Chapter 12 Endnotes

1 SHAEF G-3 Notes on Immediate Prospects of Western Front, 28 Nov 44, SHAEF SGS File, Post OVERLORD Planning 381, 11.

2 The tank losses of the 4th Armored Division during November had not been very high: 36 mediums and 10 lights irreparably damaged. The number of killed and wounded also was moderate: 220 and 805, respectively. However, the November battles had taken a heavy toll in the armored infantry battalions; they averaged only half strength at the beginning of December. The nonbattle casualties for the month of November amounted to 1,137 officers and men, mostly from the armored infantry. 4th Armd AAR, Nov 44.

3 The turn to the north by the XV Corps had extended the battle lines east of the Sarre-Union sector. Here on the First Army extreme left wing the 256th VG Division, the 245th Division, and the, 361st VG Division faced the XV Corps and fought to bar the road to Bitche and Wissembourg. On 1 December elements of the 44th Infantry Division were echeloned to the right rear of the 4th Armored Division in an attack directed at Tieffenbach.

4 During December the type of fighting somewhat nullified the task force or combat team organization which had been used by the 4th Armored Division as conventional tactical organization in the earlier battles in Lorraine. Therefore, reference in this chapter generally will be made to the organic units of the division.

5 In addition to the 4th Armored After Action Reports and journals, a semiofficial diary kept by Major Spires has been used as a source in reconstructing the 4th Armored operations during early December.

6 Sgt. Walter A. Young of I Company here repelled a counterattack with a captured machine gun. He was awarded the DSC.

7 Capt. Edward R. Radzwich, commanding I Company, was awarded the DSC for bravery shown in this action.

8 There is considerable disagreement as to the German strength in the counterattack Of 3 December, disagreement that points up the difficulty of establishing the exact facts of any confused action such as this. Early reports entered in the XII Corps G-3 journal say that eleven tanks and three infantry companies were involved. The diary of the commanding officer of the 101st Infantry says that six tanks and about a hundred enemy infantry were encountered. Officers of the 3d Battalion, 101st Infantry, when interviewed in the field recalled the German strength at eight tanks and a company and a half of infantry. Hist Div Combat Interviews. Most of the enemy prisoners were taken from one company, the Begleit (Escort) Company of the 11th Panzer Division. 26th Div G-2. Jnl, 3 Dec 44. In any event it is doubtful whether the rifle strength of the 3d Battalion, 101st Infantry, was more than 150 men at this time.

9 The German counterattacks on 2 and 3 December had been made by scratch units thrown into action by the Panzer Lehr and 11th Panzer Divisions. Both of these formations were already under orders to go to Army Group B. The German reverses on 2 and 3 December were keenly felt in higher commands, and the chief of staff of the First Army reports on the night of 3 December that even Wietersheim, "who has nerve," is depressed. Army Group G KTB and Anlagen.

10 General Wood was returned to the United States for rest and recuperation; he subsequently took command of the Armored Replacement Training Center. Brig. Gen. H. L. Earnest, who had earlier commanded an independent task force in the dash across northern Brittany, relieved Col, W. P. Withers as commander of CCA, 4th Armored Division.

11 XII Corps C-3 Jnl, 2 Dec 44: "The 4th Armored Division . . . should be withdrawn as soon as possible. The need for rest and readjustment is acute, because of poor physical condition and some disorganization, due to the loss of key leaders, including the division commander."

12 XII Corps Operational Directive No. 46.

13 The German strength figures given in this paragraph are taken from a strength report forwarded by Army Group G to OB WEST as Of 4 December 1944. See also estimates in MS #B-078 (Mellenthin).

14 During the fight near Rémering Sgt. Joseph J. Lazarski, E Company, 320th Infantry, led his platoon in an attack to wipe out a concentration of enemy machine guns. When all but two had been accounted for Sergeant Lazarski went on alone, was severely wounded, but silenced these last machine guns. He was awarded the DSC.

15 In the first days of December the XII Corps artillery had fired an average of 9,000 rounds per day. But On 4 December the ammunition expended rose to 27,575 rounds. XII Corps Opns Rpt, 4 Dec 44.

16 The 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division was only the wreck of a division and Balck believed it incapable of putting up much of a fight. Since the 17th belonged to the Waffen-SS it could be reconstituted and re-equipped only by Himmler, who showed little interest in the fate of this division. On 5 December, therefore, Balck asked OB WEST for another division to replace the 17th SS, but without effect. Army Group G KTB

17 Sgt. Paul Porter, B Company, 53d Armored Infantry Battalion, was awarded the DSC for "repeated acts of heroism" at Domfessel, engaging the enemy in hand-to-hand combat "wherever he encountered them." Sergeant Porter was wounded while attempting to rescue a wounded medical aid man.

18 The organic German artillery was reinforced by the 401st Volks Artillery Corps.

19 The Singling action is described by Gordon A. Harrison in Small Unit Actions, a volume in the AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION series prepared by the Historical Division, War Department.

20 Losses in experienced officer personnel had been very high since 8 November: a number of companies had had a 100 percent turnover in officers, and the battalion staffs had been decimated. The armored infantry, of course, suffered high casualties. On 2 December the 51st Armored Infantry Battalion had a rifle strength of 16o and the 53d had only 126. Company B, 51st Armored Infantry Battalion, received 128 replacements for losses between 9 November and 6 December. Tank losses also were severe. The 8th Tank Battalion, already crippled by the loss of nearly a whole medium tank company at Baerendorf, lost 14 tanks in operations between 3 and 6 December. XII Corps C-3 jnl, 2 Dec 44. The casualties inflicted on the tank crews were particularly damaging to the division since the replacements coming in at the end of the Lorraine Campaign usually were converted riflemen or headquarters personnel who knew nothing about tanks. In one batch of replacements sent to the 37th Tank Battalion only two men had ever seen the inside of a tank--one of these as the result of having once been given a ride by a cousin in the Armored Force while training in the United States. During the latter part of 1944, training at the Armored Replacement Training Center had deteriorated and few replacements were being turned out. See The Armored Force Command and Center, AGF Study No. 27 (Historical Division, War Department).

21 Pvt. Gordon E. Huggins, K Company, 104th Infantry, received the DSC as a result of action on 7 December. Picking up a defective grenade he smothered it against his body to save his comrades standing near. Private Huggins lost a hand and received severe fragment wounds.

22 General Allen, a graduate of Texas A. and M. College, had joined the Army as a cavalry officer. He served in France from 1917 to 1919 with the A Cavalry. In 1940 he joined the 1st Armored Regiment at Fort Knox, and thereafter served with various armored units. General Allen was commanding the 20th Armored Division when, in September 1944, he was dispatched by plane to England, there taking command of the 12th Armored Division.

23 The decision to relieve the 4th Armored Division followed General Eddy's letter of 2 December to General Patton in which he suggested that the XV Corps had a narrower front than the XII Corps and had divisions in reserve, one of which could replace the 4th Armored Division. After General Patton and General Patch agreed to this exchange the commanding generals of the XII and XV Corps met at Fénétrange on 6 December and arranged the details of the relief. The 12th Armored Division was in effect "loaned" to the XII Corps, but the corps' boundaries remained unchanged; as a result the division operated in the XII Corps zone under XV Corps command. See Seventh Army Opns Instructions No. 30, 6 Dec 1944. On 10 December Generals Haislip and Eddy made the following arrangements: the 12th Armored Division will attack with the 26th Division "if going looks easy"; if the 44th Division "gets up," the 26th Division, the 12th Armored Division, and the 44th Division will make a co-ordinated attack to penetrate the Maginot Line. See XII Corps C-3 jnl. General Haislip did not want to commit the 12th Armored in an all-out attack until it had some battle experience.

24 Not only was artillery ammunition in short supply, but the number of guns available to the Germans was far less than the number the Allies could bring to bear in the support of any operation. On 12 December OB WEST had on the Western Front 5,422 pieces of artillery, including coastal guns and antiaircraft guns of all calibers. The Eastern and Southeastern Fronts combined had 10,078 guns. OKH/Stab Gen. Art. Beim Gen. St. d. H. KTB Anlagen #830. This number of guns gave three guns to each kilometer on the Eastern and Western Fronts. OKHIStab Gen. Art. beim Gen. St. d. H. KTB Anlagen #860.

25 German information on these first days of December has been taken from the Army Group G KTB and Anlagen; OB WEST KTB; MS #T-122 (Zimmermann et al.); and MS #B-078 (Mellenthin). It is interesting to notice that, hard pressed as Rundstedt was, he protested against the OKW plan to use the Hiderjugend born in 1928 as replacements in the field forces of the Wehrmacht. OB WEST KTB, 7 Dec 44.

26 Some of the enemy did put up a fight in entrenchments near the bank. Sgt. Raymond M. Kirkland, F Company, 320th Infantry, made a singlehanded attack against one position and destroyed two machine guns. He received the DSC.

27 The 320th Infantry After Action Report for December 1944 points with pride to the 8 December attack as an example of a well-conducted river crossing.

28 134th Inf jnl, 8 Dec 44; Hist Div Combat Interviews. A battalion of infantry was employed in this abortive counterattack, combining with the tanks to form what was a sizable task force for the First Army front in December. Apparently this failure in the X111 SS Corps sector was the capsheaf to a number of such untoward experiences. Late on 8 December Balck issued a general directive: "The experiences of the last days have taught that the enemy artillery, employing air or ground observation, easily destroys our own counterattacks before they are actually formed." Therefore, said Balck, counterattacks in the future are to be launched only at twilight, during the night, or in fog‑unless enemy observation is denied by woods or by bad weather. Since the Americans have a distaste for hand-to-hand fighting the counterattack must be made so as to close with them as quickly as possible. Army Group G KTB,, 8 Dec 44.

29 Maj. Leon D. Gladding, commanding the 1st Battalion, 104th Infantry, received the DSC for gallantry in the fight around Achen. When one fort checked the left flank of the battalion Major Gladding led four men through the enemy wire around the fort. While his men covered him Gladding went on alone, cleared one bunker with a white phosphorous grenade, and charged the other, firing his submachine gun. One German officer and nineteen men surrendered to Gladding.

30 Hist Div Combat interviews; 328th Inf AAR, Dec 44.

31 12th Armd Div AAR, Dec 44. Ltr, Maj Charles P. Chapman to Hist Div, 17 Jan 47

32 Captain Giacobello received the DSC for bravery in this action. Company F was awarded a Distinguished Unit Citation.

33 The enemy too had a rough time at the hands of the artillery. The 945th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. howitzer) and the 731st Field Artillery Battalion 055-mm. gun) picked up a German tank park near Bebelsheim, some 5,000 yards northeast of Frauenberg, and crippled or destroyed several of the enemy tanks.

34 The 11th Panzer Division and 25th Panzer Grenadier Division were now under a new command, the XC Corps (General der Infanterie Erich Petersen). The XC Corps was a scratch command which had been brought in to free the X11I SS Corps staff for the Saarlautern fight. It had almost no corps troops. The corps artillery consisted of one battalion of light howitzers and one battalion of mixed Flak. MS #B-071 (Petersen). On ii December the 11th Panzer Division was reported as at the end of its armored infantry strength and Balck ordered that it use its tanks in defensive tactics. The 11th had just received twenty new Panthers.

35 The 35th would have had to rely on generators and smoke pots. At this time the XII Corps had no 4.2 chemical mortars, which might have been more effective under the circumstances. Throughout the Lorraine Campaign the bulk of the Third Army chemical units went to the XX Corps.