At 0900 hours on 22 February 1967, Brigadier General John R. Deane, Jr., stood in the door of a C-130 aircraft. When the green light flashed, General Deane jumped, leading the first U. S. parachute assault in the Republic of Vietnam, and the first such assault since the Korean conflict fifteen years earlier. This parachute jump of the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, signaled the beginning of Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE. The original plan, as conceived in November 1966, called for the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division to make the parachute assault; but, much to their chagrin, they were engaged in other operations and the honor was to go to the 173d.

Operation JUNCTION CITY employed the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, elements of the 4th and 9th Infantry Divisions, and South Vietnamese units, as well as the 173d Airborne Brigade. Their target was enemy bases north of Tay Ninh City, in the area the French had named "War Zone C." The decision to make a paratroop assault was based on the urgency to place a large force on the ground as quickly as possible and still have enough helicopter assets to make a sizable heliborne assault as an immediate follow-up.

The requirement for helicopter lift on D-day was substantial. The 1st Infantry Division had five infantry battalions to put in by air assault and the 173d had three infantry battalions. In addition to the requirement for the Huey slicks, there was a tremendous requirement for CH-47 lift for positioning artillery and resupply of ammunition. The 173d had computed that they would free 60 Hueys and six Chinooks for support of other forces by using the parachute assault technique. The paratroopers were assigned landing zones farthest to the north-areas that would have cost many extra minutes of flying time for lift helicopters. The practical aspects of making more helicopters available were perhaps colored

by the emotional and psychological motives of this proud unit which was anxious to prove the value of the parachute badge; nevertheless, the jumpers contributed strongly to the overall attack.

The 173d was placed under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division for this operation and developed an elaborate deception plan to avoid possible compromise of the drop zone. In the planning phase only the commanding general, his deputy, and two key staff officers were aware of the actual drop zone. The cover plan designated a larger alternate drop zone outside the planned area of operation. This permitted all the necessary staging preparations which must precede an air drop and all necessary coordination with the Air Force. The actual drop plan for the airborne assault phase of the operation was not distributed to the units until 1900 hours on 21 February, the evening before D-day. After Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Sigholtz, the Airborne Task Force Commander, briefed his troops on the operation, he sealed off his battalion area as a security measure. Thirteen C-130's were used for the personnel drop and eight C-130's for heavy drop of equipment. Jump altitude was 1,000 feet.

The battalion dropped on schedule and by 0920 hours on D-day all companies were in their locations around the drop zone. Out of the 780 combat troops who made the assault, only eleven sustained minor injuries. The heavy equipment drop commenced at 0925 hours and continued throughout the day. The 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry began landing by helicopter assault at 1035 hours and the entire battalion was in place shortly thereafter. No direct contact with an enemy force occurred during these early hours of D-day. Another infantry battalion, the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry, conducted a heliborne assault into two other close landing zones at 1420 hours and phase one Of JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE was essentially complete.

During this operation, the 173d Brigade was supported by the 11th, the 145th, and the 1st Aviation Battalions. Over 9,700 sorties were flown in support of the operation and Army aviation lifted 9,518 troops and a daily average of fifty tons of cargo. While the initial parachute assault phase received most of the publicity, the subsequent tactical moves were made by helicopter and the momentum of the operation depended on this support.

As might be expected, some operational problems resulted from this first mix of parachute and heliborne operations. One accident and several near accidents were experienced as a result of helicopters trying to land in an area littered with parachutes. There just

wasn't time to adequately police the drop zone. Also there were some problems on Tactical Air coordination. Long delays were imposed prior to a tactical air strike by the communications and coordination required between the large number of units involved. While safety was of prime consideration, there were periods of time when no ordnance was being delivered against the enemy. In addition, General Deane had noticed that air strikes were being called in when troops were unable to break contact, forcing the jets to break away without having an alternate target. However, the control and coordination procedures began to smooth out after the first few hours of confusion.

This combined operation, which the 173d Brigade had begun so dramatically, continued until mid-May. The enemy lost over 2,700 dead along with vast amounts of ammunition, medical supplies, and more than 800 tons of rice. War Zone C, which had been an exclusive Viet Cong stronghold for many years, was now vulnerable to the allied forces at any time of their choosing. In retrospect, there is no question that the parachute assault which began JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE was effective. The troopers had been well trained and knew what to expect but, as General Deane stated, "More importantly, they did what was expected of them."

The employment of the airborne parachute force is historically visualized as a theater-controlled operation aimed at achieving strategic surprise. Although parachute delivery of troops and equipment is a relatively inefficient means of introduction into combat, the very existence of this capability complicates the enemy's planning and offers the friendly commander one more option of surprise. In this instance, which involved multiple units in a major operation, there was a greater demand for helicopter lift than there were helicopter assets. As a result, the 173d pushed strongly for a parachute assault. The fact that airborne techniques were not used more often in Vietnam can be attributed to many factors.

The most obvious restraint to an airborne operation in Vietnam was the time lag inherent in airborne operations in responding to intelligence on the elusive enemy. The relatively unsuccessful French parachute operations already had pointed this out to us. A much more important restraint was the nature of the war itself and the limitations imposed on U. S. forces. From a strategic point of view the U. S. posture in Vietnam was defensive. U. S. tactical offensive operations were limited to the confines of South Vietnam. Had the rules been changed, the parachute potential could have profitably been employed by planning an airborne assault into enemy territory at a distance within the ferry range of the Huey.

This would have allowed the parachute force to secure a landing zone and construct a hasty airstrip. Fixed-wing aircraft would have air-dropped or airlanded essential fuel and supplies. Then the helicopters could have married up with this force, refueled, and immediately given them tactical mobility out of the airhead. These circumstances never came about.

Every man with jump wings was eager to prove his particular mettle in Vietnam. However, this special talent was not often suited for that enemy, that terrain, and that situation. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that there is a continuing requirement for an airborne capability in the U. S. Army structure.

On 1 April 1967 1 assumed command of the 1st Cavalry Division from Major General John Norton. I was fortunate in inheriting an outstanding team of senior commanders. My two assistant division commanders were Brigadier Generals George S. Blanchard, Jr. and Edward De Saussure. My chief of staff was Colonel George W. Casey, and the three brigade commanders were Colonel James C. Smith, to be replaced in a few weeks by Colonel Donald V. ("Snapper") Rattan, Lieutenant Colonel Fred E. Karhohs, and Colonel Jonathan R. Burton. My division artillery was commanded by Colonel George W. Putnam, Jr., and Colonel Howard I. Lukens had the 11th Aviation Group. Colonel Charles D. Daniel had the Support Command, to be shortly replaced by Colonel Hubert S. ("Bill") Campbell. These officers, along with many others too numerous to mention, enhanced the pleasure of commanding the "First Team." For the next nine months my tactical command post would be in Binh Dinh Province at a location with the unpretentious name of Landing Zone TWO BITS. Division Rear would remain at An Khe.

In preparing this section of the study, there was a temptation to view all problems from the vantage point of the division commander. The 1st Cavalry Division was not unique in having many incidental day-to-day problems-problems that were typical of every division in Vietnam. For example, as any commander, I was concerned that we averaged over fifty cases of malaria per month. Again, the 1st Cavalry is fundamentally an infantry division and we had all the problems of booby traps, mines, ambushes, and base security that one would find with any division, plus those additional problems that go with taking care of over 400 helicopters. I have tried to focus on the airmobility aspects of my experience

in Vietnam, since all other details are covered in the specific history of the 1st Cavalry Division.

The 1st Cavalry Division had been operating in the Binh Dinh Province through four successive campaigns since early 1966—Operations THAYER I, IRVING, THAYER II, and the then current campaign, PERSHING. The 1st Cavalry had put intense pressure on the North Vietnamese Army 3d Division and its three main force regiments throughout these campaigns. They had suffered severe logistical and personnel losses. Relentlessly pursued in every portion of the province, the remaining North Vietnamese Army units were forced to find an area in which they could regain strength and reorganize their ranks. Consequently, the 2d Viet Cong Regiment as early as mid-October 1966 had retreated north into Quang Ngai Province to avoid the 1st Cavalry. The 22d North Vietnamese Army Regiment also withdrew into Quang Ngai during the month of March. These frequent enemy retreats to the north, to rest and regroup, contributed to the necessity for the 1st Cavalry's participation in Operation LEJEUNE which began on 7 April. The principal reason behind this operation was an urgent Marine requirement to free some of their troops in Quang Ngai for movement further north.

The boundary between the provinces of Quang Ngai to the north and Binh Dinh to the south established the demarcation line between the I Corps and II Corps Tactical Zones. This same boundary line divided the U. S. military effort, with the III Marine Amphibious Force having the responsibility in the I Corps area.

Throughout its previous nineteen months of operations in Vietnam, the 1st Cavalry had never operated outside of the II Corps area and, as a matter of fact, no U.S. Army combat unit had operated in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The enemy (with some reason) had assumed that they would be secure by moving into the "safe" area of Quang Ngai Province and thus elude the seemingly endless pursuit by the 1st Cavalry Division. This proved to be a mistaken assumption for on the 7th of April an Air Cavalry battalion task force moved into Duc Pho in the southernmost district of Quang Ngai.

The Duc Pho area had been effectively controlled by the communists for more than ten years. Over the years the Viet Cong and its political arm, the National Liberation Front, had increased their power by political indoctrination, torture, and terrorism until

it had a well-developed infrastructure from the sea coast as far inland as Ba To. The legitimate government of Vietnam controlled at most 10 percent of the land area in the district and, in essence, was powerless in the area.

On 28 January, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, part of Task Force X-RAY,¹ had moved from its base at Chu Lai into the Duc Pho area to alleviate some of the enemy control in that district. The Marines concentrated their operations around the city of Duc Pho itself, for the Marine battalion had very little helicopter support and was, by and large, restricted to ground mobility. The only Marine reinforcement in this area had been in late February and early March when a special landing force of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines (from Okinawa) and the 2d battalion, 5th Marines (from Chu Lai) were engaged in a search and clear mission to the south of Duc Pho City. In early March these reinforcements returned to their home bases leaving the 3d battalion, 7th Marines in place. The III Marine Amphibious Force had been receiving increasing pressure along the DMZ throughout the early months of 1967 and increased enemy infiltration had forced the Marines to commit the majority of their forces along this line. The Marines were thin on the DMZ and wanted to move Task Force X-RAY north from the southern part of their area of responsibility. The Marine plan included pulling out of Duc Pho as soon as Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, could provide a replacement force. General Westmoreland decided that the most responsive unit available would be the 1st Cavalry Division.

The 1st Cavalry Division was given less than twelve hours to put a battalion task force into the Duc Pho area and less than 36 hours to increase that force to brigade size. In deference to the Marines, the operation was named after Major General John Archer Lejeune, a Marine leader during the Spanish American War and World War I. Most of the landing zones also were given names from Marine Corps history.

When the orders to move were received on the night of 6 April, the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Stevenson, was chosen to begin the action since this battalion was in a preparatory posture at An Khe for another operation. At 0115 hours on the 7th, approximately three hours after the Division had received the oral order, the 11th Aviation

1. Task Force X-RAY was commanded by Brigadier General Foster C. ("Frosty") LaHue. He and I would be coordinating on many operations in I Corps Tactical Zone during the next few months.

Group, located at landing zone Two BITS, was alerted to move the 2d battalion, 5th Cavalry and supporting elements from An Khe to Duc Pho beginning at first light. The operation officially began at 0930 hours on the 7th. The battalion had fully closed by 1700 hours that afternoon.

It was immediately obvious that the first requirement in this area would be the building of a heavy duty airstrip for support by Air Force aircraft. The decision was made to build a C-7A Caribou strip immediately at landing zone MONTEZUMA which could be expanded to accommodate C-123 aircraft. At landing zone MONTEZUMA there would also be space enough to build a parallel Caribou strip while the first airstrip was improved and surfaced to handle the larger and heavier C-130 aircraft.

Company B of the 8th Engineer Battalion had arrived at landing zone MONTEZUMA during the morning of the 7th and immediately began a thorough reconnaissance of the airfield site. During the next two days, 31 pieces of heavy engineer equipment weighing over 200 tons were airlifted into Duc Pho. This move required 29 CH-54 "Flying Crane" sorties and 15 Chinook sorties. Much of the equipment had to be partially disassembled to reduce the weight to a transportable helicopter load. By 1800 hours on the 7th, enough equipment was on the ground to begin work. The earthmoving commenced and continued throughout the night by floodlights. By midnight, six hours after construction had begun, 25 percent of -the Caribou strip was completed.

On 8 April the remainder of the 2d Brigade Task Force under Lieutenant Colonel Karhohs deployed into the LEJEUNE area of operations and assumed operational control of the area. The remainder of the Marine task force was placed under operational control of the 2d Brigade until such time as they could be moved north.

Landing zone MONTEZUMA was composed of light sandy soil; and the heavy rotary wing traffic soon generated monumental, semi-permanent dust clouds. This in turn generated a severe maintenance problem in the rotor heads of the helicopters. Peneprine, an oil-base dust palliative, was spread on the helipads and refueling areas as fast as it became available and helped reduce this problem. A concurrent problem was the air traffic control necessary for the hundreds of aircraft arriving with the Air Cavalry combat and combat support units being lifted into MONTEZUMA throughout the day and the Marine aircraft beginning the outward deployment. Air traffic at the landing zone was at best confusing and at worst downright hazardous. As had been experienced in every

landing zone (even when there was no confusion) , the turbulence from hovering helicopters was severe. Tents were blown down and equipment scattered. One irate individual anonymously broadcast over the air to whom it may concern, "If you blow my tent down one more time, I'm going to shoot you down." A three-man pathfinder team from the Pathfinder Platoon of the 11th General Support Aviation Company soon arrived to assist the Marine air traffic control personnel. The control problem improved, but it was far from being solved.

I had sent one of my assistant division commanders, General Blanchard, to Duc Pho as my personal representative and he remained in the LEJEUNE area of operations almost exclusively. On several occasions, he had expressed to me his deep personal concern over the aircraft density but, nevertheless, was amazed at the effectiveness of the three-man pathfinder team which controlled daily the more than 1,000 arrivals and departures of OH-13, UH-1B, UH-1D, CH-47, and CH-54 helicopters along with the fixed-wing aircraft. The team initially stood on the hood of a ¼-ton truck in the dust storms churned up by rotor turbulence and with a single radio controlled traffic with nearly the efficiency of an air-conditioned tower at a large U. S. airport.

By 1630 on the afternoon of 8 April, the 1500-foot Caribou strip was completed. Work continued on the strip to expand it to 2,300 feet for C-123 use. The first Caribou airplanes that landed carried a mundane cargo of 30 tons of culvert, which was unloaded by the side of the runway since no parking ramp had yet been prepared. Work continued through that night again with glaring searchlights. The Marines shuddered at the Army's intense illumination since they had long been accustomed to very strict light and noise control at night. Their apprehension was fortunately unfounded and the engineer work continued without enemy interruption. On 13 April, the 8th Engineers began the construction of a second Caribou airstrip parallel and west of the completed C-123 strip. This was necessary to allow the C-123 field to be improved and surfaced to meet C-130 criterion. The second strip was finished in 25 hours after 4150 cubic yards of earth had been moved and graded.

One reason that landing zone MONTEZUMA did not sustain an enemy night attack during Operation LEJEUNE was the Night Hunter operations that were conducted almost every evening. Karhohs developed this technique to a high degree in this action and, later, on the coastal plains of Binh Dinh. These operations used four helicopters; one acted as a lead and flare ship, while the

other three unlighted helicopters were armed to take care of targets of opportunity. As the lead ship dropped flares, the door gunners in the next two helicopters, which flew at a higher altitude and at a distance not to be revealed by the flares, observed the ground with starlight scopes. Once the enemy was spotted, the gunners would open up with tracers to pinpoint the target for the last armed helicopter to make a run with 2.75-inch rockets. This technique was very effective at finding and killing the enemy and denying him one of his most valuable assets—the night.

Once the brigade task force had established itself at Duc Pho, a sea line of communication became necessary to provide the required daily 250 short tons of supplies necessary to support the brigade task force. The newly constructed Caribou airstrip could not possibly carry all the required logistical support. A sea terminal point was selected almost directly east of landing zone MONTEZUMA called Razor Back Beach. During the 8-day period between 9 and 17 April, over 8,000 short tons were moved over the shore from LST's and LCM's. The operation was not without difficulty. Sand bars prevented LST's from coming in with a full load and eight to twelve foot breakers made the landings of the smaller craft extremely touchy.

Operation LEJEUNE combined the efforts of four military services: The U. S. Army, the U. S. Marine Corps, the U. S. Air Force, and the U. S. Navy. The tactical air force support was substantial. They had only taken over operation of the Caribou since the first of that year and, though slightly leary of accepting the hastily constructed airstrip, they made 159 sorties into MONTEZUMA carrying 1,081 passengers and 229 tons of cargo. During the first eight days of operations, tactical air dropped 115 tons of bombs and 70 tons of napalm. The U. S. Navy provided gun support with a total of 2,348 rounds from its two ships offshore, the USS Picking and the USS Shelton.

It was apparent right from the beginning that the enemy in that area had never before been challenged by airmobile tactics. It was several days before they began to appreciate the versatility and flexibility of the 1st Cavalry operations. The enemy chose to disperse and hide. Contact was only sporadic with the heaviest combat action on 16 April.

At noon on 22 April, Operation LEJEUNE was terminated. Although contacts were primarily light throughout the operation, 176 enemy had been killed and 127 captured by the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry. This brigade was relieved in place by the 3d Brigade

of the 25th Division, under Colonel James G. Shanahan, which had been under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division for some months. The 3d Brigade of the 25th would soon become part of Task Force OREGON, the first division-size U. S. Army force to be formed in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

Operation LEJEUNE was unique in many ways. The deployment of the 2d Brigade to the I Corps Tactical Zone was the first commitment of any large U. S. Army unit in that area. More importantly, the engineering effort, including the lifting of 30 tons of equipment to build two tactical fixed-wing airstrips in a matter of a few days, was unparalleled in Army engineering history. Finally, the demonstrated "fire brigade" reaction capability of deploying a large task force in a day and a half to an entirely new area of operations proved again the flexibility of the airmobile division. At Duc Pho the 1st Cavalry left behind two airstrips, an impressive sea line of communications, several critical connecting roads, and a damaged Viet Cong infrastructure. In light of the

limited mission, Operation LEJEUNE was an unqualified Success.²

The techniques of the 1st Cavalry Division that were demonstrated in Operation LEJEUNE were to prove invaluable in the many campaigns to follow. Operation LEJEUNE, however, was a relatively short move outside of the Division's area of operations. Much more complex and longer moves were made shortly thereafter which involved Air Force fixed-wing aircraft in addition to the organic lift. These moves demonstrated a technique whereby an Air Cavalry unit was extracted from combat, moved to a landing zone, and the bulk of its equipment flown by Air Force aircraft to a new location. The organic aircraft would then be ferried to the area and join with the unit ready to be employed again.

On 23 June 1967, about 0900 hours in the morning, Lieutenant General Stanley R. Larsen told me to have a battalion ready to move by 1300 that afternoon. They would be lifted by C-130's from landing zone ENGLISH in the Bong Son Plain to the Dak To-Kontum area in the Central Highlands where they were desperately needed. It was necessary to pull the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry directly out of contact with the enemy and get them to landing zone ENGLISH. Using 24 C-130 aircraft loads and two C-123's, the battalion moved to Dak To by that evening along with an artillery battery. They were almost immediately thrown into combat. The next day, two more battalions followed and the third day, the remainder of the direct support artillery. By now I had my 3d Brigade (-) committed to operational control of the 4th Infantry Division. In the next few days these units would participate in one of the hardest fought battles of the Vietnam war. The enemy had shown unexpected strength and determination. During this action the 3d Brigade was commanded by Colonel James O. McKenna, who had just taken over the Brigade from Colonel Burton on 22 June. The 3d Brigade would not return to my control until 25 July.

2. Operation LEJEUNE had an interesting sidelight in its unique command relationships. I mentioned earlier that we had crossed the invisible border into I Corps Tactical Zone where Lieutenant General Lewis W. Wait, as Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, was commander of all U.S. forces in that area. On the other hand, I worked for Lieutenant General Stanley R. Larsen, Commanding General, I Field Force, Vietnam, who commanded all the U.S. Forces in II Corps Tactical Zone. (Are you still with me?) Even though I commanded a major operation on General Walt's real estate, I reported directly to General Larsen and only co-ordinated informally with the Marines on the spot. This is hardly standard military procedure.

In order to cover the area left open in the PERSHING area of operations, I spread the remainder of the 1st Cavalry Division north and south of the Bong Son River. With the Division's unique ability to rapidly generate a reserve force from other forces in contact, I had no hesitation in allowing all maneuver elements to be committed.

This is not to say that any commander is happy to lose operational control of any of his forces. The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry that had been detached from the 1st Cavalry before I took command had been operating in the southeast corner of the II Corps Tactical Zone near Phan Thiet since September 1966 and circumstances dictated that I would not have it back under my wing until after January 1968, when it would join me in the I Corps area. Administratively, it still belonged to the Division and we were responsible for all normal support for this unit except operational control, which was vested directly to General Larsen.

Throughout the Battle of Binh Dinh, one airmobile battalion task force was detached under I Field Force control in Binh Thuan Province to support pacification activities around the city of Phan Thiet. The task force was created and moved on 24 hours notice. Although scheduled for 60 days of operation, it stayed in being for 17 months. The task force contained a very significant part of the division's assets. In addition to the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, it included a scout section from the air cavalry squadron, a platoon of engineers, a battery of 105-mm howitzers, a platoon of aerial rocket artillery, lift helicopters, a signal team, and intelligence and civil affairs personnel, plus a forward support element for logistics. This battalion-sized operation, known as Operation BYRD, was especially interesting as a parallel to the Division's activities during this period. BYRD was in effect a microcosm of the Division's operations in Binh Dinh.³

Binh Thuan is located about 100 miles northeast of Saigon, 200 miles south of Binh Dinh and bordering the South China Sea. The principal port city, Phan Thiet, was surrounded by a heavily popu-

3. Task Force BYRD was originally under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Billy M. Vaughn. It was in turn commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fred E. Karhohs who made several significant changes in the Task Force's operations. Upon General Norton's recommendation, Karhohs took over the 2d Brigade the same day I assumed command of the Division. Lieutenant Colonel Leo D. Turner became the new commander of Task Force BYRD. During the last six months of the Task Force's operations, it was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph T. Griffin, Jr., who wrote a definitive thesis on Operation BYRD while attending the U. S. Army War College in 1970.

lated rice-growing area. Forty percent of the Province consisted of forested mountains, which supplied some of the best timber in Vietnam. These woodlands also provided clandestine bases and rest areas for the Viet Cong. Operation BYRD was an economy of force effort, using a minimum involvement of United States ground combat forces, aiming to upgrade capabilities of the armed forces of South Vietnam in that area.

In order to protect the vital port of Phan Thiet and surrounding areas, the Commanding General of I Field Force, Vietnam gave the 1st Cavalry Division the mission of defeating the enemy forces in the BYRD area, in close coordination with South Vietnam forces. The battalion was to assist in opening National Highway #1 as it ran along the coast through this area. Of the approximately 1,600 personnel in the average daily task force strength, 650 were organic to a battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division, 500 were from other 1st Cavalry assets, and 450 were from I Field Force. Although the composition of the task force varied, the nucleus was the airmobile battalion. The small force Contained all the elements essential to sustain independent operations and could take advantage of available support.

Initially, the task force established a fire base and command post on the Phan Thiet airfield from which infantry rifle companies were air assaulted into landing zones within the range of the direct support of the artillery battery. The first operations relieved pressure on Phan Thiet and the nearby district capitals. The task force began combined operations with the South Vietnamese, taking advantage of U. S. Navy ships and U. S. Air Force fighters for fire support. The area of influence of the task force was broadened by the establishment of fire bases at steadily increasing distances from Phan Thiet.

The operation, as it continued, isolated the enemy in the heavily-forested areas, away from the populated zones. In the close-in areas, the task force concentrated on the Viet Cong infrastructure and took action to build confidence in the population and in the friendly armed forces. Revolutionary development activities extended from the city toward the outlying parts of the province. All of these phases took place simultaneously. Initially, the task force operated with regional and popular forces of the South Vietnamese. Later, it conducted combined operations with two Vietnamese Army battalions of the 23d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division.

The Task Force ended up with an amazing record. During the 17 months of Operation BYRD, the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry had

only 34 troopers killed in action while 849 enemy were killed and 109 captured, More important than enemy losses, the Task Force had enabled the South Vietnamese government to spread its control from the province and district capitals to virtually all the population in the area. Agriculture production, commerce, education and medical treatment had increased manyfold.

The small but vitally important air assaults of Operation BYRD not only reproduced the Binh Dinh battle in miniature; they also underscored the significant advantages of envelopment over penetration as a tactic. Penetration is costly—opening a gap, widening it, and holding the shoulders in order to get into the enemy's rear. The air assault concept permits a cheaper, faster, and more decisive vertical envelopment approach, which has made the conventional battlefield more fluid than ever. The great variety of air assault concepts seems to fall under two major headings—each of which is a principle of war—surprise and security. In the Battle of Binh Dinh as well as in Operation BYRD, extensive preparations or detailed reconnaissance, while maximizing security, compromised surprise and often created dry holes. Executing air assaults without prior artillery preparation and with limited prior reconnaissance involved considerable risk, but frequently yielded rewarding results. The choice depends on the enemy situation and the ability of the G-2 to present the proper recommendation to the division commander. The air assault must rely on speed, scheme of maneuver, locally available firepower (aerial rocket artillery), and command and control from an aerial platform. Additionally, a reinforcing capability to exploit success or to assault the enemy from another direction must be immediately available to the commander.

This period in the BYRD fighting was characterized by almost daily contacts with squad and platoon-size Viet Cong elements as the task force searched base areas and interdicted lines of communication. Combined United States and South Vietnamese operations were continuous, with both sides gaining mutual respect and experience.

In August 1967 the 1st Cavalry Division again moved into Quang Ngai Province in I Corps Tactical Zone with three battalions under the 3d Brigade, commanded by Colonel McKenna. This resulted in the first major reconnaissance in force into the

Song Re Valley.⁴ The Song Re Valley had been a sacrosanct Viet Cong stronghold for years. The picturesque terrain consisted of numerous hillocks in the valley floor, fertile fields of rice, and well-fed livestock. Previous aerial reconnaissance had drawn heavy antiaircraft fire. Although the valley appeared prosperous, only a few inhabitants had been observed. Intelligence experts suspected that military age personnel were either hiding in the hills as outright Viet Cong soldiers or being used as laborers by the Viet Cong forces in constructing fortified positions.

On 9 August 1967 the 2d Battalion of the 8th Cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John E. Stannard, commenced a battalion air assault into the valley 32 miles southwest of Quang Ngai City. The selected landing zone, named landing zone PAT, was situated on a ridgeline 2,300 meters southwest of an abandoned airstrip at Ta Ma. This landing zone selected because it was the only high ground large enough and clear enough of obstructions to allow six lift ships to land, and because it was in an area which would give an assaulting company the advantage of reconnoitering from high ground down to the valley floor. The assault started at 0936 after a short artillery preparation. After the 1st Platoon had landed, intense antiaircraft fire came from the surrounding hills. Two Huey's were shot down almost immediately. Company A of the 2d Battalion was faced with a pitched battle for the next four hours. The enemy situation, reconstructed later from information gained from prisoners of war, captured documents, and a survey of the battle area, disclosed that the chosen landing zone was right in the midst of well-prepared enemy positions. Looking down on the position were at least 80 North Vietnamese with three 12.7-mm antiaircraft weapons, 82-mm mortars, and 57-mm recoilless rifles. A Viet Cong Montagnard rifle company was on the same hill mass. The ridgeline was rimmed with fox holes and well-concealed bunkers almost flush with the ground. Company A had landed in a nest of hornets.

There were to be hundreds of acts of individual heroism in the next few hours which have been duly recorded elsewhere. How

4. This operation was co-ordinated with the larger operations of Task Force OREGON taking place in southern Quang Ngai Province under Major General William B. Rosson (who in turn reported to III Marine Amphibious Force). Again the corps boundaries had not changed but the 1st Cavalry took its orders from CG, I Field Force Vietnam as it did during Operation LEJEUNE. During this time, the 1st Cavalry worked with the 1st Brigade, 101st, under Brigadier General Salve H. ("Matt") Matheson. Later, when the Brigade joined its parent division, it would be commanded by Colonel John W. ("Rip") Collins.

ever, for the purpose of this study, the importance of landing zone PAT stems from the fact that Air Cavalry units were able to react with terrific firepower and extract their men from almost untenable positions when necessary. The aerial rocket artillery had fired 576 rockets in support of this action and two armed Chinook helicopters had delivered eight tons of ordnance on possible escape routes. Tactical Air had done a magnificent job of supporting the ground forces with a total of 42 sorties. What could have been a disaster turned out to be an effective assault, killing 73 enemy while only losing 11 friendly troops. Two major enemy units had been flushed out of hidden positions and a major antiaircraft position had been destroyed.

The skirmish at landing zone PAT was the major encounter with the Viet Cong during the reconnaissance in force of the Song Re Valley. This reconnaissance was a preview in miniature of major operations of the 1st Cavalry in subsequent years. We had learned to establish a fixed-wing base near the assault area and save our precious helicopter sorties for short-range missions. Song Re Valley was an excellent rehearsal for what was to come.

As a commander I could not help but be struck by the never-ending inventiveness of the U. S. soldier. In my experience the average soldier in Vietnam was as good as, and, in many ways, better than, his World War II predecessor. He came up with new solutions for new problems in a new environment almost daily. One example was the use of the Chinook as an "ad hoc bomber."

The Viet Cong had developed tremendous underground fortifications and tunnel systems throughout Binh Dinh Province. Many of these fortifications could withstand almost any explosion. Riot agents were introduced to drive the enemy from his tunnels and force him into the open. During Operation PERSHING the 1st Cavalry dropped a total of 29,600 pounds of these agents from CH-47 aircraft using a simple locally fabricated fusing system on a standard drum. Initially the drums were merely rolled out the back of the open door of the Chinook and the fusing system was armed by a static line which permitted the drum to arm after it was free of the aircraft. Using this method, a large concentration of tear gas could be placed on a suspected area with accuracy.

Napalm was rigged and dropped in a similar manner during this same period. A single CH-47 could drop two and one-half tons of napalm on an enemy installation. Naturally, this method

of dropping napalm was only used on specific targets where tactical air could not be effectively used.

Another version of the CH-47 which was unique to the 1st Cavalry Division was the so-called "Go-Go Bird." The "Go-Go Bird," as it was called by the Infantry, was a heavily armed Chinook which the 1st Cavalry Division was asked to test in combat. Three test models were received armed with twin 20-mm Gatling guns, 40-mm grenade launchers, and .50-caliber machine guns, along with other assorted ordnance. Though anything but graceful, it had a tremendous morale effect on the friendly troops which constantly asked for its support.

From the infantryman's viewpoint, when the "Go-Go Bird" came, the enemy disappeared. The pilots who flew these test aircraft performed some incredibly heroic deeds to prove the worth of the machine. However, from the overall viewpoint of the Division, these special machines required an inordinate amount of support and, if we had kept them as part of our formal organization, we would have been required to give up three of our essential lift Chinooks. Army Concept Team in Vietnam monitored the tests of the "Go-Go Birds" and flew many of the missions. After two of the test vehicles were lost through attrition, the final armed Chinook was transferred to the 1st Aviation Brigade. Much debate would continue about the effectiveness and vulnerability of such a large armed helicopter, but the individual trooper who enjoyed its support would never forget it.

To deal more effectively on a continuing basis with the enemy fortifications on the coastal plains of Binh Dinh, the Division had requested and received one tank company from the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, 4th Division, at Pleiku. On the surface one of the most unlikely additions to an airmobile division would appear to be heavy armor. The tank with all its implications of ponderousness seems to be the antithesis of what one looks for in a "lean and mean" light fighting unit. In many circumstances, this would be true. But, I had always wanted to explore the possibility of a combination of the surprise of air cavalry and the shock of armor. Binh Dinh seemed the appropriate place.

The 90-mm gun of the M-48 tank was found to be one of the best weapons in dealing with the enemy fortifications. In 24 to 48 hours, a determined enemy could prepare an elaborate perimeter affording him excellent cover and concealment around an entire

village. His fortifications were well organized and usually prepared in a series of hedgerows. The Viet Cong would not usually leave his bunker under any circumstances. The bunker had to be destroyed to kill him. It was here that the tank came into its own.

In the Bong Son Plain, the 1st Cavalry Division usually employed one platoon from A Company of the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor with from six to eight tanks in conjunction with an infantry battalion when they assaulted a fortified village. Because the employment and maneuver of the tanks were so essential in attacking a fortified village, a problem of too much communications sometimes developed. Everybody from the infantry platoon leader and company commander on the ground to the battalion commander and his S-3 in the air were directing and maneuvering the tanks. To sort out this problem, it soon became standard procedure to put the tank commander or his executive officer in a light observation helicopter to control the attached tanks for the infantry battalion commander. This method worked best.

The tank usually carried a basic load of 62 rounds of 90-min shells and 2,000 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition and very often, in the course of a four or five hour battle, a tank would use as much as three basic loads. To prohibit a tank running out of ammunition during a crucial time of an engagement, the 1st Cavalry developed a system whereby a basic load of tank ammunition was pre-slung for helicopter delivery and stored at the closest fire base to the scene of the action. Upon initial contact, an immediate resupply of ammunition was initiated. This same air transport capability was used to maintain the tanks by rapidly moving mechanics and repair parts to disabled vehicles.

The most critical limiting factor in the use of tanks in Vietnam was the trafficability of the soil. In the Bong Son area during the dry season and the latter stages of the rice-growing cycle, the M-48 tank could move across the rice paddies with a certain amount of ease. When the rice paddies were flooded, movement was greatly restricted and had to be carefully planned in conjunction with the engineers. Bulldozers and engineer mine-sweeping teams had to be attached to the moving tank elements to keep open movement options for the armor.

In September 1967, the 1st Cavalry Division received another armor capability when the 1st Battalion, 50th Mechanized Infantry was attached. The battalion was completely ground mobile in its organic armored personnel carriers.

When I received the 1st Battalion, 50th Mechanized Infantry, I decided not to treat this battalion as an orphan child to be held

in reserve for some particular contingency, but rather to totally integrate it into the 1st Cavalry Division and to train its troops completely in airmobile tactics. We rounded out the battalion with a fourth rifle company from headquarters and supply units and placed their armored personnel carriers at a central position near landing zone UPLIFT. The companies would go out on airmobile operations just as other companies of the Division and if a mission appeared that needed a mechanized unit, we extracted the troops to landing zone UPLIFT and deployed them in their primary role. The 1st Battalion, 50th Mechanized Infantry proved to be a very valuable asset and, when we had lost our attached tanks to their parent organization, we often employed the Armored Personnel Carriers with their .50 caliber guns in tank-like formations. In using the mechanized battalion in this manner, we felt we enjoyed the best of both worlds. We had the additional troops which were completely trained in air assault tactics and we had the mechanized capability when the terrain and situation demanded.

On 1 September 1967, the first Huey Cobra (AH-1G) arrived in Vietnam. The initial six aircraft were assigned to their New Equipment Training Team, under the supervision of the 1st Aviation Brigade. Cobra New Equipment Training Team training started on 18 September with pilot transition courses and instruction on air frame, engine, armament and avionics maintenance. The Cobra was a major step forward in the development of the armed helicopter. For those pilots who had been flying the old, make-shift UH-1C's, it was a giant step.

After all this time there were many people, both in and out of the military, who didn't understand the role of the armed helicopter. Ever since Colonel Jay D. Vanderpool had tied a machine gun on a H-13 in the mid-50's, there were those who saw the armed helicopter as a fragile toy dreamed up by frustrated fighter pilots in the Army who were unable by regulation and budget to own really sophisticated attack aircraft. The consensus was generally that a semi-skilled skeet shooter or even a good slingshot artist could knock any helicopter out of the sky at short range and that an encounter with more sophisticated antiaircraft weapons would be suicidal. This attitude is quite understandable in duck hunters who never had the challenge of ducks shooting back. Also, the very nature of the helicopter, which looks very ugly and fragile com-

pared to a sleek jet aircraft, adds to the conviction that flying one in combat is non-habit forming.

On the plus side, the helicopter is the most agile of all aircraft and has a capability of taking advantage of cover and concealment at extremely low altitudes that would be impossible in a fixed-wing airplane. It was soon proven that the helicopter was remarkably hard to shoot down and the most vulnerable part was the pilot himself. Personnel armor protection and armored seats greatly increased the pilot survivability. The experienced pilot used every unique aspect of the helicopter's flight envelope to his advantage.

Observation from the helicopter is unequaled. The enemy learned that to fire at one was to give up his advantage of cover and concealment and generally bring a devastating return of machine gun fire and rockets. A corollary to the advantage of seeing the enemy was the ability to identify our own troops with precision. Consequently, the armed helicopter pilot could safely place fires within a few meters of our own troops. This became particularly important as the enemy developed the "hugging" tac-

tics which he used to avoid the heavier fires from our tactical air support and B-52 bombers.

The Army had long realized that the Huey-gun-rocket combination was a make-shift, albeit, quite ingenious, system that should be replaced by a new aircraft specifically designed for the armed mission. In the early 1960's, industry asserted that advance was within the state of the art. Experts in research and development urged the Army planners to go for a compound helicopter with an integrated armament system as soon as possible. They argued that it was technically feasible and procurement of any "interim" system would mean the Army would be stuck with an inferior capability for years to come. Moreover, it appeared that an advanced system could be procured almost as soon as an interim aircraft.

There were other pressures too. The Office of the Secretary of Defense had been critical of all the Services in their efforts to procure expensive weapon systems that appeared to offer only marginal improvements over the system they were to replace—aircraft that flew a little higher or faster, tanks that had only slightly better performance, ships that cruised but a few knots faster. Ever since the Howze Board, the Army was sensitive to any criticism that it was striving for less than the best in airmobility. Also, the Air Force maintained that much of Army aviation duplicated an Air Force capability rather than, as the Army claimed, complemented Air Force support. The Army decided that its best option was to hold a design competition for a totally new system that would offer unique capabilities.

Unfortunately, what was a straight forward concept for a new armed helicopter soon became bogged down in a morass of permutations, modifications and additions to its design. The technicians had taken over from the tacticians. The concept grew in complexity and cost. Worse, it was being pushed into a later time frame when it was sorely needed in combat. Such things as a rigid rotor, ground avoidance radar, inertial navigation and computerization were straining the state of the art and pricing the Army out of mass production. A reevaluation was inevitable.

Bell Helicopter Company had prudently carried on its own research and development program using proven dynamic components of the Huey. Consequently, they were able to offer, at the appropriate moment, an "off-the-shelf" armed helicopter for just slightly more than the modified UH-1 that the Army was then buying to replace Vietnam attrition. The "Cobra" had enough speed to meet the escort mission; tandem seating; better armor;

and a better weapons system. With the strong urging of the combat commanders, the Army decided to procure an interim" system for immediate requirements while it sorted out the problems of the "ultimate" system.

The history of the use, lack-of-use, and misuse of DECCA has many important lessons for future developers of airmobile equipment.

It was recognized by the earliest planners that one of the limitations of the airmobility concept would be operating at night and under periods of extreme low visibility. Research and Development offered many possible options to improve the helicopter's capability under these conditions, but all were expensive and complex.

The British had perfected a low-level radio navigational aid known as DECCA which essentially used three low frequency ground radio stations to propagate a series of hyperbolic curves which could be translated by a cockpit instrument into a position fix. Accuracy depended on the spread of the stations, the distance from the station, and the weather conditions. Because of the low frequency, one of the attractive features was its low altitude capability. This contrasted to the line-of-sight limitation of omnidirectional radio navigation aid and Tactical Air Navigation used by the Air Force. The Army tested several versions of the DECCA System and decided it had enough advantages to warrant its installation on command helicopters and lead aircraft.

A DECCA chain had been installed in Vietnam and in the early 1960's, the Army took over its supervision and maintenance. A big disadvantage in the DECCA system was the requirement for special maps printed with the hyperbolic grid and a reluctance by the user to take the time and effort to develop confidence in the system. Its use was further complicated by the resistance of the Air Force to accept a position report in instrument weather from a DECCA read-out as a positive fix. Many senior officers were dissatisfied with the accuracy and reliability of the DECCA system at night and eventually the DECCA died from lack of use and misuse. The requirement for a secure, accurate means of low-level navigation remained.

On 28 September the 1st Cavalry Division was notified that an increasing enemy buildup in the I Corps Tactical Zone might require that the III Marine Amphibious Force be reinforced. The

1st Cavalry was alerted to prepare one brigade. The brigade began movement on 1 October as the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry and the 3d Brigade command post departed for Chu Lai. By that evening the 3d Brigade command post, the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, B Company of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry and C Battery of the 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery were closed and the Brigade was under operational control of the Americal Division.

By 3 October all Brigade elements were in place and Operation WALLOWA began the next day with a series of air assaults. This deployment also involved the first major move of significant maintenance elements from An Khe to Chu Lai. This experience would prove to be extremely valuable in later operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

The concept of a brigade task force, in the U. S. Army's current division organization, is such that different battalions can be used under any brigade controlling headquarters. This allows a great deal of flexibility. For example, the 3d Brigade which had been deployed to the Dak To area and returned to the PERSHING area of operations had different battalions when it deployed to Chu Lai. During November we-were alerted to move another brigade back to the Kontum-Dak To area. This time I elected that the 1st Brigade headquarters under Colonel Rattan would control the task force.

The second battle of Dak To, under operational control of the 4th Division, has been extensively documented elsewhere. For the purpose of this study, it is important to note that the helicopters of the 4th Infantry Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 52d Aviation Battalion, and the 1st Cavalry Division flew in excess of 10,000 hours in support of the battle. Over 22,000 sorties were flown, transporting 40,000 passengers and 6,000 tons of cargo. Dak To was another example of the flexibility of an airmobile division which allows its assets to be parcelled out as rapid reaction forces and still continues on a basic mission of its own. The large PERSHING area of operation was left with only one thin brigade during this period. I was glad we had spent so much time working with the 22d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division on airmobile tactics, since the 22d, under the able leadership of Colonel Nguyen Van Hieu, would have to bear the major burden in Binh Dinh Province for a time.

During the long period of the Binh Dinh operations, the 1st Cavalry Division had developed a special rapport with the regiments

of the 22d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Infantry Division. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam regiments were assigned distinct areas of operation contiguous to the 1st Cavalry brigade areas and, teamed with 1st Cavalry helicopters, they became well versed in the intricacies of airmobile assaults. During Operation PERSHING over 209 joint operations were conducted with the 22d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Infantry Division. The 40th Regiment of this division played a major part in the Battle of Tam Quan.

Back in May 1967, the Division's capabilities had been greatly enhanced by the attachment of three companies from the 816th National Police Field Force. Introduction of the National Police Field Force into the PERSHING area of operations brought a new weapon to bear on the Viet Cong infrastructure. Now, the Division could conduct cordon and search operations of hamlets and villages with greatly increased effectiveness. The National Police Field Force squads were very important to 1st Cavalry operations in the Binh Dinh Province.

The Battle of Tam Quan, 6 December to 20 December 1967, which was one of the largest battles during Operation PERSHING, was a good example of the "piling on" tactics which had been so successful in the early airmobile reactions to the enemy. The battle began with the fortuitous discovery of an enemy radio antenna by a scout team near the town of Tam Quart and a small force was inserted at 1630 hours on 6 December. Although the original enemy contact had been late in the day, the 1st Brigade reacted by "piling on" with a battalion of infantry and elements of the 1st Battalion, 50th Mechanized Infantry. On the following day, elements of the 40th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment joined the fight and distinguished themselves by their aggressive manner. Throughout the battle, which was characterized by massive use of artillery, tactical air support, and air assaults by both the U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops, the allied force held the initiative. There were frequent vicious hand-to-hand battles in the trenches and bunkers. The division used its mechanized forces to fix the enemy and drive him from his fortified positions. The airmobile units hit him when he tried to move. The enemy lost 650 men during this fierce engagement.

The Battle of Tam Quan had a much greater significance than we realized at the time. In that area, it pre-empted the enemy's Tet offensive even though the full impact wasn't then realized. As

a result, that part of Binh Dinh Was the least effected of any part of South Vietnam during Tet.

During the late fall of 1967, plans had been developed which would have a tremendous effect on the future of the 1st Cavalry operations during the next year. U. S. Army, Vietnam, Headquarters, for the first time in the war, had been given the mission of contingency planning. They began planning four contingencies which would project the 1st Cavalry Division into the I Corps Tactical Zone. I—the Cavalry Would go north of Kontum and Pleiku . . . way north of Dak To; II—the Cavalry would go up near Khe Sanh; III—to Ashau; and IV—the Cavalry would go into the big supply area west of Quang Ngai. The plans themselves, known as the YORK Series, are incidental but, like many contingency plans, they made the U. S. forces examine potential logistical bases, without which the plans were meaningless. The Marines

were told to start working on Red Beach north of Da Nang as a logistical base to support the Cavalry in this series of operations. A smaller logistical base was to be set up at Hue-Phu Bai. Events were soon to prove that the logic behind this planning effort by U. S. Army, Vietnam, was indisputably sound.

The year 1967 had proved many important facets of the airmobile concept. Perhaps the most important facet that had been demonstrated without question was the inestimable value of the Air Cavalry squadron. This unit, especially in its operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone, had demonstrated its unique capabilities in uncovering the elusive Viet Cong. Practically every major engagement was started with a contact by the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Troop, and the enemy was very slow in discovering means of coping with this reconnaissance in force.

The Air Cavalry squadron success in the airmobile division convinced higher headquarters that more Air Cavalry squadrons should be assigned to the theater to work with non-airmobile divisions. In my briefings to the many senior officers who visited the Cavalry Division, I never missed an opportunity to state that no matter what kind of a division I might be privileged to command in combat, I would fight tooth and nail for the capability of an Air Cavalry squadron.