Chapter 6 Endnotes
1. See Ruppenthal, Logistical Support; see
also 12th A Gp Rpt of Opns V and VI.
2. On the night of 23 September the Second British Army finally
authorized the withdrawal of the 1st British Airborne Division from the bridgehead;
two nights later the survivors of the gallant division were brought back across
the lower Rhine in assault boats.
3. Minutes of meeting at SHAEF, 22 Sep 44,
SHAEF SGS File, Post OVERLORD Planning 381, I. Field Marshal Montgomery was
represented at the meeting by his chief of staff.
4. For fuller discussion, see Pogue, Supreme Command.
5. Eisenhower to Montgomery, 24 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS File, Post
OVERLORD Planning 381, I.
6. Bradley to Patton, 23 Sep 44, 12th A Gp
File, Military Objectives 371.3, I.
7. See Chap. III, p. 173.
8. Eisenhower to 12th and 6th A Gps, FWD-15934, 26 Sep 44,
SHAEF SGS File, Post OVERLORD Planning 381, I.
9. 12th A Gp Ltr of Instructions No. 9, 25 Sep 44.
10. Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 Aug 43, SHAEF Cable Log.
11. TUSA Diary, 23 Sep 44. See also the author's
notes taken at the time in the Third Army headquarters.
12. Bradley to Eisenhower, 25 Sep 44, 12th A Gp File, Military
Objectives 371.3, I.
13. TUSA AAR, Ltr of instructions No. 4. This letter ends
with the typical Patton touch: "We only await the signal to resume our career
of conquest."
15. AAF Historical Studies, No. 36 (Oct 45),
pp. 222-231.
16. XX Corps G-3 Jnl, 17 Sep 44.
17. The XIX TAC began attacks against the
Metz forts on 26 September and continued to attack daily until 30 September.
However, the fighter-bomber efforts had little effect. XIX TAC Report on the
Combat Operations of the XIX Tactical Air Command, 30 May 45.
18. The fort had been renamed, when the French repossessed
it after World War I, in honor of the heroic Lt. Col. Driant of the 56th Battalion
of Chasseurs, who had met his death in gallant fashion at Verdun in 1916.
19. MS #B-042 (Kittel).
20. 5th Div AAR, Incl 10, Sep 44.
21. The massed air attacks scheduled in the
THUNDERBOLT plans had been abandoned on 25 September. General Bradley had
given verbal orders to the 12th Army Group G-3 Air, Col. Sheffield Edwards,
canceling the operation on the grounds that there was insufficient artillery
ammunition to support an all-out ground attack against the Metz forts. Interv
with Col Edwards, Washington, 21 May 47. Thereafter bomber support was allocated
on a day-to-day basis.
22. On the contrary, the morale of the German garrison was
raised by these attacks, since it found that the concrete works gave adequate
protection. AAF Evaluation Board, The Effect of Air Power in the Battle of
Metz, 19 Jan 45.
23. The 2d Battalion attack was supported by 3 battalions
of 105-mm. howitzers, 3 battalions of 155mm. howitzers, 1 battery of 8-inch
howitzers, and 1 battery of 240-mm. howitzers.
24. 11th Inf Jnl, 27 Sep 44. See also 11th
Inf AAR, Incl 10, Sep 44.
25. 5th Div Telephone Jnl, 28 Sep 44.
26. The orders releasing the XV Corps from the Third Army
had automatically erased the Forêt de Parroy attack as top priority
of those listed by General Patton on 25 September. A new TUSA Operational
Directive, issued on 28 September, gave the Metz fort first priority in the
revised program for local operations.
27. TUSA Diary, 29 Sep 44.
28. The 5th Division losses during September are listed
tentatively as 380 killed, 2,097 wounded, and 569 missing. 5th Div G-1 Jnl
and AAR, Sep 44. These losses do not include sick and combat fatigue cases.
The number of such cases was so high that on 26 September General Patton sent
General Gay to make an inspection. Gay's report was favorable to the 5th Division.
He noted that morale was good, that the division had taken severe losses,
and that it had been fighting hard for a considerable length of time. Gay
added that in his opinion any student in a military' school who "attacked"
a position such as the 5th Division had attacked and held would have been
graded "Unsatisfactory" on his solution. Furthermore, the 5th Division was
in process of absorbing and training 200 officers and 3,773 enlisted replacements
who had come into the division during September. Many of these replacements
saw their first fighting at Fort Driant.
29. The 5th Division held a line of approximately 19,000
meters, which, the 5th Division G-3 pointed out, was "no division front."
So exposed was the 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry, that the 2d Battalion, 358th
infantry, was sent by trucks to Gorze on 3 October with orders to cover the
left flank of the assault force. General Irwin asked for the use of "only"
two companies of the 358th's battalion, but this request was refused by General
Walker.
30. What the 500- and 1,000-pound aerial bombs failed to
accomplish by direct hits could hardly be expected of a 286-pound shell.
31. Ninth AF Summary of Opns, 3 Oct 44. However,
about 1245 the 358th Group of the XIX TAC arrived and dropped napalm bombs
in the Driant area. The P-47's continued to give support throughout the afternoon.
32. The subsequent account of the Driant operation is taken
from several sources: TF Warnock Jul; 5th Div G-3 Jnl; 11th Inf Jnl and Inclosures;
Hist Div Combat Interviews; and 5th Div AAR II, Oct 44.
33. Company E dug in on the glacis and held there under
constant fire for four days; when the company withdrew it numbered 85 officers
and men.
34. Pfc. Robert W. Holmlund, B Company, 11th Infantry, was
awarded the DSC as a result of action at Driant during the 11th Infantry assault
on 3 October. In the assault wave he drove the enemy from the first emplacements
and knocked out a machine gun. When the enemy counterattacked he advanced
to an exposed position and stopped the attack with his BAR. Holmlund later
was killed while checking the positions held by his men.
35. Company B had four flame throwers, but only one functioned.
Flame throwers were little used throughout the operation.
36. During 4 October the Third Platoon of
G Company, 11th Infantry, made an assault to force one of the fort entrances.
The platoon was driven back by a counterattack but was saved by the heroic
action of 2d Lt. L. S. Dilello, who covered the withdrawal with fire from
a BAR until he was killed by a hand grenade. Lieutenant Dilello received a
posthumous award of the DSC.
37. About this time General Patton told General Walker to
take Driant, saying that "if it took every man in the XX Corps, [he] could
not allow an attack by this army to fail." TUSA Diary, 4 Oct 44. Actually,
the Third Army commander's subsequent actions as regards Driant all show a
more reasonable attitude.
38. In the late afternoon of 5 October the S-3 of the 2d
Battalion, Capt. Ferris N. Church, sent back a message with a graphic report
from an infantry captain on conditions at the fort: "The situation is critical
a couple more barrages and another counterattack and we are sunk. We have
no men, our equipment is shot and we just can't go. The trs in G are done,
they are just there what's left of them. Enemy has infiltrated and pinned
what is here down. We cannot advance nor can K Co, B Co is in same shape I'm
in. We cannot delay any longer on replacement. We may be able to hold till
dark but if anything happens this afternoon I can make no predictions. The
enemy arty is butchering these trs until we have nothing left to hold with.
We cannot get out to get our wounded and there is a hell of a lot of dead
and missing. There is only one answer the way things stand. First either to
withdraw and saturate it with hvy bombers or reinforce with a hell of a strong
force. This strong force might hold here but eventually they'll get it by
arty too. They have all of these places zeroed in by arty. The forts have
5-6 feet walls inside and 15 foot roofs of reinforced concrete. All our charges
have been useless against this stuff. The few leaders are trying to keep what
is left intact and that's all they can do. The trs are just not sufficiently
trained and what is more they have no training in even basic Inf. Everything
is committed and we cannot follow attack plan, This is just a suggestion but
if we want this dammed fort lets get the stuff required to take it and then
go. Right now you haven't got it. Gerrie, Capt., Inf." TF Warnock Jnl, 5 Oct
44.
39. When the Germans opened fire, Sgt. Dale H. Klakamp, 7th Engineer Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, sprang forward and started to build the barricade. His comrades, who had been shaken by the sudden fire, then came to his aid. Sergeant Klakamp was awarded the DSC.
40. This is a tentative estimate of losses
for the period 3-8 October. See special report in XX Corps G-3 Jnl, 8 Oct.
44. The total casualties for the Driant operation numbered 64 killed in action,
547 wounded in action, and 187 missing in action. See Fifth Infantry Division.
41. TF Warnock Jul, 9 Oct 44; TUSA Diary, 9 Oct 44.
42. Six tanks from the 735th Tank Battalion had to be left
in the fort; they were destroyed by the American artillery.
43. Marshal Bazaine attacked north along this
route in his last attempt, in October 1870, to break out of the iron ring
forged by the German armies around the French at Metz. The French advanced
as far as Woippy and were there defeated.
44. Activity in this sector consisted of patrolling. For
his part in one such patrol on the night of 29 September, Pfc. L. G. Zelmer,
G Company, received the DSC. Zehner was the point man in a patrol sent to
cross a footbridge at the canal near Richemont. He was well ahead of the rest
of his patrol when a German voice challenged him. Zehner ran straight across
the bridge, firing his BAR. On the enemy bank he captured a machine gun, silenced
German rifle fire by throwing grenades into the near-by houses, and then rejoined
the patrol.
45. Ltr, Gen Walker to Hist Div, 8 Oct 47.
46. Major Ward was given the DSC.
47. General McLain had hoped that seizure of the slag pile
would make the town untenable to the enemy. XX Corps G-3 Jul, 2 Oct 44.
48. 2d Bn, 357th Inf, Jnl, 7 Oct 44.
49. At the same time the First Army massed several field
artillery battalions, since there was little American pressure elsewhere,
and put very heavy fire on the Americans. See MS #B-214 (Mantey).
50. XX Corps G-3 Jnl, 11 Oct 44.
51. On 15 October General McLain was given command of the
XIX Corps and Brig. Gen. James A. Van Fleet took over the 90th Division. Earlier
General Eisenhower had credited McLain with making the 90th "a first class
fighting outfit." Eisenhower to Marshall, CPA-90255, 25 Aug 44, SHAEF Cable
Log.
52. General Van Fleet had assumed command of the 90th Division on 15 October, after having spent about a month as commander of the 4th Division. Van Fleet was a West Point graduate. During World War I he had participated in the Meuse-Argonne offensive as a machine gun battalion commander and had been wounded in action. An infantry officer, Van Fleet took over the 8th Infantry Regiment in 1941, trained it for amphibious operations, and led it across Utah Beach on D Day. Subsequently he was awarded the DSC for gallantry in the action of 8 June. Before his promotion to division commander Van Fleet had taken part in fighting at St.-Lô and Brest as assistant division commander of the 2d Division.
53. See 90th Div AAR for these days.
54. Instead the American artillery fired counterbattery
fire before H Hour. As a result the infantry assault met little fire from
German guns.
55. Lt. Col. John H. Mason, commanding the A Battalion,
357th Infantry, was given the DSC for gallantry displayed in this attack,
as was the regimental commander, Col. George H. Barth, who was wounded while
with an assault platoon.
56. The town had been carefully mapped, even down to watering
troughs and laundry sheds. Each platoon in the final assault was given a block
of houses as an objective, each block carefully numbered on the town plan.
The 1st and 3d Battalions, 357th Infantry, participated. The 2d Battalion,
357th, feigned an attack opposite Semécourt.
57. General Macon was a graduate of the Virginia
Polytechnic Institute. After his commissioning as an infantry officer in 1916,
Macon served at various posts in China, the Canal Zone, and the United States.
From 1940 to 1942 he trained armored infantry. During the invasion of North
Africa Macon commanded the 7th Infantry Regiment. He had assumed command of
the 83rd Division early in 1944.
58. On 19 September General Gay, the Third Army deputy chief
of staff, made a personal reconnaissance in the Thionville sector and advised
General Patton that the terrain here favored a crossing. Patton at once asked
Bradley to give him the 83d Division. The following day General Bradley granted
him permission for the use of the 83d. However, the logistical situation did
not permit such an extension of offensive operations; the Third Army was put
on the defensive and General Macon was given orders to destroy the enemy in
the Remich sector, patrol to the Moselle-Sauer line, and prevent the enemy
from recrossing the rivers. TUSA Diary, 19 and 20 Sep 44; Ltr, Gen Macon to
Hist Div, 29 May 47.
59. The 43d Cavalry was reinforced by some artillery, the
135th Combat Engineer Battalion, a task force from the 6th Cavalry Group,
and the 2d French Battalion. On 22 September, 259 men were sent to join the
latter but only 22 had rifles. Colonel Fabian, liaison officer for these French
forces, had great difficulty in equipping them. The men were members of the
FFI, organized as a unit of the First Paris Regiment (Major Dax), and armed
with French, Italian, Belgian, and German rifles. Units were attached to both
the 90th Division and Task Force Polk. Used generally on patrol and security
missions, the French seem to have given a good account of themselves.
60. The Germans had been pushed back into the West Wall positions east of the Moselle and north of the Sauer by the First Army during mid-September. This sector, held by the LXXX Corps, was given to the Seventh Army about this time.
61. See the 83d Div AAR, Oct 44.
62. On 14 October, 2d Lt. R. C. Downs, Troop C, 43d Cavalry,
carried out a daring daylight reconnaissance on the enemy bank of the Moselle.
Downs and a companion had orders to determine the location of enemy positions
some 1,200 yards east of the river. They obtained the needed information but
were brought under fire. The second man was lost, but Downs swam the river
in full field equipment and reached his own lines. He was awarded the DSC.
63. Chapter II, p. 115.
64. This battle may be followed in the 317th Infantry S-3 Journal. Command of the 317th Infantry passed on the afternoon of 3 October to Col. Warfield M. Lewis, who relieved Col. A. D. Cameron.
65. Only forty men were left in G Company. These probably owed their escape to a rear guard action fought by Sgt. James L. Atkins. Sergeant Atkins was wounded but made his way back through the village after covering his comrades. He was awarded the DSC.
66. XII Corps Opns Rpt, Oct 44.
67. The American artillery fired 17,588 rounds (or about
600 tons of shells). XII Corps Opns Rpt, Oct 44.
68. The 510th Squadron of the XIX TAC did excellent work
against the German battery emplacements.
69. See the 6th Armored Division Combat Record for
this operation.
70. The 3d Battalion of the 317th Infantry
had a hard time getting into Moivron and fought there most of the afternoon.
317th Inf Jul, 8 Oct 44. However, the initial advance was made somewhat easier
by effective overhead fire from the 633d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion.
71. On 8 October, 127 prisoners were taken in Fossieux.
On the morning of 9 October, 7 enemy tanks and about 140 infantry got back
into Fossieux and hit the two companies there. The tanks first took cover
behind a heavy wall in the north part of the town. When they finally came
out, the American tank destroyers knocked out four and crippled a fifth. The
infantry were able to clear the town the next day. In the course of this action
1st Lt. Frederick L. Bach, L Company, 137th Infantry, went alone into a house
from which the enemy were firing and captured a German officer and fifteen
men. Bach was given the DSC. (In this operation the 35th Division identified
troops from the 1120th Regiment, remnants of the 73d Regiment, and
part of the 103d Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion of the 3d Panzer
Grenadier Division.)
72. The village of Clémery was taken
during this advance. Here Sgt. Watson W. Paine, B Company, 318th Infantry,
while carrying a message to a platoon leader through heavy artillery fire,
was wounded in the arms and hands by shell fragments. A machine gun nest blocked
his way, but he assaulted the position with rifle fire and grenades and destroyed
it, got through with his message, and helped destroy another machine gun before
he was evacuated. Paine was given the DSC. During the 318th Infantry fight
at les Quatre Fers, Sgt. Louis A. Antal, E Company, took command of his platoon
after the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and all the squad leaders had
been killed or wounded. Antal reorganized the remnants of the platoon and
led it in an assault which cleared the village. In the course of this action
the sergeant personally knocked out a German antitank gun and captured the
surviving members of its crew. Antal was awarded the DSC.
73. On 5 October the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division had
been pulled out of line on the north flank of the 553d VG Division to
go to the Aachen sector. The 553d was forced to extend its line to
fill this gap and was badly outnumbered in the attack of 8 October. Late on
8 October Balck ordered an armored Kampfgruppe from the 11th Panzer Division,
held behind the right flank of LVIII Panzer Corps, to move during
the night to Delme. On the afternoon of 9 October it started some counterattacks
from Abaucourt, but these were broken up by American artillery. All free German
tanks and guns were rushed to the 553d sector, and plans were made
to commit the 48th Division in case the American attack continued.
Balck also authorized a withdrawal to the line Port-sur-Seille-Nomény-Malaucourt.
On 9 Oct Army Group G KTB reported that the mass of the infantry of
the 553d VG Division had been destroyed.
74. The 80th Division losses for the month of October were
382 killed, 898 wounded, and 425 missing. Most of these casualties were sustained
in the period 1-8 October. 80th Div AAR, Oct 44.
75. For his part in the fight for the Bois
du Haut des Trappes on 9 October, 2d Lt. James G. Schwartze, F Company, 319th
Infantry, was awarded the DSC. Schwartze was severely wounded while leading
his platoon, but continued in action-personally accounting for a German machine
gun-until ordered by his battalion commander to go to the rear. In this same
action 2d Lt. W. E. Newing led a platoon of G Company, although so badly wounded
that he could not stand without assistance. Newing was awarded the DSC.
76. A detailed discussion of supply planning and problems
during October and early November will be found in Ruppenthal, Logistical
Support.
77. See TUSA Diary, 25 Oct 44. In the fight
near Moncourt Woods, Pfc. Harry G. Gamble, Jr., Headquarters Company, 104th
infantry, volunteered to deal with a troublesome machine gun and advance alone,
armed only with a demolition charge. Within a few feet of the German position
he lit the charge and threw it, killing the 6-man crew and destroying the
machine gun. He received the DSC. Cpl. Thomas J. Walsh of the 104th Infantry
gave aid to the wounded under heavy fire until hit in both legs, then continued
to drag himself about to give first aid to the critically wounded. Exhausted
by loss of blood he finally crawled to a ditch where he lay for two days.
He also was awarded the DSC.
Company A, 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion, was attached to the 26th Division
during the attack near Bezange-la-Petite. Here 2d Lt. Charles Kollin, who
was leading a platoon to reinforce the infantry attack, found himself and
his platoon in a mine field under heavy artillery fire. He reorganized the
platoon and went back and forth through the mine field directing evacuation
of the wounded, then led the attack forward. Lieutenant Kollin was awarded
the DSC. The A Company commander, 1st Lt. John J. Preneta, also was awarded
the DSC. When the company was hatted by the mine field he made a reconnaissance
on foot, killed two snipers with his pistol, and captured two others in a
pillbox. Capt. Elva Harris, 253d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, also received
the DSC for his leadership near Bezange, where he rallied a rifle company
that had suffered heavy losses and led it in the assault.
78. These grousers were 3½-inch pieces of reinforced 4-inch channel iron which were welded to the outer edge of the track connectors.
79. This was the established War Department basis of issue. General Patton made numerous bitter complaints and finally got a more reasonable issue.
80. From the 362d Group, XIX TAC.
81. The Army Group G reports say that the cut was 30 meters
wide.
82. Ltr, Gen Moses to Gen Crawford, 2 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS
File, Supply Problems of Allied Advance 400-3/1.
83. SHAEF G-3 Memo, Advance into Germany after the Occupation
of the Ruhr, 24 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS File, Post OVERLORD Planning 381, I.
85. Decisions reached at Supreme Commander's
conference, 18 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS File, Post OVERLORD Planning 381.1, II.
86. Be 12th A Gp AAR, V.
87. Eisenhower to Devers, 23 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS File, Post
OVERLORD Planning 381, II.
88. Directive, Eisenhower to A Gp Commanders,
SCAF 114, 28 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS File, Post OVERLORD Planning 381, II.
89. Patton to Bradley, 19 Oct 44, 12th A Gp File, Military
Objectives 371.3, II.
90. TUSA Diary, 1 Nov 44.
91. Ibid., 2 Nov 44.
92. Ibid., 5 Nov 44.
93. TUSA AAR, II.
94. TUSA G-1 Periodic Rpt, 4-11 Nov 44.
95. 95th Div G-3 Jnl, 4 Nov 44.
96. This section is based on the KTB's of Army Group
G and OB WEST for October and early November, 1944. A number of situation
maps in the GMDS collection show the planned defenses.
97. Not included in these nine divisions was the 30th SS Grenadier Division (Russian), which had mutinied in September and been sent to the Belfort area for reorganization. Army Group G was unwilling to use these Ost troops and had advised that they be disarmed and broken up into labor battalions. However, OB WEST refused this request-a good commentary on the dire condition of German resources in manpower at this stage of the war.
98. Apparently Balck was informed about 1
November that a great German counteroffensive was being planned. He was not
entrusted with the location of the German attack, but was told that it would
not be in the Army Group G sector.
99. On 9 October Balck reported to OB WEST that Army
Group G had been reduced by about 28,000 men since the last days of September.
Of this number 12,000 were casualties and 16,000 were in divisions which had
been taken away from Army Group G.
100. OKH/Org. Abt. KTB, Anlage, 1
Dec 44.
101. The lack of fuel and the constant attacks by American
planes slowed up all movement by supply trains. Trains were dispatched only
on orders from OB WEST so as to use all poor flying weather and hours
of darkness. This remote control from higher headquarters still further ensnarled
the overloaded railway system.
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Last updated 12 October 2004 |