Endnotes for Chapter XV
1 Memo, Actg ACofS G-2 for CofS, 14 Apr 41, cited in Résumé as in G-2/2657-D 1067.
2 Informal Navy Memo for CofS, repeating summary of Navy information, dated 3 Jul 41, WPD 4544. Copies transmitted to CG's Haw Dept, Phil Dept, Caribbean, Fourth Army, 7 Jul 41, same file, also in AG 380.3. See also, indicative of Army thinking, Memo, ACofS G-2 for CofS, 17 Jul 41, sub: Japanese Movement into French Indo-China, cited in Resume . . . as G-2/2657-H-528, and same for same, same date, sub: Mobilization of Additional Japanese Manpower, G-2/2023-1025, on p. 255 of Résum0. The latter memorandum predicted Japan's later movement against the maritime provinces.
3 (1) Memo, Dir WPD (Navy) for CNO, 11 Jul 41, WPD (Army) 4454-1. (2) Minutes of JB meeting, 12 Jul 41. Compare the WPD warning of 20 November 1940, previously cited, that Philippine mobilization might stimulate Japan to action.
4 Joint dispatch of CofS and CNO to CG's Phil, Haw, Carib Depts, 25 Jul 41, sent by naval radio. Résumé, p. 261.
5 See Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 5, p. 2384.
6 Memo, Actg ACofS G-2 for CofS, 23 Sep 41, sub: Crisis in Japan, cited in Resume as Intelligence Bulletin 131. See also IB 135, dated 2 Oct 41, filed in G-2 and IB 144, dated 21 Oct 41; Memo, ACofS G-2 for CofS, 16 Oct 41, sub: Fall of Japanese Cabinet; and IB 112, 16 Aug 41, sub: Developments in the Far Eastern Situation. These arc on pp. 310, 327, 339, 334, and 271 of Resume.
7 Rad from (.NO (shown to CG Haw Dept), 16 Oct 41. Quoted in Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 22, p. 34.
8 Memo, ACofS WPD to CofS, 18 Oct 41, sub: Resignation of Japanese Cabinet. Sent out by radio Oct 41 as message 357 to MacArthur, 266 to Haw Dept, 223 to West Def Com, the copy rubber-stamped with notations by DCofS and CofS. WPD 4544-5.
9 See exhibits of intercepts in Pearl Harbor Attack, Parts 12 and 13. See also testimony of Brig. Gen. Hayes A. Kroner in part 34. pp. 42-48, upon limited access to the "Magic" information.
10 See Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 34, PP. 47-48 for declaration that the Intelligence Estimate of 29 November 1941 "does not include in the lines of action open to Japan an attack on Pearl Harbor." General Miles' view (p. 57) was that an air attack on Pearl Harbor had been studied for 20 years and was omitted from this estimate "presumably because it was so obvious." General Gerow's view was that the Japanese inquiries about die Panama Canal (much less stressed in the inquiries) forced the American military to be quite as much on guard there, even though no attack on the Canal eventuated, for bombing of the Panama locks could have affected the fleet seriously. In brief, General Gerow explained, had WPD not been concerned with both Panama and Hawaii, it would have been remiss. "It was probable that they might attack any one of our four major areas bordering on the Pacific." Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 4, P. 1653.
11 Asked at the Army inquiry of 1944 what were War Department conclusions in the 2941 autumn, General Marshall said: " We anticipated, beyond a doubt, a Japanese movement in Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam and against the Malay peninsula. We did not, so far as I can recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought with the addition of more modern planes that the defenses there would make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack." Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 27, Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, p. 14. See also Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39, Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, P. 439, recording the ejaculation of Secretary Knox on 7 December when informed of the raid at Pearl Harbor, ' :My God, this can't be true. This must mean the Philippines." Sec also in Report, p. 76, Vice Adm. W. S. Pye's recollection of Secretary Knox' visit to Pearl Harbor shortly after the attack, specifically the Secretary's opening; remark that "no one- in Washington expected an attack---even Kelly Turner," Admiral Turner then being; Navy WPD chief and "the most aggressive-minded of all." On the other hand, General Miles, the ACofS (:-2 in 1941, informed the joint Committee in 1945: "We knew a surprise attack was possible . . . . Hut we knew also that then: was no possible way that we could see of warding; off or detecting, a surprise attack except by reconnaissance from Hawaii, whether that reconnaissance was air or surface or sub-surface or radar." Pearl Harbor Attack, part 2, p. 823. As to omitting Hawaii from the list of possible targets named in the estimates, this chief 0f Intelligence declared that such a mention was not considered necessary because "it was a fortress built for one sole purpose, defense in a Japanese war . . . ." Ibid., p. 838.
12 Report of the joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, pursuant to S Con Res 27, 79th Cong, with additional and minority views, (apart from the thirty-nine volumes of Hearings), is printed as Document 244, 79th Gong„ 2d sess (Washington, 1946). It covers 540 printed pages. The testimony of the hearings before this committee, plus exhibits which include the reports of 7 earlier hearings, is found in 39 volumes under the general title Pearl Harbor Attack. Those earlier inquiries, with their appropriate numbers as Committee Exhibits are (1) Roberts Commission-243; Admiral Thomas C. Hart-244; Army's Pearl Harbor Board-145; Navy Court of Inquiry-246; Col Carter W. Clarkc-247; Maj Henry C. Clausen-248; Admiral H. Kent Hcwitt-249. Sec Morison, The Rising Sun In The Pacific, specifically, Chapter V. Many texts of nonofficial origin exist.
13 It should be remembered that the "Magic" device intercepted and decoded not merely the important messages but all messages. They still had to be translated into English but there was no way to tell in advance whether a message was of any importance. Because translators were few there were delays in the translation, and because of so much chaff in the heavy flow of interceptions the solid wheat was difficult to separate.
14 See p. 476 above.
15 Reference is again made to the formal findings of the several inquiries listed in n. 12. The Congressional committee majority, having made its final findings on the numerous failings and responsibilities ties for the disaster, concluded its labors (Report, IT. 253-66) with 25 "supervisory, administrative and organizational principles" for Army and Navy study which "strongly impressed" the postwar Chief of Staff's special advisory group on this matter. In a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff on 19 September 1946 this advisory committee, headed by Lt. Gen. Wade H. Haislip, purposely addressing its attention only to the administrative area, declared the analysis of the 25 principles showed "that the deficiencies which existed [in Pearl Harbor defenses on 7 December 1941] were due to the system employed on departmental and theater levels." Study of these principles by all commands and staff divisions was therefore recommended: approval of this suggestion by the current Chief of Staff, General of the Army Eisenhower, was followed by the Secretary of War's formal order for such study throughout the Army, followed by a review of "existing procedure with a view to developing better organization, simpler and more certain command and staff methods." Sec Ltr, TAG to Commanding Generals, 15 Oct 46, sub: Report of the Joint Committee . . . on the Pearl Harbor Attack, AGAO-S-C-M 334 Joint Committee of Congress on Pearl Harbor (8 Oct 46) and accompanying Memo, Gen Haislip for DCofS, 19 Sep 46, sub: Report of the Joint Committee . . . . Both filed as Tab 33 of bndr called Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee, in AG records.
16 Joint Committee exhibit 8-d, ind 1, interrog 10, in Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 13, Exhibits, P. 426.
17 Ibid., p. 400.
18 Ibid., p. 410.
19 Ibid., extension of exhibit 8, pp. 718-19.
20 Hearing before the joint Committee on 7 Dec 45, in Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 3, pp. 1152-53.
21 These are assembled as Exhibits 1 and 2 in Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 12, pp. 1-316.
22 (1) Rad, Manila (signed Brink) to Milid (Military Intelligence Div of G-2), 27 Oct 41. (2) Rad paraphrase from Manila (Evans) to WD, 28 Oct 41. Copies of both in Résumé, p. 341 and p. 349.
23 Cited in Résumé as MID summary of 3 Nov 41, MID 336 (11-3-41) in G-2 files.
24 Report of JB meeting, 3 Nov 41. For G-2 judgments of probabilities of an attack on Thailand (which G-2 continued to stress on 7 December) See Memo, G-2 for CofS, 27 Nov 41, sub: Recent Developments in the Far Fast; also same for same, 5 Dec 41, sub: Supplementary Brief Periodic Estimate . . . Dec 1, 1941-March 31, 1942. These arc cited in Resume, tip. 410--13 and pp. 441-42 respectively. Sec also Memo, G-2 (Miles) for CofS, 15 Dec 41, sub: Sunday Morning, Dec 7, 1941, cited in Résumé . . pp. 472-73, recording Gen Miles' recollections. The 5 December summary discussed a reported decline in Axis morale, reasons for which in Italy anti Japan were held to be obvious.
25 Summarized, not quoted, from Memo, CNO and CofS for the President, 5 Nov 41, sub: Estimate Concerning the Far Eastern Situation, 0130012 War and Navy Departments, copy in R6sumc on Pearl Harbor.
26 From Ltr, CNO to Admiral Kimmel, 7 Nov 41, copy in OPD Exec 8, Tab "Miscellaneous," OPD See, Hist Div, SSUSA.
27 Cited in Resume . . ., p. 393, as paraphrase of code radiogram London 1045, signed Lee, 9 Nov 41
28 Cited in Résumé as Rad, CNO to CINCPAC, CINCAF, and 11, 12, 13, 15 Dist com, 24 Nov 41.
29 Telg, DeWitt to CG GHQ, 25 Nov 41, and Memo, Andrews for TAG, 29 Nov 41, both in WPD 4544-19.
30 (1) Min of JB meeting, 26 Nov 41. (2) Message, TAG (Adams-Robinson) to CG Haw Dept, No. 466, 26 Nov 41, cited in Resume . . ., p. 407. (3) Message, TAG (Adams) to same, AF 448, 26 Nov 41, cited in Resume . . ., p. 408. The report that the first of the planes actually arrived with deficient armament, next mentioned, is that in Rad 1044, Gen Martin (signed Short) to CofAC, 5 Dec 41, copy of which is in Resume, p. 440.
31 For discussion of this note and of succeeding events see Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 32ff.
32 For discussion and text see Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 380-84.
33 Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 27 Nov 41, sub: Far Eastern Situation, WPD 4544-13. See also Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 39, pp. 84-88.
34 (1) Rad 624, signed Marshall, to CG American forces in the Far East, 27 Nov 41, initialed "B" (Bryden, DCofS). (2) Rad 461 and 472 respectively went to CG Carib Def Com and CG Haw Dept, the latter initialed "G. C. M." but bearing no accompanying date. These referred to "hostile action possible." The "war-warning" message was sent by Navy radio, CNO to CINCAF and CINCPAC, 27 Nov 41. Copies of all arc in WPD 4544-16 which also contains copy of message from President Roosevelt to High Commissioner Sayre, 26 Nov 41, for delivery to President Quezon, expressing his reliance on Philippine support. Message 472 appears also as Exhibit 32 (7) on p. 1328 of Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 14.
35 Message, Miles to G-2 Haw Dept, 27 Nov 41, No. 473, Exhibit 32 (10), p. 1329 of Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 14. General Gerow had previously blocked an effort to squeeze a "subversive" warning into the much more serious Message 472. Scrutinizing the WPD draft of that communication he saw the passage "Needed measures for protection against subversive activities should be taken immediately," and struck it out as conflicting with the message's main purpose. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, pp. 831ff., and Part 3, pp. 1023-24. Also Exhibit 36 in Part 14. PP. 1393-94, reproducing Memo, Gerow for TAG, 27 Nov 41, sub: Par Eastern Situation, in WPD 4544-13, which shows the draft with initialed deletion.
36 Rail 959, Short to CofS, 27 Nov 41, copy in WPD 4544-13.
37 Testimony before Army Pearl I [arbor Board in Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 27, p. 32.
38 Unsigned and undated aide-mémoire " Defense of Hawaii" in OCS 19741-53, with penciled notation 4-24-41. Original sent to SW. OW" (Col Ward). See Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 3, p. 1092.
39 (1) Gen Gerow quoted in Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 29, Proceedings of Army Pearl Harbor Board, P. 2191, and in Part 3, Proceedings of Joint Committee, p. 1036. (2) Gen Marshall quoted on this issue in Part 3, p. 1423. (3) (:en Short quoted in Part 39, Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, p. 80.
40 Memo, Stark and Marshall for the President, 27 Nov 41, sub: Far Eastern Situation, Exhibit 17, in Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings Part 14, P. 1083.
41 Memo, Miles for TAG, 28 Nov 41, copy in OCS 14561-23. This memo resulted in the message of TAG (Adams) to CG Haw Dept, same date, printed in Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 14, as Exhibit 32 (13). A message from TAG to Hawaii (Gen Arnold for Gen Martin) is filed immediately afterward as Exhibit 32 (13). The response, dated 4 December, for unexplained reasons was recorded as having been received to Dec qt. See Exhibit 32 (19). General Shorts acknowledgment to TAG, 29 Nov 41, is filed as Exhibit 32 (17). See General Miles' discussion of this in Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, pp. 833-36.
42 Rpt, Gen Short to CofS, 12 Dec 41, sub: Report of the Battle of Oahu, WPD 4622-39.
43 Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 150-51.
44 Extract from General Marshall's testimony before the joint Committee, printed on p. 163 of Pearl Harbor Report.
45 Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 53ff. deals with the plan and its execution. A vivid narration is presented by Morison, The Rising Sun In The Pacific and by Morton, The Fall of the Philippines.
46 In recollections published several years afterwards Donald M. Nelson, wartime chairman of the War Production Board, asserted that at the close of his call at the White House on Tuesday, 2 December, President Roosevelt said, "I wouldn't be a bit surprised if we were at war with Japan by Thursday." Nelson added that on' 3 December in answer to his guarded questioning Secretary Knox, who was "not at all reticent," replied, "We may be at war with the Japs before the month is over . . . . You bet your life its that bad." Donald M. Nelson, Arsenal o/ Democracy (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946), pp. 182-83.
47 (1) Pearl Harbor Report, p. 47. (2) Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service, p- 391. On pp. 391-9z of On Active Service, after an attribution of "major responsibility" for the Pearl Harbor disaster to Admiral Kimmel and General Short, is this passage: "It was true that the War and Navy Departments were not fully efficient in evaluating the information available to them, and of course it was also true that no one in Washington had correctly assessed Japan's intentions and capabilities . . . . Further, Washington had not adequately appreciated the importance of keeping its field commanders fully informed . . . . The men in Washington did not foresee this attack and they did not take the additional action suggested by a retrospective view. But the basic fact remained: the officers at Hawaii had been alerted . . . , unlike other outpost commanders they proved on December 7 to be far from alert."
48 Pearl Harbor Report, p. 211ff.
49 Ibid., p. 224.
50 Ibid., pp. 225-26.
51 Ibid., p. 69.
52 Ibid., pp. 67ff.
53 Ibid., pp. 65 and 71. The figure on American dead is that employed in Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 126-27. See also Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 64-65, tabulating 3,435 casualties. See also current tabulations of losses in Hawaii and Philippines as of y Dec 41 in WPD message file 1, Messages, Situation Reports, Telephone Conversations, and Notes, Document 140. See also Ltr, Short to CofS, 12 Dec 41, sub: Report of Battle of Oahu, WPD 4622-39.
page created 12 December 2002