3 For an interesting account of this deception, see Hon. Ewen Montagu,
The
Man Who Never Was (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1954).
4 For an account of German and Italian plans and preparations for
Italy during the pre-HUSKY period, see Smyth, Sicilian Campaign and the
Surrender of Italy.
5 For a summary of the role of War Department staff officers overseas
from 1943 onward, see Cline, Washington Command Post, Ch. XV.
6 (1) Pets ltr, Wedemeyer to Handy, 4 Jul 43, with Tab 16 in ABC 381 HUSKY
(1943), 1-B. (2) Pers ltr, Patton, CG Seventh Army, to Marshall, 18 Jul 43,
with Tab 16 in ABC 381 HUSKY (1943), 1B. (3) Pers ltr, Eisenhower to
Marshall, 21 Jul 43, Case 38, Book 11, Exec 9. (4) For a discussion of
General Wedemeyer's participation in HUSKY, See Cline, Washington Command
Post, pp. 296-99.
7 (1) BIGOT-HUSKY msg (originator OPD), Marshall to
FORTUNE Algiers, 3 Jun 43, CM-OUT 1397. (2) BIGOT-HUSKY msg (originator OPD),
Marshall to FORTUNE Algiers, 5 Jun 43, CM-OUT 2250. (3) Msg (originator OPD)
Marshall to Eisenhower, 1 Jun 43, CM-OUT 300. All in Item 6, Exec 3. (4)
BIGOT-HUSKY msg, Eisenhower to OPD (Attn North African Theater Sec), 31 May
43, CM-IN 16 (1 Jun 43), Item 7, Exec 3. (5) Ltr, Maj Gen Troy H. Middleton,
CG 45th Div, to OPD, 31 Jul 43, sub: Comments and Recommendations, 45th Div
Task Force, OPD 371 ETO, 106. (6) Ch. II, above.
8 BIGOT-HUSKY msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower, 29 May 43,
CM-OUT 12639, Item 8, Exec 3.
9 Memo, Col Alexander D. Reid, Chief European Sec Theater Gp OPD, for Gen
Handy, Gen Hull, and Col Bessell, 23 Jul 43, sub: Effect of TORCH and
Subsequent Diversions Upon BOLERO, Paper 36, Item 1c, Exec 3. Colonel Reid
noted that, based on Casablanca figures, U.S. strength for 1 July 1943 had
been projected irk the United Kingdom at 456,000 and in NATO at 407,700,
thereby indicating the build-up in NATO in excess of that in the United
Kingdom even more sharply.
10 Memo, Handy, ACofS OPD, for CofS, 6 Aug 43, sub: Replacements for 1st
Infantry Div, Case 59, Book 11, Exec 9.
11 BIGOT msg, FORTUNE via AFHQ Algiers to Middle East for FORCE 545,
FORCE 343, War Office, WD, etc., 12 May 43, Case 12, Item 1c, Exec 3. (2)
Memo, Hull, Actg ACofS OPD, for CofS, 13 May 43, sub: Br Twelfth Army,
Case 9, Item 1c, Exec 3. (3) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower,
15 May 43, CM-OUT 6885. (4) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower (info copy OPD),
17 May 43, CM-IN 10837. (5) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower,
17 May 43, CM-OUT 7288.
12 (1) CO Hq Bull No. 1/1, London, October 1943, "Notes on the Planning and
Assault Phase of the Sicilian Campaign by a Military Observer," OPD 381
ETO, 217. (2) Memo, Ferenbaugh for ACofS OPD, 29 Sep 43, sub: Brief of the
Hist Rcd, Provisional Corps, Seventh U.S. Army, for the Period 15 July to
20 August 1943, OPD 381 Africa, 151.
13 Eisenhower rpt, Sicilian Campaign, p. 32.
14 A detailed discussion of the operation and significance of the air
attack on Pantelleria and Lampedusa is contained in Craven and Cate, AAF
II,
419-34. See also Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval
Operations in World War II, II, Operations in North African Waters,
October 1942-June 1943 (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1950) (hereafter cited as
Morison, Operations in North African Waters), p. 279.
15 (1) Memo, R. A. Meredith, Hq AGF, for CGS Second, Third, and Fourth
Armies, etc., 31 Jan 44, sub: Amphibious Operations Against Sicily, OPD
381 ETO, 251. (2) OPD brief of rpt of Operation of II Corps in the
Sicilian Campaign, incl to memo, Ferenbaugh for Handy, 13 Oct 43, sub: Rpt
of Operation of II Corps in the Sicilian Campaign, OPD 381 ETO, 130. (3)
Notes Covering Observations Prior to and During HUSKY Operations, Gen
Wedemeyer [1 Aug 43], Case 35, Book 11, Exec 9. (4) OPD brief of rpt
Comdr Center Attack Force on Operation HUSKY, 30 Aug 43, OPD 381 ETO, 77.
(5) Pers Itr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 Aug 43, Case 37, Item 1c, Exec 3.
16 The DUKW, a 21/2-ton amphibian truck, soon popularly known as the
"Duck," was used to move cargo from ship to shore, and later moved in
simultaneously with assault troops, thereby increasing the mobility of
attacking forces.
17 (1) Msg, 15th Army Gp to WAR (info copy OPD), 21 Aug 43, CM-IN 15816.
(2) Strength of
Forces in Sicily, 10 Aug 43, based on msg, CM-IN 15816 (21 Aug 43), Case
91, Book 11, Exec 9.
18 Eisenhower rpt, Sicilian Campaign, p. 31.
19 The decision to bomb the marshaling yards of Rome was taken only
after careful consideration by the Allied authorities. Military as well as
political considerations determined it. Rome was not only the capital of
Fascist Italy, it was also the center of the Italian system of
communications. The decision and the operation are discussed in: (1) Craven
and Cate, AAF 11, 463-65, 479; (2) Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade
in Europe (New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 168-69; (3)
Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 828-29; (4) Smyth, Sicilian Campaign
and the Surrender of Italy.
20 A full discussion of the role of the U.S. Army in the planning and
execution of the Sicilian campaign is to be presented in Smyth, Sicilian
Campaign and the Surrender of Italy.
21 The Halverson Project (HALPRO) is discussed in Matloff and Snell,
Strategic Planning: 1941-42, PP- 139, 141, 246-47, 250.
22 (1) Min, 83d mtg CCS, 13 May 43. (2) OPD brief, title: Notes . . .
meetings CCS, 19 May 43, Tab 2, Folder 1, Item 10, Exec 5. (3) Min, 3d mtg
held at Gen Eisenhower's villa, Algiers, 3 Jun 43, Official TRIDENT Conf
Book. (4) Memo, Wedemeyer for CofS, 8 Jun 43, sub: Operations of Red Air
Force Subsequent to SOAPSUDS, Paper 16, Item 1c, Exec 3.
23 The Prime Minister, with his usual sensitivity to the use of
appropriate code names, liked the change in code name from SOAPSUDS to the
more elegant TIDALWAVE. So did the President. "May they grow bigger and
better," he declared to the Prime Minister in late June (Msg No. 296,
President to Prime Minister, 28 Jun 43, WDCSA ETO (Super Secret)).
24 This brief account of the Ploesti raid is based largely on Craven and
Cate, AAF II, 477-84. Quote is from p. 483. See also Eisenhower,
Crusade in Europe, pp. 160-61.
25 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 810.
26 Msg, Prime Minister to Gen Smuts, 16 Jul 43, quoted in Churchill,
Closing the Ring, p. 36.
27 Min, 6th mtg CCS at the White House, TRIDENT, Official TRIDENT Conf
Book.
28 Quoted by Stimson, in Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, P. 428.
29 (1) Min, 1st mtg held at Gen Eisenhower's villa, Algiers, 29 May 43,
Official TRIDENT Conf Book. (2) General Eisenhower's willingness to go
directly to Italy aroused fears among some of the American planners lest the
Allies be committed to a major operation in the Mediterranean before the JCS
had an opportunity to pass on it. Informal memo, L. J. L. [Lt Col Lawrence
J. Lincoln] for Gen Wedemeyer, and appended "Summary Minutes of
Meetings-Eisenhower's Villa, Algiers, 29 May 43," .with CCS 223 in ABC 384
Post HUSKY (14 May 43),I.
30 (1) Min, 2d mtg held in Gen Eisenhower's
villa, .Algiers, 31 May 43. (2) Min, 1st mtg held in Gen Eisenhower's
villa, Algiers, 29 May 43. Both in Official TRIDENT Conf Book.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Min, 3d mtg held at Gen Eisenhower's villa, Algiers, 3 Jun 43,
Official TRIDENT Conf Book.
The Algiers Conference is treated from the viewpoint of two of the
principal participants in Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 166-68,
and Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 816-30.
34 JPS 223, 3 Jul 43, title: Comparison of Various Post-HUSKY Operations
in Relation to Allied Air Capabilities.
35 OPD brief, title: Notes . . . 83d mtg JPS, 7 Jul 43. Comparison of
Various Post-HUSKY Operations in Relation to Allied Air Capabilities (JPS
223), with JPS 223 in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May 43), I.
36 (1) Memo, Handy, ACofS OPD, for DCofS, 3 Jul 43, sub: Heavy Bomber
Squadrons for HARDIHOOD II. (2) OPD draft Itr, DCofS for Air Marshal Sir
William L. Welsh, Br Joint Staff Mission, incl to memo, Handy for DCofS, 3
Jul 43, sub: Heavy Bomber Squadrons for HARDIHOOD II. Both with JPS 169/D in
ABC 384 Post HUSKY (I4 May 43), I
37 CCS 268/1, 6 Jul 43, title: Post-HUSKY
Operations North African Theater.
38 OPD brief, title: Notes . . . 10lst mtg CCS, 9 Jul 43, Post-HUSKY
Operations North African Theater (CCS 268/1), with CCS 268/1 in ABC 384
Post HUSKY (14 May 43), I. OPD action officer was Col. G. A. Lincoln.
39 (1) OPD brief, title: Notes . . . 102d mtg CCS, 16 Jul 43, Post-"HUSKY"
Operations North African Theater (CCS 268/2), with CCS 268/2 in ABC 384
Post HUSKY (14 May 43), I. (2) Min, 102d mtg CCS, 16 Jul 43.
40 Memo, Gen Strong, ACofS G-2, for CofS, 15 Jul 43, sub: "HUSKY"
Exploitation, Case 15, Book 10, Exec 8.
41 Min, 102d mtg CCS, Jul 43.
42 Msg, CCS to Eisenhower and Br COS, USFOR, London, 16 Jul 43, CM-OUT
6683, FAN 165 (info copy OPD).
43 (1) Tel conv, SW and Gen Marshall, 9:05 A.M., 19 Jul 43, Paper 2, Book
11, Exec 9. (2) Incl to ltr, Stimson to Hopkins, 4 Aug 43, no sub, SW
files, White House, 36. The inclosure contains Stimson's report to the
President of his overseas trip in July.
44 Incl to ltr, Stimson to Hopkins, 4 Aug 43, no sub, SW files, White
House, 36.
A detailed discussion of Stimson's negotiations and conclusions drawn from
his visit to England in the summer of 1943 is contained in: (1) Stimson
and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 429-38, and (2) Rudolph A. Winnacker,
The Mediterranean Versus the Channel, 1943, draft MS, OCMH files.
45 For the British staff views see: (1) CCS 268/6, 21 Jul 43 title:
Post-"HUSKY" Operations North African Theater; and (2) J. P. (43) 265, Rpt
by Br Joint Planning Staff War Cabinet for Br COS, 21 Jul 43, title: The
Exploitation of "HUSKY", with CCS 268/3 in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May 43),
I. The British joint planners here recommended AVALANCHE in place of an
operation against the heel (MUSKET) as "a sounder and more decisive
operation.
46 General Marshall's staff planners, keeping the Chief of Staff alert to
studies exploring his proposal, followed the progress of negotiations
between the CCS and General Eisenhower. For an example of the staff
planners' briefing function, see memo, OPD for CofS, 17 Jul 43, sub:
"HUSKY" Exploitation, with JCS 417 in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May 43),
I. OPD action officer was Colonel Roberts. The memo referred to a study of a
Naples operation being conducted by the JWPC. The study is contained in
JCS 417, 19 Jul 43, title: Rapid Exploitation of "HUSKY."
47 Actually, General Eisenhower and AFHQ planners had long been impressed
with the desirability of promptly seizing the port of Naples, but they had
been considering the project as the culmination of an overland advance
from the south, in exploitation of BUTTRESS and GOBLET (operations
against the toe of Italy to capture Reggio on the Calabrian peninsula, and
against the ball of Italy near Crotone, respectively). Hitherto they had
not considered a direct assault upon Naples feasible because of such
problems as the anticipated shortage of landing craft and insufficient
fighter cover for the operation.
See: (1) BIGOT-HUSKY msg, Eisenhower to WD for CCS, and to War Office for
Br COS, 30 Jun 43 (info copy OPD), CM-IN 434 (1 Jul 43); (2) Smyth,
Sicilian Campaign and the Surrender of Italy, Ch. II, "Preliminary
Planning of Attack on Italy;" pp. 32-33; and (3) Allied Force
Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander's Dispatch, Italian Campaign, 3 Sep
43-8 Jan 44 (hereafter cited as Eisenhower rpt, Italian Campaign), p. 12.
48 (1) Min, 69th mtg CPS, 20 Jul 43. Original draft of message was
submitted by Colonel Roberts of OPD, acting Army Planner in the absence of
Gen Wedemeyer during HUSKY. (2) Min, 97th mtg JCS, 20 Jul 43. (3) Msg, CCS
to Eisenhower, 20 Jul 43, FAN 164, CM-OUT 8200 (info copy OPD).
49 (1) CCS
268/3, 19 Jul 43; CCS 268/6, 21 Jul 43; and CCS 268/8, 24 Jul 43. All
entitled Post-HUSKY Operations. (2) For a detailed discussion of the
logistical debate and preparations in connection with planning for the
invasion of Italy, see Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global
Logistics and Strategy, 1943-45, MS draft chapter, "The Invasion of Italy," OCMH files.
50 Colonel Roberts served in the Military Intelligence Division in 1941
and on temporary duty with the Army forces in the CBI in early 1942. He
joined the Strategy Section of OPD in July 1942.
51 (1) Col Robert's draft reply to CCS 268/6, 22 Jul 43, with CCS 268/6
in ABC 384 Post HUSKY (14 May 43), I. (2) His conclusions were echoed in the
JPS report to the JCS-JCS 421, 23 Jul 43, title: Post "HUSKY" Operations
North African Theater. Both papers were drawn up as suggested replies of the
JCS to the British Chiefs' proposal (CCS 268/6).
52 Min, 103d mtg CCS, 23 Jul 43.
53 (1) Min, sp mtg GCS, 26 Jul 43, with CCS 268/9 in ABC 384 Post HUSKY
(14 May 43), I. (2) Min, sp mtg JCS, 26 Jul 43, with CCS 268/8 in ABC 384
Post HUSKY (14 May 43), I. (3) CCS 268/9, 25 Jul 43, title: Post-"HUSKY"
Operations North African Theater. CCS 268/g was a memo by the U.S. JCS.
54 (1) Min, sp mtg GCS, 26 Jul 43, with CCS 268/9 in ABC 384 Post HUSKY
(14 May 43), I. (2) BIGOT-AVALANCHE msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 26 Jul 43,
CM-OUT 10374, FAN 175 (info copy OPD).
55 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 38.
56 BIGOT msg, Eisenhower to AGWAR for CCS
and to USFOR for Br COS, 27 Jul 43, CM-IN 19362,
NAF 300 (info copy OPD).
57 BIGOT msg, CinC, Algiers to AGWAR for CCS and to USFOR for Br COS,
28 Jul 43, CM-IN 20257, NAF
303
(info copy OPD).
58 BIGOT-AVALANCHE msg, CinC, Algiers to AGWAR for CCS
and to USFOR for Br COS, 2 Aug 43, CM-IN 1142,
NAF 307 (info copy OPD).
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