

THE AMERICAN CONGRESS

THIRD EDITION

STEVEN S. SMITH, JASON ROBERTS, AND RYAN VANDER WIELEN
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE and the
WEIDENBAUM CENTER ON THE ECONOMY, GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS

CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONGRESS, LOBBYISTS, AND INTEREST GROUPS

Most Americans believe that members of Congress are beholden to lobbyists and the special interests that lobbyists represent. A 1985 ABC News/*Washington Post* survey found that 70 percent of Americans agreed that “most members of Congress care more about special interests than they care about people like you.”¹ A few years later, a nearly identical percentage of Americans interviewed for a CBS/*New York Times* poll concurred with the statement, “Most members of Congress are more interested in serving special interest groups than the people they represent.”²

Members themselves are sensitive to the public’s view of their relationships with lobbyists and organized interests. During the Senate’s 1993 floor debate on legislation to tighten regulations on lobbyists, Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-New Jersey) made these observations:

Unfortunately, there is a widespread perception that Members of the Congress are failing to pursue the public interest and are responding to special interests inside the beltway. In the view of many, legislators have lost touch with ordinary Americans, in part because they enjoy an assortment of special perks and privileges that are unavailable to the general public. One legislator explained:

Now, I know and I believe deeply that many of my colleagues would not change their view on legislative matters because someone offers to buy them a meal or a gift. But the perception problem is real. And the fact is, many Members of Congress do enjoy special advantages that do not accrue to the ordinary American. And many of these special perks are specifically designed to influence Members in the performance of their official duties.

One prime example, Mr. President, is the way that many lobbyists shower Members of Congress with gifts. It is not unusual for lobbyists to give Members free tickets to, say, a show, a concert, a sporting event, and take them out to dinner before the event, buy them a cup of coffee and some nice desserts afterward or maybe a little champagne. Some lobbyists regularly take Members out for lavish meals at expensive restaurants. Let me add that we do not want to hurt the restaurant business, but this needs to be cleaned up.

Sometimes the lobbyists provide Members with free trips, typically involving stays in luxurious hotels in beautiful places, along with various forms of entertainment, whether it is playing tennis, golf, skiing, you name it.

I know that many of my colleagues feel that Members of Congress would not be influenced by a free dinner or even a luxury trip to the Caribbean. And I concur in that. Members of this body are serious, committed public servants who want to do what is right for their constituents and for the country at large.

However, it seems indisputable that these kinds of gifts have contributed to Americans' deepening distrust of Government, and Congress, in particular. And that is a serious problem, for as public trust diminishes, the ability of Congress to address our Nation's serious problems is also diminished.³

Congressional concern about the influence of lobbyists, or at least about the public's perception of members and lobbyists, led to action on new legislation to regulate lobbying in 1993 and 1994. Many members defended their own integrity during the sometimes-heated debates over lobbying reform, but few members dared defend lobbyists. Nonetheless, some noted the importance of lobbying in the American democracy. Senator Robert Dole (R-Kansas) observed that "Americans have a constitutional right to petition their Government. Lobbyists can—and many do—serve as surrogates for the millions of Americans who cannot make the trek to Washington themselves to express their views directly with their elected representatives."⁴ Indeed, the Constitution guarantees the rights of free speech and association and also guarantees the right to petition government for redress of grievances. These constitutional protections limit the ability of Congress to regulate lobbying and interest group activity.

Lobbyists and interest groups are key players in the legislative game because they are involved in nearly every aspect of legislative politics. They often persuade committee members and staff to put an issue on—or keep an issue off—the congressional agenda. They author much of the legislation that members introduce as bills or amendments. They often get involved in efforts to elect party leaders or to gain committee appointments for friendly legislators. Lobbyists also work to influence members' decisions when issues come to a vote, and many of them work to get some members reelected or defeated.

Frequently, lobbyists provide an important informational service to members, by representing perspectives that members may not be entirely familiar with. Senator John F. Kennedy once noted that:

Lobbyists are in many ways expert technicians and capable of explaining complex and difficult subjects in a clear, understandable fashion. They engage in personal discussions with members of Congress in which they can explain in detail the reasons for positions they advocate...Because our congressional representation is based on geographical boundaries, the lobbyists speak for the various economic, commercial, and other functional interests of this country serve a very useful purpose and have assumed an important role in the legislative process (*Congressional Record*).

The nature of the community of lobbyists and interest groups in Washington is the subject of this chapter. The tremendous expansion of the lobbying community, the

resources and strategies of lobbyists and groups, efforts to regulate lobbying, and the influence of lobbying on Congress are considered.

The Expanding Community of Lobbyists and Interest Groups

Lobbying has been a part of congressional politics from the first Congresses. In fact, it is often noted that Congress attracts an extraordinary number of lobbyists (see the accompanying box). Congress's great importance in national policy making is the primary reason it attracts so much attention from lobbyists. Furthermore, the relative weakness of congressional parties and the many points of access provided by the committee systems of the two houses give lobbyists more opportunities to influence Congress than they find in most other national legislatures. Lobbyists are easily able to find individual members who can champion a cause and have a chance to push the legislation to enactment.

Generalizing about lobbyists is difficult. Some lobbyists are officials of organized interest groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Sierra Club, and the National Cable Television Association. Other lobbyists are lawyers, former members or staff of Congress, or public relations specialists who have their own lobbying firms that are hired by interest groups, corporations, or other organizations to represent their interests on a specific bill or issue. Many lobbyists work for universities and colleges, state and local governments, and even foreign governments that seek to influence federal policy. Frequently, lobbyists are citizens who have made the trip to Washington to make their case in person.

Congressionally Speaking . . .

Lobbyist is a term that referred originally to reporters waiting in the lobby of the British House of Commons to speak to members of Parliament. In the mid-nineteenth century, the term came to be used for people seeking to influence legislators and soon gained quite negative connotations because of the money and other resources with which lobbyists plied legislators.

Today, a lobbyist has a more technical meaning in federal law—someone who is paid to communicate with Congress on behalf of others. And lobbyists now see themselves as specialized professionals. They even have their own professional association, the American League of Lobbyists.

Most interest groups represent occupational or organizational communities.⁵ Occupational groups include organizations representing doctors, teachers, accountants, and even association executives. Even government employees have many specialized interest groups—the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, for example. Many—perhaps most—interest groups are associations comprising organizations. Most trade associations, such as the American Petroleum

Institute, the Association of American Railroads, and the National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors, represent corporations in a particular sector of the economy. But associations representing member unions, universities, local governments, and other organizations are important as well. The Association of American Universities and the National League of Cities are prominent examples.

Citizens' groups compose about 20 percent of the interest group community. Political scientist Jack Walker observed that these groups usually arise in the wake of broad social movements concerned with such problems as the level of environmental pollution, threats to civil rights, or changes in the status of women. The groups formed to act as representatives of these social movements often are created by political entrepreneurs operating with the support of wealthy individuals, private foundations, or elected political leaders who act as their protectors, financial supporters, and patrons.⁶ Citizens' groups include Citizens for Tax justice, Common Cause, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Organization for Women, and Ralph Nader's Public Citizen.⁷ Their members generally are individuals rather than representatives of organizations or institutions.⁸

The size of the lobbying and interest group community has expanded tremendously in recent decades. A 1982 survey of 2,800 organizations that had lobbying offices in Washington found that 40 percent had been created since 1960 and 25 percent since 1970.⁹ One analyst found that the number of Washington offices for trade associations—the National Association of Manufacturers and the National Independent Retail jewelers, for example—nearly tripled from about 1,200 in 1960 to 3,500 in 1986. Even greater proportionate growth in the number of corporations with offices in Washington occurred in the same period.¹⁰ Today, more than three thousand corporations have some kind of representation in Washington.¹¹ In 1989, the privately published directory *Washington Representatives* listed more than twelve thousand “persons working to influence government policies and actions”—up from about four thousand just twelve years earlier.¹² And between 1961 and 1989, the number of Washington-area lawyers grew from about thirteen thousand to fifty-one thousand.¹³

Moreover, the Washington offices of even the older interest groups expanded their lobbying activity in recent decades. Two-thirds of the respondents to a survey of 175 lobbying organizations in the early 1980s reported that their organizations were more frequently contacting government officials to present their point of view and testifying at congressional hearings than in the past. More than 50 percent indicated that informally contacting government officials (at conventions, over lunch, and so on), helping draft legislation, and consulting with government officials to plan legislative strategy were more common than in the past.¹⁴

Many factors have contributed to the expansion of the interest group community and lobbying activity. Perhaps the most important factors are the rapid social and economic change and related expansion in the role of the federal government in recent decades. The creation of new groups was also a by-product of expanding federal regulation of the economy and growing federal programs that provided financial

benefits to individuals, organizations, and local governments. Firms affected by proposed or implemented regulations, recipients and potential recipients of federal benefits, and service deliverers (local governments, banks, and so on) had an incentive to organize and influence congressional policymaking.

Social movements have contributed to the growth of the interest group community as well. A common observation about the late twentieth century is that a series of social movements—civil rights, women’s rights, environmental protection, consumer rights—swept the country and spawned lasting interest groups. To be sure, traditional lobbying was not the main political strategy of many of these groups, but most began to emphasize congressional lobbying once they lost the spotlight of media attention. Many of the new citizens’ groups were labeled “single-issue groups” because of their focus on a particular set of issues. And, initially, most were liberal in political orientation. But the liberal groups were soon matched by conservative counter-movements. For example, Planned Parenthood was challenged by the National Right to Life Committee. The consequence of overorganization and counterorganization was the proliferation of strongly issue-oriented citizens’ groups and greater diversity in the kinds of groups found in Washington.

Yet, the interest group community remains dominated, at least numerically, by business interests. By one estimate, 70 percent of organized interests in Washington are business interests. According to political scientists John Tierney and Kay Lehman Schlozman, “While there has been a noticeable increase in the number of organizations representing the interest of consumers, the poor, and others traditionally unrepresented in the lobbying process, there has been a parallel increase, of far greater proportions, in the number of organizations representing corporate or other business interests.”¹⁵ Nevertheless, the growth of citizens’ groups does mean that business interests are more likely to be challenged and challenged successfully.

An enlarged middle class and technological advances also contributed to the growth of the Washington interest group community. The middle class has become an important base of support for occupational and citizens’ groups that depend on membership dues and contributions for financial support. Technological advances in communications and computer-generated mailings have facilitated the growth of groups that require support from the general public. And advances in communication and transportation have made it more convenient and affordable for groups to headquarter in Washington, far from concentrations of their members.

Finally, the federal government is responsible for directly stimulating the creation of some groups and underwriting their costs of operations. Much of the domestic legislation of the 1960s and 1970s required some kind of citizen participation in executive agency rule making or provided for the creation of community-based groups. Many interest groups representing citizen and environmental action groups, and legal and health care organizations for the poor, were stimulated by these public policies. Indeed, the activists running many of the new social programs actively promoted the creation of new organizations to represent their clients’ interests.¹⁶ In other cases,

federal agencies encouraged the formation of groups to facilitate communication between the agencies and the sector they serve and to build a base of support for their own programs and budgets. And, as federal domestic programs expanded, many more citizens' groups received grants or contracts from the federal government to conduct studies or perform services for executive agencies.

The enlarged community of lobbyists and interest groups has altered the political environment of members of Congress in important ways. The most obvious effect is that it has increased the diversity and intensity of demands placed on members of Congress. Issues of even modest importance are more likely to generate conflict among groups, and no one group is as likely to dominate policy making as was often the case at mid-century. There is now greater uncertainty about the mix of organized interests that will seek to influence congressional action and hold members accountable for their individual actions.

Furthermore, the large community of organized interests also creates opportunities for members to champion causes of organized interests and reap the benefits of publicity and campaign support that follow. As a result, the incentives for members to develop individualistic, entrepreneurial legislative styles are now greater than they were in the middle decades of the twentieth century.¹⁷ And there are now far more organized interests from which members can solicit campaign contributions. Conversely, this increase can also mean that there are numerous more organized interest groups that can mount opposition to members. Therefore, members must be cautious in taking action that may have an unfavorable effect upon an organized interest.

Influencing Congress

Influencing Congress involves much more than gaining the votes of individual members. Lobbyists work hard to find members who are willing to champion their causes. They need members to introduce their proposals as legislation, to offer amendments in committee and on the floor, and to help them get issues on, or keep issues off, the agendas of committees and subcommittees.

Moreover, lobbyists spend more time gathering, digesting, and reporting information to their clients than they do trying to influence Congress.¹⁸ They help their clients anticipate and track legislative developments that are difficult for people not experienced in congressional politics to follow. Because congressional politics and federal policy are so much more complex and important than they were a few decades ago, corporations and other organizations need the assistance of experienced insiders to observe and interpret congressional activity that might affect their interests. Therefore, a good lobbyist seeks to develop access to well-placed members and staff on Capitol Hill to meet the demands of his or her clients for information.

Lobbyists employ a wide range of techniques, which have evolved as lobbyists have adapted to changes in technology, society, and Congress. The empowerment of House subcommittees in the 1970s, the greater individualism in the membership, and

expansion of congressional staffs since the mid-twentieth century have forced lobbyists to develop relationships with more members and staff and follow the activity of more committees and subcommittees. At the same time, developments in electronic communications and computers have enabled lobbyists and interest groups to reach people throughout the country with ease.

These developments have stimulated important changes in the way lobbyists do their work. Many observers of Washington politics have noted the change from inside lobbying, or face-to-face efforts to influence a few important legislators, to outside strategies, or public relations efforts to generate public support for special interest causes.¹⁹ Perhaps more accurately, outside strategies have supplemented the old-style inside strategies that once dominated Washington lobbying.

Inside Lobbying

The more traditional form of lobbying—inside lobbying—involves personal contact between a lobbyist and members of Congress. Successful lobbyists use access to important decision makers, a network of contacts, mastery of the process, policy expertise, Washington experience, and money to develop strong ties to legislators and their staffs. Their success often depends on their being able to phone a prominent member of Congress, get the call returned promptly, and gather critical intelligence about when an issue will be raised or which member is wavering on an important provision. An aide to a former House Speaker characterized the work of the inside lobbyist this way:

They know members of Congress are here three nights a week, alone, without their families. So they say, “Let’s have dinner. Let’s go see a ballgame.” Shmooze with them. Make friends. And they don’t lean on it all the time. Every once in a while, they call up—maybe once or twice a year—ask a few questions. Call you up and say, “Say, what’s Danny [Rostenkowski, chair of the House Ways and Means Committee] going to do on this tax-reform bill?” Anne Wexler [a former official in the Carter White House, and now a lobbyist] will call up and spend half an hour talking about left-wing politics, and suddenly she’ll pop a question, pick up something. They want that little bit of access. That’s what does it. You can hear it. It clicks home. They’ll call their chief executive officer, and they’ve delivered. That’s how it works. It’s not illegal. They work on a personal basis.²⁰

Career Washingtonians—former members, former executive branch officials, and even the sons and daughters of prominent public officials (see the accompanying box)—who have developed personal friendships with members and their staffs are greatly advantaged in direct lobbying. Former members are particularly advantaged because they retain special advantages of access on Capitol Hill—access to the House and Senate floors, gyms, and dining rooms. They also benefit from the political and policy expertise gained from service in Congress, a certain visibility in Washington and in the country, and their established contacts with people and organizations with money.

Former congressional staff aides share many of the advantages enjoyed by former members and so make ideal inside lobbyists. A reporter noted in 1992 that “in the few short years since the passage of the historic Tax Reform Act of 1986, fully half of the aides who had worked with members of the congressional tax-writing committees had left their Capitol Hill jobs to lobby for many of the same corporate interests that were the bill’s biggest victims. The career path did not have any partisan coloration. Democratic aides left to work for business interests with about the same frequency as Republican aides did.”²¹ Indeed, many people join congressional staffs to develop contacts and skills that will make them attractive to law firms, corporations, and public relations houses that are looking for lobbyists.

Family Members as Lobbyists

Although laws and congressional rules are reasonably explicit about limits on campaign contributions and gifts from organized interests, the rules are ambiguous about to *who* can lobby politicians.

A recent trend among organized interest groups is to hire the relatives of key congressional members as lobbyists on a variety of issues. One example is Chet Lott, son of former Senate majority leader Trent Lott (R-MS), who was hired by multiple corporations and special interests to represent their cause. Among the corporations to hire Chet Lott was BellSouth, a competitor of the Mississippi-based communications giant WorldCom, which had long enjoyed Senator Lott’s support. Another example is Senator Harry Reid (R-NV) and his son and son-in-law. The senator supported measures endorsed by both close relatives, who have lobbied to facilitate federal land swaps, protect mining interests, and direct federal money to Nevada interests.

Critics have argued that using family members in such a manner creates a significant conflict of interest. To avoid generating controversy, many of the relatives of members that work in the lobbying arena have adopted policies of not professionally interacting with family serving public office. For example, Doris Matsui, wife of Representative Robert Matsui (D-CA), a senior member on the Ways and Means Committee, will not lobby any member on the Ways and Means Committee.

Source: Based on information from Juliet Eilperin, “The Ties That Bind on Capitol Hill,” *Washington Post*, August 7, 2003, p A19; Mark Preston, “Lott’s Son Lobbies Hill,” *Roll Call*, June 24, 2002, pp. 1, 30.

Beyond personal relations, money and information are essential ingredients of successful inside strategies. Money, of course, can be used as an outright bribe, though it seldom is any longer. But money has been a vital asset to gaining access to legislators. Money allows lobbyists to offer members trips to exclusive resorts to attend conferences or charity functions that are also attended by lobbyists and corporate leaders; to host outings to golf courses, ball games, and concerts; and to sponsor lunches, dinners, and receptions in Washington. Such activities have sometimes been

labeled “social lobbying” because they facilitate the development of strong social ties between lobbyists and members. Money also allows lobbyists to acquire other resources, such as the assistance of policy experts, which are often critical in dealing with legislators and their staffs.

The most obvious, and perhaps most important, use of money is for campaign contributions. Many lobbyists are in a position to direct campaign contributions from political action committees associated with organizations for which they work. Some lobbyists can make considerable contributions themselves. And many lobbyists orchestrate contributions from many political action committees and wealthy individuals to maximize their influence with a few legislators.

Just how much influence is exercised through campaign contributions is an open question (see the accompanying box). Most campaign contributions appear to flow to members who already support the positions of the contributors—the money follows the votes, the saying goes. But measuring the influence of campaign contributions is very difficult. Some contributions are intended to encourage members to remain inactive, or at least to not actively challenge policies favored by groups.²² Other contributions are designed to generate action at less visible stages of the legislative process—to offer an amendment in a subcommittee markup, to hold to a policy position in private negotiations in conference, and so on.²³

For a Price

Former senator Fred Harris (D-New Mexico) reports on comments made by a colleague of his, Senator Russell Long, who once chaired the Senate Committee on Finance and now is a prominent lawyer/lobbyist in Washington:

The colorful Democratic senator from Louisiana, Russell Long, used to tell a humorous story on himself that contained more than a kernel of truth about the effect of money in Senate campaigns. He said that in one of his reelection races, a union group brought him a cash contribution of \$5,000. “When he handed me the money,” Long related, “the leader of the group said, ‘All we want, Senator, is good government.’ And I told him, I said, ‘For a thousand dollars, you could have had good government; for five thousand dollars, you can have any kind of government you want!’”

Source: Based on information from Fred R. Harris, *Deadlock or Decision: The U.S. Senate and the Rise of National Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 80.

Despite the difficulties in gauging the influence of campaign contributions, few doubt that campaign contributions are an important link between members and those lobbyists who can generate large sums for the members’ campaigns. In recent years, lobbyists have become weary of members who insist that the lobbyists organize

fundraising activities on their behalf. Lobbyists often do not dare refuse, because they fear losing access that they have worked so hard to gain.²⁴

Information is a critical resource as well for the lobbyist engaged in inside lobbying. Legislators appear to have an insatiable desire for information about the policy and political consequences of their actions. Lobbyists who develop a reputation for having reliable information at hand are called on more frequently by legislators and are more likely to gain the access necessary for exercising influence. Of course, the amount of technical information a professional lobbyist is likely to have is limited, so success depends on having a network of contacts in research institutes, universities, executive agencies, corporations, or wherever expertise relevant to the lobbyist's interests is found. In fact, many lobbying firms and interest groups hire technical specialists such as lawyers and social and physical scientists so that they can provide timely information to decision makers and even conduct original research of their own.

Outside Lobbying

The most dramatic change in the lobbying business in recent decades has been the increase in outside, or grassroots, lobbying. Rather than relying solely on Washington lobbyists to make appeals on behalf of a cause, groups often attempt to mobilize their membership or the general public to generate outside pressure on members of Congress. Successful mobilization of members' constituents increases the stakes for members by increasing the likelihood that their actions will have electoral consequences. The survey of lobbying groups reported in Table 11.1 shows that more than 80 percent of groups inspired letter-writing or telegram campaigns, 80 percent mounted grassroots lobbying efforts and prodded influential constituents to contact their congressional representatives, and about one-third ran advertisements in the media about their positions on the issues.

Technology has driven innovations in outside lobbying. Throughout the history of Congress, groups of people from around the country have converged on Washington to demand action on their programs. Improved means of transportation have increased the frequency with which groups mobilize their members or the general public for marches, special lobbying days, and other events in Washington that are designed to heighten congressional interest and support for their causes. Mass marches have always been the necessary strategy of large groups without the money and experienced Washington lobbyists essential to effective inside strategies. But today many groups, even well-established groups, bring large numbers of people from around the country on special occasions to pressure members of Congress.

By the late 1960s, computer-generated mailings allowed groups to quickly send "legislative alert" letters to group members or targeted groups in the general public to stimulate an avalanche of mail and waves of phone calls to congressional offices. Members of Congress soon learned to identify and discount orchestrated letter-writing campaigns. Nevertheless, as lobbyist Bill Murphy observes, "The congressman has to care that *somebody out* there in his district has enough power to get hundreds of people to sit down and write a postcard or a letter—because if the guy can get them to do *that*,

he might be able to influence them in other ways. So, a member has no choice but to pay attention.”²⁵ At a minimum, a member must worry that those same constituents could be motivated, by the same means used to stimulate their letter writing, to contribute their money to or cast their votes for a member’s opponent.

TABLE 11.1 Percent of Interest Groups That Reported Using a Lobbying Technique

Testify at hearings	99
Contact government officials directly to present your point of view	98
Engage in informal contacts with officials—at conventions, over lunch, etc.	95
Present research results or technical information	92
Send letters to members of your organization to inform them about your activities	92
Enter into coalitions with other organizations	90
Attempt to shape the implementation of policies	89
Talk with people from the press and the media	86
Consult with government officials to plan legislative strategy	85
Help draft legislation	85
Inspire letter-writing or telegram campaigns	84
Mount grassroots lobbying efforts	80
Have influential constituents contact their congressman’s office	80
Make financial contributions to electoral campaigns	58
Publicize candidates’ voting records	44
Run advertisements in the media about your position on issues	31

Source: TABLE (Adapted)—“Percent of Interest Groups That . . .” from *Organized Interest and American Democracy* by Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, p. 150. Copyright © 1986 by Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney. Reprinted by permission of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.

Today’s lobbyists take outside strategies several steps further. For example, Washington-based firms have adapted telemarketing strategies to congressional politics. Working from computer-generated lists of Americans likely to support a particular point of view, telephone operators dial homes, ask a few questions, and effortlessly transfer the call to the appropriate congressional offices so that constituents’ views can be registered with their representatives and senators. Particular geographic constituencies can be targeted to maximize the pressure on a few members of Congress.²⁶

Increasingly, media advertising is an integral part of lobbying strategies. Most such advertising is intended to increase the visibility of an issue or cause and shape opinion in the general public. For the most part, the media ads are designed and produced by the same people who produce election campaign ads. One group, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, produces its own television programs that are shown on local stations throughout the country. And it uses its production and satellite facilities to link its Washington studios (which are just one block from the White House) with corporate sponsors.

In short, Washington lobbying has become very much like running an election campaign. Robert Beckel, a lobbyist who was Walter Mondale's 1984 presidential campaign manager, explains:

What we do is take campaign techniques and go out to the districts of these guys in Congress and organize the districts like a campaign. What we can do is get some real honest-to-goodness back-home pressure. We do a lot of subcontract work for lobby firms who say, "We got a real problem with Congressman X on this issue." And so we'll go into his district, and because we invariably know a lot of people in every district in the country, we'll find somebody who in a sense becomes a campaign manager for us. And we go to work on the congressman.²⁷

Beckel, a Democrat, joined with Republican campaign consultant Roger Stone in his lobbying enterprise—called National Strategies—so that the political networks of both parties could be exploited on behalf of their clients. In fact, bipartisan lobbying partnerships have become commonplace.

The growing importance of outside strategies has led to the proliferation of "full-service" lobbying firms. These large firms combine traditional insider lobbyists with policy experts; public relations, graphic arts, and media specialists; speechwriters; campaign fundraisers; communications and computer technicians; and even pollsters in one large working group. The model is Hill & Knowlton Public Affairs, a firm with more than 180 employees that boasts its own broadcast studio. The firm includes former members of Congress, staff assistants, and executive officials from both parties. Hill & Knowlton (known as H & K in Washington) is owned by a British advertising company.²⁸

Coalitions

Whatever an interest group's mix of inside and outside strategies, it seldom stands alone in major legislative battles. Many coalitions are created for specific issues and then disappear once congressional action on certain legislation is complete. Other coalitions are more enduring. Some coalitions have formal names; others do not. Coalitions are a means for pooling the resources of lobbyists and groups. They also are a means for lobbyists and groups to demonstrate a broad base of support for their cause and to make their effort appear to be as public-spirited as possible. Some coalitions are the creation of lobbyists looking to manufacture a new client.

The Choice of Strategies

In 1980, political scientist Jack Walker conducted a detailed survey of the top officers in 734 national interest groups. Walker found that

most groups adopt a preferred style of political action early in their histories, and, when these early choices are made, group leaders naturally emulate the tactics being employed at that time by the most successful groups. Once either an inside or outside strategy becomes the association's dominant approach, it is very difficult to move in a new direction. Choices made early in the history of a group establish a strategic style that restricts innovation, largely because political strategies are so intertwined with other basic organizational decisions.

Not surprisingly, Walker discovered that groups facing organized opposition to their goals tend to more aggressively pursue both inside and outside strategies than do other groups. Outside strategies, however, are more frequently the choice of groups with many local chapters or subunits, citizens' groups, and groups from the nonprofit sector (local governments, universities, non-profit professions, and so on). Inside strategies are more likely to be the choice of groups representing business and groups that have established large central office staffs, usually in Washington.

Source: Based on information from Jack L. Walker, Jr., *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), pp. 103-121; quote from pp. 119-120.

A good example of a coalition is the Council on Research and Technology, or Coretech. In 1990, forty-six companies and seventy-two universities were members of Coretech. The coalition's legislative agenda was increased federal spending on university-based research and federal tax breaks for corporations' research and development expenditures. The executive director of the group was lawyer and professional lobbyist Kenneth Kay, who had been an aide to Senator Max Baucus, the chief Senate proponent of research and development tax credits. A close observer of the coalition's work noted that "corporations quietly financed most of Coretech's activities, and through it lobbied for federal handouts that were even more expensive than the legislation sought by their university allies. The largest beneficiaries of Coretech's legislative agenda were not scientists or even science, but the shareholders of a few dozen big-name corporations."²⁹ Nevertheless, universities likely believe that their cause benefits from their association with the well-financed coalition backed by some of the most respected corporations (IBM, Hewlett Packard, and Digital Equipment Corporation, among others).

Sometimes, organized interest groups form coalitions with other groups with similar objectives to increase their effectiveness. In the most basic form, interest groups may simply coordinate effort to maximize resources. On a more complex level, interest groups may engage in fiscal alliances to reduce the formal limitations placed upon them. Specifically, those interest groups operating as charitable organization may

accept tax-deductible contributions, however, they may dedicate no more than 20 percent of their annual expenditures to lobbying activity. Conversely, organizations operating as social welfare organizations may not deduct contributions, but have no limit on the amount of money they may dedicate to lobbying, assuming that their actions are in compliance with regulations governing campaign contributions. Therefore, some organizations reap tax advantages and encounter sizeable restrictions on lobbying, while others face tax disadvantages yet have fewer limitations on the funding of lobbying efforts. Thus, depending on their objectives, some organization may choose to join forces to circumvent these trade-offs. For instance, a charitable organization may decide to transfer money to social welfare organizations to increase their ability to lobby. One such group known to do this is the Sierra Club. In 2000, the Sierra Club transferred approximately 65 percent of its funds to organizations that had fewer limitations on lobbying (APSA paper).

Members Influencing Organized Interests

The relationship between lobbyists and members is a mutual one. As discussed earlier in this chapter, members benefit greatly from contributions made by lobbyists that help to strengthen their reelection efforts. But lobbyists also rely on the support of members to gain access to legislative process. Thus, lobbyists must be willing to accommodate sympathetic members that are critical to their legislative cause(s). Often, members ask lobbyists to generate interest in an issue that is central to that member's constituency by using outside lobbying mechanisms. In other cases, a member may request that lobbyists assist in his or her own reelection effort or the reelection of a colleague that is in danger of losing a seat.

Party Leaders Instruct Lobbyists

In the months preceding the 2002 congressional elections, lobbyists reported that the party leaders, particularly Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) and Minority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS), threatened to block their legislation if they supported the wrong candidate in the South Dakota Senate race between Senator Tim Johnson (D) and Representative John Thune (R). The threats had mixed results. Many lobbyists paid heed to the warnings and supported the candidate of the party that was perceived to be critical to achieving their goals. One conservative interest group decided that Daschle's threat was so credible that they would not contribute to Thune's campaign. In the end, Johnson emerged victorious after having out-spent his opponent by nearly a million dollars.

Source: Based on information from Chris Cillizza and John Bresnahan, "Lobbyists Warned on S.D. Race," *Roll Call*, December 16, 1995, pp. 1, 21.

In making the decision as to whether or not to comply with the demands of a member, lobbyists must assess just how credible a member's threat of legislative obstruction is. If a lobbyist's objective is central to the member's constituency, then it

is unlikely that the member will carry out the threat to block the lobbyist's legislation. However, if the lobbyist's cause is tangential to the issues that get a member reelected, than it is likely that the threat is credible. In other words, members have greater leverage over lobbyists in this relationship when the issues promoted by lobbyists are not central to members' political careers.

Grassroots vs. Astroturf

New technologies and strategies have greatly expanded efforts to influence members of Congress by generating an avalanche of phone calls and letters to Capitol Hill. A type of grassroots lobbying, the new contrivances have been labeled astroturf lobbying.

Sometimes the new strategies are too obvious to succeed. For example, a group called the Health Care Coalition had operators call small business owners who were likely to be affected by an amendment pending in the House, tell them that the amendment would be bad for managed health care, and then offer to connect them to the office of the member from their district. Dozens of calls were targeted at critical members.

In another case, hundreds of telegrams were dumped onto the floor of the House Commerce Committee to show public opposition to a telecommunications bill. Perhaps thousands more were sent directly to members. Suspicious congressional aides discovered that many of the telegrams were sent without the signatories' permission by a group called the Seniors Coalition. The public relations firm in charge of the effort blamed shoddy work by a mass marketing subcontractor. Some of the signatories proved to be deceased.

Source: Juliet Eilperin, "Dingell Takes on Bogus Mailgram," *Roll Call*, October 16, 1995, pp. 1, 20. Reprinted by permission.

Regulating Lobbying

Modern lobbying is remarkably clean and ethical, at least when compared with lobbying during most of American history. In the nineteenth century, lobbyists ran gambling establishments to put legislators in their debt and openly paid members for representing their interests on Capitol Hill. With few exceptions, the retainers and bribes are gone. In fact, lobbyists now have their own professional code of ethics.

At various points throughout history, congressional, journalistic, and criminal investigations have exposed remarkably corrupt lobbying practices, but on only a few occasions did Congress or either house impose any restrictions on lobbying. In 1876, for example, Congress for the first time required that lobbyists register, but the rule was in effect for only one Congress. Congress did not pass its first comprehensive lobbying regulations until 1946, when the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act was adopted as a part of the Legislative Reorganization Act.

The central feature of the 1946 law was the requirement that people who solicit or receive money for the purpose of influencing legislation must register with the clerk of the House or the secretary of the Senate. Lobbyists were required to file quarterly reports on the money they received for and spent on lobbying. The authors of the 1946 act hoped that disclosure of lobbyists' clients and legislative purposes would put members, reporters, and the public in a better position to evaluate lobbyists' influence.

The law proved to be unenforceable. In 1954, the Supreme Court ruled in *United States v. Harriss* that the registration and reporting requirements applied only to those persons who are paid by others to lobby and who contact members directly, and whose "principal purpose" is to influence legislation.³⁰ The Court argued that the First Amendment to the Constitution, which prohibits Congress from making a law that abridges the right "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances," limits Congress's ability to regulate an individual's right to represent himself before Congress and to organize other people for influencing Congress. By limiting the force of the 1946 act to those lobbyists whose principal purpose is to influence legislation, the Court created a large loophole for anyone who wanted to claim that influencing legislation was not his or her principal purpose.

Interest in creating meaningful registration and reporting requirements was renewed in the early 1990s. Ross Perot gave great emphasis to the influence of "special interests" in his 1992 presidential campaign. Perot's theme was reinforced by television reports about members' all-expenses-paid trips to vacation resorts where they fraternized with lobbyists. And a large number of members elected for the first time in the 1990s had promised to reduce the influence of special interests in Washington. The result was consideration of significant lobbying reforms.

In late 1995, Congress enacted new legislation designed to close some of the loopholes in the 1946 law. The new law extends the 1946 law that covered only people who lobbied members of Congress, to those who seek to influence congressional staff and top executive branch officials. Anyone who is hired to lobby a covered public official must register with the clerk of the House and the secretary of the Senate within forty-five days of being hired or making the first contact. People who receive five thousand dollars or less in a six-month period and organizations that spend less than twenty thousand dollars in a six-month period do not have to register. Thus, average citizens do not have to register. Semiannual reports on the issues lobbied must be filed. Lobbyists for foreign governments or organizations must register. The registration requirement excludes grassroots, lobbying, such as efforts to persuade people to write members of Congress.

The new law more than doubled the number of registered lobbyists. Among the newly registered were a variety of lobbying coalitions—organized groups of lobbyists, associations, and lobbying firms—that had not been registered under the old law.³¹ Separately, the House and Senate adopted rules that limited or banned lobbyists' gifts to members and staff. The Senate bans gifts valued at more than fifty dollars, including

meals and entertainment. Gifts from any one source cannot exceed one hundred dollars in value for a year, with gifts under ten dollars excluded from calculation. The House adopted a stricter policy that bans all gifts to members and staff. Gifts from family members and gifts of token value (T-shirts, mugs) are excluded. Both houses prohibit expense-paid trips, even to charitable events.

Members' Groups and Legislative Service Organizations

Special interests can exert more than external pressures on members of Congress. Groups of members frequently coalesce or even formally organize to pursue specific political interests. In fact, informal groups of members have been prominent features of Washington politics since the early Congresses. In the early nineteenth century, members tended to find lodging in boarding houses where they found like-minded colleagues.³² Informal but conspicuous intraparty factions, such as southern Democrats, have been quite important from time to time. And state delegations, particularly those of the larger states, have been the building blocks for coalitions throughout the history of Congress.³³ Two developments of recent decades have altered the character of membership groups.

The first is that intra-party factions developed formal organizations, with formal memberships, elected leaders, staff, offices, and even membership dues. The prototype, and still the largest such group, is the Democratic Study Group (DSG). The DSG was formed in 1959 by House Democratic liberals to counter the strength of the conservative coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats. The services of the DSG—especially issuing and scheduling reports—eventually became so highly valued that nearly all Democrats joined and contributed dues to take advantage of the group's work.³⁴ Nevertheless, the DSG remains the organizational focal point for liberal activists in the House.

Even more remarkable was the explosion of single-issue caucuses with bipartisan membership. Since the early 1970s, dozens of caucuses have been formed. In 2003, nearly 300 caucuses existed. The Arts Caucus and the Congressional Sportmen's Caucus formed to promote certain public funding for the arts and to oppose many proposed regulations on fire arms, respectively; regional interests are promoted by the Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition, the Congressional Sunbelt Council, the Tennessee Valley Authority Caucus, and the Western Caucus. Both constituency concerns and personal circumstances provide a foundation for the Congressional Black Caucus, Hispanic Caucus, and Caucus for Women's Issues. District economic interests are reflected in the Congressional Minor League Caucus, Automotive Caucus, Steel Caucus, Textile Caucus, and Travel and Tourism Caucus.

Caucuses are a way to become involved in and demonstrate a commitment to a particular cause or issue that falls outside of the scope of their regular committee duties. This is particularly true in the House, where most members are limited to two committee assignments. In fact, about 90 percent of caucuses are found in the House. In most cases, a caucus is a basis for publicizing a cause or an issue and building policy

coalitions within Congress. Outside interest groups seeking to cultivate congressional support for their interests have stimulated the creation of many congressional caucuses. In some cases, outside interest groups provided financial support for staff, publications, conferences, and other expenses incurred by congressional caucuses, a practice that has since been curtailed somewhat by House rules. But interest groups continue to sponsor fundraising events and directly support foundations that underwrite the costs of congressional caucuses.

Health and Medical Research

Health is among the most popular subjects for congressional caucuses. These caucuses include:

- Coalition for Autism Research and Education
- Congressional Biomedical Research Caucus
- Congressional Brain Injury Task Force
- Congressional Diabetes Caucus
- Congressional Digestive Diseases Caucus
- Congressional Fitness Caucus
- Congressional Glaucoma Caucus
- Congressional Hearing Health Caucus
- Congressional Heart and Stroke Coalition
- Congressional Kidney Caucus
- Congressional Mental Health Caucus
- Congressional Spina Bifida Caucus
- Congressional Task Force on Alzheimer's Disease
- Congressional Task Force on International HIV/AIDS
- Congressional Task Force on Tobacco and Health
- Congressional Vision Caucus
- Congressional Working Group on Parkinson's Disease
- Generic Drug Equity Caucus
- Home Health Care Working Group
- House Cancer Caucus
- House Nursing Caucus
- House Rural Health Care Coalition
- Medical Technology Caucus
- Organ and Tissue Donation Task Force
- Prescription Drug Task Force
- School Health and Safety Caucus
- Senate Cancer Care Coalition
- Senate Hunger Caucus
- 2015 Caucus

Many caucuses were formally recognized in the House as “legislative service organizations,” or LSOs, and were subject to audits and a few regulations. LSOs were controversial because they received dues from members’ office accounts and gained office space in the House office buildings. Critics charged that this practice allowed money from office accounts to be spent indirectly for purposes—dinners, for example—for which office account funds cannot be spent directly. Moreover, many LSOs bridged the gap between interest groups and congressional caucuses by creating foundations and institutes with close ties to both external groups and internal caucuses. In the view of some critics, the ability of lobbyists and interest groups to contribute money to these new foundations was just another way for special interests to support travel and social events for members and congressional staff participating in the work of the foundations.

LSOs were banned by the House Republican majority in early 1995. Consequently, LSO caucuses lost special privileges—the ability to receive dues paid from official budgets and office space in House buildings. Instead, caucuses may register as congressional member organizations, or CMOs, with more limited privileges. Members of CMOs may jointly pay for staff and other functions, but they do not pay dues for separate staff and activities. Only a half dozen or so CMOs had been formed by late 2003. Consequently, most caucuses are not formally recognized by either house of Congress, although members advertise their membership in the groups as if they had some important policy-making status.

The Influence of Lobbyists and Interest Groups

Even experienced and insightful watchers of the lobbying and interest group community have mixed views about the influence of special interest lobbying. A popular view in the 1950s and 1960s was that policymaking was dominated by “subgovernments” or “iron triangles”—tightly bound sets of interest groups, executive agencies, and committees. According to this view, cozy relationships among lobbyists, bureaucrats, and members prevented other interests from influencing policy choices and implementation. The subgovernments perspective was always recognized as an overly stylized view, but it captured an important feature of Washington politics: In many policy areas, only a few groups, agencies, and members took an interest in the issues, and so they dominated the policy choices that were made.³⁵

The classic case of subgovernment policy making was mid-twentieth century agriculture policy politics. Generally, only those agriculture groups directly affected by certain federal commodities programs, the Agriculture Department bureaus that ran the programs, and a few members sitting on the agriculture committees of Congress took an active interest in farm policy. Those groups, bureaucrats, and members interested in the various farm commodities assisted each other in gaining congressional approval of the periodic legislation that supported federal programs. Although federal taxpayers paid for these programs, the costs were not so high as to breed resistance. And the lack of conflict among agriculture sector groups and decision makers helped keep others from paying attention.³⁶

Many political scientists responded to the subgovernments' perspective by noting the special conditions that allow a subgovernment to develop and dominate policy making. The most important feature is little conflict. Conflict among the interested groups and members would encourage the contending forces to recruit supporters from a broader range of groups, members, executive branch officials, and even the general public. Expanding the scope of the conflict in this way usually alters the balance of forces and the policy outcome.³⁷ The low level of conflict, in turn, is the product of the concentrated benefits and widely distributed costs of some programs. The beneficiaries are motivated to organize and lobby to protect their interests, and the fairly small burden on taxpayers stimulates little opposition. But the number of people affected by policy choices, distribution of costs and benefits, and the scope and intensity of conflict varies greatly across policy areas. The result is great variation in the role of groups in shaping policy choices.³⁸

Political scientist Hugh Heclo noticed that policy areas once dominated by subgovernments had lost their insular character by the 1970s. Heclo coined the term *issue networks* to capture the more diverse, mutually antagonistic, and fluid character of the lobbying and interest group community found in many policy areas.³⁹ Many factors contributed to the change. In the 1960s and 1970s, new citizens' groups, many of which were by-products of broad-based social movements, challenged established groups. Groups representing economic interests proliferated, partly in response to new government policies and regulations, which led to a fragmentation of Washington representation in many policy areas that were once dominated by just one or two groups. And congressional reforms made Congress more open, accessible, and democratic, which encouraged new groups to lobby and stimulated more members of Congress to champion the cause of once-neglected interests.

Analysts are divided on the issue of the political meaning of the expansion of the interest group community and the breakdown of subgovernments. Tierney and Scholzman emphasize the continuing numerical advantage of business-oriented groups. They also observe that the explosion of interest group activity has

introduced a potentially dysfunctional particularism into national politics. If policymakers in Congress are forced to find an appropriate balance between deference to the exigencies of the short run and the consideration of consequences for the long run, between acquiescence to the clearly expressed wishes of narrow groups that care intensely and respect for the frequently unexpressed needs of larger publics, the balance may have shifted too far in the direction of the near-term and the narrow.⁴⁰

Political scientist Robert Salisbury disagrees. He insists that the large number of corporate lobbyists and the tremendous resources of business groups should not lead us to conclude

that business interests or even self-serving groups invariably prevail. The total system of policy advocacy is far broader than the array, vast as it is, of organized interest groups. Every holder of public office—indeed, every candidate for public office—is or may be an

advocate of some policy alternatives. Members of Congress do not wait passively for lobbyists to persuade them one way or the other; they too are advocates, as are the more prominent members of the administration, the editorialists and commentators in the mass media, the academic pundits and writers, and a host of other citizens who write letters, attend rallies, argue with each other, and generally make their views known on policy questions of the day.⁴¹

Besides, Salisbury contends, most business-group resources are devoted to monitoring government activity important to business decisions rather than to influencing policy choices.⁴²

It seems fair to say that Tierney and Schlozman's critical view is more widely shared among sophisticated observers of congressional politics than is Salisbury's more forgiving perspective. Nevertheless, Salisbury's note of caution is important. Lobbyists and interest groups are not the only source of pressure on members. Nor are they the only important source of change in the nature of congressional politics. Communications and transportation technologies, electoral campaigns, the structure of the legislative process, the distribution of power within Congress, and other factors affect the balance of forces influencing congressional policy choices as well.

Conclusion

Lobbyists and interest groups remain one of the most controversial and least well-understood features of the legislative game. They appear to be both an essential part of the representation of interests before Congress and a source of bias in the policy choices made by Congress. Generally, they direct members' attention to narrow and parochial issues that might otherwise not be addressed. Whatever their consequences, lobbyists and interest groups now form a much larger and more diverse community than they did just a few decades ago. They bring to bear on Congress more money, more expertise, and a larger repertoire of strategies than ever before. These developments have sensitized the general public about the influence of special interests and produced new efforts to regulate lobbyists and lobbying.

NOTES

¹ Cited in David B. Magleby and Candice J. Nelson, *The Money Chase: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990), p. 75.

² Chuck Alston, "Image Problems Propel Congress Back to Campaign Finance Bills," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, February 2, 1991, p. 277.

³ *Congressional Record*, May 3, 1993, p. S5502.

⁴ *Congressional Record*, May 3, 1993, p. S5574.

⁵ Jack L. Walker, Jr., *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), p. 10.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

⁷ On Common Cause and public interest groups, see Andrew S. McFarland, *Common Cause* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1984); on the National Organization for Women, see Joyce Gelb and Marian Leif Palley, *Women and Public Policies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).

⁸ Walker, *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America*, pp. 64-66.

⁹ Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), pp. 74-82.

¹⁰ Jeffrey M. Berry, *The Interest Group Society*, 2nd ed. (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1989), pp. 20-21.

¹¹ John T. Tierney and Kay Lehman Schlozman, "Congress and Organized Interests," in Christopher J. Deering (Ed.), *Congressional Politics* (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1989), p. 204.

¹² Fred R. Harris, *Deadlock or Decision: The U.S. Senate and the Rise of National Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 64.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹⁴ Schlozman and Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy*, p. 155.

¹⁵ Tierney and Schlozman, "Congress and Organized Interests," p. 205.

¹⁶ James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 203.

¹⁷ On these themes, see Hugh Hecllo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in Anthony King (Ed.), *The New American Political System* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), pp. 87-124; Robert H. Salisbury, "The Paradox of Interest Groups in Washington—More Groups, Less Clout," in Anthony King (Ed.), *The New American Political System*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1990), pp. 203-229; and Barbara Sinclair, *The Transformation of the U.S. Senate* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), Chapter 4.

- ¹⁸ Robert Salisbury, “The Paradox of Interest Groups in Washington.”
- ¹⁹ Hedrick Smith, *The Power Game* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988).
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 232.
- ²¹ Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, *The Lobbyists: How Influence Peddlers Work Their Way in Washington* (New York: Times Books, 1993), p. 127.
- ²² Harris, *Deadlock or Decision*, pp. 81-82.
- ²³ Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman, “Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees,” *American Political Science Review*, September 1990, p. 815.
- ²⁴ Schlozman and Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy*, pp. 242-246.
- ²⁵ Quoted in Tierney and Schlozman, “Congress and Organized Interests,” p. 212.
- ²⁶ Birnbaum, *The Lobbyists*, pp. 234-235.
- ²⁷ Smith, *The Power Game*, pp. 240-241.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 208-209. Also see p. 236.
- ²⁹ Birnbaum, *The Lobbyists*, pp. 82-100; quote from p. 83.
- ³⁰ *United States v. Harriss et al.*, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
- ³¹ Mary Jacoby, “The Newly Registered Lobbyists: Coalitions,” *Roll Call*, April 18, 1995, pp. 1, 20.
- ³² James Sterling Young, *The Washington Community, 1800-1828* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).
- ³³ Tom Watson, “State Delegations: Power’s Payoffs and Pitfalls,” *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, January 3, 1987, pp. 24-28.
- ³⁴ Arthur G. Stevens, Jr., Arthur H. Miller, and Thomas E. Mann, “Mobilization of Liberal Strength in the House, 1955-1970: The Democratic Study Group,” *American Political Science Review*, June 1974, pp. 667-681.
- ³⁵ The term *subgovernments* comes from Douglass Cater, *Power in Washington* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), and Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1966). Also see J. Leiper Freeman, *The Political Process* (New York: Random House, 1965).
- ³⁶ See William P. Browne, *Private Interests, Public Policy, and American Agriculture* (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1988).
- ³⁷ E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1960).
- ³⁸ Theodore J. Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory,” *World Politics* (1964), pp. 677-715; and “Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice,” *Public Administration Review* (1972), pp. 298-310. Also see Randall B.

Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, *Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1980).

³⁹ Hugh Hecllo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," pp. 87-124. Also see "Interest Groups, Iron Triangles, and Representative Institutions in American National Government," *British Journal of Politics* (1984), pp. 161-185.

⁴⁰ Tierney and Schlozman, "Congress and Organized Interests," p. 216.

⁴¹ Robert H. Salisbury, "Putting Interests Back into Interest Groups," in Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis (Eds.), *Interest Group Politics*, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991), pp. 382-383.

⁴² Salisbury, "The Paradox of Interest Groups in Washington," pp. 203-229.