Endnotes for Chapter XI
1 (1) CCS 304, 10 Aug 43, title: Operation "OVERLORD"-Outline Plan. (2)
Min, 108th mtg CCC, 15 Aug 43.
2 (1) Min, 102d mtg CCS, 16 Jul 43. (2) Memo, Strong, ACofS G-2, for CofS,
15 Jul 43, sub: "HUSKY" Exploitation, with SS 57/2 in ABC 381 SS Papers,
Nos. 2-95 (7 Jan 43). (3) BIGOT-AVALANCHE msg, CinC, Algiers, to AGWAR for
CCS and to USFOR for Br COS, 16 Aug 43, CM-IN 11966 (info copy O PD).
3 (1) BIGOT-AVALANCHE msg, CinC, Algiers, to AGWAR for CCS and to USFOR for Br COS, 16 Aug 43, CM-IN 11966. (2) BIGOT
msg, Gen Smith (sgd Eisenhower) to Gen Whiteley, 17 Aug 43, CM-IN 12560
(action copy OPD). Both msgs were relayed to the conferees at Quebec.
4 For a discussion of the planning and execution of the invasion of Italy,
especially as seen from the point of view of headquarters and commands in
the theater, see: (1) Eisenhower rpt, Italian Campaign; and (2)
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, Chs. 10 and 12; (3) Martin Blumenson,
Salerno to Cassino, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II; and (4) Smyth, Sicilian Campaign and the Surrender of
Italy.
5 (1) Msg, Eisenhower to AGWAR for CCS and to USFOR for Br COS, 3 Sep 43, NAF 354, CM-IN 2225. (2) Armistice Terms With Italy,
3 Sep 43, Fairfield
Camp, with CCS Memo for Info 138 in ABC 381 Italy-Arm-Surr (5-9-43), 1-A.
(3) CCS Memo for Info 138, 11 Sept 43, title: Armistice Terms With Italy.
The dramatic story of. the complicated surrender negotiations between
Allied and Italian representatives, with secret rendezvous in Lisbon,
Sicily, and Italy, disguises, clandestine channels of communications, and
hurried air flights often under the noses of the Germans, is described in
Smyth, Sicilian Campaign and the Surrender of Italy.
6
(1) BIGOT-AVALANCHE msg, CinC for CCS and to USFOR for Br COS, 1 Sep 43,
NAF 347, CM-IN 524. (2) Msg, Roosevelt and Prime Minister to Eisenhower, 2
Sep 43, No. 6704, with Tab 65, Item 5, Exec 2. (3) Memo, Deane, Secy JCS,
for OPD, 2 Sep 43, no sub, with Tab 65, Item 5, Exec 2.
7 See Smyth, Sicilian Campaign and the Surrender of Italy, Ch. IX. See
also pp. 260-61, below.
8 (1) Msg, Russell sgd Eisenhower to Handy, 4 Sep 43, CM-IN 3493. (2)
BIGOT msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Sep 43, CM-IN 3986 (action OPD).
9 OPD brief, title: Notes . . . 114th mtg JCS, 14 Sep 43, Temporary
Retention of Three Wellington Squadrons for "AVALANCHE" (CCS 346), with
CCS 346 in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May 43), II.
10 Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower or Smith, 4 Sep 43, CM-OUT
1993.
11 OPD draft memo, CofS for President, 28 Sep 43, no sub, OPD 381 ETO,
113.
12 The campaign in Italy was to last twenty months-from 3 September
1943 until 20 May 1945. The fall of Rome did not actually take place until 4
June 1944, two days before the Allies landed in Normandy. The U.S. Fifth and
British Eighth Armies were to advance slowly up the length of the country
until they eventually burst through the final barriers of the Apennines and
overflowed into the Po Valley and to the Brenner Pass. As one speaker at the
Army and Navy Staff College later characterized it, the Italian campaign,
"for bitter fighting, for continued uphill going, and for number of days per
man in action, created a record no one is particularly anxious to surpass."
See speech, "The Landing at Salerno" (about 1 Aug 45], with CPS
105 in ABC 384 Italy, 9 Nov 43.
13 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 190.
For discussions of the planning and operations for the Italian campaign,
see: (1) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, Chs. 10 and 12; (2)
Eisenhower rpt, Italian Campaign; and (3) Sidney T. Mathews and John E.
Westover, The Campaign in Southern Italy, a volume in preparation for the
series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
14 For an example of the reasoning of the U.S. Army planners, see SS
study [Oct 43], title: Major and Limited Operations in the Balkans via
Eastern Mediterranean, Tab 172 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160-95 (7 Jan 43).
15 (1) OPD Diary, 29 Aug 43. (2) OPD draft memo, Marshall for CG's, AGF,
AAF, ASF, USAFIME, USAFICA, Africa-ME Wing, ATC (late Aug 43), sub: Comd
in the Middle East Central African Theater, with Paper 1 in ABC 381 Middle
East (3-10-42), 1-B. (3) D/F, OPD for TAG [through SGS], 1 Sep 43, sub:
Transmittal of Ltr of Instrs and incl OPD to TAG for Royce, 1 Sep 43, sub:
Ltr of Instrs, WDCSA Middle East (Secret). The D/F contains the boundaries
of the enlarged USAFIME. (4) OPD Diary, 3 Sep 43.
16 Craven and Cate,. AAF II, 495-96, 642-43. On 16 October 1943 General
Brereton assumed command of the Ninth Air Force newly located in the
United Kingdom.
17 Ltr of Instrs, CofS for Royce, Cairo, 4 Sep 43, with JCS Memo 29 in ABC
381 Middle East (3-10-42), 1-A.
Though the Persian Gulf Supply Command was to remain under his command,
Royce was relieved of responsibility for supply to the USSR. Also excepted
from his control were Maj. Gen. Clarence S. Ridley's mission to improve
the efficiency of the Iranian Army, Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf's mission
to reorganize the Iranian Gendarmerie, and certain activities in connection
with Air Transport Command operations.
18 Min, special mtg JCS, 9 Sep 43.
19 (1) Annex to min, mtg CCS with President and Prime Minister at White
House, 9 Sep 43, ABC 334 CCS mtgs (1-23-42), 5. (2) The Prime Minister's
memo for the President is quoted in full in Churchill, Closing the
Ring, pp. 134-37.
20 Memo, Hull, Acting ACofS OPD, for CofS, 9 Sep 43, no sub, with Paper 43
in ABC 381 (9-25-41), VII.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Min, sp mtg JCS, 9 Sep 43.
24 Min, Min, mtg CCS with President and Prime Minister at White House,
9 Sep 43, ABC 334 CCS mtgs (1-23-42), 5.
25 (1) CCS 341/2, 10 Sep 43, title: Review of Strategic Situation in
the Light of the Italian Collapse. (2) Min,
118th mtg CCS, 10 Sep 43.
26 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 205.
27 In the case of eastern
Mediterranean operations, the Army planners in Washington evidently fell
behind in their efforts to keep up with the global war. On 30 September
1943, Colonel Roberts, chief of the Strategy and Policy Group, OPD, wrote to Brigadier McNair of the British Joint
Staff Mission in Washington: "Recently we have seen and heard references
to operations against the island of Rhodes, but so far we have received
nothing official." He requested Brigadier McNair to ascertain the status
of the operations in order that he, Roberts, might keep his chief, General
Handy, advised. See ltr, Col Roberts to Brigadier McNair, 30 Sep 43,
before CCS 365 in ABC 384 Mediterranean (3 Oct 43).
28 For the Prime Minister's position on the Aegean operations, see
Churchill, Closing the Ring, Ch. 12, and Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p.
191.
For an informative, detailed discussion of British plans and action in the
Aegean in the period August-November 1943, see Ehrman, Grand Strategy, V,
88-105.
29 Msg, Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt, 7 Oct 43, quoted in
Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 210-11.
30 CCS 365, 3 Oct 43, title: Future Operations in the Eastern
Mediterranean. CCS 365 is a memo by the British Chiefs of Staff.
31 Msg, Br COS to Br Joint Staff Mission, 1 Oct 43, with Tab 154 in ABC
381 SS Papers, Nos. 13159 (7 Jan 43). Wilson's statement of his views grew
out of discussion between himself, the British Chiefs of Staff, and Allied
Force Headquarters concerning subsequent operations in the Middle East.
32
BIGOT-OVERLORD msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 Oct 43, CM-IN 2303
(action OPD).
33 BIGOT-OVERLORD msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 Oct 43, CM-IN 1703.
34 CCS 365/2, 5 Oct 45, title: Future Operations in the Eastern
.Mediterranean.
35 (1) Memo [OPD] for CofS, 5 Oct 43, sub: Future Operations in the
Eastern Mediterranean. with Tab 154 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 131-59 (7
Jan 43). (2) OPD brief, title: Notes . . . 117th mtg JCS, 5 Oct 43, Future
Operations in the Mediterranean (CCS 365), with Tab 154 in ABC 381 SS
Papers, Nos. 131-59 (7 Jan 43). OPD action officer was P. W. C. (Lt. Col.
Paul W. Caraway) of the Strategy and Policy Group. (3) OPD brief, title:
Notes . . . 84th mtg CPS, 7 Oct 43, Future Operations in the Eastern
Mediterranean (CCS 365), with CCS 365 in ABC 384 Mediterranean, 3 Oct 43.
The OPD action officer was again Colonel Caraway.
36 OPD brief, title: Notes . . . 84th mtg CPS, 7 Oct 43, Future Operations
in the Eastern Mediterranean (CCS 365), with CCS 365 in ABC 384
Mediterranean (3 Oct 43).
37 Min, 117th mtg JCS, 5 Oct 43.
38 The British Chiefs of Staff had informed General Eisenhower in a
message of 1 October (repeated to the Commander in Chief, Middle East) that
plans for the Rhodes operation should be based on the assumption that two LST's from General Eisenhower's theater were to be made available to
the Middle East. Admiral King took the position that the British Chiefs of
Staff apparently devised a "rubber stamp approval" by the JCS for what
appeared to be a case of unilateral action. See min, 117th mtg JCS, 5 Oct
43.
39 Min, 117th mtg JCS, 5 Oct 43.
40 These conclusions were forwarded by the JCS to the CCS in CCS 365/1, 6
Oct 43, title: Future Operations in .the Mediterranean.
41 (1) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower, 7 Oct 43, CM-OUT
3071. The message contained the President's communication of the same day
to the Prime Minister. (2) Memo, Col Ham. mond, GS, for Col William T.
Sexton, 7 Oct 43, no sub, with Tab 45, Item 2, Exec 2.
42 Memo, Marshall fox Leahy, 8 Oct 43, no sub. Item 64, Exec 10. The memo
contains a draft message, evidently drawn up in the Office of Chief of
Staff, for a proposed reply by the President to the Prime Minister's
suggestion for a conference at General Eisenhower's headquarters. This
draft may have influenced the White House reply to Mr. Churchill via Mr.
Hopkins.
43 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. ,765.
44 Min, 112th mtg CCS, 8 Oct 43.
45 Msg, CinC AFHQ to AGWAR for CCS and to USFOR for Br COS, 9 Oct 43, NAF
384, CM-IN 5833.
46 (1) SS study [about 12 Oct 43], title: Operation ACCOLADE. (2) Memo,
Roberts, Actg Chief S&P Gp OPD, for ACofS OPD, 12 Oct 43, sub: ACCOLADE.
Both in Tab 151 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos.
131-59 (7 Jan 43).
47 (1) CPS 365/5, 14 Oct 43, title: Future Operations in the Eastern
Mediterranean. (2) Min, 123d mtg; CCS, 15 Oct 43.
48 Msg, Former Naval Person to the President [10 Oct 43], Item 63b, Exec
10. The message is quoted in full in Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp.
218-19.
49 Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 218-20, 224-25.
50 Memo, Col Harold D. Kehm for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 20 Sep 43, no sub,
Paper 62, Book 12, Exec 9.
War Department records reveal occasional flashes of such apparent
differences in views between the Prime Minister and his military
staff-differences belied by the United front presented by the British in
military negotiations with the United States. Such a difference apparently
had occurred in connection with the previous British decisions to
undertake operations in the Dodecanese. General Barker, Deputy COSSAC,
reported to General Handy in mid-November 1943 that Sir Alan Brooke had
informed General Morgan, COSSAC, that the recent Dodecanese operations had
been undertaken on the instructions of the Prime Minister and contrary to
advice given by his military staff. Recalling his previous reference to
the people subjected to the "Prime Minister's sunlamp," General Barker
concluded that "it would appear that even those chaps rebel at times." See
pers ltr, Barker, Deputy COSSAC, for Handy, 17 Nov 43, Paper 20, Folder 3,
Item 15, Exec 5.
51 For the above summary of the War Department arguments on Balkan-eastern
Mediterranean operations, see: (1) SS study [Oct 43], title: Major and
Limited Operations in the Balkans via Eastern Mediterranean, Tab 172, ABC
381 SS Papers, Nos.160-95 (7 Jan 43); (2) OPD brief of Operations in the
Balkans, 2 Nov 43, with Tab 171, ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160-95 (7 Jan
43); (3) OPD brief, title: Notes . . . 121st mtg JCS, 2 Nov 43, United
Nations Strategy in the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean Region (JCS 558),
with JCS 558 in ABC 381 Balkan-Mediterranean (1 Nov 43); and (4) SS study,
3 Nov 43, title: The Unsuitability of the Balkans as an Area for Major or
Decisive Operations, with Tab 172 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160-95 (7 Jan
43). The last study here listed was the basis of a memo from the War
Department to Secretary of War. See memo (WD for SW, about 3 Nov 43], sub:
Balkan Operations, Paper 65, Book 13, Exec 9.
52 OKH, Organisations Abteilung Schematische Kriegsgliederung, 17 Jul
43
and 15 Oct 43, copies in OCMH files.
53 Magna E. Bauer, Shifting of German Units Before and After Nettuno
Landings . . . , MS, OCMH files, p. 28.
54 (1) Rpt of Sp Subcommittee, Cols Bessell and Lindsay, 25 Jul 43, sub:
Conduct of the War, with Tab SS 90 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2-95 (7 Jan
43). (2) JPS 242 /1, 5 Aug 43, title: Strategic Concept for the Defeat of
the Axis in Europe. JPS 242/1, a memo by Army members of JPS, was
circulated by JPS to JCS as JCS 441 /1.
55 The British were committed to the extent of the HARDIHOOD agreements to
furnish forces for the security of Turkey. According to the HARDIHOOD
agreement, into which the British had entered with the Turks in April
1943, a considerable number of air and ground forces were to be provided
by the British to assist in Turkey's defense if Turkey should enter the
war. The United States continued to the end of 1943 to have no such direct
commitment to Turkey. See: (1) SS 165/1, 4 Nov 43, title: Turkish
Participation in the War, ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160-95 (7 Jan 43); and
(2) memo, Col Joseph J. Billo, Chief SS, for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 24 Dec 43,
sub: Notes on Radiogram COS (W) 996 from Br COS to AFHQ, Tab 204 in ABC
381 SS Papers, Nos. 196-213 (7 Jan 43).
56 (1) JPS 231, 26 Jul 43, title: Operations in the European-Mediterranean
Area, 1943-44, Adequacy Of TRIDENT Strategy. JPS 231 is a report by JWPC.
(2) JPS 242, 5 Aug 43, title: Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis
in Europe. JPS 242 was prepared by JWPC and submitted by JPS to JCS as JCS
444. The JWPC also called for the political and economic policy toward
Spain to be characterized henceforth by sternness rather than by
conciliation. In the case of Spain, benevolent neutrality was to include the
redistribution of its armed forces so as to threaten the Pyrenees and not,
as at the time, the Allied lines of communication.
57 Min, 71st mtg CPS, 13 Aug 43.
58 (1) CCS 303, 9 Aug 43, title:
Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe. CCS 303 is a memo
by U.S. JCS to CCS. (2) Min, 113th mtg CCS, 20 Aug 43. (3) CCS 322, 20 Aug
43, title: Policy Towards Turkey. CCS 322 is a memo by Br COS.
59 CCS 322/ 1, 30 Aug 43, title: Policy Towards Turkey.
60 (1) Min, 121st mtg JCS, 2 Nov 43. (2) JCS 558, title: United Nations'
Strategy in the Balkan-Eastern Mediterranean Region. (3) Memo for rcd, 4
Nov 43, appended to memo, Col Andrew J. McFarland, Deputy Secy JCS, for
Secy JSSC, 3 Nov 43, same sub, with JCS 588 in ABC 381
Balkan-Mediterranean Area (1 Nov 43). (4) Memo, Leahy (for JCS) for
President, 9 Nov 43, same sub, Paper l0l, Book 13, Exec 9. (5) JCS 558/2,
9 Nov 43, same sub. (6) JPS 384, 13 Nov 43, title: Action That May Be
Necessary Should Turkey Enter the War.
61 (1) CCS 379, 26 Oct 43, title: Operations in the Mediterranean. CGS 379
contains views of the Br COS. (2) JCS 584, 28 Oct 43, same title. JCS 584
is a JPS report. (3) Memo, CofS for President, 8 Nov 43, sub: Conduct of
the European War, with Tab go in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 2-95 (7 Jan 43).
The memo was evidently drafted by the OPD Strategy Section for the
signature of the Chief of Staff. (4) Memo, OPD for CofS, 10 Nov 43, sub:
Msg From General Deane With Reference to Possible Russian Desire for
Increased Activity in the Mediterranean, Tab 181 / 1 in ABC 381 SS Papers,
Nos. 160-95 (7 Jan 43) (5) Min, 123 mtg JCS, 15 Nov 43.
62 Msg, War Cabinet Office to Br Joint Staff Mission, 24 Oct 43, Item 12a,
Exec 5. The Prime Minister asked Field Marshal Dill to give the message to
General Marshall privately.
63 Msg appended to memo, Col W. T. Sexton, SGS, for Comdr R. D. Coleridge,
27 Oct 43, no sub, Item 12a, Exec 5. The memo stated that General Marshall
wished that his message in reply to the Prime Minister's of 24 October be
transmitted to the Prime Minister through British channels.
64 For AFHQ views, see memo, Gen W. B. Smith, CofS Allied Force, for Secy
JCS, 13 Oct 43, no sub, with CCS memo 141 in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May
43), II. See also JCS 531, 14 Oct 43, title: Retention of Certain Units
for Offensive Operations in Italy.
65 OPD brief, title: Notes . . . JCS mtg, 26 Oct 43, Rpt by JSSC on
Retention of Certain Units for Offensive Operations in Italy (JCS 531/2),
Paper 83, Book 13, Exec 9.
66 Memo, McFarland, Deputy Secy JCS for Secy JPS and Secy JSSC, 29 Oct 43,
sub: Retention of Certain Units for Offensive Operations in Italy, with JCS
531 /2 in ABC 322 Italy (14 Oct 43).
67 See min, 126th mtg CCS, 5 Nov 43.
68 (1) Min, 89th mtg CPS, 4 Nov 43. (2) Min, 126th mtg CCS, 5 Nov 43. (3)
Memo, C. H. Donnelly, Secy JPS, for Adm Bieri, USN, Brig Gen Haywood S.
Hansell, Jr., USA, and Capt A. K. Doyle, USN, 6 Nov 43, sub: Operations in
the Mediterranean, with CCS 397/5 in ABC 384 Mediterranean (26 Oct 43).
69 (1) SS 173, 2 Nov 43, title: Operations in the Mediterranean, Tab 173
in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 160-95 (7 Jan 43). (2) Msg, OPD to Maj Gen John
R. Deane, Moscow, 15 Nov 43, CM-OUT 6032. Action officer was "GAL" (Col
Lincoln) of OPD.
For an OPD study of alternative actions against Germany Should OVERLORD be
canceled or indefinitely postponed, see SS 133/4, 4 Nov 43, title: United
Nations Courses of Action in Europe in the Event OVERLORD Is Canceled, Tab
133/4 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 131-59 (7 Jan 43).
70 Min, 126th mtg CCS, 5 Nov 43.
71 The 7,686,000 figure was often rounded off to 7,700,000.
72 Remarks by General McNarney before the Senate Military Affairs
Committee, 15 Sep 43, Exec 9, Book 12.
73 Msg, Marshall to all theater comdrs, 22 Sep 43, CM-OUT 10372-CM-OUT
10389.
74 Memo, Maj Gen Ray E. Porter, G-3, for CofS, 17,Oct 43, sub: Troop Basis,
1944, OPD 320.2, 819.
75 Memo, Tansey for Handy, 2 Nov 43, sub: Troop Bases for All Services for
1944 and Beyond, OPD 320.2, 819.
76 The troop basis authorization of
8,290,993 in May 1945 was intended to cover the actual increments of
strength from mid-1944 onward, which exceeded the 7,700,000 ceiling and
resulted largely from the prolongation of the war in Europe. The actual
strength reached in May 1945 was 8,291,336.
77 (1) (JCS 285/6, 19 Oct 43, title: "OVERLORD" .assault. (2) Paper
"OVERLORD," Tab ETO in Gen Handy's copy of OPD Condensed Information Book,
6 Nov 43, Exec 6. (3) Informal memo, G. A. L. for Hull, 19 Nov 43, no sub,
Paper 119, Book 13, Exec 9.
78 See [OPD] Paper, title: Major Units and Strength of the Army, Nov 43, Tab
Deployment of Divs, in Gen Handy's copy of OPD Condensed Information Book, 6 Nov 43,
Exec 6.
79 See List, Troop Situation NATO [Nov 43], Tab AAF, in Gen Handy's copy
of OPD Condensed Information Book, 6 Nov 43, Exec 6.
80 (1) STM-30, 1 Jan 48. (2) AAF Statistical Digest, 1945.
81 Victory Program Troop Basis, 26 Oct 43, Tab Deployment of Divisions, in
Gen Handy's copy of OPD Condensed Information Book, 6 Nov 43, Exec 6. This
document bears the typed notation, "Approved-By order the Secretary of
War--Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff."
82 (1) [OPD] Paper, ETO, Table-Major Units in the U.K., n.d. (2) [OPD]
Paper, Build-up of Ground Force Major Units in the U.K., n.d. Both Tab ETO,
Gen Handy's copy of OPD Condensed Information Book, 6 Nov 43, Exec 6. AAF
figures are complicated by the many revisions of the Bradley Plan, named
after a report submitted by General Follett Bradley to General Arnold in
late May 1943. This plan, designed to secure maximum strength in June 1944
in the United Kingdom, had been accepted by the War Department by 21
September 1943. According to the revisions in use in early November, by June 1944 104 groups were to be in the United Kingdom. See Craven and Cate,
AAF II, 635-37.
83 A detailed discussion of the build-up of U.S. troops in the United
Kingdom in 1943 is contained in Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, Ch.
III.
84 For exchanges on the dispatch of two additional divisions to the
Mediterranean, see: (1) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 Sep 43, CM-IN 1223,
(action OPD); (2) memo, Col G. A. Lincoln for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 9 Oct 43, sub: Future Availability of Forces in the
Mediterranean, with JPS 195/2 in ABC 381.2 Mediterranean Area, 7 May 43;
(3) memo, Col Connor, Actg Chief North African Sec Theater Gp OPD, fox
Chief Theater GP OPD, 27 Oct 43, sub: Allied Force Troops in Italy and
Priority for Future Build-up; Scheduled Movement of Divs to U.K.;
Scheduled Movement of Landing Craft to U.K. and Troops in North Africa,
Case 262, Book 15, Exec 9; and (4) memo, Caraway for Chief S&P Gp OPD,
1
Nov 43, sub: Forces Available in the Mediterranean and the Middle East,
Tab 154 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 131-59 (7 Jan 43)-
The 85th and 88th Infantry Divisions were shipped from the United States
in December 1943. See Study 12, Hist Sec, ACT, title: The Building and
Training of Infantry Divisions, Table III, p. 29.
85 For the actual intertheater transfer of these four divisions in
November-December 1943, see:
Overseas Troop Basis, Nov 43, and Overseas Troop Basis, Dec 43, Troop Sec
Logistics Gp OPD WDGS, Exec 101; and (2) Order of Battle of the United
States Army in World War II, ETO Div, Office of the Theater Historian,
Paris, France, Dec 45, in OCMH files.
86 For the approval of the AAF proposal on WD, JCS and CCS levels, see: (1)
memo, Kuter, ACofAS Plans, for Roberts, OPD, 9 Oct 43, sub: Plan To Assure
the Most Effective Exploitation of the CBO, with CCS 217 in ABC 381 U.K.
(1-20-43), 1 (General Arnold's memo recommending the buildup of the U.S.
Mediterranean Strategic Air Force is dated 27 Sep 43); (2) min, 118th mtg
JCS, 12 Oct 43; (3) msg (originator OPD), Spaatz to Eisenhower, 14 Oct 43,
CM-OUT 6433; (4) min, 119th mtg JCS, 19 Oct 43; (5) CCS 217/1, 19 Oct 43,
title: Plan To Assure the Most Effective Exploitation of the CBO; (6) min,
124th mtg CCS, 22 Oct 43; and (7) min, 125th mtg CCS, 25 Oct 43.
87 For a full discussion of the establishment of the Fifteenth Air
Force, see Craven and Cate, AAF II, 564-74.
88 Memo, Caraway for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 1 Nov 43, sub: Forces
Available in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Tab 154 in ABC 381 SS
Papers, Nos. 131-59 (7 Jan 43).
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