Endnotes for Chapter I

Endnotes for Chapter I

1 General Brooke had commanded the British 2 Corps in France in 1940; he became commander of the British Home Forces in 1940 and Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1941. Admiral Pound was named First Sea Lord and chief of the British naval staff in May 1939 and became Admiral of the Fleet in July 1939. Air Chief Marshal Portal had served on the Air Council and as Air Officer, Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command; he was appointed Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force, in October 1940.

2 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 662ff.

3 (1) Report by JIC Sub-committee (Br), S Dec 42, title: German Strategy in 1941. (2) Comments by G-2 WDGS, on Br JIC paper-German Strategy, 1943, n. d. Both in Casablanca Books, Vol. I (1 May 43), Exec 6.

4 (1) Msg, Prime Minister to President, 18 Nov 42, No. 195. (No copy in WD files.) This message was circulated as JCS 153, 18 Nov 42, title: Plans and Operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Near East. (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 674.

5 For a description of the American staff preparations, see: (1) Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 215-17; and (2) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Ch. XVII.

6 Min, 55th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.

7 Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.

8 GYMNAST was the code name for an operation against North Africa under British and American consideration in late 1941 and early 1942.

9 (1) Min, 55th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43. (2) Min, 58th mtg CCS. 16 Jan 43. (3) Min, 60th mtg CCS, 18 Jan 43.

10 (1) Min, 57th mtg CCS, 15 Jan 43. (2) Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.

11 (1) Min, 2d Anfa mtg, 18 Jan 43, Official Casablanca Conf Book. (2) Gordon Harrison, Cross Channel Attack, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 41.

12 (1) Msg, Prime Minister to President, 18 Nov 42, No. 195. The message refers to a Presidential message about Mediterranean possibilities. (2) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 676. (3) See also Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 425.

13 Min, 2d Anfa mtg, 18 Jan 43, Official Casablanca Conf Book.

14 (1) Min, sp mtg JCS and President, 16 Jan 13. Official Casablanca Conf Book. (2) Min, 52d mtg JCS, 16 Jan 43.

15 For references to internal British divergences see: (1) min, sp mtg JCS and President, 15 Jan 43, Official Casablanca Conf Book; and (2) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 678.

For a discussion of Mediterranean alternatives in Allied strategy and the final compromise on Sicily at Casablanca, see H. M. Smyth, The Sicilian Campaign and the Surrender of Italy, MS, Ch. I, OCMH files.

16 For the summary of Marshall's arguments, see especially: (1) min, 2d Anfa mtg, 18 Jan 43, Official Casablanca Conf Book; (2) min, Goth mtg CCS, 18 Jan 43; (3) min, sp mtg JCS and President, 15 Jan 43, Official Casablanca Conf Book; and (4) min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.

17 (1) Min, Goth mtg CCS, 18 Jan 43. (2) Min, 2d Anfa mtg, 18 Jan 43. (3) Min, 55th mtg JCS, Jan 43. (4) Min, 56th mtg JCS, 20 Jan 43. (5) History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MS, Sec. II B, Procurement and Allocation of Material Means, Pt. III, Sharing With Allies: Pangs of Coalition Warfare, Ch. IV, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Aid to Russia, 1942-43," by Capt Ernesto Giusti.

18 See Ch. XIII, below.

19 CCS 170/2, 23 Jan 43, title: Final Rpt to the President and Prime Minister Summarizing Decisions by the CCS. See also min, 56th mtg JCS, 20

Jan 43.

20 (1) CCS 155/1, 19 Jan 43, title: Conduct of the War in 1943- (2) 170/2. 23 Jan 43, title: Final Rpt to the President and Prime Minister Summarizing. Decisions by the CCS. (3) Min, 66th mtg CCS, 22 Jan 43.

21 CCS 169, 22 Jan 43, title: Organization of Command, Control, Planning and Training for Cross-Channel Operations.

22 Out of these tentative beginnings was to come the COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate) ) staff, which wrote the OVERLORD plan and became the nucleus of SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force). See Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 4445.

23 On the basis of the calculations of the shipping experts, it was estimated that the rate of troop build-up in the United Kingdom for 1943 could reach 80,000 in the first quarter, 169,000 in the second 375,000 in the third, and 359,000 in the fourth -a total of 983,000. The grand total of accumulated strength in the United Kingdom was estimated at 1,118,000 by 31 December 1943. CCS 172, 22 Jan 43, title: Shipping Capabilities for Bolero Buildup.

24 Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.

25 Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 41.

26 A full discussion of AWPD-42, essentially a reaffirmation of AWPD-42 is contained in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, II, Europe-TORCH to POINTBLANK-August 1942 to December 1943 (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1949) hereafter cited as Craven and Cate, AAF II), 27779, 288-90, 292-93, 301.

27 (1) CCS 155/1,19 Jan 43, title: Conduct of the War in 1943. (2) See also Craven and Cate, AAF II, 301.

28 CCS 166/1/D, 21 Jan 43, title: The Bomber Offensive From the United Kingdom.

29 Min, 65th mtg CCS, 21 Jan 43.

30 For a discussion of area versus precision bombing, see Craven and Cate, AAF II, 212-13, 227-29, 296-302.

31 Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp. 261, 375, 393.

In January 1942 Faker had organized the VIII Bomber Command in England, and in December 1942 he became Commanding General, Eighth Air Force.

32 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 678-80.

33 (1) Min, 56th mtg JCS, 20 Jan 43. (2) Min, 65th mtg CCS, 21 Jan 43.

34 The summary of JCS views was contained in JCS 167/2, 23 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for 1943, circulated as CCS 135 on 26 Dec 42 for consideration of the CCS. The JCS paper followed largely the line of thought developed in joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) studies. See: (1) JSSC 1, 11 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for 1943; (2) JCS 167, 11 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for 1943; and (3) JCS 167/1, 20 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for 1943.

35 Min, 49th mtg JCS, 5 Jan 43.

36 CCS 135/2, 3 Jan 43, title: American-British Strategy in 1943. The paper contains a memo by British Chiefs of Staff.

37 Min, ,6th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.

38 Min, 55th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.

39 Min, 59th mtg CCS, 17 Jan 43.

40 Min, 56th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.

41 Min, 2d Anfa mtg, 18 Jan 43, Official Casablanca Conf Book.

42 Min, 56th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.

43 CCS 153, 17 Jan 43, title: Situation To Be Created in the Eastern Theater (Pacific and Burma) in 1943.

44 CCS 153/1, 17 Jan 43, title: Situation To Be Created in Eastern Theater.

45 Min, 60th mtg CCS, 18 Jan .43.

46 For a summary of the discussion on Pacific strategy at the conference, see John Miller, jr., "The Casablanca Conference and Pacific Strategy, "Military Affairs, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (Winter 1949).

47 Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.

48 CCS 135, 26 Dec 42, title: Strategic Concept for 1943 .

49 Min, 55th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.

50 Min, 51st mtg JCS, 14 Jan 43.

51 (1) Min, 55th mtg CCS , 14 Jan 43.(2) Min, 56th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.

52 Min, mtg JCS and President, 16 Jan 43.

53 Min, 59th mtg CCS, 17 Jan 43.

54 See Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington Government Printing Office, 1953), Ch. VII, which contains a brief discussion of the issues relating to the CBI theater before and during Casablanca.

55 Min, 60th mtg, CCS18 Jan 43.

56 Min, 2d Anfa mtg, 18 Jan 43, Official Casablanca Conf Book.

57 (1) Min, 2d Anfa mtg , 18 Jan 43, Official Casablanca Conf Book. (2) Min, 54th mtg JCS, 18 Jan 43. (3) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 693.

58 For Casablanca decisions pertaining to the Far East, see especially: (1) CCS 155/1, 19 Jan 43, title: Conduct of the War in 1943; and (2) CCS 170/2, 23 Jan 43, title: Final Rpt to the President and Prime Minister Summarizing Decisions by the CCS.

59 General MacArthur had served as Chief of Staff in 1930-35 and then had become Military Advisor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines. In July 1941 he was appointed Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East. In April 1942 he was ordered from the Philippines to Australia and became Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.

60 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 686-87 .

61 General Somervell had been Assistant Chief of

Staff, G-4, in 1941 and the following year became Commanding General, Services of Supply, predecessor of Army Service Forces.

62 Pers ltr, Brig Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer to Gen Handy, 22 Jan 43, Paper 5, Item la, Exec 3.

63 (1) Min, 67th mtg CCS, 22 Jan 43. (2) CCS 75/3. 22 Jan 43, title: System of Comd for Combined U.S.-British Operations.

64 The London Times, January 27, 1943.

65 In late 1942 a State Department subcommittee on security problems, which included Army and Navy representatives, had come to the conclusion that unconditional surrender should be imposed upon Germany and Japan, though negotiations might be carried on with Italy. Norman Davis, chairman of the subcommittee, informally imparted the early conclusions of this group to the President, but the subcommittee never made a formal recommendation. The effect of the informal recommendation on the President's thinking and announcement is a moot point. See Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation: 1939-1945, General Foreign Policy Series 15, released February 1950 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 127.

66 For a description of the background of the President's announcement, see: Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 695-97, 972-74; and Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 68.t-88. Apparently the only body that discussed the unconditional surrender policy formally at the time of Casablanca was the British War Cabinet. For a provocative discussion, based largely upon circumstantial evidence, of the background of the enunciation of the concept, see Guenther Moltmann, "Die Genesis der Unconditional-Surrender Forderung,"in Wehrwissenschlaftliche Rundschau, Vols. 3 and 4 (March and April 1956). The postwar debate over unconditional surrender may be traced in a number of accounts. For arguments against the concept see: (1) J. F. C. Fuller, "The Lost Peace: An Analysis of the European Strategy of World War II," Army Ordnance, XXXI, No. 161 (March-April 1947), 413-16: (2) Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp.14ff.; (3) Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, pp. 123, 166, 382, 477, 549-51, 713-14; (4) Russell Grenfell, Unconditional Hatred (New York, Devin-Adair Company, 1953), pp, 204, 240-42. For more favorably inclined accounts see: (1) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 685, 688-90; (2) Wallace Carroll, Persuade or Perish (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), pp. 306ff; (3) Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Wilmot's War or Churchill Was Right," in The Reporter, Vol. 6, No. 9 (April 29, 1952), pp. 38-39; (4) John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, VI, October 1944-August 1945 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), 4-6.

67 Actually the Joint Board had recommended as a national objective the eventual restoration of the balance of power in Europe and Asia in its report to the President on the Victory Program in September 1941. See Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, p. 6on.

68 In May 1942-less than eight months before the Casablanca Conference-President Roosevelt had intervened in Anglo-American treaty negotiations to oppose a guarantee of territorial concessions to the Soviet Union, even though Churchill had indicated his willingness to accede to the Soviet desire. See Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, The Macmillan Company,1948), 2 vols., II, 1170-74. See also Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1950) Ch. V, "The Decision to Postpone Political and Territorial Decisions until after the War."

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