Endnotes for Chapter XXIII
1 Min, 1st plenary mtg, OCTAGON, 13 Sep 44.
2 CCS 660/1, 9 Sep 44, title: Prospects of a German Collapse or
Surrender.
3 List, 29 Aug 44, title: Pers To Attend Octant [sic], Item 16, Exec
5.
4 (1) Leahy, I Was There, p. 259. (2) For the British background, see Churchill,
Triumph and Tragedy,
pp.
146-49.
5 Memo, T. T. H. for CofS, no date, sub: Notes for Conf With
President, filed with CCS 681 in ABC 337 (14 Sep 44) 1 .
6 (1) Min, 172d mtg CCS, 12 Sep
44. (2) Min, 1st plenary mtg, OCTAGON,
13 Sep 44, OCTAGON Conf Book. (3) CCS 680/2, 16 Sep 44, title: Rpt to
President and Prime Minister.
7 (1) Min, 172d mtg CCS, m Sep 44. (2) Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 12 Sep
44, OCTAGON-Out 16. (3) CCS 674/1, 12 Sep 44, title: Assumption of Comd
of DRAGOON Forces by SCAEF.
8 (1) CCS 520/6, 14 Sep 44, title: Control of Strategic Bomber Forces
in Europe Following the Establishment of Allied Forces on the Continent.
(2) Graven and Cate, AAF III, 320-22.
9 The reasons behind the President's volte-face are still not
entirely clear. Churchill suggests that by the time of OCTAGON the
President, "evidently convinced by the [U.S. and British] military view,"
decided to accept the southwestern zone. (See Churchill, Triumph
and Tragedy, pp. 509-l0.). In commenting on the draft manuscript of this volume, Admiral Leahy
recalled that the President had told him that "after tedious argument with
Prime Minister Churchill he [Roosevelt] accepted the British contention
that Northwest Germany would be of more value to the future of our friend
and ally England than to the United States of America." Admiral Leahy's
Comments on Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, MS, 16
Jul 56, in OCMH files. The official British historian of grand strategy, John Ehrman,
indicates that the President by OCTAGON was informed of the British
intention to assume responsibility for southeastern Europe and Austria and
of the practicability of supplying U.S. forces in southern Germany via the
Low Countries and northern Germany. Ehrman suggests that these
developments removed the President's objections to the original
agreement. (See John Ehrman, Grand Strategy V, 516.). In view of the President's hitherto stubborn resistance to similar
arguments and proposals, it seems more likely that another factor-the
acceptance of the Morgenthau plan at OCTAGON-may have had greater
influence on the President's decision. See n. 11, below.
10 (1) Min, 172d mtg GCS, 12 Sep 44. (2) CCS 320/27, 16 Sep 44, title:
Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany.
11 (1) Min, 1st plenary Mtg, OCTAGON, 13 Sep 44, OCTAGON Conf Book.
(2) Msg, President to Secy State, 15 Sep 44, filed with CCS 681/2 in ABC
337 (14 Sep 44), 1. (3) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service,
pp.
576-77 See also Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 156-57 Shortly after OCTAGON, Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. Morgenthau,
Jr., maintained that the President withheld his consent to an American
occupation of a southwestern zone in Germany until the last minute
because he wanted the British to be charged with implementation of the Morgenthau plan in the Ruhr and Saar areas in the northern zone. See memo
of mtg, 20 Sep 44, by H. Freeman Matthews, in Department of State,
Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and
Yalta, 1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1955) PP- 134-35.
12 Msg, President to Secy State, 15 Sep 44, filed with CCS 681/2 in
ABC 337 (14 Sep 44), 1.
13 CCS 618/3, 12 Sep 44, title: Machinery for Coordination of
U.S.-Soviet-Br Military Effort. The familiar delaying tactics on the part
of the Russians followed. The committee was never established. See Deane,
Strange Alliance, pp. 153-54.
14 CCS 643/1, 9 Sep 44, title: Estimate of the Enemy Situation,
Pacific-Far East.
15 (1) Msg, Halsey to Nimitz, 13 Sep 44, CM-IN 12893. (2) Msg, Nimitz
to MacArthur, 14 Sep 44, CM-IN 12896. (3) Msg, MacArthur to Nimitz and
JCS, 14 Sep 44, CM-IN 12636. (4) Msg, Nimitz to MacArthur, 14 Sep 44,
GM-IN 13048. (5) Ms9, JCS to MacArthur, y Sep 44, CM-IN 13500.
16 Min, 1st plenary mtg, OCTAGON, 13 Sep 44, OCTAGON Conf Book.
17 (1) Min, 1st plenary mtg, OCTAGON, 13 Sep 44, OCTAGON Conf Book.
(2) Min, 174th mtg CCS, 14 Sep 44. (3) Arnold, Global Mission, p. 527- (4) Ehrman,
Grand Strategy V, 500ff .
18 (1) Min, 1st plenary mtg, OCTAGON, 13 Sep 44. OCTAGON Conf Book. (2)
Min, 174th mtg CCS, 14 Sep 44. (3) CCS 680/2, 16 Sep 4a, title: Rpt to the
President and Prime Minister.
19 (1) Min, 2d plenary mtg, OCTAGON, 16 Sep 44. OCTAGON Conf Book. (2)
See Ch. XXI, above.
20 (1) CCS 678, 13 Sep 44, title: Planning Date for the End of
the War Against Japan. (2) Min, 174th mtg CCS, 14 Sep 44.
21 (1) CCS 679, 14 Sep 44, title: Redeployment of Forces After
the End of the War in Europe. (2) 175th mtg CCS, 15 Sep 44.
22 (1) CCS 417/8, 9 Sep 44, title: Operations for the Defeat of Japan
1944-45. (2) Min, 173d mtg CCS, 13 Sep 44. (3) Min, 174th mtg CCS, 14 Sep
44.
23 Min, 75th mtg CCS, 15 Sep 44.
24 (1) Min, 2d plenary mtg, OCTAGON, 16 Sep 44. OCTAGON Conf Book. (2)
See also Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 148.
25 Min, 1st plenary mtg, OCTAGON, 16 Sep 44, OCTAGON Conf Book.
26 See App. D-1, pp. 551-52, below.
27 For the distribution of troops and units overseas, see: (1)
STM-30, 1 Jan 48; and (2) AAF Statistical Digest, 1945.
28
Ibid.
29 The distribution of Army divisions at the end of September 1944 was
as follows:
Europe
ETO 34 divisions:
1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 26th, 28th, .29th, 30th, 35th, 36th,
44th, 45th, 79th, 80th, 83d, 90th, 94th, 95th, 102d, and 104th Infantry
Divisions; 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 10th Armored Divisions;
17th, 82d, and tout Airborne Divisions (the 84th and 99th Infantry and
the 11th and 12th Armored Divisions were en route),
MTO 6 divisions:
34th, 85th, 88th, 91st, 92d Infantry Divisions and 1st Armored
Division,
Pacific
POA 5 divisions:
7th, 77th, 81st, 96th, and 98th Infantry Divisions,
SWPA 16 divisions:
Americal, 6th, 24th, 25th, 27th, 31st, 32d, 33d, 37th 38th, 40th,
41st, 43d, and 93d Infantry Divisions; 1st Cavalry Division; 11th Airborne
Division. See App. D-2, pp. 553-54. below.
30 It should be noted that there were in the Pacific at the end of
September, in addition to the Army divisions, eleven separate Army
infantry regiments, and five Marine divisions present and one forming. The eleven separate
Army infantry regiments equaled the number of separate regiments then
deployed against Germany.
31 Of the total of over three and a half million men, 2,165,000 were
combat and support troops of various types (325,000 in divisions);
1,245,000 were in the administrative, training, and operational overhead
of the three major commands (AAF, AGF, and ASF) carrying out zone of
interior missions; and the remainder were 140,000 hospital patients,
returnees from overseas, and others not available for overseas
assignment.
32 (1) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 476 (2) McCloy,
"In Defense of the Army Mind," Harpers,
Vol. 194 (April 1947), p. 342.
33 (1) JCS 521, 7 Oct 43, title: Strategic Deployment
of U.S. Forces to 31 Dec 44. (2) JCS 521/3, 3 Feb 44, same title.
(3) JCS 521/6, 11 Jun 44, title: Strategic Deployment of U.S.
Forces to 30 Sep 45. (4) STM-30,1 Jan 48.
34 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 455.
35 JCS 973, 28 Jul 44, title: Fundamental Military Factors in Relation
to Discussions Concerning Territorial Trusteeships and Settlements. This
memo, drawn up by the JSSC, was, with minor amendments, forwarded by the
JCS on 3 August 1944 to the Secretary of State. See JCS 973/4, 9 Jan 45
title: International Trusteeships.
36 See Chs. XXI and XXII, above.
37 (1) SS 293, 11 Apr 44, title: Operations in Java, ABC 381 SS
Papers, Nos. 283-96 (7 Jan 43). (2) Memo, Billo for Deputy Chiefs S&P Gp
OPD, 4 May 44, sub: Notes on the Air Planners Paper, "Planning the War
Against Japan," filed with SS 287 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 283-86 (7 Jan
43). (3) Memo, Henry for Chief SS OPD, 22 Jun 44, sub: Comments on
Attached Paper, "British Participation in the War Against Japan," filed
with SS 287 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 283-97 (7 Jan 43) (4) Memo, Billo
for Chief S&P Gp OPD, 31 Aug 44, no sub, filed with SS 301, in ABC 381 SS
Papers, Nos. 297-313 (7 Jan 43) (5) SS 324. 25 Oct 44, title: Operations
into the East Indies Subsequent to the Occupation of Luzon, ABC 381 SS
Papers, Nos. 31426 (7 Jan 43).
38 (1) Leahy, I Was There, p. 220. (2) Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 820-21. (3) Samuel I. Rosenman, Working With
Roosevelt (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1952), PP- 411-12.
39 Craven and Cate, AAF V, 796.
40 Msg, JCS to MacArthur and Nimitz, 3 Oct 44, CM-OUT 40782. For a
discussion of the concluding phase of the Formosa-Luzon debate, see Smith,
Triumph in the Philippines, Ch. I.
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