1. Memorandum From the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (LeMay) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/

CSAFM 6-64

Washington, January 4, 1964.

IMPROVED MANNED STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT

1. At their meeting with the President on 30 December 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked to review and provide their comments on certain recommendations by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, concerning a proposed follow-on manned strategic weapon system./2/ Accordingly, the basis for these recommendations is provided below for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. By the end of 1972, the B-52 will be twenty-one years beyond its design date and the last production B-52 and B-58 will be ten years old. With the passage of time, we have had to rely increasingly on tactics which these aircraft were not designed to employ. Even with the planned modifications to the B-52 fleet these aircraft will be subject to the combined effects of continued structural fatigue and a diminishing capability for effective mission performance in an environment of modern offensive and defensive Soviet weapon systems. If there is further delay in initiating action toward the provision of a suitable replacement capability, there will be no recourse for the nation but to place principal reliance for its security in the 1970s on ballistic missiles. In my judgment, such reliance is both dangerous and militarily unsound.

3. I am in complete agreement with the need for a modern effective ballistic missile force as an element of our deterrent posture. These weapons provide the quick time to target delivery capability which is essential to underwrite the time urgent nuclear threat targets. Additionally, a secure ballistic missile force, in concert with other survivable strategic forces, provides the strongest possible incentives to the USSR to abstain from attacks on the population centers of the United States, either in an initial attack or as a rational option during conflicts of lower intensity.

4. It is important to recognize, however, that ballistic missile forces represent both the U.S. and Soviet potential for strategic nuclear warfare at the highest, most indiscriminate level, and at a level least susceptible to control. The employment of these weapons in lower level conflict would be likely to escalate the situation, uncontrollably, to an intensity which could be vastly disproportionate to the original aggravation. The use of ICBMs and SLBMs is not, therefore, a rational or credible response to provocations which, although serious, are still less than an immediate threat to national survival. For this reason, among others, I consider that the national security will continue to require the flexibility, responsiveness, and discrimination of manned strategic weapon systems throughout the range of cold, limited, and general war. Specifically, there will be a continuing requirement for:

a. A system that can be used to provide visible evidence, through increased alert and dispersal and show of force flights, of national determination as an element of diplomatic maneuver and negotiating strength in times of international crisis. Regardless of the size of the force, ICBMs and Polaris missiles have no meaningful utility for this purpose.

b. A fully credible national response option to provocations below those which would warrant the employment of ICBMs. Manned strategic systems have a capability for selective and discriminate application of force which is not provided by ballistic missiles.

c. A capability to respond quickly under national direction to unforeseen and rapidly changing circumstances.

d. A system that can be tested again and again under conditions approximating actual combat as opposed to ballistic missiles which must function perfectly the only time they are ever called upon. In 1963, strategic bombers flew more than 80,000 missions involving 700,000 flying hours, and the crews performed nearly 150,000 scored bomb runs. With ICBMs a very small statistical sample will be fired annually from special test sites which do not correspond to the operational environment. Further compounding the risk of placing undue reliance on ballistic missiles is the ever-present possibility, based on several examples to date, that a single unanticipated failure may negate or drastically reduce the capability of the entire force. Last year, for example, all Wing I Minuteman missiles were determined to be unreliable for a period due to difficulties with the re-entry vehicle. Concurrently, all Wing II Minuteman missiles, comprising the remainder of the force, were considered unreliable by the Atomic Energy Commission as a result of warhead deficiencies. Finally, the reliability of the Polaris A-1 fleet, during a period in 1963, was suspect in its entirety due to bonding problems with the propellant. Although these difficulties all have been corrected, they are indicative of the vulnerability of the total capability to a single unforeseen system deficiency. Such far reaching effects have not been encountered with manned systems. Temporary difficulties may cause restrictions for peacetime flight safety purposes but they have no immediate repercussions upon our war fighting capability.

e. Timely information, as a basis for informed national decisions in times of conflict, which can be provided only by placing man over the enemy with a capability to look, act, and report.

f. A diversified threat to the enemy so that a single break-through on his part, such as an effective anti-ballistic missile defense will not neutralize our retaliatory power; additionally, to continue the requirement that the enemy dilute his already limited resources between anti-ballistic missile and air defenses.

g. A system that can be used to effect a favorable war termination, irrespective of the level of conflict, and which can be used to police a truce, once it has been achieved.

5. Throughout the period of the last year, various study groups within the Air Force have analyzed the requirement for a follow-on strategic aircraft. From these efforts, the prescribed characteristics of an improved manned strategic system have evolved. The aircraft would be designed primarily for low level penetration at subsonic speeds but also would be capable of dash speeds in excess of Mach 2.0 at high altitude. The basic armament would consist of internally carried, short range air to surface missiles with variable yield warheads. A reconnaissance subsystem consisting of side-looking radar, infra-red, and photographic sensors also would be integral to this system. This aircraft would have intercontinental range, unrefueled, and would be compatible with the KC-135 tanker for range extension through aerial refueling.

6. In my discussion of this subject with the President during the meeting on 30 December 1963, I stated my intentions to recommend the following:

a. The initiation of system definition effort on an improved manned strategic aircraft in FY 1964 with $5 million from funds already available to the Air Force.

b. A level of effort in FY 1965 adequate to complete the design studies and program definition and to provide the option for the earliest practicable system IOC by funding at a minimum level the long lead time items such as propulsion and avionics. Based on our studies to date, this effort would require approximately $50 million. In this case also, due to the importance which I place on this matter, I anticipate recommending certain adjustments within the Air Force budget to accommodate this effort without increased funds.

7. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum at the Enclosure/3/ be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to the commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

Washington, January 8, 1964.

SUBJECT
Meeting with the President--5:30 on 8 January 1964

1. Reviewed Estimate 11-14/2/ as outlined in attached memorandum dated 8 January.

2. Reviewed general reconnaissance satellite program, demonstrating two or three photos, particularly the one of Washington. Advised the President we had now identified 234 ICBM launch sites and about 700 IRBM launch sites, about 125 probably in operation. While this was a lesser number of ICBMs than we had, we must always bear in mind that they are very large and carry warheads in the several megaton range and this gives me concern.

3. Advised the President we were going to conduct the inspection of the Dimona reactor in Israel starting January 14th, a good team had been selected from the AEC and I knew they were good because of the background of my personal relationship with them.

4. Gave the President the memorandum on 20 Latin American countries which he retained to read./3/

5. Reviewed the status of Cuban economic developments, armed shipments and troop training as reported in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] dated 8 January 1964, attached.

6. Discussed briefing of Congressional Committee Chairmen. President advised he planned a dinner for the Chairmen and the senior minority members of principal committees and their wives. After dinner--the wives upstairs--he would ask me to give a 10-minute review of the Soviet economics; McNamara 5 minutes on the military posture; and Rusk 5 minutes on the political problems.

7. Advised the President I had completed plans to brief the Heads of State, Europe, as follows:

President Segni and Saragat of Italy when they are here next week.

Following week I would brief de Gaulle and others in Paris and Erhard and others in Bonn.

Then I would brief Lord Home and his party when they are here in February.

This was agreed.

8. Reviewed briefly President Kennedy's letter to me of January 16 and asked for reaffirmation of DCI responsibilities as outlined in the letter or any modifications which he desired./4/ The President kept the letter and advised he would communicate.

NOTES FOR BRIEFING OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON
ON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

We now have [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] satellite photography for intelligence purposes.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Search of very large areas for new installations. This coverage is supplied by the Corona satellite, which has been primarily a CIA development.

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] pictures are taken from an altitude of about 100 miles over targets in the Soviet Union and elsewhere when required. The satellites stay in orbit [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and the film is recovered in special reentry vehicles by aircraft near Hawaii.

The Corona/Search satellite first returned film from orbit in August 1960, and has performed successfully 29 times since then out of 46 attempts. It is launched from a Thor-Agena at a total cost of about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] dollars per shot. The Corona can cover three million square miles per mission in stereo, mowing a two hundred mile wide strip below its trajectory.

We are able to blow these film strips up to 40-60 times their original size and produce photographs of ICBM sites and other critical targets which are truly remarkable. The quality of photographs that we get is especially highly classified.

This type of photography provides a major source of raw intelligence data and is one of the most important inputs for our national estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities. So far, we have covered over 100 million square miles of the earth's surface. 95% of the USSR has been filmed to date. In this year alone, we have covered 65% of the USSR and 45% of China. From all of this photographic coverage we have identified some 18 ICBM Complexes in the USSR containing more than 234/6/ ICBM pads. Over 700 IRBM/MRBM positions and more than 1100 surface-to-air missile sites have also been located and reported.

We are now looking at ways to improve the present system further and to invent a successor with greatly improved capabilities. In the meantime, we have constructed the National Reconnaissance Plan so as to provide one Corona/Search flight each month indefinitely.

[2 paragraphs (14 lines of source text) not declassified]

[1 line of source text not declassified] will bring you especially important examples of this photography to discuss in conjunction with our regular intelligence meetings.

JCSM-4-64

Washington, January 10, 1964.

SUBJECT
Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) (S)

1. Reference is made to:/2/

a. JCSM-405-63, dated 29 May 1963.

b. JCSM-484-63, dated 3 July 1963.

c. JCSM-753-63, dated 27 September 1963.

d. JCSM-914-63, dated 2 December 1963.

e. Secretary of Defense Decision/Guidance (Format B), dated 19 December 1963, subject: Deep Underground Command Center.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered on a continuing basis over the past several months the matter of the Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC). On those occasions in which this subject has been addressed directly (references 1a through 1d), the response has dealt with separate but related aspects of the problem. In view of the bearing of this matter on other programs under consideration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to state their views as to the justification for a DUCC and as to the military requirement therefor.

3. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a DUCC as a military command center cannot be justified and it is not recommended for inclusion in the National Military Command System (NMCS) program for the following reasons:

a. It would not, in their opinion, permit top military leaders to operate as effectively as would be possible through use of other survival means. Specifically, it would involve their operating without adequate staff or support in a "buttoned-up" environment from which communications and egress would be uncertain following a nuclear attack.

b. The adverse effect of the DUCC on the NMCS program, planned to establish an effective and survivable system of command and control facilities, is exemplified best when viewed in relation to the long-term aspects of the program. The proposed funding for the Five-Year Program (FY 1965-69) indicates that approximately $860 million may be committed to the NMCS. The cost estimate for a 300-man DUCC is approximately $310 million which represents over 36 per cent of the total budget proposed for the NMCS. The $310 million basically provides for only construction costs, and does not include in-house or entrance communications equipment or operational support systems essential to the realization of initial operational capability. If the DUCC were to be included in the NMCS program, there are indications that it would absorb in future years considerably more than 36 per cent of the total NMCS funds now programmed for the NMCS, and, unless additional funds were provided, would thereby force severe reductions in other NMCS programs, such as deferral of the First Generation National Military Command Center, limitations in number and degree of enhancement of the more desirable mobile alternate command centers, and curtailment of communications and other support systems.

c. The weakest link in a hardened communications system is the antenna. In view of limited progress to date in the design of hardened antennas, the probability of survival of DUCC communications depends primarily on redundancy of antennas. Various means of communications have been considered as possible solutions to this problem. One such means particularly suited for use in a DUCC installation is the substrata earth transmission of electromagnetic waves. However, research on this project has not progressed to the point where operational feasibility can be determined nor can reliable operational use be predicted with any degree of confidence.

d. An examination of the functions to be performed by the National Command Authorities, which include the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicates that for this decision group to operate within the isolated environment of a DUCC, adequate space and facilities to house sufficient staff personnel and to provide appropriate supporting data would require that the facility be considerably larger in size and scope than the 300-man DUCC estimated to cost $310 million. To meet the demands of nuclear war, it will be of vital importance that a tremendous volume of actions be performed swiftly by trained and experienced people.

e. An austere size (50-man) DUCC would be totally inadequate to accommodate the decision element of the National Command Authorities together with minimum essential staff support and housekeeping support. It is clearly evident that a 50-man DUCC is essentially a survival facility. As a follow-on step, it is highly probable that immediate expansion to a 300-man DUCC will be required to provide a minimum national command facility. However, such an expanded DUCC would be inadequate for military purposes.

4. A deep underground facility could be useful as an emergency shelter to safeguard the President for continuity of government, provided escape and survivable communications can be assured. The following factors are considered germane to the issue:

a. It would be a facility affording improved protection to which the President and a minimum number of selected advisors could rapidly relocate in times of international tension.

b. The minimum amount of time would be lost during the relocation process, and confusion, disruption of operations, and adverse public impact would be minimized.

c. Studies indicate that a deep underground facility could be designed to permit relocation within the time period now described as "tactical warning" due to its ready accessibility to the President and selected advisors.

d. Escape and survivable communications from a DUCC would be problematical in case of a direct attack on Washington with large-yield nuclear weapons.

5. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the DUCC would be too small, and its communications too uncertain, to serve as a military command center. They recommend against the allocation of resources to such a facility at the expense of existing and currently planned elements of the NMCS. They consider that it is a question for executive decision as to whether the DUCC would be worth its cost as a safe shelter for the President and a minimum number of selected advisors, from which he might or might not be able to communicate in case of attack.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor/3/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, January 16, 1964.

Harold Brown and I discussed the matter of the DUCC this morning. In view of the problems between the Secretary and the JCS,/2/ we agreed that the best way to handle the matter was to create a limited interdepartmental committee to study the problem from the point of view of the civilian top level of Government; and at the same time suggest to the Secretary of Defense that he request the Joint Chiefs to give their views on the nature of their relations with both the President-Secretary of State-Secretary of Defense level and the CINCs in a crisis situation toward the end of the sixties. The target date for this is the 15th of March.

The purpose of this would be to get the Chiefs to deal explicitly with their view of the relations between the top civilian level and the operational commanders during the period of crisis, and make clear both their ideas of what kinds of crisis situations they are thinking of and the amount and character of communication they would expect in both directions from and on location.

The interdepartmental study group would try to answer four questions, against the background of some likely scenarios of crisis in which a thermo-nuclear war is either imminent or has actually begun.

A. What would the utility of the DUCC be in this situation in the late sixties?

B. How big would the facility have to be in terms of the number of people it could hold to provide this utility?

C. Are there any unresolved technical problems which would have to be dealt with to make the installation effective?

D. What would its relation be to the other elements of the National Military Command System (NMCS)?

Harold and I think the committee should be chaired formally by you, and that its members might be himself, Andy Goodpaster, Alex Johnson, Walt Rostow and Ray Cline. Spurgeon and I would join to represent you on the committee, and I could convene the meeting and act as Chairman in your absence. The main staff of the committee who would be available for full-time work would be furnished by Harold Brown's office. In addition, Jim Clark of BOB who is knowledgeable on these problems, might serve on its staff.

E. Secretary McNamara might prefer to deal with this purely as an internal problem within the Department of Defense. However, the arguments for the other arrangement are convincing to Harold Brown and me. First, if there is to be a fight with the Congress, the President himself must be convinced of the need for the proposed facility, and this can best be done through the participation of his own staff. Second, there is not within the Pentagon the kind of experience that the White House-State-CIA are likely to have that is requisite to a thorough examination of the issues. While nobody has the relevant experience, the suggested group would come closer to having a basis for speculation about it than any other we can think of.

CK

Washington, January 18, 1964.

SUBJECT
Status Report on Anti-satellite Capabilities

In accordance with your request for a status report on the anti-satellite capabilities, the following information is submitted:

Program 437 involves the attainment of an anti-satellite capability based on the employment of [2 lines of source text not declassified]. SPADATS, the worldwide satellite tracking system, provides target satellite position data from which an intercept point is determined. [2 lines of source text not declassified] In general, the system will have at least two opportunities each day to intercept from Johnston Island any satellite which passes over the United States. The response time of the system is determined by the ability of SPADATS to provide the necessary satellite position prediction data. Presently the system requires approximately 36 hours of tracking to provide sufficiently accurate data. Performance of the SPADATS system is being improved and further evaluated to determine feasible improvements in response time and accuracy.

Program 437 is a concurrent effort with the research and development and operational implementation actions occurring simultaneously.

The research and development phase, which was funded at $7.9 million in Fiscal Year 1963 and $16.0 million in Fiscal Year 1964, has reached the point of launch demonstration. [9 lines of source text not declassified] Other than the radio frequency interference problem, all elements of the system have demonstrated a capability to support a successful intercept up to the point of launch. SPADATS has completed five targeting exercises, each time providing sufficiently accurate satellite position predictions within the 36-hour system capability.

On June 27, 1963, the Secretary of Defense directed that Program 437 achieve a short reaction operational capability by June 1964. Subsequently, the 10th Aerospace Defense Squadron has been activated with duty station at Vandenberg Air Force Base. It is planned that launch teams from this squadron will rotate on temporary duty at Johnston Island, thereby providing a full standby alert capability. [1 line of source text not declassified]

Required training facilities have been completed at Vandenberg Air Force Base. Necessary technical data is in final stages of preparation. The first launch team has completed individual training and is in crew-training status as of January 13, 1964, with completion programmed for March 1, 1964. An actual launch by this crew is scheduled between completion of the research and development launches and the directed operational date.

On December 2, 1963, the Secretary of Defense approved investment expenditures of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for obtaining the Program 437 operational capability. This will provide a trained unit, on alert, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. Approximately $7 million per year will be required for operations and maintenance. At this point, all actions concerning the operational phase of Program 437 are on schedule, and no significant difficulties in meeting the directed June 1964 date are forecast.

On May 23, 1963, [4 lines of source text not declassified]. The development program leading to this highly successful demonstration required one year and a funding of $15 million.

On May 28, 1963, the Secretary of Defense directed that the [2 lines of source text not declassified]. A total of $8 million has been provided for this purpose. [13 lines of source text not declassified]

[11 lines of source text not declassified] adaption kit. This round successfully met test objectives. Two additional successful test firings will be required to complete warhead certification program. These firings are currently planned for February and March 1964. Since the personnel required to perform the [2 lines of source text not declassified] operation and maintenance costs for this special capability are minimal.

W.J. Howard

Washington, January 21, 1964.

MEMORANDUM FOR
State--Secretary Rusk
Defense--Secretary McNamara
CIA--Mr. McCone
ACDA--Mr. Fisher
White House--Mr. McGeorge Bundy
White House--Dr. Wiesner
White House--Dr. Welsh
White House--Mr. Johnson
NASA--Mr. Webb
USIA--Mr. Murrow

SUBJECT
Possible Disclosure of Satellite Reconnaissance

Following discussions among your representatives, we have concluded that no additional action to disseminate more knowledge of our satellite reconnaissance capability is required at this time in support of our disarmament and other policies.

This memorandum summarizes our findings on the nature of present official and unofficial knowledge of U.S. satellite reconnaissance, and on ways in which wider knowledge might affect allied and Soviet acceptance of our disarmament proposals.

As a result of actions taken following the review of the political and public handling of the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program under NSAM 156/2/ in the summer of 1962, all NATO heads of government, Foreign Ministers and NAC Permreps were told officially of our reconnaissance satellite program--the fact that we had it, that it was developing well and was directly benefiting the alliance, and finally, that the U.S. must maintain it at all costs. A somewhat similar briefing was given to several selected neutral officials. None of those briefed [2 lines of source text not declassified] were shown pictures, and no details of the quality or extent of coverage were given. Changes have occurred in four NATO Governments and in the NAC since these briefings, and we have made arrangements to brief the appropriate [3 lines of source text not declassified].

A list of foreign officials who have been briefed on the program is at Tab A./3/

Much satellite-derived information is presently being incorporated into NATO planning documents, particularly the Target Data Inventory which provides exact locations on such military targets as Soviet SAM, MRBM and ICBM launch pads. This information is classified Secret and there is no attribution of source. The nature of the data is such, however, that we must assume that many of the more than 500 non-U.S. NATO officials who have access to the TDI deduce its overhead photographic origin.

We are aware of no basic disagreement within NATO on the accuracy of our intelligence, and thus find no present necessity for additional disclosures to our Allies, either in terms of briefing more people or of giving more details about the program.

We have examined NATO and other non-Bloc press coverage of reconnaissance satellites but, with the exception of the U.S. press, find nothing of significance. We plan to query selected U.S. Embassies in an effort to determine more clearly the level of public and official awareness of the U.S. satellite program and attitudes toward it. If our experience with recent proceedings of the UN Outer Space Committee is a valid indicator, most non-Bloc states tend to accept space reconnaissance as a fact of life and to view attendant political considerations with indifference. This situation is satisfactory from our standpoint.

Over the past 18 months we have noted a decline in Soviet press articles and statements on U.S. satellite reconnaissance. The Soviet press regularly reports "secret" launches of U.S. "spy" satellites, but these are only two or three sentence summaries of U.S. press agency stories, usually without Soviet comment. We have seen little else in the Soviet press since last summer on any aspect of reconnaissance satellites, and certainly nothing to compare either with earlier Soviet assaults on such activity or with recent U.S. articles on this subject. There has been no Soviet commentary yet on these U.S. articles adverting to extensive U.S. space reconnaissance operations.

In the UN Outer Space Committee negotiations, the Soviets have relaxed (but not abandoned) their position of long standing on banning reconnaissance satellites, at least to the extent of making agreement possible last fall on general principles of space law, without reference to reconnaissance. It is clear that the Soviets have taken this action without prejudice to future negotiations, but it does represent a significant shift in Soviet tactics.

The new Soviet attitude may result in part from experience they have acquired with reconnaissance satellites. In the last year the USSR has launched a large number of recoverable satellites, some of which carried low resolution cameras. We have intercepted Soviet video transmissions of pictures from these cameras. It is quite possible, given the 10,000 lb. weight of the Soviet Cosmos vehicles, that higher resolution cameras were aboard as well. Khrushchev hinted as much when he told Spaak last summer that the Soviets were photographing the U.S. and even offered to show Spaak some pictures. Adzhubey is reported to have made a similar statement in Finland in September 1963.

On the basis of the inconclusive evidence we have acquired in the last year or so, we believe that (a) the Soviets are certainly aware of the program, although probably still uncertain of its precise scope and quality; (b) they are prepared for the moment to live with it, in part because there is no feasible alternative open to them to stop it, and (c) they are probably engaged in a reconnaissance effort of their own. As they acquire first hand experience, their awareness of the strength and weaknesses of space reconnaissance may have some influence on their future proposals in space and disarmament matters.

At Tab B is a study, prepared by ACDA, attempting to gauge the impact of satellite photography on the principal current arms control proposals under consideration in ACDA, and on the contribution satellites can make in monitoring agreements already in effect, i.e., the test ban and the resolution against bombs in orbit.

A separable first stage proposal on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and production cutoff would, of course, be heavily dependent on our unilateral reconnaissance capabilities. The degree of this dependency may well have to be revealed in part to make a separable first stage proposal acceptable to our Allies and domestically. Until a U.S. position on this matter is fully worked out, however, we cannot usefully anticipate possible solutions to this problem.

U. Alexis Johnson

The Contribution of Satellite Photography to the Verification of Current Arms Control and Disarmament Proposals

The United States has developed an observation satellite system which is now able to furnish reasonable quality and reasonably timely photography of any area in the world which may be of interest. This unilateral capability effectively provides the "open skies" coverage of the USSR which was requested by President Eisenhower in 1955 as part of a disarmament agreement. It is clear that possession of this photography changes the requirements for ground or other types of inspection as part of the verification of a number of different proposed arms control agreements although it does not obviate the need for complementary means of data collection. This brief discussion has been prepared as an attempt to gauge the impact of satellite photography on the principal current arms control proposals under consideration in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Currently the most important single U.S. intelligence asset is satellite photography. Since the first successful recovery of a Keyhole vehicle in August 1960, there have been about 30 recovered missions, providing cloud-free, usable photography of approximately 90 percent of the USSR. The quality of the photography has now reached the level, in some instances, of early U-2 photography, and long focal-length camera systems, first successfully used in the summer of 1963, can now provide even better materials on selected targets. With photography from the normal search mode, using the KH-4 camera system, photo-interpreters can detect objects as small as 8 to 10 feet on a side. [8 lines of source text not declassified]

Satellite photography will be of particular value in the investigation of suspect locations. It is particularly well suited for the identification of new construction activity, for example, and existing photo interpretation procedures include, as a matter of course, the examination of comparative photographic coverage of a given area to detect changes. Tunneling and digging operations, requiring the dumping of spoil, would be readily apparent, for example.

The appearance of new transportation nets, even if only a few dirt roads into a relatively inaccessible area, is readily identifiable.

For nearly four years photography from earth satellites has been an important source of information on the ground force in the Soviet Union. The extensive high level photography from aircraft (Talent) of military installations and training areas acquired during the period from mid-1956 to mid-1960 is still useful to photo-interpreters for comparison with photography from satellites (Keyhole). Usable Keyhole photography acquired since mid-1960 covers virtually all of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. This photography is good enough to locate and describe military installations including such details as the dimensions, and probable functions of buildings. It can reveal whether installations are currently in use, although the extent of usage at any time cannot be determined. Military training areas, firing ranges, tank moving-target ranges, and vehicle driving courses are easily discerned, and the photography can reveal whether such facilities have been in recent active use. However, it cannot pick up major land combat equipment. Enhanced image resolution offers the hope for sufficient further improvement to eliminate this difficulty. However, there is no certainty that overhead photography can provide a complete and independent confirmation of the existence of a unit or of its strength in manpower and equipment.

1. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Including Underground Tests.

The evidence of actual underground nuclear testing, both in the United States and the Soviet Union, has already been detected in photography. The major deterrent to effective use of satellite photography is likely to be lack of adequate coverage resulting from weather conditions or long time lapses between photography. Few areas in the USSR remain which have not yet been photographed, and none of these is readily accessible by existing transportation facilities. Certain portions of the USSR, however, provide more information than others. In far northern latitudes, light conditions generally preclude much usable photography during winter months. Meteorological conditions also hamper interpretation in places--the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kuriles, for example, are nearly always cloud covered, as is the Baltic area. On the other hand, desert areas between the Caspian Sea and Lake Balkhash are nearly always cloud-free.

The time between photographic missions covering a given area varies considerably, depending on the location of the area under study. Although to date an average of at least one mission per month has been orbited, the areas covered by each mission vary, and few areas receive repeated coverage on consecutive missions. With the added factor of unfavorable cloud conditions, it is frequently possible that a specific target may not be covered more frequently than every six to eight months. On the other hand, some areas located near significant targets, such as ICBM sites or known R&D facilities, and in desert areas where cloud conditions are generally good, are covered nearly every time a satellite is programmed.

[2 paragraphs (22 lines of source text) not declassified]

2. Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, Interim Reduction and Production Cut-off.

The current proposal specifies armament reductions and curtailment of test and production for the following major strategic weapons categories: ICBMs and IRBM/MRBMs; heavy and medium bomber aircraft with air-to-surface missiles; submarines equipped to deliver weapons by ballistic or cruise missiles; and ABMs.

[2 paragraphs (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

a. Land Based Missiles:

Satellite photography has permitted the identification of all or nearly all the fixed launch facilities for strategic missile systems in the USSR and would provide an effective check on Soviet declarations of such bases as well as initiation of new launch site construction. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

b. Submarine Launched Missiles:

[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

c. Heavy and Medium Bomber Aircraft:

[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

d. Production of Strategic Weapons:

[1 paragraph (18 lines of source text) not declassified]

3. Fissionable Material Production Cut-off

Satellite photography is admirably suited to support any arms control agreement on the cut-off of production of fissionable material. Installations capable of contributing significantly to the fissionable material stockpile of any of the nuclear powers would, of necessity, be sufficiently large and characteristic to be detectable by all present reconnaissance systems. In fact it is believed that essentially all of the important elements of the Soviet AE production complex have been so photographed and identified. Thus Soviet declarations of production sites could be confidently checked by satellite photography and decisions made on the Soviet compliance. A solid basis would be provided for reaching a decision on inspection to locate an undeclared facility. Construction of a new AE production facility could also be detected and probably identified well in advance of actual operation.

[2 paragraphs (13 lines of source text) not declassified]

4. Nuclear Free Zones

The proposal provides for the prohibition of nuclear weapons from defined geographic regions, such as Latin America. Photographic satellites could provide broad-base coverage on which to establish a base or mosaic of large-scale military activities in a particular region. It would be a useful means of obtaining wide area coverage to be used for targeting more specific collection means such as low altitude or ground observation.

[1 paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified]

5. Other Proposals

Photographic satellites would have limited applications in providing background information pertinent to the enforcement of a number of other arms control measures.

a. Observation Posts and Surprise Attack:

Satellite photography would have only limited value in support of the observation post proposal. In general the time delay in obtaining reliable coverage of any area make this source unattractive as a unique source for detecting any surprise attack or clandestine maneuver. Furthermore, the quality of the [12 lines of source text not declassified].

b. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (6-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

c. Bombs in Orbit:

The US and the USSR have agreed to a UN resolution forbidding the orbiting of nuclear weapons. Verification is by unilateral means and, presumably, the orbiting of the number of large, low-orbit satellites sufficient to have real military significance would be noticed even though intentions were not known. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

d. Conventional Armaments and Force Levels:

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

Washington, January 29, 1964.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 1 [2 of 2], Box 5. Top Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

Following the discovery of audio surveillance devices or "bugs" in the Great Seal at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, along with the microwave bombardment of that Embassy, the U.S. Government increasingly sought methods to counter this threat to sensitive information. While an NSC subcommittee (NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures) had been in existence for many years, during the Kennedy administration the issue engaged the President, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and senior Department of State and Defense and FBI officials. A coordinated program was undertaken to install secure facilities in many overseas posts, and regular progress reports on the program were provided to the NSC. Details remain classified. Documents covering the issue are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 1, Box 5; ibid., Agency File, Central Intelligence Agency, Vol. II, Box 9; ibid., Subject File, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Box 41; and ibid., Agency File, Central Intelligence Agency, Filed by LBJ Library, Box 10.

Washington, February 3, 1964.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 1 [2 of 2], Box 5. Secret. 7 pages of source text (including 5-page Appendix A) not declassified.]

Washington, February 6, 1964.

SUBJECT
Improved Manned Strategic Aircraft

REFERENCES
(a) JCSM-37-64, dated 20 January 1964/2/

(b) CM-1140-64, dated 20 January 1964/3/

(c) Memo for Sec AF, dated 23 January 1964/4/

Reference (a) recommends approval of an Air Force proposal to reprogram FY 1964 and apportion FY 1965 Air Force funds to initiate a program definition for a follow-on manned strategic aircraft system and to initiate advanced technology on "long-lead-time" development items, including avionics and propulsion, to reduce the time required to achieve an operational capability. This recommendation is derived from two basic considerations: (1) That strategic aircraft in general can be justified on the basis of diversity, flexibility, responsiveness, reliability and the need for timely reconnaissance; and (2) that the B-52/B-58 force will be reaching the end of its effective service life in the early 1970's. Specifically what is being proposed are budgetary actions, in advance of programmatic decisions, beyond the funds currently being applied to the over-all program concerning strategic aircraft.

The present program relating to strategic aircraft includes: (1) aircraft design studies to further delineate possible characteristics of a new strategic aircraft; and (2) a rather extensive advanced technology program including avionics, propulsion, and sensors.

The aircraft design studies will serve as the basis for a specific proposal (or proposals) by the Air Force. The Air Force proposal, when available, will provide something concrete on which to base a decision whether or not to proceed with a Project Definition Phase. It is to be noted that the basic objective of a Project Definition Phase is to provide detailed technical and management data upon which incentive or fixed price contracting can be based. It is not a substitute or supplement to the studies required to establish the basic design and utility of a proposed system.

With regard to the program on avionics and propulsion, I would welcome specific suggestions as to what are possible deficiencies and improvements. These suggestions must, of course, be judged on a case-by-case basis in comparison with other claims for resources.

In my view, the case has not yet been made that the additional capability that would be provided by an Improved Strategic Aircraft warrants a decision to proceed with the development program recommended by the Air Force. First, the detailed studies by the Air Force have not progressed to the point where detailed aircraft specifications are available. When they are, the potential superiority of the now proposed aircraft can be compared to the B-52. This superiority must be such as to warrant the large expense of replacing the B-52. It is to be noted that the investment in the B-52/B-58 fleet, along with the KC-135, is over $15 billion. Second, I have not been presented with convincing evidence that this fleet will, from the standpoint of air vehicle wear-out, be at the end of its useful service life in the early 1970's. This question is currently being studied by the Air Force and by my own staff. Third, the Air Force has not yet submitted the information requested in CM-1132-64 dated 16 January 1964, Subject: Requirement for Follow-on Manned Strategic Aircraft./5/ In that memorandum the Chiefs asked the Air Force to provide an analysis setting forth the reasons why a strategic bomber system is required as a follow-on of the B-52/B-58 systems and why such a bomber system should have the characteristics of the aircraft described in JCS 1478/104-1./6/ The Chiefs pointed out that: "Such an analysis should undertake to determine whether any follow-on manned bomber system of attainable characteristics is justified in view of the competing systems in the time period in question, and, if so, whether the particular system proposed with its specific characteristics is the preferred follow-on system."

I can see no advantage to pre-judging proposals not yet received by now taking budgetary actions beyond those already in force. Certainly it is not necessary to make a decision now on FY 65 apportionment. As to reprogramming of current year funds, that is possible at any time.

I will want the views of the Chiefs on the specific proposals of the Air Force when they are available.

Robert S. McNamara/7/

Washington, February 10, 1964.

Two subjects on which we must reach an agreed policy decision are (a) the surfacing of the Ox and (b) the management of NRO.

With reference to the former, I reviewed the "visibility" of the Ox on Friday./2/ I find that Drs. Wheelon and Maxey/3/ are agreed that the improved Soviet radar capability makes the Ox visible both to the long range search radar and the radars associated with the surface-to-air missile systems. Therefore it is impossible to fly the Ox over Soviet territory without detection. Originally it was thought--and as recently as 18 months ago--that the Soviet radar would not pick up the Ox. The findings of Dr. Wheelon disprove this and this fact bears heavily on the future use of the Ox.

If the decision is made by higher authority not to use the Ox for the purposes originally planned--i.e., clandestine surveillance of the Soviet Union--then it must be considered as a "quick reaction" surveillance asset to be used in times of danger, under circumstances of heightened tension, with the full appreciation of the risks and the provocations.

This raises the question of whether in its reconnaissance configuration it should continue as a CIA asset or be turned over to the Air Force. This question must be examined carefully and, quite naturally, the use of the Oxcart over non-Soviet denied territory such as Communist China, Southeast Asia and even Cuba should be taken into consideration.

The above problem is one of the important questions associated with surfacing the Ox--probably/4/ the most important long term question from the standpoint of CIA, our budget, etc.

I feel it must at some time be surfaced because of the military versions. Also we are sure to have an accident or forced landing at a public airport, or a "leak", which will have the effect of surfacing. Timing is of importance as well as method, and these should be studied and an in-house decision reached for guidance in talking with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Director, NRO and higher authority.

The second question is the management of NRO. My last discussion with a representative of DoD was with Fubini about three weeks ago at which time he drafted a memo which I felt outlined a very sensible plan./5/ I understand it has run into some difficulties with McMillan/6/ and also I note Dr. Wheelon's alternate proposal.

I would like to reach an in-house agreement as to what part, if any, CIA must play in the operation of proven article, the technical improvements of such an article in order to produce better quality product and the development of a new generation search and spotting satellite to give the ultimate resolution.

Since both Fubini and McMillan want to see me early this week, the above should be discussed at this afternoon's meeting.

JAM/7/

Washington, undated.

JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN FOR
FY 1969-1971 (JSOP) (U)

Part I--Purpose

1. The purpose of JSOP-69 is to:

a. Provide information to commanders of unified and specified commands and planning guidance to the military services for the mid-range period beginning 1 July 1968 (M-day) under conditions of cold, limited, and general war.

b. Translate national objectives and policies into military objectives, prescribe strategic concepts for the employment of forces, and define basic undertakings which support these objectives and concepts.

c. Provide the Services with program guidance derived from the basic undertakings in terms of objective force levels considered necessary to support the US military strategy delineated in the plan.

d. Provide logistics planning guidance which will serve as a basis for development of Service logistic program objectives in support of the JSOP objective force levels for 1 July 1968, and as a basis for industrial mobilization planning.

e. Provide research and development planning guidance in support of military objectives and strategy delineated in the plan.

f. Provide chemical, biological and radiological warfare guidance in support of military objectives and strategy delineated in the plan.

g. Provide nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon delivery planning guidance in support of the objectives, strategy, and basic undertakings in the plan.

h. Provide guidance for the conduct of psychological and counter-insurgency operations, and unconventional warfare.

i. Provide nuclear weapons damage considerations.

j. Provide an estimate of desirable and reasonably attainable force objectives for countries, Allied or potentially Allied, in support of US military strategy.

k. Provide planning guidance for command and control systems in support of military objectives and strategy delineated in the plan.

l. Provide communications and electronics planning guidance in support of the military objectives and strategy delineated in the plan.

m. Provide the Secretary of Defense:

(1) Military advice for the development of the FY 1966 military budget;

(2) Justification for departmental FY 1966 program objectives as they pertain to major combatant forces; and

(3) A basis for reassessment of military aspects of the previously approved Department of Defense Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program.

n. Provide military basis for the establishment of a US position with respect to:

(1) Military assistance to our Allies and other friendly countries under conditions of cold, limited, and general war.

(2) The development and review of NATO and other Allied mid-range plans.

Part II--Strategic Appraisal

2. General. This appraisal summarizes the probable changes in the world situation likely to affect warfare, military strategies and world balance of military power, from the present through the period of the plan. It contains a brief analysis of the communist threat to the security, objectives and stability of the United States and other Free World nations based on more detailed information contained in the Intelligence Annex (Annex A)./2/ Advances in technology will continue to affect the development of weapons and conduct of warfare during the period. The major powers and other technically advanced nations will continue efforts to reduce their vulnerability to attack, protect their military forces, and improve their relative technical, political, economic and military postures. For factors influencing specific technological developments during the period of the plan see appropriate annexes.

3. Development of the World Situation Up to the Period Beginning 1 July 1968

a. The world situation will continue to be influenced by (1) the struggle between communist nations on the one hand and the free societies and other nations who share similar interests on the other; (2) the struggle of newly emergent and/or underdeveloped nations for self determination and a greater share of the world's material wealth; (3) the struggles resulting from traditional rivalries between nations wherein their own interests are involved; (4) the internal struggles within Free World nations which tend to move them away from Free World orientation; and (5) the struggle within Bloc nations.

b. The Soviet Union will increase pressures on the Free World as opportunities present themselves, and will relax pressures when it is to her advantage to do so. Any US or Allied retreats in critical situations will intensify Soviet tactics aimed at achieving advantages, including their inclination to employ force or threats of force. The Chinese Communists will seize every opportunity to undermine US standing; when they judge that circumstances permit, they will supplement political warfare with guerrilla action by indigenous forces as well as by higher intensity military action if they consider that the attendant risks are not too great. Both the Soviet Union and Communist China individually and possibly in concert will continue to instigate and support what they term "wars of liberation" with the aim of weakening the position of the West and establishing communist-oriented governments. Means used to support dissidents will probably range from political and economic assistance to providing military equipment, military training, military advisors, and even cadres. Other communist nations and communist parties in the Free World nations, with the support and encouragement of the Soviet Union, and/or Communist China, will attempt increasingly to embarrass and harass the United States and nations of the Western Alliances. The Soviet and ChiCom estimates of relative US-Soviet-Communist Chinese strength will be no less important to their decision as to the courses of action to pursue than their evaluation of Western reactions to Sino or Soviet probes.

c. Disarmament, nuclear testing and international agreements for the exploitation of space are likely to remain active subjects of international importance. Efforts by the United States to negotiate with the Soviets on disarmament will be continued in an effort to effect some reduction in armaments without jeopardy to US security. Despite any future Soviet willingness to negotiate either an arms agreement or an unlimited nuclear test ban, her basic motive will remain one of subverting the world to international communism. There appears to be little reason to believe that any such agreement can be achieved which will not be predicated on the assumption by the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union and her allies will derive some advantage. Communist China's eagerness for a voice in world affairs and her unwillingness to abide by international agreements reached without her participation probably will continue to inhibit the effectiveness of any agreement on these subjects.

d. The inclination toward neutralism or relaxed military efforts in many nations may have these effects: (1) create therein a political climate susceptible to communist internal and external influence; (2) weaken Western Alliances; (3) restrain newly emerging nations from adopting pro-Western policies; and (4) discredit US leadership. Individual differences, divergent national objectives, nationalistic drives and personal ambitions of their leaders should prevent the neutralist nations from becoming a cohesive military and political entity.

e. Newly emergent nations will continue to be characterized by nationalism, internal dissension, instability in political and economic institutions, and a tendency to concentrate disproportionately on external affairs in order to assert their independence. Political, military, and economic weaknesses will offer the communists opportunities, at relatively minor risk, for supporting subversive insurgency, political, and economic exploitation, including restrictive trade agreements, and the supply of arms and technicians. It is expected that many new nations will identify themselves with "anti-imperialistic" causes. However, Free World assistance, disenchantment with Soviet forms of assistance, and the political, economic, military and cultural ties between former colonialist powers and their former colonies will tend to counter Bloc efforts. Success of Western efforts to maintain a non-communist alignment among these new nations will depend largely upon the methods and the initiative displayed by Free World nations in combating communist subversion and persuasion. Communist control of a nation, once established, is unlikely to end except through introduction of outside military force.

f. The communists will continue to employ threats, alternating belligerency and tractability in the attempt to erode normal diplomatic usage and the rule of law in international relations. They will continue attempts to discredit the United Nations Organization and impede peace-keeping arrangements, unless it serves their purposes to do otherwise.

g. Divisive forces probably will become more pronounced within the Sino-Soviet Bloc as a result of differences between Moscow and Peiping over doctrine and strategy, over ChiCom desires for a nuclear capability, and over the more fundamental questions of authority in the International Communist movement. It is anticipated that these differences will continue to be important considerations in Sino-Soviet Bloc courses of action and will offer some opportunities for exploitation by the Free World. In any event, the Sino-Soviet dispute will continue and will present the Soviet leaders with increasing difficulties in their management of the International Communist movement, resulting in a further diminution of their control over it.

h. Technological and scientific advancement is expected to continue at a rapid pace within the Soviet Union. Soviet propaganda will equate spectacular successes such as those in space to military, economic and social gains and will cite them as proof of the superiority of the communist system.

i. In economic strength, the United States is presently well ahead of other countries. The Common Market area and Japan will continue to show impressive economic gains. The quality, diversity and technological level of production in Communist China will remain considerably below that of Japan, the USSR and the industrial nations of the West. Soviet Bloc policy will continue to emphasize growth and expansion of the bases of national power. Bloc economic planning will include continued maintenance of great military strength, continued efforts to enlarge their penetration of world markets, and selective expansion of trade and aid programs to underdeveloped countries and prospective satellites.

j. The socio-politico-economic bases of the Soviets and Communist Chinese will continue to contain inherent though slow-acting weaknesses potentially vulnerable to exploitation by the United States and its Allies, particularly through political, psychological and unconventional warfare.

k. The process of closer economic union of West European nations under the Common Market concept will continue with some unevenness and will be accompanied by the development of closer political and military ties with the possibility of a growing independence within [11 lines of source text not declassified].

l. Regional Appraisal. It can be expected that communist policy will be marked by subversion and opportunism. Communist leaders undoubtedly will continue to seek new developments favorable to their interests in a number of areas, but more especially in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. They probably intend to give particular attention to establishing a strong presence in Africa, to stimulating and exploiting leftist and revolutionary movements in Latin America, and to encouraging the growth of a radical anti-American mass movement in Japan and elsewhere as expediency dictates. The communists will use any form of enticement and pressure which they consider advantageous and appropriate to any particular time. These pressures will include political, diplomatic, cultural and economic, as well as propaganda and the threat of military action. The communists will continue to drive aggressively for the control of peoples and areas through subversion and inspiration or capture of insurgent movements. Although the Soviets for propaganda purposes, will label such activity as "wars of liberation," they will be attempting to bring the non-aligned nations into the communist camp. Above all, however, the Soviets intend to build up their national base of power in the belief that they can improve their over-all power position. They will continue to believe that, as they do so, more opportunities for readily exploitable communist expansion will open up for them.

(1) European area. The Soviet Bloc seeks to: (a) confirm the division of Germany; (b) develop the prestige of East Germany; (c) perpetuate the status quo of the European satellites; (d) prevent the resurgence of West Germany as a potent military power; (e) force the withdrawal of US forces from overseas bases; (f) discourage increases in Allied military capability; (g) prevent the proliferation of Allied nuclear capability; (h) reduce the credibility of the Allied response in critical situations; and (i) weaken and bring about the dissolution of NATO. They are expected to continue to take those actions designed to improve their general military posture, intimidate and divide the West and convince the world that they are determined to pursue their objectives in the face of high risks.

(2) Middle East. Bloc objectives in this area appear to be to achieve the dissolution of CENTO, use the Arab nationalist movement to their advantage, weaken the credibility of US response, deny the area and its resources to the West and expand Bloc influence. Major Bloc goals are to obtain a land bridge to Africa and control the Middle East.

(3) Africa. The Soviet Union and Communist China will continue to develop economic, cultural, and diplomatic relations with African nations, seeking to penetrate and subvert their political structure and influence their alignment with and dependence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc through external and internal pressures. Frustration of communist objectives, the stability and growth of sound, democratic political institutions and the development of a viable economy among the new nations of Africa will be dependent in a very large degree on the assistance rendered by the Western World.

(4) Asia and the Far East

(a) Despite Sino-Soviet differences, the Bloc is expected to continue its efforts to reduce Western influence in Asia and undermine the government and politico-economic institutions of selected non-communist or neutral Asian nations. Efforts of the communists to reduce the effectiveness and force dissolution of SEATO will continue. Communist China will continue efforts to achieve recognition as a major world power and the dominant power in Asia. Generally, Asians probably will become more reluctant to assume a strong stand in opposition to China in the absence of credible guarantees of Western protection.

(b) Indonesia probably will attempt to maintain a neutralist position and seek a balance in relations with major communist and non-communist nations. Indonesia probably will attempt to achieve hegemony over additional island territory in the area, particularly Portuguese Timor and the island portions of Malaysia, while simultaneously attempting to spread her influence in Southeast Asia. Indonesia will continue to rely on the USSR for substantial military assistance and aid and on any other opportune arrangements with Western or communist nations.

(c) The Soviets desire to build up good will and enhance Soviet prestige in India against the time when prospects for communist acquisition of power are considerably improved. India appears determined to check Chinese expansion in the Northern border areas.

(d) No settlement of the India/Pakistan Kashmir dispute is foreseen. A by-product of this dispute, however, could have far-reaching effects in spheres of immediate US interests. The prospect of continuing US/UK military aid to India has caused strong resentment in Pakistan and has increased her dissatisfaction with CENTO and SEATO. She has threatened to withdraw from the latter. To counter both the presumed threat from India and the perennial danger of pressure from the USSR, Pakistan may seek further rapprochement with Communist China.

(e) The USSR's political relations with Japan are likely to remain at an impasse. Moscow will continue to reject Japanese claims to the southern Kuriles and to insist upon abrogation of the defense treaty with the United States as a precondition for normalizing Soviet-Japanese relations with a peace treaty. The USSR would probably relax somewhat its present unyielding position, however, if it detected in Tokyo signs of a willingness to loosen ties with the United States.

(f) The communists desire to establish control in Laos and South Vietnam at an early date. The USSR is not disposed to make heavy sacrifices however, or to jeopardize other objectives vis-a-vis the West in order to make immediate advances in an area which is of more direct concern to Hanoi and Peiping. The USSR is likely, therefore, to urge a less precipitous strategy and to accept some temporary setbacks in preference to the risks of substantial involvement to sustain the Viet Cong. The threat of large-scale intervention by ChiCom military forces will continue behind the communist's activities in the area. Communist infiltration, subversion, and support of so-called "wars of national liberation" in Southeast Asia will increase. The ChiComs are not likely, however, to resort to limited or general war as long as they calculate that their ends can be achieved through means short of overt war. They will not hesitate, however, as illustrated by their actions in Tibet and on the China/Indian border, to resort to overt military action when they believe it is necessary and when in their opinion the risk of military confrontation with the United States is low. The development of effective measures to halt infiltration, insurgency and subversion will continue to be an urgent requirement in SEATO. While ChiCom concern over retaliation by the United States will deter it from attempting a military conquest of Taiwan or the Offshore Islands, they may undertake limited military action in the straits area to test Nationalist Chinese defenses and to probe US determination.

(5) Latin America. Latin America will continue to be a primary target for Bloc penetration. The conflict will almost certainly intensify during the period. The Bloc will continue to push its campaign to:

(a) Isolate the United States from its traditional Allies;

(b) Nullify hemispheric unity;

(c) Infiltrate and subvert vulnerable countries; and

(d) Strengthen and exploit its present foothold in Latin America.

The Soviets and ChiComs will continue to use Cuba as a base from which to expand communist influence further into the Western Hemisphere and as a significant factor in world-wide negotiations. Cuba will be closely watched by Latin American and other nations as a measure of the relative strength and resolution of the US and the Soviet Union. Periodic crises will almost certainly continue to occur in Latin America throughout the period. In general, based on the assumption of continued US support, the area will almost certainly remain US-oriented, although in the face of internal and external Bloc pressures, some nations can be expected to adopt an increasingly independent position. The Soviets will attempt to turn to their advantage such promising revolutionary developments as may occur.

4. The Soviet Bloc Threat

a. General.

(1) While striving to improve Soviet Bloc security, especially that of the USSR, the Soviet rulers will attempt to advance toward their over-all objective of achieving a communist world under Soviet leadership. This basic Soviet Bloc objective remains constant and is supported by every member of the Bloc.

(2) Soviet thinking about military policy is influenced by a general outlook which asserts that historical forces are moving inexorably in the direction of communism. In theory, this movement is carried forward by the struggle of the "masses," led by the communist parties, to overthrow the existing social-economic order during an indeterminate period of "peaceful coexistence" rather than by the direct use of the military power of the Soviet Bloc. Soviet leaders see military power as serving two basic purposes: defense of their system and support for its expansion. Thus, one of the most important objectives of Soviet military policy is to deter general war while the USSR prosecuted its foreign policies by means short of actual hostilities involving Soviet forces. Military power is constantly brought into play in direct support of these policies, through the threats which give force to Soviet political demands, through the stress on its growing power which is intended to gain respect for the Soviet state and its communist system, and through the military aid and support rendered to allies, friendly but neutral regimes, and anti-Western movements. Despite a strong Soviet military posture, the relative strategic balance of forces is in favor of the West and as long as this condition exists it is doubtful, except through miscalculation or misadventure, that the Soviets would initiate general war. There is, however, good evidence that the Soviets, in recognition of this imbalance, are striving for weapon systems which could, in the future, enhance their capabilities relative to the West.

b. Attitude Toward War.

(1) The Soviets wish to have the forces to fight wars effectively should they occur. One of the most important objectives of Soviet policy is to deter general war. Except for so-called wars of national liberation, their political outlook, their military programs of recent years, and intelligence on their current intentions all suggest that the Soviet leaders do not regard war as desirable. They realize their deterrent must be credible in the sense that it rests upon powerful military forces. Moreover, they recognize that deterrence may fail in some key confrontation in which, despite their best efforts to retain control over risks, either they or their opponents come to feel that vital interests are under challenge. Against this contingency they wish to have a combination of offensive and defensive capabilities which will enable them to seize the initiative if possible, to survive enemy nuclear attack, and to go on to prosecute the war successfully. Although logically they must think that a deliberate Western attack on them is improbable, they appear to have genuine apprehensions.

(2) Devoted as they are to the need for implacable struggle against the "capitalist" world until communist domination is assured, and to the view that power--in its broadest economic, military and political sense--is the key ingredient in this struggle, the Soviets see their priority objective as constantly trying to change the East-West balance of power and the world conception of that balance in their favor. To this end they persistently endeavor to enhance the components of their economic, military, and scientific strength and no less important, their political position in the world arena. Soviet boasts of military prowess and superiority over the West are designed to back up their political initiatives by exploiting present and future Soviet power potential. At the same time, the Soviets do what they can to undermine and denigrate the power of the West in these respects.

(3) Fundamental hostility toward the noncommunist world defines one limit of Soviet foreign policy; so long as it persists, the USSR will regard international issues as opportunities progressively to weaken and undermine its opponents, and not as occasions for conciliation which would protect the interests of all parties. The other limit, which puts a check upon this aggressiveness, is the Soviet leaders' awareness that their own nation and system would face destruction in a general nuclear war. Both their statements and their actions in recent years have demonstrated their unwillingness to run any considerable risks of this eventuality. This does not mean, however, that they would always estimate the risks correctly, nor does it mean that they would abandon interests they considered vital in order to avoid grave risk of nuclear war. Barring the development of a decisive weapon system, the Soviets almost certainly consider that neither side will deliberately initiate a general war or react to any crisis in a manner which would gravely risk such a war, unless vital interests were considered to be in jeopardy.

(4) It is believed that the Soviets are unlikely, as a matter of general policy, to assume the military and political risks involved in using their own forces in formal military operations to achieve local gains. They would probably employ Soviet forces, as necessary, if some Western military action in areas adjacent to a communist country threatened the integrity of the Bloc itself. Even in the latter case, however, they would attempt to use their forces in a way calculated to achieve their local objectives, to end hostilities rapidly and to control risks of escalation. At a much lower level, they will almost certainly encourage and support the use of force by pro-communist forces when they believe that a local situation is ripe for forceful exploitation and that the challenge to Western interests is not direct enough to involve uncontrollable risks of a direct encounter between United States and Soviet forces.

(5) This estimate of Soviet views on general and local war is generally consistent with the positions expressed by them on 6 January 1961, when they defined various types of wars and their attitude toward them./3/ On that occasion, in addition to stating Soviet opposition on both world wars and local wars between states, they distinguished a category of "wars of national liberation, or popular uprisings." Such internal wars, ranging pro-Soviet or anti-Western forces against colonial or pro-Western regimes, were declared to be "just" and deserving of communist support. They were carefully vague, however, in discussing the forms which this support would take, and in particular, neither promised nor hinted that Soviet forces would join in the fighting. Subsequent Soviet actions, however, indicate that this was not a statement of intent to usher in a new phase of vigorous Soviet incitement of such conflicts everywhere or of maximum military assistance to "national liberation" forces.

(6) It seems likely that Soviet emphasis on "national liberation" warfare, was intended in part to meet Chinese criticisms then being made that the USSR, by its stress upon the need to avoid war, was in fact ruling out altogether the use of force in advancing the communist cause. This charge is a major component of the Chinese attack upon the correctness of Soviet policies and, therefore, upon the legitimacy of the USSR's traditional leadership of the communist movement. It is also designed to win for China the allegiance of communists and radicals in the less developed countries, who are less firmly tied to Soviet leadership than their European counterparts. Despite these Chinese pressures, the USSR has not given full political and material support nor committed its prestige to all armed anti-Western movements in the under-developed areas. It is believed that the Soviets will continue to follow an opportunistic policy in this regard.

c. Military Balance of Power.

(1) The Soviets maintain substantial forces-in-being and a large mobilization potential. As far as ground forces are concerned, they probably regard the balance of power in Eurasia as being in their favor. They also have a large short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missile arsenal with which they could attack targets anywhere in the European area. They have acquired an intercontinental missile capability in addition to their long-range bomber forces. Their force of missile-firing submarines continues to increase and forms an increasingly important part of their strategic capabilities. However, their capability for intercontinental attack remains decidedly inferior to that of the West.

(2) Bloc leaders probably continue to view their combined military power as adequate to meet military situations in Eurasia in which the nuclear capabilities of the Western Powers were not involved. They probably also conclude that they possess sufficient military power to deter the West from launching general war except under extreme threat to vital national or common interests. They almost certainly conclude that in the event of general war their military power would be unable to prevent unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union.

d. Mutual Deterrence and the Deliberate Initiation of War. The Soviet leaders evidently continue to base their military and foreign policy planning on the assumption that the present over-all military relationship, in which each side can exert a strong deterrent upon the other, will continue for some time to come. The Soviets do not view this situation as a stalemate, but rather as an opportunity to conduct aggressive maneuvers of many sorts and to undertake a comprehensive effort aimed at attaining a military technological breakthrough. They are clearly determined to maintain and improve their strong military posture. The Soviets are vigorously pursuing programs for research and development in advanced weapons, hoping if possible to create a strategic imbalance favorable to them. It is estimated that these research and development efforts include defense systems against ballistic missiles, the military application of space vehicles and very high yield warheads. It is possible that some future technological breakthrough could lead them to believe that they had acquired a decisive advantage and that they could, therefore, be far more aggressive toward the West. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that, under these circumstances, a decision to initiate a first strike might be made. It is not believed, however, that the Soviets base their policies upon the expectation that they will be able to achieve, within the foreseeable future, a military posture which would make the deliberate initiation of general war a rational decision; the Soviets realize that the West is determined to maintain second-strike capabilities which would inflict intolerable destruction upon them. In any case, their policies rest on the proposition that communist victory can be won without resort to general war.

e. Miscalculation. Soviet strategy recognizes that, while general war is unlikely, it cannot be excluded as the result of miscalculation by either side or as the outcome of a crisis in which both sides become progressively committed. The Soviets are unable to be certain in advance what the circumstances surrounding the beginning of a general war would be. A miscalculation could occur if the Soviets misjudged either the importance to the West of an issue and the actions which the West might take in support of its position, or even the consequences of the policies being pursued by a third party associated with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, such a crisis might arise should the West miscalculate in a similar way.

f. Pre-emptive Attack. If the Soviet leaders were ever convinced that the West was irrevocably committed to an imminent strategic nuclear attack against them, there is little question that they would themselves strike pre-emptively. Such conviction, however, on the part of any country about the intentions of another is extremely unlikely. The Soviet leaders have probably concluded that it would be impossible to count upon incontrovertible advance evidence that the enemy was irrevocably committed to an imminent attack. Moreover, the compulsion to strike first, if the threat of hostile attack is still ambiguous, declines as missile systems become more important and less vulnerable, and if the net military advantage to be derived from a first strike decreases. This trend of Soviet thinking is suggested by assertions that an aggressor cannot neutralize the retaliatory capability of a powerful opponent. Nevertheless, a surprise attack--that is to say, one delivered in a period of no particular tension and after entirely secret military preparations--is the only one which would give the Soviet Union a chance of destroying any significant part of the Western nuclear strike capability before it could be launched. Therefore, in spite of its unlikelihood, it remains a possible, though improbable, course of action for the Soviet Union.

g. Escalation. A number of Soviet statements in recent years have expressed the view that limited war involving the major nuclear powers would inevitably escalate into general war. While such statements are intended in part to deter the West from local use of force, this official view also reflects a genuine Soviet fear of the consequences of becoming directly engaged in limited war involving Soviet and US forces. This probably also extends to involvement of Soviet forces with certain Allied forces in highly critical areas, notably Western forces in the European area. Nevertheless, they might employ their own forces to achieve local gains in some area adjacent to Bloc territory if they judged that the West, either because it was deterred by Soviet nuclear power or for some other reason, would not make an effective military response. They would probably employ Soviet forces as necessary if some Western military action threatened the integrity of the Bloc itself. Should the USSR become directly involved in a limited war with the US or Allied forces, it is believed that the Soviets would not necessarily expand it immediately into general war, but that they would probably employ only that force which they thought necessary to achieve their local objectives. They would also seek to prevent escalation by political means.

5. Chinese Communist Threat

a. General. Communist China's foreign policy will probably continue generally along current lines. Peiping will remain strongly anti-American and will strive to weaken the US position, especially in East Asia, but is unlikely, knowingly, to assume great risks. China's military force will probably not be used overtly except in defense of its own or satellite borders or, in the absence of US/Allied military power, to assert territorial claims against India. Subversion and covert support of local revolutions will continue to be Peiping's primary mode of operation in Southeast Asia and, to a necessarily more limited degree, elsewhere in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

b. Modernization of Armed Forces. The modernization of the armed forces, which was progressing steadily until about 1960, has practically ended, except for the continued introduction of radar and certain other electronic equipment. No advanced aircraft, submarine components, or other items of advanced equipment have been received from the USSR in the past two and one-half years, domestic production of fighter aircraft and submarines has ceased and inventories are being reduced by deterioration and cannibalization. In general, the Army has been less affected than the other Services. During the depths of the domestic decline, the military forces suffered shortages of even routine items of supply, but this condition has apparently been alleviated in the past year.

c. Advanced Weapons.

(1) The intelligence data available does not permit a high degree of confidence in estimating the future development of the Chinese nuclear program, and this appraisal is made in light of this general caution.

(2) The Chinese Communists have given high priority to the development of nuclear weapons and missiles. The earliest date a first plutonium device could be tested is believed to be early 1964, but if the normal number of difficulties are encountered this date would be postponed to late 1964 or 1965. Beginning the year after a first detonation, the single reactor thus far identified could produce enough material for only one or two crude weapons a year. The Chinese have a few bombers which could carry bulky weapons of early design.

(3) Communist China is probably concentrating on a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) system of basically Soviet design, such as either the 630 mile SS-3 or the 1,020 mile SS-4. The earliest date either missile would be ready for deployment is believed to be 1967. It is unlikely that a compatible nuclear warhead would be available by that date.

(4) The detonation of a nuclear device would boost domestic morale. Although it is possible that the ChiCom leaders would experience a dangerous degree of overconfidence, it is more likely that they will concentrate on furthering their established policies to:

(a) Force their way into world disarmament discussions and other world councils,

(b) Overawe their neighbors and soften them for Peiping-directed communist subversion, and

(c) Tout Chinese-style communism as the best route for an underdeveloped nation to achieve industrial and scientific modernity. In pursuing these policies, increased confidence of ChiCom leaders would doubtless be reflected in their approach to conflicts on the periphery of Communist China.

d. Domestic Production. Peiping almost certainly intends to achieve domestic production of all necessary weapons and materiel for its armed forces. It has a long way to go before reaching this goal, however. The Chinese at present are probably unable to produce even MIG-17's entirely by themselves, and it will be a number of years before they can design and produce more advanced types of military aircraft. Indeed they may have chosen instead to concentrate their limited resources on missiles. Their wholly domestic naval shipbuilding capacity is likely to be restricted to surface ships of the smaller types during the next few years.

e. Military Policy. Communist China's military policy has always been characterized by caution in undertaking initiatives in the face of superior power. Hence, the decline in the relative effectiveness of its military equipment and weapons is likely further to temper its policy, especially in circumstances where it might confront US armed power or US-equipped Asian air forces. However, the Chinese Communist Army will continue to be the strongest in Asia and will provide a powerful backing for Chinese Communist foreign policy. The Sino-Soviet dispute will probably place additional demands on Chinese military dispositions and capabilities, since one of the consequences of China's new "independence" from the USSR will be the need to keep a closer watch than previously on the long China-Russia border--which the Chinese still consider a "difficult" and "unsettled" question. Her slowly developing nuclear weapon and missile capability will increase an already considerable military advantage over Asian neighbors. However, for the foreseeable future she will not approach the advanced weapons might of the United States or USSR, particularly in the field of long-range striking power. For this reason, among others, Peiping would be unlikely to attribute a decisive importance to modern weaponry. They would probably continue to rely primarily on a huge ground force and, unless confident of Soviet support, would try to avoid hostilities which might escalate into nuclear war. Considering the chances of retaliation, it is difficult to conceive of any situation in which Peiping would be likely to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in the next decade or so.

f. Foreign Policy. Communist China's foreign policy objectives can be distinguished roughly by the amount of risk the regime is prepared to take. The obvious first rank objective is the preservation of the regime and the protection of its existing boundaries. For these purposes the ChiComs are willing to go to war, almost regardless of the odds. If US or SEATO troops approached its borders through Laos or North Vietnam, they would almost certainly be ready to commit their forces openly, unless in the particular circumstances they saw greater advantage in more covert military operations. The acquisition of Taiwan falls in the second rank of objectives--those for which they are fully prepared to use overt military force, but only when the prospects of success are judged to be high. To achieve this goal, they are prepared to run fewer risks and are particularly anxious to avoid direct conflict with the United States. They almost certainly will not attempt to seize by military force either Taiwan or any of the major offshore islands which they believe the United States would help defend. It is not believed that the explosion of a nuclear device, or even the acquisition of a limited nuclear weapons capability, will produce major changes in her foreign policy in the sense that they will adopt a general policy of open military aggression, or even become willing to take significantly greater military risks. China's leaders recognize that their limited capabilities will not alter the real power balance among the major states and could not do so in the foreseeable future. In particular, they will recognize that they remain unable either to remove or neutralize the United States' presence in Asia. Nevertheless, the Chinese would feel very much stronger and this mood would doubtless be reflected in their approach to conflicts on their periphery. They would probably feel that the United States would be more reluctant to intervene on the Asian mainland and thus the tone of Chinese policy would probably become more assertive. Further, their possession of nuclear weapons would reinforce their efforts to achieve Asian hegemony through political pressures and the indirect support of local "wars of liberation."

g. Spread of Communism. For the broader and longer range goal of spreading communism throughout the under-developed world, Communist China is probably not prepared to accept any substantial risk, although it must be noted that it tends to estimate the risks involved in supporting "wars of national liberation" much lower than does Moscow. It apparently does not intend to undertake overt conquests of foreign lands in the name of communism, but intends to let indigenous revolutionaries do the fighting and the "liberating." The ChiComs are prepared to train foreign nationals in guerrilla and political warfare, and will back revolutionary movements to the extent of their limited capabilities with equipment, funds, propaganda, and support in international affairs.

[Here follow Part III. Military Objectives, Part IV. Strategic Concept, Part V. Basic Undertakings, and Annexes A-L.]

Washington, February 26, 1964, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT
Discussion with the President at 1:00 o'clock, February 26th; No one was present

[Here follow items 1 and 2.]

3. I told the President we had completed an extended Corona coverage of the Soviet Union involving the photographing of about 54% of the Soviet landmass. I explained this was the first time in which we had returned two reels of film from one satellite. This gave me an opportunity to discuss the Corona J development. I said that the photography had not been completely studied but the evidences were that the Soviets were slowing up or stopping construction of soft ICBM sites and were emphasizing the construction of hard sites. I explained that after Penkovsky/2/ was apprehended, Khrushchev had stated, and we had learned, that he had told the Presidium that Penkovsky had revealed the location of their missile sites, therefore he had to spend an enormous amount of money--50 billion rubles--to relocate the missiles because we now knew where they were. This was untrue because Penkovsky had not told us the location of a single missile site. However Khrushchev knew that through satellite photography we were learning the exact location of missile sites. He was not relocating them--what he was doing, he was hardening them, and this was costing them an enormous amount of money. The President expressed great interest in the subject of satellite photography and I asked for an hour's time to go over the program, the pictures and other details. He agreed. I suggested perhaps when he was flying some place I go with him and we could spend an hour or so together on this one subject. This he felt might be a good idea.

Action: Remind me to follow this up and to make arrangements on a Presidential trip in the near future.

4. I then discussed the surfacing of the Oxcart and advised him that Chairman Vinson and Senator Russell felt that their Committees should be fully informed by them and they wished to do this in advance of the announcement and also stated that Mr. Cannon wished me to meet with his Subcommittee prior to the announcement and that George Mahon wished to inform his committee prior to the announcement. I recommended that this be done but it be timed so the Committees would be advised practically concurrently with the announcement so that the press would not get the news before the President announced it. I said that if, for instance, he was to make the announcement Saturday/3/ morning (which he did not confirm at the time), then all of the Congressional actions should be taken Saturday morning. Thus the Congressmen would know in advance but not so much in advance that the press would get hold of the story. The President was very much against this. He felt that if the announcement was made on Saturday, we could inform the Committees on Monday. I stated that this would cause the Committee Chairmen and the Committees a great deal of trouble. With this Johnson picked up the phone to call Senator Russell; however the call was not returned and I did not get a final decision.

Action: Later I mentioned the question to Bundy and he said that he would have to get to the President and get a decision. Until this decision is forthcoming we should take absolutely no action with respect to the Hill. Bundy and I discussed the problem several times during the day, including a brief discussion at Mrs. J.F. Kennedy's residence when the President was there. However, Bundy did not think it appropriate to discuss it with the President on the particular occasion at Mrs. Kennedy's residence. This should be followed up with Bundy today.

[Here follow items 5-8.]

[document number not declassified]

Washington, February 27, 1964.

MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency

The enclosed statement has been drafted for consideration at a meeting of the National Security Council on February 29./2/ After consideration in the NSC, the President may decide to make this statement public on Saturday at 11 A.M.

There is also attached a list of questions and answers/3/ which have been reviewed on an interagency basis for the use of Mr. Salinger, whom the President expects to designate as the responsible background officer if he decides to make the public statement.

The probability that the President will decide this matter affirmatively is high, and the President authorizes entirely private disclosure of the statement to NATO allies, Japan and Australia, not more than twenty-four hours in advance of 11 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, Saturday, February 29. Those who are informed should be warned of the great importance of privacy with respect to this information until the President does make an announcement. In the case of European capitals, it is the President's desire that information not be revealed before Saturday morning, European time. In the case of the U.K., the disclosure will take the form of a private letter from the President to the Prime Minister. Appropriate instructions should be sent to our Ambassador in Moscow.

The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized to take the necessary operational steps to position A-11 aircraft at Edwards Air Force Base.

The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence are requested to take appropriate steps to inform all those holding Oxcart clearances of the limits within which this disclosure is being held./4/ Those limits are defined by the enclosed statement and the enclosed questions and answers.

The Director of Central Intelligence is authorized to brief Congressional leaders holding Oxcart clearances so that they in turn may give the approved information to members of the appropriate committees not earlier than 11 A.M. on Saturday, February 29. Any additional briefing of any sort with respect to this project will require White House approval.

McGeorge Bundy

Washington, February 29, 1964, 10:05 a.m.

SUBJECT
Discussion at the NSC meeting. Attended by the President, all members and the four members of the President's personal staff.

1. I opened the meeting by explaining briefly the background of the development of the Oxcart, the features which were applicable to military aircraft, contribution the plane would make to supersonic transport and the reasons why it was necessary to surface the development at this time. I explained there was a growing danger that it would surface itself through a leak, accident or forced landing and this would be more awkward than if we announced it in advance. I avoided any reference to the reconnaissance mission, however, Secretary McNamara added very considerable amount of information bearing on the reconnaissance development which brought out some discussion [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the amount of flying, the number of planes, etc. McNamara made a point of the fact that a total of over 40 planes, together with the entire development cost of the plane and engine, had been accomplished in a remarkably short time, 4 or 5 years, and at a cost of about $1 and 1/2 billion. He compared this to the B-70 on which there has been about $2 billion spent and the plane is still not out of the hangar. Both during the meeting and afterwards he spoke with great enthusiasm on the performance of the Agency, Lockheed and other contractors in the development and he expressed a wish that the Department of Defense could perform in the same way. He attributed the performance to people who were doing the job and actually knowing what was going on in detail in the areas of their responsibility.

2. The President and Speaker McCormack were most praiseworthy of the secrecy, the President asking what the formula was as he would like to invoke it in departments and also in the White House itself. There was no dissension to the surfacing, although it was known that General LeMay had dissented at the Joint Chiefs on Friday afternoon. General Taylor did not reflect the dissension at this morning's meeting.

3. No other business was transacted at the meeting./2/

Washington, undated.

EXPENDITURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have simplified the format of the currently approved Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in Emergency Conditions, and have updated the language to make the instructions editorially compatible with terminology employed in current plans.

2. Subject to presently approved restrictions, the instructions authorize [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

[4 paragraphs (32 lines of source text) not declassified]

3. Also, in the period since the original instructions were approved, a new commander of major U.S. forces has been designated: CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA (Commander-in-Chief STRIKE/U.S. Commander-in-Chief Middle East, Southern Asia and Africa, South of the Sahara). In addition, CINCARIB (Commander-in-Chief Caribbean Command) has been redesignated USCINCSO (Commander-in-Chief United States Southern Command), and the area in which he exercises command has assumed greater military significance. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

Washington, March 4, 1964, 6:10 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT
General Taylor
General Wheeler
General McKee (for General LeMay)
Admiral McDonald
General Greene
General Clifton

General Taylor introduced the subjects to be discussed in the order in which they appear on the attached agenda from General Taylor (Tab A)./2/

On the Furtherance document,/3/ General Taylor gave the President a summary memorandum. This memorandum reflects the Chiefs' recommendations and was approved by the President (Tab B)./4/ (Note: a blue-covered document entitled "Furtherance" and classified Top Secret was given to the President and later taken to Mr. Bundy's office to be filed there.) The Furtherance document consists of currently approved instructions for the expenditure of nuclear weapons in emergency conditions as brought up to date and containing minor changes.

In the situation described in the document, the Chiefs described that [10-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

General Taylor said there is a Furtherance document here at the White House and that he would like to have it back and the new one, which he gave to me, substituted for it. The President directed that this be where it can be available to all who should know about it.

(Mr. Bundy, the Military Aide, Bromley Smith, and whoever else Mr. Bundy directs should know about this.) The decision on it should be held very closely.

General Taylor also pointed out that they have modified the emergency action book called the "Gold Book" and that they would give this new Gold Book to us./5/ They would like the superseded one returned to the Joint Chiefs.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.]

C.V. Clifton
Major General, USA
Military Aide to the President

Washington, March 12, 1964.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 1 [2 of 2], Box 5. Secret. 7 pages of source text not declassified.]