Although overshadowed by the more dramatic actions on the battlefields of Vietnam, the U.S. training mission has been one of the most critical aspects of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. From the beginning in 1954, the U.S. mission was to "advise and assist" the government of Vietnam in training a military force capable of defending the nation. Some of the more important facets of this task have been the establishment, development, consolidation, improvement, and support of military service schools and training centers, the development of programs of instruction, and assistance in evaluating and planning requirements and capabilities. Although many obstacles were never completely overcome, U.S. accomplishment in the area of training have been impressive in light of the expansion of the Vietnamese armed forces from a U.S. supported force of 150,000 in 1956 to its subsequent authorized strength of over one million. In the following pages an attempt will be made to summarize these accomplishments and at the same time to present some of the more serious recurring headaches that beset the training effort.
The Vietnamese armed forces school training system expanded from one national training center in 1956 to a total of thirty-three by 1970. This rapid growth was necessary in view of the qualitative and quantitative expansion of the military forces. In an effort to improve training, U.S. advisory teams were assigned to each training center on an almost continual basis. However, headway in this area was generally extremely slow.
The most significant obstacle to effective training was poor leadership at the training center level. The most highly qualified officers should have been placed in training positions; but too often these posts were filled by officers who were relieved of combat commands. Their superiors often reasoned that such officers could do less damage in these positions of seemingly little responsibility than[123]
as combat officers and, in the short run, their logic was probably sound. But poor leadership at the top quickly affected lower echelons, starting a cycle of poor training and poor combat effectiveness. Although advisers have long noted this deficiency, the Vietnamese have been reluctant to relieve incompetent center commanders, possibly because they lacked suitable replacements.
The low quality of cadre personnel also impeded the training mission. By and large, most cadres were not sufficiently knowledgeable in their subject areas and members lacked any real motivation to develop from a trainee into a combat-ready soldier. Perpetuating the inefficient cadre corps was the tradition of "homesteading" cadre personnel for up to five years. Such inbreeding only worsened a bad situation. Ideas became stagnant and progress merely trickled along; modern techniques and doctrine developed and practiced each day by combat units, unless inculcated by the advisers, often failed to reach the student, and often even the advisers were unaware of current tactics and techniques. The job of providing combat-experienced cadres received much emphasis, and a program was instituted to replace instructors without recent combat experience with people fresh from combat units. But this policy was not entirely successful because field commanders, when levied to support the program, often kept their best men and sent only marginal personnel. Not surprising, many of the replacements lacked the aptitude and motivation for cadre duty, and the duty itself suffered a corresponding lack of prestige.
Most of the other deficiencies within the training centers were by-products of the leadership and cadre difficulties. Instructional techniques were poor: instruction was presented almost entirely through the lecture method with little emphasis on practical work or demonstrations. A strong disregard prevailed for the use of concurrent or integrated training techniques. Instructors appeared to look upon lesson plans as something to be covered as quickly as possible with no regard for their obligation to impart knowledge to their students. Advance preparation was almost nonexistent and class rehearsals rare. Although methods of instruction courses were established, improvement was limited.
Training management, from the Central Training Command, Joint General Staff, to the training center level also left much room for betterment. The Central Training Command was responsible for training at the national level but was an extremely passive headquarters with little apparent experience in supervising and administering the training command. Army training programs, subject schedules, programs of instruction, and other training literature remained outdated and in dire need of revision.
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Staffing for the Central Training Command, whose mission was comparable to Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, was inadequate. For example, in 1970 two officers in the Central Training Command had total responsibility for developing, reviewing, and upgrading the forty programs, which were conducted at the training centers. In addition, these same officers were tasked to review all 650 programs of instruction submitted by the service schools. The job proved too great an undertaking with little being accomplished.
At the training center level, training management was no better. When revised Army training programs, subject schedules, and other training literature were received, often no real effort was made in updating and revising lesson plans so that they would correspond to the changes made. For example, four-hour blocks of instruction would be taught from two-hour lesson plans.
Hardships in such areas as class scheduling, maintenance of training records, and make-up training also existed. It was not unusual for two or three companies to show up at the same range at the same time for firing. Individual training records were almost nonexistent and reflected the cadre's resignation to the fact that many trainees would receive incomplete training. To make matters worse, there was no make-up training program.
Night training techniques also received much adverse criticism. While the Vietnamese Army programs of instruction emphasized night training, the training centers generally did not implement the instruction effectively. This situation was partly due to the practice of limiting training to a "regular" eight-hour workday and partly to the requirement for centers to furnish their own night security personnel from the training detachments.
Although the programs of instruction emphasized specialized training, such as night, small unit, and marksmanship training, these activities were often too complex for the basic Vietnamese Army soldier. Many blocks of instruction could have been eliminated or at least reduced in length. For example, much of the technical material on the functioning of the M16 rifle was wasted because the rifle was far more sophisticated than anything the trainee had ever encountered before. What good was it to teach him that the round detonation created 50,000 pounds of pressure per square inch chamber pressure? Such information was not really relevant to his need to learn to fire and maintain his weapon, was a waste of time, and took hours of instruction away from more valuable subjects.
The above deficiencies were not the only shortcomings found within the training centers nor were they indicative of every center.
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But they were typical, and almost all trouble stemmed from the lack of aggressive leadership and of a highly capable cadre within the training center base.
Unit training was continually emphasized but rarely undertaken by the Vietnamese combat units. In-place unit training was virtually nonexistent. Vietnamese Army commanders were normally required to conduct this type of instruction between combat operations. For the most part, the Vietnamese commanders disregarded this requirement and used the time for rest and recuperation. The relationship between training and operational efficiency was generally unappreciated, and continued emphasis by advisers at all levels failed to modify the indifferent attitude toward in-place training.
Refresher training was also a requirement for many years. Under this program, Vietnamese Army units were rotated through training centers, usually once every two to three years. Training sessions lasted from four to five weeks, and unit officers and noncommissioned officers were to accompany their units while training center instructors provided the actual instruction. The arrangement was a complete failure with the major problem being the reluctance of corps and division commanders to release combat units from operational missions for refresher training. Another handicap was the attitude of the unit officers and noncommissioned officers who regarded the training period as a chance for rest and recuperation. The result was a complete lack of interest in unit retraining. Thus, while the need for unit training was valid, and the programs for retraining Vietnamese Army units in training centers by training center instructors was sound, there was need for the whole practice to be re-examined. In any case, the success of any future modifications will be greatly dependent on a greater appreciation of the value of training in a combat environment.The Vietnamese armed forces school system, like the training centers, was rapidly expanded and finally totaled twenty-five different schools. U.S. advisers supervised this expansion and were assigned to each school to advise and assist in developing successful training programs. Not surprising, the resulting school system was patterned after that of the United States and gave officer and en-
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listed instruction at all levels of responsibility in general, technical, and administrative fields.
The establishment of this system was a continuous process tied closely to the course of the war. As new requirements were recognized, new schools were established through advisory insistence. For example, the National Defense College was established in Saigon in August 1967 in recognition of the need to provide training to top military officers and government civilians for functions involving national security; the Vietnamese National Military Academy was permanently converted from a two-year to a four-year institution in 1967 in order to improve what was the major source of regular Army officers.
Through U.S. efforts, South Vietnam has developed a school system, which is probably unequaled anywhere in Asia. But, although this system is functioning and functioning well, there are still serious problem areas. Most critical are the lack of highly qualified supervisors and both highly qualified and combat-experienced instructors. Other deficiencies lie in such areas as training management, methods of instruction, and programs of instruction and are similar to those afflicting the training camps.
Early efforts of the United States revolved around a small number of advisers, mobile training teams, and the offshore training program. These activities were enough for the internal situation during the 1950s. At first the Americans concentrated on creating a military force, which was conventional in tactics and equipment, patterned after the standard U.S. organization, and capable of withstanding an invasion from the north. This Army proved incapable of coping with an internal insurgency. Before 1960 its organization was too centralized and its equipment too heavy to counter the rapid growth of the guerrilla war.
In 1959-60 the United States realized that the development of a counterinsurgency capability was urgent. Its massive efforts to develop this capability through the use of Special Forces units, mobile training teams, increased advisory assistance, revised training programs, organizational changes and increased combat support forces, and materiel aid were extremely successful and resulted in great official optimism by 1963. But the Buddhist uprisings and the successful overthrow of the Diem regime in late 1963 led to a complete deterioration of the armed forces. Only the decision to introduce U.S. combat forces in early 1965 saved the Republic of Vietnam from total military defeat.
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The years following 1965 were characterized by continuous efforts to revitalize the South Vietnam Army with men, money, and matériel. Time for these efforts was bought by the commitment of large U.S. combat forces, and for a while many U.S. leaders felt that American troops could defeat the insurgency alone. Militating against this view were two serious problems affecting the buildup and training of the Vietnamese Army. First, by 1967 the Vietnamese Army was devoted almost entirely to pacification security missions and, in the minds of many, had been relegated to a secondary role in the conduct of the war. Vietnamese Army units often reflected this attitude in their over-all lack of enthusiasm and in their willingness to leave most of the fighting to the Americans. This apathy ended during Tet offensive of 1968 when the Army's combat performance allowed the units to regain a sense of pride and purpose. In retrospect, the Vietnamese Army should have been given a greater combat burden between 1965 and 1968, together with more U.S. backup support.
A second problem was also a by-product of the large U.S. ground presence. By 1966 U.S. forces had been given first priority for men, money, and matériel, and the basic mission of strengthening the Vietnamese armed forces became a second priority. This change immediately lowered the quality of advisory personnel and the availability of the more modern equipment for the Vietnamese Army. By 1966 the high standards required of advisory personnel were abandoned and instead emphasis was placed on assigning the best men to U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam. Officers and noncommissioned officers began to look upon advisory duty as undesirable and avoided such duty if possible; promotions came through assignments to U.S. units, not through advisory service. Sensing this drop in adviser quality, General Westmoreland continually emphasized the importance of the advisory mission and referred to it as the "heart and soul" of the U.S. effort in Vietnam. Finally, a series of projects were undertaken to make these positions more attractive, and this series proved partially successful in re-establishing the desirability of advisory duty.
The large scale of the American involvement after 1965 also precluded extensive equipment modernization for the Vietnamese armed forces until 1968, and the practice of lending equipment to the Vietnamese Army from USARV stocks satisfied only certain priority needs. However, once the decision was made to limit U.S. Involvement and Vietnamize the war, the situation changed. Beginning in 1969 vast quantities of matériel became available to the Vietnamese armed forces, most of which were supplied by redeploying U.S. units. From 1969 to 1972 American units and com-
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South Vietnamese Armor In Cambodia
mands, together with the U.S. Advisory network, were heavily committed to the buildup and modernization of the Vietnamese armed forces. At the same time, the armed forces training base also expanded to meet the demands of Vietnamization so that its dependence on U.S. Training support was minimal by the end of 1972. While it is difficult to say if these measures should have been taken earlier, it is evident that they were implemented successfully once the South Vietnamese Army was given greater attention.
In summary, the U.S. approach in training has been successful despite the many deficiencies indicated. As concluded earlier, the whole problem revolves around the availability of qualified leadership. Although many leadership courses were established and continual emphasis placed on the development of leadership, a serious obstacle was United States own overriding emphasis on establishing "rapport" with its counterparts even at the expense of not accomplishing its mission. Too often advisers did not take firm stands with their counterparts on key issues nor recommend the relief of unsatisfactory commanders for fear that such recommendations would reflect badly on their own abilities. If more
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South Vietnamese Field Operations
advisers had insisted on the relief of ineffective commanders, command positions would have opened up, affording incentive and opportunity for the more junior officers to exercise their leadership ability. The rapport approach is dangerous because it lends itself to the acceptance of substandard performance by the adviser. In any future situation where advisers are deployed under hostile conditions, the emphasis should be on getting the job done, not on merely getting along with the individual being advised.
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page created 8 August 2002
