1. Purpose. This directive announces policy and prescribes responsibilities and procedures for the intelligence exploitation of human sources and documents captured or acquired by United States military forces.

2. Definitions.

a. Detainees. Persons who have been detained but whose individual status has not yet been determined. All detainees must be classified expeditiously as Prisoners of War, Returnees, Civil Defendants or Innocent Civilians. The various categories of detainees are described at Annex A, MACV Directive 351-46.

b. Doubtful Cases. Persons who have committed a belligerent act and whose entitlement to status as a PW is in doubt. Doubtful cases will be processed as outlined in MACV Directive 20-5.

c. Very Important Sources. Human sources assessed by the G2/S2 to be of significant intelligence value because of their rank, level of access to information, area of knowledgeability, or particular unit to which assigned.

d. Documents. All written, printed, drawn or engraved material, sound or voice resoundings, photographs, exposed films, insignia, or reproductions of any of the foregoing.

3. General. The intelligence exploitation of human sources and captured documents is accomplished through a combined MACV/RVNAF/FWMAF exploitation system. The concept of combined interrogation of sources and exploitation of captured documents is practiced at all echelons from sector to national level. This mutually supporting system provides for the exchange of captured documents, human sources, and intelligence reports,

1. This directive supersedes MACV Directive 381-11, 4 May 1967.

and is designed to satisfy tactical strategic, and counterintelligence requirements of the US, RVNAF, and FWMAF. The system is comprised of the following:

a. A Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC) located in Saigon.

b. A Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) located in Saigon.

c. Combined Interrogation Center (CIC) located in Corps Tactical Zones. [Map 2]

d. US interrogation teams attached to ARVN sectors, special zones, divisions, and corps; and ARVN interrogation teams attached to US/ FWMAF separate brigades, division, and field force headquarters.

e. Additional interrogation and document exploitation support provided during specific operations as follows:

(1) The ARVN Section S2 will provide US/FWMAF one or more personnel when an operation is conducted in one province. When an operation involves more than one province, the ARVN S2/G2, at special zone, division, or corps will provide personnel to assist in human source and document exploitation.

(2) The Province National Police, National Police Special Branch, and the Special Branch US Advisor may also provide interrogation support, document screening, and exploitation assistance.

(3) Upon request of US/RVNAF/FWMAF, combined interrogation and document exploitation field teams are provided by the ACofS, J-2.

4. Responsibilities.

a. The ACofS, J-2 is responsible for developing plans, policies, and procedures for the intelligence exploitation of human sources and captured documents. The priority for exploitation is tactical and strategic intelligence, psychological operations and public information.

b. Commanders of subordinate commands as defined in MACV Directive 310-2 will insure compliance with the procedures contained here.

5. Exploitation of Human Sources. Interrogation.

a. Detainees.

(1) Detainees will be screened expeditiously by the capturing unit to determine PW or non-PW status, to segregate knowledgeable sources, and to establish interrogation priorities. All classified detainees will be disposed of as prescribed by paragraph 5 of Annex A to MACV Directive 381-46.

(2) Interrogation of sources may be conducted at all levels of command; however, interrogation will normally be limited to that information which is of immediate value to the tactical commander or his subordinate units/agencies. All interrogations will be conducted according to the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) with particular regard to the prohibitions against maltreatment contained in Article 17 and the fact that these prohibitions apply equally to detainees/ PW (Article 5, GPW). When US personnel have knowledge that violation

of these provisions occur on the part of FWMAF or RVNAF, the senior US commander involved in the operation should point out the violation to the FWMAF or RVNAF commander. A report will then be forwarded to this Headquarters, ATTN: MACJA.

(3) Sources should be exploited initially to satisfy the priority intelligence requirements of tactical units. There must be adequate coordination at all levels so that common requirements are pooled for servicing by the unit or agency having custody of the source. In accordance with collection priorities, but with emphasis on timely fulfillment of urgent military requirements, reciprocal arrangements should be made for subsequent accesses to sources by interrogators representing US Counterintelligency (CI), RVN Military Security Service (MSS), US advisors to National Police Special Branch, National Police Special Branch, the Sector S2 Advisor, Sector S2, and the National Interrogation Center (NIC). When it is not feasible for representatives of the above units/agencies to interrogate sources, the capturing unit will, when conditions permit, conduct the interrogation on behalf of these units/agencies.

(4) The normal evacuation of PW's is from capturing unit to division or separate brigade, then to Corps PW Camp. Selected PW's may be released to the ARVN Corps CIC, and in the case of very important PW's directly to the CMIC in Saigon for detailed interrogation. Knowledgeable sources, regardless of rank, will move through the interrogation chain as shown at Annex B.

(5) PW's who have been captured by US forces or who have been turned over to US forces by FWMAF, as delineated in MACV Directive 190-3 will remain in US military channels until released to the CMIC, the ARVN Corps CIC, or to an ARVN PW camp. PW accountability procedures are explained in MACV Directive 190-3.

(6) If it is necessary to reinterrogate a PW after he is turned over to an ARVN Corps PW Camp, the source may be retrieved by coordination with the ARVN Corps G1. Retrieval of PW's interned at the Central PW Camp on Phu Quoc Island will be coordinated by the ACofS, J-1.

(7) Exploitation of sources held at GMIC normally involves a period of from one to seven days. Exceptional cases can be held at CMIC up to four months, but any source held at CMIC in excess of four months will require -the approval of the J2/JGS and the ACofS, J-2.

b. Returnees.

(1) Returnees are particularly fruitful sources of information because, unlike PW's, they have made a personal decision to reject their former allegiance. The psychological barrier of "name, rank, service number, and date and place of birth" does not exist. Interrogation, exploitation, detention, and processing must take into full account the significantly different status of the returnees.

(2) GVN authorities require that the returnee be delivered to a Chieu Hoi agency within 48 hours of the original contact with friendly elements.

During this period he may be interrogated for perishable information of immediate tactical value. If, for some reason, he cannot be delivered to the local Chieu Hoi agency within this length of time, immediate notification must be given the Province Chieu Hoi officials of the arrival of the returnee. Interrogation and exploitation should be accomplished as expeditiously as possible.

(3) Returnees reporting to GVN agencies or directly to the Province Chieu Hoi Center will be available at the Chieu Hoi Center for interrogation upon request by the local senior US intelligence officer to local Chieu Hoi officials. GVN Chieu Hoi regulations require that interrogations be conducted in the Chieu Hoi Centers which are located at Province, Region, and National levels. The purpose of these regulations is to prevent hostile interrogation or mistreatment of Hoi Chanh. In special cases, however, returnees may be removed from the Center provided Chieu Hoi officials are aware and are in agreement with proposed action. The local senior US intelligence officer will establish continuing liaison with ARVIN and GVN Chieu Hoi officials to insure that returnees who report directly to the Province Chieu Hoi Center are properly interrogated and reported.

(4) Returnees may be asked to volunteer to assist military operations as guides or informants; however, such request must be approved by the local Chieu Hoi officials. Units using returnees in such operations will insure that the individuals are adequately protected, fed, housed, and returned to the Chieu Hoi Center immediately upon completion of the operation. A report will be furnished the local Chieu Hoi officials of the results of the operation in order to properly reward the returnee for his information.

(5) Receipt for confiscated weapons, monies, and documents will be issued to the returnee by the receiving unit or agency prior to transfer of the returnee to the Chieu Hoi Center.

(6) Returnees should not be evacuated as PW's, but should be delivered to the nearest Chieu Hoi official or office (there is an office in each district). If for some reason returnees must be evacuated through intelligence channels to higher or adjacent headquarters, the CMIC, or a Corps CIC, the local Chieu Hoi officials must be notified.

c. Refugees. The interrogation of refugees possessing information that satisfies military intelligence requirements will be accomplished by the Sector S2 or the S2 Advisor.²

2. The remainder of the directive, pertaining to the processing of administrative reports and the exploitation of documents, has not been reproduced.