Chapter XIII:
British-American Plans and Soviet Expectations: August - November 1943
Preparing for a final showdown with the British on European strategy, the
U.S. Army planners and leaders were acutely concerned in the fall of 1943
over the need for closer unity among the three major allies-the United
States, Great Britain, and the USSR. Through the elaborate machinery of
the CCS system and through common undertakings in the theaters, much
progress had already been made in pooling British and American ideas,
plans, and resources, but with the Soviet Union military relations had not
been as close, nor had understanding been as genuine. The USSR, outside
the CCS committee and conference system, had remained on the periphery of
the Anglo-American coalition.
The survival of the USSR and its continued active participation in the war
against Germany had been a prime factor in Anglo-American strategic
thinking for nearly two years. As Admiral King had put it at Casablanca:
"the geographical position and manpower of Russia is the key to the defeat
of Germany."1 But down to the fall of 1943 at least, no effort to
co-ordinate western strategy and planning directly with those of the
USSR had been successful. For the Soviet Union the critical question
from the beginning of the war had been a second front, and its
long-continued postponement had added to Soviet suspicions of the West.
As the War Department had come to recognize, until definite signs of a
resolute British-American understanding on this issue were shown, the
West could expect no improvement in military relations with the Soviet
Union.
By the fall of 1943 bridging the gap between Western plans and
Soviet expectations had become more imperative than ever to the U.S.
military staff. Never had the circumstances seemed more opportune. After
much debate and sparring, a pattern of strategy against Germany had
finally been evolved by the Western Allies. The massive Soviet drive
from the east then in progress and the developing plans for the
Mediterranean and the cross-Channel invasion had to be firmly and
finally linked if the Allies were to pool their
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efforts effectively to achieve the one common goal-an early victory over
Germany.
The USSR in British-American
Planning
To the fall of 1943 United States military collaboration with the Soviet
Union had been effected chiefly in connection with intergovernmental
arrangements on lend-lease. On 6 January 1943 President Roosevelt had
reaffirmed the importance of lend-lease to the USSR as a cornerstone in
the U.S. war effort:
I understand both the Army and Navy are definitely of the opinion
that Russian continuance as a major factor in the war is of cardinal
importance and therefore it must be a basic factor in our strategy to
provide her with the maximum amount of supplies that can be delivered to
her ports. I fully endorse this concept.2
Lend-lease aid to the USSR was a cardinal objective of U.S. policy, but
even in that sphere there was much room for improvement in mutual
understanding of respective capabilities, limitations, needs, and aims.3
Americans who had come into close contact with Soviet military leaders,
Brig. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley for example, felt that the USSR, involved in
a land war on one main front, did not appreciate the shipping problems
confronting the United States in its multi-front global war.4
Similarly, there was growing impatience in U.S. military quarters over
Soviet refusal to exchange information freely on the use and
effectiveness of U.S. military equipment in combat.5
Much could be tolerated and excused in 1942 when the USSR was fighting
with its back to the wall and U.S. forces and matériel were only
beginning to become effective in the international conflict. In 1943
irritations increased. The Russians were safely past the critical turning
point in their military fortunes and showed more and more signs of strong
staying power. To the Army staff it sometimes seemed that aid to the USSR
was a one-sided affair with little appreciation on the part of the
Russians of the costs involved-of the serious drain on vitally needed
ships, of the postponement in programs of training and equipping American
units and deploying them in combat. On those occasions the staff was
inclined to doubt the wisdom of U.S. policy, in practice from early in the
war, of giving the Soviet Union preferential treatment in the allocation
of munitions over all other Allies and even, at times, over the armed
forces of the United States. The desire for reciprocal treatment and a
stiffening of American policy toward the Soviet
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was reflected in a comment of the Operations Division's Policy Committee
on 23 January 1943:
...the United States should continue to furnish Lend-Lease supplies to
Russia to the full extent of our capacity, provided and provided only-that
Russia cooperates with us and takes us into her confidence. As we grow
more powerful (and 1943 will most certainly see the United States far
stronger, at least on the sea and in the air, than any other belligerent)
we can afford to, and in simple self-interest must start exercising the
dominant influence to which such power properly entitles us. The time is
appropriate for us to start some straight from-the-shoulder talk with Mr.
Joseph Stalin.6
Irritation with Soviet behavior also appeared in General Handy's comment
to General Marshall in early March 1943:
Russia has given the United Nations little credit for the munitions which
we could ill afford to spare and which we have sent in our much-needed
ships. Stalin, on the other hand, has consistently called for a second
front. Originally our lend-lease was designed to keep our Allies fighting
until such time as we had built up our own armed forces. This objective
has been achieved, and the time has come when we must complete the
equipping of the forces that we have placed in being and move them to the
combat zones in order to gain victory in the shortest possible time.
Consideration should be given to reducing our aid to Russia and using this
equipment to create the conditions and forces required for establishing a
second front.
Looking ahead to the end of the conflict and to the time of a
political settlement, he went on to say: Victory in the war will be
meaningless unless we also win the peace. We must be strong enough
militarily at the peace table to cause our demands to be respected. With
this in view, we should give only such equipment to our Allies that they
can put to better and quicker use than we can.7
During the discussion in the spring of 1943 on the Third (London)
Protocol to cover lend-lease to the USSR for the fiscal year
1 July 1943 to
30 June 1944 some Army and Navy support arose for inserting a clause
calling for all authorized military and naval attaches and observers to be
given the same rights of visit and access to information in the Soviet
Union as those extended to their Soviet counterparts in the United States.8 Not all military men were in agreement on the wisdom of inserting
such a provision. On 22 May General Marshall reported to the JCS that he
felt such a proviso would be ill advised. The cardinal principle, he
pointed out, was still to help the USSR as much as possible.9 In any
event, military sentiment for circumscribing U.S. aid to the USSR with a
proviso for a freer exchange of data continued to be blocked in 1943 by
the White House policy that lend-lease to the USSR was not to be used as a
basis for bargaining. Like the two earlier protocols, the Third, signed on
19 October in London by representatives of the United States, the United
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Kingdom, Canada, and the Soviet Union, contained no such proviso.10
Lend-lease to the Soviet Union remained an important commitment for U.S.
shipping, planes, equipment, and supplies. The magnitude of the aid during
1943 is indicated in the dry statistics of the tonnage and aircraft
deliveries. As of 31 August 1943 the total number of airplanes due under
the three protocols was 6,448; factory deliveries had been made to the
number of 6,514. Of the 6,207 departures from the United States, 5,389
arrived at their destination, 4341 passed to Russian control, 556 were
lost en route, 1,048 were in American hands at their destination, and the
remainder were en route. The AAF and the War Department were directing
their efforts toward overcoming the difficulties encountered and expanding
the Alaskan and Persian Gulf routes to take care of the normal flow of 495
planes per month called for under the Third Protocol. The number of
aircraft leaving Great Falls for the Alaska-Siberia route rose steadily
from 54 during September 1942 -the month the route opened-to over 300
aircraft per month during June, July, and August 1943. As of 31 August
there were in the Persian Gulf area about 1,000 planes, all still in
American hands. This-route also showed a great increase over 1942, though
not the same steady rise that occurred on the Alaskan route-transportation
difficulties at Abadan, Iran, especially complicating the delivery
problem.11 By mid-1943 the
mounting production of American factories, the decline of shipping losses,
the increased pace of shipbuilding, and improved capacity on routes of
delivery had reacted favorably upon lend-lease deliveries to the Soviet
Union.12 In terms of cargo shipped from the Western Hemisphere to the
USSR, the year 1943 was to see the dispatch of 4,794545 long tons as
compared with 2,453,097 for 1942. The principal routes in 1943 for this
traffic were the Persian Gulf, Soviet Far East (for nonmilitary
supplies), northern Soviet ports via the Atlantic (with the exception of
the hiatus in convoys from April through October 1943), and the Soviet
Arctic via the Pacific (from May through August).13
Continuing the work it had begun in 1942, the Army staff paid increasing
attention in 1943 to plans for improving the Persian Corridor as a supply
route to the USSR.14 An interesting experiment in international
co-operation in a wartime theater thereby resulted-involving Americans,
Englishmen, Russians, and Iranians.15 For the Ameri-
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cans the problems in the Persian Corridor were complicated by a number of
special conditions. Though the whole Middle East theater was recognized by
the United States and the United Kingdom as one of British strategic
responsibility, the U.S. Army forces in it had been given by mutual
agreement a unique responsibility for expediting lend-lease to the USSR.
With the concomitant decline in 1943 of the rest of the Middle East
theater as an area of active operations for U.S. forces, the Persian Gulf
Service Command became increasingly important. Amid the varying national
interests, problems constantly arose calling for a conciliation of views
as the Americans took over more and more control of the supply functions
in the Corridor. To help Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, U.S. commander of
the Persian Gulf Service Command, General Marshall early in the spring of
1943 had directed him to send monthly reports to Washington. The reports
were to describe especially any difficulties with the British or Russians
and were to be written with a view to being forwarded to the President by
the Chief of Staff.16
Growing importance of the American contribution in the Persian Gulf area
was reflected not only in the rising figures of lend-lease dispatched to
and handled there but also in the increase of U.S. personnel. During 1942
only a few hundred U.S. Army troops were in the
Persian Corridor, but in 1943 the assigned Army strength steadily rose,
exceeding 28,000 at the end of the year.17 The increasing importance of
the U.S. Army role in the supply of the USSR through the Corridor was also
reflected in the growing independence of the Persian Gulf Service Command
from USAFIME-culminating in the establishment of the Persian Gulf Command
as a separate command directly under the War Department on 10 December
1943.18
Outside the field of lend-lease, attempts to correlate U.S.-Soviet efforts
to the fall of 1943 had been much less successful. The American offer
during the siege of Stalingrad to send a group of heavy bombers to Soviet
bases in the Caucasus to assist in the defense operations of the Soviet
Army had been rejected.19 The Russians were intensely interested in
receiving the planes, but not the men - a solution Marshall thought unwise
since it would withhold striking power against the enemy for too long a
period while the Russians learned to operate and maintain the aircraft
.20 The U.S. military proposal-backed by
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the White House-to co-ordinate planning for the use of American airpower
in the event of war between the USSR and Japan had also been rebuffed. In
rejecting the proposed survey of Siberian airfields by Gen. Follett
Bradley, Stalin, on 13 January 1943, stated to Roosevelt: "It would seem
obvious that Russian military objects can be inspected only by Russian
inspectors, just as American military objects can be inspected only by
American inspectors. In this respect [there] must be no misunderstanding."
21
President Roosevelt's suggestion at the time of the Casablanca
Conference to send General Marshall to the Soviet Union to discuss
Allied plans and problems in the war against the Axis Powers also met
with a cool reception from Moscow.22
Such developments convinced the military planners that the USSR would not
go to war against Japan until after the German threat to the USSR had been
eliminated. Beginning with TRIDENT, the U.S. and British staffs joined
with the President and the Prime Minister at the end of each of their big midwar conferences in expressing the hope that, upon the defeat of the
Axis in Europe, the USSR would help the others bring about the
unconditional surrender of Japan. Despite apparent Soviet disinterest and the absence of adequate data, U.S. staff planners continued
in 1943 to study the possibilities of a Russo-Japanese war and to keep
plans for such an eventuality on a stand-by basis.
During the Anglo-American debates over European strategy, Soviet behavior
and tactics were, for the West, as puzzling as they were disturbing. The
USSR's curious position as half-ally-in the alliance yet outside of
it-meant that the Soviet Union did not directly participate in most of the
debates. The Soviet Government nevertheless resorted to a variety of
tactics and pressures to influence the result. At the end of each of their
conferences, the Western partners announced to the Soviet Union the
general decisions reached and their expectations for the second front.
Cycles of irritation followed those of good feeling as the prospects of
the second front gradually receded from 1942 to 1943 to 1944. A chain
reaction of displeasure was generated throughout that part of Soviet
officialdom that came into contact with the West and affected dealings on
all levels and problems-even those only remotely associated with the issue
at hand. Shortly after the TRIDENT Conference in May 1943, the Soviet
Government tried a diplomatic gambit, going so far as to recall its
ambassadors from London and Washington. There is fleeting
evidence-difficult to weigh-suggesting that at least at one point in the
summer of 1943 the Soviet Union may even have seriously considered a
separate peace with Germany and entered into tentative negotiations.23 The
Soviet
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press kept up its campaign of registering displeasure at the delay of the
second front, at times even questioning the good faith of the Western
Allies, especially of the British .24 The Soviet attitude made any attempt
to bring about close military co-operation extremely difficult.
Over-all U. S. military planning continued to be vitally affected in 1943
by events on the Eastern Front. At every international conference, the
Western planners sought to achieve one of the most determining factors in British-American
strategy-the relief of German pressure on the Soviet Army. Even the
planning for the over-all strength and the extent and type of cutting
edge of the U.S. Army needed to carry out the American role in global
strategy continued, as from the outset of the war, to be directly
related to the Soviet military situation.25 Thus, as the USSR had increasingly demonstrated its ability to hold and
fight back, the Victory Program had been progressively revised downward in
armored and motorized units.26
Appreciative of the fact that the United States was associated with allies
over whose "most fateful decisions"-as General Embick phrased it-they
might have no control, U.S. Army planners did not rule out the possibility
of a Soviet withdrawal or a Soviet-German rapprochement.27 Nor were they
blind to the fact that the Soviet Union might be fighting the war for
completely different ultimate ends from those of Great Britain and the
United States. But, aside from examining direct military implications,
they usually refrained from speculating openly on policy conflicts
developing among the Allies and international political issues likely to
arise at the close of the armed conflict. By training and habit, U.S.
military men had been nurtured in the tradition of the separation of
military and political
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spheres in national policy. While, as General Marshall had earlier put it,
they could not help having "the thought of political matters" always on
their minds, they carefully avoided trespassing on what they regarded as
the political field. The absence of clear-cut American political guidance
and concrete political objectives susceptible to military implementation
in the war reinforced U.S. staff preoccupation with ending the war as
quickly as possible and letting those responsible for political problems
worry about ultimate political implications and goals. This state of
affairs led one U.S. Foreign Service officer in the summer of 1943 to draw
a sharp contrast on the points of view of the United States and its allies
on military policy in over-all national policy:
Most American military men think of war as a soldier's job to be done ....
Most of our officers want the job accomplished as soon as possible, with a
minimum of fuss over international political and economic issues, which
they regard as of secondary importance. Political and economic questions,
they feel, can be discussed and decided after the defeat of the Axis.
To our allies the conduct of the war is a function of overall political
and economic policy. Military logic is therefore always subordinate to and
sometimes violated in favor of political and economic considerations.
Our wartime policy is directed at defeat of the Axis .... Certainly
they [political and economic principles] have never appeared, to
override the purely military policy of defeating the Axis.28
Whatever the ultimate political disadvantages of concentrating on
the military
task of winning the war-a problem much debated in western circles after
the close of hostilities-there are indications that the Army staff was not
entirely unaware that the conduct of the war would shape the conditions of
the peace. This was reflected in General Marshall's expression of concern
to the President, in the early spring of 1943, over the possible postwar
chaos in Europe if the Western and Soviet drives against Germany did not
keep pace.29 But the Army staff also was not without hope that the
build-up of American strength during the war would make the United States,
as Handy had said, "strong enough militarily at the peace table to cause
our demands to be respected." The precise definition of those demands
would, in conventional U.S. military practice, be left for others to
decide. There was even an occasional expression of foreboding over the
likely differences in approach between the United States and the USSR to
the political problems of the eventual settlement. Since such questions
were considered outside conventional military interests and concerns and
more properly in the sphere of the political branch of government, a
Washington Army staff officer was the more likely to express his
reservations, doubts, or suspicions on the ultimate political aims and
intentions of the Soviet ally only in the privacy of his own thinking or
to a circle of his closest associates. One such recorded case-as revealing
as it is rare-was the view expressed in August 1943 by a General Staff
officer in connection with the question of a possible agreement with the
USSR on "post-German Europe." The fact that the comment was offered by an
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officer not actually responsible for strategic planning for coalition
warfare may make it all the more-rather than less-an accurate index to Army
sentiment at large. He warned that, in dealing with the Soviet Union, the
following ideas had to be borne constantly in mind:
a. Russia is concerned solely with Russia.
b. Any agreement or treaty with Russia will endure only so long as it is
expedient for Russia.
c. Even though Russia might enter into
negotiations with the expectation of breaking the agreement, she would not
even initially come to any agreement which is not heavily weighted in
favor of Russia.
d. The Third International is not dead
by a long shot. The real objective of Russia is the Sovietization not only
of Europe but of the world. Therefore even if Russia came to a
satisfactory agreement with us, and to all appearances, lived up to, it,
we should still be on the losing end. That is, the agreement would be
lived up
to by the facade of the Russian Government but all the energies and
resources of Russia would flow through the Third International into the
fertile fields of a disillusioned Europe.
e. In the final analysis the only language understood by Russia is force.
f. In the course of history practically
every plan has been tried to hold down powerful nations and preserve
peace. The only (repeat only) effective method has been genuine "Balance
of Power." Wars have broken out only upon the break-down of the "balance."
We should, therefore, seek to provide balanced power in Europe.
To prevent Soviet dominance in postwar Europe, he went so far as to
recommend:
a. Seek our own councils only for the
time being.
b. Pour in the power and forces to the Nth degree in western Europe.
c. Get to Berlin FIRST.
d. Line up our allies, particularly France and Turkey.
e. Then try to gain what we can through agreement with -Russia.
f. As for Germany, the mere threat of our alliance with her will
suffice to give pause to Russia.30
Despite such occasional expressions of pessimism over ultimate political
prospects, the task at hand, in the opinion of the Army planning staff,
was to get on with the war. The Soviet Union was still an ally whose
military might was being counted on heavily to defeat Germany, and,
whatever the differences in national policies and ultimate political aims
of the three allies, the immediate and pressing aim was to establish
closer unity in military action. To secure their basic goal of a quick,
decisive, and relatively inexpensive victory over Germany -and prosecute
the war against Japan the Army planners in the summer of 1943 called for
co-ordination of Soviet offensive efforts from the east with
British-American air-ground offensive from the west.31 They particularly
feared that if, as a result of differences in British-American views over
European strategy, the Soviet Army alone was relied upon for major ground
operations, a protracted European war would follow and might result in
unilateral action culminating in a peace short of complete victory. It was
also apparent to the planners that before closer unity of action could be
established the Western Allies would have to overcome the suspicion of the
Russians that had been building tip as a result of the long-promised and
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much-postponed second front. They would have to convince the Russians of
the sincerity of their intentions and the firmness of their plans to carry
out the invasion from the west and fulfill the long-disappointed Soviet
expectations.
Establishment of the U.S. Military Mission to the
USSR
Down to the fall of 1943 close collaboration with the USSR was, perhaps,
not immediately necessary. The major Soviet and Anglo-American efforts
against Germany were still far apart, and overall purposes would seem to
have been satisfied if the Allies fought vigorously in their respective
theaters and retained the initiative. Following QUADRANT the improved
prospects for a second front and the consequent prospective link-up of
Soviet and Anglo-American efforts changed the picture. Acceptance by the
United States and Great Britain of an agreed European strategy at Quebec
made improved collaboration with the USSR appear imperative to the Army
and other American leaders.
To gain the confidence of the Soviet staff and win the fullest
co-operation of the Soviet Government for the over-all strategic
objectives, the Americans proceeded to set their own house in order. As a
first step they reorganized the U.S. liaison machinery in Moscow, which
had all but broken down as an effective unit in the face of internal and
external difficulties in the Soviet capital. In the early stages of the
war the United States had been represented in Moscow by its ambassador,
its military and naval attaches, and an agency known as the U.S. Supply
Mission that handled the lend-lease supply program. The divergent
aims of these representatives had led to internal friction and even
instances of working at cross purposes. Differences had developed between
Brig. Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, the lend-lease representative, and Brig.
Gen. Joseph A. Michela, the military attaché, and General Michela had also
encountered difficulties with the Russians. In addition, Admiral William
H. Standley, the U.S. Ambassador, had not been kept informed of U.S.
military planning. Since he was the only American who had ready access to
Stalin, this gap, too, had militated against effective military liaison in
the Soviet capital.32 When, in the fall of 1943, these chief United States
representatives were withdrawn, a new U.S. politico-military team was
dispatched.
The new ambassador was Mr. W. Averell Harriman. The choice of Mr. Harriman
was especially fortunate and was to prove popular with the Russians. Long
an intimate adviser of the President, he had played a leading role in the
lend-lease program. Together with Lord Beaverbrook, he had negotiated the
initial lend-lease agreement with the Soviet Union in 1941; he had served
as the President's representative at the first military discussions
between Churchill and Stalin in August 1942; and he had attended many
high Anglo-American politico-military conferences.
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Late in September 1943 Mr. Harriman, with General Marshall, determined the
nature and function of the new military mission.33 It was to be a small
group and was to be set up under the direction of the ambassador and
headed by Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, From his earlier service in Washington
as secretary of the General Staff and from his more recent vantage points
as secretary of the JCS and as U.S. secretary of the CCS, Deane had become
intimately familiar with high-level strategic plans and military policies.
His staff in the USSR was to include Brig. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding of the,
Army Service Forces and Brig. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg of the Air
headquarters staff in Washington. General Spalding was to be responsible
for handling lend-lease matters in the USSR in accord with policies
established by the Lend-Lease Administration, tae U.S. ambassador, and
General Deane. General Vandenberg's assignment was to be a temporary one
and he was to return to Washington within six weeks after the
establishment of the mission. To avoid embarrassing and complicating the
work of the new delegation in Moscow, General Marshall and Mr. Harriman
decided that no military attach6 or direct representative of G-2 should be
appointed for the time being. Attempts would be made to obtain information
required by G2 either from the British or directly from the Russians, if
such efforts could be made without interference with the mission's primary
objective.
The primary objective of the military mission-and of Harriman-was to
break down Soviet suspicion. The hope was to obtain better knowledge of
Soviet plans and to establish closer co-operation in carrying out
operational plans against Germany. Harriman and the military mission
also were to look toward obtaining Soviet participation in the Pacific
war. General Deane was to be at liberty to discuss with the Russians all
information concerning U.S. strategy, plans, and operations that might
promote the primary objective and that in his and the ambassador's
judgment was appropriate.34
On 1 October the War Department informed General Deane of his designation
as the head of the mission and gave him a directive.35 He was cautioned to
make no commitments that might cause an increased deployment of U.S. Army
supplies or troops, without first securing War Department approval. He was
to report in his new capacity to the U.S. ambassador at Moscow immediately
upon completion of the coming tripartite conference (United States, Great
Britain, and Soviet Union) in Moscow, to which he had in the meantime been
designated as a military observer. Later, General Deane's directive was
amended to include a naval division in his mission and thereafter he was
to report to the JCS rather than to the War Department
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as specified in his original instructions.36 On 3 October the Soviet
Government agreed to the proposal to establish the U.S. military mission
to Moscow.37
On 1 November-upon the conclusion of the Moscow Conference-General Deane
proceeded to organize the new mission in the Soviet capital. This fresh
attempt to unify Allied planning through an effective extension of the
Washington politico-military staff and improved liaison mechanisms in a
far-off capital was to open a new phase in Soviet-American military
collaboration in World War II.38
The Moscow Conference
Preparations and Instructions
A second and far more ambitious effort to secure closer co-ordination of
British-American and Soviet national policies and planning took place at
the Moscow Conference, 19-30 October 1943. Toward the end of the QUADRANT
Conference, Washington learned that Stalin had agreed to a conference in
Moscow of the U.S., British, and Soviet foreign secretaries. The meetings
were to be exploratory in character and were to pave the way for a later
conference of the three heads of government.39 The
news was received with enthusiasm by the Western Allies since, as
Churchill later recorded, "This was the first favorable mention from the
Russian side of a meeting between the three Allies at any level."40
During the pre-conference exchanges, between Moscow, London, and
Washington, Stalin laid considerable stress on the need for military
discussions centering on the second front in Europe. It was apparent that,
above all, he would want to hear about Allied plans for a landing in
France. Though the British and U.S. Governments viewed the forthcoming
tripartite meetings in the Soviet capital primarily as a political
conference, it seemed wise therefore to include military advisers among
their representatives. In late summer and early fall each government
prepared to send along a well-briefed military observer to assist the
political head of its delegation. In early September General Deane
received his first inkling-from British sources of the President's
intention to have him participate in the conference as the United States
military observer. At the same time he learned that the Prime Minister
intended to designate General Ismay, Deputy Secretary to the War Cabinet
and Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense, as his opposite number
at the meetings.41
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At General Deane's request, the JSSC drew up and the JCS approved
instructions for the U.S. military observer in late September.42
According to these instructions, the primary duty of the military observer
was to act as military adviser to the senior United States
representative-Secretary of State Cordell Hull. In that capacity he was to
advise concerning the military aspects of proposals under consideration
and emphasize "the inseparable interrelation between political proposals
and military capabilities." He was to make clear that prospective United
States military capabilities could be estimated only on the basis of
agreed global strategy. Though he was to present the JCS point of view, he
was not authorized to commit the JCS without their specific authority. In
matters within the province of the CCS, he was to co-operate closely with
the British military adviser, who would be furnished with appropriate
extracts of these instructions. The U.S. military adviser was to attend
the meetings of the conference and be available on request to present
facts, figures, and arguments on military questions.
For Deane's guidance, the JCS also outlined their position on
military aspects of subjects likely to come up for
discussion. Thus, in connection with co-ordination of military efforts for
the defeat of Germany, he was authorized to divulge such additional
details of Anglo-American operations in Europe agreed upon at QUADRANT and
not already given to the Russians as the timing and reasons therefore, if
warranted by developments at the conference. If he revealed the OVERLORD
target date, he was to emphasize the importance of timing Soviet
operations in support Of OVERLORD. Plans for the war against Japan were to
be disclosed only in general terms, with stress to be put on the
solidarity of the British-American effort and on the great advantage to
the USSR should it join that effort.43 The United States was prepared, the
JCS also stated, to open a military air route on a reciprocal basis
between Seattle and Moscow and hoped that an early agreement to this
effect might be reached.
The JCS summed up the U.S. staff position on the role of the USSR in grand
strategy. They foresaw that, when Germany was defeated, the powerful
Soviet military machine would be in a dominant position east of the Rhine
and the Adriatic, and the Soviet Union would be able to impose whatever
territorial settlements it desired in Central Europe and the Balkans. At
the same time, the USSR's continued and full cooperation in the war
against Germany was of cardinal importance in order to achieve the basic
U.S. strategic objective for the earliest possible defeat of Ger-
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many. If the Soviet Union withdrew from the war and the German military
machine was essentially intact, Anglo-American operations on the Continent
would become impracticable and the effort against Germany would have to be
limited on the whole to an air offensive. Similarly, full Soviet
participation in the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany was of
the highest importance in order to assure the prompt and decisive defeat
of Japan and at far less cost to the United States and Great Britain than
would otherwise be possible.44
These views on the military value of the Soviet Union as an ally were
but a reaffirmation of the basic Army stand from early in the war.45
While the JCS were outlining the course for the military observer to
follow at the forthcoming conference, the Army planning staff was busy
collecting background data for him on the problems and difficulties
involved in establishing a second front .46 In early October the War Department also instructed Generals Faymonville and Michela,
who were being relieved from duty in Moscow and returning to the United
States, to await in Cairo the arrival of the Harriman-Deane party en route
to Moscow and consult with them.47
after
his departure from Washington, Deane stopped off in England and North
Africa. With Mr. Harriman, he met the rest of the United States
delegation headed by the Secretary of State en route, and proceeded with
them in mid-October to MOSCOW.48
The Meetings and Their
Consequence's
At the Moscow Conference, in addition to Secretary of State Hull, Mr.
Harriman, and General Deane, the American party included a number of State
Department officials and a few officers from the Washington staffs .49 The
Brit-
[293]
ish sent Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir
Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in Moscow, William Strang,
Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, and
General Ismay. The Soviet delegation included Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the
Foreign Minister, Andrei Y. Vishinsky and Maxim M. Litvinov, also of the
Foreign Office, Marshal Klementy Voroshilov, Vice Commissar of Defense and
deputy to Stalin, and Lt. Gen. A. A. Gryzlov of the Soviet Army General
Staff.
Before the conferees assembled there had been a considerable exchange of
correspondence among the three Foreign Secretaries about the agenda. The
Americans had advanced a number of suggestions, including a four-power
declaration and the treatment of Germany during the armistice period. The
British had put forward a much longer list of suggestions-also on
political questions-including a common policy toward Turkey and Iran arid
relations between the USSR and Poland. The Russians proposed one topic-and
one only - "the consideration of measures to shorten the duration of the
war against Germany and her allies in Europe." It became apparent from the
outset that the Russians were not prepared to discuss anything else until
this military question had been fully explored. At the first formal
meeting, on 19 October, Molotov was chosen chairman and the agenda was
settled.
The Russians immediately proceeded to a discussion of the one topic
they had put on the agenda, dividing it into three
parts: (a) vigorous preparations during the rest of 1943 to insure an
invasion of northern France; (b) the possibility of inducing Turkey to
enter the war immediately; and (c) the possibility of persuading Sweden to
permit immediate use of her air bases.50 The British and Americans agreed
to turn the first phase of the discussion-the cross-Channel operation-over
to their military observers, Generals Deane and Ismay. Describing the
plans for the invasion of Europe, the two generals assured the Russians
that at each of the successive British-American conferences from
Casablanca through QUADRANT the necessity of aiding the USSR had been a
cardinal consideration. They set forth the anticipated role of the
Combined Bomber Offensive and briefly outlined various preparations then
under way for OVERLORD. Requirements for the build-up for the cross-Channel
operations such as landing craft, transportation, and supplies were
explained in some detail. The decision of the TRIDENT and QUADRANT
Conferences to invade in the spring of 1944 was reaffirmed. At the same
time, the two Western military advisers outlined the conditions the United
States and Great Britain had accepted as a prerequisite for launching
OVERLORD. It was the expectation of the Western Allies, they informed the
Russians, that these conditions would be created through the combination
of the Combined Bomber Offensive, continued pressure in Italy, secondary
landings in France, guerrilla activities in the Balkans, and, most of
[294]
all, through Soviet pressure on the Eastern Front.
At the conclusion of this presentation, Marshal Voroshilov and General Gryzlov asked some pointed questions about the conditions necessary for
the launching and pressed for an exact date. Fearful of jeopardizing
security by a premature announcement so far in advance of the then
tentative planning date, early May, the British and American
representatives went only so far as to state that the operation would be
launched sometime in the spring.51 In reply to Mr. Molotov's question
about the validity of the decision on the cross-Channel operation, General
Deane hastened to reassure him, pointing to the action taken at the Quebec
conference and affirming the confidence of the United States and Great
Britain that the prerequisite conditions would exist.
52 It was the hope
of the United States, Deane went on, that its military mission in Moscow
would be used as a medium for closer collaboration between the respective
staffs. That mission was authorized, he pointed out, to keep the Soviet
staff fully informed of the progress of preparations for OVERLORD.53
The Soviet delegation appeared to be completely satisfied with the
sincerity of British and American intentions. They assured the
Anglo-American representatives that they would continue the pressure on
the Eastern Front and do all they could to help create the conditions
necessary for the invasion. The Anglo-American representatives, who had
expected another Soviet demand for a "second front right now," thereupon
felt relieved.54
Taking advantage of the understanding that then appeared to exist
among the delegates, General Deane proceeded to put forward for adoption
three U.S. proposals to hasten the conclusion of the war against
Germany. First, bases should be made available in the USSR for the use
of U.S. aircraft in order to execute shuttle bombing against industrial
Germany; second, a more effective interchange of weather information
should be instituted and, to accomplish this, an improvement of United
States and Soviet signal communications should be effected; and, third,
air transport between the two countries should be improved. These
proposals were made specifically at General Arnold's request.55
General Deane later reported that the proposals took the Soviet
representatives
[295]
completely by surprise.56 He stated that, as a result of the action taken
on the proposals, he learned two important lessons for his subsequent
dealings with Soviet officials - no subordinate official in the USSR could
make a decision on matters involving foreigners without consulting higher
authority, and "an approval in principle" by the Soviet Government was not
necessarily an indication of a binding agreement. Two days after General
Deane had made the proposals, Molotov announced to the conference that the
Soviet Government had considered them and approved them "in principle."57
Secretary Hull thereupon suggested that the details be worked out
immediately by the Soviet Army General Staff and the U.S. military
mission. Mr. Molotov agreed.
In Washington the JCS, abreast of General Deane's negotiations in Moscow,
quickly moved to develop the three proposals in some detail for his
guidance in exploring the subject further with the Soviet representatives.
The JCS approved with some modifications a reply proposed by General
Arnold. They estimated the requirements for shuttle bases for U.S.
aircraft at approximately ten sites, so located as to aid heavy bombers
striking targets on the way to and from the United Kingdom. They called
for an exchange of basic weather ciphers. The interest in the USRR weather
was in connection with shuttle bombing, the transport route north of
Tehran, Chinese operations, and the Siberian air route. In connection with
air transport, the JCS expressed interest in the Alaska-Siberia route as
first in importance; service from the United States to Moscow via the United Kingdom and possibly
Stockholm second; extension of current service north from Tehran to Moscow
third; and improved connecting services at Tehran fourth.58
Actually, General Deane was to find that not until February 1944 were
the Russians to enter upon conversations on the proposals and "then only
after continuous pressure by the President on Stalin, by Harriman on
Molotov, and by me on the General Staff."59
Following the discussion of British-American plans for the invasion,
Cordell Hull and Anthony Eden took up the questions raised by the Russians
with respect to the neutrals, Turkey and Sweden.60 At this time, Mr.
Eden took a somewhat more cautious position on the entry of Turkey into
the war than Mr. Churchill had previously supported. He declared that
Turkey's entry could be effected only at the expense of the Italian
operations and of the build-up in the United Kingdom for OVERLORD and the
Combined Bomber Offensive. Moreover, since bases were then available in
Italy, Turkish airfields from which the Balkan oil fields might be bombed
were no longer so important. But, he went on to say, if the rest of the
delegates be-
[296]
lieved that Turkey's entry into the war should be pressed, the British
would give the matter serious consideration. Secretary Hull felt that the
question was essentially a military one, but he presumed that the views
expressed by Mr. Eden would also reflect those of the U.S. Government.
Like Turkey, Sweden had long managed to stay aloof from actual
hostilities. This course was made all the more complicated for the
northern neutral as a result of its exposed geographic position and
important trade relations within the German orbit. While Sweden found it
difficult to resist German economic and military demands, the Allies were
becoming more and more concerned over continued permission extended to the
German troops to cross Sweden to and from occupied Norway and over the
valuable supplies such as iron ore and ball bearings going from Sweden to
Germany. As for the Soviet proposal to obtain the use of air bases in
Sweden, Mr. Eden pointed out that vital Allied resources would be drawn
off in the process of assuring Sweden protection. Mr. Hull took the
position that since these matters were "primarily military in character"
they should be left for settlement by the heads of government in
consultation with their Chiefs of Staff. He referred both Soviet proposals
to Washington for further instructions.
In Washington the propositions were immediately turned over to the joint
staff and Army planning committees for exploration.61 Some differences of
views
among Washington military planners soon became apparent. The Army
planners, intent upon concentrating Allied efforts for the cross-Channel
effort, currently took a dim view of Turkey's entry into the war.
62 In
their opinion, no action should be initiated by the Allies to draw Turkey
into the war. They advanced a number of arguments. The active
participation of Turkey would require the British to honor their
agreements to furnish aid to Turkey, and such action would constitute a
drain on Allied resources, especially on heavy bombardment aircraft, thus
jeopardizing the success of Allied effort in Italy as well as of other
operations. Turkey did not want Soviet help and would probably demand
British and American guarantees to protect it against the USSR before it
would consent to enter the war. As an ally, moreover, Turkey would not
contain additional German divisions in the Mediterranean-a major purpose
of prospective Mediterranean operations as agreed at QUADRANT. The
acquisition of air bases in Turkey, Army planners also pointed out, had
become less important as a result of the newly obtained Italian airfields.
The JSSC reached the opposite conclusion-that the United States should
take
[297]
the position that it would be very desirable to have Turkey enter the war
immediately.63 Among the advantages of bringing Turkey into the war, the JSSC maintained, were further increase of German commitments in the
Balkans and consequent increased dispersion of their forces, the
possibility of forcing a German withdrawal from Greece and the Aegean, the
access of air bases in Turkey, and the possibility of opening a direct
supply route to the USSR via the Dardanelles and the Black Sea. However,
the JSSC qualified its recommendation. Action to bring Turkey into the war
must not entail commitments of military assistance that would jeopardize
projected operations in Europe; and the United States was not in a
position to furnish Turkey with substantial military assistance.
The Army planners and JSSC were in somewhat closer agreement on the
question of gaining access to Swedish bases. To secure their use, both
concluded, would be very advantageous for the Allies-especially for air
operations to supplement the Combined Bomber Offensive. But, to the Army
planners, the whole proposition was not feasible at that time, since
Sweden could not provide adequate protection for the bases and the
Allies were unable to supply or reinforce the Swedes via ground lines of
communications. Because of Sweden's fear of the USSR, moreover, the
forces involved would in all probability have to be American and
British, thus jeopardizing OVERLORD. The Army planners recommended,
therefore, that efforts to secure air bases in Sweden be deferred until
such time as means became available for opening a land route through
Norway from the Atlantic or through Finland from the USSR.64
The JSSC agreed that a major British-U. S. amphibious operation would be
necessary to seize the necessary lines of communications across Norway-an
operation that would imperil OVERLORD. On the other hand, they maintained;
it would be practicable to use Swedish air bases for small numbers of
fighter bombers, thus aiding the Combined Bomber Offensive.65 General
Marshall and General Arnold, in accord with the Army planners' views on
Turkey and Sweden, expressed their disagreement with the JSSC.66
The result of staff discussion and study in Washington was to sound a note
of caution for United States delegates at the conference with reference to
committing the United States to the Turkish or Swedish ventures. The JCS
concluded that it would be desirable to have Turkey enter the war and to
secure air bases in Sweden, but only if planned operations in Europe were
not thereby jeopardized.67 Since such assurance
[298]
could not be given, the United States military position was that no
definite decision could be reached on the issues. Absence of information
on the Soviet position concerning assistance to Turkey was an additional
reason given by the JCS for delaying the decision. On 28 October Secretary
Hull presented to the conferees the President's reply to Molotov's
proposals concerning Turkey and Sweden.68 The answer-in accord with the
cautious United States military views -was in the negative on both issues.
The British expressed agreement with the American reply. As a result of
the British and American stands, the USSR yielded on both proposals. The
conferees concluded that final action on Turkey and Sweden would have to
be postponed until the three governments had given the problem further
study.
How strongly the Soviet delegates felt about the decision on Turkey became
apparent to General Deane on the final day of the conference. Their
displeasure took the form of refusing to put Deane's proposals concerning
shuttle bombing, exchange of weather information, and improved
communications and their approval "in principle" into the record of the
conference. Molotov contended the proposals had not been discussed in
detail. Vishinsky asked-with considerable bitterness-why the Russians
should obligate themselves when the United States refused to join them
in inducing Turkey to enter the war. That entry would remove fifteen
German divisions from the Soviet front and enable the USSR to advance
into Prussia in two months. The U.S. proposals and the Soviet agreement
in principle were finally entered into the record only as a result of a
strong stand taken by Secretary Hull and the promise of generous
treatment of the USSR in the distribution of Italian naval and merchant
vessels.69
Conclusion of the discussion of questions involving military
considerations enabled the three Foreign Secretaries to turn their full
attention to the more purely political problems facing the
conference-with important results. Their agreements were embodied in a
secret protocol. It was at this international conference that the
leading Allied Powers agreed that the united action pledged for the
prosecution of war against their respective enemies was to be continued
for the organization and maintenance of peace and security after the
close of hostilities. The agreement was incorporated in the "Four-Power
Declaration," proposed by the United States and signed by the United
States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China.
It proved difficult to obtain the USSR's consent to include China as
a signatory. The U.S. Government, anxious to raise China's morale-then
at a low ebb-and to secure the recognition of China's status as one of
the big four, was insistent. Only through the per-
[299]
sistent efforts of Secretary Hull, acting on President
Roosevelt's instructions, was the Soviet delegation finally won over to
accepting China as one of the big four signatories.70
The declaration provided for unanimity on surrender and disarmament terms,
the necessity of establishing an international organization (later to be
known as the United Nations Organization), and agreements in connection
with postwar employment of military forces within the territories of other
states and for postwar regulation of armaments. The Americans, British,
and Russians also agreed to establish a European advisory commission in
London to begin the study of questions connected with the termination of
hostilities in Europe, including the terms of surrender to be imposed upon
the enemy states and the machinery to implement them. In addition, they
decided to establish an advisory council-to include a Russian delegate-for
Italian affairs.71 Thus was the machinery of co-operation among the three
principal Allies to be extended.
In the wake of the conference, decisions on political policy were
made that brought the United States, Great Britain,
and the Soviet Union closer on the Turkish question. The formal meetings
had barely ended when the British and Soviet Foreign Secretaries in Moscow
signed a protocol (on 1 November) embodying a compromise agreement that
the British would make immediate demands on Turkey for air bases and the
two governments would undertake joint action later to bring pressure on
Turkey to come into the war before the end of the year.72
Thereupon, the President reached the decision that the U.S. Government
would join in these efforts, subject to the proviso that British and
American resources that in the opinion of the responsible commanders
were necessary for OVERLORD or for operations' in Italy would not be
committed to the eastern Mediterranean area.73
Perhaps the most encouraging signs were the indications at Moscow that the
Soviet Government wanted to establish friendlier relations with the United
States and Great Britain. The talks among the three Allies had been
conducted and concluded in a generally conciliatory manner. Exemplifying
the favorable atmosphere and undoubtedly contributing to it was the
removal of points of friction in the way of resuming Anglo-American
convoys to the USSR on the northern route. Sorely disappointed when the
northern convoys had
[300]
been postponed in March 1943 and suspended in April, the Russians had
pressed for the reinstatement of the railings. On 21 September Molotov had
gone so far as to call in the British ambassador in Moscow and urgently
request their resumption. The general situation then seemed to the Prime
Minister more favorable. Especially encouraging was the heroic attack of
British midget submarines on the Tirpitz, disabling her and removing her
as an immediate threat to the convoys. On 1 October the Prime Minister had
revealed to Stalin his intention of reinstituting the northern
convoys-planning to sail one convoy a month in November, December,
January, and February, each to consist of approximately thirty-five
ships, British and American. But misunderstandings and irritations had
soon developed over the question of whether his intention was a firm
contract or an "earnest resolve," as well as over his concurrent request
for better treatment of British personnel in the USSR. The Russians had
argued that the Soviet Union was bearing the brunt of the fighting
against Germany, that the Allies were falling seriously behind in their
lend-lease commitments, that the northern route permitted delivery of
armaments to the Eastern Front in the shortest time, and that deliveries
through the ports and by rail in Iran could in no way compensate for
those not delivered on the northern route. During the Moscow Conference,
talks by Eden and Stalin smoothed the irritations and removed the
misunderstandings. In November shipments via the northern route were
reinstituted.74
The Moscow Conference is generally known for its political achievements
and, in fact, ended without reaching outstanding military decisions. This
was more in accord with the President's and Prime Minister's original
anticipation that the Moscow Conference was not one to plan or recommend
military strategy than with Stalin's evident determination that military
strategy be discussed. Nevertheless, the by-products and offshoots of the
meetings at Moscow were to prove of considerable significance in the story
of strategic planning in World War II. Marking the first time since the
outbreak of war that British and U.S. staff officers had met face to face
with Soviet military representatives and discussed strategic plans, the
conference was a landmark in the development of closer collaboration among
the Allied Powers in World War II. The meetings at Moscow laid the
groundwork and helped pave the way for later agreements that finally
linked Anglo-American strategy with Soviet operations against Germany-a
result that was to become apparent only in time. Pointing to an even
broader international military collaboration further in the future was a
by-product of the discussions at Moscow reported by Harriman to General
Marshall on 2 November. This was the confidential assurance given by
Molotov to Harriman that the USSR expected to join in the war against
Japan "at the appropriate time."75 It echoed a concurrent promise made by
Stalin to Secre-
[301]
tary Hull.76 Of immediate significance to the U.S. military
planners, preparing for the final showdown with the British on the
cross-Channel-Mediterranean issue, was the opportunity afforded by the
conference to obtain valuable glimpses of Soviet politico-military
thinking on the projected operations to end the war against Germany.
That preview disclosed both a promise and a potential threat to
furtherance of their own strategic thinking and planning. Encouraged by
Soviet reception of plans for OVERLORD and the Combined Bomber
Offensive, they were alerted to possible dangers to the execution of
their own basic concepts by the expressed Soviet interest in the
Mediterranean and particularly in the eastern Mediterranean. There were
even intimations during the conference-as puzzling as they were
disturbing-that the Russians might be willing to accept Allied
operations in Italy, in which they expressed great interest, as
constituting the second front.77 The conference therefore served the
unexpected purpose of disclosing to the United States planners
unanticipated areas of possible disagreement with the USSR-especially in
connection with the
Mediterranean-that might upset the accepted QUADRANT decisions. Such
signs, added to the more familiar British pressure for Mediterranean
ventures, gave them pause. At the Moscow Conference, as Stimson has
recorded, there were "further alarms" from the Prime Minister.78 Through
Eden, Churchill informed the Russians that a postponement of OVERLORD for
one or two months might be necessary if the Italian campaign did not
progress satisfactorily.79 It was apparent that it was necessary not only
to achieve a final understanding with the British on an integrated
strategic pattern in the war against Germany but with the Russians as
well.
The meeting with the Soviet politico-military delegation, furthermore,
added to the store of American staff experience in international
conference techniques and procedures gathered in dealing with British
teams from Casablanca through QUADRANT. The somewhat painfully acquired
knowledge of the U.S. staff in the "surprise paper" and "agreement in
principle," British model, was extended to include "approval in
principle," USSR version, in the meaning of which the U.S. staff was
initiated at Moscow. The necessity of making thorough staff preparations
and achieving closer coordination with the political head of
state-hammered home to the American staff as lessons of the earlier
conferences -became all the more apparent in order to cope with the
peculiarities of a third ally at subsequent meetings. Past experiences
with the British, as well as the brief but valuable insights into Soviet
[302]
strategic thinking gained at Moscow, were to help prepare the staff to
meet the British and Russians on even terms at the first full-dress,
formal staff conference among the three allies later in
1943
"Fish or Cut Bait"
The British-American pledge to the USSR at the Moscow Conference that a
second front would be launched in the spring of 1944 strengthened the
conviction of the U.S. Army planners in Washington that the decision to
undertake the cross-Channel operation this time must be firmly held.
Faithful adherence to that promise was essential not only in order to
avoid the creation of a strategic stalemate in Europe but also in order to
maintain and strengthen the favorable relations of the "United Nations"
foreshadowed by the accomplishments of the Moscow Conference.80 But, in
probing the implications of current Allied pressures-both British and
Soviet-the Army planners felt uneasy lest the over-all strategic pattern
in the war against Germany as outlined at QUADRANT and the prospective
linking of that pattern with Soviet operations be upset.
The Army planners were particularly alerted to this possibility
through General Deane's warning cables from Moscow. On 9 November
General Deane informed the JCS of his impressions that the Russians
might attach "less importance to Overlord than heretofore"-as indicated by their acceptance at the
Moscow Conference that OVERLORD take place in 1944 without pressing for an
advance in the date.81 The Soviet desire to get Turkey and Sweden into the
war and concern over British-American pressure in Italy seemed to indicate
that the USSR was now more interested in immediate measures than in a
second front. Deane warned the JCS that the Americans might be confronted
at the next international conference with a demand that further action be
undertaken in the Mediterranean immediately, for example, increased
pressure in Italy and some operation in the Balkans for the purpose of
drawing off German strength from the Eastern Front. The Russians might
even urge some delay in OVERLORD if more immediate results thereby became
possible. In his opinion, the Russians particularly wanted to end the war
quickly and were now confident of their ability to do so. General Deane
also relayed Mr. Harriman's impression that the Russians were as keen as
ever about the second front. But, Deane stated, Harriman agreed with him
that the choice between OVERLORD In the spring of 1944 and more immediate
assistance elsewhere would be a very difficult decision for the USSR to
make.
Two days later General Deane confirmed these impressions in a message to
the War Department.82 He informed General Marshall that, in a talk with
Marshal Voroshilov that day, the Soviet official had stated that the
Germans had moved eleven divisions to the Eastern Front in the previous
forty days-five
[303]
from France, four from the Balkans, and two from Italy. He repeated Soviet
dissatisfaction, earlier voiced by Molotov and reported to Washington,
over insufficient Allied pressure in Italy to prevent the Germans from
moving divisions to the Eastern Front. General Deane reported that he had
given the American side of the story-the narrow front, terrain obstacles,
the landing craft bottleneck, and so forth. British-American pressure in
Italy would be an issue at the next meeting with the USSR, General Deane
advised. While Voroshilov and other Soviet officials seemed content to
wait until next year for OVERLORD, they were insistent that more be done
immediately to relieve pressure on the Soviet front.
Within the War Department, the Army planners studied these warning
signals and sought to prepare the military case to counter the potential
threat to basic United States strategic concepts.83 The Army planners
doubted that any British-American operations that could be undertaken in
the Mediterranean before spring-in addition to those currently
planned-would be on a large enough scale to force the Germans to
withdraw forces from the Eastern Front. An increased effort in the
Mediterranean might take one of the following forms: more divisions in
the line in Italy; an assault on the Adriatic coast of the Balkans; an amphibious
assault on the Aegean islands; or operations through Turkey. These
possibilities were ruled out largely because of logistical considerations
and because initiation of any of them would result in delaying OVERLORD.
The planners pointed to a survey of logistical factors involved, which
revealed that additional forces could not be used effectively in the
Mediterranean until more bases were captured and additional ports were
opened. A decision to put greater stress on Mediterranean operations would
probably accelerate those operations before the target date to OVERLORD
and might possibly even prevent the Germans from moving more divisions to
the Eastern Front, but, in contrast with OVERLORD, would yield only slight
results in the long run. To put increased emphasis on the Mediterranean,
furthermore, would mean stopping the buildup in the United Kingdom and
would enable the Germans to move divisions from northwest Europe to the
Eastern Front. The Army planners concluded that the pressure of the
British for increased emphasis on the Mediterranean was "becoming very
hard to resist." Should the British receive Soviet support for their
projects, it would probably be most difficult not to yield. The Russians
must, therefore, be clearly informed of the choice before them. They would
have to choose between a decision to undertake a major and decisive
military offensive in the following spring or to proceed immediately with
a series of indecisive efforts in the Balkan-eastern Mediterranean area.
Strength and materiel for such efforts would have to be withdrawn from allo-
[304]
cations to OVERLORD.84 The Russians, who were not faced with the necessity
of conducting amphibious operations, must be made to understand the
difficulties and demands inherent in those undertakings. The planners
warned that the discussions at the next conference might even reach the
point of calling for a firm decision either to continue with OVERLORD as
then planned or to accede to the Soviet demands and establish the second
front in the Mediterranean.
The Army planners concluded that the British and the Russians both
must be made to realize that the success of OVERLORD was vitally
dependent on a number of factors-continuation of pressure against the
Axis in Europe in the Mediterranean and on the Eastern Front;
continuation of the Combined Bomber Offensive; and retention of all
resources then allotted to OVERLORD for that operation, with the
possibility of having to add to them.85 The Russians and British must
recognize, therefore, that the price of immediate aid on a relatively
small scale would be cancellation of the decisive operation in the
spring of 1944. The disturbing possibility remained that even such
arguments at the next conference might not put an end to British and
Russian demands for increased pressure in the Mediterranean at the
expense Of OVERLORD. Continued insistence, in the opinion of the
planners, would indicate that the Russians and the British firmly
believed that, with
additional pressure in the Mediterranean coupled with the Soviet advance,
a cross-Channel Operation of the RANKIN C variety would suffice.86
In that event, the planners argued, American resources released by the
cancellation Of OVERLORD should be allocated in part to the United
Kingdom to execute RANKIN, and in part to the Mediterranean for
operations in Italy and for minor undertakings in the Balkans. The
remainder -in the familiar vein of the "Pacific Alternative"
argument-should be diverted to the Pacific to hasten the defeat of
Japan.87
By early November 1943 the Army planners preparing for the full-dress,
formal conference with Great Britain and the Soviet Union believed
themselves to be faced with a fundamental dilemma. Anxious as ever to end
the war in Europe as quickly as possible, they had continued to put their
faith in a major cross-Channel operation. For the same reasons they had
remained opposed to strikes at the "soft underbelly" of Europe-to them a
war of attrition. QUADRANT had given an acceptable formula-for which they
had been searching since the diversion from BOLERO for retaining the
primacy of a cross-Channel operation-OVERLORD-and weaving the Mediterranean
and Combined Bomber Offensive into its support. Nevertheless, the complete
resolution of the cross-Channel versus Mediterranean debate and the end of
the spar-
[305]
ring with the British over that issue had not followed in the, fall
of 1943. Signs of Soviet, as well as British, support for immediate
Mediterranean ventures threatened not only to upset the QUADRANT pattern
but also to reopen the whole problem of European strategy. It had become
apparent to the Army planners, in probing the subsequent course of the
USSR in the European war, that they were still faced with imponderables.
As one of the Army planners put it, ". . . the Russians, due to their
successes, are a bigger question mark than ever."88
Army planners could take a measure of comfort from the fact that
through the Moscow Conference the areas of possible agreement and
disagreement with the USSR-as well as with Great Britain -had become
more clearly defined. But the fundamental problem remained of drawing
the Allied Powers firmly together in support of the cross-Channel
operation and keeping other operations subsidiary. Basic Army views on
overall strategy and on the wasteful effects of past diversions from
agreements reached convinced the planners that a final decision on
European strategy with the British vas long overdue. The war with
Germany was lengthening, and the three major Allied Powers had still not
completely agreed on European strategy or taken basic measures to
integrate their efforts in support of it. The lack of a definitive
decision in the conflict against Germany, moreover, not only was holding
up the progress of the war in Europe but was also threatening to
postpone the defeat of the other major enemy, Japan. "The time has now
arrived," concluded the planners, "when further indecision, evasion, and
undermining of agreements cannot be borne. In plain American words, the
talking stage is over and the time has arrived to ' fish or cut bait.' "89
[306]
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