the care and evacuation of the wounded. The battalion surgeon, medical supplies, and four aid station personnel had arrived at 1400 hours and, under heavy fire, they treated the wounded in the command post area. Colonel Moore had decided to restrict medical evacuation helicopters from coming in too frequently because most of the afternoon the landing zone was under fire. He had kept one small area big enough to land two helicopters open as his supply and evacuation link to the rear and intended to defend it at all costs. A system was arranged whereby every helicopter coming in with troops and supplies would have a specific load of wounded keyed to its departure.

Concerning his helicopter support, Colonel Moore stated:

By late afternoon it had become apparent that the battalion would need a night landing capability and Company A of the 229th Helicopter Battalion had anticipated the requirement. A pathfinder team arrived and cleared a fairly safe zone with engineer demoli-

tions and set up the necessary lights for night landings. This remarkable feat was accomplished under enemy observation and fire. By darkness at 1915 hours, a resupply of ammunition, rations, water, and medical supplies had been brought in even though smoke hung like a horizontal curtain over the entire area.

Early that night the wounded had all been evacuated and the dead had been collected in the command post area. Mortar and artillery fires were registered close to the perimeter and the battalion prepared for night attacks. Company B still had one platoon that was cut off and surrounded, but it was reported holding its position with good morale. Later it was learned that this platoon began and ended the night with eight killed in action, twelve wounded in action, and only seven men not hurt. They had lost their platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and weapons squad leader. The platoon received several attacks during the night by an estimated 50-man enemy force. All were beaten off by small arms fire and artillery concentrations. A tactical air strike was made under flareship illumination. This was the only illumination used all night since it exposed the men in the surrounding area. However, there was a fairly bright moon from 2315 hours onwards. When daylight broke, numerous enemy dead were seen in the surrounding area.

At brigade headquarters, Colonel Brown continued to assess the significance of the day's activities. He was pleased that the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had been able to hold its own against heavy odds, and with moderate casualties, but was convinced that the fight was not yet over. He radioed General Kinnard for another battalion, and was informed that the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, would begin arriving at brigade headquarters the following morning.

In the early morning hours savage close range fighting went on throughout the battalion perimeter. There was considerable hand-to-hand fighting. For example, the 1st Platoon leader of Company C was found killed with five dead enemy around him in and near his command post fox hole. Nearby, one trooper was found killed in action with his hands at the throat of a dead North Vietnamese Army soldier.

At approximately 0715 hours, the enemy attacked the sector of Company D, near where the mortars were emplaced. This put the perimeter under attack from two directions. Artillery, aerial rocket artillery, and Tactical Air were called in and delivered accurate and extremely effective fires. The aerial rocket artillery literally rained the perimeter with its rocket concentrations. Shortly, Colonel Moore radioed brigade headquarters informing

them of the situation and, in view of the heavy losses, requesting an additional reinforcing company. The request was approved, but the company was not brought in at that time due to heavy fire in the landing zone. The enemy fire was so heavy that movement toward or within the landing zone resulted in more friendly casualties. At 0755 all platoon positions threw a colored smoke grenade on order to define visually for Tac Air, aerial rocket artillery, and the artillery air observer the periphery of the perimeter. All fire support was brought in extremely close and a few rounds of artillery fell inside of the perimeter along with two napalm bombs. However, only two men were wounded from friendly fires. The troopers stood their ground and many individual acts of heroism were recorded. By 1000, the enemy attack had been defeated.

At approximately 1330, all companies in the perimeter screened out for 300 meters and policed the battlefield. The area was littered with dead enemy, weapons and equipment and there was massive evidence from the bloody trails, bandages, etc., that many other enemy had been dragged from the area. Some of the enemy dead were found literally stacked behind ant hills. Two prisoners were taken and evacuated.

Late in the afternoon of 14 November, the brigade commander had moved the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, into landing zone VICTOR. At approximately 0800 hours the following morning, it headed on foot for landing zone X-RAY. By noon, it had closed on the position. With this added strength, the Cavalry troopers were able to attack early in the afternoon and reached the surrounded platoon at 1510. The platoon still had some ammunition left and their morale was good. The wounded were evacuated, and all units were disposed and dug in for the night.

Although the enemy strongly probed their positions during the early hours of 16 November, the Cavalry troops held their positions. Flares were used continuously. At first light, orders were given for all men on the perimeter to spray the trees, the ant hills, and bushes forward of their positions for just over a minute to kill infiltrators and snipers. Immediately upon firing, a force of approximately 30 to 40 enemy exposed themselves forward of Company A of the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and began firing their weapons. Apparently the "mad minute" of fire had prematurely triggered a planned enemy attack. The tactic of spraying had accounted for six enemy dead. Several dropped out of the trees in the surrounding areas. The men liked this particular tactic not only for the effect it had on the enemy but for the relief of tension that had been built tip throughout the night. By 0930 hours, the first elements

of the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, began arriving at landing zone X-RAY and they closed by-noon. Colonel Moore ordered one final sweep of the area before he turned over control of landing zone X-RAY to the new troopers. His troops were extracted by UH-1D's early in the afternoon without enemy opposition. Discipline was excellent, and the helicopters were only on the ground a few seconds because the aircraft loads had been pre-spotted. By 1830 hours all elements had closed into Camp Holloway, in the vicinity of Pleiku.

Colonel Moore, who was to receive his eagles in just seven days and thus be promoted away from his command, had every reason to be proud of the performance of his battalion. Some 634 enemy had been killed by actual body count and six had been captured. Seventy-nine troopers had been killed and 121 wounded. None were missing. The enemy had lost many small arms, heavy machine guns, and other equipment, and the individual U. S. soldier had acquitted himself well in the hardest kind of hand-to-hand battle.

In his after action report, Colonel Moore noted that aerial rocket artillery had been extremely effective. His commanders had confidence in bringing such fires extremely close to their own positions. He also had noted that tube artillery, aerial rocket artillery, and tactical air can be used at the same time without seriously downgrading the effectiveness of the fire or endangering the aircraft. The aerial rocket artillery and Tactical Air flew perpendicular to the artillery gun-target line in those cases when they were making a simultaneous attack on the same target areas. This technique was possible by close teamwork between the forward air controller and the artillery liaison officer.

As mentioned earlier, casualties had been a critical problem and attempts to help the wounded had caused additional casualties in attempting to get them out. Colonel Moore said, "I lost many leaders killed and wounded while recovering casualties. Wounded must be pulled back to some type of covered position and then treated. Troops must not get so concerned with casualties that they forget the enemy and their mission. Attempting to carry a man out requires up to four men as bearers which can hurt a unit at a critical time."

The 1st Cavalry troopers had found that the enemy was well trained, aggressive, and was equipped with a preponderance of automatic weapons with plenty of ammunition. He was an expert at camouflage and sought to close in strength to render U. S. fire support less effective and to force us to fight on his terms. He fought

to the death. When wounded, he continued fighting and had to be approached with extreme care. Many friendly troops were shot by wounded North Vietnamese Army soldiers. He also appeared fanatic in his extreme efforts to recover bodies of his dead and wounded and their equipment.

In the after action report, high praise was given to the pathfinders and their control of the "hot" landing zone. Until they had arrived, every incoming aircraft had to be guided in and out by the battalion commander on the battalion command net. The pathfinders took over this responsibility and made possible the invaluable night supply and evacuation missions. The fact that pathfinders were available and trained as part of the 1st Cavalry Division's organization was testimony to the soundness of its early doctrine.²

The action of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was one of a series of major actions fought by the 1st Cavalry Division in this, its first major campaign in Vietnam. The 3d Brigade continued its systematic search and destroy pattern and defeated each of the three enemy regiments in turn. All together, the 1st Cavalry Division and Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops killed an estimated 1800 North Vietnamese troops.

The battle lasted 35 days, and on 26 November 1965, the 1st Cavalry Division had completed its mission of pursuit and destruction. The statistics of the aviation units involved, to a large extent, tell the story of how the mission was accomplished.

During the 35 days of the campaign, the aircraft delivered 5,048 tons of cargo from the wholesale terminals to the hands of the troops in the field. In addition, they transported 8,216 tons into Pleiku from various depots (primarily Qui Nhon and Nha Trang). Whole infantry battalions and artillery batteries were

2. The U. S. Army almost lost its "pathfinder" role completely after World War II. In the reorganization of the Service roles and missions, it was determined that the pathfinders for the joint airborne assaults should be Air Force personnel since the Air Force insisted its Combat Control Team should be inserted first and control all subsequent drops. However, in 1955, when I had the Airborne-Army Aviation Department at Fort Benning it became obvious that the Army should have its own pathfinder capability for the terminal control of the Army's organic helicopters. I received permission to reactivate Army training in these skills and Lieutenant Colonel John E. Stannard wrote the manual. Fundamental to this decision was a determination of where Army pathfinders would be assigned. We tried to incorporate the pathfinder skills into each infantry battalion, but this solution was disapproved by Continental Army Command. The pathfinder almost became a man-without-a-country until the formation of the 11th Air Assault Division, where they were made part of the Aviation Group. As a result, only the 1st Cavalry had organic, trained pathfinders when required. Our other units in Vietnam would find many occasions when they needed them—desperately.

moved by air, and approximately 2,700 refugees were moved to safety. In all this flying, 59 aircraft were hit by enemy fire-three while on the ground-and only four were shot down; of these four, three were recovered.

General Westmoreland stated, "The ability of the Americans to meet and defeat the best troops the enemy could put on the field of battle was once more demonstrated beyond any possible doubt, as was the validity of the Army's airmobile concept."

It has been well documented that by early 1965 the enemy had reinforced his units in Vietnam to the point of being able to move almost at will against major population areas. In fact, it looked as if the North Vietnamese Army were about to cut the country in two, right across the middle. It is also well known that the commitment of U. S. Forces stemmed the tide and turned it in the other direction. The major battles that took place were in the highlands where the 1st Cavalry answered the challenge of a powerful North Vietnamese Army division that was attempting to overrun the Special Forces camp at Pleime. This operation was in essence the watershed line; from that time on, the joint U. S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam operations throughout the country regained the initiative and began to drive back the major enemy forces in an all-out counteroffensive.

In 1965 there were just not enough airmobility assets to go around. Partly by design and partly by default, most of the airmobile assets ended up in support of U. S. forces, to the detriment of overall Army of the Republic of Vietnam operations. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam units in general reverted to a mission of near-static ground operations close to the populated areas. The U. S. forces choppered into the jungles to fight the main force North Vietnamese Army units. During this phase, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces actually had less helicopters available to them than in the period before the buildup.

The first operations of the 1st Cavalry Division brought out many points which confirmed the basic conclusions of those who had worked with the airmobile concept over the years. Airmobility put a new dimension into ground warfare, but it did not change the nature of warfare itself and it certainly did not negate those basic rules of survival so important to the individual soldier.

The airmobile trooper, like the paratrooper before him, must be basically a professional infantryman, artilleryman, and so forth.

The advent of the helicopter does not permit him to neglect his individual weapon or other battlefield disciplines which have been essential to survival since recorded history. Airmobility, if anything, is particularly unforgiving of carelessness or sloppiness. The after action reports of airmobile units tend to repeat lessons learned in Korea and World War II on such things as ambushes, mines, and booby traps, rather than highlight new helicopter techniques. Indeed, some of the operations fought by the 1st Cavalry hardly make mention of their airmobility.

These records indicate in a way that these units took airmobility for granted and only mentioned aircraft technology when there was a need for improvement-just as jeeps and 3/4 tons were seldom mentioned in dispatches of earlier battles. This is an indication that the helicopter was doing its job so well and so routinely that it was not considered worthy of mention.

This was not unique to the 1st Cavalry operations alone, for in writing this study, I was struck by the similarity of other units who used attached airmobile assets in a matter-of-fact attitude. To a large degree, these units considered themselves as much airmobile as the 1st Cavalry Division although they were not officially designated as such. This is a great credit to those separate airmobile companies and battalions who supported these units. Obviously they became so identified with the 173d, the 101st, and so forth, that they functioned with almost the same continuity as those helicopter units which were organic to the 1st Cavalry Division. This takes away nothing from the individual helicopter crew or the unit that they supported; but, there is a wealth of examples which demonstrated that airmobile expertise which had been carefully developed over a period of months suddenly was downgraded by the shifting of attachments. Every commander instinctively knew that he could do certain things with "his" Hueys that he couldn't quite do with "somebody else's."

By the end of 1965, it had become apparent that the "business-as-usual" approach to the aviation training base and helicopter production lines soon would create a major deficit in the Army's inventory of pilots and aircraft. Belated recognition of this fact produced an almost unmanageable surge in the pilot training program and a strain on every helicopter manufacturer's capacity, especially Bell. It would be almost two years before the aviation assets approached the Vietnam aviation requirements. Many Army aviators would find themselves faced with repetitive tours in Vietnam and many operations in Vietnam would be structured around the limitation of available helicopters rather than the more basic

consideration of the enemy threat. Indeed, the management of aviation assets would soon become a major preoccupation of every senior commander.