London, February 12, 1967, 1505Z.

T. 31/67. This is a background telegram about the reasons for our present difficulties which you may or may not wish to study and in any case I think that David or Chet may be filling in the detail.

The main difficulty is this. On Tuesday/2/ I outlined to Kosygin the basic American position based on paragraph 14 of Dean Rusk’s detailed letter to George Brown before George’s Moscow visit. It was given more specific content by the briefing I received just before Kosygin’s arrival from Chet Cooper whom you had sent in response to my appeal./3/ I was further reinforced in this by the relevant paragraph of your telegram no CAP 67038./4/

I did not at that time know that the message you were sending to Hanoi was in a different and tougher form and in terms of the sequence of timing was different from the Rusk/Brown exchanges of November,/5/ different from the more detailed Cooper briefing and indeed appears to be inconsistent with your 14th Point./6/

Kosygin was interested and he told me he had been in touch with Ho Chi Minh between the end of the formal meetings and my dinner with him that evening.

I was surprised on Friday/7/ when I went over this ground again with him that he was highly excited by my formulation which only repeated my Tuesday statement./8/ Obviously the reason for this as I can now appreciate was that Hanoi had told him what they had heard from Washington and my account of Friday naturally seemed to be more acceptable to them. This is why he asked me to put it in writing and why he told me he was transmitting it forthwith. You can imagine the shock he must have had on boarding his train for Scotland when he got Rostow’s message late on Friday night British time./9/

You will forgive me if I say what I cannot understand is this. My statement to him on Tuesday originally oral but followed up by a written repetition, was communicated at once to Washington. It is now clear to me that it differed from the Washington/Hanoi message referred to in your telegram under reference. If my message was going to be repudiated, as indeed it was on Friday night by Rostow’s telegram, I cannot understand why I was not told earlier. Kosygin will find it even more difficult to understand.

You will I am sure appreciate Kosygin’s position as I understand it. For a long time he has been trying to put pressure on Hanoi and there have been undoubtedly those there who did not want any truck with a peaceful settlement. He climbed out on a limb trusting in my confident assertion of where you stood. Now his enemies in Hanoi and perhaps in Moscow will be saying he was wrong to be misled by me.

I hope I can quickly reestablish trust with Kosygin. As you know, I have known these Russians for 20 years and this week I have been trying to cash the cheque I have painfully built up over this time. I hope past credit will stand me in good stead tomorrow. Above all I am passionately keen to get him associated with me for the future in the political operation we all know is necessary.

I know you understand my difficulties. I see little purpose in an inquest into the events of the past week. We must look to the future. And I feel the sooner we can meet the better, provided that the meeting is related to the continuing Anglo Russian responsibility for a political settlement and does not seem to be merely in response to any military developments in these next few days.

Washington, February 12, 1967, 3:36 a.m.

CAP 67043. I have carefully read and considered your two messages bearing on your talks later today with Kosygin./2/

I would wish to leave these thoughts with you on the present position.

I really do not believe that the matter hangs on the tense of verbs. Moscow had from George Brown in November the Phase A-Phase B formulation. Hanoi also had it from the Poles. Hanoi has shown no flicker of interest for more than two months. Meanwhile their build-up continues and they have used 3 periods of no bombing (Christmas, New Year’s and Tet) for large scale movement and preparation of their forces for further military action.

I want to emphasize that we have had nothing yet from Hanoi. They receive our messages--but thus far it has been a one-way conversation. Many intermediaries have attempted, from time to time, to negotiate with us. Everyone seems to wish to negotiate except Hanoi. I wish someone would produce a real live North Vietnamese prepared to talk.

Understandably your present preoccupation is Kosygin’s attitude. But thus far, Kosygin has not transmitted one word from Hanoi except to endorse their Foreign Minister’s interview with Burchett in his own press conference.

From an operational point of view, we can not stop the bombing while three (possibly four) divisions dash south from the DMZ before their promise is to take effect. I hope you will see the importance of this for the men out there who are doing the fighting.

We do not accept the view that our statement to you of our position on February 7/3/ is inconsistent with either our message to Hanoi/4/ or our formula for you and Kosygin of February 10./5/ We asked on February 7 for an "assured stoppage" of infiltration. In your version of an A-B formula it was transmuted to an assurance that infiltration "will stop." This, in our view, is a quite different matter. We so recognized promptly on receipt of your formula and telephoned Burke Trend that we were drafting and would transmit our response shortly.

The problem of substance is that no formula can be satisfactory to us--and perhaps to Hanoi--unless there is clarity about two matters:

--The timing of a cessation of bombing, cessation of infiltration, and no further augmentation of forces.

--How assurance in the matter of infiltration will be established. You have correctly pointed out that the cessation of bombing and the stoppage of augmentation by us will necessarily be public.

I would not expect Kosygin to come in at Chequers with anything firm and definitive by way of a positive response. In that case we can take stock and see where we go from here on the diplomatic track. If he does respond positively and constructively, we can then proceed to the clarifications that both sides will surely require.

Hanoi has received our messages and has just today informed us that a direct response to us from Hanoi will be forthcoming. We suppose that we shall not hear from them until your talks are concluded. There is importance, then, in our staying together. We must not let them play one position off against another.

Let me add that I much appreciate your dedicated effort during this week--and will, of course, express publicly our thanks. I’m always glad to know that you are in my corner but I would have some difficulty, in view of my responsibilities and problems here, in giving anyone a power of attorney. I hope for peace more than you can possibly know and will be much interested in what happens at Chequers.

London, February 12, 1967, 1450Z.

T. 33/67. Thank you for your message CAP 67043/2/ which I have carefully studied.

I fully take your point about the grave danger that if there were an interval between the cessation of bombing and the stoppage of infiltration, Hanoi might rush three or four divisions through the DMZ into South Vietnam before their promised stoppage of infiltration took effect. This I agree could happen even if the interval between Phase A and Phase B were only two or three days.

I have been turning over in my mind an alternative way of securing the required guarantee, namely that the prior two-way assurance should contain a timetable if possible underwritten by or communicated through the Russians. What might be provided is that you would agree in advance to stop the bombing in return for their prior assurance that they would stop the infiltration, say six hours afterwards, or an even shorter timetable if that was considered necessary. I’m not asking you to comment on this at this stage but if the conditions are right tonight I might see what mileage I can get out of it with Kosygin. It would of course be aired as a possible idea without committing you in any way. Indeed I would make it clear I have not attempted to ascertain your views on it. I’ll let you know of course how things go.

By the way. You misunderstood me I think about a power of attorney. Clearly that would be out of the question. That was not my phrase. The key words were ad referendum, repeat ad referendum.

We will keep you informed on how things go this evening.

Washington, February 12, 1967, 1:16 p.m.

135734. For Monday morning delivery to Ambassador unless instructed otherwise by septel.

1. We now assume that Kosygin will leave London tomorrow and that you may be called on for follow-up dealings with Soviets. For this purpose, we are giving you additional background info on dealings in London, as they stand prior to final Kosygin/Wilson meeting ending tonight at midnight London time. We expect to give you best possible summary of that discussion by later telegram.

2. First, you should know that we have in fact held off on resumption of bombing and naval action against the North until Kosygin leaves London. We expect resumption to follow promptly thereafter, and to make frank statement here that additional short suspension period was because we were already suspended during Tet and because active resumption in these peculiar circumstances might have been misconstrued in relation to Kosygin visit. We expect to make clear on background that this represents no change in our basic policy of not stopping bombing for mere willingness to talk or even actual talks among third parties. British are fully informed of our decision (for which they had of course pressed) but we have told Wilson not to reveal it explicitly to Soviets, who we are sure will fully understand what we are doing and also why we are not giving them a message on it or announcing it publicly until after it has taken place.

3. State of play in London is that British on Feb. 7 gave Kosygin as their own draft a summary of the proposal contained in the President’s letter to Ho./2/ However, unlike that letter, the British draft of that date clearly separated the stopping of the bombing from the actual stopping of infiltration, although it required assurance of the latter before the former would be done. This differs from the President’s letter to Ho, which of course spoke of assurance that infiltration had stopped already.

4. This difference has since caused difficulty with the British. On Feb. 10, Wilson repeated the substance of the British Feb. 7 version to Kosygin, who expressed real interest. That afternoon, the British worked up a draft with Cooper and sent it back to us for full clearance. Based on the same factors that had dictated the form of the President’s letter--namely the presence of 3-4 North Vietnamese divisions just north of the DMZ who might be introduced very quickly between the assurance and the fact of stopping infiltration--we corrected the British draft so that it insisted that we have assurance that the infiltration had stopped. We will copy to you the version that we finally gave to the British./3/ They caught Kosygin just as he took his train that evening, but it is possible, indeed probable, that the earlier "will stop" version was transmitted by the Soviets to Hanoi.

5. We have now somewhat tidied this up with the British, explaining that our own message to Hanoi of the 7th (channel unspecified) has made clear our real view. We have also pointed out that the difference in tense is almost certainly not critical. Wilson feels that he was put out on a limb on the 10th, however, so that there is some remaining friction. However, he now understands our position, and the reasons for it, fully, for his discussions this evening.

6. From your standpoint, the important thing is whether the Soviets may have been misled at any stage. From a direct Dobrynin reference with the Secretary on Friday evening,/4/ we now know that the Soviets are familiar with the contents of the President’s letter to Ho, and this direct statement means that you can assume this in any conversations with the Soviets. In short, they knew our position very shortly after the President’s letter was delivered, and again had it in clear form when we cleared the authorized version for transmission to Kosygin on the evening of the 10th. At most, they may have been briefly misled on the afternoon of the 10th and may have transmitted to Hanoi a "will stop" version on that afternoon based on that misunderstanding, and on the fact that British had handed over the version they sent to Washington before they had our final clearance.

7. We shall know tonight whether Kosygin even raises the difference in tenses, and what may flow from that. However, we are sending you this background so that you have it in case the ball should move rapidly to you tomorrow.

Rusk

Washington, February 12, 1967, 9:05 p.m.

135749. Deliver to Ambassador 7 a.m.

1. At PM Wilson’s request the USG authorized Wilson at 1830 EST Sunday night to present following proposition to Kosygin in London forthwith:/2/

/2/According to a February 12 memorandum from Read to Rusk, Wilson's proposed text was: "If you (Kosygin) can get an assurance from Hanoi, communicated directly to the US or through the Soviets, before 10:00 a.m. GMT tomorrow, that no arms or people will move across the 17th parallel (extended from Gulf of Tonkin through Laos), I (Harold Wilson) will get an assurance from the US that the US will not resume bombing from that time. Having gotten such an assurance from the DRV, the US would stop further augmentation of its forces in the South." Wilson was prepared to accept a U.S. variation of this proposal, according to Read. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Sunflower & Sunflower Plus)

If you can get a North Vietnamese assurance--communicated either direct to the United States or through you--before 10:00 am British time tomorrow that all movement of troops and supplies into South Viet-Nam will stop at that time, I will get an assurance from the US that they will not resume bombing of North Viet-Nam from that time. Of course the US build up would also then stop within a matter of days.

This would then give you and me the opportunity to try to consolidate and build on what has been achieved by bringing the parties together and promoting further balanced measures of de-escalation. End Text.

2. While likelihood of DRV reply before 10 a.m. GMT is obviously exceedingly slight, direct or indirect dilatory reply from Hanoi might be a likelier possibility. We know that you and Guthrie will be available and on maximum alert throughout remaining time before resumption, now scheduled for 11 a.m. EST Monday/3/ morning, to flash us any word from DRV which you may receive.

Rusk

Washington, February 12, 1967, 2333Z.

CAP 67045. As I pointed out early this morning, the A-B offer has been outstanding now for about three months. I gather from Cooper that as of the time you went into dinner tonight, you had no reply from Kosygin. We have had no reply from Hanoi.

Nevertheless, you have worked nobly this week to bring about what all humanity wants: a decisive move towards peace. It is an effort that will be long remembered. I feel a responsibility to give you this further chance to make that effort bear fruit. We will go more than half way. I am prepared to go the last mile in this week’s particular effort: although none of us can regard a failure tonight as the end of the road.

I must, of course, also bear in mind my responsibility to our men who are fighting there, to our allies, to the people of South Viet Nam who are counting on us to bring about an honorable peace consistent with our commitments to them.

Therefore, I agree with you that you should go forward and try once again with Kosygin saying to him:

[Here follows the verbatim text of the message in Document 69.]

With this deal consummated, we would, of course, be prepared to move promptly to a neutral spot to engage in unconditional negotiations designed to bring peace to the area.

Herewith some further observations.

It is significant that Kosygin reflects no further word from Hanoi. Our own private line with Hanoi remains silent. Actually, Kosygin may prefer that any final deal come bilaterally after he leaves London in view of his China problem.

Presumably the two co-chairmen would continue to be in touch with each other. It would be helpful if communiqué could express support of two co-chairmen for 1954 and 1962 Accords and agreement that any differences arising out of these accords should be settled by peaceful means.

Washington, February 12, 1967, 10:13 p.m.

President: Say that "Your noble efforts must be recognized by giving you everything we possibly can without endangering our men," and a little palaver where he’s really complimented and we can keep him aboard when he loses the battle and the war. And finally, when we get through with our stump speech and a flag in the blood, say to him something that will not--say it to him as much as we can say without endangering our people too much or unnecessarily. And I would think we could be able--would be able--to say that we will not resume--make it appear as magnanimous and as generous as we can, because we’re going to need it for the record, that here, we had it all wrapped up and then we wouldn’t answer him or we wouldn’t reply. I think that’s too dangerous. But we would say we would not resume our bombing, although there’re terrible things taking place right now, if Hanoi says they have ceased infiltration--men, supplies, and so forth. And soon as we get that assurance, we will take whatever actions we can to verify it and to observe it by land, sea, air, tunnel, and everything else, that they just be sure they close down and do not one damn thing on infiltrating. And within a period of very minimum necessary hours, if this is true, then we will be glad for he and the Indians, or Wilson and the Canadians or ICC, or anybody, ICC or co-chairmen or anybody else, to observe that we are ordering augmentation stopped. And then we’ll go to some neutral city, Geneva or some other place, for conferences in good faith that will try to result in a supervised election and some kind of a self-determination [inaudible]. And get the self-determination and neutralization and everything else we can think of in that part of it. Now, I would say that we’re going to gain by bombing during the two or three days, that we are checking to see if infiltration has ceased is not going to be enough--what we gain by bombing is not going to be enough--to justify us insisting on doing it. If we can get that kind of agreement and if we can cut him off from supplying them anyway, under the tunnels or Laos or sea or air, anyway, just make it so damn firm, in effect reiterate just what we’ve said, but doctor it up a little bit and instead of saying it has stopped just have them say it has stopped. And have Hanoi say that to the Russians and have the Russians say to us just that they believe this is true, or the co-chairmen say that it’s true. Anyway, I think we ought to try to write a wire, and when Fulbright thinks he’s got you and getting ready to railroad you and sends you right to jail, you can read this wire and he’ll say, "I’ll be damned, you did all a human could." Now that’s what we ought to decide, and you can talk to your military man, and then you can--you ought to come on down to the Cabinet room. And, I’d like to though, while I’m dressing, have your thought on what you would do.

McNamara: Well, I think . . .

President: You just put yourself--now suppose you’re President, and you know damn well that we haven’t thought this bombing’s going to save our life, and we’re just hoping against hope that we could get out of it some way or other, and that we could get to a table some way or other. Just bear that in mind now, because we don’t want to get up close to it and then get arrogant and cocky.

McNamara: The formulation you suggested is just exactly what I would support, with one minor modification, perhaps. I hate to see another formula put on the table until we have at least word from Wilson that he said to Kosygin, "Well, I gave you a formula on the 7th, and then you asked for it in writing on the 10th, and I gave it to you on the 10th, and then you wanted to be sure it was from the highest authority, so I got that and gave that to you in writing on the 10th. Now, what do you say?" Then I’d come back and say, "Well, Kosygin said nothing, he hadn’t been able to get anything out of Hanoi." Then I would still go back with the formula you suggest. But I hate to put another formula on when we haven’t even heard from Wilson before he’s even asked the question of Kosygin.

President: I just think that makes our case better, Bob, to do just what you said. Just say "Now, I want to thank you for your noble efforts and certainly if nothing results from it, it won’t be your fault because you’ve operated with a tenacity and a fervor that I haven’t seen before, and I just--as I understand it, you put it on February the 7th and we told you when we were assured to stop it, and then you came on February the 10th, and you did this, and then they wanted it confirmed, and we confirmed it, and you said 'has,’ we said 'has stopped,’ and the Chief, you and he both knew we’d already said this to Hanoi ahead of time, so what we said to Hanoi, and what you’ve said to him the 7th, and what you said to him the 10th, and then when we confirmed it on highest authority, it seems to me that it should have produced something, and it ought to produce something, and if you can’t make it produce something I can understand how harassed you must be and how disgusted you must be, but anyway because I love mother and God and little children, I’m still going to authorize you once more to continue your noble work by saying to him so-and-so."

McNamara: Well, sure, that’s all right. I’m just a little curious from a negotiating point of view here as to what Kosygin has found out. He must have found out something. You would have thought that the first thing Wilson would say to Kosygin, "Well, now, you’ve been pressing all week for something. I gave it to you three different ways three different times. You’ve had 4 days. You said you’re in direct contact with Hanoi. Now what have they told you?" And then Kosygin would have had to say they told me something or they told me nothing.

President: Well, I’d suggest that in the wire, I just--and that’s a good way to put it if you could write it that way. I don’t know why you don’t bring your own Negro stenographer over there and just dictate it that way and let us work from there. But I’d say that in the wire: "Now here’s what’s happening, here’s what you’ve done, you’ve had four days and you haven’t told us anything, now why don’t you tell us something?" And then say, "I think you ought to pursue this, because you’ve done a noble job here, and I’m going to say so to the world, and I think that every freedom-loving person will admire it." Now then, if that has failed, and you’ve got nothing else, and since it’s a completely one-way street anyway, I would say, and then I’d repeat the hardest damned thing to be sure I live with it. Because I have thought 95-5, and not much five, and I don’t want, though, when it leaves, him to say, "Well, they wouldn’t answer me, number one, and they held back or I could have done it." Every guy thinks--you think you just might have made a million dollars if Henry Ford hadn’t have told you not to do something. And let’s just play this one for the record. And you be thinking all these things that we stuff up his bottom good and let him dilate before we shoot in the second one, you see. Or you might even get this one off right quick, and say, "I think that would make the record look a little better." Just say, "We understand, we sympathize with what you’re going through, we appreciate your noble efforts, we’re going to say this to the world and we know everybody else will appreciate them, but here’s what has happened, and give them this résumé, and it looks like this man could say something. And while you’re trying to get him to say something, which we’d like for you to report right away, we will give you something in another hour that will at least be the final straw that broke the camel’s back."

McNamara: Yeah, I’d be much inclined to take it in two steps.

President: Yes, I think that’s good. I think it makes us look like we’re--I’d point out the summary that you have and send it to him, and say, "Now, here’s what you’ve done. You offered it to him the 7th, and you couldn’t have been more diligent, persistent, tenacious. You offered it to him the 10th. Then you confirmed it. And now he’s in charge, he says he’s got influence in Hanoi--they told us that, Gromyko--and he says he’s been in touch with them. Now what is the answer?" It seems to be a blank silence. So find out the answer and communicate it to us.

McNamara: And we’ll then be prepared to respond immediately.

President: And we’ll be prepared to respond immediately. And if it’s nothing, why we’ll still give you every weapon we can before it’s over.

McNamara: I think that probably Dean and Walt and I ought to get down there. Should I call Walt and ask him to meet us?

President: I told Walt to call you now but not to do it for 5 minutes--and that’s probably him--so I could talk to you.

McNamara: Okay. Thanks.

President: Bye.

Washington, February 12, 1967, 11:03 p.m.

President: Yeah.

Rostow: I gave David [Bruce] the line. He says that he’d just like to put down his own view of this matter and he’ll file something. He said my feelings won’t be hurt. He just wants to put something down on paper.

President: Oh, he’s wants to be a Goddamned peace-maker.

Rostow: Its very hard to discourage him. He said, "Oh, don’t worry about it. By the way, I don’t feel very strongly. I don’t think anything will come of it." But he has this vision of Kosygin being the one fellow who was really, because of his fear of the Chinese, really trying to push this thing, and he’d like him to have enough time to talk to his colleagues. The other thing is Bill Bundy told me this was a flight that would be 4 hours. I checked with the NMCC. They say its 4 hours and 50 minutes. And I found a pilot who says that with that kind of plane it might take 5 hours and 35 minutes. So, he might not touch down before the bombing began, but I don’t really think that’s a federal case. But in any case, sir--so David will be filing. We don’t have to tell the British anything right now. I gave--I told David that he would . . .

President: I wished he wouldn’t file it. Why do we want this in our file when they investigate us? Why in the hell didn’t he just tell you . . .

Rostow: I tried, very, very hard just for that reason. I didn’t want to say this on the line. I gave him a flat instruction, and it said when you come back, you’ve got time. You don’t have to file now. You don’t have to tell the British right away. Give it to them--they’ve all gone to sleep anyway--give it to them in the morning whatever the time is. And don’t pay any attention to this, but I want to give you my impressions, and . . .

President: What did he tell you--did he give them to you then? Did he give them to you on the phone?

Rostow: He sure did. I could write an essay on them.

President: Well, why does he want to make a record of them?

Rostow: Well, I don’t know, I guess, he said he wanted Secretary Rusk to consider it, and so on.

President: Tell him you’ll convey them to him.

Rostow: He couldn’t have had . . . [laughing]. He knew that I’d turned it off to speak to you, and I said, "Now here are the four points," and I gave them to him. One--we bought his language and his timing. Two--they’ve had it 3 months. Three--they had it direct since Tuesday./2/ Four--there’s no reason why if they buy any such proposal they can’t come back when the bombing’s stopped and march through it loud and clear. And he said, well, it might give him a chance to talk to his colleagues or something. He’s for us.

President: Now who says that he wants to talk to his colleagues? Did he say that? Did Kosygin say that?

Rostow: Of course he didn’t. Kosygin was wholly correct. All Kosygin said was--one, I will transmit. He did not say he will back this. Two--I will sit aside; he said, "I may be regarded as a traitor because this will leave a hundred thousand fellows down there at the mercy of everybody." Three, he said "That ain’t much time." But we didn’t fake up the time. Can’t Wilson do arithmetic? Well, sir, I’m just reporting it, sir. I’m just going to open the cot back here, and I’ll be here all night to pick up. So don’t you worry about it. But I do think . . .

President: Wonder what we’re going to do about it, though? If he goes to--Bruce just wants to make it hard on us, doesn’t he?

Rostow: No, I don’t believe that’s right, sir. I think . . .

President: Well, is there anything he can tell you about why he hadn’t already told you?

Rostow: No, sir.

President: Why--why then?

Rostow: I guess he wanted just to get them to Secretary Rusk--I don’t know why he wants to file the wires.

President: Why don’t you have Rusk call him and tell him?

Rostow: All right, sir.

President: Have you talked to Rusk lately?

Rostow: Not in the last half hour.

President: Does he favor going ahead?

Rostow: Yes, he does. He’s the one that keeps saying they should have the information and . . .

President: Answer--he does go ahead. McNamara favors going ahead too.

Rostow: That’s right.

President: I’ll call Rusk and ask him to call this fellow and tell him that he doesn’t want him worrying him in the middle of the night; that he’s glad to get his views and debate it with him and resolve it, and so he ought to tell him./3/

Washington, February 12, 1967, 11:17 p.m.

Rostow: Here’s the possible draft, sir. "We’ve considered the case for a further delay to receive a message from Hanoi beyond 10:00 a.m. British time, which you suggested. I’ve gone into this with my senior advisers, and we are prepared to hold for receipt of the North Vietnamese assurance until 11:00 a.m. Washington time, 4 p.m. your time."

President: Add "postpone," or "delay" or something. Hold is not a good word. Let’s say . . .

Rostow: "To delay"?

President: Let’s see if we can tie it to their suggestion, "to attempt to comply with the thoughts you expressed or imparted," or something like that. Read what you’ve got there again.

Rostow: "I’ve gone into this with my senior advisers, and we are prepared to . . ."

President: ". . . and after carefully considering your suggestion and thorough evaluation of the problems you present, the problems here, and the morale . . ."

Rostow: That comes in later.

President: ". . . of our uniformed men, we are extending the time"--6 hours, is it?

Rostow: That’s right.

President: "Six hours." Something like that. Then give your times.

Rostow: "After carefully considering your suggestions, the problems you present, and the problems . . ."

President: ". . . and the problems here."

Rostow: "and the problems here, including . . ."

President: ". . . the morale of our uniformed men, we . . ."

Rostow: "We shall."

President: "We are extending . . ."

Rostow: "We are extending."

President: ". . . we are extending the time as you suggested, but feel national interest requires extending the time as you suggested as long as we feel the national interest permits . . ."--or something like that--". . . for extending the time for six hours, which we believe, all factors considered, is as long as we can justify."

Rostow: ". . . for 6 hours . . . as long . . . justify."

President: "As long as we believe is advisable," maybe.

Rostow: Yeah, I think that’s better.

President: "As long as we believe is advisable."

Rostow: "As long as we believe is advisable." Right.

President: I would say something, "Our senior military men have opposed not only Tet truce but all extensions thereto."

Rostow: "You should understand . . ."

President: Yes. "I believe you would want to know that our military advisers have unanimously opposed not only Tet truce but all extensions thereto."

Rostow: "Our senior military men."

President: Yes, "have unanimously." "Our Joint Chiefs and commanders in the field have unanimously opposed--Our Joint Chiefs and General Westmoreland--Our Joint Chiefs, CINCPAC, and General Westmoreland have unanimously opposed Tet truce and any extension thereto." That’s true, isn’t it?

Rostow: Yes, sir.

President: Buzz had a pretty strong letter yesterday on it./2/ I believe you would want to know.

Rostow: [inaudible]

President: Right. I’d say, "not only on the ground of morale but on the cost in human lives, in American lives--not only on the ground of morale but on the cost in American lives."

Rostow: ". . . not only on the ground of morale but on the cost in American lives."

President: All right. "Therefore . . ."--give them the times announcement.

Rostow: "Unless we get his assurance, military operations . . ."

President: I wouldn’t say "unless." I’d say "we will wait for assurance until."

Rostow: All right. "We will wait for assurance for a receipt."

President: "We will wait for any information--we will wait for any forthcoming information--we will wait for any information that may be forthcoming until 11:00 o’clock our time and . . ." whatever it is.

Rostow: "4:00 p.m. your time. Unless military operations against the North--unless we get that--I have assurance, military operations will resume between 11:00 a.m. and . . ."

President: I wouldn’t say "unless." How’s that sentence go now? "We will wait until 11 our time for any information that may be forthcoming, and--but military operations will not be delayed beyond that point--that time."

Rostow: "Military operations will resume between 11 a.m. and noon."

President: That’s right--"will be authorized to resume, but may not resume--will be permitted," is what I’d say. "Be expected to resume" or "permitted to resume."

Rostow: All right . . . "permitted to resume" . . . "our time." I had some more palaver, if you do want to hear that.

President: Yeah.

Rostow: "In making this decision, I bore in mind their problems of transmittal in two ways. But I have also been conscious of the fact they have had the possibility of responding to this message with the 3 months since it was given to the Poles and you gave it to the Russians, in the 5 days since it was transmitted directly to Hanoi and given by you to Kosygin. If there is any interest in some such A-B proposition, there has been ample time for them to either agree or come back with a counter-proposal. Your gallant last-minute effort, which I was glad to back, is one on which they must move fast in any case. On receiving it, they must be either be ready to make a response . . ."

President: I wouldn’t say "on which I was glad to back"--"on which I agreed to--on which I consented to . . ."

Rostow: "On which I consented to support. . . "

President: No--"On which I consented to . . ."

Rostow: Oh, I see. I got it sir. "On which I consented to . . ." Got it.

President: Go ahead.

Rostow: ". . . is one which they must move fast in any case. On receiving it, they must either be ready to make a response or not. A few hours either way cannot be significant."

President: I wouldn’t say "move fast." I’d say "move." That implies . . .

Rostow: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. "You must also bear in mind that the offer for a reciprocal deescalation remains available to them when we resume bombing the North."

President: Cut out "also." Just say "you must bear in mind" or say "bear in mind."

Rostow: Yes, sir. Right. "Bear in mind the offer for reciprocal de-escalation remains available to them when we resume bombing the North."

President: "Bear in mind" what?

Rostow: "Bear in mind that the offer for a reciprocal de-escalation remains available to them when we resume bombing the North. The channel to open up discussions . . ."

President: I wouldn’t say that. "Bear in mind that the offer to"--what is it?

Rostow: "For a reciprocal de-escalation."

President: ". . . for a reciprocal de-escalation has not been withdrawn."

Rostow: I think that’s good--"has not been withdrawn . . ."

President: ". . . and can be accepted any moment they desire to do so--they may desire to do so. Even though operations are in effect, they could be suspended momentarily."

Rostow: The way I have it there was--"I also had to bear in mind my responsibilities to the men in the field." But you’ve already got that in. "They must be in a position to protect themselves. Right now supplies and weapons are moving down at a high rate."

President: I’d leave that in right now.

Rostow: "Bearing in mind their safety and their morale, I could not spare my responsibilities for another extension beyond those 6 hours. Hope you have a good chance to catch up on sleep after this arduous and interesting week."

President: I wouldn’t--I’d leave--I’d cut out the first sentence on troops, and the next one--read that second one you read. "Men and supplies are moving down right now."

Rostow: "Right now supplies and weapons are moving down at a high rate," which is true, incidentally, sir. "Bearing in mind their safety and their morale . . ."

President: "Bearing in mind the safety of more than a half million of our men--more than half a million of our men . . ."

Rostow: "I could not spare my responsibilities for an extension beyond those 6 hours."

President: I want to make it positive. "I feel that to grant in part--to go along in part with your suggestion for an extension is--could be costly, but I am so anxious--but I desire so much to cooperate fully, I have extended it for an additional 6 hours."

Rostow: Could you do that again, sir? "I feel that to go along in part with your suggestion for an extension . . ."

President: Now wait a minute. Read it again.

Rostow: "Bearing in mind the safety of more than a half million of our men, I feel that to go along . . ."

President: ". . . in part with your suggestion . . ."

Rostow: ". . . to go along with part of your suggestion . . ."

President: ". . . by extending--I can go along in part--I should--bearing in mind . . ."--read that again.

Rostow: "Bearing in mind the safety of more than a half million of our men, I feel . . ."

President: ". . . that I should go along in part with your suggestion--I should go as far as possible to meet your suggestion--go as far as possible to meet your suggestion, and therefore am stretching the resumption time by another--by extending--stretching the beginning of military operations--stretching the beginning of military operations by extending the resumption time another 6 hours. Considering all the time and conversation that have gone on before, this . . ."/3/

Washington, February 11, 1967, 0533Z.

CAP 67046. Monday, February 13, 1967.

From the President to the Prime Minister

We have considered the case for further delay to receive a message from Hanoi beyond 10:00 A.M. British time, which you suggested.

I have gone into this with my senior advisers and, after carefully considering your suggestion, the problems you presented, and the problems here--including the morale of our uniformed men--we are extending the time by 6 hours. This is as long as we believe is advisable.

I am sure you would want to know that our Joint Chiefs, CINCPAC, and General Westmoreland have unanimously opposed the Tet and other truces and extensions thereto--not only on the grounds of troop morale but because of the cost in human lives./2/ We will wait, then, for information that may be forthcoming until 11:00 A.M. Washington time--4:00 P.M. your time. Military operations against the North will be permitted to resume between 11:00 A.M. and noon our time.

In making this decision I bore in mind Moscow’s and Hanoi’s problems of transmittal two ways. But I also was conscious of the fact that they have had the possibility of responding to essentially this message for the 3 months since we gave it to the Poles and you gave it to the Russians; and the 5 days since it was transmitted direct to Hanoi and also given by you to Kosygin.

If there is any interest in some such A-B proposition, there has been--and still is--ample time for them either to agree or to come back with a counter-proposal.

Your gallant last minute effort--which I consented to--is one on which they must move. On receiving it they must be either ready to make a response or not. A few hours either way cannot be significant. Bear in mind that the offer for a reciprocal de-escalation has not been withdrawn. It can be accepted any moment they may desire to do so, even though operations are in effect. They could be suspended momentarily. The channels for discussions on these or other lines will remain open.

Right now supplies and weapons are moving down from the North at a high rate. While bearing in mind the safety of more than a half million of our men, I feel I should, nevertheless, go as far as possible to meet your suggestion and, therefore, am stretching the beginning of military operations by another 6 hours.

Considering all the time and conversation that has gone on before, this allows added time for talk if they are really serious.

I hope you have a good chance to catch up on sleep after this arduous and interesting week which, I am inclined to believe, will prove in the end to have been most constructive.

Saigon, February 13, 1967, 1100Z.

17875. 1. Pursuant to your 135744,/2/ I flew to Dalat Monday afternoon and saw Ky.

2. I recalled that the U.S. had decided to refrain from bombing the North until Kosygin left London. This decision, I said, was dictated solely by extreme British concern and the vital importance of keeping British support. We believed that the British might have been seriously disturbed if their talks with Kosygin had produced no results--which seems likely. We also did not want to be in the position of being blamed because their talks with Kosygin had produced nothing. While we are not yet sure that either the British or the Soviets can play any useful role, we felt that resumption of bombing would have heavily damaged any such prospect. Moreover, we believe repercussions in British public opinion could have placed Prime Minister Wilson in an almost untenable position, and the U.S. considers that his support remains of major importance in the European picture and more broadly.

3. This decision, I added, does not mean that either the British or we have any indication that Hanoi will accept the proposal which I described to Ky Saturday. We believe Kosygin has transmitted the proposal on to Hanoi but we have no more reason than before to suppose that it will be accepted. Kosygin had nothing new Sunday to convey to Wilson on the subject.

4. The latest development in London, I said, is that at Prime Minister Wilson’s suggestion we have authorized him to tell Kosygin that if Hanoi accepts our proposal by 10:00 A.M., London time today (5:00 P.M. Saigon time), we would continue the bombing suspension. The requirement remains, I added, that Hanoi must assure us that infiltration has stopped, with our cessation of augmentation of U.S. forces to follow in a few days.

5. I declared that we have made it absolutely clear to the British that in the absence of Hanoi acceptance, we expect to resume bombing the North within a few hours after Kosygin’s departure from London, which is expected to be about 6:00 P.M. Saigon time today (Monday). We have also, I said, made absolutely clear to the British that we are maintaining our basic position of not stopping the bombing in exchange for mere talks of any sort.

6. If we resume the bombing, I told him that we expect to make a public statement on Monday (Washington time) along the following lines:

A) "As you know, the South Vietnamese Government announced on the 11th that its forces and those of other nations assisting South Viet-Nam would resume normal operations during the day on February 12. This resumption was in accordance with the truce period announced by the South Vietnamese Government some weeks ago. As the South Vietnamese had made clear in early January and again last week, it was prepared to discuss extension of the truce period at any time. There was no response to this offer.

B) "During the Tet period, bombing and other military operations against North Viet-Nam were also suspended. This suspension was continued for a short additional period in order to avoid any possibility that earlier resumption would be misconstrued in relation to Mr Kosygin’s visit to London. Operations have not been resumed."

7. I said that many speculative press stories were now appearing, adding that General Westmoreland and I had made (and would make) no comment whatsoever about the matter before this statement is issued in Washington, I repeated that secrecy on this matter is of the highest importance.

8. Finally I recalled his expression of concern Saturday/3/ regarding the effectiveness of the International Control Commission in verifying possible infiltration from the North. I said I would like to add to what I said then that in the unlikely event that Hanoi should take up the proposal we would expect ourselves to conduct extensive reconnaissance. Our reconnaissance capabilities together with other intelligence operations in Laos should, I said, give us a virtual certainty of detecting any substantial North Vietnamese violations of an undertaking to stop infiltration.

9. Ky’s only reply was to thank me and to say in French: "J’ai peur que Hanoi va vous jouer un mauvais tour" which I translate as: "I’m afraid Hanoi will play a dirty trick on you." He repeated that we would both be much stronger in a few months: militarily and, above all, politically--which, he stressed, underlay the military. We would, he said, be stronger after the hamlet elections were held next month than we are now./4/

Lodge

On February 13, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson met from 8:29 a.m. to 10:45 a.m. with a group of his senior foreign policy advisers, including General Earle Wheeler, Robert McNamara, Cyrus Vance, Walt Rostow, Nicholas Katzenbach, Hubert Humphrey, William Bundy, Maxwell Taylor, and Foy Kohler. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) The meeting concerned the attempt by British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin to broker an arrangement that would lead to an opening of peace talks on Vietnam. According to handwritten notes of the meeting taken by Presidential aide Tom Johnson, the following exchange occurred:

"Buz Wheeler: Following a presentation describing the increase in North Vietnamese infiltration, Wheeler added: Have not suffered any ill effects. Movement of supply has been substantial. W/O it could move 1/5 of it. Postponement--Yes, I favor it because this is the 1st time Soviets have been in like this.

"VP: Chinese sit(uation) may mean they can’t hold this power over Hanoi. Time element is very desirable, if even for a couple of hours.

"Bill Bundy: Use open line to Thompson. Russians will intercept. Announce here at 12 o’clock.

"Rostow: Favor proposal made. Have reacted to Kosygin request.

"Pres.: Asked Nick to draft cable to Wilson. Add another 7 hours on bombing but will try to minimize movement of supply by naval forces. Following comments by Bundy and McNamara, the President added: Don’t want to get involved in another extension if not doing any good.

"Rostow: (No indication of a response)

"Bundy: Urged until 3 p.m. for naval gunfire.

"McNamara: Thro British put proposals to Kosygin. K sent to Hanoi. If they stop infil. we will cease bombing of N. on Sat. Hanoi told embassy had transmitted our Kosygin to Brezhnev. Have transmitted our proposal. Soviet has endorsed our proposal. Wilson wanted five more hours. Gave until 11 a.m. this a.m. Planned to resume at noon. Now to 7 p.m. tonight. Execute message at 3. Naval gunfire start at noon. Does Hanoi distinguish between gunfire and bombing.

"Wheeler: Another 2-3 hours won’t have any effect.

"Pres: Stand on alert until 3 p.m. our time. Bombing starts at 7. Naval gunfire to be moved back.

"VP: Argued with McN--1st time Soviets began. This is risk worth taking. Ought to give extra hours.

"Pres: If military people are satisfied.

"Buzz: This is a political decision. Not going to make that much difference militarily.

"Bundy: We’ve gone more notches.

"Max Taylor: No prob. in postponing mil. gunfire.

"Tom Johnson noted: At 12--resumption of mil. action authorized. Announcement of resumption & bombing falling at same time." (Ibid., Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings)

Washington, February 13, 1967, 11:55 a.m.

McNamara: Mr. President, may I call Walt Rostow and ask him to work up a contingency press release that would respond to allegations that we screwed up another peace effort and that would make reference to the 10-mile restriction, the Polish talks, the bombing of the 13th, 14th, the current discussions, etc.? Wilson has just put out a statement that is likely to raise questions later. It says that based on his talks with Kosygin, he claims a peace could be arranged. I don’t have it right in front of me, but that’s the essence of it. And our public relations people feel they’re going to be pressed very hard after we put out the announcement this afternoon as to whether there were peace talks, and what they were, and why they failed, and why didn’t we continue with the [restriction on] bombing Hanoi.

President: I don’t think that we’d want to get into the London conversations too much though now, do you?

McNamara: I’d stay away from them. But I’d just like to see the best possible statement from your point of view protecting you written down so we have it available, because we don’t know what Wilson is going to say. He’s going to try to make himself a hero and if things didn’t succeed it was really not his fault but ours, which is what I fear will come out of all this. I’ll call Walt.

President: Yeah, okay, I think that’s all right. Now, he’s landed, I assume, by now.

McNamara: Yes, he should have. Five minutes ago.

President: Have you heard anything back?

McNamara: No, I haven’t, although . . .

President: From Buzz?

McNamara: No, I talked to Buzz just a moment ago, but we don’t have anything on the bombing yet, but the naval gunfire is due to start in 5 minutes. And we may of course be queried as a result of a Hanoi statement that gunfire has started, and I’ve already given our people a statement they can make under those circumstances.

President: When do you think the other thing will come on?

McNamara: Well, my guess is that it will start around 2:30 or so and we’ll hear about it 3:00 to 3:30.

President: Okay.

McNamara: Goodbye. Thank you.

Washington, February 13, 1967, 12:28 p.m.

President: Yes?

McNamara: Mr. President, Uly Sharp just called and said the first strike was over the target at 12:10. He had some planes that were saddled up in fact and he just sent them off. I thought this was about what would happen. I think we should go with the announcement. We should have some kind of thing.

President: Well, what’re you going to say now?

McNamara: Let’s check on it right here. "Combat operations against military targets in North Vietnam have now been resumed. The suspension of these operations, initiated at the beginning of Tet, was continued beyond the end of Tet for a short additional time in order to avoid any possibility that earlier resumption would be misconstrued in relation to Mr. Kosygin’s visit to London."

President: All right, now, let me hold a minute. I told Walt to tell the British in his conversation with them they’d have a few more hours. Let me see if I could top that.

McNamara: Sure.

Washington, February 13, 1967, 12:31 p.m.

McNamara: Uh, yes, I did, at least I read what the wire said it was. I didn’t read the . . .

President: What is it--just hold out a little hope that’s not there?

McNamara: Yeah, well it . . .

President: I told Walt to tell the British that this could get up false hopes, and that if we were going to be partners in this thing, he had to constantly remember that for 3 months now we had no reply from Hanoi, and I didn’t know anybody that ever quoted Hanoi on anything, and how in the hell could he say that you can have peace with somebody that never has even answered you?

McNamara: Yeah. Well, I think its extremely important that you not be put in the position of torpedoing peace again. And this is just exactly what Wilson would try to do to bring glory to himself. He had it all made, and you screwed it up. I wouldn’t put it that vulgarly, but that’s about the air he would give the whole thing. And then he would go on to say, "Of course, if peace ever comes, it will really be because of my efforts and my ability to finally pound some sense into the head of the Americans." Now I think we have to be prepared to counter that. The first thing to do is just what you have done--have them call--tell--David Bruce to turn that off. The second thing to do is to have a good contingency story here. I talked to Walt after I talked to you and he said he would prepare one. I also called Nick [Katzenbach] and asked him to work on it as well. And I’ll put this out right away./2/

President: Right.

McNamara: Bye.

On February 13, 1967, Prime Minister Harold Wilson spoke before Parliament about the events that had transpired during the just concluded visit of Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. He described a "secret plan" for peace that had been generated by himself and Kosygin, and purported that an end to the fighting in Vietnam "could have been very near." Wilson blamed in part the North Vietnamese troop movements that had occurred during the Tet truce for the failure of the plan’s implementation. His speech was excerpted in The New York Times, February 14, 1967.

In Circular 137167, February 14, the Department cautioned Embassies that there had in fact been no "secret plan" developed during the period in question. Wilson had simply put forward a variation of the position stated by Representative to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg the previous September that required assurances of reciprocal action by the other side. The position of the U.S. Government "remained unchanged" from the Goldberg statement throughout the talks. In addition, the southward infiltration of the Communists had buttressed the position that the United States had consistently maintained. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S; for Goldberg’s statement of September 22, 1966, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume IV, Document 244)

It first appeared that Wilson took the disappointment in stride. In telegram 6543 from London, February 14, U.S. officials Philip Kaiser and Chester Cooper reported on their meeting with Prime Minister Wilson and his advisers soon after the Parliament speech. The British leaders noted their satisfaction with the U.S. Government’s going "more than half way" in its efforts to accommodate North Vietnam. Wilson stated that he could deal with domestic political problems that had arisen due to the failure of the initiative, especially since the British press was describing North Vietnam as "the villain in the piece" due to its failure to accede to the terms offered which might have led to the opening of peace talks. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) During the debate, a member of the House of Commons had put forth a query as to the "replenishment" of U.S. forces during the Tet truce. In telegram 142063 to London, February 21, the Department suggested that Wilson reply to the query by stating that only "normal replenishment" of U.S. forces had occurred during the Tet cease-fire period while the movement of Communist forces during the same interval "was conservatively 5 times that normally occurring in non-truce periods." (Ibid.)

Indications that Prime Minister Wilson found the results of Sunflower troubling arose soon after the overture’s termination. On February 25 Walt Rostow informed the President and Secretary of State Rusk of a conversation that he had with Wilson. Rostow stated that "the main point of his interview with me was to get off his chest his frustrations with the week with Kosygin." The Prime Minister’s main difficulty was with what he perceived as a "breakdown in communications," resulting in an "ultimatum" that foreclosed any chance of a successful outcome. Rostow allowed Wilson "to use my presence to unload his feelings." Because of his support of U.S. efforts in Vietnam, Wilson now faced significant obstacles in Britain. Rostow impressed upon Wilson that the President had three main concerns: 1) to safeguard a half million troops in Vietnam, 2) the danger that a failed peace would undermine the administration’s political base at home, and 3) the likelihood that the search for peace would degenerate into a Panmunjom-style negotiation since the North Vietnamese leadership showed no "will" to negotiate. (Telegram 6894 from London, February 25; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Sunflower & Sunflower Plus)

Later, Wilson was to cite President Johnson’s refusal to extend the cease-fire just a few more hours as a principal reason for collapse of this initiative. See Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), page 442; Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London: Harpercollins, 1992), pages 460-465; and Chester L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade: The Full Story of U.S. Involvement in Vietnam From Roosevelt to Nixon (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970), pages 362-369.

Moscow, February 15, 1967, 1150Z.

3503. Ref: Moscow 3501./2/

/2/Telegram 3501 from Moscow, February 15, 1043Z, read: "Le Chang handed DCM at 1:00 p.m. Ho Chi Minh's reply to President's letter. Reply completely unyielding and in subsequent oral remarks, Le Chang said he could no longer meet with U.S. representatives in Moscow. Text and full report follow." (Ibid.)

1. At Le Chang’s request (Hoang Manh Tu phoned Akalovsky at 11:45), DCM called on him at 13:00 today.

2. Le Chang handed DCM Ho Chi Minh’s reply to President’s message delivered February 8, requesting that it be transmitted to President (septel)./3/ Le Chang then made the following additional oral statement:

/3/See Document 32. The translation of Ho Chi Minh's reply is printed as an attachment to Document 82.

A. Position and attitude of DRV Govt are very correct and serious, and enjoy strong support of world public opinion, including American people. US, however, always obstinate and perfidious, and it continues advance conditions for cessation of bombings.

B. US had made use of DRV representative’s receiving US representative in Moscow to deceive public opinion that secret negotiations going on while bombings continue.

C. Lately, US extended so-called suspension of bombings during Tet. Less than two days later, bombings were resumed on pretext that there had been no response from Hanoi. This constitutes insolent ultimatum to compel Vietnamese people to accept unacceptable conditions.

D. In such circumstances, DRV representative does not consider it possible receive US representative in Moscow on US proposal. Responsibility for this rests completely with US./4/

/4/ In a February 15 memorandum to Katzenbach, Bundy found Le Chang's remarks "of possible interest." He speculated that Le Chang's statements put forth a "teaser" designed to mean that "the door was not really shut if we keep our mouths shut about the channel." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/SUNFLOWER)

3. After making sure he understood Le Chang’s final statement correctly, DCM called his attention to President’s February 13 statement/5/ and cited sentence stating that door to peace is and will remain open and US prepared go more than half way to meet any equitable overture from other side.

4. In response, Le Chang quoted final portion Ho’s message, beginning with sentence stipulating cessation of bombings and all other acts of war against DRV as precondition if US really desires conversations.

5. Meeting was attended by usual participants and lasted 15 minutes.

Thompson

Washington, February 15, 1967, 10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is our translation of Ho’s flat no, plus the comments made in transmittal./2/ They are breaking off the Moscow contact.

We cannot know what is running through their minds, but we must assume that "no bombing for the possibility of talk" was as much of a consensus as Ho could get out of his split government; it may have shaken and, even, frightened them that Moscow would consider a formula involving the end of infiltration; and we must assume that they have decided to sweat us out to the 1968 election and, if they lose, withdraw silently rather than to negotiate--although the latter judgment is clearly premature.

Therefore, I recommend a stock-taking of Viet Nam policy designed to:

--decide what we do in the North (electric power; steel; cement; mining of ports; naval gunfire to shore; or what?).

--how to accelerate all aspects of military and political action in the South.

--and, in particular, how to shift the peace effort to the South via amnesty, contacts, Saigon-NLF dialogue, etc.

In any case, Nick, Cy, and I will be putting our heads together; and next week--perhaps Tuesday lunch, when I believe Sect. Rusk will be back--we can go into it and move./3/

/3/The Department apprised Rusk, who was at the Punta del Este Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States, of Ho's letter in telegram 137496 to Buenos Aires, Tosec 35, February 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/SUNFLOWER)

Walt

Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States

Your Excellency:

On February 10, 1967, I received your message./5/ Here is my reply:

Vietnam is thousands of miles from the United States. The Vietnamese people have never done any harm to the United States, but contrary to the commitments made by its representative at the Geneva Conference of 1954, the United States Government has constantly intervened in Vietnam, has launched and intensified its aggression against South Vietnam for the purpose of prolonging the division of Vietnam and of transforming South Vietnam into an American colony and an American military base. For more than two years now, the American Government, using its military planes and its navy has been waging war against the sovereign and independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The U.S. Government has committed war crimes and crimes against peace and against humanity. In South Vietnam, a half million American soldiers and soldiers from satellite countries have used the most inhuman and barbaric methods of warfare such as napalm, chemicals and toxic gases to massacre our compatriots, destroy their crops and level their villages. In North Vietnam, thousands of American planes have rained down hundreds of thousands of tons of bombs destroying towns, villages, factories, roads, bridges, dikes, dams and even churches, pagodas, hospitals and schools. In your message you seem to deplore the suffering and the destruction in Vietnam. Allow me to ask you: who is perpetrating these awful crimes? It is the American and satellite soldiers. The United States Government is entirely responsible for the critical situation in Vietnam.

American aggression against the Vietnamese people is a challenge to the countries of the Socialist camp, menaces the peoples’ independence movement and gravely endangers peace in Asia and the world.

The Vietnamese people deeply love independence, liberty and peace. But, in the face of American aggression, they stand as one man, unafraid of sacrifices, until they have gained real independence, full liberty and true peace. Our just cause is approved and supported strongly by all the people of the world, including large segments of the American people.

The Government of the United States is aggressing against Vietnam. It must stop this aggression as the only way leading toward the re-establishment of peace. The Government of the United States must stop the bombing, definitively and unconditionally, and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all its troops and those of its satellites, recognize the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and allow the people of Vietnam to settle their problems by themselves. This is the essence of the Four Points of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as well as the expression of the principles and essential provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1954 on Vietnam. It is the basis for a just political solution of the Vietnamese problem. In your message, you suggested direct talks between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States. If the Government of the United States really wants such talks, it must first unconditionally halt the bombing as well as all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Only after the unconditional stopping of the bombing and all other American acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam can the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States enter into conversations and discuss the questions in which both parties are interested.

The Vietnamese people will never yield to force nor agree to talks under the menace of bombs.

Our cause is entirely just. It is our hope that the Government of the United States acts with reason.

Sincerely yours,

Ho Chi Minh

Washington, February 15, 1967, 9:24 a.m.

Rostow: [Here follows Rostow’s reading of the reply of Ho Chi Minh as delivered by Le Chang, the North Vietnamese Chargé in Moscow.]/2/ So it’s about flat as it could be, sir. I’ll get it translated. I wanted you to know immediately. My first reaction is that we ought to fairly soon soberly take stock of where we go from here both on the North and the South and political policy. But I wanted you to know right away, sir.

President: We got a letter in here from these Congressmen--they’ve already released it--on the CIA. I don’t know--I guess we better send it over to Nick [Katzenbach] and get him to answer it. But I’ll send it over to you. The first thing you better talk to Nick about is what kind of acknowledgment Henry Wilson/3/ ought to make, and then get that dictated to Henry, and get Meg to call these fellows in and tell them what’s happening. And I think somebody ought to get a little brochure on Ramparts, and let them know what’s happening here, that this is a Communist propaganda campaign, and I think we’re going to have to tell the country that all these speeches are being used as propaganda against your men, every one of these speeches. Don’t you think so?

Rostow: It’s perfectly obvious. They still think they’ve got enough of a hold on us through public opinion and these public speeches to make us stand down. They haven’t given that up. No, I think there are a number of moves. This is the end of one phase and I think that as far as Hanoi is concerned, we ought to stop probing them. We ought really to put on a major effort, not only of course to accelerate the military and all that, but to work on Chieu Hoi contacts on the Southerners, and take an attitude for a little while, "You call me, I won’t call you" for a bit. I think it’s--it may encourage them that we have been just so--to them we may look over-anxious. Now, we have a delicate balance; we want to keep the door open. I think a little hard work, a little leaning on them, a little acceleration in what we’re doing, and carrying forward the political process in the South because I don’t know of course but I suspect that what they may have decided is that if they’re going to lose this, they’d rather withdraw silently and let the fellow in the South make any deal, rather than overtly get into negotiations with us and admit they lost the war. It may be something like that. In any case, our work’s cut out for us, and we ought to line it up soon enough.

President: Do you think that this is urgent enough to have Rusk come back?/4/

Rostow: No, sir, I do not think it’s that kind of a--I think he should be informed it’s negative, and I don’t think that we should react convulsively, but I think that we’ve come to a stage, all this sort of fussing-about before Tet, I think that the truth probably is that their government is so split in Hanoi that the one position they could agree on is this no bombing for a possibility of talks, that all this talk of peace feelers and so on got them in trouble with the Chinese faction and they know they’re terribly vulnerable . . .

President: You said in your memo that the State Department leaked this. I was told that Bobby’s [Kennedy] boy Vanden Heuvel/5/ told the people back here and they leaked it. Where’d you get the State Department leaked to Newsweek that Bobby had a feeler?

Rostow: Wasn’t that . . . didn’t that . . . It’s not my memo--it’s Nick’s.

President: Well, ask him who leaked it in the Department.

Rostow: Yes, I will. I have no knowledge . . .

President: Just tell him our information from a pretty good source was that it was Bobby’s people leaked it. Ask him what he’s got to dispute that. If our people did leak it, I want to see. I think it is outrageous to make it look like we got a feeler, because it shows that it affects Hanoi, doesn’t it?

Rostow: That’s right. I shall get back on that.

President: I got a letter from Dick [unintelligible word] last night saying that this fellow, this Frenchman that talked to Bobby, they got a good record on him./6/

Rostow: Oh, I know that. He’s been anti-U.S. and very much tied up with the left. He was out with--De Gaulle looked to him very much for the line he took in that speech at Phnom Penh, you’ll remember, in Asia, in Cambodia. Well, sir, I’ll be getting this up to you . . .

President: I think you ought to brief somebody on that, Walt. Give me a memo on Manac’h and his background, who he is and so forth, what he is and what--just so I’ll have general knowledge of him.

Rostow: Shall do it, sir.

President: Now, does Nick think there’s any truth in the Washington Star editorial--that we brought Bobby in and just murdered him and so forth?

Rostow: No. I think that what Nick feels is that Bobby felt very put upon, Bobby felt very put upon. Whether he thinks it’s any--I don’t think that he feels that he was treated badly, but Bobby got himself into trouble and he felt he was put into a very difficult position. The thing that I don’t understand about Bobby is that suppose he did feel this way--he’s a big boy now, and he ought to know that when you go and talk to the President of the United States you don’t go around to every dinner party belly-aching. He above anybody ought to know that’s not the way this country runs, and . . .

President: But he was belly-aching to me. He’s telling me everything is wrong in every country, and I just said, "Yes, sir," sat there and listened to him. Then he got in here and started getting up on my State Department, well I just had to tell him that it wasn’t mine--he picked out the God-damn State Department that he was running with. I didn’t pick them. I didn’t select these folks that he was whoring around with. Now what else did we say besides that?

Rostow: One of the things that Noyes/7/ came back--he didn’t print it, but he said it last night, remember, I put a footnote on--he said that Bobby was saying that the kind of thing that you thought he was saying was leading to fellows getting killed over there. I don’t remember you saying that.

President: Not at all, not at all.

Rostow: I told him I didn’t remember that. Well, I . . . he . . . I said to Noyes that "I cannot vouch for how Senator Robert Kennedy feels. I have a feeling that he feels the whole episode turned sour on him. But that was not because of anything that the President did or we did over here in general, but that the true story--the story leaked that he looked kind of foolish, and he’s taking out the feeling that he got whip-sawed on this by the events and blame it on you and that talk. But in any case, we cannot vouch for how Senator Kennedy feels, but we can ask them if there is a story of this kind to check both ends of it." He said, "That’s fair," and he repeated that. He came back, he said, "Well, my reporter got it from the Senator," and I said, "Yeah, I gather he did. He’s been talking to a lot of people. But did you call the President? Did you call Nick? Did you call me?" Answer: negative. All right. Check both sides. That’s where that ended up.

President: Well, you see Mary McGrory/8/ just runs an advertising agency for Bobby.

Rostow: I see, yes, yes. He probably wept on her shoulder.

President: Oh yes, that’s right, that’s right. Okay, then, you get a hold of this, and get me an analysis of it, your interpretation, by the time I come over. And I’ll get this letter over to you and you call Nick now and tell him we want to be prompt with these guys, and I think it’s better to get them a letter before Congress gets back in. And I think we ought to consider what we do to investigate things. I think we ought to set up some kind of a board to look in to it or something. And I don’t think they’ve done anything wrong, but I think it’s bad for them to let somebody else do it. But I think all of that will come out if they have a Congressional committee. And they won’t touch me because I haven’t been connected with it. But I think Nick ought to know that we probably ought to try to set up some kind of a board like when we did when he had Allen Dulles/9/ and Bobby Kennedy and them study the Bay of Pigs thing. I don’t know how we ever got by with having that "objective" group look at the Bay of Pigs.

Rostow: Brought back Max Taylor as the nearest thing to a fig leaf we could get.

President: You don’t know when Rusk is coming back, do you? This is Wednesday, isn’t it?

Rostow: It’s Wednesday, sir.

President: I’m planning to leave tomorrow, so anything we need to do we ought to think about it.

Rostow: Well, I think that what ought to happen is that without you Nick and Bob [McNamara] and Cy [Vance] and the others and I should sort of take stock of where we are in Vietnam.

President: Now you think that what he says is, "We might talk if you quit bombing."/10/

/10/A quote from Ho Chi Minh's February 15 letter to the President; see Document 82.

Rostow: That is correct. That’s exact. That’s exactly how the French would say. It never was more lucid than seeing it in French because it uses the conditional--pourrait--might--it’s not will, it’s pourrait, which is conditional--pourrait engager des conversations.

President: All right. Now, is there anything else of note--noteworthy about it?

Rostow: No, sir. Its obvious these--this fellow’s very sensitive to the notion that maybe he was talking while the bombing was on and we might use that against him with the Chinese and with the NLF. I mean, that comes through very clearly in this anxiety, and he’s partly clearing the skids with everybody, but it’s also perfectly clear he’s not willing--he’s just not willing to go beyond that. But I think that we ought to carefully analyze it, and then formulate what we’re going to do, and then see if we can’t accelerate some of these things in the South and maybe lean on the North, if you want to, and so on.

President: I want you to get your people to look at these targets a little more carefully. I think McNamara’s listened to these folks very closely, and I think we ought to get every damn target we can that hasn’t got a lot of civilian people around it not right in Hanoi. Now all these electric plants . . .

Rostow: I think we ought to tick off one of those every 4 days or every once a week.

President: Well look at it and see what we can do about the civilians and let’s see about it. And I want to get that steel mill and cement plant. I don’t know why, but I’d like to have the other side of the argument--why are they important to get them? Are they held back because they’re close to Hanoi?

Rostow: I think they’re held back because, the point is, I think Bob feels that one--they wouldn’t have much to do with the fighting in the South, two--they would raise a lot of diplomatic storm in the world for our hitting something that wasn’t directly connected to the fighting, and three--I don’t think the civilian casualty problem is very great with those two targets. A lot of people work in the plants, but I think that is not the primary point. The primary point Bob would make is one--they don’t have much to do with the fighting in the South; two --you pay heavy political and psychological costs around the world. It’s also true you’d pay pretty heavy political costs in the United States. But the boys in Hanoi, on the other hand, feel they can have those plants protected by their success in pressuring us psychologically in the rest of the world. But I think we want to take stock of the--there’s another thing we have to think about, which is that the Viet Cong have been working that channel over pretty good, and they have some Russian mines in there, and we either ought to put some mines up there in that Haiphong or tell the Russians that they better get those fellows to lay off--we’re sick of picking up Russian mines in the Saigon channel.

President: Now what are you saying--the Russians’ve been putting mines in the Saigon channel?

Rostow: Not the Russians, but Russian-manufactured mines are being put by the VC. We have two of them, and they’ve been working over that channel pretty well, and if they want to play that kind of game, we can play it better than they can. I just have a note--Bob Komer did a note on it to me and I’ve been following it.

President: And say to them, "If you don’t quit putting mines in the Saigon channel, we’re going to put them in Haiphong"?

Rostow: Correct. That’s one thing we ought to consider. I’m not--I don’t want to go off half-cocked on something like that. But I do think we are sobering down the whole agenda with things like that. The trend of attacks in merchant shipping has risen from 1 in '65, 2 in the first half of '66, 5 in the last half of '66, 3 in the first month of '67. VC are now using thousand-pound Soviet contact mines. And I think at the minimum that we ought to tell our friend Dobrynin that "This is a game that two can play," or maybe we want to go lay a few of them and see what happens. But all I’m saying is, sir, that we ought to take all the things we might do in the North, make believe that we never heard of them before, and then do pros and cons on them.

President: Can’t the South Vietnamese lay the mines in Haiphong?

Rostow: I don’t know whether they could fly that kind of aircraft. We could find out.

President: Well, how’d the Viet Cong put theirs in?

Rostow: They do it with boats.

President: Well, can’t the South Vietnamese do it the same way?

Rostow: Well, its kind of far to get up in a little boat.

President: I was just thinking that maybe we ought to tell him, "Now the South Vietnamese have been wanting to do this for some time and they’re going to do it."

Rostow: That’s a pretty good idea. We could get them the planes--that type. All right, sir. Got it.

President: I’m going to talk to Bob about this and the targets too. And those power plants we know would hurt them some. I think steel and cement ought to, and I think we ought to just take one at a time. I’ve already approved them. Now, what else is there that we got that we can do?

Rostow: Well, I don’t know whether we could accelerate the barrier. I don’t know whether that’s technically possible. I think we ought to tell--I’d like to see--Westy has been running the war a little on a kind of a, how should I say, a safe, sort of "6%" basis. He’s been pushing his fellows pretty hard, but running it fairly comfortably without sort of forcing the pace much, in a very sober and competent way. It’s not the way it would be if he were in desperate straits. I think we ought to, without trying to be generals here, tell him that we’d like for the maximum the pace of operations to be really picked up against these VC bases. I think we really ought to get a burr under his saddle on accelerating pacification, both the ARVN side of it and our own thing. I think that we ought to try to get some roads open and stayed open. A sense of sort of urgency and hard drive of the kind that you had when you had a major war going on. Hell, out there MacArthur ran those operations with no landing craft, very economical, he strained to get every ounce of fighting power out of a limited supply situation. I’d like to see a little bit of that mood out there in South Vietnam because time is--the clock is--ticking on us. And then I’d like to see Ky get his village elections, and then talk to him, and from a position of confidence begin to try to reach out and grab and talk and cajole and buy out some of these fellows in the South and ignore Hanoi for a while except to clobber them a little bit more. I just think . . .

President: You don’t think Bob Murhpy’d/11/ be any good as Ambassador?

Rostow: I think he’s a little old, sir.

President: Well, I don’t know, he was pretty active the other day and pretty alert.

Rostow: Yeah, yeah, that’s an interesting thought. Max Taylor mentioned Frank Pace./12/ I don’t have much feel for him.

/12/Frank Pace, member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

President: Well, I think he’s a pretty smart cookie. Max mention anybody else? Walt, let’s have Max in on all these meetings.

Rostow: We will. I’m briefing him on the schedule.

President: I know it, but the other day I had to call him afterwards, and I think he’s got awfully good judgment.

Rostow: I agree with you, sir.

President: So let’s just when we have’em and when we’re talking about Saigon ask me in the morning before the lunch if we want to have Max Taylor.

Rostow: Right, sir.

President: Okay.