Endnotes for
the Epilogue
1 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, Ch. 5, and passim.
2 For the President's attitude toward Stalin, see Sherwood,
Roosevelt and
Hopkins, pp. 799, 870.
For the expressed interest of the President (and Hopkins), at Tehran, in
Iran as a clinic or experimental station for the President's postwar
notion of developing and stabilizing backward areas, see A. C. Millspaugh,
Americans in Persia (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1946), pp. 8,
206, 214-15.
3 (1) Pogue, The Supreme Command, Chs. XXIII, XXIV. (2) Forrest C. Pogue,
"Why the Russians Got Berlin and Prague," Misc 201 Pogue, Forrest C. Copy
of paper read in American History Association meeting in New York City,
December 1951, OCMH files. (3) Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, Chs. 8, 11. (4) Brig. Gen. Thomas North, "The Last 45 Days,"
Infantry Journal, June
1947.
4 Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 Apr 45, CM-OUT 64349. This message
forwarded the reply of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.
5 Draft msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Apr 45, OPD 381 TS, 123. The message
was sent with the above comment; see msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Apr
45, CM-OUT 74256.
6 Ehrman, Grand Strategy V, 44ff., 505-06. Ehrman advances
the thesis that the British staked their all on the defeat of Germany in
1944, and the prolongation of that war into 1945, was to have serious effects not only on
the British economy but also on British relations with the other Allies.
7 (1) According to the Federal Reserve Board, the index of
industrial production, using a 1935-39 base as the equivalent of 100, rose
from 176 in December 1941 to a peak of 247 in October and November of 1943,
and tapered off to 225 in May 1945. Bureau of the Census, Historical
,Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945: A Supplement to the
Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1949), App. 6, p- 330. (2) Bureau of the Budget, The
United States at War, Chart 11, Industrial Production, p. 104. The report
states that the quarterly rate of U.S. output of goods and services rose
from $34 billion in the last quarter Of 1941 to $52 billion in the second
quarter of 1945 (P. 462).
8 Forrest C. Pogue, "SHAEF-.A Retrospect on Coalition Command,"
The Journal
of Modern History, Vol. XXIII, No. 4 (December 1951).
9 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy,, pp. 71, 267, 455-70.
10 For the detailed Pacific story, see Louis Morton,
Strategy. Command, and Administration, a forthcoming volume in the UNITED STATES ARMY IN
WORLD WAR II series, Pacific sub-series. For other summaries of planning in
the last year of the war against Japan, see: (1) Chs. XXIX and XXX of Vol.
II, The Advance to Victory, in Sec. IV, The War Against Japan, prepared by
Lt. Grace P. Hayes, USN, for the History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
and (2) Cline, Washington Command Post, Ch. XVII.
11 The three OPD officers were Generals Hull and Craig, and Brig. Gen.
George A. Lincoln. See Cline. Washington Command Post, p. 347n.
12 For an interesting indication of the revelations of the
postwar spy trials, see The New York Times, March 18, 1951.
13 Shortly after OCTAGON, General Handy informed General
Marshall that, in his opinion, continued U.S. military success against Japan
and a statement of American postwar intentions on the Asiatic mainland would force the
Soviet Union to enter the war in order to secure a seat at the peace table
and present its own demands. See D/F, Handy for CofS, 1 Oct 44, sub: U.S. Policy in re Russian Participation in the War Against
Japan, filed with SS 318 in ABC 381 SS Papers, Nos. 314-26. (7 Jan 43).
See also SS 318, 10 Oct 44, same sub, same file.
14 For a statement of the terms of agreement at Yalta, see
Department of State, The Conferences at
Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.
15 Leahy, I Was There, p. 318.
16 The problem of Soviet entry into the war against Japan
is surveyed in the Department of Defense Documentary Report, The Entry of
the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945,
October 1955.
17 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 826,
836ff., 865.
18 Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 Aug 44, no sub, Item 57, Exec
10.
19 (1) Tel conf, Marshall and Craig, 1 Nov 43, filed with
JCS 574 in ABC 686 Philippines (8 Nov 43), 1-A. (2) Memo, Handy for SW, 8
Nov 43, sub: Post-war Military Requirements in the Philippine Islands, filed
with JPS 318/D in ABC 686 Philippines (8 Nov 43), 1-A. (3) Memo, F. D. R.
for JCS, 10 Jul 44, no sub, Item 70, Exec 10.
20 For a discussion of liaison machinery between the State
Department, the War Department, and the White House, see Cline, Washington
Command Post, Ch. XVI.
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