Latino Representation in the U.S. Congress: To What Extent Are Latinos Substantively Represented?

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One of the most fundamental concepts in the study of Congress is that of representation. Beginning with Richard Fenno's classic study of how each congressional member has a different "home style," political science scholars have tried to make sense of the many ways members of Congress represent their constituents. In the United States, representation of blacks by blacks and Latinos by Latinos has been dismal, to say the least[1]. In terms of sheer numbers, African Americans and Latinos still do not have an equal proportion of representatives in Congress when juxtaposed to their respective populations. For example, in the early 1990's, California's population was 34.4% Latino, yet Latinos held only 3 of the 54 congressional seats (Grofman ed, 1992)[2]. Redistricting changes that have occurred and future elections will, however, increase these numbers. The promise of American democracy is that all citizens, regardless of race or ethnicity, are represented in the halls of Congress. This study, to the extent possible, will examine how this promise has been realized in the representation of Latinos in Congress. Through the examination of key roll call votes cast by members of Congress from districts with similar numbers of Latinos, it is possible to make some conclusions regarding substantive and descriptive representation.

This paper proceeds as follows: First, representation is defined so as to make it precisely clear what we mean by the concept. Second, a brief history of Latinos in the U.S. House of Representatives is presented. Third, a brief review of the scholarly literature on Latino representation is presented in order to demonstrate what we already know. Finally, the data and interpretation of the coefficients enables us to see how these

[1] In the political science literature, the use of the term Latino is preferred to Hispanic. As such, this paper will abide by convention. In addition, the term Latino or Latinos will refer to males and females of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, or other Spanish-speaking descent.
[2] California's Latino population statistic includes citizens as well as non-citizens.

analyses contribute to this scholarly research program. Through the examination of key roll call votes cast by members of Congress from districts with similar numbers of Latinos, it is possible to make some conclusions regarding substantive and descriptive representation.

Representation Defined

What does representation entail? Does it mean that blacks can only be represented by blacks? Hanna F. Pitkin introduced two notions of representation: descriptive and substantive. Descriptive (or dyadic) representation involves Latinos having a Latino represent their district, while substantive representation involves a non-Latino representative voting the way her Latino constituents prefer. By examining districts with similar demographics and different (white or Latino) representatives, this dichotomous distinction can be somewhat refined.

Descriptive representation occurs when the person representing looks like the represented in some way. If a district were majority Catholic, then a Catholic representative would descriptively represent the district. Canon (1999) notes three different values of descriptive representation:

- There exists a distinct value in having role models.
- Descriptive representation is not useful unless linked to substantive representation.
- Modern day politics extols the value of leaders that "look like America."

Most would agree that descriptive representation is important to a certain extent. Precisely how members of Congress represent their constituents is just as important.

Johnson and Secret (1996) refer to Edmund Burke's theory of representation with which he combined "a conception of the focus of representation with a concept of the style of representation." In addition, the local and national aspects of representation must also be considered, according to Burke. Burke's notion of a trustee and delegate style of representation must be combined, according to Pitkin (1967) in order for genuine representation to occur. Johnson and Secret found that African American congressmen were much more concerned with local interests, while Latino congressmen were focused on national representation. They postulate that it is probably due to the much weaker (descriptive) representation of Latinos in the U.S. Congress. Because of historically low numbers of representatives on the Hill, I would expect Latino members of Congress to vote and act differently than other members of their party on issues important to Latinos.

Miller and Stokes (1963) contributed to the literature on representation by searching for the "congruence" between the beliefs of constituents and the way the legislators voted. Hence, policy responsiveness or congruence has become a way to assess the extent to which representation is occurring.

Perhaps the best description of precisely how representatives respond to their constituents is from Fenno's interviews. Fenno's *Home Style* (1978) aptly explores several congressmen's efforts to represent their districts. This aspect of representation is crucial in order to be able to explain roll call votes and their implications. Unfortunately, Fenno's research style is expensive, difficult, and thus less ubiquitous than roll call analysis.

In the area of racial representation, however, Carol Swain's *Black Faces, Black Interests* is an analysis of how African Americans are represented in Congress. Swain's

interviews with African American members of Congress provide great insight into the varying styles within the black community. Her analyses of former Rep. Mike Espy (D-Mississippi) and Rep. John Conyers (D-Michigan) show just how different African American members of Congress had to respond to their districts in order to secure re-election. Swain's fundamental thesis, however, that blacks would be better served by electing Democratic members of Congress, regardless of race, has been a controversial one. For example, Canon (1999) notes that Swain does not account for all white representatives with at least a 25% black population in the 103rd Congress. Grose (2002) argues that Swain neglects the importance of black descriptive representation in terms of yielding substantive representation as measured by pork project allocation and constituency service. For roll-call voting, Grose concedes that Swain is correct in calling for the election of more Democratic legislators as a way to increase black substantive representation.

Furthermore, Swain's thesis cannot be applied to Latinos for a variety of reasons. Latinos are not politically monolithic, nor are they as strongly partisan. It is true that the majority of Latinos identify with the Democratic Party, but a significantly larger percentage of Latinos have been willing to cross party lines in certain elections, such as the recent election of Michael R. Bloomberg as Mayor of New York City.[3] For example, President Bush received approximately 35% of the Latino vote in the 2000 election—far from a majority, but much better than the low single digits he received from African Americans.

This debate between advocates of different types of representation continues to affect members of the Latino community. Congressional Hispanic Caucus chairman Rep.

[3] Bloomberg received 50% of the Latino vote in his 2001 victory.

Silvestre Reyes (D-Texas) has indicated his clear support for substantive over descriptive representation. He would rather support incumbent white members of Congress than risk the divisiveness of a primary, perhaps referring to Diana DeGette's Denver district in which a Latina challenged her in the primary in a 54% minority district (Wallison 2001). On the other hand, Larry Gonzalez of the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) believes that the Congressional Hispanic Caucus is simply neglecting what should be its apparent goal—the election of more Latinos to Congress.

Research in this area is important because the results could shed light on what is the most effective way of representing Latino interests. In addition, research previously done on African American representation must be updated in light of the differences between both minority groups and the contributions of scholars of legislative politics. What previous studies on racial representation have lacked is an ability to synthesize what we have learned in the field of legislative politics with the contributions of scholars of race and ethnicity.

To date, very little research has been done regarding Latino representation in the U.S. Congress. Existing research addresses the question of substantive and descriptive representation by examining key roll call votes compiled by the Southwest Voter Research Institute (SWVRI) for previous Congresses. Given the population boom of Latinos in just the past few years, more research on this subject using different data is clearly warranted. To what extent does having a Latino/a representative make a difference in terms of substantive representation? An analysis of roll-call data can shed light on the differences, if any, among representatives' voting patterns, but it cannot

answer the normative question of whether Latino elected officials are essential to advancing a Latino agenda.

Brief History of Latinos in the U.S. House

Before the Voting Rights Act was enacted in 1965, Latinos were hardly represented in the U.S. Congress. Before 1912, only one Latino, California Republican Romualdo Pacheco served in the U.S. House. With the exception of New Mexico and Louisiana, no state sent a Latino to Congress between 1912 and 1960 (Lublin 1997). The Congressional Hispanic Caucus began in 1976 through the efforts of Democratic Reps. Herman Badillo (NY), Baltasar Corrada (PR), E. Kika de la Garza (TX), Henry B. Gonzalez (TX), and Edward Roybal (CA). Compared to the Congressional Black Caucus, the Hispanic caucus is new and has fewer members. In 1992 and 1994, the number of black representatives stood at thirty-eight while the number of Latinos stood at seventeen (Lublin 1997). By today, the number of Latinos in the Congress has increased to nineteen. This, of course, partially reflects the rapidly growing Latino population, especially in California, Texas, and Florida. Now that Latinos are approximately 12.6% of the U.S. population, it is expected that the results of the 2001 redistricting process will have created new districts that have larger percentages of Latinos, thus raising the possibility of more descriptive representation in the coming years. In fact, the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) estimates that 122 (28%) of the 435 U.S. House districts have Latino populations that surpass 12.6%, the national average. The Southwest and California clearly have the highest percentages, but Latinos have surpassed African Americans as the largest minority in states like New Jersey and New York.

Latino Representation Literature Review

The literature on the question of Latino representation in the U.S. Congress is quite sparse, although several studies have been done in recent years. Since Latinos have only recently surpassed African Americans as the largest minority group in the United States, it is only a matter of time before more scholars and politicians turn their attention to a minority group that is more diverse and less partisan. The earliest work on Latino representation borrowed heavily from previous work on African American representation in the Congress. As such, Latinos were assumed to be a monolithic group generally more liberal than whites. Welch and Hibbing (1984) noted that Latino Conservative Coalition scores were more liberal than non-Latino representative scores. This study, however, only classified members from 1973-1980. It was not until 1992 that members of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban groups were to be simultaneously represented in the Congress. Earlier Latino representatives were Mexican Americans, who are one of the more liberal Latino groups in the United States.

Hero and Tolbert go beyond Welch and Hibbing's **(**1984) earlier analysis by entertaining the use of Southwest Voter Research Initiative (SWVRI) scores for the 100th Congress to gauge the representation of Latinos and their interests. In their analysis, Hero and Tolbert find that high SWVRI scores for Latino representatives were not significantly different than for non-Latino representatives. In essence, they find that Latinos benefit from collective representation and that dyadic representation is not evident. Kerr and Miller (1997) respond to this article by arguing that dyadic representation of Latino interests is present. For them, "dyadic and collective representation can and do occur simultaneously in the political system and, as an

analytical matter, should be considered together" (Kerr and Miller 1997, 1071). While exposing some of the methodological problems with the paper, Kerr and Miller do not provide the necessary prescriptions for a better analysis. For example, the SWVRI scores in question are few in number and only cover the 100th Congress. For Hero and Tolbert to conclude based on these data that there is little, direct substantive representation of Latinos is premature.

David Lublin, however, uses Poole-Rosenthal NOMINATE scores in his analyses. Poole-Rosenthal scores do a much better job of assessing the political ideology of members of Congress as all votes are included, not just a few select votes, such as ADA or ACU scores. The Poole-Rosenthal scores are also continuously distributed, unlike interest group ratings (Lublin 1997). Lublin interacts Latino population with the party of the representative and finds that Republican members are more conservative when they have higher Latino populations and Democrats are significantly more liberal (Lublin 1997; Canon 1999). Lublin explains this by noting the differences in who Democrats represent (Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans) and who Republicans generally represent (Cuban Americans). As Canon (1999) notes, Lublin does not control for these constituency differences within the Latino community (365). Lublin's research provides a better way of looking at Latino representation than before. The data are more comprehensive and systematic, which leads to more accurate insights into the nature of Latino representation.

Data

The dataset used in this analysis was organized by David Lublin. This dataset includes Poole-Rosenthal scores and additional population variables.[4] In addition, demographic variables concerning U.S. House districts from the 87th through the 104th Congress are also included. Poole-Rosenthal DW-NOMINATE scores from the 102nd Congress through the 104th Congress are missing in Lublin's dataset, and consequently have been added in order to provide for a more updated analysis[5]. Missing data in this dataset is usually coded as a period. Important variables to notice in this dataset include a dummy variable for Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican representatives[6]. Lublin's dataset also includes the necessary population figures for these districts including racial and ethnic background, median family income, and urban population. This dataset is the most updated and comprehensive available for studying Latino representation.

The extent to which Latino constituencies have an effect on how their representatives vote in Congress is examined including all members of Congress. The impact of percent Latino in a congressional district on vote for a Democratic congressional candidate is also statistically examined. All districts are included in this analysis, as well as a separate analysis for those districts with at least a 5% Latino population. These analyses further test Hero and Tolbert's (1995) conclusions, which were based on SWVRI scores in the 100th Congress, using Poole-Rosenthal scores and extend the analysis to include the 87th-104th Congresses.

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[4] Data analyses conducted using STATA statistical software (Intercooled Stata 7.0).
[5] DW-NOMINATE scores are used in this analysis because such scores are comparable within and across Congresses.
[6] To date, all Latinos elected to the House of Representatives have been either Cuban, Mexican, or Puerto Rican.

In the next regression analysis, the dependent variable is the Poole-Rosenthal DW-NOMINATE ideology scores. As Poole and Rosenthal (1997) note, American politics has become centered around a left-right conflict especially with regard to income redistribution. Poole and Rosenthal's second dimension revolves around racial issues, but racial issues have all but been submerged into the first dimension in recent years. Latinos of all ethnicities generally believe in income redistribution. According to a Pew Hispanic Center and Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation survey of Latino voters, 58% of Latino Democrats and 52% of Latino Republicans would rather pay higher taxes to support a larger government.[7] Regression analysis is used to analyze these scores relative to the ethnicity of the representative and the population of Latinos in House districts. Unfortunately, this dataset does not separate citizens from non-citizens, which could pose a problem for interpretation. Recall that previous studies (Hero and Tolbert 1995) have used the SWVRI scores as the dependent variable to assess Latino representation. Poole-Rosenthal scores can help as an additional measure here. Since Hero and Tolbert use data from the 100th Congress, this regression analysis tabulates Poole-Rosenthal scores for that Congress alone. Hero and Tolbert used a threshold of at least 5% Latinos in a given district to reduce the number of representatives in the sample, which is why the N is 127 instead of 435. This is the baseline of comparison to determine whether Latino substantive representation is present in that during the 100th Congress the national Latino percentage hovered around 5%.

Starting in the 105th Congress, the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda Committee has compiled a Congressional scorecard, which assigns scores to each

[7] See Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation *National Survey of Latinos: The Latino Electorate*, October 2002 for more details. Of course, differences with respect to social and foreign policy issues exist within the Latino community and this survey reveals such divisions.

member of Congress based on their votes on 24 carefully selected bills concerning Latino interests. These scores are used here to compare to the results above. Perhaps future research may include these scores in order to assess their relationship to other measures of Latino representation. In their study, Hero and Tolbert noted that the SWVRI scores are highly correlated with conservative coalition scores for the 100th Congress. NHLA scores are included in Table 1 for Latino representatives serving in 2002.

[Insert Table 1 here]

Analysis

Hero and Tolbert test whether percentage of Latinos in a given district affects the level of electoral support for Democratic candidates (de la Garza 1992). First, all districts are considered and then those districts with 5% or more Latino population are considered. These data, while different than Hero and Tolbert's, should resemble their findings. Indeed, they substantively do. When the 5% or more districts are included, the same variables emerge as statistically significant. Note, however, that the percent Latino variable remains statistically insignificant. This differs from Hero and Tolbert's finding in a significant way. Percent Latino in a district has no unilateral impact on vote for Democratic congressional candidate neither in all districts nor in districts with 5% or more Latino voters.

[Insert Table 2 here]

To assess whether this is just an aberration of the 100th Congress, I conducted an analysis using the same variables over the 87th-104th Congresses (See Table 3). These data show significant coefficients for all districts as well as for those with 5% or more Latino population. While Hero and Tolbert seem to have been mistaken in their analysis

for the 100th Congress, over time the hypothesis that indeed the percentage of Latinos in districts has an impact on the vote for Democratic candidates is a viable one.

[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here]

Like Hero and Tolbert (1995), the regression analysis presented in Table 4 is divided into Model 1A and Model 1B. Model 1A gauges the impact of Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican representative on the Poole Rosenthal first dimension score, not the SWVRI score. Explanatory variables include Cuban representative, coded as 1 if Cuban, 0 otherwise, Mexican representative, coded as 1 if Mexican, 0 otherwise, Puerto Rican representative, coded as 1 if Puerto Rican, 0 otherwise, percent urban, percent African American, median family income, and political party. As Hero and Tolbert (1995) note, these explanatory variables all might have an impact on ideology.

In my analysis of Model 1A, the coefficient for Mexican representative is -.097, while the coefficient for Puerto Rican representative is -.121, which suggests that Mexican and Puerto Rican representatives have Poole Rosenthal ideology scores that are more liberal than other members of Congress.[8] Hero and Tolbert's finding of Latino members of Congress having SWVRI scores of 10 points higher than non-Latinos seem to generally agree with these results. Hero and Tolbert's findings for the 100th Congress seem to hold up against a more comprehensive dependent variable and the separation of Mexican and Puerto Rican representatives, as well as a dummy variable for Black representatives, which theoretically makes sense if percentage of blacks in the district is also included. The most significant explanatory variable is political party—the coefficient of –1.29 indicates a strong effect in the liberal direction.

[8] There are no observations for Cuban representatives, since none existed at the time of the 100th Congress.

Model 1B includes the same explanatory variables, but adds one concerning the percentage of Latinos in the district. This variable is not statistically significant, and thus has no unilateral impact on Poole Rosenthal scores. Thus far, these findings are not altogether different than Hero and Tolbert's findings. Based on these data, one can conclude that there is little evidence of substantive representation in the 100th Congress.

[Insert Table 5 here]

Turning to the initial regression results on ideological scores, Table 5 involves the same dependent and explanatory variables, but does so over the period of the 87th-104th Congresses again using districts with at least 5% Latino population. Hero and Tolbert's findings only apply to the 100th Congress. Presumably, over time, and utilizing more data, the results may vary, and we may indeed find substantive representation of Latino interests. The coefficients of -.286, -.063, and -.202 for Cuban, Mexican and Puerto Rican representatives are statistically significant, indicating that they are more likely to be on the more liberal side of the spatial Poole Rosenthal score.[9] In addition, all of the other explanatory variables are statistically significant.

[Insert Table 6 here]

In Model B, when percentage of Latinos in the district is added into the regression, the results are virtually the same. Percentage of African Americans in the district and median family income lose statistical significance. Percentage of Latinos in district is not statistically significant. Hero and Tolbert are correct in asserting that we find little evidence of direct, substantive representation of Latinos over this time period. African Americans, on the other hand, have experienced more substantive representation

[9] Poole-Rosenthal scores range from -.851 to .778 from 1971-1985, with the most liberal member rating -.851 and the most conservative rating .778. The mean is -.042 for this time period and the standard around the mean is .30.

over this time period according to the data analysis. Political party remains the most highly significant variable.

In order to gauge the impact of Latino representation across all House districts, Table 6 shows regression results for Models 3A and 3B. These models essentially follow Models 1 and 2 by extending the analysis to all House districts, not just those districts with at least 5% Latino population. The direction of the explanatory variables stays virtually identical. Percent black becomes statistically significant, as well as median family income. Most importantly, however, is the percentage Latino in district variable of Model 3B, which still has no significant effect on Poole Rosenthal ideology scores. The only explanatory variable that is not statistically significant is that of Cuban Representative. The coefficient for Cuban Representative is -.092 for Model 3A and -.076 for Model 3B, which indicates that Cuban representatives generally are more conservative than their Latino counterparts, but still are not as conservative as one might expect given the Cuban American community's reputation for dogmatic conservatism. This may have to do with the fact that foreign policy voting is where Cuban Americans are the most conservative, not necessarily votes on redistribution, which is what the Poole-Rosenthal scores measure.

Concluding Remarks

Given the rapidly increasing numbers of Latinos in the United States, this study has attempted to determine the extent to which Latinos are substantively represented. In the 100th Congress, the findings of Hero and Tolbert coincided with the findings here. Apparently, the SWVRI scores, albeit limited, were correlated with the Poole Rosenthal ideology scores, which are the most comprehensive available. For the 87th-104th

Congress, however, the results are different—whether one is represented by a Mexican or Puerto Rican representative has a negative, significant effect on the Poole Rosenthal score. When percent Latino in district is considered, there is no effect of on the ideology of the representative. Hero and Tolbert found no significance for Latino representative in their analysis (1995). Analyzing data from all districts for the 87th-104th Congress, the results show strong effects of all the explanatory variables, except the percent Latino in district and Cuban Representative.

Kerr and Miller (1997) indeed have a point concerning Hero and Tolbert's conclusions regarding their analyses. By merely interpreting the coefficient for Latino representative as insignificant, Hero and Tolbert "conclude that dyadic substantive representation of Hispanics is lacking" (Kerr and Miller 1997, 1067). These data can only provide some sort of benchmark indicating the extent to which Latinos are substantively represented.

While these data do not address normative concerns, it is nonetheless important to entertain some of these issues. There is no question that Latinos suffer from a lack of descriptive representation in all levels of government. To what extent is it important that Latinos be represented by other Latinos? Is it the case that more Latinos in Congress will contribute to greater political involvement among Latinos? For African Americans, Gay (2001) has concluded that more African Americans in Congress only rarely contributes to greater political involvement among black constituents. Gordon and Segura (2002) conclude their analysis of California's Latino population by finding that the collective representation of Latinos in the legislature had an overall positive effect on the Latino population's overall evaluation of government. Whether these findings can be

generalized to non-Mexican Latinos and nationwide is a question that deserves additional research that should include additional public opinion data on how important it is to Latinos that their representatives are like them. In addition, my analysis shows that percentage of Latinos in House districts does little to affect ideology scores. Without concluding the non-existence of Latino substantive representation, it is safe to conclude that substantive representation of Latino interests is not at the same level as African Americans, for example.

Future research in this area may take different forms. For example, Katherine Tate has used data from the 1996 national telephone survey of African Americans to determine how blacks feel about the way in which they are represented. This line of research may be applied to the study of Latino representation to determine the extent to which African Americans and Latinos differ in their approaches to representation.

Another promising and necessary line of research is to study the extent to which redistricting has affected and will affect the representation of Latino interests. David Canon's work on this subject, as well as David Lublin's research must be updated to reflect the latest increases in the Latino population. A comprehensive study is needed solely on the issue of Latino representation, and this to date has not been done within political science.[10]

Moreover, scholarly research on this subject must be informed by the analysis of those members of Congress who do serve substantial Latino populations. Much in the same way Carol Swain was able to connect with African American members of Congress for her research, the need is great for scholarship that engages Latino members of Congress as well as white congressmen that represent heavily Latino districts, such as

[10] I hope to develop these ideas in my dissertation.

Howard Berman (D-California). For an analysis of roll call votes, while in many ways instructive, must be supplemented by the myriad of different ways that constitute representation.

Table 1: Latino Representatives in the U.S. Congress ranked in descending order of Latino population (2002)

Name	District	% Latino	% Black	Party	NHLAScore[11]
Lucille Roybal-Allard	33-California	86%	4%	Democrat	N/A
Ruben Hinojosa	15-Texas	79%	2%	Democrat	92%
Silvestre Reyes	16-Texas	78%	3%	Democrat	92
Lincoln Diaz-Balart	21-Florida	78%	5%	Republican	67
Grace Napolitano	34-California	72%	2%	Democrat	N/A
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	15-Florida	71%	5%	Republican	58
Solomon Ortiz	27-Texas	71%	2%	Democrat	92
Luis Gutierrez	4—Illinois	70%	3%	Democrat	96
Charles Gonzalez	20-Texas	67%	6%	Democrat	N/A
Henry Bonilla	23-Texas	66%	1%	Republican	42
Ciro Rodriguez	28-Texas	65%	8%	Democrat	100
Xavier Becerra	30-California	64%	3%	Democrat	96
Jose Serrano	16-New York	63%	36%	Democrat	96
Ed Pastor	2-Arizona	63%	5%	Democrat	100
Loretta Sanchez	46-California	62%	2%	Democrat	83
Hilda Solis	31-California	59%	1%	Democrat	N/A
Joe Baca	42-California	51%	12%	Democrat	N/A
Nydia Velazquez	12-New York	49%	13%	Democrat	88
Robert Menendez	13-New Jersey	47%	13%	Democrat	96

Source: National Journal's *Almanac of American Politics*, 2002.

[11] National Hispanic Leadership Agenda (NHLA) scores begin in 105th Congress (1997-8), and some members of Congress in the table were elected beginning in the 106th or subsequent Congresses. For these members, N/A is noted.

Table 2: Impact of Percent Latino in Congressional District on Vote for Democratic Congressional Candidate for 100th Congress

Explanatory Variable	All Districts	>5% Latino Population
% Latino in District	.149 (.129)	.185 (.182)
% Urban	.218* (.076)	.561* (.168)
% African American	.382* (.098)	.287 (.178)
Median Family Income	-.002* (.001)	-.002* (.001)
Constant	73.62* (7.04)	52.06* (16.39)
Adjusted R-squared	.19	.36
N=	435	127

*p<=.05
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Table 3: Impact of Percent Latino in Congressional District on Vote for Democratic Congressional Candidate for 87th Congress-104th Congress

Explanatory Variable	All Districts	>5% Latino Population
% Latino in District	.318* (.029)	.363* (.035)
% Urban	.069* (.015)	.157* (.040)
% African American	.577* (.022)	.671* (.039)
Median Family Income	-.000* (.000)	-.000* (.000)
Constant	50.07* (1.19)	39.73* (3.51)
Adjusted R-squared	.21	.32
N=	4785	1455

* p<=.05
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Table 4: Impact of Mexican and Puerto Rican Representative and Percent Latino on Poole-Rosenthal Score for 100th Congress

Explanatory Variable	Model 1A	Model 1B
Cuban Representative	--	--
Mexican Representative	-.097 (.102)	-.101 (.138)
Puerto Rican Representative	-.121 (.154)	-.122 (.159)
African-American Representative	-.270 (.148)	-.271 (.153)
% Latino in District	-----	.000 (.000)
% Urban	-.005* (.002)	-.005* (.003)
% African-American	-.003 (.003)	-.003* (.004)
Median Family Income	-4.21e-06 (8.14e-06)	-3.92e-06 (.000)
Political Party of Member	-1.30* (.064)	-1.30* (.064)
Constant	1.15* (.198)	1.14* (.225)
Adjusted R-squared	.86	.87
N	127	127

* p<=.05
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Table 5: Impact of Cuban, Mexican and Puerto Rican Representatives and Percent Latino on Poole-Rosenthal Score for 87th-104th Congress Using Districts with at least 5% Latino Population

Explanatory Variable	Model 2A	Model 2B
Cuban Representative	-.286* (.095)	-.329* (.129)
Mexican Representative	-.063* (.023)	-.120* (.052)
Puerto Rican Representative	-.202* (.033)	-.140* (.048)
African American Representative	-.417* (.029)	-.212* (.053)
% Latino in District	-----	-.000 (.001)
% Urban	-.004* (.000)	-.005* (.001)
% African-American	.004* (.004)	-.001 (.002)
Median Family Income	2.02e-06* (4.69e-07)	-6.28e-07 (7.86e-07)
Political Party of Member	-.521* (.010)	-.630* (.022)
Constant	.495* (.016)	.785* (.062)
Adjusted R-squared	.54	.51
N	3447	1472

*p<=.05
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Table 6: Impact of Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican Representative and Percent Latino on Poole-Rosenthal Score for 87th-104th Congress Using All House Districts

Explanatory Variable	Model 3A	Model 3B
Cuban Representative	-.092 (.131)	-.076 (.147)
Mexican Representative	-.232* (.038)	-.213* (.056)
Puerto Rican Representative	-.222* (.045)	-.192* (.053)
African-American Representative	-.352* (.030)	-.289* (.038)
% Latino in District	-----	-.000 (.000)
% Urban	-.004* (.000)	-.003* (.000)
% African-American	-.001* (.000)	-.002* (.001)
Median Family Income	2.77e-06* (4.41e-07)	3.44e-06* (5.78e-07)
Political Party of Member	-.002* (.001)	-.002* (.001)
Constant	.224* (.015)	.180* (.023)
Adjusted R-squared	.13	.12
N	6814	6814

*p<=.05
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

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