Chapter 11 Endnotes
2 General Walker had given orders for an advance to Saarburg before the 3d Cavalry Group encountered the main works of the orscholz position on the afternoon of 19 November. The first order sent to the 10th Armored Division (at 0920 on 19 November) called for CCB to make the advance to Saarburg. About an hour later the corps commander rescinded this order-possibly because the pincers had closed on Metz-and dispatched the 10th Armored Division (minus CCB) to make the Saarburg attack. 10th Armd Div G-3 Jnl, 19 Nov 44.
3 l0th Armd CCB S-3 jnl, 19 Nov 44: "...head of our column entered Germany at 1032."
5 On 22 November CCB patrols occupied Zeurange, 2 1/2 miles south of Waldwisse. The inhabitants of Zeurange told them that American troops had first entered the village on 22 November 1918.
6 Details of the CCA attack are given in 10th Armd Div C-3 Jnl; CCA AAR; and Hist Div Combat Interviews.
7 A message from the CCA commander on the evening Of 21 November reads: "Please note that we have not breached the Ell Defensive Pos in our immediate front. I have been in contact with both Chamberlain and Standish both of whom assure me that early tomorrow morning they will breach hostile defensive positions and be on their way. I request that CCA be given an opportunity to crack this position tomorrow morning and that the Inf Combat Team be not employed for this purpose." l0th Armd Div C-3 Jnl, 21 Nov 44.
8 During the fight in the woods 2d Lt. Glenn E. Rugh, I Company, 358th Infantry, led a bayonet charge, under withering fire, which cleaned out an enemy trench and netted thirty prisoners. He was awarded the DSC. Pfc. Harold R. McQuay, K Company, mopped up a German machine gun crew in a singlehanded assault. He also was awarded the DSC.
9 Capt. Robert B. McHolland received the DSC for his part in the action of 24 November. He led in breaking up the attack against his command post. When the Germans retreated McHolland and two men pursued them, killing fourteen with hand grenades, wounding seven, and capturing several. The two men were wounded and McHolland was killed while trying to get them back to a building.
10 See the 358th Infantry After Action Report and battalion journals for this action.
11 On 24 November OB WEST had given orders that the Orscholz line must be reinforced, because the position "has special importance" as an outwork of the West Wall. The following day OB WEST ordered the 404th Volks Artillery Corps, the 21st Panzer Division, and a composite regiment to be hurried up to the line (the elements of the 21st Panzer Division actually had been in and out of the fight). See Army Group G KTB of these dates.
12 The 358th Infantry was at about 40 percent effective strength. Hist Div Combat Interviews.
13 Acting as an artillery forward observer for the 1st Battalion during the withdrawal, 2d Lt. Cecil H. Eller went forward to an exposed position to adjust fire on enemy mortars that had pinned down the infantry. He remained at his hazardous post until he was killed. Lieutenant Eller was awarded the DSC posthumously.
15 MS #B-078 (Mellenthin). Both Balck and Rundstedt counted heavily on the natural strength of the Saar Heights Stellung. See various orders for withdrawals to this position in Army Group G KTB and OB WEST KTB.
16 XX Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt, 22 Nov 44.
17 The 347th Division (Trierenberg) had come south from the quiet Eifel sector.
19 This relict of the 19th and 559th had long since been bled white. It had come north from the Morhange sector after relief by the 17th SS. Weak as the Kampfgruppe was, it continued to have a good reputation, a fact that German writers ascribe to its brave and able officers. NIS #B-487 (Simon).
20 In October 1941, the Germans had discussed the possibility of using the Maginot Line in the event of an Allied invasion on the Continent. At that time it was concluded that the reconstitution of the fortified works would require too much labor and money. Interestingly enough, some of the German experts also raised the point that their own victories had called into question the value of any permanent fortifications. However, recommendations were made that certain parts of the Maginot Line be used to block the road nets leading to the West Wall. (This from a study by the Kdtr. d. Eifel und Saarpfalz, dated 2 Oct 41, in OKH/General der Pioniere und Festungen.) In the late summer and early autumn of 1944 some attempts were made to carry out this last recommendation and rearm the line in the Faulquemont and Wittring sectors, but no work was done cast of Metz. MS #B-003 (Souchay), MS #B-088 (Claer). So little attention had been paid to the French fortifications since 1940 that on 4 September 1944 the Metz commander had to send a wire to the German Army historians asking for a detailed plan of the Maginot Line. OKWIChef der Heeresarchive, Lagebuch, 4 Sep 44. On 16 November Hitler got around to the question of the Maginot Line and asked his staff how it was armed, to what extent its works had been oriented to face westward, and like questions. However, it was too late to take any action. Office of Naval Intelligence, Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1944. The XX Corps G-2 had correctly predicted that the Maginot Line would not be defended. XX Corps C‑2 Periodic Rpt, 22 Nov 44.
21 Here Sgt. Lloyd A. Russell, C Company, 378th Infantry, destroyed a German gun that had knocked out three American tank destroyers. He was awarded the DSC.
22 Evidence of the stubborn German fight to hold the Saar Heights Stellung on 29 November is found in the tremendous rise in ammunition consumption by the XX Corps artillery, which leaped to 21,377 rounds for the 24-hour period. After the breach in the positions of the 347th on 28 November Balck gave the First Army permission to retire to the Saar Heights Stellung, but added a peremptory order that this was to be the "last" withdrawal. Knobelsdorff already had reported that Kamp1gruppe Muehlen and the 347th were so reduced that in his opinion they could hold no continuous line of resistance. Army Group G KTB, 28 Nov 44. On 28 November OB WEST ordered the officers responsible for the bad showing of the 347th Division to be shot without trial. This order Was carried out. Army Group G KTB Anlagen.
23 377th Inf Jul, 29 Nov 44. The 21st Panzer Division troops had been hastily transferred from the Orscholz line on 28 November. Balck had asked for the use of the entire Panzer Lehr Division "for two days" to wipe out the American gains made on 27 and 28 November, but Rundstedt denied this request (Panzer Lehr, it will be remembered, had been committed in the Sarre-Union sector). OB WEST KTB, 28 Nov 44.
24 Prisoner interrogations indicate that a Kampfgruppe from the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division had been employed in these counterattacks. Apparently it had assembled in the Warndt Forest, where the 36th VG Division held a salient at the boundary between the X11 and XX Corps. 95th Div G-2 Jul, 29 Nov 44. At the end of November this detachment of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division was pulled out and sent south to aid the rest of the division in the Sarre-Union sector.
26 OKH/General der Pioniere und Festungen, Aktennotizen, Band III. A report of a Hitler staff conference on 28 November 1944 is included in the foregoing.
27 Army Group G KTB, this date. When Knobelsdorff took command of the First Army in September he was told to hold the Moselle as long as possible and thus keep the industrial production of the Saar intact. MS #B-222 (Knobelsdorff).
28 Hitler ordered a special briefing on 26 November for an operation to recover Alsace and Lorraine. A like operation also had been discussed in October. However, nothing came of either of the two staff conferences on the subject. OKW/WFSt KTB Ausarbeitung, Der Westen.
29 Army Group G KTB, 28 Nov 44.
32 Ninth AF Summary of Opns, 1 Dec 44. The 322d, 323d, 334th, and 387th Groups took part in this attack.
34 The 87th Regiment of the 36th YG Division had been attached to the decimated and disorganized 347th Division. MS #B-223 (Wellm).
35 The enlisted casualties in the 95th Division during the month of November totaled 4,246. 95th Div C-I Jnl, Dec 44.
36 The XX Corps estimates for November place the number Of 95th Division sick at 658. XX Corps AAR, Nov 44. This low figure probably is reasonably accurate. But only the 379th Infantry After Action Report makes a sick return: 177 officers and men during November. An undoubted factor in the high morale of the division was the large number of prisoners it had taken (estimated by the XX Corps at 7,036).
37 Army Group G KTB Aniagen, 3 Dec 44.
40 Sgt. Roy E. Holcomb, A Company, 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion, was awarded the DSC for action in the attack against the "enemy‑held town" on 1 December. A platoon of tank destroyers had been stopped inside the town by a well‑sited German Mark IV. Sergeant Holcomb took a bazooka, crawled to within fifty yards of the tank, partially disabled the tank, and forced it to withdraw. A second enemy tank took over the position. Sergeant Holcomb crawled forward again and fired four rounds, crippling the tank. He was killed by return fire. However, the second German tank withdrew to another position, where it was destroyed by TD fire. Company A of the 377th Infantry made a spirited attack to clear "the newly won town of St. Barbara" at dawn on 1 December when the enemy in "great strength" tried to dislodge the Americans. Twice wounded in this attack, 2d Lt. Frederick K. Baker, A Company, 377th Infantry Regiment, received the DSC.
41 The hard‑fighting Germans were probably from the 87th Regiment, 36th VG Division, which was nearly destroyed in the battle on the right wing of the X111 SS Corps. MS #B-223 (Wellm). Simon, who commanded this corps, says that the 87th and the remnants of the 347th Division fought "tooth and nail" in this sector. MS #B-487.
42 95th Div G-3 Jnl, 3 Dec 44.
43 Colonel Philbin had earlier won distinction in the fighting west of Metz and had been awarded the DSC for bravery in action near Gravelotte.
44 The engineers finally took more than three tons of explosives from the bridge and from chambers built into its stone piers.
45 The platoon from the 607th was commanded by 1st Lt. Richard A. Reynolds, who led his men through the town and across the bridge to assist the infantry, exposing himself constantly to direct the platoon with no regard for his own safety. Lieutenant Reynolds was killed later in the action. He was awarded the DSC posthumously.
46 The details of the coup de main at the bridge are given in Historical Division Combat Interviews. See also 95th Div AAR, 3 Dec 44.
47 Army Group G KTB and OB WEST KTB for this date. See also MS #B-078 (Mellenthin). Word of the German failure at the bridge reached Hitler on the following day. Rundstedt's headquarters reported that "the Fuehrer was enraged." Army Group G KTB Anlagen, 4 Dec 44.
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Last updated 12 October 2004 |