CHAPTER VI

Vietnamization, November 1969-February 1973

President Richard M. Nixon, in November 1969, officially established the goal of the American effort in the Vietnam conflict as being that of enabling the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of their country. Although Vietnamization was a new word, the concept was neither new nor revolutionary but was, in fact, a return to an earlier policy-one that had all but disappeared in the feverish escalation from aid and advice to combat support to active participation. As early as the summer of 1967, the first tentative steps toward Vietnamization were being taken. Concerned about the effectiveness of Vietnamese Army, Regional Forces, and Popular Forces units, General Westmoreland directed that a conference be held to air views, consider proposals, and make recommendations through which assistance could be provided the Vietnamese military in order to mold it into an aggressive and responsible fighting force.

Field Artillery Assistance Programs

Senior American commanders met at Pleiku on 12 August 1967 and, on the basis of their conclusions, the Commanding General, I Field Force, Vietnam, directed that the Commanding General, I Field Force Artillery, "establish liaison with Vietnamese units and . . . isolate problems to be alleviated through U.S. training support." I Field Force Artillery immediately assigned a liaison officer to II Corps (Vietnamese) Artillery to "provide a channel for the request of supporting U.S. artillery for ARVN operations in II CTZ." This officer was recalled when the necessary procedures had been established, and his duties were assumed by the artillery officer of II Corps Advisory Group. To provide further assistance, an "on-call" liaison officer from the 52d Artillery Group was designated.

Even as this coordination was being established, a decentralized assistance program was developing. On 28 September 1967, Brigadier General William O. Quirey directed that all field force artillery battalions establish forward observer teams specifically to train

[190]

Regional and Popular Forces units in the techniques of fire adjustment. Further, battalions were to provide any assistance necessary to assist Vietnamese artillery units to achieve maximum technical proficiency. This guidance, however, proved to be too general. Field force battalions provided only sporadic aid in the II Corps area, and effectiveness depended on the willingness of the Vietnamese participants in the program and the ability of the U.S. units to do the job.

Meanwhile, I Field Force Artillery had initiated a four-month study of Vietnamese Army artillery operations in order to evaluate the effectiveness of their support. Total assets in II Corps were 103 105-mm. howitzers and 41 155-mm. howitzers. Of these, 6 155-mm. and 15 105-mm. tubes were committed to support training centers, 6 155-mm. and 13 105-mm. tubes were located at Duc My in support of the South Vietnamese Army Artillery Center and School, and 2 105-mm. pieces were situated in Da Lat in support of the South Vietnamese Military Academy. Although all school support weapons had the secondary mission of supporting the Duc My complex and Da Lat city, their primary function of school support prevented their effective utilization in support of operations. In addition 18 105-mm. pieces were positioned in platoons at Special Forces and Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps. The remaining guns-55 105-mm. and 30 155-mm. pieces-had primary responsibility for supporting Army and Regional and Popular Forces maneuver elements. Because this artillery also had to provide fire support for road security and the various political headquarters throughout II Corps, platoon and split­battery configurations were the prevalent formations employed. The size of II Corps Tactical Zone, some 30,000 square miles, and the magnitude of the mission proved the artillery incapable of providing even marginal fire support to maneuver forces during offensive operations.

The study examined ten long-term operations and seventy-two short-term operations. Long-term operations were defined as those performed within the framework of the normal mission of the maneuver force and short-term operations as those in response to specific and immediate needs such as those based on special intelligence. Findings showed that artillery supported slightly less than half of the short-term operations. Of those operations which were listed as being supported by artillery, each maneuver battalion was shown to have received artillery support which averaged slightly more than one platoon (two guns). The average support was less than one platoon of artillery per battalion when all short-term operations were taken into consideration. The study also showed

[191]

that although South Vietnamese Army artillery units were thoroughly grounded in the fundamentals of gunnery, they were severely hampered by poor maintenance practices, slipshod repair parts support, and inadequate communications equipment. Further problem areas were encountered in the meteorological support and survey capabilities of the Vietnamese. Based on this study, specific programs were initiated to upgrade the ability of Vietnamese artillery to support maneuver forces in the field. This aid was aimed at increasing the responsiveness of the firing units in answering calls for fire and the ability of the ground soldier to request and adjust fire. Because the mission of Vietnamese batteries continued to be security of roads and strategic installations, no attempts were made to increase the fire-massing capacity of these units.

To remedy the problems exposed by the study, American artillery units in early 1968 initiated four assistance programs: Task Force DAI BAC I (Cannon I) was formed by the 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery, to assist Vietnamese artillery units in the Kontum area. This program was short-term, lasting only 23-27 February 1968. Its primary mission was to ascertain the condition of the Vietnamese weapons and to demonstrate the responsiveness of Vietnamese and U.S. artillery to calls for fire from Vietnamese, Regional and Popular Forces, and U.S. units in the Kontum area. To accomplish this mission, the 92d Artillery established a fire direction center, collocated with the Vietnamese 221st Artillery Battalion at Kontum, that could control all artillery fire in the area. The objective was to create a working Vietnamese fire direction center. Another team with interests in logistics and maintenance was to examine and correct hardware deficiencies. Additional teams were designated to assist in firing battery operations, communications, and survey. Because of the short duration of the program, specific objectives were established for each day to insure that all areas were examined and upgraded. The program revealed that significant shortcomings in fire direction procedures were caused primarily by a lack of logistical support and by poor understanding of sophisticated gunnery procedures. Firing battery deficiencies were closely tied to logistical or maintenance support. Tubes ranged in age from thirteen to twenty-seven years and averaged 10,000 rounds per tube. The task force provided the necessary logistical support to upgrade the weapons and instructed Vietnamese in advanced fire direction procedures. The task force also pointed out that the remaining problem areas were founded in the weak Vietnamese logistical system and recommended that artillery advisers spend more time with their units and actively establish liaison with

[192]

neighboring American units so that assistance could be made more readily available.

At the same time that Task Force DAI BAC I was being established, another program began to provide assistance to Civilian Irregular Defense Group and Special Forces artillery platoons. Responsibility for the program was given to the major artillery commands in II Corps. These commands provided technical assistance to the Civilian Irregular artillery platoons. Classes were conducted in fire direction, firing battery operations, and maintenance. Initial success resulted in the continuation of the program on a regular basis.

Perhaps the most important of the four projects was the I Field Force and Army of the Republic of Vietnam Associate Battery Program, which commenced on 14 March 1968. The idea behind the program was to augment the existing advisory effort, improve the effectiveness of Vietnamese forces, and open channels for better coordination of fire support and mutual understanding. Under this concept, U.S. artillery units sponsored selected Vietnamese battalions in their locale and provided them with a responsive American headquarters from which to request technical, maintenance, and training assistance.

Finally, I Field Force Artillery developed a program of instruction to train Vietnamese artillerymen in the use of antipersonnel (Beehive) ammunition in preparation for the time when Vietnamese firing units would be issued the special rounds. This program, however, never became functional because the Vietnamese Joint General Staff had not authorized their units to draw and employ the ammunition.

The initial success of these programs, coupled with the disastrous defeat suffered by the Communist forces during their ill-fated Tet offensive earlier in the year, allowed the embryonic Vietnamization program to grow. During the fall of 1968 military leaders in Vietnam studied after-action reports, intelligence estimates, and staff studies pertinent to the Tet campaign and its immediate aftermath. From these evaluations a parallel course-one that would merge with President Nixon's some eight months later-began to germinate. On the basis of an over-all evaluation of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, it became evident to these leaders that if Vietnamese forces were eventually to assume the burden of the ground war, a test of their ability to operate semi-independently would be necessary. The stress on semi-independence rather than complete autonomy was in recognition of the inherent weakness of these forces in fire support and air assets. To this end, a suitable testing ground had to be found. The area had to be secure enough

[193]

to allow for unhampered transfer of forces before Vietnamese units became actively engaged but at the same time had to have potentially significant enemy activity to provide the Vietnamese with a viable test. Further, the testing ground had to be in an area of minimal danger to the pacification program. An ideal area was found in northern Kontum Province, with its sparse population, potential enemy threat from Laos and Cambodia, and relative isolation from the psychologically important population centers of the country.

Preliminary discussions between American and Vietnamese leaders began in late 1968, and a verbal agreement was reached in January 1969 between Lieutenant General William R. Peers, Commanding General, I Field Force, Vietnam, and Major General Lu Mong Lan, Commander, II Corps. However, this agreement was not written, and the designated Vietnamese force, the 42d Regiment, and its command headquarters, the 24th Special Tactical Zone, failed to assume responsibility for the area by 1 February 1969, as had been agreed. Further, negotiations were hampered by the natural confusion of a change of command at I Field Force, Vietnam, and it was not until 12 April 1969 that General Lu Lan indicated general agreement with a new proposal. A draft memorandum of agreement was drawn up and signed by American and Vietnamese officials on 24 April 1969. On the same day the exchange of forces neared completion and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam assumed responsibility for northern Kontum Province.

In deference to the weakness of Vietnamese artillery (six 105­mm. howitzers and six 155-mm. howitzers) the agreement specifically provided that the 4th Infantry Division Artillery units would assume effective artillery coverage of National Highway 14, the major north-south artery in the highlands, and that the Commanding General, I Field Force Artillery, would provide general support artillery as required; support operations within the 24th Special Tactical Zone with a minimum of two light or medium artillery batteries; and maintain the fire support coordination center to coordinate all fire support means available, including operation of air advisory stations.

I Field Force assigned the mission of providing the specified support to the 52d Artillery Group headquarters in Pleiku. The 52d immediately provided six light, twelve medium, and five heavy artillery pieces to the 24th Special Tactical Zone to augment organic Vietnamese batteries. Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery, a 4th Division Artillery unit, provided road coverage. Automatic weapons were allocated from Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (Automatic Weapons). With the assumption of responsibility

[194]

for northern Kontum Province by the 24th Special Tactical Zone, the first major Vietnamese ground operation began. Dubbed DAN QUYEN by the Vietnamese, it grew out of special agent reports indicating a major buildup of enemy units southwest of the Ben Het Civilian Irregular Defense Group camp, which sat precariously at the convergence of the Laotian, Cambodian, and Vietnamese borders.

In order to head off Communist plans to execute a strong offensive effort in the highlands, the 24th Special Tactical Zone was tasked to conduct operations to spoil Communist plans, protect Ben Het, and compel enemy forces to retire to their Cambodian sanctuaries. The operation was conducted in three phases: Phase I (5­15 May) involved forces of three Vietnamese and two mobile strike force battalions screening the tri-border area west of Ben Het; Phase II (16 May-3 June), based on intelligence produced during the initial phase, was a six-battalion (plus) offensive operation conducted southeast of Ben Het and targeted against elements of the North Vietnamese 66th Infantry, 28th Infantry, and 40th Artillery Regiments; and Phase III (3-5 June) consisted primarily of bomb damage assessments by multibattalion Vietnamese forces and the establishment of a defensive screen around the Dak To, Tan Canh, and Ben Het areas. By operation's end the South Vietnamese had succeeded in mauling the Communist forces and establishing a favorable 7-to-1 kill ratio. In support of the operation, the 52d Artillery Group provided 29 tubes of artillery-12 105-mm. howitzers, 12 155-mm. howitzers, 1 8-inch howitzer, and 4 175-mm. guns-and assigned the 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery, to establish the forward command post for U.S. support forces. This command post was later expanded into a fire support coordination center for all American artillery in the area. From their own assets, Vietnamese forces utilized 8 155-mm. and 6 105-mm. howitzers in support of the operation. A total of 73,016 rounds was expended by friendly faring units. Enemy soldiers captured during the campaign expressed a fear of first-round volley fire employed by both South Vietnamese and U.S. units in the form of random time-on-target missions.

Although the operation, was deemed a success, a number of weaknesses became apparent. The magnitude and complexity of coordinating, integrating, and controlling available fire support means virtually overwhelmed the 24th Zone staff at the Dak To tactical operations center. Some of the blame for this failure was attributable to an inexperienced staff and the inadequate manning structure of the headquarters, but specific shortcomings were apparent as well. When the 92d Artillery established the U.S. fire

[195]

support coordination center at Dak To, South Vietnamese commanders were encouraged to send representatives, but only one did so. Fire support activities thus were not properly coordinated, so flexibility was lost, resources were wasted, efforts were duplicated, and frequently targets were not attacked with the appropriate means at the proper time. This problem originated with the failure of the force commanders in organizing for combat to understand or appreciate the need to integrate closely maneuver plans and fire support plans and to collocate the tactical operations and fire support coordination centers. The problem was finally rectified two weeks after the operation started when the commander of the 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery, was tasked to establish an integrated fire support coordination center. This agency quickly matured into an effective organization capable of providing timely and accurate fire support.

Additional problems were encountered in fire clearances, coordination of fire support assets at company level, and requests for and adjustment of artillery fire. It became apparent that these deficiencies were a result of the dependence of the South Vietnamese commanders on American advisers. These weaknesses were not corrected satisfactorily and it was clear that additional stress in training would be required to upgrade the fire support cooridination ability of Vietnamese units.

Despite the weaknesses noted during the campaign, the performance of the Vietnamese forces proved that they could plan and successfully execute semi-independent ground operations against Communist main force units. The significance of this fact would not be apparent for another five months, when the policy of Vietnamization became the stated objective of the American command in Vietnam.

By 1968, Military Assistance Command had submitted its plans for Phase II of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Improvement and Modernization Plan. Phase II planning was based on assumptions that North Vietnamese intervention would increase and that the missions of the allied forces would remain substantially unchanged from those that had been stated for fiscal year 1968; that is, U.S. and allied forces were assigned to destroy Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces and base areas, and South Vietnamese Army and Regional and Popular Forces units were to support the pacification program. Because of these assumptions, the improvement plan was rather methodical and cautious. The proposal was submitted to the Secretary of Defense, who disapproved and returned it to the Saigon planners for substantial revision. In early 1969 the plan was resubmitted as Phase IIa, which assumed the

[196]

same basic premises as those of the initial Phase II plan but substantially increased the speed and scope of the modernization. On 28 April 1969, the Deputy Secretary of Defense gave final approval of the Military Assistance Command program as modified by the joint Chiefs of Staff and in his approving memo stated: "Vietnamizing the war should have the highest priority. Providing needed equipment for the RVNAF is therefore of greatest importance. To assure that equipment turned over to the RVNAF can be used effectively, it must be supported by (1) training and (2) logistic support."

Phase IIa of the Improvement and Modernization Plan recognized that major shortfalls existed in the fire power capabilities of the Vietnamese forces, and a substantial portion of the plan was devoted to rectifying this weakness. The equipment ceilings established by the plan were intended to increase substantially the artillery capability of the Vietnamese. These proposed figures were further modified when Presidents Nixon and Thieu met at Midway in June 1969. President Thieu presented the requirements as seen by the Vietnamese to President Nixon, who in turn gave them to General Abrams for study, comment, and possible inclusion in the program. One of the requirements, as seen by the Vietnamese, was heavy artillery in the form of four 8-inch field artillery battalions. After this proposal was scrutinized by Military Assistance Command, only portions of requests were approved. Three additional battalions of artillery, two 105-mm. and one 155-mm., were added to the fiscal year 1970 activation schedule. By the end of 1969, the artillery improvement plan had undergone a number of revisions but delivery of field artillery weapons was being accomplished smoothly and ahead of schedule.

[197]

At the same time the master plan for Vietnamization was taking shape, the required training base to prepare the South Vietnamese Army to assume a more proportionate share of the action immediately and the entire combat role in the future was receiving careful consideration from the appropriate American commands throughout the country. I Field Force Artillery, which had a substantial jump on the other headquarters in the establishment of a training assistance program for Vietnamese forces, reviewed its existing programs, found them to be valid, and, on the basis of additional studies, added two plans through which it intended to improve the capabilities of Regional Forces and Popular Forces units to call for and adjust artillery fire in defense of their positions and in support of their operations. In addition, basic fire planning was taught to the Regional Forces so they could support their own operations. Based on this program, a comprehensive defensive target list was developed throughout II Corps and, if a target fell within range of an artillery unit, fire was adjusted onto it. This program increased hamlet and village security. Before the initiation of the plan, only 684 of the existing 4,208 defensive targets planned at various times during the war had been fired on. By August 1969, with the emphasis applied by I Field Force Artillery, each of the 52 districts in II Corps had a fire plan, 5,869 targets had been developed, and 32 percent of the targets had been fired in. The effectiveness of the program was demonstrated during the week of 11 August 1969, when eight friendly hamlets drove off Viet Cong attacks by simply calling for previously fired-in defensive targets.

In III Corps Tactical Zone, II Field Force Artillery was also examining the Vietnamization of artillery support. Until the summer of 1969, assistance to Vietnamese artillery had been limited to small contact teams concerned primarily with assisting the Vietnamese to solve maintenance and logistics problems by making American supply channels available for immediate, pressing needs. However, during the summer of 1969, through the efforts of the commanders of II Field Force Artillery and III Corps Artillery, the need for a coordinated assistance program was examined. Such a program would complement the II Field Force and III Corps Operation DONG TIEN (forward together). A combined working committee was formed to develop a plan for the program, define its concepts, and establish policies and procedures for coordinating all mutual support projects, which would increase the capabilities and effectiveness of the combined artillery team in III Corps. The objectives of the program, as seen by the committee, were to improve coordination and mutual understanding between allied artillery units; to improve fire support effectiveness by combining

[198]

planning and coordination of fire support, standardizing techniques, and improving quality of training; and to increase artillery firing capabilities.

To accomplish the program objectives, the planning committee developed nine mutual support projects:

Project 1: Exchange visits of battery personnel
Project 2: Combined fire support coordination centers
Project 3: Procedures and coordination requirements for planning combined fire support
Project 4: Standardized operational readiness evaluations
Project 5: Combined unit refresher training program
Project 6: Standardization of tube calibration procedures
Project 7: Standardization of registration policy
Project 8: Combined use of meteorological data
Project 9: Combined survey control plan

The proposed projects were translated into concrete programs and initiated in a low key through the associate battery concept. Key personnel from both U.S. and Vietnamese units visited their "sister" batteries to gain a better understanding of each other's problems, observe battery operations, and exchange views. This exchange of ideas led naturally to the establishment of the standardized operational readiness evaluations (ORE's) as outlined in Project 4. A denotative checklist was developed to measure the effectiveness of artillery units. The checklist was particularly effective because it matched performance against an established standard rather than against another unit, minimizing the threat of embarrassment or loss of face-an important consideration with the Vietnamese. To prepare units for operational readiness, evaluations, unit refresher training was initiated. Mobile training teams were created and dispatched to isolated areas to give instruction. Classes were kept small so that thorough instruction could be given to key personnel and specialists, and on-the-job training was conducted whenever possible.

In order to standardize procedures and improve the accuracy of Vietnamese artillery fires, the committee developed a plan to insure that all weapons were calibrated annually. Second, a standardized registration policy was adopted throughout III Corps and emphasis placed on persuading Vietnamese units to accept American registration practices.

To refine artillery accuracy further, teams provided assistance to Vietnamese units to develop the capability to use meteorological data. All U.S. meteorological stations in III Corps began to conduct dual-language broadcasts four times daily in order to provide Vietnamese artillery units with the requisite data. Finally, a

[199]

combined effort was initiated to extend survey control to all artillery units in III Corps.

By May 1970, the DONG TIEN Program was well under way and had scored a number of successes. Over 88 percent of the howitzers employed by Vietnamese artillery in III Corps were calibrated; survey was brought in to 67 of 122 Vietnamese firing positions, an increase of 55 percent in six months; meteorological data were received and employed by the majority of the Vietnamese units; and a substantial number of the Vietnamese artillery units were employing American registration techniques.

With the refinement and improvement of Vietnamese fire support, the necessity to control these fires became apparent. Combined fire support coordination centers were created in various provinces throughout III Corps. These centers included Vietnamese, U.S. and Free World forces artillery representatives, U.S. Air Force representatives, and, where necessary, U.S. Navy personnel. In addition to planning fire support and clearing fires, they provided a readily accessible means for the interchange of fire requests between Vietnamese and American units. These agencies significantly increased mutual support and reduced primary reliance on U.S. artillery

In addition to DONG TIEN, three other significant programs were initiated. The Civilian Irregular Defense Group Artillery School was opened at Trang Sup on 1 September 1969. It was created to train CIDG artillerymen to assume the fire support of seven Special Forces camps. The school was staffed and operated by the 23d Artillery Group, which designed a compact but thorough ten-week course. The school conducted three sessions during which 186 Civilian Irregular artillerymen were trained and deployed to designated camps. With the irregulars assuming artillery duties at these outposts, Vietnamese Army artillerymen were relieved to return to their regular force structures. In September 1969, III Corps Artillery began training a Vietnamese Army artillery battery in air movement techniques and jungle operations. Training was completed in December 1969, and the battery assumed direct support of the 3d Mobile Strike Force, a mission that had been the responsibility of the U.S. Jungle Battery, a composite battery of three 105-mm. and three 155-mm. howitzers. This III Corps training program enabled six guns to be returned to force artillery assets. Finally, the Fire Direction Officer's School, conducted by Field Force Artillery for its own officers, was made available to Vietnamese personnel. This week-long course assisted in standardizing artillery procedures in III Corps by providing comprehensive instruction in the latest gunnery techniques employed by U.S.

[200]

artillery. By May of 1970, 56 Vietnamese officers had been graduated from this school.

At about the same time, considerations for Vietnamization were being examined in Military Region I. With the impending redeployment of the 3d Marine Division, the Vietnamese role would increase significantly. From November 1969 until 9 March 1970, the primary exchange of ideas and programs took place between XXIV Corps Artillery and Vietnamese 1st Division Artillery because, until its redeployment in March 1970, III Marine Amphibious Force was the principal American headquarters in the northern provinces. This interplay between the Americans and Vietnamese consisted of decentralized programs initiated at all levels through personal contact and coordination established by the U.S. commanders.

In early 1970, XXIV Corps Artillery, in anticipation of the impending departure of the Marines, began to study the feasibility of a more intensive and centralized Vietnamization program. A XXIV Corps regulation was prepared by corps artillery to outline the minimum requirements for insuring effective coordination of U.S. and Vietnamese fires. The regulation also included provisions for establishing liaison between supporting artillery elements and territorial force headquarters down to subsector level. At the same time, work was initiated to revamp the artillery and air strike warning system since, at the time, a dual system existed within the Vietnamese and U.S. chains of command. As American withdrawals continued, inordinate difficulties might be experienced by both U.S. and Vietnamese pilots unless the system was effectively Vietnamized. After careful study, the collocation of the respective warning agencies was adopted at the most practical solution-one that would allow for the most orderly eventual transfer of responsibility to the Vietnamese when U.S. strength in Military Region I no longer justified the combined effort.

During March 1970, XXIV Corps Artillery initiated an artillery instructor training program in support of the Vietnamese artillery refresher training project. Representatives of all artillery battalions in the Vietnamese 1st Division and the Quan Da Special Zone underwent three weeks of instruction to prepare them to conduct training in their own organizations. Separate courses were presented in fire direction procedures, firing battery operations, and maintenance. Upon completion of the instructor training phase, each battalion formed a mobile training team which was augmented by one U.S. officer and one U.S. noncommissioned officer. These teams then moved to the field to conduct refresher training at battery locations. Early indications were that the pro-

[201]

gram was successful and that the proficiency of the firing units was clearly improved.

One month later a team of officers from XXIV Corps Artillery and I Corps Artillery (Vietnamese) conducted a survey to determine the proficiency of Regional Forces and Popular Forces personnel in artillery adjustment procedures and the desirability of conducting training in the subject: The team interviewed Vietnamese officials and U.S. advisers in all five provinces; all agreed on the necessity for forward observer training and agreed to support a combined U.S. and Vietnamese program to provide such training. Two programs were instituted, one for Regional Forces and one for Popular Forces. XXIV Corps directed that the 23d Infantry (Americal) Division incorporate the Regional Forces training into its Regional Forces and Popular Forces leadership and orientation course. The goal of the course was to train observers from sector headquarters (1 each), subsector headquarters (1 each), battalion headquarters (2 each), company group headquarters (2 each), and company (3 each).

The first class started on 10 June 1970, and 889 Regional Forces officers were scheduled to undergo training.

Training for the Popular Forces was assigned to I Corps Artillery, which designed a comprehensive three-day course stressing basic essentials and live firing. A total of 3,138 Popular Forces leaders was scheduled to learn adjustment procedures in an eight­week period beginning 15 June 1970.

Further, agencies responsible for existing programs that had been established to support American units were directed to shift their emphasis to Vietnamese artillery batteries. In February 1970, the corps artillery firing battery inspection team began providing technical assistance to Vietnamese units. Detailed technical checks of fire direction procedures, firing battery operations, maintenance, and safety were made at each battery visited. On-the-spot critiques were given during the inspections and formal reports were submitted to I Corps Artillery. Logistical support was limited primarily to technical assistance and emergency aid to insure that the Vietnamese supply system was exercised. Whenever emergency assistance was given in the form of supplies or repair parts, one of the contingencies under which it was granted was that the Vietnamese unit initiate parallel supply action in its logistics channels to insure that the demand was recorded.

Even as these programs were being initiated, Military Assistance Command was finalizing the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Improvement and Modernization Plan for fiscal year 1971. An analysis of Vietnamese combat capability conducted as part of this

[202]

FORMAL FIRE DIRECTION CENTER CLASS FOR ARVN FIELD ARTILLERYMEN

plan revealed that a primary shortfall existed in artillery. The study projected weaknesses in fire power for the coming three fiscal years in the following areas: medium, heavy, and long-range artillery for 1971; medium and heavy artillery for 1972; and medium artillery for 1973.

In addition, the rapid expansion of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces cut drastically into their experienced manpower pool and, in turn, diluted the leadership and technical base of newly created artily units. To offset this problem Military Assistance Command emphasized the improvement of instruction at the Vietnamese Artillery School and approved its expansion. During 1970 the Artillery School enrolled 2,327 students, well above the 1,715 initially planned for the year. Instruction was improved. New programs were prepared for the survey officer course and the survey instructor course. A copy of the program for the U.S. artillery advanced course was obtained from Fort Sill, edited to emphasize essential portions, and provided to the director of instruction for updating the battalion commanders course. Several new gun emplacements with concrete ammunition and personnel bunkers were built in the school demonstration area.

In June 1970 the most significant training improvement occurred when the school began to coordinate service practice, fire direction,

[203]

and gun crew training during live fire exercises. This arrangement saved ammunition and training time and released support troop gun crews to perform maintenance. Their training improved noticeably after the commandant directed that classes be inspected daily and written reports submitted.

In consonance with the American Vietnamization plan, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Artillery Command implemented a new training program entitled the Reorganization Technique Plan. The program was to operate in an eleven-month time frame and was to raise the technical proficiency level of all Vietnamese artillery units. During Phase I, January and February 1970, the Artillery Command developed the concepts and disseminated instructions and lesson plans to the artillery units, which in turn formed mobile instruction teams. In Phase II, March 1970, the various division artillery and corps artillery headquarters consolidated the mobile training teams, issued instructions, and conducted instructor training. In Phase III, April-November 1970, two-week training programs were presented at all firing positions and a proficiency test was administered. To insure the adequacy of the training, the corps or division artillery headquarters administered a unit test thirty days after the mobile training teams had completed the training and individual testing of all firing elements.

Once Military Assistance Command had established the added emphasis necessary to create a strong training base, it examined the problems of the projected artillery shortfalls. It became apparent that the fragmented positioning of artillery, as practiced by South Vietnamese Army units to secure lines of communication and strategic centers of population, detracted from the artillery's support of offensive operations. Even with the activation of new artillery battalions, the ratio of tubes to maneuver battalions did not increase significantly. Further, the requirement to man artillery platoons in static locations cut into the manpower pool of Vietnamese forces and created difficulties during new unit activations. To offset this weakness, Military Assistance Command approved the addition of 176 two-gun fire support platoons to replace Vietnamese artillery in fixed sites. Each platoon was authorized 29 spaces to be provided from Regional Forces assets. By year's end 100 of the 176 platoons were activated, and of these 53 were deployed throughout Vietnam. Training of the territorial artillerymen varied from military region to military region. In Military Region I, contingency plans, which had been formulated by XXIV Corps Artillery to train these forces, were activated. In Military Region II, training was accomplished at the Artillery School and the Vietnamese division training centers; II Field Force Artillery reoriented the Civilian Irregular Defense

[204]

Group Artillery School to prepare territorial forces to assume the artillery mission. In Military Region IV, the Vietnamese Corps Artillery established a training center for the Regional Forces artillerymen. With at least part of the light artillery problem solved, planners in Saigon attacked the Vietnamese long-range fire power weakness. After thorough investigation, Project ENHANCE was promulgated. This plan authorized the activation and deployment of five 175-mm. gun battalions. Three of these battalions were scheduled for deployment in Military Region I. The remaining two battalions were projected for Regions II and III. Two battalions were to be trained, equipped, and deployed along the demilitarized zone in 1971 to replace withdrawing American units.

Operations Into Cambodia

Although commanders throughout Vietnam were placing primary emphasis on Vietnamization and the structure of the program was taking shape, the American effort and the ability of Vietnamese forces to absorb it had not had a significant test. The vehicle through which the Vietnamese fighting potential could be tested and its progress more reliably gauged was rapidly approaching in the spring of 1970.

The sanctuaries and base areas established by the Communist forces along the South Vietnam-Cambodia boundary had long been a frustrating irritant to both American and Vietnamese military leaders. (Map 20) Although the occupation of these areas by the North Vietnamese was a flagrant violation of Cambodian neutrality, the position taken by Prince Sihanouk and his government made it impossible to conduct operations across the border in an effort to deny the enemy the free use of these sanctuaries. Sihanouk's neutrality was flexible, ranging from open hostility toward South Vietnam and her allies to a more agreeable tolerance of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. Over the years, this tolerance permitted the establishment and maintenance of these base areas.

In the spring of 1970 the political atmosphere in Cambodia changed drastically and erupted into violence, which culminated in the overthrow of the Sihanouk regime. With the formation of the Lon Nol administration, the attitude of the Cambodian government changed completely; its hostility was directed away from the South Vietnamese and against the Communists. This reversal of position made possible the subsequent incursions into Cambodia.

Intelligence reports had been indicating a massive logistics buildup in the Cambodian sanctuaries in the Military Region III area for some time. Evidence was strong that the Communists were

[205]

ARVN 155-MM. HOWITZER STATIC POSITION

planning a major offensive-possibly similar in intensity to the 1968 Tet offensive. In addition, military intelligence had pinpointed the location of the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), the major North Vietnamese headquarters for South Vietnam, in the "Fish Hook" region of Cambodia. The intent of the Cambodian incursion was to forestall an enemy offensive, despoil the sanctuaries, and, if possible, capture the Central Office. At the same time, the achievement of these objectives would so disrupt Communist plans and capabilities that the Vietnamization program would greatly benefit from the added time gained.

South Vietnamese operations into Cambodia commenced on 14 April 1970 with several limited penetrations into the "Angel's Wing" area. These penetrations were followed by a major Vietnamese thrust launched on 29 April 1970. Operation TOAN THANG 42 (Rock Crusher) was initiated by the Vietnamese III Corps attacking with three task forces into the Angel's Wing area and then south into the "Parrot's Beak" area of Cambodia. (Map 21) Each task force was supported by one battery of mixed 105-mm. howitzers and augmented by U.S. self-propelled medium artillery as needed. II Field Force Artillery supported the attack with six batteries of medium and heavy artillery, initially deployed to the north and east

[206]

ARVN 103D FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION IN TRAINING

of the area of operations in order to provide maximum support for the maneuver units. Liaison to further insure timely support was established with all Vietnamese task forces, III Corps, and IV Corps. All U.S. artillery fires in TOAN THANG 42 were coordinated and controlled by a forward element of the 23d Artillery Group, which was collocated with the Vietnamese III Corps tactical operations center at Go Dau Ha and later at Tay Ninh. During the latter phases of this operation, two medium and two heavy batteries displaced into Cambodia to keep pace with the rapidly moving Vietnamese forces. These batteries provided close and continuous support to the maneuver elements but were not allowed to displace west of Svay Rieng, the westernmost limit of the politically imposed U.S. operational boundary. As the operation progressed, two of the task forces turned north to Prey Vang and the Chup Plantation.

On 27 April 1970, the 1st Cavalry Division was given the mission of planning and executing a campaign to eliminate the North Vietnamese base areas in the Fish Hook region of Cambodia adjacent to Military Region III. (Map 22) To accomplish this mission, elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the Vietnamese 1st Airborne Division were placed under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division. Task Force SHOEMAKER was formed to carry out the attack.

[207]

Map 20

[208-209]

Map 21

The maneuver plan was simple and direct. The 3d Brigade of the Vietnamese 1st Airborne Division would occupy blocking positions north of the objective area, and elements of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment would make a four-pronged attack from the south. Artillery would be provided from all the elements involved in the attack, and additional fire support would come from II Field Force Artillery units.

The fire support available was formidable and included the largest concentration of artillery, tactical air strikes, and B-52

[210]

Map 22

strikes committed in support of an operation of this size by the Free World Military Assistance Forces in the Republic of Vietnam. The fire support coordination planning required to support the operation was extremely complex and detailed. Initially, targeting information was limited; however, after the operation was approved, additional information became increasingly available from II Field Force and Military Assistance Command sources. The bulk of the fire planning was conducted during 27-29 April 1970. After the basic fire support annex and artillery fire support appendix were prepared, detailed coordination of fires with other fire support assets was conducted. Care was taken to insure that the various fire supports did not interfere with each other, times on target were adjusted to insure flight safety for ordnance-carrying aircraft, and definitive air corridors were established. The annex and appendix with target lists and overlays were distributed on 29 April for the D-day H-hour fires and on 30 April for the planned fires in support of subsequent phases of the operation.

Ninety-four cannon artillery pieces were positioned to support the initial phases of the attack: thirty-six 105-mm. howitzers, forty­eight 155-mm. howitzers, four 8-inch howitzers, and six 175-mm. guns. The initial positioning of artillery took place during the period 29 April-1 May 1970. By 30 April (D minus 1), the II Field

[211]

Force heavy and medium artillery, the direct support artillery for the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, and one Vietnamese airborne artillery direct support battery were in position and prepared to support the operation.

At 0600 on 1 May, D-day, an extensive 390-minute planned artillery and air preparation was initiated. Beginning with the 0600 preparation fires, in support of elements of the 1st Airborne Division, until the end of the preparation at 1245, a total of 2,436 artillery rounds was fired. These fires were effectively integrated with 48 tactical airstrikes to complete the D-day preparations. Throughout the morning tactical air and cannon and aerial field artillery were simultaneously employed in the attack on multiple target complexes. The total fire support delivered for D-day operations included 185 tactical air sorties, 36 arc light missions, and 5,460 artillery rounds.

During the period 2-5 May, the detailed fire support planning paid handsome dividends as many lucrative targets were engaged. The heavy concentration of cannon artillery and flexible fire support coordination allowed fires to be massed again and again with relative ease. Artillery moves to support advancing friendly forces began on 2 May and were subsequently made whenever necessary to insure continuous artillery coverage. II Field Force Artillery units alone moved 198 times during the sixty-day operation to maintain pace with the maneuver forces.

On 5 May plans were initiated for an expansion of operations in Cambodia. As a result of the planned expansion, Task Force SHOEMAKER was dissolved and the responsibility for fire support coordination was passed from the task force to the 1st Cavalry Division.

With the initiation, of Operation TOAN THANG 45 northeast of Bu Dop by the 2d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, in Base Area 354 by elements of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division, and in Base Area 350 by the Vietnamese 9th Regiment, fire support coordination activities were expanded but did not change significantly from the smooth-functioning procedures previously established. Positioning II Field Force Artillery units centrally and well forward had facilitated the support of the additional maneuver units as they attacked into Base Areas 354, 707, 350, and 351. Except for a few batteries located in critical areas of III Corps, virtually all remaining units of II Field Force Artillery were moved to the Cambodian border or across it. During one three-day period, 32 artillery moves were conducted to place the firing elements in the best positions to support the expanded operations.

During the withdrawal phases of both TOAN THANG 43 and

[212]

TOAN THANG 45, extraction support plans were formulated to derive maximum benefit from all available fire support. The purpose of these plans was to deny the enemy access to the extraction sites and air corridors. Like the fire plans that had been developed for the conduct of the operation, the extraction support plans were comprehensive and effective. Each direct support artillery battalion planned the extraction fires for the supported brigade, and the division fire support coordination center cooperated closely with the Vietnamese airborne division artillery commander to establish the fire scheme for the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces. These plans were so effective that continuous fire was maintained around the extraction sites and air corridors during the entire operation. By 1800 on 29 June 1970, all American units were withdrawn from Cambodia.

At the same time that the well-publicized campaign across the Cambodian border was kicking off in the Military Region III area, the 4th Infantry Division, located in the central highlands of II Corps Tactical Zone, received a warning order to be prepared to conduct operations across the border into Base Area 702 to locate and destroy enemy resources, installations, and command facilities. Planning was initiated immediately for the two-brigade assault. Fire support was provided by division artillery units reinforced by medium and heavy elements of the 52d Artillery Group. Division artillery established a forward tactical command post at New Plei Djereng and, in conjunction with a permanent liaison party provided by the 52d Artillery Group, developed the fire support plan for the operation, called BINH TAY I. Because South Vietnamese elements were involved in the operation, it was necessary to form the additional liaison parties to support Vietnamese units. A special fire support team was established with the Special Forces and Civilian Irregular Defense Group unit at New Plei Djereng to insure timely clearance of fire requests. Firing units were positioned in forward areas on 4 May 1970 to facilitate joining the maneuver forces and reduce the time required to lift the units into the selected fire support bases. After the planned occupation of the fire bases by the light and medium artillery batteries, only one battery was relocated within the base area. This move was required because of a decision to increase the troop density in the 1st Brigade area of operation. With this one exception, all artillery units remained in their initial positions throughout the Cambodian operation. Although artillery support,of the operation was adequate, ammunition resupply problems hampered the total effectiveness of the firing units. A temporary ammunition supply point was established at New Plei Djereng; however, its stockage was not in accord with

[213]

the recommended stockage objective. A critical shortage was avoided only because the initial combat assaults of the maneuver forces were delayed one day.

Although significant amounts of material were captured and destroyed, Operation BINH TAY I was less than a total success. Because of other commitments and operational requirements in II Corps, 4th Division elements were withdrawn ten days after the operation started and substantial areas were left unexploited. The lack of air assets, both Army and Air Force, artillery resupply problems, and heavy initial contact severely hampered the efficiency of the operation. Although Vietnamese forces continued to operate in Base Area 702 until 25 May 1970, the major tactical effort was complete with the withdrawal of the 1st Brigade units on 16 May.

The Cambodian incursion was an overwhelming success both in materiel captured or destroyed and the artillery rounds expended in support of the operation. During the two-month assault, friendly units expended 847,558 rounds of which 261,039 were fired by Vietnamese artillery units. Reported surveillance credited artillery units with 253 killed and 70 bunkers and 20 tunnel systems destroyed. Surprisingly, all artillery kills were reported by Vietnamese sources and 230 were reported as a result of the preparation fires that initiated the operation. The 1st Cavalry Division, in whose area of operations 708,965 rounds were fired by both U.S. and Vietnamese field artillery, did not credit the artillery with any kills or any bunker or tunnel destructions.

The Cambodian operation measured in terms of Vietnamization showed that weaknesses in Vietnamese fire support techniques still existed. Vietnamese artillery was not employed to its full effectiveness by task force commanders. Repeatedly, these commanders waited too long for tactical air, gunships, and light fire team support when direct support artillery was within range and ready to provide immediate fire. Throughout the operation, task force commanders called for tactical aircraft and light fire team strikes without regard to the nature of the target being engaged. Often, light fire teams were called to engage well-fortified positions-targets better suited for artillery engagement. This failure to expeditiously engage the enemy materially reduced the effectiveness of the combat mission. Often, Vietnamese artillery liaison officers and forward observers were not properly utilized. On numerous occasions the maneuver element commanders personally adjusted artillery fire and Vietnamese Air Force air strikes although trained observers were available. On several occasions, Vietnamese fire support officers were intimidated by their supported unit commanders to the extent that they would not approach the commanders with recommenda-

[214]

tions on the use of artillery. These failings resulted in lowering the effectiveness of the fire support and removed the commanders from their more immediate responsibilities of command. In addition, some coordination and liaison problems emerged between U.S. and Vietnamese forces. These problems were most acute whenever U.S. units were under the operational control of Vietnamese commands, and the difficulties manifested themselves in displacement, emplacement, and security arrangements. At times, slow reaction by the responsible Vietnamese headquarters in target clearance matters hampered the ability of the American artillery units to provide responsive fire support to elements in contact.

One of the most significant successes of the Cambodian incursion was really a byproduct of the action. With Vietnamese troops committed in such large numbers to the operation, territorial security became the primary responsibility of the Regional and Popular Forces. Their reaction to the challenge was surprisingly good and, more important, the confidence they gained from their successes served as a valuable psychological boost.

Toward Vietnamese Self-Sufficiency

With the termination of the Cambodian operation, primary attention was returned to Vietnamization. The performance of Vietnamese units during the recent campaign was carefully scrutinized, their strengths and weaknesses were analyzed, and emphasis was placed on those areas in which improvement was necessary. It also became apparent that the ability of ARVN artillery units to support maneuver forces adequately was substandard. Although the deployment of territorial artillery, as projected and approved by Military Assistance Command, was considered the ultimate answer, it was evident that, because of the physical limitation of training and equipping them, these platoons could not deploy rapidly enough to release Vietnamese artillery units to provide standard tactical support. At the same time, the redeployment of American artillery was progressing so rapidly that the "repositioning tactic" employed earlier in the year was losing its validity. It became apparent that immediate stopgap measures were required. More and more senior artillery commanders admitted that the platooning of American artillery for extended periods of time to increase area coverage was the best solution. Though it had been common practice in Vietnam to separate U.S. batteries into platoon positions, the practice had been viewed as a short-term expedient only. In the fall of 1970, Brigadier General Thomas J. McGuire, I Field Force Artillery commander, summed up the feeling of most artil-

[215]

lery commanders when he said, " . . . even though US artillery is prepared to respond rapidly by moving and shooting to destroy the enemy, we are prepared to replace ARVN artillery platoons and batteries which are on LOC [lines of communication] missions so that these ARVN batteries may move with the ARVN maneuver elements and support them on operations."

This tactic became standard procedure for American artillery units during the latter phases of the war. It also magnified the myriad problems that had plagued Vietnamese artillerymen when they platooned their guns. U.S. commanders found that the problems-command and control, technical proficiency, maintenance, and apathetic personnel-they had attributed to the "personality" of the oriental were, in fact, the result of the fragmented employment of artillery units. Diminishing assets made logistical support of these subunits difficult, the lack of qualified fire direction personnel limited the efficiency of the platoons, the absence of well-defined missions caused morale problems, and battery commanders were often out of touch with major parts of their units.

To offset diminishing long-range fire capabilities, heavy artillery raids were planned and conducted frequently. These raids normally were coordinated: the targets were carefully planned, the ammunition was quickly fired, and the guns were returned to their normal positions.

By the end of the year, the Vietnamese artillery posture had increased substantially and further deployments were planned. A total of 1,116 tubes were providing artillery support throughout the country.

With the approval of Project ENHANCE in the fall of 1970, XXIV Corps was directed to prepare a comprehensive training program for presentation to cadre personnel of the 101st Artillery Battalion, the first Vietnamese 175-mm. gun unit scheduled for activation.

[216]

Corps artillery began this mission by carefully scrutinizing the composition of the proposed unit to insure that each facet of 175-mm. gun employment received sufficient coverage in the program of instruction. Added emphasis was placed on maintenance, since this was to be the initial experience of ARVN forces with self-propelled artillery. Meteorological training received special consideration because, by tables of organization and equipment, the Vietnamese gun battalions were assigned meteorological teams. In early 1971 the program of instruction was approved, and the schooling of sixteen Vietnamese cadres began on 15 March 1971. On 19 April cadre training was completed and the general instruction of troops initiated. Fire direction and firing battery procedures were taught at Fire Support Base CARROLL, meteorology was taught at Fire Support Base NANCY, and driver and maintenance procedures were taught at numerous locations throughout Military Region I. Although instruction was conducted by the newly trained cadres, American experts were available to supervise and advise as necessary. Deployment of the first 175-mm. gun unit was scheduled for July-August 1971.

The year 1971 brought another shift in the Vietnamization concept. Since the promulgation of the Vietnamization program in November 1969, the basis for Vietnamization had been training programs and combined operations conceived and controlled by Americans. By 1971, the American troop strength in Vietnam had been halved and it became apparent that the capability of U.S. units to directly support training programs was fast diminishing. At the same time, American commanders felt that if Vietnamese forces were to become self-reliant, they would have to provide the training impetus for themselves. Assistance was offered only as needed and required. This shift in policy produced some hopeful indications as the Vietnamese began to assume the initiative in meeting most of their requirements.

In 1971, Military Assistance Command reviewed the Vietnamization program and divided it into three phases:

Phase I-Turn over ground combat responsibilities to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.
Phase II-Develop air, naval, artillery, logistics, and other support capabilities of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces to the degree that effective independent security can be maintained.
Phase III-Reduce the American artillery presence to a military advisory mission and, finally, withdraw as the South Vietnamese become capable of handling the Communist threat without U.S. military assistance.

Although these phases were rather definitively stated, work was

[217]

being done in both Phases I and II because it was impossible to achieve any success in the first phase without substantial gains in the second.

Having examined and approved the feasibility of providing self­propelled 175-mm. guns to Vietnamese forces, Military Assistance Command began studies relative to the turnover of self-propelled 155-mm. howitzers. The concept called for the activation of three battalions armed with the M109 howitzers. The study was continued until 23 August 1971, when General Abrams informed General Vien, Chief of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, that the activation of the three new battalions was not feasible and that " . . . introduction of this new weapon into ARVN will overtax the training base and the logistics system, which is not now prepared to cope with the maintenance difficulties presented by this weapon . . ."

Meanwhile, in January 1971 U.S. and ARVN commands planned an operation across the border into Laos from Quang Tri Province in northern Military Region I. Both U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence estimates had strongly indicated that the enemy was preparing to conduct an intensified resupply and reinforcement operation in southern Laos as well as to build up supplies and equipment in Military Region I. Sources estimated enemy strength across the Quang Tri Province border to be 13,000 line and 9,000 support troops. In view of the successful Cambodian sanctuary operations of 1970, the logical tactical follow-up would be an effort to disrupt North Vietnamese supply and reinforcement operations.

The operation, termed LAM SON 719 and commanded by the commanding general of the Vietnamese I Corps, did not call for the employment of American ground forces in Laos. However, U.S. air assets augmented the South Vietnamese Air Force in supporting ground operations. To permit a greater Vietnamese effort, American ground units provided extensive ground support in northwestern Quang Tri Province.

U.S. and Vietnamese forces estimated a four-phase offensive:

Phase I-U.S. units would open fire bases in Khe Sanh Plateau and secure Route 9 as well as staging areas and artillery positions from which to support subsequent operations.
Phase II-Vietnamese forces would attack into Laos on three axes, with the major axis along Route 9. Attacks would carry no further west than Tchepone, about thirty kilometers into Laos.
Phase III-Gains would be consolidated.
Phase IV-Friendly forces would be extracted.

Planning for the employment of U.S. artillery to support Phase I was extensive. Although ARVN maneuver units had their own

[218]

light and medium artillery, they needed augmentation by heavy U.S. artillery operating from the border. To this end, fire support was planned between the I Corps fire support element and the XXIV U.S. corps fire support element through I Corps Artillery, the I Corps G-3, and the I Corps Artillery adviser. In addition, plans included coordination with the 108th U.S. Artillery Group, the control headquarters for heavy U.S. artillery

The 108th Artillery Group consisted of the 8th Battalion, 4th Field Artillery, and the 2d Battalion, 94th Field Artillery, each with four 8-inch howitzers and eight 175-mm. guns, as well as Battery B, 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery, with four 175-mm. guns. The 4th Battalion, 77th Aerial Field Artillery, 101st Airborne Division, was also available to support the operation and, being an air asset, was not restricted by borders. Three 175-mm. batteries and one 8-inch battery were situated along the Laos-Vietnam border. The remaining batteries were set up in the Khe Sanh area.

Phase I, dubbed Operation DEWEY CANYON, proceeded without a significant hitch. However, subsequent phases, which were to be conducted primarily by Vietnamese forces, went awry. Plans called for the Vietnamese 1st Airborne Division to conduct an airmobile attack all the way to Tchepone. At the same time, the Vietnamese 1st Armored Brigade was to attack along Route 9 and link up with the airborne division to open up necessary supply lines. Unfortunately, the armored brigade did not fulfill its mission. It could neither advance with sufficient speed to provide a timely linkup nor keep the route to its rear open. Supplies to the airborne force had to be moved by air against intensive enemy antiaircraft fires. The consolidation phase ended quickly and extraction began in haste. Enemy pressure forced the abandonment of equipment, including artillery pieces. Notwithstanding the loss of equipment, statistics were quite impressive in favor of Vietnamese forces. Over 19,360 enemy were killed in action whereas ARVN forces sustained 1,749 killed.

In terms of Vietnamization, LAM SON 719 again pointed out Vietnamese weaknesses, particularly the inability of units to coordinate fire support. Without the assistance of U.S. advisers, who had been left behind, the South Vietnamese displayed a marked deficiency in requesting and controlling artillery and tactical air. Weapons were poorly matched to targets, air strikes were often requested for targets more suitable for artillery, and aerial field artillery was often requested to attack targets beyond its capabilities. So inefficient was the fire support coordination system that in most cases maneuver units abandoned the procedures and sent fire requests directly to fire support elements.

[219]

1972 Enemy Offensive

In mid-1971, shortly after the conclusion of LAM SON 719, Military Assistance Command redeployed the 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division and thus removed the last American maneuver unit from the demilitarized zone. Artillery units of the 108th Artillery Group, however, remained because Vietnamese forces still desperately needed artillery assets. To fill the void created by the withdrawal of the American forces, the joint General Staff activated the Vietnamese Division. This unit was a conglomeration of independent units already operating in Military Region I and newly created units still being trained and outfitted. Artillery elements taken from I Corps Artillery assets and redesignated the 30th and 32d Artillery Battalions supported the newly created division. Of these, the 30th Artillery Battalion was a 155-mm. howitzer unit. The third direct support element, the 33d Artillery Battalion, was activated on 1 December 1971. Unit training was to start 17 January 1972, and field deployment was scheduled for 1 April 1972.

Over-all, 1971 was a wait-and-see year. More and more responsibility was given to Vietnamese units, and their performance was evaluated. Although operationally their performance was spotty, there were some hopeful indicators. Territorial artillery assumed greater fire support responsibilities, and by year's end 100 platoons had been deployed; the Artillery School continued to revamp and upgrade its program to include initiation of the artillery officer's advanced course in August; and in some divisions, the artillery began to assume traditional support roles and develop habitual support relationships with the maneuver regiments. By December, deployed Vietnamese artillery strength had increased to 1,202 tubes of various calibers, including twelve 175-mm, guns.

By mid-December 1971, intelligence sources were beginning to

[220]

note increased enemy activity along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and in the demilitarized zone area of Vietnam. As this buildup continued and a pattern of sorts developed, American and Vietnamese commanders began warning their commands to prepare for a major enemy offensive commencing with the Tet holidays in mid­February. As the pulse of enemy movements picked up through January 1972, commanders increased vigilance and expected heavy action to erupt with the Vietnamese new year. American leaders believed that the expected offensive would be the greatest test of Vietnamization, perhaps with the preservation of the entire nation at stake. Wary eyes studied the demilitarized zone. If a major attack materialized, the untested 3d Division would have to bear the brunt of the fighting.

Tet passed with no significant increase in enemy action. Allied commanders continued to expect an attack, but the vigilance and readiness established for the holidays could not be maintained. As the days after Tet slipped by without action, the nervous edge of the troops faded and daily routine returned to normal. Then on 30 March 1972 the North Vietnamese launched an infantry-armor attack through the east central portion of the demilitarized zone against the fire bases defended by elements of the 3d Division. With this attack, the Nguyen Hue offensive started. The North Vietnamese units quickly routed the defending forces and slashed forward toward Dong Ha. South Vietnamese forces fled in the face of the onslaught, and Dong Ha fell with little resistance. Farther south in Military Region I, the North Vietnamese attacked east from Laos and by 14 April had captured Fire Support Base BASTOGNE and were threatening Hue. Meanwhile, in Military Region III, Communist forces launched their An Loc campaign on 1 April by overrunning Fire Support Base PACE, 35 kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh city. On 5 April, the North Vietnamese attacked Loc Ninh and controlled the city by the next morning. The withdrawing South Vietnamese forces suffered continual attacks and sustained heavy casualties as they moved south on Route 13. By this time General Minh, commander of III Corps, realized that the main enemy effort would be in Binh Long Province and quickly reinforced An Loc. On 10 April, the anticipated offensive began. The North Vietnamese 9th Division, supported by armor elements, attacked An Loc.

In Military Region II, the initial enemy action was limited to increased harassing tactics, interdiction of Route 14 at the Kontum Pass, and the successful closing of the An Khe Pass on Route 19 on 11 April 1972.

Action in the Mekong Delta was negligible.

[221]

Early in the offensive, some of the objectives of the coordinated attacks throughout the Republic of Vietnam became apparent:

1. To divide the national reserves and force piecemeal and, therefore, indecisive commitment of these forces.
2. To give the impression of greater strength by attacking on several "fronts."
3. To promote a lack of decisiveness on a South Vietnamese command structure faced with few clearcut options and several ominous potential situations.
4. To encourage widespread dissatisfaction with the government of Vietnam by demonstrating its inability to protect its people.

The strategy of the enemy in attaining these objectives centered on the provincial capitals. These cities or towns were focal points because of, first, their governmental prominence; second, their relative isolation; and, third, their comparatively weak defenses. It also became clear that the ultimate objective of the North Vietnamese was the capture of Quang Tri, Qui Nhon, Kontum, An Loc, Tay Ninh, and, because of its psychological importance as the historical and cultural center of Vietnam, Hue. The loss of these cities could well have precipitated the collapse of the South Vietnam government.

The first two weeks of the offensive were disastrous for the South Vietnamese forces. Throughout the country they experienced heavy personnel losses, had to face infantry and armor attacks in significant numbers for the first time, and, often, especially in Military Region I, found themselves outgunned by enemy artillery. During the first ten days of the Nguyen Hue offensive, South Vietnamese units lost 81 105-mm. howitzers, 32 155-mm. howitzers, and 4 175-mm. guns. Most of their losses were due to reliance on aircraft for fire base evacuation and the inability of the aircraft to do the job because of enemy artillery. In Military Region I, the 30th and 31st Artillery Battalions of the 3d Division lost all their guns and the 33d Artillery Battalion escaped similar fate only because it was still in training and only partially deployed. Still, the 33d managed to lose 2 of its guns. All the fire support bases north and west of Dong Ha were overrun and the artillery positioned there was captured or destroyed. Artillery losses throughout the remainder of South Vietnam were fewer only because units were more widely deployed.

Throughout April and May the North Vietnamese Army continued to apply pressure along all the fronts. In Military Region I, enemy units attacked and captured Quang Tri in early May. In Military Region II, the drive in the highlands began on 23 April. In quick succession Fire Support Bases 5 and 6, Tanh Canh, and

[222]

ARVN ARTILLERY LOSSES, 31 MARCH-10 APRIL 1972

Dak To fell and northwestern Kontum Province was in enemy hands. In Military Region III, An Loc remained under pressure, Dau Tieng suffered attacks, and the interdiction of Route 13 continued.

As these actions occurred, South Vietnamese forces began to regroup. They stiffened their resistance to enemy pressure and, with the aid of massive air support, including large numbers of B-52 arc light strikes, slowed the momentum of the enemy thrust. During May the action began to stabilize as ARVN forces established a defensive line along the My Chanh River in Military Region I, stopped the enemy at Kontum, and stubbornly resisted at An Loc. Although enemy pressure remained great throughout May, the thrust of the offensive had been blunted. Once checked, the North Vietnamese attack never regained its force. Throughout the counteroffensive that followed, opportune application of artillery and air power prohibited enemy buildups and attacks.

The late May stabilization permitted South Vietnamese commanders to scrutinize carefully the over-all situation and take ap-

[223]

propriate actions. When it became apparent that An Loc and Kontum would not fall, they turned their attention to planning a counteroffensive in Military Region I to recapture Quang Tri Province.

Whereas the actions around both Kontum and An Loc were monuments to air power, the counterattack out of the My Chanh River line proceeded along conventional lines. The purpose of the counterattack, dubbed Operation LAM SON 72, was to provide a defense for Hue, secure the Quang Tri and Dong Ha area, and destroy enemy forces and restore government control to Quang Tri Province.

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces limited their operations during most of June to repositioning of forces, probing attacks to test enemy strengths, and cover and deception activities. Then, on 28 June, the counterattack began. The Airborne Division conducted the main attack west of Route 1 in the direction of La Vong and Quang Tri. The Marine Division conducted the supporting attack along Route 555 in the direction of Trien Phong and Quang Tri. Initial progress was slow but steady. South Vietnamese forces met only moderate resistance. As they approached the Thach Han River, however, enemy reaction stiffened. By the time the Airborne Division had reached the outskirts of Quang Tri city on 7 July, it was clear that the enemy intended to hold the city at all costs. The counterattack ground to a halt. Although the initial plan called for Quang Tri to be bypassed, recapture of the city now became an emotional national objective. On 27 July, the boundary between the Airborne and Marine Divisions was shifted and the more heavily equipped marines were given the mission of taking the city. The airborne troopers were ordered to secure the Thach Han River line, seize Fire Support Base BARBARA, block enemy supply routes from the west, and secure Route 1-the corps main supply line.

Success during August continued to be limited, and it was not until early September that the final phase of the Quang Tri battle began. Then the marines launched the final push against the citadel within the city. Progress was slow and costly in the face of determined enemy resistance, but on 11 September 1972 the marines succeeded in breaching the citadel wall. After heavy fighting at close quarters for five days, the marines gained control of the citadel on 16 September and by nightfall on the 17th the city belonged to the Marine Division. Activity now shifted to the area of operation of the Airborne Division as they drove to capture Fire Support Base BARBARA. Their efforts were hampered by heavy attacks by fire and deteriorating weather as the October monsoon began to bring its heavy rains. However, by the end of October the fire support base

[224]

was recaptured and the major tasks of the counteroffensive were accomplished.

The employment of artillery in support of the counteroffensive in Military Region I gradually evolved from the fire base concept to conventional tactics. This change resulted from the introduction of 122-mm. and 130-mm. artillery weapons by the enemy and the effective use of these weapons against fixed fire bases. Although artillery contributed extensively to the success of the combat operations, poor artillery procedures were evident in all units. The failure to survey, register, and apply meteorological data and the use of improper ammunition-handling procedures reduced the accuracy of artillery fire. Further, a tendency to substitute massive unobserved fires for less intense observed fires resulted in excessive ammunition expenditure rates. At the same time, the development of the I Corps fire support element at Hue during May 1972 enabled the corps, for the first time, to integrate all U.S. and Vietnamese fire support means. The fire support element worked extremely well and contributed substantially to the success of the corps operation.

Problems During Phase-Down of U.S. Forces

The massive emphasis given so suddenly to Vietnamization caused a variety of feelings among the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces leaders. These feelings became more and more verbal in early 1970. In connection with an assessment of the Vietnamization effort, II Field Force, Vietnam, indicated:

To most senior ARVN Commanders, Vietnamization has provided the motivation . . . to assume the responsibility for the defense of their country in as short a time as possible. Many of these responsible individuals also express concern lest the Vietnamization process move too rapidly, leaving them to face a determined and waiting enemy before they are fully ready. Other responsible ARVN officers are optimistic about ARVN combat units taking over now . . but they emphasize the continued need for U.S. combat support (helicopter, artillery, etc.) and logistics support until these ARVN capabilities are fully built up.

Even as Vietnamese leaders were expressing anxiety over the relatively high speed of the Vietnamization programs, American commanders began experiencing operational difficulties caused by redeployments, stand-downs, and space reductions. To counter these problems, comprehensive studies were conducted to discern the most efficient utilization of the remaining assets. These studies revealed gaps in artillery coverage, poor utilization of heavy artillery

[225]

capability, and unsatisfactory positioning of light artillery. The best example of the results of such a study was Operation METRO MEDIA executed by I Field Force Artillery. Between January and March 1970, over seventeen sequential and coordinated complete relocations of artillery battalion headquarters and subordinate elements were conducted. The moves resulted in I Field Force Artillery assets being positioned most effectively to accomplish the required support mission. Better utilization of the long-range capability of heavy artillery was realized and a quick reaction artillery force was created in the central portion of Military Region II.

Further problems were generated by the actual redeployment of artillery units. Since withdrawal plans and Vietnamization programs did not emanate from the same source, more often than not the administrative considerations of stand-down clashed with the tactical requirements of the commands affected by redeployment. Often, artillery coverage was not immediately available to replace that provided by the recalled elements and a short-fuzed shuffle of the remaining artillery assets ensued. This tended to lower the effectiveness of offensive operations because of the lack of adequate fire support. The withdrawal of the 9th Infantry Division from Military Region IV is a good example of this loss of fire power. The movement of the division from the Mekong Delta caused an immediate loss of three artillery battalions. Even when all the artillery with the Vietnamese 7th Division became operational, there was a net loss of two artillery battalions, and the addition of two battalions to IV Corps assets was insufficient to upgrade the artillery posture of the upper delta without affecting other portions of IV Corps Tactical Zone. Additional hardships resulted from the lack of experience by which to gauge the time requirements of stand-down. The effort to insure optimum artillery coverage for the longest time often placed inordinately heavy administrative requirements on the redeploying units.

The time squeeze was most apparent in personnel matters, in which transfers within the country and tour completion requirements posed difficulties. In addition, early stand-down cut into the active artillery posture, forced hasty repositioning, and at times affected offensive operations in progress. At the same time, early stand-down caused administrative problems by leaving units with no equipment, no mission, and no motivation-a situation ready made for racial tensions, drug incidents, and morale problems.

An additional problem that affected artillery units was the far­flung deployment of some firing elements. This widespread positioning prevented the battalion headquarters from effectively controlling the stand-down of their batteries. To overcome this situ-

[226]

ation, higher headquarters directed battalions in the same locale as the isolated unit to assist the battery during stand-down operations. The assisting battalion was not staffed to absorb the added work load.

As redeployment progressed the experience factors were established, most of the administrative hardships were overcome, and a general system was developed. The tactical difficulties, however, remained and often grew. Because of the technical and personnel limitations, Vietnamization in certain areas of the country lagged behind the pace of the American withdrawal programs.

With the introduction of tube artillery by the enemy during the Nguyen Hue offensive, the weakness of South Vietnamese target acquisition means and counterbattery techniques became apparent. This inability to produce lucrative artillery targets was compounded by the consistent ability of enemy artillery to outrange South Vietnamese artillery and thus make counterbattery fires almost impossible. To offset this weakness the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill sent target assistance teams to Vietnam to aid in "target acquisition, with emphasis on the counterbattery program." The teams arrived in Vietnam on 21 May 1972 and deployed to the field two days later. Their success depended on the specific needs of each South Vietnamese division: its mission, its degree of involvement with the North Vietnamese offensive, and the attitude of its commanders The teams were fairly successful in helping to establish counterbattery intelligence centers, especially in I Corps where units were heavily committed to combat operations against North Vietnamese forces.

The following results highlighted some of the target acquisition efforts of the target assistance teams and South Vietnamese units: the 18th Division acquired 178 confirmed targets over a seventeen­day period; the 21st Division destroyed 6 howitzers; the 22d Division destroyed 2 howitzers; and I Corps destroyed 11 130-mm. guns, 2 122-mm. weapons, and ammunition storage.

[227]

However, the main source of targeting information concerning hostile armor and artillery weapons continued to come from airborne visual and electronic observation conducted by U.S. Army and Air Force resources.

More telling of the state of Vietnamization was the report of the target assistance teams. The Vietnamese Artillery School, the report concluded, performed "its mission in an outstanding manner" and its curriculum incorporated sufficient instruction in target acquisition. "The inadequacies in the proper employment of counterbattery tactics and techniques appeared to be generated in the field." Units such as the Vietnamese 25th and 1st Divisions had personnel knowledgeable in counterbattery procedures but saw no need to employ counterbattery tactics and techniques. They entertained, the teams reported, "no real sense of urgency." This neglect led to deterioration and eventual inability to employ effective counterbattery programs. The teams observed that the units required "strong ARVN command emphasis with corresponding advisory followup." The solution, then, seemed to lie not with more instruction but with constant supervision. Here, in microcosm, was the dilemma of the entire Vietnamization program. U.S. Army, Vietnam, units had to support maneuver elements and simultaneously supply the drive behind Vietnamization. Personnel problems alone often destined the latter task to be secondary. And, without full-time support, the Vietnamese failed to perceive the necessity of certain procedures. Consequently, they remained dependent on American aid.

The teams also provided valuable information concerning North Vietnamese Army artillery employment methods. Their analysis indicated that the North Vietnamese artillerymen were extremely professional and capable. The gunners generally fired at optimum range and preferred to mass widely separate pieces in surprise fires. Their ability to utilize artillery in this manner indicated that they surveyed gun positions, established effective communication systems, and exercised centralized control of fires.

On the other hand, the target assistance teams found that South Vietnamese artillerymen still ignored basic requirements necessary for effective fire support. ARVN artillery units did not conduct registrations and limited survey functions to utilize the existing survey established by American units prior to redeployment. Moreover, all South Vietnamese units except the 1st Division ignored meteorological data. For these reasons, it became apparent that although artillery fires normally were available, Vietnamese commanders preferred to call on tactical air assets to neutralize targets.

Although the Nguyen Hue offensive remained in the forefront

[228]

throughout most of 1972, Vietnamization continued. During August, September, and October, the activation of three 175-mm. gun battalions marked the completion of the Project ENHANCE schedule. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam projected the employment of these battalions in Military Regions I, II, and III. Of these units, the 104th Artillery Battalion was the first to receive guns supplied directly from the United States rather than guns transferred within the country from departing American units.

The South Vietnamese Artillery School initiated a systems engineering approach in the structuring of programs of instruction. A thorough program of briefings and discussion insured that key personnel understood the systems engineering concept and that continuity would be maintained if key personnel were transferred. The school added classes in crater analysis and target acquisition for cadre personnel from the various branch schools and training centers throughout Vietnam. These classes were to be a base for similar courses at these various places.

Facilities at the Artillery School remained inadequate. There were only fourteen classrooms. When these were filled, classes were held in other facilities or on the parade field. The school submitted a compound improvement construction plan to V Area Logistics Command on four occasions, the last in October 1972, but received no replies.

A revised table of organization and equipment would have increased the instructor force level adequately to support the student population. Submitted some eighteen months before, the new table had still not been approved in late 1972.

Despite these shortcomings, the school managed to provide the basic training required to establish the foundation for South Vietnamese artillery. On 20-21 December 1972, the Field Liaison Directorate, Liaison and Inspection Team, evaluated the school and gave it a good rating.

From October 1972 until the cease-fire in early 1973, the entire scope of the war changed. As peace rumors increased, combat action rose. Both sides began final "land-grabbing and flag-raising operations." Vietnamization became primarily a logistical exercise in an attempt to stockpile as much equipment in Vietnam as possible. For all practical purposes, the active Vietnamization program had ended.

With the signing of the cease-fire on 25 February 1973 and its effective date on 28 February 1973, the United States involvement in Vietnam came to an end. During the last three years of that involvement, efforts were concentrated on preparing the Vietnamese to defend their country without active American participation. An

[229]

assessment of that effort would show that despite the adoption of program after program to assist ARVN forces in becoming proficient in all phases of fire support, little improvement was to be seen in combat. The Ben Het-Dak To Campaign in 1969 pointed out weaknesses in fire support coordination, adjustment of fire, and clearance procedures. One year later the same weaknesses appeared during the Cambodian incursion. The LAM SON 719 operation in 1971 did not change the picture, and the Nguyen Hue campaign during 1972 added technical shortcomings to the fire coordination weaknesses noted in the earlier actions. In addition, surveys conducted throughout Vietnam during the period continued to show that Vietnamese forces ignored advanced gunnery procedures.

In retrospect, it is apparent that in almost all the field artillery programs that were cited as successful during the Vietnamization period, American units were actively involved, providing labor and material. The Vietnamese were merely recipients of a service. It can be argued that by providing the major impetus to the Vietnamization program the Americans doomed the program to marginal success at best. By providing services to the Vietnamese, the argument would go, the American command failed to involve the Vietnamese actively and therefore failed to teach them how to perform the work themselves or convince them of tie program's value.

But the American command was in a quandary. Senior commanders were certainly intelligent enough to foresee the disadvantages of allowing American units to do the work while the Vietnamese sat idly by. On the other hand, much had to be accomplished in a short time. Any adviser could attest to the fact that it took time to convince ARVN commanders that an improvement was needed and to show them how to carry it out. If U.S. programs were to be successful, they would at least have to be implemented and, restricted by time, Americans would have to furnish the major impetus. Then the Vietnamese could at least be exposed to those techniques necessary to provide the best fire support possible. With American air power denied them, Vietnamese forces would turn more and more to their artillery to fill the gap in fire power. To provide this support, the artillery hopefully would be forced to utilize the techniques to which they were exposed during Vietnamization. Whether in fact they do is, of course, the question.

[230]

page created 13 March 2003

Previous Chapter        Next Chapter

Return to the Table of Contents

Return to CMH Online