The Army faced a dilemma at this period of time in that it had spread its aviation assets in Vietnam to support the Army of the Republic of Vietnam divisions, one Republic of Korea division, the 1st U. S. Army Division, the 173d Brigade, and the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne with non-organic aviation units. Only the 1st Cavalry Division had sufficient organic aircraft. There was little experience in supporting non-airmobile divisions with separate aviation assets and the Army was not sure of the proper mix.

The finite limitations of available Hueys and Army aviators forced the decision to support the average size division or Vietnamese elements with considerably less than had been devoted to the airmobile division and eventually a ratio was determined of one assault helicopter company per brigade in the II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones. At this time, the Marines had the responsibility for aviation support in the I Corps Tactical Zone. But, the mere spreading of limited aviation assets did not solve the problem of organization command and control. It was obvious from the beginning that some sort of centralization was going to be necessary. The companies in Vietnam at that time all had developed distinct methods of operations and procedures which they had worked out on an ad hoc basis with the supported commanders. As a result, it was very difficult to take a company from the highlands and switch its support operations to the Delta or vice versa for it entailed relearning complex command relationships, terrain, and methods of operation. Therefore, a high degree of standardization of training, procedures, and methods of operations was obviously indicated.

In contrast to this need, there was a strong underlying feeling that centralization of Army aviation at a brigade level would be a major step backwards from the fundamental principle that Army aviation had held since World War II, that is decentralization to the lowest possible commander who could use and maintain it.

Furthermore, the ghost of "another Air Corps" kept rising from the graveyard with all the unhappy memories of that early era. There were those who saw the formation of such a brigade as the final positive indication that Army aviation was truly headed for a separate air arm.

The 1st Aviation Brigade was formed provisionally on 1 March 1966 with Brigadier General George P. ("Phip") Seneff in command. General Seneff's career had been sprinkled with key assignments related to airmobility and he had been a major commander in the testing of the 11th Air Assault Division. He was quick to assemble many of his former "11th Air Assault Team" to form a brigade staff and to publish the first handbook and standard operating procedures of the brigade. With the publication of basic operational manuals, the 1st Brigade was able to standardize aviation operational procedures throughout Vietnam, establish training schools, enforce safety regulations, and in general more effectively manage the growing aviation assets.

Essentially, General Seneff commanded the non-organic Army aviation elements in Vietnam, but operational control was vested in the supported ground commander. It was a tribute to the personalities involved that this unusual system worked; retaining the best features of centralized command—training and standardization—and the best features of decentralization—operational control and support. The onus of a large impersonal structure with its inherent unresponsiveness was avoided. Though the ghost of another air corps would not be entirely exorcized for years to come, the 1st Aviation Brigade avoided most of the pitfalls that had been grimly predicted at its onset.

General Seneff, in coordination with Major General William E. DePuy who then commanded the 1st U. S. Division, began a test period to determine the most satisfactory means of supporting a line infantry division with separate aviation elements. While considerable work had been done in this area during 1965, it had grown in different directions depending on the unit supported and the aviation assets available. Using the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph B. Starker, as the test vehicle, Generals DePuy and Seneff soon ironed out most of the serious problems in matching aviation to the ground units. Because the requirements varied in each part of Vietnam, the brigade tried to collocate one assault helicopter company with each U. S. brigade and in course of time each Republic of Korea brigade. The companies supporting Army of the Republic of Vietnam units were located in the most centralized positions for best support. The

1st Aviation Brigade assigned one combat aviation battalion headquarters in direct support of each infantry division and this battalion headquarters normally worked with that division no matter how many companies might be assigned for a specific mission.

At this time the 52d Aviation Battalion supported the 4th Division in the highlands, the 10th Aviation Battalion supported the brigade of the 101st and the Republic of Korea division, the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion supported the Big Red One, the 214th—the 9th Division, and the 269th—the 25th Division. The 13th Battalion, which was later to become a full group, remained in the Delta. Two aviation groups—the 17th and the 12th—supervised the aviation assets in the II and III Corps Tactical Zones respectively. The aviation group commander was also the aviation officer for the U. S. Field Force commander.

During the spring of 1966, one of the most emotionally packed debates was reaching its final stages. This would culminate on 6 April 1966 in a formal agreement between the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force to relinquish Army claims to the Caribou and future fixed-wing aircraft designed for tactical airlift. Before discussing this issue, we should put a few basic points into focus.

The keystone to airmobility was-and is-the helicopter and it is easy to forget the versatility and uniqueness of this vehicle. Many futile discussions have been held on the cost, ton-mile capacity, complexity, and limitations of the helicopter when either comparing it to fixed-wing transport or other means of mobility. The simple fact is that no other machine could have possibly accomplished the job of the helicopter. It alone had true vertical capability and could perform those scores of missions ranging from an insertion of a long range patrol to the vertical assault of an entire division; it alone could place artillery on the mountain tops and resupply these isolated bases; it alone could evacuate the wounded out of a chimney landing zone, surrounded by 100 foot trees; it alone could elevate the infantry support weapons and deliver that discreet measure of fire so dear to the survival of a squad. Only the helicopter could place a small bulldozer on a critical piece of terrain or extract another aircraft downed in the jungles and return it to fly again.

Therefore, in discussing the inter-service differences between the Army and the Air Force, one must keep in mind that the heli-

copter—specifically the tactical transport as represented by the Huey—was the absolute sine qua non of the Army's concept of airmobility. General Johnson, then Chief of Staff of the Army, was keenly aware of this basic fact.

At the working level in Vietnam both Army and Air Force officers hammered out practical methods of solving their day-today problems and coordinating their efforts. Ever since the conference I mentioned in the first chapter of this study where General White expressed his concern on the size of the Army's fleet, the Air Force had opposed the Army's continued acquisition of the Caribou. By 1966 the Army was operating six Caribou companies in Vietnam. The 7th Air Force in Vietnam, which had been upgraded from the 2d Air Division on 2 April 1966, was severely critical of the Army's method of operation of its Caribou assets. They believed that the Caribou should be incorporated into the Air Force managed Southeast Asia airlift and consequently be more productive from a ton-mile basis.

The Army on its side had some very strong advocates for the Army retaining the Caribou and procuring its turbine powered successor, the Buffalo, as soon as possible. They pointed to the history of the Caribou's responsiveness to the demands of far-flung isolated units and the lack of guarantee that such support would be available under Air Force management. They looked upon the Caribou as a bitterly contested victory for a legitimate Army mission and they were appalled at the mere possibility that the Army might trade this victory for an empty guarantee that they could remain in the helicopter business. It was truly an emotionally charged atmosphere—one that was neither as black nor as white as the critics on both sides appeared to believe.

Prior to the Air Force assumption of the Caribou, most were already under centralized management under Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and were participating in the Southeast Asia airlift effort. However, one-fourth to one-half of their resources were dedicated to specific Army support. That is, one company had the sole function of supporting the 1st Cavalry Division and others had full-time missions in support of small elements in the Delta and Special Forces. A small portion of the Caribou fleet hauled parts and supplies to isolated Army aviation elements. No doubt some of the Caribou missions were inefficient from a standpoint of payload, but none were considered a luxury by the users.

With this as a background, let's turn to the actual agreement by the two chiefs of staff as signed on 6 April 1966. Because it is important and relatively short, the complete text follows:

You will note that the agreement was far broader than the Caribou problem alone and essentially established without doubt the Army's claim to the helicopter and especially to the armed helicopter. Furthermore, you will note that the future developments of VTOL aircraft were left for future negotiations. Sometimes forgotten, this document established a precedent for attaching Air Force units to ground commanders.

In the context of the times I find it quite easy to understand. General Johnson's rationale for signing this controversial agreement. The Army's airmobility program was being threatened by inter-service bickering and budget limitations. There was a distinct possibility that, in the absence of some such agreement, an all-out battle on the very right of the Army to own any aircraft might have occurred. Furthermore, the Army Chief of Staff was a man of uncompromising integrity who had every confidence ' that both the word and the spirit of this agreement would be carried out by both Services. To their credit, both Services did bend over backwards to make sure that the transfer of the Caribou would be smoothly effected by 1 January 1967. The Aviation School set up special training programs for Air Force pilots and the Army Caribou pilots who were working themselves out of a job could not have been more diligent.

General Johnson closely followed the transfer, of the Caribou and its subsequent effectiveness under Air Force management. He charged his staff to keep him informed of progress by frequent analyses. One such study, made after the Air Force had been operating the Caribou for a full year, showed a 12.4 percent increase in hours flown and a 11.4 percent increase in Caribou cargo tonnage. Incidentally, this same study showed a drastic rise in the utilization of the Chinook. Fundamentally, there was no real way to compare the Air Force operations versus the Army. By Air Force standards, Army aviation organizations were woefully under-manned and under-staffed; support and maintenance were accomplished entirely differently by the two Services; and the Air Force had consolidated the Caribou operations in three fixed bases. Much more basic from the ground commanders' viewpoint, the Air Force seemed unwilling to procure more Caribou or its successor—the Buffalo.

In this regard, Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., Deputy Commanding General, U. S. Army, Vietnam, on 21 April 1968, wrote General Johnson, the Chief of Staff, as follows:

Many studies would follow by both the Air Force and the Army to prove the point, or disprove the point, that the Caribou were better, or worse, under Air Force control. The same arguments on combat effectiveness versus cost effectiveness would surface again, but the transfer of the Caribou must always remain a footnote to the Army's story of airmobility rather than a chapter by itself.

During 1966, while I was Commandant of the Army Aviation School, the shortage of Army aviators became critical. This should not have come as a surprise since the Army planners had forecast this shortage for more than a year, but now the buildup of U. S. forces in Vietnam and the concurrent requirement for more airmobile assets made it apparent to commanders at every level.

As early as January 1966, Department of the Army had informed General Westmoreland that all aviator sources had been exhausted and nearly 500 Republic of Vietnam returnees would be needed for additional tours in Vietnam. One hundred and seventy-six of these had less than two years between tours and soon

an aviator could only count on twelve months between successive tours in Southeast Asia. Every pilot in the grade of major and below was being assigned to a cockpit position. This made some units extremely "top heavy" in rank and consequently morale suffered. Aviators in a sense felt they were being treated as second class citizens and had serious reservations about their career potential. They alone seemed to be singled out for this repeated duty in Vietnam and it was very hard to explain to their families why this was so.

On 14 June 1966, Department of the Army summed up the seriousness of the pilot shortage. Their projection showed that by the end of Fiscal Year 1966 the Army would have a requirement for approximately 14,300 aviators versus a projected strength of 9,700. The requirements were forecast to grow in fiscal year 1967 from a projection of 16,800 to approximately 21,500. Against this requirement it appeared there would only be a strength of 12,800 aviators. Obviously the real constraint to airmobility growth for some time to come would be the critical shortage of aviators.

It was not until 29 March 1966 that the Army received Secretary of Defense approval to increase its flight training from 120 pilots a month to an active Army output of 410 aviators per month. No matter how fast this training program was accelerated, this training rate could not be reached until April 1967. Nevertheless, the Aviation School did reach a rate of 200 per month in May 1966.

Drastic action had been taken throughout the world to reduce manning levels for all overseas commands except Southeast Asia to an absolute minimum. Aviator strength decreased in Europe to a minimum of 250 and only 34 pilots were available to our forces in Korea. Department of the Army mailed individual letters to almost 2,000 aviators in the Reserves asking for volunteers for active duty, but this effort failed to produce substantial results as only sixty applications were received. The Army wisely decided not to drastically reduce its standards nor dip into the "seed corn" of aviation instructors at the schools. Vietnam would have to live with this shortage and use every internal management tool to make the best use of the assets they had.

When I made my second visit to Vietnam in 1966, I was anxious to glean any information which I could take back to the Army Aviation School to better prepare the students for their service in Vietnam. Fort Rucker at that time was almost exclusively geared and oriented to meet the growing needs in Vietnam and the School made a special effort to debrief all Vietnam returnees in an effort to glean every bit of information that would improve its

instruction. The new aviator received 32 weeks of training following a syllabus that used every precious hour to best prepare him for Vietnam. After I became Commandant, it became obvious that the rotary-wing aviator must graduate with more than passing knowledge of instrument flying as most of these students were going directly to combat—without the usual unit training transition which had always been the accepted practice in all Services. We managed to squeeze sufficient hours out of the course to give each initial-entry student a thorough instrument course, complete in every respect except for flight checks in two systems not being used in Vietnam—instrument landing system and VHF omnidirectional range. Upon graduation, these students were perfectly capable of flying instruments; but, any instrument course demands continued practice to develop confidence and increase proficiency. Unfortunately many graduates soon lost this capability through lack of use and supervision.

To partially compensate for the lack of unit training after graduation, the course ended with an extended field maneuver. I had directed that this last week before graduation incorporate as much combat realism as possible to facilitate the essential transition from "student" to "pilot." Almost every commander was enthusiastic over the continued high quality of the new pilots being assigned to Vietnam.

If there was ever a question about the wisdom of the Army's Warrant Officer Aviator Program, it was laid to rest at this time. As Commandant of the Aviation School, I watched thousands of these splendid young men mature in front of my instructors into professionals—and that is exactly what they wanted to become—the best Army helicopter pilots in the business. Nothing more and nothing less.

When the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and his Assistant visited the Aviation School, they were concerned about the lack of branch career schools for the warrant aviator and his future motivation. They could not believe that, most of these people came into the Army for the single purpose of flying; and that, though many had been to college and were married, they did not aspire to a career as a commissioned officer. Further, they were not aware that those few who did want a commission could get one under current regulations. I did my best to disabuse them of their misconceptions. Our warrant program was attracting the very best of American youth at the most critical time.

To add to the problems brought about by the chronic pilot shortage, the Army in Vietnam was given the additional missions

of training U. S. Naval aviators in the armed Huey to take over the responsibility for "Market Time" operations. For some time the U. S. Army armed helicopters had been giving fire support to Task Force 116 in their mission of waterway and off-shore surveillance. Now the Navy wanted to train its own pilots and borrow some of the Army's precious armed helicopters to do a Navy mission that no fixed-wing aircraft could do.

On 25 July 1966 a joint U. S. Army—U. S. Air Force—Vietnamese Air Force conference laid down the plans for the Army to train the first ten Vietnamese pilots in the UH-1 helicopter. This was the beginning of a long range plan to expand the capabilities of the Vietnamese to conduct airmobile operations completely on their own.

Finally, the 1st Aviation Brigade was given the mission to familiarize a limited number of Korean Army pilots and mechanics with the UH-1 helicopter. When you add these requirements to the requirement to conduct an in-country familiarization course for all new Army aviators as well as the day-to-day commitments to actual combat, it is easy to appreciate the dilemma of the senior aviators in spreading their thin assets.

In most battalions, each new aviator was given a check ride to ascertain his knowledge of the unit aircraft and, if necessary, was given additional training in this particular type. He was then placed in the copilot seat regardless of his rank and received a theater procedural orientation flying administrative type missions for 25 hours. After this step, he was allowed to fly copilot during actual combat assaults and, when the aircraft commander felt he had sufficiently demonstrated his proficiency, only then was he allowed to fly as first pilot.

Because the Army aviator was anxious to perform as many possible tasks as he could, it became common in the Republic of Vietnam for aviators to fly over 100 hours a month and 120 hours was not exceptional. This amount far exceeded the limit that had commonly been accepted as safe over an extended period of time. Fatigue was inevitably linked to a higher accident rate and commanders at all echelons were alerted to detect signs of pilot fatigue within their own units. The 1st Aviation Brigade established a policy on aviator fatigue which provided close supervision by a flight surgeon of any aviator who exceeded 90 hours of flight time in a consecutive 30 day period. Naturally, flying hours alone were an inadequate measure of this problem: one must consider the intangibles of landing in a hot landing zone versus a "milk run"

to Saigon; or the differences between landing time after time in a pinnacle approach versus ordinary operations.

Although regulations required two pilots per aircraft for each flight, some commanders found it necessary to relax this procedure for certain administrative flights. Consequently, many units began an unofficial training program whereby crew chiefs were given "stick" time and were coached in the rudiments of flying to the point where they could take over in case of an emergency and theoretically land the helicopter safely.. This training paid off in isolated cases where the pilot and copilot were wounded and the crew chief brought the aircraft back. This informal training had an ancillary benefit in that it encouraged quite a few crew chiefs to apply for warrant officer flight training.

The shortage of pilots was only part of the personnel problem. Skilled mechanics, crew chiefs, avionics and armament specialists were in critical demand. The twelve month rotational policy (which General Westmoreland determined essential for the long range haul) generated special problems in what was known as the "hard skills." The enlisted student might spend a full year or more in developing proficiency in repairing radar or turbine engines, and then serve in Vietnam for a year or less before he had to be replaced by an equally skilled man. For the career soldier, there was a danger that he could become over-specialized in some particular skill required in Southeast Asia and consequently could not be utilized when he left. This led to morale and promotion problems. Many a skilled helicopter crew chief upon being reassigned to the United States or Europe found himself "technically unemployed" and wound up in an obscure motor pool where his special identity would get lost. Fortunately, many of these outstanding people were kept in the program and volunteered either to return to Vietnam for a successive tour or volunteered for flight training.

The performance of the crew chiefs and mechanics were summed up by one general this way:

Units in Vietnam would continue to be undermanned throughout 1966 and the ratio of aviation units to ground units would grow increasingly worse for the next eighteen months. Though every effort was being made in the United States to meet the surge demands for pilots and aircraft, there was only so much that could be done to increase the output of the schools and speed up production lines.

The 6th of July 1966 marked the beginning of a new close support capability for the ground commander. On this date, the B-52's operated for the first time using a "combat sky spot" bombing system. This system enabled a ground radar control to direct the bomber over the target and also indicate the exact moment of bomb release in almost any kind of weather. Now the big bombers could be used on targets of opportunity with a great deal of flexibility.

The B-52's were not new to Vietnam and, in fact, had made their first strike in War Zone D more than a year before on 18 June. Since that time they had flown more than 3,700 sorties using the code name "Arc Light." B-52's stationed on Guam were being used increasingly on enemy supply routes and suspected bases that were located by the combined intelligence effort of the U. S. and Vietnamese forces.

The new system employing ground radar control also incorporated a quick reaction force of six B-52's which were on continuous alert at Guam. General Westmoreland, commenting on their effectiveness, said, "The B-52's were so valuable that I personally dealt with requests from field commanders, reviewed the targets, and normally allocated the available bomber resources on a daily basis. I also continued to urge that action be taken to substantially increase the B-52 sorties."

To some the use of a heavy bomber, designed for strategic nuclear response, in a counter insurgency environment was analogous to using a sledge hammer to swat flies. To the contrary, I think the employment of this system showed the imagination and flexibility of the U. S. Military in adapting this powerful system to add a new dimension of fire support for the ground trooper. In contrast to the snide remarks of "jungle agriculture" that some

armchair strategists applied to the B-52 effectiveness, those who had witnessed this effect on the ground will testify that the B-52 was an awesome weapon which could destroy the deepest Viet Cong tunnel structure, open up instant landing zones, and strike terror into the hearts of the enemy. A single B-52 usually carried 36,000 pounds of "iron bombs." Like any new system, it took some time to smoothly integrate it into the overall fire plan and develop confidence in its control. However, many a prisoner of war substantiated the psychological effect of the B-52's and many enemy dead gave mute evidence of its lethality.

The B-52's relation to the story of airmobility is in the firepower half of the firepower-maneuver equation. The best utilization of the B-52 power included an immediate follow up of a strike, and the air assault was the natural means of such exploitation. In the next few years this combination would be used more and more.

A civilian might be surprised to learn that the most important training takes place in combat. This would hardly surprise the veterans of World War II and Korea. Every theater of war-and each area of that theater-presents special problems that require the commander on the scene to develop new tactics and techniques to fit the situation. The helicopter was probably the only solution to the dense tropical jungle, but even this versatile machine needed some place to touch down. Every unit in Vietnam had to adapt many of its airmobile procedures to fit its mission. The following sample, from the 1966 files of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, is typical.

Brigadier General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, had established a training program for helicopter rappelling techniques since his brigade frequently operated in dense jungle terrain which did not have accessible landing zones. This training was particularly concentrated in the reconnaissance elements and the engineer landing zone clearing teams. These latter teams performed a most necessary and dangerous task of going into an unknown and lightly protected area-with equipment that had to be airdropped or sling delivered—and felling enough trees to permit several helicopters to land simultaneously. Vietnam abounds with many large hardwood forests which are extremely difficult to cut, even with the best heavy equipment. To add to the frustration of clearing operations, the

engineer teams found that chain saws were of little value in bamboo forests. Vines became easily entangled in the saws and the bamboo splinters caused many lacerations among the workers.

A corollary problem in the dense jungle was the evacuation of wounded. The Huey at this time had no suitable hoist which would allow a stretcher to be lifted to a hovering helicopter. The hoist of the Chinook was adequate, but too slow for personnel evacuation, and seldom would this helicopter be available for this mission. General Pearson recommended that improved winch systems for both the Huey and the Chinook be provided as soon as possible.

In the 101st operations in the highlands during this period, an airmobile company was placed in direct support of each infantry battalion and the same company habitually supported a specific battalion. The brigade found this arrangement was mutually advantageous; resulted in increased responsiveness; and enhanced the effectiveness of aviation support. By now the use of a command and control helicopter had become routine for each infantry battalion commander and he used this helicopter for liaison, communications relay with subordinate units, assisting units to pinpoint their locations, guiding units to terrain objectives, and locating potential landing zones.

Seldom mentioned in dispatches, the brigade had two fixed wing Beavers which handled a multitude of minor resupply and administrative missions for the brigade; and the old reliable fixed wing O-1 observation aircraft did yeoman service. These airplanes, which were almost taken for granted because they required so little attention, relieved critical helicopter assets for vital tactical missions for which they would otherwise have not been available.

With the arrival of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade on 14 August 1966, the total U. S. strength in Vietnam rose to approximately 300,000. More troops would soon follow. To some casual observers throughout the world, this seemed an inordinate number of military personnel to cope with an unsophisticated enemy in a relatively small country. Some people visualized a U. S. soldier on every other square yard of South Vietnamese soil. This simply is not so.

Map 3 is an outline map of South Vietnam superimposed over an outline map of the United States. You will note that when the northern border along the 17th Parallel is positioned near Pitts-

burg, the southernmost point in South Vietnam (Ca Mau Peninsula) extends to Savannah.

The country is relatively narrow, to be sure, but the long border between Laos and Cambodia is largely a tortuous terrain of jungles and mountains. Even the primitive nomadic tribes, which live in this sparsely populated area, have difficulty in traversing this area once they have left their own little familiar area.

The U. S. forces occupied small dots (not vast areas) on this long expanse. They extended their power by major airmobile sweeps throughout their assigned area of operations, but in no sense did they "hold" the terrain for long periods of time. Many operations inflicted severe damage on the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops, but the tenacious infrastructure of the guerrilla in many areas allowed them to rebuild their strength, sometimes in a matter of months. It was often necessary to go back into an area time and time again to defeat not the same enemy but perhaps the same numbered unit which had regrouped from local recruits and replacements from the north. This was particularly true along the borders of Cambodia and Laos in those provinces where a strong communist infrastructure had existed for more than a decade.

Without the potential for extending our power through the helicopter, we would have been forced into small enclaves which in themselves would be prime targets, such as the French had found themselves in at an earlier time. But, air assault techniques gave the initiative to the Free World Forces along with the elements of surprise and mass. No matter what the frustrations were in fighting in Vietnam, it is safe to say that without the airmobile tactics our so-called "massive presence" in Vietnam to a great extent would have turned into mere pinpoints of static defense.

Operation THAYER I marked the beginning of the series of battles that kept the 1st Cavalry Division in constant operation in the plains of Binh Dinh for many months. The course of this battle followed the enemy as he drifted across 506 Valley into the Crescent Plains and Cay Giep Mountains.

The Division jumped off in the attack on 15 September 1966, with the simultaneous air assault of two brigades. Three battalions were lifted from An Khe and two from Hammond into the mountains of the Kim Son Valley. The five assaulting battalions secured the high ground all the way around the claw-shaped valley and then fought their way down to the valley floor against elements of the

18th North Vietnamese Army Regiment. In the action that followed, the 3d Brigade was committed, putting a full airmobile division into combat on a single tactical operation for the first time. Later in the fight, the cavalrymen were reinforced by the 3d Brigade of the 25th Division, which increased to eleven the number of battalions controlled by the 1st Cavalry Division, operating in conjunction with nine battalions of the 22d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division and two to three of Government of Vietnam Marines and airborne troops. The division supported all of these units with its own organic airlift.

On 20 September, the battle area shifted to 506 Valley as the 18th North Vietnamese Army Regiment attempted to evade to the east and break contact. Three cavalry battalions made air assaults to the east to follow their trail. The brigade fire base at Hammond was attacked on the night of 23. September, in what was apparently a move to take the pressure off the enemy in the Kim Son and 506 Valleys as they moved eastward. Also on 23 September, the Capitol Republic of Korea Infantry Division moved into the Phu Cat mountains in force, opening up a new phase of the Free World effort in Binh Dinh Province. A few days later, the build-up of sightings and small actions were clearly indicating that the bulk of the 18th Regiment was shifting toward the coast actually moving into a natural pocket bounded by sea and mountains. In the face of the Government of Vietnam successes in reestablishing governmental control of the coastal area east of Phu My-Phu Cat, the 18th Regiment was being sent in among the population in force to bolster resistance. THAYER came to a close at the end of September with over 200 enemy killed and 100 tons of rice captured.

By the 1st of October 1966, the 1st Cavalry Division had been in Vietnam for a full year and many airmobile techniques had been refined and polished in the crucible of combat. Nevertheless, it is surprising how well the basic fundamentals of the organization stood the test of time.

At the end of its first year of operations in Vietnam the 1st Cavalry Division was to face another major challenge-rotation. During the summer of 1966 approximately 9,000 officers and men of the Division had rotated to the United States. Replacement personnel were flown to Pleiku, South Vietnam, from Travis Air Force Base, California. Liaison teams were placed at both Travis and Pleiku and the massive aerial replacement service from the United States direct to the 1st Cavalry Division functioned with speed and efficiency. Of particular value was the liaison team placed at Travis Air Force Base. This team not only looked after the welfare of

incoming replacements, but coordinated directly with the Air Force troop carrier unit on aircraft, weight, and space available and loading and departure times.

At the other end of the pipeline, at Pleiku, Division personnel received and coordinated the further movement of replacement personnel to the division base at An Khe. Some of this movement was accomplished by convoy over Highway 19, but a significant part of the movement was made by air, as Air Force C-130 aircraft and the Division's Caribou (CV-2) aircraft were available. Although 11,000 miles long, stretching half-way around the world, the Division's replacement pipeline worked smoothly and effectively. Units were maintained at fighting strength, operations continued, and the Division moved through its transitional "changing of the guard."

This changeover not only included the loss of combat seasoned leaders, fighters, flyers, and supporters, but also witnessed the departure of those personnel who had been a part of the birth of the airmobile experience, had been with it through its early development and formative period, had tested it, and had applied the principles of airmobility to the nature of warfare in South Vietnam.

I have mentioned earlier that one cannot view the airmobile concept as a simple problem of moving men and equipment from point "A" to point "B." One of the fundamental reasons for the development of airmobility was the Army's concern that the balance between firepower and maneuver had swung too far in the direction of firepower. It was envisioned that the helicopter could right this balance. However, with this mobility, there was also danger that the soldier would outrun his supporting firepower if some means were not found to increase the mobility of the supporting weapons to the same degree. This is particularly true of artillery.

The U.S. infantryman over the years has come to expect and get continuous artillery support on call. The artilleryman in turn has depended on the infantry to secure his positions and keep his supply routes open. In Vietnam no simple solutions were available to continue this long-established teamwork. The early designers of the airmobile division had recognized that they would have to sacrifice the heavy 155-mm howitzers and be content with moving the 105-mm howitzer with the Chinook helicopter. As it turned out, a 155-mm howitzer battalion was continuously attached to the 1st Cavalry. It was teamed with the CH-54 Crane to become an inte-

gral part of the Division's fire support, even though it was not officially "organic." The Little John rocket had been included in the original organization, but when the 1st Cavalry deployed to Vietnam, the Little John was deleted due to tactical and manpower considerations. To make up for this deficiency in firepower, an aerial artillery battalion was organized as the general support artillery. It consisted of three firing batteries, each equipped with twelve Huey helicopters armed with 2.75-inch aerial rockets.

The airmobile tactics of the 1st Cavalry Division, its speed of maneuver, and the distances involved required drastic changes in the techniques and development of fire support co-ordination. For one thing, the air was filled with a number of new objects-hundreds of troop transport helicopters, armed helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft, and tactical air support. Through this same atmosphere thousands of shells from tube artillery had to travel. Fire support co-ordination during the critical air assault phase of an operation was the most difficult to resolve. The tactical air support, tube and aerial artillery, and sometimes naval gunfire and B-52 bombers had to be integrated without danger to the friendly forces and without firepower gaps that would relieve the pressure on the enemy. Only careful planning and carefully worked out standing operating procedures could make this manageable.

As an example, the 1st Cavalry Division had a zone system based on the twelve hour clock superimposed on the map location of each firing position. North was at 12:00 o'clock. Prior to firing, the artillery units announced over the aircraft guard frequencies the danger areas such as "firing in zones three and four, altitude 3,000 feet." It was incumbent on the pilot to check for artillery fire prior to approaching a landing zone. As an additional precaution, canonneers scanned the skies in the direction of fire prior to pulling the lanyard while observers checked the forward end of the trajectory.

During the first battle of the Ia Drang Valley, the 1st Cavalry had covered such a wide zone that the placement of artillery was of utmost importance. Not only was it necessary to cover the landing zones of the attacking forces, but it was also necessary to place artillery in such a position that it could cover another artillery unit for mutual support. In this "war without front lines," the artilleryman found himself often confronting the enemy face to face. It was not long before the artillery decided it would be good practice to collocate itself with the infantry battalion reserve. Nonetheless, many an artilleryman thought lie had well deserved the Combat Infantry Badge.

From the artillery viewpoint, the most significant development of the first year's operation of the 1st Cavalry Division was that aerial artillery came of age. In the beginning, some officers considered aerial rocket artillery to be a nuisance on the battlefield, and they could not understand why its method of employment should be any different than the armed helicopter which escorted the tactical troop lift. Fortunately, the aggressive spirit of the aerial rocket artillery battery demonstrated that it could and should be used in mass. While the other armed helicopters were preoccupied by pinpoint targets, the aerial rocket artillery could deliver area fire with the same responsiveness (and through the same communication channels) that tube artillery had done in the past.

These same aerial rocket artillery assets, if distributed piecemeal throughout the division, could not have functioned nearly as well. In this case, the whole was greater than the sum of all its parts. Aerial rocket artillery never entirely replaced tube artillery, nor was it ever meant to. However, by careful allocation of fire and precise timing of ships on station, the aerial rocket artillery was able to provide a remarkable volume of fire at times when no other fire support was available. To their credit, the aerial rocket artillery developed the same combined arms partnership with the infantryman that has always existed between the red leg and the dog soldier.

To the infantryman who has never been in an airmobile division, it is a very difficult thing to explain the responsiveness and effectiveness of aerial rocket artillery. Aerial rocket artillery, in contrast to the roving gunship, generally stayed on the ground with one section having a two-minute alert time. They were positioned so to be only a matter of minutes away from any potential target. Two minutes after a fire mission was received they were airborne, and, in a matter of a few minutes more, on target. As soon as the first section departed, a second section moved from a five-minute alert to the two-minute alert status, and another standby team moved to the five-minute alert. By this method, continuous and accurate firepower could be delivered. Aerial rocket artillery was so effective in the 1st Cavalry Division that the artillery commanders had to constantly remind the Infantry to use tube artillery when appropriate rather than call automatically for aerial rocket artillery support.

During MASHER-WHITE WING, the 155-mm howitzer was airlifted for the first time using the CH-54 "flying crane" helicopter. During this same campaign, it became an accepted technique to

select hilltops for artillery positions since these were easier to defend and provided open fields of fire.

Artillery has always been notorious for consuming large tonnages of ammunition. Again this is symptomatic with the kind of support that the U. S. infantryman has taken for granted. However, in Vietnam where practically every round had to be delivered by air, artillery ammunition proved to be one of the biggest logistics problems. Commanders had to exert supervision at all levels to make sure that the right fire support means was chosen for the target of the moment. A wise commander did not spend too much ammunition on harassment and interdiction fires that could not be observed.

The airmobile artilleryman had learned to fire in all directions with a minimum of confusion. He became accustomed to rapid and frequent moves and developed confidence in his airmobile prime mover, the Chinook. He even developed his own special tactics, known as "the artillery raid." In this case, an artillery battery would be moved deep into suspected enemy territory, rapidly fire prepared concentrations on targets that had been developed by intelligence, and then pull out before the enemy could react. Some of these raids were conceived, planned, and executed in less than three hours.

Workable methods were found to employ aerial rocket artillery at night, but the mainstay of fire support during the hours of darkness remained the tube artillery. Seldom was an infantry unit required to hold a position at night out of range of its friendly guns.

Close-in fire support has always been inherently dangerous. In the fluid situation of the airmobile battlefield, the ever present danger of the proverbial "short round" is multiplied by all the points on the compass. An error in any direction may well result in friendly casualties. As a result, coordination and control of all fire, the knowledge of the exact location of every friendly element is more important in the airmobile division than in any other combat force. A year's experience in Vietnam had matured the 1st Cavalry Division's fire support techniques and had proven its organization to be fundamentally sound. The artilleryman had not been left behind in this new dimension of combat.

The fall of 1966 saw many operations develop as the U. S. strength continued to grow. The newly arrived 196th Light Infan-

try Brigade ran into a major enemy force south of Sui Da while searching for rice and other enemy supplies on 19 October. When four companies of the U. S. 5th Special Forces Group's Mobile Strike Force were inserted into landing zones north and east of Sui DA, they immediately became heavily engaged. It became apparent that the Viet Cong 9th Division, consisting of three regiments, together with the North Vietnamese 101st Regiment had deployed into the central Tay Ninh Province with the major objective of wiping out the Special Forces camp at Sui DA The four Special Forces companies were overrun and had to withdraw in small groups or be extracted by helicopters.

General Westmoreland responded to this large enemy threat by committing the 1st Infantry Division, contingents of the 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions, and the 173d Airborne Brigade. Some 22,000 U. S. and Allied troops were committed to the battle which became known as Operation ATTLEBORO. The battle continued until 24 November, during which over 1,100 enemy were killed and huge quantities of weapons, ammunition, and supplies were captured. The Viet Cong 9th Division would not be seen again until the following year.

The 1st Cavalry Division continued its operations in Binh Dinh Province with Operations THAYER II and IRVING. During the latter operation on 15 October, they found a medical cache with several thousand containers of medicine and, at another location, camera equipment with 5,000 reels of film. Among the cameras found was one owned by Look Magazine senior editor, Sam Casten, who had been killed during Operation CRAZY HORSE in May. Over 1,170 prisoners were captured and identified as Viet Cong infrastructure members or North Vietnamese regulars during Operation IRVING. This operation included the hard fought battle of Phu Huu, in which the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, won the Presidential Unit Citation.

IRVING was a good example of cooperation between U.S., Government of Vietnam, and Republic of Korea forces. The tactical moves and the complicated phasing were carried out with precision, and without any major difficulties. At the same time, the operation showed that large scale sweeps, with two or three divisions participating, should be the exception rather than the rule in this kind of counterinsurgency operational environment. They serve to stir up the enemy, and they bring some of the infrastructure to the surface, but larger units are able to evade the sweeping and blocking forces. In this case, the primary target was the infrastructure within the population, and the sweep was profitable, but, with the

exception of the fight at Phu Huu, the North Vietnamese Army forces known to be in the objective area were able to exfiltrate.

During the same period, PAUL REVERE IV was continuing near the Cambodian border in Pleiku Province. The newly arrived 4th Infantry Division carried the bulk of this battle with elements of the 25th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division. By 30 December, 977 enemy had been killed.

Each one of the above operations contained hundreds of examples of the growing capability of U. S. forces to employ airmobile operations with effectiveness and daring. The year 1966 was the year of accelerated buildup and the beginning of major offensive operations in Vietnam. It was also the year in which the enemy began to doubt his strategy and his tactics.

By the end of 1966, the United States would have a total of 385,000 U. S. military personnel in South Vietnam and would be in a position for the first time to go over to the offensive on a broad and sustained basis. General Westmoreland remarked, "During 1966, airmobile operations came of age. All maneuver battalions became skilled in the use of the helicopter for tactical transportation to achieve surprise and out-maneuver the enemy."