The story of airmobility has been long—so my summary will be short. I've tried to interject my honest opinion where it seemed appropriate in the text. Only a few final observations are necessary.

For the reader who has borne with me through this account of ten years of airmobility in Vietnam and the fundamental decisions in the decade preceding that, the obvious question is, "What does all of this mean?" The one inescapable conclusion is that the airmobility concept is irreversible. The thousands of officers who have learned to think and fight and live in three dimensions will never allow themselves to be restricted to two dimensions in the future. Airmobility will change and grow, but it is here to stay.

In the first chapter we learned that the growth of the airmobile concept did not take place in the framework of guerrilla warfare. It was conceived out of the necessity to disperse on the modern battlefield under the threat of nuclear weapons and still retain the ability to mass quickly for decisive actions, then disperse again. The actualities of Vietnam have since obscured these origins and have led many people to the assumption that airmobility was designed for and limited to counter-guerrilla contingencies. The very nature of the terrain in Vietnam with its jungles and mountains has led many to connect helicopter operations to this type of terrain. Indeed, the opposite is true. Airmobility worked in Vietnam in spite of the tremendous problems of working in the jungles and the mountains of an undeveloped country. The helicopter overcame the obstacles of limited landing zones, primitive road nets, restricted observation, and high density altitudes as no other vehicle could. But, in the open countryside of Europe or a desert in the Middle East, the airmobile force has far greater flexibility and many more options than even the armored forces of Rommel in North Africa. Vietnam represented only a fraction of the possibilities for airmobile tactics.

A casual observer of Army aviation in Vietnam could easily have arrived at the conclusion that there was no need for special-

ized airmobile divisions. In the latter years, especially 1967 and 1968, there were enough aviation assets to satisfy almost every requirement for airmobility in every division. Many of the nonairmobile divisions, and rightly so, were very proud of their air assault techniques and had developed highly refined operating procedures with their supporting aviation companies. The question then arises as to the need for a special organization which has over 400 helicopters assigned to it on a full-time basis.

However, there is much more to airmobility than just using helicopters. The Huey, the Cobra, the light observation helicopter, and the Chinook were the essential vehicles of airmobile combat and combat support. But, the essence of an airmobile division is the ability to integrate the capabilities of these aircraft into an organization designed for their use by people specially trained for their use. This total integration is only possible in a unit which "owns" its helicopters.

This is not to detract from the effectiveness of non-airmobile units for they possess certain characteristics which give them advantages in certain situations. A division which has tank or mechanized battalions or ground cavalry squadrons has certain advantages over the airmobile division. The same thing is true for the heavier weapons which are organic to the infantry division. Conversely, the lighter weapons and vehicles of the airmobile division are essential for the advantages which it possesses. This study has detailed the strategic moves of the 1st Cavalry Division from II Corps to I Corps to III Corps Tactical Zones, and touched upon the many brigade and battalion moves involving airlift. In all these moves, I was struck by the distinct advantage in moving inherently lean airmobile forces as compared to the airlift requirement of other organizations.

The tactical advantages of the airmobile division can be summed up as follows: increased efficiency due to the repeated association of units; thorough integration of its assets because of close association and command relationships; and the ability to take a different conceptual approach because of its assured assets. The impact of organizational and command relationships has a direct and distinct impact on the quality of support. There is no denying that general support units rarely tend to identify closely with the supported unit, at least not as closely as organic units. This is a simple truism of human nature.

The epitome of "superior" airmobile tactics, as contrasted with "good," is the capability to exploit not only an opportunity but the trends and changing patterns in enemy activity. This requires

a flexibility which is much more difficult to initiate and accomplish when non-divisional units are involved. This is particularly true of air cavalry. More than any other unit, the air cavalry development in Vietnam has proven the need for quick reaction to meet the demands of the situation as seen by the commander on the scene. Adaptation to a change in environment is more feasible and more likely when the unit is organic.

The airmobile division commander is able to plan a complete campaign based on airmobility as opposed to a campaign which, as an incidental element, employs airmobile assets in some of its battle plans. As a corollary, I know of no other major organization besides the airmobile division where the commander is willing to consistently commit all his forces on a day-to-day basis; that is, not keep the traditional reserve. The airmobile division commander knows that he can extract a reserve out of his deployed units as needed because he has the assets and the training to do so. This is a major economy of force.

By changing our perspective from that of the division commander to the individual soldier, we can perceive one of the often forgotten advantages of airmobility. It is ironic to me, after the millions spent to reduce a few pounds from the infantryman's rifle, that many soldiers would end up carrying as much (or more) total weight as the doughboy of World War I. A soldier when he exits a helicopter becomes the Army's most important extension of the airmobile concept; and his individual load should consist of the bare essentials needed for the next few hours—basically ammunition and water. To avoid the classic soldier's syndrome of holding on to everything he owns, the 1st Cavalry Division developed a technique for keeping all the personal equipment of the individual in squad bundles that were consistently delivered when needed. This was a tremendous boost to morale as well as a very real increase in effectiveness. However, this seemingly simple technique has to be relearned several times in every campaign.

In reviewing this volume, I sense that I could have spent more time emphasizing the natural affinity of armor with an airmobile force. When the terrain and circumstances permit, armor and airmobility complement each other in a natural way to form an unbeatable team. Airmobility gives the commander unique capabilities in reconnaissance, maneuver, and logistics while the armor gives the shock and firepower which have characterized it in the past. Air cavalry and airmobile infantry can find and fix the enemy so that armored and mechanized forces can be brought in at the decisive moment to finish him. There is no precise balance of these

forces that would apply across the board. It will be up to the theater commander and subordinate commanders to mix these two elements to form the specific compound for a particular situation.

Many new organizations will be conceived as a result of our Vietnam experience and that is as it should be. However, we must make certain we do not invent something we have already thoroughly tested in combat. For example, there is a great deal of experience in the record of armor working with airmobile units; there was an air cavalry combat brigade, in fact if not in name, operating as part of the 1st Cavalry Division in 1970. We should be certain that we pick up any extrapolations for the future where we left off in combat. There is so much work that needs to be done that we can ill afford time to prove what has been proven or preparing answers to questions that will not be asked again.

We must use a similar approach to future Army-Air Force relationships. One lesson should stand out loud and clear from our ten years of experience in Vietnam: the command and control procedures evolved in combat, often hammered out by the very men whose lives depended on them, proved sound and workable. While this monograph has not tried to detail the Air Force story in Vietnam, I trust it has given enough examples of the magnificent support that the Air Force provided, and the trust and confidence that was generated in the minds of every major ground commander. As our experience grew, the close integration and timing of Air Force support to the organic Army support could not have been improved. I see no need for the Army and the Air Force to go through another agonizing reappraisal of their command and control structures (and the haggling over hardware to do the job) such as was experienced after World War II and Korea. In these latter two periods, valuable and important lessons were forgotten in the peacetime budget exercises while the Services engaged in bitter and often emotional debates which proved unnecessary and detrimental. Now is the time to capitalize on the vast reservoir of experience in both Services to put the ad hoc arrangements of Vietnam into lasting doctrine. It is not the time to debate new interfaces, new organizations and new command relationships that are untested.

In any activity where two Services operate the interface between them will seldom be a comfortable enmeshing of capabilities—whether these capabilities are competitive, supplementary, or complementary. Army-Air Force aviation relationships are no exception. The important thing to recognize is that there are gaps more often than overlaps in all areas of the interface. This has occurred

because each Service is able to provide less of a capability, at least in qualitative terms, than is militarily desirable. This is especially true as we look to more sophisticated threats throughout the world. In my estimation, quantitative duplication is a myth, because seldom will relatively scarce and expensive vehicles such as aircraft be adequate to meet all requirements.

Another myth—one that has haunted Army aviation for thirty years—is vulnerability. Throughout this volume we have touched on various aspects of the vulnerability of Army aircraft and, in particular, the helicopter. Nevertheless, the subject is still uppermost in the minds of those who have honest reservations on the soundness of future airmobile tactics.

When I began the research for this study, I sent letters to fifty senior officers requesting their personal comments and experiences on the subject of airmobility. Many of their thoughts have been incorporated in this volume. Only one letter, from Lieutenant General Arthur S. Collins, Jr., voiced serious doubts about the future of the airmobile concept. In his detailed analysis, which is an important part of the bibliography, General Collins listed nine major strengths of the airmobile concept; however, he still believed that "the fundamental weakness of the helicopter, and therefore the entire airmobile concept, is its vulnerability to ground-to-air fire." I disagree. But such concern cannot be lightly dismissed. Those charged with the responsibility of planning our future force structure must weigh very carefully their decisions on the type and amount of airmobile organizations against the possible contingencies. In the preface to this volume I stated that airmobility was no panacea. Some of the operations in Vietnam showed that there were higher risks involved for higher gains. I submit that the entire strategy in Southeast Asia would have had to be revised downward if we had not had airmobile organizations, imperfect though they were.

The key word for airmobile operations is "survivability," not vulnerability." Survivability of air vehicles in the land battle is one end product of a combination of actions and reactions by two opposing forces. The kinds of battlefield actions and reactions are many and varied, beginning with intelligence production and planning and ending with the last shot fired. Survivability of aircraft can be appreciated only by examining all of these influences in their proper relationship to each other.

The oft-studied subject of vulnerability, which is only one input to survivability, has to be recast in proper perspective with regard to other equally or more important contributors. The develop-

ment of this perspective requires considering similarities which exist among the survivabilities of all combat elements to include Army air vehicles. The survivability of Army aircraft is enhanced by suppressive ground fire support, close air defense support, the proper use of intelligence for planning aviation operations, the effect of tactic and techniques on increased survivability, the soldier's desire to accomplish his mission, and the effect of personal command attention. Since Army aircraft operate in the ground environment, proven techniques of ground survival are available to them; and, the most effective of these techniques is the co-ordinated use of all his capabilities by a commander on the scene. What is germane is the fact that the American soldier is more capable of carrying out his mission and more likely to survive in combat because he is airmobile.

Throughout this study we have tried to emphasize the "man" portion of the man-machine equation. However, I'd like to reiterate a few of the equipment lessons that seem exceedingly important during future procurement decisions. History has proven that the tools of combat are seldom if ever, used in the exact manner which their designer had conceived. For example, the Huey began life as an air ambulance. Therefore, it is essential that today's developer, in laying the keels for the next generation, design the most useful tools, so that some future commander will have available a flexible arsenal that he can adapt to his war.

The Army's decision to standardize on a utility tactical transport helicopter has far-reaching implications on every operation from its planning to its execution. Literally hundreds of our key battles could not have been fought without a light, agile machine that could go into improbable landing zones at a critical time. Had the Army chosen to build its airmobile tactics around a "platoon carrier," different and less flexible tactics would have been forced on our commanders. As we move to replace the Huey fleet, we must never lose sight of the essential characteristics that made the Huey invaluable to the Infantry commander. Technology offers so many tempting alternatives that one can easily forget the basic problems of squad tactics. The vital lessons which we learned in the "sizing" of our helicopter fleet dare not be forgotten.

Similar principles must be kept in mind in our future helicopter gunships. There is no doubt that from a hardware standpoint, the armed helicopter was the single greatest innovation of Vietnam. I trust this volume has provided enough examples of its unique characteristics and methods of employment to leave no doubt about its place in the support of the ground soldier. The introduction of

the Cobra into Vietnam vindicated all the hypotheses of the armed helicopter pioneers who were derided in their early experiments. The Cobra came at the right time in sufficient numbers to do a job that no other fire support means could do. LAMSON 719, if it proved any point at all, proved that the Cobra could survive under high intensity warfare while the older Huey gunship merely showed deficiencies that we knew had always existed.

But, there is another story in this volume that has perhaps not been emphasized enough, and that is the test of the "Go-Go Bird" or armed Chinook. Now, I am speaking of a frame of mind that wanted to produce a "battleship" (with all the firepower that term implies) rather than an agile "destroyer" with the agility to go in and get out. For the future, I think it is possible to reap the benefits of the latest technology in weapons systems without producing another "battleship" with its inherent disadvantages.

The story of airmobility in Vietnam is almost certainly just the first chapter of a new and dynamic Army. The glamour of airmobility has long passed, but the challenges are as great as ever. Some of the technological forecast, just dimly seen by the early planners, is now reality. If this study has served any purpose besides its bibliography, which I think is most important, it will form part of the corporate memory for those planners of the future who would like not to pay the terrible price of relearning again in combat many costly lessons. As the poet-diplomat Paul Claudell once observed, "It is not enough to know the past, it is necessary to understand it."