On 11 June 1968, General William C. Westmoreland passed command of the U. S. forces in Vietnam to General Abrams, who would serve as Acting Commander until General Westmoreland was sworn in as Chief of Staff of the Army on 3 July.

It would be presumptuous on my part to try to give an overall assessment of General Westmoreland's influence on the airmobile concept during his four and one-half years as Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; however, there was no doubt that General Westmoreland had set the airmobile stage for his subordinate commanders through his own strategy and example. Most importantly, after giving them his broad concept of an operation, he allowed them that precious freedom which is so necessary for subordinates if they are expected to exercise their own imagination and seize fleeting opportunity.

For this study, it is important to again note that General Westmoreland believed so much in the potential of airmobility that he was willing to commit the 1st Cavalry to a major operation only days after its arrival-recognizing full well that a failure would have been not only a setback for the war but a disaster for the future of airmobility. Again, his decision to relieve Khe Sanh by a series of air assaults under the scrutiny of the entire world press was solid affirmation of his confidence in the airmobile concept. Appropriately, he would become the first Army Chief of Staff to wear the Army Aviator Badge.

On the night of 16 June 1968, an incident occurred that graphically demonstrated the problems of command and control of the air space in the face of an enemy air threat. It also surfaced fundamental differences in the Air Force and Army concepts which, if not solved, could have a major impact on future airmobile tactics.

At 2055 hours on 16 June a U. S. radar station reported that ten unidentified helicopters had been located six kilometers north of the Ben Hai River. During the remainder of the night of 16-17 June 1968 numerous reports were received of enemy helicopters operating in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone. Another report cited an attack on a U. S. Navy boat by an unidentified aircraft. Finally, it was reported that many of the enemy helicopters were destroyed by U. S. Air Force aircraft and by artillery. Two hours after the first report had been received, 7th Air Force dispatched a message stating that all aircraft, both helicopter and fixed-wing, operating in the I Corps Tactical Zone would be under the positive control of Air Force ground radar stations. In effect, this Air Force message would have paralyzed all ground operations in this area.

General Williams, Commanding General of the 1st Aviation Brigade, visited 7th Air Force Headquarters early on the morning of 17 June to inform the Chief of Staff of the 7th Air Force that compliance with the Air Force teletypewriter exchange was impractical since it would cut off not only tactical operations but also emergency resupply and medical evacuation flights in I Corps Tactical Zone. He pointed out that the 7th Air Force did not have a control means to handle even a fraction of the 1,000 Army aircraft that were in I Corps and that the 7th Air Force message itself was not valid since that headquarters was not in the U. S. Army, Vietnam, command channel. There is no record of III Marine Amphibious Force receiving the message or, if received, any objection to the message. At 1100 on 17 June the Chief of Staff of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, informed the Chief of Staff of the 7th Air Force that Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, had not even been an information addressee on the message; that the message was impractical since it would stop combat operations; that it was not within the prerogative of the 7th Air Force to send; and that it would be rescinded.

Colonel Eugene M. Lynch, Deputy Aviation Officer, U. S. Army, Vietnam, attended a meeting at 7th Air Force Headquarters that same day to discuss this problem. The Air Force considered the helicopter sightings a serious threat to Da Nang Air Base and all other major installations in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Colonel Lynch emphasized the points that had been made previously . . . that combat operations could not be stopped entirely and that the Army installations were quite capable of defending themselves against enemy helicopters. He suggested that the best anti-enemy

helicopter weapon might be the armed Cobra. The Air Force continued to press for drastic measures to cope with the threat.

A meeting was held at III Marine Amphibious Force on 18 June to discuss the Services positions and problems in this matter. The Marines and the Army took similar positions, basically that stated previously by General Williams. The Air Force cited one of their problems was that of identifying the low slow-flying aircraft.

As time passed and further investigations were conducted, it developed that no finite evidence was available to confirm that enemy helicopters had been observed in flight, on the ground, or in a damaged state following claims of destruction by friendly air. The previously accepted positive reports were discredited.

My purpose in relating this incident is not to criticize any Service or persons involved, but to highlight the lack of prior planning in this most important area. The U. S. forces had enjoyed complete air superiority for so many years in Vietnam that the mere possibility of the presence of even an enemy helicopter threw all of their operational procedures into chaos. The Air Force reaction to a possible enemy air threat was predictable and, in their estimation, the only realistic option at that time. The Army and the Marine ground elements, which depended on the unlimited use of the helicopters, naturally could not accept the rigid restrictions that the Air Force insisted was necessary. The incident did not have a positive effect of clarifying the command channels and some sober planning on means and methods to better react to future enemy air contingencies. It is an incident that should not be forgotten by the future planners of airmobility in any conflict where absolute air superiority is not a basic assumption.

On 28 June 1968 U. S. Army, Pacific published General Order 325 which initiated reorganization of the 101st Airborne Division into the Army's second airmobile division. This same order called for the Division to be redesignated the 101st Air Cavalry Division effective I July 1968.¹

1. At this same time, the 1st Cavalry Division was redesignated the 1st Air Cavalry Division. Indeed, the abbreviation "1 ACD" had been in common use long before this official change. However, the terminology "air cavalry division" was revoked by Department of the Army on 26 August 1968, and the designations were reestablished as the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). To avoid confusion, this monograph only refers to the two divisions' latter designations.

Conversion of the 101st to an airmobile configuration had been considered by Department of the Army prior to the deployment of the division (-) in December 1967. However, the continued deficit in aviation assets during the buildup of forces in Vietnam had made such conversion impractical. The deployment of the 1st Brigade of the 101st in 1965 has been covered in an earlier portion of this study. In August 1967, two years and twenty-seven days after the departure of the 1st Brigade, the remainder of the 101st Airborne Division was alerted for deployment to Vietnam from Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Originally, the Division was scheduled to be in country on 10 February 1968. However, this movement was subsequently rescheduled for early December 1967.

The culmination of the Division's preparation for deployment was Operation EAGLE THRUST. This lift was keynoted by the departure on 8 December of the Commanding General, Major General Olinto M. Barsanti, in an aircraft piloted by General Howell M. Estes, Jr., Commander of the Military Airlift Command. On 18 December 1967 the last airplane touched down in Vietnam ending the largest and longest military airlift ever attempted into a combat zone. The move had required 369 C-141 Starlifter aircraft missions and 22 C-133 Cargomaster aircraft missions, ultimately airlifting 10,024 troops and over 5,300 tons of the Division's essential equipment.

During the 1968 Tet Offensive, elements of the Division moved to protect the cities of Saigon, Bien Hoa, Song Be, Phan Thiet, and Hue. As mentioned earlier, elements in Saigon had helped secure the American Embassy during the first few hours of that abortive enemy attack. The Division Headquarters moved to the Hue area on 8 March 1968. The 101st would remain in this area for the next few years.

The Screaming Eagles participated in a series of combat operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone to include Operation DELAWARE near the A Shau Valley. Though the 101st was not programmed into the A Shau Valley proper during this operation, it would be back in force several times in the next few months. When the order came to reorganize as an airmobile division, the 101st was involved in Operation NEVADA EAGLE, a large rice-denial effort in the plains south of Hue.

The Division developed a three-phase plan to accomplish the conversion from the airborne to the airmobile configuration. The first phase (1 July to 1 December 1968) would involve the activation and organization of the 160th Aviation Group and a reorganization of the division base. The second phase, which would not be

completed until June 1969, involved the conversion of the armored cavalry squadron to an air cavalry squadron. The last phase involved the activation of an aerial rocket artillery battalion. It was determined that a full year would be necessary to convert the 101st to an airmobile configuration. This time lag took into consideration the long range procurement of aviation assets and the fact that the Division would continue to conduct combat operations throughout the conversion period without degradation to its combat posture.

The reorganization progressed in a smooth manner with a few exceptions, one of these being in the aircraft maintenance area. U. S. Army, Vietnam, and the 101st planners envisioned the new airmobile division's aircraft maintenance as decentralized rather than centralized. In this case, they hoped to profit from the experience of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Aviation Brigade. Higher headquarters had failed to establish this cellular concept in its order for the conversion. Instead, it called for a large centralized maintenance and supply battalion. This problem was resolved by U. S. Army Pacific General Order 607, dated 11 October 1968, which established the desired cellular maintenance organization within the division. In effect, this married a maintenance cell with each company-sized aviation unit. This cell would have the capability of providing both direct support and avionics maintenance.

Many "chicken and the egg" arguments resulted from the final maintenance structure of the 101st versus the then current maintenance structure of the 1st Cavalry Division. The 1st Cavalry had espoused decentralized maintenance ever since its deployment to Vietnam, but there was finite limitations on the number of skilled mechanics and maintenance tool sets during the early build-up phase. The arguments of the logisticians for centralized maintenance prevailed.

When I took over the division in 1967, the division was still tied to the maintenance "hub" at An Khe. Only the detached battalion combat team at Phan Thiet had its own maintenance capability. Operation LEJEUNE, a week after I joined the division, convinced me that drastic action would have to be taken, and I ordered our logistics planners to develop maintenance kits that could be easily moved with displaced units. In October 1967, when I had to send a brigade to Chu Lai, the problem became critical. Part of a maintenance battalion had gone with the brigade, but there was still insufficient capability.

U. S. Army, Vietnam, in the early planning for the move to I Corps Tactical Zone, finally recognized our obvious requirement, and included a more decentralized maintenance concept as part of their logistical plan. I've already mentioned how fortunate we were to have started our logistical bases at Red Beach and Hue-Phu Bai prior to the Tet Offensive. When the 1st Brigade went to Quang Tri, they had their maintenance with them. We had finally broken down the "golf course" syndrome which was associated with An Khe.

When the 101st was ordered to an airmobile configuration, my staff and I completely supported its concept of decentralized maintenance. The major portion of the tremendous responsibility for converting the 101st to its new configuration would soon be in the very capable hands of Major General Melvin Zais. He would receive the unqualified cooperation of every aviation commander in this effort.

On 15 July 1968 1 turned over temporary command of the 1st Cavalry Division to Brigadier General Richard L. Irby. Major General George I. Forsythe had already been announced as the new Division Commanding General and would formally take command on 19 August, after completing flight training. After fifteen months of combat, several points stood out in my mind as particularly significant to the airmobility concept.

First, the vulnerability of the helicopter was still the most debatable issue in the entire military establishment. Depending on one's preconceived notions, one could use the same statistics to prove opposite viewpoints. For example, during calendar year 1967 the 1st Cavalry had flown 977,983 sorties and had 688 aircraft hit. Of these, 36 were shot down and lost. In the first six months of 1968, the Division had flown 407,806 sorties and had had 271 aircraft hit. Of these, 66 were shot down and lost. Part of this difference could be attributed to the increased intensity of combat in the northern I Corps Tactical Zone where the Division had been fighting since January; part could be attributed to the improvement in the quantity and quality of the North Vietnamese Army antiaircraft weapons systems; but, much of this so-called "increased vulnerability" was due to the thousands of random and sometimes uncontrolled flights by one or two aircraft performing separate observation, administrative, and control missions. In other words, I do not believe that we had a major increase in our losses in our

organized air assault formations, even during the high intensity antiaircraft fire of the A Shau Valley. However, more and more helicopters were being flown singly and in pairs without the benefit of detailed pre-flight intelligence briefings on especially "hot" zones and known enemy concentrations. It was particularly hazardous for the many transient aircraft that assumed they were in "safe air" just because they were a few kilometers from a major U.S. installation. Before I left the Division, I initiated a formal study effort to quantify this observation. Unfortunately, this study was never completed.

The second major observation I made in my after action report of 15 July 1968 was the critical problem of protecting the airmobile division's helicopters on the ground. Until one has viewed at first hand the real estate necessary to park approximately 450 dispersed helicopters near their related aircraft maintenance facilities, it is difficult to appreciate the magnitude of this problem. I know that the Marines grossly underestimated our base camp requirements when we moved north into the I Corps Tactical Zone. They just could not believe that we really required the area we had asked for—the equivalent of several major airfield complexes.

Once established, these areas had to be secured. This security was partly obtained by dispersion, construction of revetments, and organization within the landing zone to separate the helicopters from ammunition and fuel storage ' areas. Security was further enhanced by armed helicopter patrols throughout the night and roving patrols on the ground. The ground patrols had to operate at least to the range of enemy mortar. The security requirements sometimes caused a tremendous drain on combat resources if they were not monitored closely by each tactical commander. However, it was my experience that an airmobile division cannot overlook any detail in the security of its most valuable asset—its helicopters.

My third comment concerned unit integrity. I've described earlier in this study how the 1st Cavalry Division was often "fragmented" to send forces of battalion size and brigade size to other areas of operation. On the surface, it might appear likely that the division could have easily sent a proportionate share of our aviation assets and maintenance to the same operation. As a matter of fact, there was no proportionate share of airlift that automatically went with any brigade or battalion in the division. The division was conceived so that the division commander could vary the amounts of his assets that would be furnished to any portion of his force during an operation. There was no set quota of airlift that was allocated on a daily basis to any unit in the division. When

the division was fragmented it reduced the flexibility of the division as a whole and proportionately reduced the true capabilities of the smaller forces. This is not to say that the airmobile division cannot be used as the "fire brigade" for a theater commander; however, like the air cavalry squadron, its total effectiveness can only be realized as an entity.

My fourth observation was the constant need to be alert to the over-utilization of rotary wing aircraft in the supply mission. While I was the commander, I emphasized that our planning must always include provisions for utilizing the Caribou, C-123, and C-130 aircraft wherever they could enhance our capabilities. I knew of no instance during my tour in Vietnam when the 1st Cavalry Division was denied this fixed-wing support when it was requested. There were occasions when the division staff failed to plan for these aircraft and took the easy way out by going ahead and using our organic Chinooks for long logistics hauls. Operation PEGASUS was a good example of careful planning for the maximum use of the fixed-wing capabilities in the operational area. It would have been impossible to move the tonnages required in the time necessary without the careful preparation of landing zone STUD as a forward fixed-wing base.

As a fifth observation, I expressed my disappointment in one item of equipment, the Mohawk. From the Division's point of view, and I emphasize division, the six organic Mohawks did not provide the expected intelligence. We made a sincere and continuous effort to use the Mohawk's side-looking airborne radar capability and the infra-red capability, but the end product never justified the man-hours and assets required. I was particularly disappointed in these results, because I had spent so much effort as Deputy Director and later as Director of Army Aviation in justifying this system. In the early years we had made a big point of the necessity of having this capability at the division level. We had hoped that the division commander would have a "real-time" read out of valuable information through a data link. After fifteen months, I had to conclude that the Mohawk should be employed at corps and theater level.

Finally, no summary of my experience with the 1st Cavalry Division would be complete without mentioning once again the "man" part of the "man-machine" equation of airmobility. During this period, I was particularly fortunate to have a series of outstanding officers and warrant officers. Space has not permitted mentioning even a small percentage of their names. But, equally important, the 1st Cavalry Division was blessed with a continuous

flow of courageous young men in our noncommissioned officer and enlisted ranks. My notes of 15 July 1968 read like this:

In July of 1968 the 1st Aviation Brigade reassigned the 308th Aviation Battalion together with its support detachments to the 101st Airborne Division. This was part of the in-theater readjustment necessary for the airmobile reconfiguration of this division. This reassignment still left the 1st Aviation Brigade as the largest single Army aviation command in the world; indeed, larger than the air force of most countries. As of 31 July 1968, its strength was 25,181 men distributed as follows:

The chronic shortage of aviation personnel described in earlier chapters had finally been overcome by the expanded output of the Army Aviation School and the leveling off of requirements in Vietnam. Aviators, once frozen to their cockpit positions, were again receiving normal ground assignments and schooling. Though many aviators were still forced to anticipate recurring tours in

Vietnam, they could count on more time between such tours and more diversified assignments to fill out their career pattern.

In Southeast Asia, the Army aviator had become the sine qua non of combat operations. No major plan was ever considered without first determining the aviation assets available to support it. Nowhere was this better exemplified than in the 1st Aviation Brigade.

On the second anniversary of this unit back on May 25th, General Abrams, Deputy Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, summed up the feeling of the non-rated officers this way: "It has always been interesting for me to note that the aviators and men of this Brigade have been taken into the brotherhood of the combat arms. Not by regulation, not by politics, but they have been voted in by the infantry, who are the chartered members of that secluded club, the combat arms." During this same organizational day ceremony, noting the presence of General Cao Van Vien, Chairman of the joint General Staff, General Abrams added, "They are heroes to the district chiefs; they are heroes to the province chiefs; and they are heroes to soldiers of every nation that fights here."

During the same ceremony, General Vien presented the Brigade its second Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm, an award earned by the men of the Brigade for their outstanding aerial support of such operations as JUNCTION CITY and JEB STUART, and their opposition to the Tet offensive. General Williams, the Commanding General of the 1St Aviation Brigade, listed a few of the Brigade's accomplishments during 1967 when they airlifted more than five million troops-the equivalent of 313 infantry divisions in more than 2.9 million sorties. In that year Brigade aircraft flew more than 1.2 million hours-the equivalent of 137 years. The Brigade was credited for killing 10,556 Viet Cong, sinking nearly 10,000 supply sampans, and destroying more than 10,400 enemy structures and fortifications.

It is very difficult to properly document the accomplishments of the pilots and crews of the 1st Aviation Brigade since their deeds have been interwoven in the combat operational reports of the units which they supported. This support almost became accepted as routine.

I have tried to spare the reader the series of inevitable "wiring diagrams" so beloved by many students of military organizations. However, the organizational structure of the Brigade as of 31 July has a special impact in the sheer number of separate aviation units that were supporting the Free World Forces at this time. (Chart 2)

The Brigade was not only continuously supporting combat operations throughout the length of Vietnam, but also expanded its operation of in-country schools for the training of Vietnam Air Force Huey pilots, Republic of Korea and Thai aviators, as well as U. S. and Australian personnel.² The Brigade was also responsible for the supervision of the New Equipment Training Teams which eased the introduction of complex equipment into the operating units.

These training teams performed a vital function in smoothing the way for complex equipment that was introduced rapidly into combat. A small group of experts would arrive with every new aircraft system and armament sub-system and work with in-country personnel to build up experience and iron out maintenance problems that are inherent in any new system.

For example, back in September 1967 when the first Huey Cobra (AH-1G) arrived, in Vietnam, a New Equipment Training Team was ready for the aircraft. This team used the first six Cobras to check out the pilots of the 334th Assault Helicopter Company. When the design problems and maintenance problems were solved, these Cobras were then assigned to that company. The New Equipment Training Team pilots traveled from unit to unit to standardize procedures and to record early problems which were immediately relayed to Continental U. S. Some of the problems were not technical but more operational in nature, such as experienced in the Cobra where pilots missed the telltale noises of enemy fire, which they could hear through the open door of the older armed Huey, and the additional eyes and ears of the door gunners. Some modifications of tactics and techniques were necessary.

The New Equipment Training Teams highlight another facet of the growth of airmobility in Vietnam. Never in any previous war had there been so much new and complex equipment introduced into actual combat in such a short period with a minimum amount of problems. The transition from the old fleet of worn out H-21's to a modern turbinized sophisticated fleet of thousands had been accomplished on the battlefield. The combination of the training base in the United States, an aerial line of communications, superb logistics, and the know-how of American industry had made this possible.

2. One unique company of the Brigade, which supported the Australian Task Force, was composed of 50 percent Australian Navy personnel with the other half U. S. Army.

Airmobile forces often can be best employed with other forces to achieve unique capabilities when a special opportunity presents itself. I have previously described airmobile operations with armor in Binh Dinh Province. The following operation, in which the 101st Airborne Division participated in a combined air-sea-land maneuver, demonstrates again the imaginative use of all Free World capabilities. Helicopters, air-cushion vehicles, swift boats, and armored personnel vehicles were effectively employed in an integrated force.³ But Operation VINH LOC was not a mere demon-

3. The air-cushion vehicles used their unique capability of operating in swampy or very shallow water to patrol otherwise inaccessible areas. Most of these machines saw duty in the Mekong Delta region where they had done a magnificent job. I have not treated them extensively in this study, since they are not really an extension of airmobile operations so much as riverine operations. During the 1950's, the Army experimented with a variety of so-called "ground effects machines." They were more noted for their instability and huge "signature," than their practicality.

stration of modern technology and sheer power; it was a microcosm of the problem facing all our forces in Vietnam-the shadow Viet Cong "government" and how to deal with it.

Operation VINH LOC, a combined operation of elements of the 101st Airborne Division, the U. S. Navy, and Republic of Vietnam forces was conducted in Thua Thien Province during the period 10-20 September 1968. Vinh Loc Island, fifteen miles east of Hue, is a sub-tropical island with sandy beaches, palm trees, and rice paddies. (Map 8) It is almost completely flat with the exception of two small hills on the southeastern end.

The Tet offensive had left a power vacuum on the island since most of the Regional and Popular Force units had been pressed into service at Hue. Viet Cong forces moved into this vacuum and established a sanctuary, prepared defensive positions, and established caches. As a symbol of their power, they had staged a public execution of a village elder and a thirteen-year-old girl to demonstrate the consequences which local residents could expect if they failed to support the Viet Cong.

One allied operation had been conducted on the island prior to Operation VINH LOC. On 9 July 1968 the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st U. S. Marine Division, had begun a one-week operation. The Marines did not encounter organized resistance, for most of the enemy preferred to hide or mingle with the civilians rather than fight. The civilians were reluctant to provide any information about the enemy because they felt the Viet Cong would reassert their dominance as soon as the Marines withdrew.

When three Regional Force companies tried a sweep operation of the area on 4 September, they were pinned down by intense mortar, rocket, and small arms fire. Only the suppressive fire of the armed helicopters of the 101st Airborne Division allowed these units to break contact. American advisors estimated that there were at least two Viet Cong reinforced companies and possibly a battalion in the area.

While these activities were occurring,, plans were being made for a combined operation to end enemy influence on the island. The concept of operations envisaged cordoning the island with naval and ground forces while air assaults were planned to overcome organized resistance and to fragment enemy units. All available district resources would be used in this search.

General Zais, Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Major General Truong, Commanding General, 1St Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division, and Colonel Le Van Than, Province Chief of Thua Thien, approved of the concept for

a cordon and search of the portion of Vinh Loc Island which comprised Vinh Loc District. Final coordination was completed on the 9th and 10th of September.

An Area Coordination Center was established under the overall direction of the Commanding Officer, 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. This center was staffed by the Deputy Province Chief, the U. S. Deputy Sector Advisor, the District Chief, and the Commanding Officer, 1St Battalion (Airborne), 501st Infantry. The center also included an intelligence section comprised of representatives from the province and district intelligence staffs, the U. S. battalion S-2 section, Special Branch Police, National Police, and the Census Grievance Committee. The entire group would be moved to Vinh Loc District Headquarters after the combat assault.

On 9 September one Regional Force company withdrew from the island as planned. The next day Company D, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 501st Infantry moved from the northeastern end of the island to an area just north of the Vinh Loc-Phu Vang District boundary. The paratroopers had been operating in this area to provide security for the Col Co beach naval supply facility, so this maneuver did not arouse enemy suspicion. It was also designed to drive enemy forces southeast along the island into Vinh Loc District. The 54th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment had been conducting operations in Phu Thu District. The 2d and 3d battalions of the regiment moved into blocking positions along the northeast coast of Phu Thu District to drive the enemy across the water into Vinh Loc. This maneuver was also an extension of normal operations and did not reveal to the enemy the impending move into Vinh Loc. The 3d Troop, 7th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Cavalry moved with its armored personnel carriers to the Hue Landing Craft Utility, ramp, then down the Perfume River on medium landing craft to the Tan My LST ramp opposite Col Co beach. They remained in the Tan My area until the night of 10 September and, under the cover of darkness, crossed over to Vinh Loc to a position south of the Col Co beach facility.

During the night of 10-11 September, the U. S. and Vietnamese Navy converged around the island and at first light on 11 September the encirclement of the island was complete. At 0732 three companies of the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry conducted air assaults into three landing zones on the seaward side of the island and started reconnaissance in force to the south. Forty-five members of the National Police Field Forces had been evenly distributed between the three companies. The 1st Battalion of the 54th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment conducted an air assault

into three landing zones at the same time to the northwest of the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry. Popular Force platoons joined each of the rifle companies after the combat assaults.

All personnel encountered were detained for questioning by the Special Branch Police. These police interrogated detainees immediately and were able to classify innocent civilians on the spot. The latter were then escorted to safe areas. All other detainees were evacuated to the combined intelligence center. Here those classified as Viet Cong or North Vietnamese soldiers were moved to a Prisoner of War compound and evacuated through U. S. channels after interrogation. Members of the Viet Cong infrastructure and civilian dependents were evacuated through province channels. Hamlet and village chiefs were used to assist in the identification.

An interesting ruse was perpetrated on the enemy by the district S-2. As darkness approached on 11 September, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam cavalry troop and infantry battalion had 231 detainees to be evacuated to the combined intelligence center. Beginning at 2220 hours, CH-47 helicopters arrived to transport these personnel to the center. As the first lift landed and the detainees began disembarking, the district S-2 was waiting for them. Amid the dust and confusion, he commanded in a loud voice, "K411 (battalion) over here, C117 (company) over there, C118 (company) over there." To the surprise of everyone, except perhaps the S-2, sixty-three of the detainees segregated themselves as he had directed. The S-2 then took personnel from those who had obeyed his command to those who had not responded and asked, "Is there anyone from your unit who did not fall out?" Additional prisoners were thus identified.

Numerous Eagle Flights were used to conduct ambushes and to rapidly exploit intelligence as it developed. Each company conducted detailed searches in its zone. While ground forces were ferreting out the enemy, the Navy and the 2d and 3d Battalions, 54th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment, maintained an effective cordon of the island. The results of this relatively small operation, which ended on the 20th of September, were very impressive. One hundred and fifty-four enemy were killed, 370 were captured (including 116 members of the infrastructure) , and 56 Viet Cong rallied to the government cause. Only two friendly troops were killed and nine wounded.

Equally important, it should be noted that the destruction of civilian property and the danger to the civilian populace were held to an absolute minimum. Preparation fires for the combat assaults were limited to barren areas near the landing zones. Though sup-

porting fires were available throughout the operation, only two fire support missions were necessary. As an indication of the restraint placed on the destructive power available, only two civilians were wounded and three huts destroyed during the entire operation.

The success of Operation VINH LOC was due to its detailed planning and coordination and the full utilization of all resources available-airmobile, naval, and ground. The establishment of the combined command post made possible the immediate flow of information between intelligence, operations, and fire support elements. The integration of the Popular Force platoons and the police forces into the U. S. units overcame the language barrier and permitted rapid distinction between civilians and enemy forces. Most importantly, the island was not left in a vacuum when the operation was over. One U.S. rifle company and an Army of the Republic of Vietnam battalion remained on the island to assist in the resettlement of the population, and to aid district forces in maintaining a secure atmosphere. Self-defense cadre were trained at district level, and rural development teams were inserted to assist in the re-establishment of local government, and to help the people improve health and sanitation measures, as well as agricultural methods. Operation VINH LOC, although modest in size, had shown how the United States and Republic of Vietnam forces could enhance their individual capabilities through mutual planning, coordination, and cooperation.

One of the more difficult military tasks is to move a division in contact with the enemy to another area of a combat theater, reposition it quickly, and have it ready to fight. In Vietnam where there were never any front lines nor truly secure rear areas, such a move had special problems. Operation LIBERTY CANYON, which was the code name given to the move of the 1st Cavalry Division from I Corps Tactical Zone to III Corps Tactical Zone in the fall of 1968, is one of the best examples of rapidly moving an entire division-a move that was made so professionally and smoothly that it even achieved strategic and tactical surprise to a knowledgeable enemy. The 1st Cavalry Division had become the world's acknowledged expert at pulling up stakes.

General Forsythe received a phone call on the night of 26 October 1968 alerting him that his division would move as quickly as possible by air and sea to the III Corps Tactical Zone and take

over a new area of operation. This proposed move, which was in response to a growing threat in the south, meant that the remaining forces in I Corps Tactical Zone would have to rapidly readjust their positions to assume the large area of responsibility of the 1st Cavalry Division so that no vacuum would be left into which the enemy could infiltrate. Speed was of the essence and planning time would be at a minimum.

On 27 October General Forsythe, accompanied by four key staff members, departed Camp Evans and arrived at Headquarters II Field Force Vietnam at approximately 2230. The group was briefed by their equivalent members of the staff of Lieutenant General Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam. The initial meeting determined that the move would begin on the 28th by air and sea with one brigade closing by 2 November. The 1st Cavalry staff members furnished II Field Force Vietnam planners the division's estimated daily consumption of supplies and fuel, and estimated exactly when and where these supplies would be needed during and after the move. Aircraft density by type and ground equipment density by type had to be determined as of the time of move and hasty decisions made as to what would go by air and what would go by sea. A freeze was established on all major personnel changes until further notice.

On the following day the groups met with Lieutenant General Frank T. Mildren, Deputy Commanding General, U. S. Army Vietnam, and members of his staff. During this meeting, important decisions were made concerning the disposition of the aviation units, engineer effort for revetments and storage facilities, and time phasing for the brigades of the Division to begin operations in their new area. Also, it was determined that the Division base would be located at Phuoc Vinh and the Division Support Headquarters would be located at Bien Hoa. A temporary Forward Command Post would be established at Long Binh for a period not to exceed two weeks.

Many different agencies and all Services had to participate in the planning at a very early stage. The Air Force would have to know the number of C-130 sorties required against the maximum sorties per day available. The Navy needed to know the size and quantity of equipment to be moved by sea and where it would embark and debark. They would then determine the shipping that could be made available for the move. The Movement Control Center, Saigon Support Command, the 1st Logistical Command, and the 1st Aviation Brigade were brought into the planning during the next day.

While these meetings were taking place in III Corps Tactical Zone, similar meetings were taking place in I Corps Tactical Zone at Headquarters III Marine Amphibious Force. Here it was determined that three LST's would be available for loading at Tan My on 28 October and two LST's available each day thereafter until completion of the move. The aircraft carrier Princeton was made available to move aircraft and equipment from the Da Nang area. Transportation was set up to haul organizational equipment from division unit locations at landing zone BETTY-SHARON, landing zone NANCY, and Camp Evans to loading facilities at Tan My Ramp, Quang Tri Airfield, and Phu - Bai Airfield.

All the units of the division had contingency plans for air movement but these had to be modified on the spot to separate what was to be moved by air and what would be moved by sea. At Camp Evans, General Irby, Assistant Division Commander Alpha, directed that 1/4-ton vehicles and smaller equipment would go by air with the troops, along with their individual combat gear, radios, and small arms. Selected larger pieces of equipment were approved for air movement on an individual basis. All other equipment was to move by sea. The aerial ports of departure were Camp Evans, Quang Tri, and Phu Bai.

On 29 October the Division completed and published an air movement plan which served as a guide as to when units would depart and the number of aircraft needed at origin and the destination of these aircraft. Due to the changes in the units stationing plan in III Corps Tactical Zone, it was necessary to make daily adjustments to this planned program. (The changes in the stationing plan were the result of later revised intelligence which caused General Forsythe to reorient some combat maneuver and aircraft assault units.) Even with these numerous changes, there was no case of an aircraft being on the ground available for loading without a load ready to be put aboard. As it turned out, aircraft loads were positioned well in advance of actual aircraft arrivals.

Units of the Division did not have definitive sea movement plans although they had made a sea movement into I Corps Tactical Zone just nine months earlier, utilizing eleven vessels. However, since that time, the Division had received a significant amount of additional equipment which made the previous sea movement experience invalid. The Division was offered initially more sea movement assets than it was capable of utilizing. Experience quickly indicated that the amount of regular incoming cargo, which was already back-logged on the ramps at Tan My, made it possible to pre-position only two LST loads without choking the

port with outbound cargo. Communications with Tan My varied from poor to nonexistent. It was necessary for members of the Division G-4 staff to make several flights per day to Tan My to keep information updated and to properly move cargo forward based on the actual loading situation.

Container express containers were utilized to the utmost in packing cargo for sea movement. Units which had insufficient container express containers were provided pallets on which to load cargo. Incidentally, the Division had been urged for months by U. S. Army, Vietnam, to turn in a substantial number of on-hand container express containers. As it turned out, if these containers had been disposed of, the sea movement would not have been possible within the prescribed time frame.

Combat elements of the Division's 3d Brigade were the first to move and upon closing in the new area were placed under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division, while combat elements of the 1st Brigade on closing were placed under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division. The Division Headquarters deployed to Phuoc Vinh on 7 November and operational control of the 3d Brigade was returned to the 1st Cavalry Division. On 9 November, the Division assumed operational control of the 1st Brigade and combat elements of the 2d Brigade closed in the area under Division control on 12 November. The last combat essential equipment of the Division closed into III Corps Tactical Zone on 15 November 1968. Combat elements of the Division immediately began extensive reconnaissance in force operations throughout Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phuoc Long Provinces in an effort to stem enemy infiltration along the Cambodian border.

During Operation LIBERTY CANYON the 1st Cavalry Division used 437 C-130 sorties to move 11,550 passengers and 3,399 short tons of cargo. Additionally, a total of 31 LST's, three LPD's, three LSD's, and one aircraft carrier were used to transport 4,097 passengers and 16,593 short tons of cargo. The 1St Cavalry Division had moved on 24 hours notice over 570 miles by land, sea, and air, and immediately took over a large area of operations during a critical time. With the exception of thirty aircraft which were moved on the aircraft carrier, the remaining 415 aircraft flew all the way south. Many of them had been hastily repaired for a one-time flight.

However, the move was not without certain problems. Colonel William C. Dysinger, Commander of the Support Command for the Division, did not have enough movement control personnel to cover eight departure and arrival airfields and four seaports. How-

ever, he and, Lieutenant Colonel Guinn E. Unger, the Division G-4 made up provisional teams that proved invaluable. The Saigon Support Command provided a liaison team at Phuoc Vinh with established special telephone circuits which became essential.

Theater support from all Services was timely and effective. General Irby was later to recall:

General Forsythe summarized Operation LIBERTY CANYON as follows:

From northern I CTZ to the jungle frontier areas of northwestern III CTZ, the Division moved and deployed to interdict the movement of four enemy divisions as they attempted to move southward for an attack on the heartland of South Vietnam. The move was completed with great speed—(the first unit was in combat in III CTZ within 48 hours after it was alerted to move, and the Division was closed in 12 days)—and with strategic surprise (the enemy was confronted suddenly with a major force air assaulted astride his avenues of approach and into his prepared base areas with no prior warning). During the first nine days of the twelve day move, one brigade concurrently conducted and completed a major combat operation in northern I CTZ to penetrate the My Chanh Valley VC base area. In III CTZ the Division was given an immense area of operations (4,800 square miles); was based where existing space and facilities could be found (occupying 9 bases for our aircraft fleet); was given broad mission-type orders ("constitute the II FFV covering force"); and was given wide latitude and freedom of action to maneuver. In addition, care was taken not to fragment the Division or its assets, to permit the full range of its power, to find the enemy and to be shifted to fight him wherever he was found. It was proven beyond doubt that the total power of an airmobile division is greater than the sum of its parts. In short, we were given the opportunity to test the "theory of design and concept" of the airmobile division and we found it to be sound and practical.

page updated 30 May 2001

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