Endnotes for Chapter XII
1 CCS 387, 3 Nov 43, title: Mediterranean Comd Arrangements. CCS 387 is a
memo by the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff.
2 Min, 126th mtg CCS, 5 Nov 43.
3 Memo, CofS for JCS [about 5 Nov 43], sub: Comd of Br and U.S. Forces
Operating Against Germany, incl to memo, Sexton, SGS, for Secy JCS, 5 Nov
43, same sub, Item 69, Exec 10.
4 Ibid.
Using the same argument as had General Marshall on the close relationship of
Mediterranean and OVERLORD operations, Admiral Leahy suggested placing the
Allied forces in Italy and those for OVERLORD under one supreme commander.
See min, 126th mtg CCS, 5 Nov 43.
5 Memo, Col G. A. Lincoln, Deputy Chief S&P Gp OPD, for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 8
Nov 43, sub: Comments on SS 133/3, Survey of Conditions Prerequisite to
Launching of OVERLORD, Tab 133/3 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 131-59 (7 Jan
43).
6 For the Air Staff's proposals, see memo, Arnold for Marshall, 3 Nov 43,
sub: CCS Air Plan for the Defeat of Germany, with Paper 43 in ABC 381
(9-25-41), VII. Pointing to the additional bases that had become available to
the Allied air forces since QUADRANT and to the overwhelming superiority in
numbers of Allied air forces as compared to the German Air Force (11,800 to
3,000 in western Europe), the AAF urged a re-evaluation of the strategic air
plan against Germany. A U.S. air command should be established to control
operations of U.S. strategic elements based in the United Kingdom (Eighth
Air Force), in Italy (Fifteenth Air Force), and on shuttle missions in the
USSR; RAF and AAF tactical principles and techniques should be re-examined;
and CCS studies should be directed toward establishment of a supreme Allied
air command responsible for execution of the strategic air plan against
Germany, utilizing air bases in the United Kingdom, Italy, and probably the
USSR.
7 Min, 122d mtg JCS, 9 Nov 43.
8 Min, 22d mtg JCS, 9 Nov 43.
As stated at QUADRANT, after allowing for the return of four U.S. and three
British divisions to the United Kingdom, the following forces would be
available in the Mediterranean (including the Middle East) on 1 November
1943: nineteen British, five U.S., and five French (native and Free French),
a total of twenty-nine divisions. Of this number, seven British and two
French divisions were to be required for garrison purposes. The balance,
which were to be operationally available on 1 November 1943, would be twelve
British, five American, and three French native divisions, a total of twenty
divisions. Between 1November 1943 and June 1944, six more French native
divisions were to become operationally available-four for garrison duty in
North Africa and two for operations. By June 1944 there were to be available
in the Mediterranean, under QUADRANT decisions, a total of twenty-two Allied
divisions. See memo, Caraway for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 1 Nov 43, sub: Forces
Available in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Tab 154 in ABC 381 SS
Papers, Nos. 131-
59 (7 Jan 43).
9
For Churchill's views on the proposals to unify OVERLORD and Mediterranean
commands, as relayed to Leahy and Hopkins via Dill, in early November see
Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 304-06.
10 Min, 122d mtg JCS, 9 Nov 43.
11 Memo, Handy, ACofS OPD, for CofS,10 Nov 43, sub: Problem of Over-all
Comd, Paper 4, Folder 3, Item 15, Exec 5.
12 Ibid
13 Ibid
14 See, for example, msgs, Winant for Secy State, 29 and 30 Sep 43, Paper
120, Book 12, Exec 9.
Mrs, Marshall had quietly begun to move their belongings from the Chief of
Staff's quarters at Fort Myer to the Marshall home at Leesburg, Virginia.
Katherine T. Marshall, Together: Annals of an Army Wife (New
York, Tupper and Love, Inc., 1946), pp. 159, 175.
15 Ltr, Gen Pershing to President, 16 Sep 43, Roosevelt Papers,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
16 Ltr, Roosevelt to Pershing, 20 Sep 43, in Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library.
17 (1) Ltr, Stimson to Hopkins, with incl for Roosevelt, 16 Sep 43, no sub,
SW files, White House, 40. (2) See also memo, McCloy for SW, 28 Sep 43, no
sub, SW files, War Plans, 52.
18 (1) Msg, Prime Minister to Hopkins, 26 Sep 43, Hopkins Papers, Franklin
D. Roosevelt Library. Also cited in Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 30102.
(2) Msg, President to Prime Minister, 19 Oct 43, Hopkins Papers, Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library.
For brief discussions on the positions of the President, Prime Minister, and
General Marshall in the summer and early fall of 1943 on the prospective
appointment of Marshall to the OVERLORD command, see: (1) Stimson and Bundy,
On Active Service, pp. 437-41; (2) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 196-97, 207-09;
(3) Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 300-306; (4) Harrison, Cross-Channel
Attack, pp. 112-14; (5) Leahy, I Was There, pp. 190-93; and (6) Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins, PP. 758-65. Sherwood concludes: "In back of Churchill's
objections to the granting of all-inclusive authority to Marshall in the
European war was his indefatigable determination to play his own strategic
hand in the Eastern Mediterranean, the area that was now dearer to his heart
than ever."
19 Memo for rcd, Handy, ACofS OPD [Oct 43], sub: Attached Papers-(1) A Study
of Comd in the European-Mediterranean Theaters; (2) A Proposed Message From
the President to the Prime Minister, OPD 384 TS, 20.
20 For the following summary of War Department proposals, see: (1) memo with
incl, Handy, ACofS OPD, for Marshall, 4 Oct 43, sub: Comdr and System of
Comd for War With Germany, and (2) memo with attached papers, Handy for
Marshall, 5 Oct 43, same sub; both in OPD 384 TS, 15.
21 Incl 1 to memo, Arnold for Handy, 29 Sep 43, sub: Problem Presented by
the Chief of Staff, OPD 384 TS, 15, Tab D.
22 To the reluctance expressed by Army leaders in the War Department
over the possible departure of General Marshall from Washington were added
the voices of Army leaders in the field. Thus after a private conversation
with General Eisenhower in Algiers, General Deane reported to General
Marshall that Eisenhower "expressed a great hope that you would not leave
Washington. His view is that the whole Army regardless of theater looks on
you as its commander." See ltr, Deane, Moscow, for Marshall, 29 Oct 43,
Envelope 3, Item 15, Exec 5.
23 (1) Memo [with incl], Col G. A. Lincoln for Col Gailey, 21 Jan 44, no
sub, OPD 384 TS. (2) Memo for red, Handy, ACofS [Oct 43], sub: Attached
papers-(1) A Study of Comd in the European-Mediterranean Theaters; (2) A
Proposed Message From the President to the Prime Minister, OPD 384 TS, 20.
24 Memo for rcd cited n. 23.
25 For the exchange between the President and the Prime Minister at the end
of October on the delay in making General Marshall available, and in issuing
a joint announcement on the European command, see: (1) msg, Roosevelt to
Former Naval Person, 30 Oct 43, No. 403, Item 63c (2d part), Exec 10; and
(2) msg, Prime
Minister to President, 31 Oct 43, No. 481, Item 63c (2d part), Exec 10.
26 Msg, Prime Minister to Dill for Marshall, 24 Oct 43, Item 12a, Exec
5.
For Marshall's reply, see memo, Sexton for Coleridge, 27 Oct 43, no sub,
Item 12a, Exec 5.
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