The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) launched the new year on 1 January 1966 with a smoothly executed move into the Mekong Delta. This was the first time an American ground unit had operated in the notorious "Plain of Reeds."

The Brigade had moved from Hau Nghia Province into the Delta by land and air. The air elements, consisting of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry; the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry; the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment; and "C" Battery, 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, came into Bao Trai airstrip.¹ By 1425 the 1st Battalion of the 503d had the honor of being the first American force to make an air assault west of the Oriental River. This assault, which was preceded by an effective landing zone preparation by Tactical Air, artillery, and armed helicopters, only experienced light opposition which was quickly brushed aside. The Australian battalion established themselves by air assault on the east side of the Oriental River which effectively cut this enemy supply route.

As previously scheduled, the 2d Battalion of the 503d remained at the brigade forward base until the following morning when they conducted a heliborne assault into landing zone WINE. This landing zone was approximately five kilometers south of the Australian position and also on the east side of the river. Here they met very strong enemy resistance and the battalion fought a bitter and fiercely-conducted battle throughout the day against a dug-in, well-concealed, battalion-size Viet Cong force. Intense artillery fire,

1. The 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment was the first U.S. unit to jump in combat during World War II (Operation TORCH in Africa). As executive officer, I helped organize the 2d Battalion and later activated, trained and led the 3d Battalion of the 503d which made the first combat jump in the Pacific. As a coincidental footnote to history, when we made that jump into the Markham Valley of New Guinea, our total artillery support was a battery of "25- pounders" of the Royal Australian Artillery.

helicopter gunship fire, and Tactical Air pounded the Viet Cong positions continuously. Late in the afternoon a strong coordinated attack behind a wall of artillery fire drove the Viet Cong from his positions. He left III dead behind along with considerable equipment.

The Brigade attempted to employ the armored elements, Company D, 16th Armor and the Prince of Wales Light Horse (Australian armored personnel carriers), with the infantry battalions but found that the carriers had extreme difficulty in traversing the marshy rice paddies. They were returned to the Brigade base area and later were successfully employed on security missions. On D+2, the Australian battalion conducted search patrols south of their position and eventually linked up with the 2d Battalion of the 503d on the east bank of the Oriental River. Operations proceeded through D+4 with only light contact being made and the enemy obviously making every effort to remain hidden.

On D+5, the 173d Brigade demonstrated its growing sophistication in airmobile techniques. On this day, three Eagle Flights, one consisting of 144 men, the others 72 each, orbited the target area just beyond visual range. When the commander was ready to move the force in, he announced the command of execution "Skyhook," which was the signal for all supporting actions to include firing to begin a countdown. From this prearranged signal with minimum radio communications, all supporting actions were time-sequenced to place the landing force on the landing zone immediately after the coordinated delivery of supporting fires and a last minute reconnaissance. After the first flight landed, the second was in orbit position until it was apparent that no reinforcement was needed in the first landing zone. The "Skyhook" procedure was then reinitiated and the second flight landed on another nearby landing zone. Following the same procedure, a flight was put in on yet a third landing zone. By this maneuver, three stripped down companies had covered an area with reconnaissance by fire that normally would have taken a battalion or more, using previous formations.

Operation MARAUDER was terminated on D+7, 8 January 1966, after decimating the 267th Viet Cong Battalion and the headquarters of the Viet Cong 506th Battalion. The 173d Airborne Brigade, as the first American unit to operate in the Mekong Delta, demonstrated its ability to swiftly co-ordinate the tactical air, helicopter gunships, artillery, and troop maneuvers. They had ranged over a very large area but always had their artillery in position by Chinook movement. Armor had been used successfully when it was given

proper terrain. Many procedures had now become standard to the point where complex operations, that would have required detailed rehearsal and briefings, could be done as a matter of routine.

Immediately following this operation, the 173d Airborne began Operation CRIMP in a drive through the Ho Bo Woods region in Binh Duong Province in an attempt to destroy the politico-military headquarters of the Viet Cong Military Region 4. After six days of tedious fighting through bunkers and tunnels, the mission was accomplished and the headquarters was found and destroyed. An enormous quantity of enemy documents and weapons were captured. The brigade commander, General Williamson, made special mention after this action of the role played by his support battalion. "The Support Battalion makes the 173d a truly separate brigade. Its performance has been exceptionally fine and represents a major contribution to our combat power by standing behind the infantry and those who support the infantry with supplies, transportation, maintenance and medical support." The Brigade was supported throughout these operations by the 145th Aviation Battalion (Reinforced). This battalion, seldom mentioned by name, had become almost completely identified with the 173d Brigade total force.

Even the most enthusiastic protagonist of the airmobility concept would readily admit that the introduction of hundreds of complex helicopters to a combat environment brought, along with its advantages, many unavoidable headaches, not the least of which was the maintenance requirement. In 1966 the helicopter was still in its adolescence from a technical standpoint. The yet unreached goal of one hour of maintenance per hour of flight was far in the future. In reality, even the simplest machine required approximately ten hours of maintenance per hour of flight. The fact that we were willing to pay that price was mute evidence of the intrinsic worth of airmobility.

The story of airmobility must include the fantastic individual efforts of crew chiefs and mechanics who worked practically every night, all night, to enable the helicopters to fight the following day. With the geometric increase in aircraft during the U. S. Forces buildup, it is important to take a brief look at the aircraft maintenance structure.

A milestone in aviation maintenance occurred with the formal approval of the organization of the 34th General Support Group by U. S. Army, Pacific General Order Number 6, dated 17 Janu-

ary 1966. This approval authorized a strength of 145 personnel for the Headquarters and Headquarters Company which, at that time, actually had a strength of only two officers and five enlisted men. This formal approval was the culmination of many earlier decisions on the best alternative solution to the (growing aviation maintenance problem in Vietnam.

In July 1965 Army aircraft maintenance in Vietnam was provided by three direct support companies and one general support company. Aviation supply was managed by a special Aviation Supply Point in Saigon. All of these units were part of the 12th Aviation Group (Provisional) which in turn reported to the U. S. Army Support Command. At this time in 1965, about 660 Army aircraft were in Vietnam; but, plans were already firm to expand this aircraft population to over 2,000 by early 1966. General Norton, then Commanding General of U. S. Army Support Command, formed an ad hoc committee to study possible alternatives for dealing with this growing maintenance requirement. General Norton's objectives were to provide one-stop maintenance and supply support to Army aircraft (including airframe, engine, avionics and armament); and, to provide an organization that had the ability to grow with the requirement.

At that time, three organizational alternatives were possible. First, the aircraft maintenance and supply units could be integrated into the 1st Aviation Brigade structure. Second, these units could be integrated into the 1st Logistical Command structure. Third, a special separate command organization could be formed to control all non-divisional aircraft maintenance and supply units. This group could be assigned to either the 1st Aviation Brigade, the 1st Logistical Command, or directly under U. S. Army Vietnam Headquarters as a separate major command.

Major Rudolph D. Descoteau and Major Charles L. Smith, as members of the ad hoc committee, developed matrices which considered all alternatives including span of control, flexibility, and responsiveness. This committee also solicited opinion of their potential customers to include the 1st Cavalry Division. On 27 August 1965 the ad hoc committee submitted their new plan of the organization of aircraft maintenance and supply. This plan marked the conception of the 34th General Support Group though it was yet unnamed. A separate command organization to provide the aircraft maintenance and supply support seemed to offer the best solution. With this organizational structure the requirements to provide one-stop maintenance and supply support could be more easily satisfied. It was realized that certain duplication in their

requisitioning systems would occur in common items, but the resultant responsive support warranted this approach. The next problem was to determine where the group should be placed in the overall command structure. Assignment to the Aviation Brigade would place it under the control of the operator for the highest aircraft density. However, this would reduce the probability of equitable support to divisional units and non-divisional-non-Aviation Brigade units such as signal and engineers. The assignment of the group to the 1st Logistical Command had the major advantage of concentrating logistical support under a single commander who would answer to the U. S. Army, Vietnam, G-4. The last alternative, having the group respond directly to U. S. Army, Vietnam, with no intervening layer, seemed in line with the critical nature of aviation assets.

The above alternatives were presented to General Norton and his staff by the ad hoc committee in September 1965 with a recommendation to adopt the separate group structure and have it report directly to U. S. Army, Vietnam. General Norton accepted the recommendation and directed implementation of the plan.

Recommendations for a management structure to provide aircraft support from a single-point, in-theater, aircraft repair parts inventory control center evolved into the Aviation Material Management Center concept. The Aviation Material Management Center Tables of distributions and allowances and the Combat Development Command Transportation Agency's proposed Table of Organization and Equipment for the General Support Group were forwarded for approval. U. S. Army Vietnam directed formation of a provisional group headquarters in November 1965. Lieutenant Colonel Ellis became the Group's commander and, using the assets of the old U. S. Army Support Command Aviation Detachment and the Aviation Supply Point, formed a skeleton staff. Personnel and equipment resource requirements were levied on the 14th and 765th Transportation Battalions to provide a minimal functional base.

The formal approval authorized the proper staffing of the headquarters but gave no relief in the critical day-to-day management requirements to expand the old Army Supply Point and establish a separate inventory control center to support the fast-growing aircraft fleet. The Supply Division of Group Headquarters performed this function until more help arrived. The 241st Transportation Company (Depot) arrived in February 1966, giving the Aviation Material Management Center the capability of operating two depots. In April the 58th Transportation Battalion arrived

and assumed operational control of Aviation Material Management Center.

On 12 April 1966 the most unusual Army aviation maintenance battalion of the 34th General Support Group steamed into Cam Ranh Bay. The unit was the 1st Transportation Corps Battalion (Depot) (Seaborne), the only Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility in the Army. The idea for this floating facility originated during military operations in the Pacific Theater during World War II, when combat areas switched rapidly from island to island and sudden changes in the combat zones made ground aircraft maintenance facilities almost useless.

As early as 1962 the floating aircraft maintenance facility concept was being developed for use in the Vietnam combat zone, but it was not until 1965 that the Navy seaplane tender USS Albermarle was actually selected for conversion to this facility. On March 27, 1965 it was rechristened the USNS Corpus Christi Bay. An energetic Army aviator, Colonel John Sullivan, scurried from the Pentagon to the shipyard to the Aviation Materiel Command to consolidate the many facets of this unusual undertaking. The Army, which had been accused by the Air Force of beginning another "Air Corps" now was getting strange looks from the Navy with its attempts to get its own "aircraft carrier."

When the red tape had been cut (lengthwise), the ship was modified to carry approximately 370 Army maintenance personnel and supporting technicians and 130 civilian maritime crewmen to operate the ship. Thirty-seven different production and support services were established aboard the ship enabling the facility to perform all maintenance functions of a depot level repair facility, including overhauling and rebuilding aircraft components. One of the most remarkable innovations was a technical data library on board which contained a complete file of 180,000 engineer drawings on film of aircraft systems, components, and special tools. In its library they had 785,000 images that could be broadcast throughout strategic areas on a closed circuit TV. In a sense, the ship represented an extension of the large aircraft maintenance facility at Corpus Christi, Texas, directly to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

When the Corpus Christi Bay first arrived at Cam Ranh Bay, extensive security precautions were taken to protect the ship from enemy action. The most serious threat was envisioned to be sabo-

tage and guards periodically threw concussion grenades over the sides to discourage enemy underwater swimmers. A scuba team periodically checked the hull. On 21 September 1966 the Corpus Christi Bay moved out of Cam Ranh Bay and sailed to the harbor at Qui Nhon to be near the 1st Cavalry, the unit it primarily supported.

While the Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility was a useful and unique addition to the U. S. Army's helicopter support capability, the more important, if less dramatic, support was performed in the open rice paddies and jungle clearings. There the maintenance personnel lived in constant danger, with practically none of the amenities, and performed daily, casual miracles on the complex aircraft. Never sure when the necessary bright lights would become an aiming point, they used the knowledge, gleaned from Fort Rucker and Fort Eustis classrooms under the most primitive conditions. As one supervisor gruffly understated, "They done good!"

During the first half of January 1966 the 1st Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division conducted Operation MATADOR to find and destroy the enemy in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. During this operation, the 1st Cavalry saw the enemy flee across the border into Cambodia, confirming that the enemy had well-developed sanctuaries and base camps inside that country.

After Operation MATADOR, the 1st Cavalry Division shifted its weight toward Binh Dinh Province. Some of its forces had been committed into this area soon after its arrival in Vietnam in the summer of 1965, but the major effort in the Ia Drang Valley occupied most of the 1st Cavalry's attention throughout 1965.

The heavily populated rice plains in this area had a population of nearly half a million people of which at least 200,000 or more were still under the domination of the Viet Cong infrastructure. The South Vietnamese Government was attempting to extend its control north from Qui Nhon, along National Highway One, through the rich plains area up to Tam Quan in northeastern Binh Dinh. In this effort, the 22d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division was being assisted by the Capitol Republic of Korea Infantry Division based near Qui Nhon. Only the southern part of the area was truly under government control.

Beyond the northern border of the Phu My District, and as far as the edge of the abrupt mountain range which walled off the plains on the north and west, there were only isolated islands of

refugees. The rest of the rice bowl belonged to the enemy and was presided over by the 3d North Vietnam Army Division. Its three regiments-the 2d, the 18th, and the 22d-operated from mobile base camps hidden in the mountains. From there they sent small forces throughout the lowlands to terrorize the farmers, manipulate the cycle of rice growing and harvesting, and generally controlled the lives of the people of Binh Dinh.

The 1st Cavalry's initial major operation in this area was called MASHER in its first phase, and WHITE WING in its second, third, and fourth phases. The fighting covered a full circle around Bong Son. The 1st Cavalry Division, in close coordination with the 22d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division, began with air assaults into the Cay Giep Mountains, then moved to the Bong Son Plains, the An Lao Valley, the Kim Son Valley, and finally back to the Cay Giep Mountains. As a result of MASHER-WHITE WING, the airmobile division and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam infantry forced the North Vietnamese Army regulars out of the area and temporarily broke their hold on the population. As it turned out, the 1st Cavalry would find itself preoccupied in this area on and off for a long time to come.

In the after action report of the 3d Brigade when it concluded Operation MASHER—WHITE WING on 17 February, they were able to report that 893 enemy had been killed by actual body count. A large quantity of equipment and small arms had been captured along with 24,000 rounds of ammunition. Friendly losses were 82 killed in action and 318 wounded.

The Brigade had been supported throughout this operation by the 133d Assault Support Helicopter Company with 16 Chinooks. The CH-47 Chinook had proved essential in moving artillery and resupplying the Brigade with ammunition and supplies. Night resupply was often required. On 28 January seven Chinooks made an emergency resupply mission during weather conditions consisting of extremely low ceilings and poor visibility, and six of the seven committed helicopters were hit by enemy ground fire. The company commander, Major Taylor D. Johnson, was killed while attempting to recover a downed OH-13 scout helicopter. Despite the weather and the enemy fire, the 16 Chinooks assigned to this company during the period 1 January through 31 January flew 526 hours transferring 3,212 passengers and over 1600 tons of cargo.

Lieutenant Colonel Max A. Clark, the commanding officer of the parent organization for this company, the 228th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion, made special note of the difficulty in supporting Chinook operations so far away from the An Khe base

with the current shortage of pilots and maintenance personnel. It took a major effort of his entire battalion to maintain an availability rate of 58 percent.

The story of airmobility is essentially one of men and machines. If the Huey helicopter became the cornerstone of airmobility, then the Chinook must be considered one of the principal building blocks.

Late in 1956 the Department of the Army announced plans to replace the H-37 helicopter, which was powered by piston-driven engines, with a new, turbine-powered aircraft. A design competition was held and, in September 1958, a joint Army-Air Force source selection board recommended that the Army procure the Boeing Vertol medium transport helicopter. However, the necessary funds to proceed with full-scale development were not available and the Army vacillated in its design requirements. There were those in the Army who felt that this new helicopter should be a light tactical transport aimed at the mission of the old H-21's and H-34's and, consequently, sized for approximately fifteen troops. Another faction believed that the new transport should be much larger to serve as an artillery prime mover and have minimum interior dimensions compatible with the Pershing Missile system. This "sizing" problem was a critical decision.

The first Vertol prototype, called the YHC-1A, was tested by the Army to derive engineering and operational data. Three aircraft were built with a maximum troop capacity of twenty. This model eventually became Vertol's commercial 107 and the Marine Sea Knight. However, the YHC-1A was considered by most of the Army users to be too heavy for the assault role and too light for the transport role. The decision was made to procure a heavier transport helicopter and at the same time upgrade the Huey as a tactical troop transport. This decision was to determine the pattern of airmobile operations for the next decade. As a consequence, the Army concept of air assault operations differed from the Marines because, among many reasons, the very nature of the equipment demanded different methods of employment.

The "sizing" of the Chinook was directly related to the growth of the Huey and the Army's tacticians' insistance that initial air assaults be built around the squad. There was a critical stage in the Huey program when the technicians insisted that we should not go beyond the UH-1B model with Bell; that there should be

a new tactical transport "between" the Huey and medium transport helicopter. Major General von Kann and I fought a rear-guard action in a Pentagon battle to keep the Huey program viable. When it was decided to go to the UH-1D (after an awkward pause on the original "C" design), the proper Chinook size became apparent. By resolutely pushing for the Huey and the Chinook, the Army accelerated its airmobility program by years.

The Army finally settled on the larger Chinook as its standard medium transport helicopter and as of February 1966, 161 aircraft had been delivered to the Army. The 1st Cavalry Division had brought their organic Chinook battalion with them when they arrived in 1965 and a separate aviation medium helicopter company, the 147th, had arrived in Vietnam on 29 November 1965. This latter company was initially placed in direct support of the 1st U. S. Infantry Division.

The most spectacular mission in Vietnam for the Chinook was the placing of artillery batteries in perilous mountain positions that were inaccessible by any other means, and then keeping them resupplied with large quantities of ammunition. The 1st Cavalry Division found that its Chinooks were limited to 7,000 pounds pay load when operating in the mountains, but could carry an additional 1,000 pounds when operating near the coast. The early Chinook design was limited by its rotor system which did not permit full use of the installed power, and the users were anxious for an improved version which would upgrade this system.

As with any new piece of equipment, the Chinook presented a major problem of "customer education." Commanders, pilots and crew chiefs had to be constantly alert that eager soldiers did not overload the temptingly large cargo compartment. I feel quite confident that Hannibal had the same problem with his elephants. It would be some time before the using troops would be experts at sling loads and educated in such minor details as removing the gunner's sight from the artillery pieces. The Chinook soon proved to be such an invaluable aircraft for artillery movement and heavy logistics that it was seldom used as an assault troop carrier. The early decision to move to this size helicopter proved to be indisputably sound.

The origins of many of the major operations in Vietnam can be traced to some minor enemy contact which was quickly exploited by airmobile forces. Often this was the only way the elusive enemy

could be forced to fight. Operation CRAZY HORSE is a good example of the aggressiveness and determination of our forces in their search for the enemy. And it is appropriate that we examine the actions of the squad and platoon to understand how it came about.

The 1st Cavalry Division was finishing Operation DAVY CROCKETT on 15 May 1966 when a Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) patrol from the Vinh Thanh CIDG Camp, working the mountain valley immediately to the east, ambushed an enemy force and captured a mortar sight, 120-mm firing tables and a gunner's quadrant, plus some sketches of the CIDG camp and the hamlets in the valley. One company of the 1st Cavalry air assaulted into the hills east of the CIDG camp at 1000 hours on the 16th, to search out the area.

At 1100 hours on the 16th, Company B, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 8th Cavalry, commanded by Captain John D. Coleman, made a combat assault into what then was a one-ship landing zone named HEREFORD, a small patch of elephant grass about halfway tip the side of the largest mountain east of the CIDG camp. Besides the usual forward observation party from the supporting artillery (an airmobile battery was landed adjacent to the camp), a Special Forces intelligence sergeant, his CIDG counterpart, and an interpreter moved with the company.

After a hard climb to the ridgeline of the mountain, marked only by one pungi stake and two heat exhaustion casualties, the company began moving eastward along the razorback. At approximately 1400 hours, after having just crossed a slight rise in terrain, the lead platoon (the Third) spotted what appeared to be a single Viet Cong and opened fire. The fire was immediately returned in volume from prepared positions to the east. The platoon leader radioed Captain Coleman that he had encountered stiff opposition and was ordering a squad to begin a maneuver around to his left.

This flanking action by the squad met with an immediate and violent counter-attack by an estimated enemy platoon. The squad members fought gallantly but soon were overrun. All but one man was killed. The sole survivor, badly wounded, wisely feigned death and later escaped.

The volume and din of enemy fire to the immediate front of the Third Platoon intensified to the point that communications became almost impossible. Lieutenant Heaney continued to try to gain the initiative in his sector, but each move cost him casualties

and failed to diminish the enemy fire. Then the enemy began thrusting at the flanks of the company column.

One enemy automatic rifleman penetrated to within 15 feet of the company command post, located immediately behind the Third Platoon, killing the forward observer's radio operator and wounding two others of the group before a grenade from a rifleman of the Second Platoon dispatched him.

Coleman deployed the Second Platoon to both flanks of the company, linking with the now recoiling elements of the Third. One squad, moving to the right, ran into a hail of automatic weapons fire and took several casualties. The squad counterattacked twice trying to reach its dead, but was beaten back into a position that eventually became part of the company's perimeter.

At about this time (1420), the weather closed in and a torrential downpour drenched the battlefield. The 200-foot high jungle canopy admitted limited light at best, and with the storm, only an eerie twilight penetrated to the jungle floor. The deteriorating weather also precluded the airlanding of any immediate reinforcements for the company. The number of casualties taken by the company, plus the violence of the enemy assaults, led Coleman to decide to abandon efforts to regain the offensive, and concentrate on forming a defensible position on the small patch of high ground the company held.

The First Platoon, next in column, was deployed to the right and rear, assuming control of the one squad of the Second. The Weapons Platoon was assigned to fill the remaining gap. The Weapons Platoon, fighting as riflemen, had barely closed into the perimeter and established some semblance of fighting positions across the trail leading into the position, when the enemy launched a determined attack from the west. It was beaten off, but it served notice to the company that it was cut off and facing an enemy force of much greater strength. Moreover, the enemy dead within the perimeter were clad in khaki uniforms and had the helmet normally associated with North Vietnamese regulars or Viet Cong main force units.

By 1630 hours, Bravo had tightened its perimeter and conducted two probes to the east to recover wounded and dead. The wounded were collected at a central location in the perimeter and the unit medics consolidated to treat them.

The enemy forces also recognized that it had isolated the company and began pressing attacks at various portions of the perimeter, preceding each with a heavy concentration of rockets and grenade launcher fire. Each attack was driven off, but at a cost

in dead and wounded that was beginning to sap the vitality of the company.

The heavy rains continued unabated during the early evening Because of the steep terrain tube artillery was unable to place their volleys near enough to the perimeter to be effective in the close-in defense fights. Under the severe weather conditions, the aerial rocket artillery, the usual savior of an isolated airmobile element, could not be expected to function. However, two birds from the 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery (the battalion commander and his XO volunteered for the mission) felt their way up the side of the mountain and, guided by radio, pressed home salvo after salvo of rockets, some within a few feet of the company's perimeter. One last volley, in conjunction with a violent exchange of small arms and automatic weapons fire, ended the enemy threat for the night. The attacks diminished in strength and intensity and by 2000 hours, all contact was broken.

With more than 40 wounded men, along with nearly 20 killed, Coleman had little choice but to remain in position and await reinforcements which had been landed at landing zone HEREFORD during a brief period when the weather broke. The men of Bravo used the respite to continue digging in, and the medics, three of them now badly wounded, worked unceasingly to give aid and comfort to the wounded.

Even though the company was badly hurt, and the men were well aware of their danger the unit maintained its fighting spirit. Not one trooper suggested that the unit pull out. Many indicated their willingness to stand and die on that piece of ground.

At a few minutes after 2200 hours, Bravo with less than 45 effectives actually manning the perimeter was reinforced by some 130 men of Company A, 1st Battalion (Airborne) , 12th Cavalry. Alfa, commanded by Captain John W. ("Jackie") Cummings, had air assaulted into landing zone HEREFORD and marched without opposition to the perimeter.

To facilitate relief in the pitch blackness, elements of the relieving company were fed into the line and integrated into overall defense. In many cases, members of Bravo Company gave up entirely or shared their hard dug holes with members of the fresh unit.

On 17 May, at 0615 hours, Bravo pulled in its listening posts, which had been stationed some 20-25 meters outside the perimeter, and the two companies initiated a "mad minute" of fire-a systematic spraying of trees and bushes in front of the positions. This firing touched off an immediate enemy reaction, and he launced [sic]

a violent attack at all sectors of the perimeter, covering his assaults with an intense barrage of grenade and rocket launcher projectiles. The intensity and violence of the incoming fire indicated an assault by at least a battalion-sized unit.

Both companies fought bravely side-by-side for nearly two hours. Enemy riflemen came within a few feet of foxhole positions before being killed, and the ammunition in the perimeter began running alarmingly low. The approach of another relief company—Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry—moving up from HEREFORD, apparently caused the enemy to break contact. As the enemy riflemen faded back into the jungle, the men in the perimeter already had fixed bayonets and had loaded their last magazines in their rifles.

When the smoke cleared, casualties were counted. Bravo had lost 25 killed, and 62 wounded. Alfa had 3 killed and 37 wounded. There were 38 enemy bodies found within or immediately adjacent to the friendly perimeter. Later evidence indicated that as many as 200 additional enemy had died in the fight. (Long afterward, in upper Binh Dinh Province, a North Vietnamese soldier surrendered to the Division. He said that his battalion had been involved in the battle against B Company and testified that his company had been decimated.)

For Bravo Company, the remainder of 17 May was spent evacuating dead and wounded. For the 1st Cavalry Division, Operation CRAZY HORSE had begun.

The rest of the action took place in the most mountainous and heavily forested area in the province, far from the lowlands. Because of the extraordinarily difficult terrain, aircraft commanders found themselves carrying a maximum load of only two or three soldiers as they went into "elevator shaft" single helicopter landing zones in the triple canopy hilltops, where the aircraft would barely fit in a circle of giant tree trunks. Chinooks hovered over the jungle so that the men could climb down swaying "trooper ladders" through the triple canopy. Nevertheless, in the three weeks of CRAZY HORSE, over 30,000 troops moved by helicopter-an example of the tactical value of airmobility in mountain operations.

The battleground was a complex morass, 3,000 feet from bottom to top and 20 kilometers square. In the fighting it soon became clear that the 2d Viet Cong Regiment was bottled up in these rugged hills, but the Division's companies were having trouble in finding and attacking this elusive enemy. In a new plan, the Division marked off the battle area into pie-shaped sectors and moved the airmobile companies to the outer edges on all sides to set up a

double row of ambushes. The artillery then began firing 12,000 to 13,000 rounds per day into the enemy concentrations. The Air Force assisted with tactical strikes and also hit the enemy with B-52 raids almost daily. The North Vietnamese, under this pressure, attempted to escape out of the area and triggered several of the prepared ambushes. The enemy's powerful 2d Regiment was disorganized by heavy losses in these ambushes; the survivors evaded to the north into the An Lao Valley and were not in contact again for several months.

During the final phase of Operation CRAZY HORSE, Republic of Korea forces maintained contact with an enemy battalion for four days, inflicting heavy casualties. In this operation the Division evacuated or destroyed 45 tons of rice, 10 tons of salt, a weapons repair shop, and several large caches of ammunition and medical supplies. Captured documents gave the first indications of the extent of the Viet Cong infrastructure in northeastern Binh Dinh. It was this intelligence that provided targets for ensuing operations.

After CRAZY HORSE, there was a pause in the Battle of Binh Dinh that lasted until early September, while the Division concentrated on battlefields to the west and south. With overlapping operations PAUL REVERE (Pleiku Province), HAWTHORNE (Kontum Province) and NATHAN HALE (Phu Yen Province) taking place many miles apart, the Division's logistics Were put to a severe test.

Complicating the 1st Cavalry's maintenance and supply problems was the fact that the Division had far too many nonstandard items in the inventory. This made it almost totally dependent on an unpredictable supply system for repair parts and replacements. There were cases in which items, such as bulldozer parts, were not replaced for more than ten months because they were "special" and not stocked in country. There were several unique supply systems, such as those for aircraft parts and electronic components, operating simultaneously in Vietnam, in addition to the military standard requisitioning and issue procedures.

As for the span of control within an airmobile division, every brigade could handle four maneuver battalions with ease and a fifth battalion with minor communication augmentation at brigade headquarters. The division, in turn, could absorb two additional brigades, for a total of five, provided each of the added brigades brings along its support slice. Therefore, logistics became a restraining factor long before span of control or communications.