Since its inception in 1982, this annual lecture series has brought to campus a number of distinguished historians. They have shared with us their insights on some facet of the past; they have provided us with a critical perspective on the present; they have encouraged us to exchange our own ideas; they have stimulated our historical imaginations; they have challenged us to look at the past so that we may envision alternative futures; and they have created for us opportunities to continue our search for understanding a complex and often confounding world. The topic of tonight's lecture readily lends itself to such contemplation.
Our speaker, Dr. Norman M. Naimark, received his Ph.D. degree from Stanford University in 1972. He has taught at Boston University and WeUesley College, has been a Fellow at Harvard University and the Hoover Institution, and has served as the Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies. He is currently Robert and Florence McDonnell Professor of East European Studies and Chair of the Department of History at Stanford University. Dr. Naimark has received numerous fellow ships and awards, including research grants from the International Research and Exchange Board (IREX), the Fulbright-Hays Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the American Council of Learned Societies. He is the author of three books: The History of the "Proletariat": The Emergence of Marxism in the Kingdom of Poland, 1870-1887(1979); Terrorists and Social Democrats The Russian Revolutionary Movement Under Alexander III (1983); and The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (1995). The title of his talk tonight is: "Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe." I am very pleased to introduce Norman Naimark.
Roger Biles, Chair
Department of History
The phrase "ethnic cleansing" became a part of the vocabulary of public opinion with press
coverage of the Yugoslav war in May of 1992. The term began to be used with phenomenal
frequency to describe the attack of Serbs on Bosnian Muslims, and to indicate that the purpose
of the attacks was to eliminate the Muslims from large swaths of Bosnian territory.2 The term also was applied to Serbian attacks on Croats
in Eastern Slavonia and Krajina the year before and was gradually extended to similar, though
less intense, actions by the Croats and Bosnian Muslims against the Serbs. Almost immediately,
there was controversy about the use of the phrase itself as a euphemism for genocide.3 In fact it became quickly apparent from a series of
Serbian atrocities in the late spring and summer of 1992 and the concurrent revelations by
Roy Gutman about the inhuman conditions and criminal acts committed against Muslims in the
Serbian detention camps, that ethnic cleansing did have genocidal implications.4 It was equally clear, however, that the Bosnian Serbs'
primary goal was to drive the Muslims out of the parts of Bosnia they claimed for their
incipient republic.
Instead of developing a precise and structured definition of ethnic cleansing, I would rather let the term assume a meaning in the course of its historical explication. In fact, if there is a definition I find attractive, it is similar to the definition of ethnicity provided by R. D. Grille: "Ethnicity arises in the interaction of groups. It exists in the boundaries constructed between them." Moreover, "it is IN history, the flow of past events, that the emergence and variation appear, and only THROUGH history can understand them.5 In short, ethnic cleansing is defined by its history.
Despite numerous instances throughout history of the expulsions of minorities and subject peoples by their rulers and conquerors this lecture suggests that the kind of ethnic cleansing experienced in the twentieth century is distinctive, both in its ideological and political motivations and in its intensity. Thus ethnic cleansing as experienced, for example, in the former Yugoslavia, is unique to the 20th century, not a product of "ancient hatreds, as so often suggested by politicians and journalists. The pogroms in late nineteenth-century Russia do not prefigure Stalin's planned deportation of Jews--a potential second Shoah--before he mercifully died in March 1953. Turkish attacks on the Armenian population in Sassun, Zeitun, and Constantinople in the mid-1890s under Abdul Hamid II were profoundly different in scale, intensity and type from the Young Turk-inspired Armenian genocide of 1915. Daniel Goldhagen notwithstanding, the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis was not simply the last phase and natural outcome of centuries of German anti-Semitism.6
The foundational ideas of ethnic cleansing emerged from the development of European nationalism in the late 19th century The articulation of political, ethnic exclusivism, and integral nationalism belong to the modem world, both in its post-Darwinist and anti-Positivist intellectual phase and in its late colonial and pre-World War I nationalist incarnation The genocidal potential of integral nationalism was already apparent in the Balkan Wars and in World War I. The important point is that the modern era organized nations by ethnic criteria.
Modern ideology cannot in and of itself explain the twentieth-century impulse to attack other peoples. The nation-state system is critical for ethnic cleansing to work. The creation, building, and reconstruction of states, which requires the mobilization of their resources, both human and material, brings reasons of state to expose the supposed dysfunctionality of heterogeneous populations. Modern technology, modern communications, modern media, modern transportation, modern school systems, and modern weaponry are all part and parcel of the phenomenon of eliminating nations within nations.7 Some scholars of Germany and the Holocaust trace killing systems to the industrialization of warfare that was developed and refined in World War I.8 Part of the relationship between ethnic cleansing and the modem state also has to do with issues of population control and management, census taking, and state intervention in reproductive policy This becomes especially clear in the post-World War I German and Soviet cases, where the relationship between the individual and the state underwent a remarkable regularization, characterized by the thoroughgoing attention to the ethnicity of the citizen. Even in the relatively backward Turkish state of Mustapha Kemal, the idea of Turkish nationality became much more regularized and bureaucratized than such identities in the earlier world of the Ottoman sultans, which were complicated by the relationships between the millets and the dominant Muslim religious nation.9
To focus the responsibility for ethnic cleansing on the nature of the modem state does not relieve political leadership of its guilt for the brutal expulsion and deportation undertaken by the state in the name of its interests. On the contrary given the power of the nation-state, ethnic cleansing of the sort that permeates the 20th century could not take place without the initiatives and connivance of politicians and responsible state officials. The scientific and technological revolution of the late 19th century produced a class of "new professionals," physicians, engineers, psychiatrists, who played prominent roles in ethnic cleansing. Medical doctors, in particular, were extremely important in the development of the Young Turks and their assault on the presence of Greeks and Armenians in Anatoli.10 Nazi doctors and medical researchers were critical to the development of the "science" of eugenics and of racial theory that led to the ideological justification for the elimination of the Jews.11 The fact that the Bosnian Serbian leaders of ethnic cleansing included Radovan Karadzic--a psychiatrist--and engineers, like Slobodan Milosevic, lead one to suspect that modem professional ethics are not inimical to mass murder.
The Cases
This lecture is divided into two basic parts. First, I will briefly describe the five cases I am studying. Second, I shall explore a series of preliminary observations about the historical phenomenon of ethnic cleansing itself.
(1) I begin with the Ottoman Empire (and Turkey) and examine the Armenian genocide of 1915. I also want to look at the Armenian case through the perspective of the expulsion of the Greeks from Turkey, part of which (along with the expulsion of the Turks from Greece) was regulated by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. It is worth noting at the outset that the Armenian issue is the most contentious and difficult historiographical problem of all of those I have studied. 12
(2) The lecture also considers Nazi ideology and the Holocaust, subjects--obviously--of intense investigation and a huge body of scholarly literature. In this case, I will focus on the ideology of genocide--what people said they were doing and why, and how this interacted with other elements of Nazi racial, eugenic, and medical/health policy. I rely primarily on the work of specialists on the Third Reich, who have examined the development of genocidal ideas and the state-authorized killing of deformed children and mental patients during the spring and summer of 1939. This policy was widened in the fall to include more and more of the "hereditary ill" in "euthanasia" programs.13 The most salient period of my work on Nazi policy towards the Jews is from the initial occupation of Poland in September 1939 to the outbreak of the war against the Soviet Union in June 1941. A new and even more horrific stage in the elimination of the Jews began in the fall of 1941 with the massacres by SS Einsatzgruppen in Eastern Poland and Russia and ultimately followed by the idea of their total extermination. Christopher Browning suggests that this "final solution" was born in October 1941 and refined by the Wannsee conference of January 1942. 14 In this last period, the term ethnic cleansing no longer has much meaning; we are dealing with genocide, the Holocaust, Shoah. In this sense, the Holocaust is the most extreme version of ethnic cleansing that one witnesses in the 20th century, indeed that can be imagined.
(3) The third case is twofold: the expulsion of Germans from Poland and correspondingly from the Czech lands at the end of World War II and the beginning of the peace. These are particularly useful cases for reversing the moral lenses that inevitably color our views of the process of ethnic cleansing. In these cases, the victims, the Germans, aroused very little sympathy at the time of their expulsions, and it is still hard to muster a sense outrage about what was done to them, given their earlier behavior in Poland, and in the Czech lands as well. Even here, one's sense of moral balance is overwhelmed by the comparison. As we know, the Germans killed and murdered roughly six million Polish citizens, half ethnic Poles and half ethnic Jews. The Nazi occupation of Poland was brutal in the extreme, a good start to Hitler's plan in Mein Kampf to reduce the Poles to a slave labor status while eliminating their intelligentsia and national aspirations. Despite the outrages of the Lidice massacre and the suffering of Czech partisans in the concentration camp of Teresin (Theresienstadt), the Czech nation survived the war intact. Indeed, historians have argued that Czech industry was actually in better shape after the war than on its eve and that the Czech commercial infrastructure was not seriously damaged. Hitler did not get very far with his ideas about eventually expelling the Czechs from Bohemia and Moravia. Yet the ethnic cleansing of the Czech German population was every bit as brutal as that of the Germans from Poland.
The East European cases also bring into focus the question of whether totalitarian and communist regimes are more likely to practice ethnic cleansing than democratic ones. In the Czech case, it is quite clear that the cleansing of the Germans was a top priority for both the democratic leadership of the Czech government, and revered Prime Minister Edward Benes. There was a complete commonality of interests between the Czech communists, who formed local armed bands that carried out much of the cleansing, and the Benes government. Plans for expelling the Germans from Czechoslovakia were refined during the war by the Czech government-in-exile in London. Edward Taborsky developed a long memorandum on the subject, thereby making it possible for proven German anti-fascists to remain in postwar Czechoslovakia as individual citizens.15 More radical voices prevailed, however, as the practices of ethnic cleansing made few distinctions between fascist and anti-fascist Germans.
There was very little practical difference between the Polish communists and the Polish government-in-exile in their determination to expel the Germans from both Poland and the newly occupied Western Territories, the so-called Recovered lands, Ziemia odzyskany. Neither the communists nor the democratic politicians cared whether the Germans had been Polish citizens before the war or not, or whether they had been anti-fascists or not; they had to be expelled. 16 True, the London government in exile worried more about the laws that would deprive the Germans of their citizenship and their property. However, when Stanislaw Mikolajczyk returned to Poland in the summer of 1945 to join the new Polish Government of National Unity, he--like communist leader Wladyslaw Gomulka--insisted that the Germans had to go and made light of Western worries about the Germans' "plight."17 Meanwhile, Gomulka, as Minister of the Recovered Lands, made it clear that the German question would be dealt with through a combination of ethnic cleansing and social revolution. For Gomulka, the land question and the question of the Germans was the same.18
(4) The fourth case--or better, pair of cases--that I shall examine is that of the deportation of the Chechens and Ingush from the Northern Caucasus to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia in February 1944, and of the Crimean Tatars four months later in May, to Uzbekistan. The Balkars and Karachaevtsy were also deported from the Northern Caucasus in this period, and Armenians (often called "Dashnaks"), Bulgarians, and Greeks were expelled from the Crimea at approximately the same time. Their cases will be used to illustrate some of the issues related to the peculiar nature of Soviet ethnic cleansing. Most of the focus, however, will be on the Chechens and their ethnic cousins, the Ingush--treated as a single ethnic unit by the Soviet authorities--and on the Crimean Tatars. One of the characteristics of Soviet ethnic cleansing is the deportation of entire peoples, without any legitimized exceptions: some 480,000 Chechens and Ingush, 41,000 Balkans, 75,000 Karachaevtsy, and 220,000 Crimean peoples (189,000 of whom were Tatars).19
(5) The final case is the most recent--that of the former Yugoslavia. The case of Yugoslavia gave the world the term "ethnic cleansing" with the conceptual artillery for making it useful for understanding similar cases. There can be little question that what we are seeing in the former Yugoslavia is primarily Serbian ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims. Even before the explosion of headlines about Serbian atrocities in the spring and summer of 1992, the Serbs had practiced ethnic cleansing as part of their war against Croatia. Of course the Croats engaged in episodes of ethnic cleansing during the forced expulsion of the civilian Serbian population of Krajina. Croats were involved in the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims as well. The present conflict between Croats and Bosnian Muslims in Mostar is an example. Conversely, there have been cases of ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Muslims of Bosnian Serbs. By far the largest number of indicted war criminals (seventy-four altogether as of the end of April 1997) are Bosnian Serbs; however, Bosnian Croats and Muslims have also been implicated in criminal episodes of ethnic cleansing.20 In the former multiethnic Yugoslav republics, ethnically based elites are doing everything they can to rid themselves of the "other" groups. In this context, it is important to reiterate that this is not the primitive Balkan phenomenon that we hear so much about in the press. Instead, these murderous attacks--no less than those on the Armenians by the Turks in 1915 or on the Jews by the SS and Wehrmacht in 1943 and 1944 on the Eastern Front--were ordered by current political leaders and carried out by their loyal soldiers.
The Murderous Twentieth Century
On the eve of the Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939, Hitler was supposed to have said, "Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?" Usually, this quote is associated with his genocidal intentions regarding the Jews. In fact. Hitler was talking at this meeting in Obersalzburg on 22 August 1939 about executing a substantial number of members of the Polish intelligentsia. At the same time, it is questionable whether or not he referred to the Armenians in his pre-invasion briefing.21 Still, there is plenty of evidence that Hitler knew about the mass murder of the Armenians, as did most European politicians, and that it could not have been far from his mind in the development of his own ideology of mass destruction. Talaat Pasha, one of the architects of the Armenian genocide, was killed in Germany by an Armenian nationalist in 1921; the assassin's acquittal by a jury trial was widely discussed in the German press.22
No one can read the Polish documents about eliminating the German minority from Poland, thereby making Poland ethnically pure, without recalling the German ideology as applied to the Poles. One of the oldest historical rules of warfare is that enemies learn from each other. There can be little question that the Poles learned from the Germans, as evidenced by their postwar treatment of the Jews as well as in their treatment of the Germans. Poles and Czechs forced the Germans to wear special signs of their nationality, white armbands. Czechs and Poles sometimes added a large "NT--for Nemec, German--on the Germans' coats. If not immediately driven out of the country, the Germans were confined to ethnically pure compounds, were forced to observe curfews, and were not allowed to walk on sidewalks, eat in restaurants or cafes, or mingle with non-Germans. They were sometimes beaten and humiliated by brutal guards and local townspeople while they were being loaded onto box cars to be freighted out of the country. Still, it is important to distinguish between the actions of the Nazis, which were part and parcel of a larger plan to dominate Europe and destroy its "lesser" peoples, and the actions of the Poles and Czechs who were primarily motivated by a sense of grievance and revenge. 23
The Soviet cases of ethnic cleansing also have resonances of Hitlerian ideology and influence. In the 1920s and early 1930s, Soviet attacks on "enemies of the people" focused almost exclusively on class-based enemies, remnants of the old regime, and the "kulaks." By the end of 1930s, just as in the rest of Europe, "enemies of the people" were considered to be based in alien nationalities. If a million kulaks were the deportees of the early 1930s, it was enemy nationals who were deported in the late 1930s and 1940s--Tatars, Kalmyks, Koreans, Bashkirs, Chechens, and ethnic Germans, among others. 24 Amir Weiner suggests that this was derived from the promulgation of a new Soviet constitution in 1936, when Stalin claimed that socialism had been achieved, and therefore there were no more class-based "enemies of the people." 25 Stalin insisted to a group of Army officers in 1938 that there was no reason to think prejudicially about the offspring of enemy classes after the building of socialism. 26 This accounts for the initial episodes of Soviet ethnic cleansing carried out on the eve of World War II.27 Still, the extent to which Stalin deported whole .nations from their homelands in 1944, treating nations as biological entities, cannot be explained without considering the influence of he war and the example of the Nazis. The fate of the Jews in postwar Soviet society only strengthens this argument. For the first time in Soviet history, anti-Semitism became part of official Soviet ideology. 28
The Yugoslav case also cannot be considered in isolation from other cases of ethnic cleansing in the 20th century The relevance of the atrocities in the Balkans during World War II, especially of Croatian Ustashe against the Serbs, is obvious to anyone who witnessed the debates between Serbs and Croats about the contemporary situation in Yugoslavia. The decades of manipulation of these issues by the communist government did not help matters any, nor did the continuing twisting of the facts by the Serbian and Croatian media. It could be argued that one of the immediate causes precipitating the war itself was the unwillingness of the Croatian government to abandon all Ustashe symbolism, including the checkered Sahovnica, hated and feared by the Serbs under Croatian rule in the Krajina and Eastern Slavonia. The Serbs also roused passions in the Balkans by systematically overestimating the number of victims of the infamous Ustashe camp in Jasenovac and treating every Croat as if he or she were part of a potential Ustashe revival. Bosnian Muslim participation in SS operations also became a common motif of Serbian propaganda. While some of it was unquestionably true, most was wildly exaggerated.29 If "ancient hatreds" played little or no role in the Yugoslav war, hatreds sparked by memories and myths of World War II were too easily inflamed. Yugoslavia, like the Soviet Union, also shifted its ideological locus from class-based enemies to nationalist foes. Tito was able to manage this shift without destroying the multi-national South Slav entity, though we should not forget the victims of his tyranny.30 In any case, with the end of communism in sight, Tito's heirs were poorly equipped to deal with these renewed nationalist ambitions.
Violence and Ethnic Cleansing
If these cases of ethnic cleansing are linked to one another throughout the twentieth century by their interactions and direct and indirect influences, they are also linked by their character. First and foremost, ethnic cleansing is accompanied by extreme violence. This has to do in part with the fact that peoples do not leave their homes, homelands, villages, and towns voluntarily. They must be pushed out, often with extreme violence, in order to accomplish the desired results. For reasons that can only make one despair at the nature of human interaction, gratuitous violence, extreme cruelty, barbaric torture, and indifference to human suffering often accompany the projects of expulsion. Unlike warfare between nations, ethnic cleansing usually involves an armed and violent perpetrator and an unarmed and innocent victim. The costs in life and limb are fearsome and devastating. The issue is not one of mutual escalation, as in warfare, but of a particularly reprehensible form of one-sided punishment.
It will be some time before historians can agree on the human toll of the Armenian genocide. Steven Katz cites the figure of 550,000 to 800,000 deaths, which is at the low end of the estimates offered by other equally fair-minded and reliable Armenian scholars.31 Ronald G. Suny, perhaps the most restrained Armenian historian to write about the genocide, cites the figures of anywhere between 200,000 (the lowest estimate) to a high of 1.5 million, a figure sometimes claimed by Armenian accounts. 32 In any case, substantial numbers of Armenians--perhaps as many as 800,000--survived the onslaught. The tales of the survivors as well as the testimonies of the witnesses describe scenes of horror that were splashed across the headlines of European newspapers, leaving the same feeling of impotence and disgust in international "public opinion" that many have felt at the revelations of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.33
The attack on the Armenians began in late February 1915, when Armenian men of military age were rounded up by the Turkish army and forced into labor battalions. During the first week of April, the old, young, and women were captured by Turkish units and sent into exile at Aleppo in northern Syria.34 The deportees were forced to march through deserts and wilderness, exposed to the elements, with no food and no protection from either bandits or marauders, and the escort troops themselves. The Armenians were robbed of their clothes and the few provisions they had with them. Many fell by the wayside, dying in vast numbers alongside the road. Children were seized from their parents and sold into slavery to Kurdish chieftains. Some of those who resisted were hacked to death or tortured and left to die in the desert. When they reached the Euphrates, many of the women threw their children into the river before they themselves jumped in and drowned. The remaining men in the labor battalions were then summarily massacred. Turkish and American scholars of Turkish history deny that the violence was directed by the state and reject the designation of "genocide" for what happened to the Armenians.35 But few would argue with the proposition that there is a good deal more work to be done, particularly in the Ottoman archives, to get the story straight.36
Many scholars point to the Greek-Turkish exchanges and the international cooperation surrounding the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 as an example of how the exchange of populations can be carried out, peaceably and legally This is historical mythology of the purest sort. The confrontations between Greeks and Turks in Anatolia were violent in the extreme. With the blessings of the British, Eleutherios Venizelos and the Greek army invaded central Anatolia in the spring of 1921 to carry out his version of unifying " Greek-inhabited territories throughout the Eastern Mediterranean land Black Seas. The Greek army's early successes inflamed its ambitions, however, and large areas of Turkish-inhabited areas were subjected to fearsome ethnic cleansing. Arnold Toynbee described the horrors inflicted on innocent Turkish villagers by the marauding Greek "chettes," or paramilitary groups, who followed the Greek Army's advance. Villages were razed; Turkish men, women and children were burned alive; pillaging and rapine were terrible.37
Greek atrocities against the Turks and the Greek advance on the Anatolian plateau aroused both the resentment and the fighting capacity of the Turks. Under Mustapha Kemal, who had already begun to unite Turkish forces in eastern Anatolia, the Greek advance was reversed and the Turks chased the Greeks back to the Aegean. Turkish army and irregular forces engaged in very much the same horrid actions as their Greek antagonists: plundering, raping, burning, torturing, and cleansing the territory of Greek villages and settlements. The Turks took Smyrna (Izmir) at the beginning of September 1922 and literally drove the Greeks into the sea. The lucky ones were able to board English and Allied ships to be evacuated to Greece itself. Many others--perhaps as many as 25,000 Greeks and Armenians--died in the great Smyrna fire of 9 September 1922. In all likelihood, the fire was set by the Turkish troops.38 In any case, the great cosmopolitan city was burned to the ground, bringing to an end the nearly 3000 year Greek presence on the shores of Western Anatolia.
Atrocities, massacres, and intercommunal warfare continued, even after the victory of Kemal. The Allies formed Mixed Commissions at Lausanne to complete the arrangements for the obligatory exchange of the 1.2 million Greeks who had lived in Anatolia and 356,000 Turks, primarily from Aegean Macedonia.39 Of those 1.2 million Greeks, however, all but some 290,000 had been driven from their homes and many were already refugees in Greece.40 By all accounts, the exchange was brutal and rough, and many Greeks died in the transfer. Greece became terribly overburdened with the hungry, sick, and homeless. Only by the end of the 1920s did the loss of life due to hunger and disease dwindle. According to Stephen Ladas, "tens of thousands of Greeks" perished in the Right from Anatolia or as a result of the inadequate conditions for staying alive in Greece itself.41 Meanwhile, the complicated agreements at Lausanne about compensating the refugees remained unfulfilled. Like the Dayton Agreement concluding the war in Bosnia, the Lausanne Treaty represented not a creative solution to an international problem but the last, bitterest phase of a terrible tragedy Many of the Muslims transferred to Turkey spoke Greek and had little in common with the Anatolian Turks.
The ethnic cleansing of Germans from Polish and Czech lands also exhibited scenes of horror that beggar description. It is hard to know how many Germans died in the process of the deportations and expulsions. Many died or committed suicide during the last phases of the war when the Soviet armies overran East Prussia, Silesia, and Pomerania. Gerhard Ziemer estimates that out of 11.5 million Germans who were expelled from Eastern Europe, 2.5 million died, from hunger and disease, attacks by Soviet armies, and Czech and Polish occupiers.42 This constituted, writes Gerhard Weinberg, "the largest single migration of people in a short period of which we know."43 It really made no difference to the Poles and Czechs whether the Germans were antifascists or not, whether they were young or old, male or female. Surprisingly, given the fact that the German occupation of the Czech lands was so much more tolerable than the occupation of Poland, Czechs were as brutal as the Poles to the Germans. 44 Even Russian tank commanders were shocked by the gratuitous violence meted out by the Czechs to the Germans.45 They specialized in hanging them from their heels on trees or balconies, dousing them with petrol, and setting them on fire. In other cases, they would let them hang there alive, to be beaten, tortured, or set upon by casual passersby In the town of Aussig on 30 July 1945, Czech crowds, aided by the local militia, went on a rampage, killing some 400 Germans. Women and children were thrown off a bridge into the river and shot at when they tried to swim away The apparent cause a the rumor that German "Werewolves" had detonated an explosion in a local factory.46 Many Germans who did not flee to the West were often put in labor camps, where they faced every sort of brutality that their warders could conjure for their victims. Short of food and living in horrid sanitary conditions, they died in large numbers before they could be transferred to Germany.
The Poles also wreaked havoc on the Germans. Gangs of Poles followed the Soviet armies into the newly occupied territories, not to settle there, but to take what plunder they could back to their own towns.47 Unrestrained by weak local authorities held back only by Soviet army units, they set upon the Germans, stole their valuables and property, and invaded their homes with impunity. In a "Wild West" atmosphere that was beyond the ability of the Polish government or police to control, these Polish groups indiscriminately attacked and pillaged the Germans.
The violence of the wartime deportations of Chechens, Ingush and Crimean Tatars was organized and focused on their respective dates of deportation, 23 February 1944, for the Chechens and Ingush, 17-18 May 1944 for the Tatars.48 The NKVD used essentially the same tactics in both cases. In the Chechen-Ingush region. Red Army troops had been bivouacked among the local people for months, with the explanation that they were taking a well-deserved rest from the war. The soldiers mingled with the local people and were often seen in their homes. Then at midnight of 22 February or dawn of the next day, the Chechens and Ingush were notified that they were to be resettled to Central Asia. As a rule they had a half an hour to pack a few things and assemble in the town and village squares. No resistance was tolerated. Those who tried to escape were shot. They were trucked off to the railheads and loaded in freight cars for the long trip to Kazakhstan. There is ample evidence to demonstrate that the sick and infirm or those who lived m remote areas were often simply shot.49 In some cases, there were mass killings. In the village of Khaibakh, two hundred and thirty Chechens were rounded up and locked in a large barn which was set on fire. Those who managed to escape, were machine-gunned by the surrounding soldiers. The estimates of the Chechens and Ingush killed number around 3,000 None were to be left behind.
The violence did not end with deportation. For the Chechens and Ingush, as well as for the Crimean Tatars, the journey to their Central Asian exile was hellish and murderous. There was little or no food, water, or protection from the cold (in the case of the Chechens and Ingush) or from the heat (in the case of the Tatars) Many died from "the extremely unsanitary conditions".50 Naturally, the old and young died first. Periodically the trains stopped and the corpses were thrown out, to be buried in mass graves by conscripted locals. Indeed, one can chisel freight cars, overcrowded with deportees, hungry thirsty starving, diseased, suffocating in unhygienic and barbaric conditions into a permanent image of 20th century ethnic cleansing. Jews in the Third Reich, Germans deported from Poland and the Czech lands, Chechens, Ingush and Tatars, and even Bosnian Muslims describe similar conditions of transport.
The NKVD documents on the deportations are filled with precise data about where the Chechens-Ingush and Tatars were to be settled, how much grain was to be made available for their consumption, what kinds of building materials were to be provided by the local authorities for their barracks, and how they were to be employed and supported. There are other documents that indicate that this planning was simply a paper exercise. 51 Local authorities were not prepared for the arrival of tens of thousands of deportees, consequently even worse suffering awaited the already severely weakened survivors of the horrid transports. The locals lived poorly and in crowded conditions and rarely did provisions for the deportees make it to the point of settlement intact. When they did, the supplies were seldom given |over to the Chechens, Ingush, or Tatars.52 Instead, the new spetspereselentsy (special settlers) were treated as pariahs, set upon, beaten, and robbed of the few possessions they had, and ignored by party and kolkhoz committees.53 Children walked about in a daze, unwashed and with no shoes; even the adults were insufficiently clothed to survive the harsh northern Kazakh winter.54 Thousands died from hunger, disease--most often typhus--and exposure in an alien and unfriendly environment. Chechen historians estimate that nearly 200,000 Chechens and Ingush died and were killed in the period of deportations and resettlement. The Crimean Tatars suggest that as many as 45 of their population perished in the process, about half of whom were children.55
The terrible violence associated with the war in Bosnia, in particular, has been documented well enough in the contemporary press to warrant only the briefest of mention. The numbers are the easiest part to digest: perhaps 250,000 were killed and more than two million made refugees. What human beings are capable of doing to other human beings in the name of cleansing a territory of an allegedly alien folk beggars description and thwarts analysis The images of bodily torture, and the unspeakable horrors of the prison camp at Omarska are identical to every other case of ethnic cleansing in the 20th century.56
War and Ethnic Cleansing
War and the transition from war to peace often provide the backdrop for the removal of peoples. Violence is made acceptable by war; people live off of its promulgation; the taking of lives becomes habitual. The military follows orders, whether it marches into battle against enemies or kills and expels identifiable ethnic others m their midst. Paramilitary groups, whether well-organized, like the Third Reich's Einsatzgruppen, or more spontaneously generated, like the Greek chettes, Serbian chetniks or Polish and Czech armed militias, attack groups singled out for ethnic cleansing. Bandits, marauders, and asocial elements find their way into these paramilitary groups, wreaking havoc on innocent civilian populations, who are robbed, plundered mutilated, or killed.
War provides a cover and a justification for violence. In Hitler's case, there seems little question that the attack on Russia ended the initial" stage of the brutal cleansing of Jews from the Reich and their ghettoization in Poland and moved to the cataclysmic level of total elimination and mass murder.
Under the cover of the First World War, the Young Turks decided to drive the Armenians from Anatolia once and for all Having already lost their remaining territories in the Balkans in the course of the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, the Young Turk triumvirate of Enver Pasha, Talaat Pasha, and Djemal Pasha were determined to preempt any possible attempts to create an independent Armenia in eastern Anatolia by driving out and killing its citizenry.
The Soviets also settled their scores of the alleged collaboration of the Crimean Tatars, Chechens, and Ingush with the Nazis under the cover of World War II.57 Chechnya was never really occupied by the Germans, and the Soviet argument that Chechens and Ingush helped German units find their way through the mountains applied only to scattered mountain clans. The leaders of the Crimean Tatar obkom during the war rejected the complaints of some Soviet partisan leaders that the Tatars collaborated in unusually large numbers. They documented Tatar resistance and accused Russian Soviet partisans of refusing to take in Tatar members. According to the Tatar communist leadership, the partisans drove the Tatars into the hands of the Nazis by wantonly attacking peaceful villagers, confiscating their food supplies, and burning down their homes.58
Wartime also highlights strategic arguments for ethnic cleansing that accompany its execution. For instance, the Armenians and Greeks were accused of endangering the Turkish war efforts. The Young Turks claimed that the Armenians were agents for the Russians, a viewpoint clearly demonstrated by the early victories of the Russians over the Turks in the Caucasus at the same time the Western allies attacked Gallipoli. Therefore, the Armenians had to be eliminated from eastern Anatolia or the border region of Turkey would never be safe from the Russians. By eliminating the Armenians as a factor in the politics of eastern Anatolia, Ronald Suny writes, "the Young Turks could with one blow end Western and Russian interference in Ottoman affairs." 59 According to the American ambassador in Turkey, Henry Morgenthau, the Turks were fully aware of the consequences of their strategically justified actions: "When the Turkish authorities gave the orders for these deportations, they were merely giving the death warrant to a whole race; they understood this well, and, in their conversations with me, they made no particular attempt to conceal the fact.60
The Turkish government also targeted the Greeks on the western littoral of Anatolia and in eastern Thrace as British spies who were intent on turning Turkey into a Western mandate. Therefore, the Greeks had to be driven from Anatolia; then Turkish settlers and Muslims from Greece could be moved into their towns and villages to defend against foreign armies. 61 Similarly, it would have been hard for the Nazis to argue that the Jews constituted any kind of strategic threat to the Third Reich. But Hitler and his chieftains certainly thought that the Jews were the source of Western (and Soviet) resistance to the "New Order" in Europe. Thus, Hitler promised before the Reichstag that if war broke out the Jews would pay with their "annihilation."62
The Polish government-in-exile's wartime planning for its postwar German population was overlaid with increasing worries about Soviet claims to the country's eastern lands, in addition to political issues related to Soviet demands for a "friendly" postwar Polish government. After Yalta, it became apparent that the Poles would lose vast territories to the east and be compensated by the occupation of formerly German territories in the west. For both the Polish government-in-exile and for the Polish communists in Moscow, it was imperative that the occupation of these territories turn into their annexation. Demographic politics also played a critical role in the impulse to expel the Germans; if not in newly acquired German territory where else would the Polish population from the eastern territories live? Geostrategy also was omnipresent in the discussions about the future shape of Poland. The Germans would have to leave East Prussia and Danzig (Gdansk), the Pomeranian coast as far as the Oder, and in some wartime plans even beyond Rostock and Wamemiinde. Some Polish government-in-exile plans called for the Polish occupation of the Kiel Canal as a way of keeping the Baltic safe from German dominion. The Polish naval ministry also maintained that the Pomeranian coast, Danzig, and Stettin (Szczecin) had to be cleared of Germans in order to insure the security of postwar Poland.63
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk argued that the Oder and Lusatian Neisse had been used by the Germans for imperial control of Silesia and Bohemia.64 For the sake of the free commercial development of Poland and Czechoslovakia, he insisted that these rivers be placed permanently under the control of the Poles. Of course, all of the Germans should be expelled from the territories east of these rivers.65 In order to insure that these lands remained in the hands of the Poles, Mikolajczyk, like Gomulka, understood that the most important issue was getting the Poles to be masters of the land, to work it and organize it for the economic benefit of the region.
On the other hand, the Czechs rarely offered strategic arguments for the deportation of the Germans. For the Czechs, the primary reason was responsibility of the Germans for the failure of the interwar republic. They were traitors to Czechoslovakia, had sold the country down the river to Hitler, and had to be expelled if Czechoslovakia were to succeed as a democracy As Benes explained, "our Germans ... betrayed the state, betrayed democracy betrayed us, betrayed humanness, and betrayed humanity"66 The expulsion of the Germans was also a justifiable historical payback for the more than three centuries of German insults that they had endured since the 1620 defeat at White Mountain during the Thirty Year War. The Soviets supported both the Czechs and Poles in their determination to expel the Germans out of sheer Political expediency and neo-Pan Slavic sentiments.67
Long-term strategic concerns, more implicit than explicit influenced the Soviet decision to deport the Crimean Tatars and Chechens and Ingush. The Crimean Tatars claimed that the Russian and Soviet governments had always hoped to create a "Crimea without the Crimean Tatars."68 Ethnic and religious affinities between the Crimean Tatars and the Ottoman Turks had spurred Imperial Russian antagonism to the Tatars in the first Burgeoning racial thinking during World War II did not Help. But it was Russian designs on the Straits and on Turkey that prompted the deportations of alleged Turkish sympathizers from the Crimean Peninsula. As they were a potential source of support for Turkish designs of the Caucasus, the Chechens and Ingush presented the Soviets with a similar strategic problem. It is also important to remember that both Stalin and Beria were of Georgian origin and may well have had plans for the territories of the Georgians' Muslim neighbors and traditional enemies. This was verified by the fact that when the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was formally abolished on June 25, 1946, mountainous territories to the south had already been turned over to Soviet Georgia. 69
The Chechens and Ingush, even more than the Crimean Tatars, were traditionally considered by the Russian and Soviet authorities as thorns in the side of expansion in the Caucasus. These mountaineers had carried out great battles against the Terek Cossacks who had been enlisted to pacify the Caucasus during Russian expansionism in the mid-nineteenth century After the Revolution of 1917, the Chechens and Ingush resisted Soviet power, many died or were exiled in fighting against the Reds even after the Civil War had been concluded. In the drive for collectivization, the Chechens and Ingush distinguished themselves by their fierce resistance to NKVD pressure to give up their plots and animals to the newly founded kolkhozes. Even on the eve of the war, there were skirmishes between NKVD mountain units and scattered chechen fighters resisting induction in the Red Army. Consequently, Stalin and Beria seized the opportunity presented by the war and the allegations of collaboration to deal with the Chechens and Ingush once and for all. Not surprisingly their plan did not work; hundreds of Chechens and Ingush escaped to mountain hide-outs and conducted ongoing warfare against NKVD troops until late into the late 1940s and 1950s.
The Serbs' ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Bosnia was carried out with an eye towards strategic justification, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly invoked. The attacks on the Muslims were concentrated in Western Bosnia, around Banja Luka and m Eastern Herzegovina, especially along the Drina valley bordering on Serbia proper. There can be little question that Milosevic, Karadzic, Mladic and the paramilitaries associated with them focused on the villages and towns of these regions in order to create a Serbian territory contiguous with Serbia proper, joined through the corridor of Brcko. No Muslim enclaves would be allowed to remain intact in what was deemed to be Serbian territory. This was the reason for the fearsome attacks on Zepa and Srebremca in the summer of 1995 and the continuing pressure on Gorazde before the conference at Dayton.
Deporting Whole Nations
Ethnic cleansing establishes hard and inviolable borders between those who perpetrate the cleansing and those who are cleansed; there are no uncertainties and few compromises Only the Ottoman and Turkish examples exhibited some variance from the general rule. Greeks were allowed to stay in Istanbul until the end of the 1920s; in fact, the total expulsion of all Greeks in Turkey was not completed until 1955. A substantial number of Armenians also managed to survive the 1915 genocide in Ottoman territory. Some Constantinople Armenians were not subjected to massacres or attacks. Among the Armenians deported from their homes in eastern Anatolia, a few were able to save themselves and their children by converting to Islam. Enough Armenians survived in Cilicia in the south to form an Armenian brigade commanded by the French. One might argue that the nationalism of the Young Turks and their followers was not sufficiently distinguishable from Ottoman patriotism to adopt the kind of racialist ideology that would demand the elimination of all Armenians, the way Hitler insisted on the destruction of all of the Jews. Yet it is important to distinguish the events of 1915 from the massacres of Armenians under Abdul Hamid II in the mid-1890s. As Richard Hovannisian has noted, the massacres of the mid-1890s were intended to keep the Armenians "in their place." On the other hand, the Young Turks sought "to create a frame of reference that did not include the Armenians at all."70
Still, Hitler was the first to introduce into the history of ethnic cleansing an unrelenting racialist essence. As we know, the Jews--defined in genetic, not cultural, religious, or linguistic terms--were scheduled to be eliminated from the country, and eventually condemned to death. Though Jews survived the Holocaust, the Nazis had intended to kill them all. After the war, the Poles and Czechs adopted a similarly racialist idea of "Germanness." Even completely Polonized Germans had to leave the new republic, though some successfully hid their nationality from the authorities. All Germans--fascists or antifascists--were forced to flee.
At the same time, the Poles sought to rescue Germanized Poles for the Polish nation, just as the Germans tried to identify real Aryans among the Poles and Czechs for re-Germanization. The so-called autochthons who lived in formerly German territories--Mazurians, Kashubs, and Silesians--were similarly given the opportunity to re-Polonize themselves. In both the Polish and Czech cases, elaborate legal procedures were established to deal with the right of Germans in mixed marriages and with the children of mixed marriages to remain in the new republics. The documentation required in these legal procedures resembled that used by the Nazis to establish racial purity: baptismal certificates going back two generations, residence permits, and certified family trees. It should be reiterated however, that legal proceedings applied only in the smallest minority of cases. Usually, Germans and alleged Germans were expelled in a paroxysm of retribution and mob violence. Few of the available legal niceties were offered German men, women or children in mixed marriages when facing vengeful Czechs and Poles.
The Soviet examples were notable for their completeness The Crimean Tatars were expelled in toto from their homeland. The same was true of the chechens and Ingush--No exceptions were allowed--whether party secretary, partisan fighter, valued factory specialist, or Hero of the Soviet Union. Husbands and wives of Russians and Ukrainians had the choice of being deported with chechen, Ingush or Tatar spouses; children under 16 could stay behind with the acceptable spouse. Tatar and Chechen-Ingush men at the front were deported directly from their units to one of the Central Asian exile destinations. Sometimes it took years for families to be reunited.
The extent of the Soviet mania to cleanse the Crimea of every single Tartar is evident in the papers of the postwar Crimean oblast NKVD. In the late 1940s, a number of influential Tatars had managed to get permission from Moscow to return to the Crimea for one reason or another In some cases, they had outstanding war records or they provided the family reasons to return. But the local NKVD authorities were outraged that as many as 220 or so returnees had reestablished homes in the Crimea and insisted that they be denied residency permits. The local party obkomi requested that Moscow not allow any more Tatars to Leave Uzbekistan and that all of those Tatars present in the Crimea be permitted to live anywhere in the Soviet Union except for the Crimea.71 Similarly, once all the Chechens and Ingush had been deported from their homelands in 1944, requests to return were systematically rejected, although some well-connected Chechens were allowed to leave Kazakhstan for other parts of the Soviet Union.
Even the intervention of the international community did not prevent the almost complete expulsion of Bosnian Muslims from what the Bosnian Serbs identified as their territory The Muslim enclave of Gorazde remains intact, largely because SFOR (NATO) troops are currently present in Bosnia. The logic of ethnic cleansing rendered illusory the Dayton Accord that Bosnian Muslims be allowed to return to their homes and villages in the Srpska Republika. It seems equally unlikely that the Croat government will tolerate a reversal of its summer 1995 ethnic cleansing of Krajina. Not unlike the Czechs during the war who argued that individual antifascist Germans should be allowed to remain in Czechoslovakia as Czech citizens--like any other citizen, with no special status--the Croats maintain that they are ready to accept those Serbs as citizens of the new Croatia who are not tainted by "war crimes." The city of Mostar lies at the heart of the internal conflict within the Muslim-Croat federation. On both sides of the Neretva, which divides the city between the western Croatian and eastern Muslim sections, ethnic cleansing continues to exact its toll on the population of the "other."
Monuments and Identity
The Yugoslav example also highlights another common trait of ethnic cleansing: the determination of the cleansers to wipe out not only the biological traces of a people, but their material culture land memory as well. The destruction of mosques and of churches land monasteries in Bosnia and Herzegovina was integral to the process. The Bosnian Serbs identified Banja Luka as a strategic center for their rule in western Bosnia and proceeded to dynamite all of the city's mosques and burn down its Catholic churches. All traces of the city of Foca's Muslim past were dynamited and bulldozed; even the name of the city was changed to Srbinje (Serb Place). Trebinje's 500-year old mosque was dynamited; the town's graceful Turkish manor and surrounding buildings were burned to the ground. 72
In Russia, after the Chechens and Ingush were driven from their homelands. Soviet bulldozers tore into Muslim cemeteries--the most sacred of Chechen and Ingush architectural monuments--and upended all of the gravestones. The Soviets then used the stones to build foundations for factories and to pave roads, very much like the Nazis' use of Jewish cemeteries.
In Anatolia, Greek and Armenian churches were destroyed and burned to the ground, sometimes with worshippers and priests in them. In other cases, the churches were transformed into mosques, frescoes defaced or painted over, altar pieces and church valuables melted down. Similarly the Greeks robbed mosques of their carpets and furniture, and killed pigs and left them to rot in the buildings, before setting them ablaze. 73 The Germans destroyed synagogues during Kristallnacht, the night of broken glass, 9 November 1938. In Poland, the Nazis burned and dynamited synagogues and converted others to storage houses and barns. Naturally, the Poles and Czechs also destroyed German monuments and vandalized German cemeteries.
These destructive characteristics of ethnic cleansing reach far beyond a people and their buildings and cemeteries. Manuscripts, books, artworks, and archives are also targeted for destruction. Place names are changed.74 Languages are purified to reflect their dominant nation and purged of local ethnic usages. Even dictionaries are destroyed as insidious. History and historiography are changed in dramatic ways; either the expelled people disappear altogether or their role in the regions is distorted beyond all recognition.75 After the Armenian genocide in 1915 and the Greek expulsion of 1922-23, Turkish history and historiography portrayed these people either as being deliriously happy in the Ottoman Empire or as plotting with foreigners to overthrow the sultanate. When considering the Armenians, Turkish historians engage in serious memory loss to this very day. The Nazis, of course, expunged the Jews completely from written German history; they became the subjects instead of the new racial science. Books by, about, and including German Jews were the first to be burned by Nazi thugs. The Poles and Czechs burned and destroyed German books, almanacs, albums, and encyclopedias, while developing an historiography of the former German territories that proved their "real" Polish and Czech character and history.
Perhaps nowhere have whole peoples disappeared from books, newspapers, encyclopedias or even daily conversation as they did m the former Soviet Union. One reads a good deal about persons in analyses of Soviet control of language and information, but rarely about non-peoples. When the Chechens Ingush and Tatars were deported from their homelands, they disappeared into thin air. Indeed, many who remained in the original homeland had no idea where they had gone or if they were still alive. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was formally abolished in 1946, its territories carved up between Georgia, Northern Ossetia, Daghestan, and the Stavropol region. Within a few months of the deportations, Daghestanis moved in to occupy many of the Chechens' former villages and farmsteads Russians and Ukrainians took many of the deportees' jobs in Grozny's oil industry The Chechen and Ingush names of towns were changed; no remnants of their culture were allowed. In the proceedings of the Grozny obkom (regional party committee) for the period following the deportations, there was not a single mention of the Chechens and Ingush.76 They had evaporated.
Similarly, the Crimean obkom protocols never mentioned the Tatars, or, for that matter, the large numbers of Armenians, Bulgarians, and Greeks who had been deported in the same period.77 The only hint that large numbers of Crimean Tatars had been deported from the region showed up in the periodic complaints of the shortage of labor for bringing in the harvest on deserted collective farms. As in the Chechen-Ingush case, town names--some of which were centuries old--were changed overnight; history books eliminated the Tatars as anything but enemies from their narratives, in effect, a nation disappeared in this case to special settlements in Uzbekistan.
Attacks on Women
Despite the hard and firm categories of ethnicity that dominate the thinking and actions of ethnic cleansers, gender is a major determinant of victimization. Part of the issue is the perception that the female is the locus of the nation, biologically if not also virtually and culturally. As a result, attacks on nations of the sort that constitute ethnic cleansing are often manifested in attacks of the most brutal sort on females and on their reproductive potentialities.
Many Armenian men were seized by the Turks, placed in labor battalions, and shot outright. Others fled to Russia, Greece and the Middle East, some simply to escape persecution, or to continue to fight for their homelands. Armenian women, the aged and the children, however, remained behind. It was primarily ' women who were forced out of their towns and villages in Anatolia and were sent on death marches through the deserts to the Euphrates River. Along the way Turkish soldiers and Kurdish marauders attacked their prisoners; there was rape, gang rape and rape murder. No one was exempt: not pregnant women, not prepubescent girls, not grandmothers. Young girls were singled out from the group and abducted into sexual slavery sometimes to brothels for Turkish troops, sometimes for the harems of Kurdish chieftains. Armenian women and girls were helpless victims, few escaped this onslaught during the long march and many committed suicide.78 Rape and the humiliation of women were all too common on both sides of the Greco-Turkish conflict as well As defeated soldiers, men could protect themselves from the aggressor in retreat or die in battle. Their women, however--Greeks, Turks, Armenians--were almost always unarmed andI without defenses, and thus were open season for the marauding bands of Armenian ethnic bands that were so prevalent in Anatolia at the end of the First World War.
Nazi treatment of Jewish women also differed from that of the men, especially before the campaign of mass extermination was set in motion m the fall and winter of 1941-42. Jewish women were subject to sterilization, they were used for medical experiments involving pregnancy and abortion, and they were forced to serve in SS brothels for the "pleasure" of Polish and Ukrainian camp guards and non-German SS affiliates. The Nazi determination to humiliate Jewish women knew no bounds. They were stripped of their clothes, deloused, and marched about for the amusement of ghetto and camp guards. They were often separated from the men. Their fate in the mass extermination camps was also more unalterable, as the Nazis were determined to kill off the future of the Jewish people. Mary Felstiner concludes: "Genocide is the act of putting women and children first. Of all the deceptions a death camp settled on, this one went down deepest. This was the hard core of the Holocaust."79
In their newly occupied western territories, Polish marauders sometimes chased down and raped German women of all ages. In the first months of the Polish occupation, armed adventurers from the former Generalgouvernement followed Soviet troops into the region with no notion of staying or settling as was intended by the polish authorities, but with every intention of stealing what they could from the Germans. Away from their homes, brutalized by the experience of the Nazi occupation, and in search of booty polish bands engaged in terrible acts of violence against German females, the vast majority of whom lived without military-age men at home.80 The actual expulsion, flight and eventual deportation of the Germans took place in uneven waves, chaotically and often without rhyme or reason, leaving the women dispersed, confused, land uncertain of their futures. Many Germans expected that the Western Allies would occupy the territory that had been temporarily given over to the Poles. The Potsdam conference and the British and U.S. foreign policy statements were decidedly ambiguous on this issue, as the final determination of the eastern borders of Germany was to be left to a future peace conference. Meanwhile, German women paid a fearsome price for the Nazi attack on Poland; they were fair game for rapists and plunderers.
There were few ambiguities about the future of the Sudeten Germans Eduard Benes was uncompromising; he wanted them all out and the Allies (British, Americans, and Soviets) supported his demands. The Potsdam agreement slowed down the process of expelling the Sudeten Germans, because an Allied commission was formed to ensure the "orderly and humane" transfer of the population to Germany and Austria.81 The Americans, in particular, wanted to bring the chaotic expulsions under control, because most of the Sudeten Germans were designated to settle Bavaria in the American zone. The Benes government, however, was not content to wait for the American transports before seizing German property.82 As a result, the local Czech authorities removed the Germans from their homes and separated the men and women and jailed them in ill-provisioned work camps. In the camps for females, German women were subjected to humiliating searches, sexual abuse, and rape. Czech overseers screamed "German whores!" "German pigs!" at the women. Before the final transfer out of Czechoslovakia was accomplished, many German women were infected with syphilis and gonorrhea, others were psychologically and physically wrecked by the abuse from Soviet soldiers who were invited into the compounds. 83
As best we know, the deportations of the Crimean Tatars and the Chechen and Ingush were not accompanied by rape and the purposeful humiliation of women excepting the first incursions of Soviet advanced units and NKVD troops into the Crimea after the Nazi retreat. Yet the Soviet deportations of the peoples of the Northern Caucasus and Crimea turned into attacks on females, the aged, and children, simply because many of the military-age men had perished or disappeared during the war. Thus, the women bore the brunt of the harsh conditions and helplessness of the deportation. As Muslims, the Tatar and Chechen and Ingush women also suffered the loss of all privacy in the crowded and suffocating freight cars. The shame inflicted on these women by deportation paled, however, when they dealt with the harsh conditions of survival in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Faced with unfamiliar terrain, harsh climatic conditions, and hostile cultures they were forced to take control of the family's economy, trying to scratch out an existence in extremely inhospitable surroundings Many mothers had to watch their children die.84
In Rape Warfare, Beverly Alien has written a searing indictment of Serbian attacks on Muslim women. Her argument is that the Serbs not only used rape as a weapon of ethnic cleansing m Bosnia, but that rape was also central to their genocidal goals She cites "tens of thousands" of cases of genocidal rape, with the goal of impregnating Bosnian women. 85 The European Council reported over 20,000 rapes; the Bosnian government estimated the number as being closer to 50,000.86 In the case of Bosnia, there can be little doubt that Serbian rape of Muslim women was not simply another example of the evil effects of men at war but of ethnic cleansing as an historical phenomenon.87 Serbian soldiers have spoken of being ordered to rape. Rape camps had logistical and financial support from the agencies of the Bosnian Serbian government. The idea behind the rapes seems to have been twofold. On the one hand, the reports of rape would help drive the Bosnian Muslims from their homelands. In this case rape is not an act of vengeance or humiliation of the enemy it is a means to an end, a way of forcing the Muslim population to flee. Secondly, rape, impregnation, and forcing women to have the babies, "little Chetniks," was seen as a way to humiliate the victim, destroy their reproductive capabilities, and convince them that their offspring were really Serbs.
There is no easy answer to the question: why has rape assumed such an important dimension in the history of ethnic cleansing and genocide? Clearly, rape has been associated historically with modern warfare and military occupation.88 In the situation of ethnic cleansing, however, a number of other unarticulated social-psychological pathologies are being expressed at once. First of all, there is the denigration of women as a way to dishonor the other ethnic being. In this connection, rape is seen as a way to exact revenge on the other for perceived injuries and insults. By violating women of child-bearing age, the ethnic cleanser attempts to destroy the core of the opponent nation. No doubt, in many cases, the rapists see the opportunity to realize their own misogynist and pornographic fantasies in war and in Ethnic strife.89
Bosnian Muslim men also have suffered terribly at the hands of the Serbs. The prison camps and torture, the mass executions and humiliations, have made an indelible impression on the world community inspiring the creation of the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague and the determination of the Tribunal to seize the individuals responsible for these heinous crimes and bring them to justice. Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims have all been indicted for war crimes against the others. In part as recognition of the role of rape in ethnic cleansing, it too has been recognized a war crime. Fundamentally the argument was that rape and sexual abuse produce "serious bodily" and "mental harm," and therefore should be seen as violations of the U.N. Genocide Convention of 1948.90
Conclusion
As a sad postscript to this outline of the dimensions of ethnic cleansing in the 20th century, it is worth noting that there is no reason to assume that this brutal historical phenomenon will not continue into the 21st century. What Rogers Brubaker has termed as the "unmixing of peoples" is a process whose force and violence have been neither been exhausted on the European continent nor in the world as a whole.91 Moreover, international institutions show no more ability to deal with ethnic cleansing now than they did at the start of the century. The European powers seemed helpless to intervene on behalf of the Armenians and only aggravated the problems of the ethnic cleansing of the Greeks from Anatolia. The centrality of the Holocaust to our understanding of the 20th century should not obscure the fact that the killing of the Jews was a matter of only mild concern to the "world community during the Second World War. Even if the countries of the West knew about the deportations of the Chechen-Ingush and Crimean Tatars, they would most certainly have raised even less of a fuss about these events than they did when the Russians bombarded Grozny in 1994. There were some passing criticisms of the Poles and Czechs for brutality in the expulsions of Germans but few non-Germans mustered much sympathy for their plight. Even with violent ethnic cleansing and mass rape on our television screens night after night from the late spring of 1992 to the horrors of Srebrenica in the summer of 1995, the West did little or nothing to stop the genocidal acts during the war of Yugoslav succession. Unlike Lausanne and Potsdam before it, the Dayton agreement brought an end to the fighting, it also stabilized the ethnic divisions in formerly multinational societies. Therefore the Dayton peace treaty should be thought of as a symbol of defeat rather than of victory like Lausanne and Potsdam Ethnic cleansing was again successful. Why should the 21st century be any different?
To view ethnic cleansing in a comparative perspective should make it clear that historically it is not specific to particular cultures, East or West, Muslim or Christian, socialist or democratic, rich or poor Modem states and modern politicians are very much the initiators of ethnic cleansing, and the sovereignty implied in their domestic affairs make it difficult, if not possible, for supra-state organizations to intervene. This, however, does not alleviate the responsibility of individuals and the human community for the havoc wreaked on their fellow men and women in this century In this sense, Christopher Browning has it right and Daniel Goldhagen has it wrong: it is human action and inaction located in concrete societies and polities that we must investigate; not the ostensibly perverse histories or national characteristics of the Germans, Turks, or Serbs.92
ENDNOTES
1. An expanded version of this lecture will be published in 1998 in The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington.
2. See Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books, 1995), 244.
3. See William Satire's "On Language" column of The New York Times Magazine, March 14, 1993,24.
4. Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (New York: Macmillan, 1993), 90-101. The revelations about the Muslim camp Omarska are of particular interest.
5. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, "Introduction," Becoming National: A Reader (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 21.
6. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), 23.
7. See Daniel Chirot, "Modernism without Liberalism: The Ideological Roots of Modem Tyranny," Contention, vol. 5, no. 1 (Fall 1995): 144-147, and "Herder's Multicultural Theory of Nationalism and its Consequences," East European Politics and Societies, vol. 10, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 11-13.
8. Omer Bartov, Murder in Our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 3-11.
9. Nancy Reynolds, "Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire; interview with Aron Rodrigue," Stanford Humanities Review, vol. 5, no. 1 (1995): 81-93.
10. See Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Role of Turkish Physicians in the World War I Genocide of Ottoman Armenians," Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (1986): 169-192. Econominos, The Martyrdom of Smyrna and Eastern Christendom (London: George Alien & Unwin), 27.
11. Robert J. Lifton, The Nazi Doctors, Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 1986). See also Burleigh and Wippermann, The Racial State, 136-197; and Gotz Aly, Peter Chroust, and Christian Pross, Cleansing the Fatherland: Nazi Medical and Racial Hygiene, transl. by Belinda Cooper (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1994), 22-99; and Christopher R. Browning, The Path to Genocide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 59-76, 145-168.
12. Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 94-115.
13. Burleigh and Wippermann, The Nazi Racial State, 145-147, Gotz Aly, "Medicine Against the Useless," in Aly, Chroust, and Pross, Cleansing the Fatherland, 22-99.
14. Christopher Browning, "Hitler and the Decisions for the Final Solution," The Elsie B. Lipset Lecture, Stanford University, March 4, 1997. See also his The Path to Genocide, 125-144.
15. The document was prepared for Benes in 1943-44. See Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter, HIA), Edward Taborsky Collection.
16. See Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 148.
17. HIA, Mikolajczyk, Box 38, Speech in Opole, April 8, 1946, 4.
18. Antony Polonsky and Boleslaw Drukier, eds.. The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 425; G. P. Murashko and A. F. Noskova, "Natsional'no-territorial'nyi vopros v kontekste poslevoennykh real'nostei Vostochnoi Evropy, 1945-1948 gg.," Natsional'nyi vopros v vostochnoi evrope: Proshloe i nastoiashchee (Moscow: Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk, 1995), 236-237.
19. According to NKVD figures of 26 November 1948, the number of Chechen-Ingush living in special settlements was 364,220, Karachaevtsy - 56,869, Balkars - 31,648 and Crimean Tatars - 185,603. If these figures are correct, roughly 290,000 of these peoples died in transport or after they arrived at their settlements. Tsentral'noe Khranenie Sovremennykh Dokumentov (Central Storehouse of Contemporary Documents, hereafter, TsKhSD), f. 2, op. 1, d. 65, 1. 14.
20. The New York Times, 29 April 1997.
21. Kevork B. Bardakjian, Hitler and the Armenian Genocide (Cambridge, Mass.: The Zoryan Institute, 1985), 3-24. See Akten zur deutschen auswartigen Politik, 1918-1945, Serie D (1937-1945), Vol. VII (Baden-Baden: Imprimerie Nationale, 1956), 171-172.
22. Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (Providence, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995), 409.
23. HIA, Edward Taborsky Collection, box 8, "Minority Regimes and the Transfer of Populations in Central Europe After this War," (prepared for Benes, 1943-44), 8.
24. Especially the deportation of the Koreans from the Soviet Far East in September 1937 served as a model for later mass deportations of minority peoples. Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiskoi Federatsii (State Archive of the Russian Federation, hereafter, GARF), f. 5446, op. 57, d. 52,1. 29.
25. Amir Weiner, "Hierarchical Heroism and Universal Suffering: Biology, Sociology and the Postwar Jewish Community," draft paper, Stanford, 1997, 38-39.
26. My thanks to Amir Weiner for pointing out this document. "Vystuplenie tovarishcha I. V. Stalina na prieme v Kremie v chest' komanduiushchikh voiskami Krasnoi Armii," Bol'shevik, vol. XX, no. 10 (May 1945): 1-2.
27. Terry Martin, "The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing," in "The Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1923-1938," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1993. My gratitude to the author for sending me his manuscript.
28. Shimon Redlich, ed.. War, Holocaust and Stalinism: A Documented History of the Jewish Anti-fascist Committee in the USSR (Luxemburg: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1955), 449.
29. See Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York and London: New York University Press, 1994), 189-192.
30. For those victims from the communist side, see Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism (Ithaca, N.Y: Comell University Press, 1988), 243-254.
31. Katz, The Holocaust in Historical Context, 87. See his discussion of the numbers issue on 86, fn. 80.
32. Suny, Looking Toward Ararat, 114.
33. Articles reproduced from the Western English-language press are compiled in Richard Diran Kloian, The Armenian Genocide: First 20th Century Holocaust (65th Anniversary Memorial Volume, 1980).
34. Robert Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 143-145.
35. See Mim Kemal 6ke, The Armenian Question 1914-1923 (Oxford: K. Rustem & Brother, 1988), 126-136; Heath W. Lowry, The Story Behind Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1990); Stanford Jay Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976-1977), 30.
36. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide, 219-234.
37. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, 282-288.
38. See Lysimachos Econominos, The Martyrdom of Smyrna and Eastern Christendom (London: George Alien & Unwin, 1922), 84, and Dimitri Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact upon Greece (Paris and the Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962), 47.
39. Michael Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the 20th Century (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 102-103.
40. Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities, 1, n. 79. According to Stephen Ladas, Lausanne oversaw the actual transfer of 189,916 Greeks to Greece (1924-26) and 355,635 Muslims to Turkey (1923-25). More then one million Greeks, he states, had already fled Anatolia by the time of Lausanne. Stephen Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (New York: Macmillan Co., 1932), 17, 441.
41. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities, 724.
42. Gerhard Ziemer, Deutscher Exodus: Vertreibung und Eingliederung van 15 Millionen Ostdeutschen (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1973), 94, 227. Heinz Nawratil estimates that of the 2.23 million dead, 185,000 were from Poland (14 of German inhabitants) and 272,000 from Czechoslovakia (8 of German inhabitants.) Nawratil's estimates are the source of considerable dispute as excessively high. See Heinz Nawratil, Vertreibungs-Verbrechen an Deutschen (Munich: Ullstein, 1987), 71. Many memoirs of the expulsions from Czechoslovakia talk about a quarter of a million losses. Even today, Czech historians claim that no more than between 15,000 and 40,000 Germans died in the "transfer." See The New York Times, 9 February 1996.
43. Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 895.
44. See Bradley Abrams, "'The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation': Czech Culture and Socialism, 1945-1948," Stanford University Ph.D. Dissertation, 1997,129.
45. Report of the Political Section of the 4th Tank Army to the chief of the Political Administation of the First Ukrainian Front," "Ob otnoshenii chekhoslovatskogo naseleniia k nemtsam," 18 May 1945, Rossiiskii Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History, hereafter, RTsKhIDNI), f. 17, op. 128, d. 320, I. 161; Serov to Beria, 4 July 1945, GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 97, II. 143-144.
46. Die Vertreibung der Deutschen Bevolkerung aus der Tschechoslowakei, Band 1, 121-123.
47. Padraic Kenney, Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945-1950 (Ithaca and London: Comell University Press, 1997).
48. See N. F. Bugai, L. Beria - I. Stalmu: "Soglasno Vashemu ukazaniiu..." (Moscow: "AIRO-XX", 1995), 90-163.
49. Aleksandr M. Nekrich, The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of the Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War, transl. George Saunders (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978) 109.
50. GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 177,11. 2-3. The Greeks often describe similar conditions on the ships that transported them from the Anatolian coastline.
51. GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 153, I. 54; d. 183, II. 54, 218.
52. The spetspereselentsy were in such bad shape that they could not work. They were "exhausted, weak, many were sick, [and] insufficiently clothed." GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 153, I. 20. "A very poor diet" is leading to the death of these people, a 23 November 1944 report notes. Ibid., 11. 42-43.
53. GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 183, I. 37, II. 238-239.
54. GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 183, I. 290.
55. Vasilii Subbotin, "Bor 'ba s istoriei," Literaturnaia gazeta, 30 January 1991, in Tak eto bylo, vol. III (Moscow: Rossiiskii mezhdunarod. fond kultury, 1993), 71.
56. Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (New York: Macmillan, 1993). See also Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, vol. 2 (New York and Washington D.C: Helsinki Watch, 1993), especially "Patterns of Abuse," 7-42.
57. Nekrich, Punished Peoples, 57-58. On the Tatars, see Subbotin, "Bor'ba s istoriei," Tak eto bylo, vol. III, 83. Tartars, Chechans, and Ingush did not collaborate at a markedly different level than did Ukranians and Russians.
58. The sharp conflict in the Tatar obkom, which met at this point in Sochi, is recorded in the protocols of the 18 November 1942, and 21 July 1943 meetings. RTsKhIDNI, op. 43, d. 1045, II. 74-84; d. 1044, II. 251-282. See also Alan Fisher, The Crimean Tatars (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 159.
59. Ronald G. Suny, Looking toward Ararat, 106.
60. Cited in Leo Kuper, "The Turkish Genocide of Armenians, 1915-1917," in R. G. Hovannisian, The Armenian Genocide in Perspective (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1986), 48.
61. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities, 440.
62. Cited in Melson, Revolution and Genocide, 228-229.
63. HIA, "Postwar Borders Poland," Kierownictwo Marynarki Wojennej, "Potrzeba Polityczno-Miliama Szczecina," November 1943, 7-8; Polish Foreign Ministry, "Granice zachodnie," 341. See also Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, Poland's Place in Europe: General Sikorski and the Origin of the Oder-Neisse Line, 1939-1943 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 100, and Detlef Brandes, Grossbritannien und seine osteuopaischen Alliierten 1939-1943 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988), 406.
64. HIA, Mikolajczyk, Box 38, nr. 46. Speech in Opole, 8 April 1946.
65. Every German, insisted Mikolajczyk, was a "German nationalist" and the Germans should be restrained from exerting any influence on European affairs. HIA, Mikolajczyk, Box 72, "Rezolucje Rady Naczelny P.S.L.," 6-7 October 1946, 6.
66. Cited in Nawratil, Vertreibungs-Verbrechen an Deutschen, 96. See also Edvard Benes, Odsun Nemcu z Ceskoslovenska (Prague: Nakladatelstvi Dita, 1996).
67. Alexei Filitov, "Problems of Post-War Construction in Soviet Foreign Policy Conceptions during World War II," in Francesca Gon and Silvio Pons, eds. The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 9.
68. Edige Kirimal, "The Crimean Turks," Genocide in the USSR (New York: The Scarecrow Press, 1958), 20.
69. O likvidatsii Checheno-mgushinskoi ASSR i ob administrativnom ustroistve ee territorii," 7 March 1944, GARF, f. 7523, op. 4, d. 208, I. 51. See also GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 64, I. 161.
70. Richard G. Hovannisian, "The Historical Dimensions of the Armenian Question, 1878-1923," The Armenian Genocide in Perspective, 25-26.
71. GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, I. 8.
72. See Michael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), 80.
73. See Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, 298. 74. For the case of eliminating Tatar names from the Crimea see Vasilii Subbotin, "Bor'ba s istoriei," Literaturnaia gazeta, 30 January 1991, in Tak eto bylo, vol. III (1993), 68-69.
75. The well-known Soviet scholars B. D. Grekov and lu. V. Bromlei contributed to the rewriting of the history of the Crimean Tatars, emphasizing their lack of interest in economic development and their historical tendency toward banditry and pillage. Subbotin, "Bor'ba s istoriei," 85.
76. For Grozny obkom records, see RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 45, d. 423, d. 424.
77. See, for example, RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 758.
78. For some accounts, memoirs and fictional: see Carol Edgarian, Rise the Euphrates (New York: Random House, 1994); Abraham Hartunian, Neither to Laugh nor to Weep (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page, 1918); reprinted: Plandome, New York: New Age, 1975.
79. Mary Lowenthal Felstiner, To Paint her Life: Charlotte Salomon in the Nazi Era (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 205-211.
80. These stories abound in the volumes published by the German government on the "Vertreibung." Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevolkerung aus den Gebieten ostlich der Oder-Neisse, vols. 1 and 2, reprinted (Munich: Weltbild Verlag, 1993).
81. Alfred M. DeZayas, Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans: Background, Execution, Consequences, third ed. (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 65.
82. See Erich Anton Helfert, Valley of the Shadow (Berkeley, CaL: Creative Arts Book Company, 1997).
83. These stories are told in detail in Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa IV. Die Vertreibung der Deutschen Bevolkerung aus der Tschechoslowakei, vol. 1 (reprinted) (Munich: Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984).
84. Many of these stories are recounted in the collection, Tak eto bylo, 3 vols. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodn. fond kultury, 1993).
85. Beverly Alien, Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 71. See also Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ed. by Alexandra Stiglmayer, transl. by Marion Faber (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1992).
86. Francis A. Boyle, "The Bosnian People Charge Genocide: Proceedings at the International Court of Justice Concerning Bosnia v. Serbia on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide" (Amherst, Mass.: Aletheia Press, 1996), 30.
87. See Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslaviafrom the Death of Tito to Ethnic War, second edition (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996), 258-259, 284.
88. See my discussion of the problem in conjunction with World War II. Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 69-140.
89. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, "Turning Rape into Pornography: Turning Rape into Genocide," in Mass Rape, ed. Alexandra Stiglmayer, 73-81.
90. Boyle, "The Bosnian People Charge Genocide," 29. 91. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10.
92. Christopher Browning, "Human Nature, Culture, and the Holocaust," The Chronicle of Higher Education, 18 October 1996.
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