Washington, September 16, 1964, 1432Z.

CAP 64320. This is preliminary CIA comment on Khrushchev's weapon statement:

"1. On 15 September Khrushchev told a visiting delegation of Japanese socialist members of parliament that the Soviet Union has developed a 'monstrous new, terrible weapon.' He stated that on 14 September he had been shown a weapon of terrible destruction by military men, scientists and engineers. He is quoted as having said, 'I have never seen anything like it. It is a method of destroying and exterminating mankind. It is the strongest and most powerful of existing weapons. Its power is limitless.'

2. After mentioning the weapon, Khrushchev launched into an attack on Chinese border claims and accused Mao Tse-tung of spreading warlike sentiments. Earlier Khrushchev has recalled the tragedy of the Japanese people, the first in history to suffer the atomic bomb. Alluding to the Chinese, Khrushchev said that he who says that the atomic bomb is a paper tiger is crazy.

3. The choice of audience, and the context in which Khrushchev's statement regarding the new weapon was delivered, suggest that he intended the threat implied by this new development to be taken as directed primarily against the Chinese.

4. While Khrushchev gave no specific clues concerning the nature of the weapon, we did have an indication four months ago that Khrushchev wanted us to know beforehand that he was going to make such an announcement.

5. Last May [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], two Soviet KGB officers deliberately revealed themselves as such to a CIA officer, and told him that they knew he was a CIA officer. The spokesman for the two then asked twice 'very positively' that the CIA officer inform Washington that the Soviet Government was soon to make a very important announcement on development of a Soviet military capability which 'would not be used against the West but would be very effective against the Chinese.' The spokesman said he was not authorized to reveal the details.

6. The delay between this tip-off is that Khrushchev wanted us to know that the announced claim of a new weapon, when it came, would be directed at the Chinese and that we should not be concerned by it. It also is possible that Khrushchev had information indicating that the Chinese were going to claim a nuclear capability this year and timed the announcement to blunt the political effect of such a development.

8./2/ We have no information on any specific Soviet weapon development which would equate to Khrushchev's description.

9. It is improbable that a new delivery system was the subject of his remarks since the Soviets have long claimed the ability to deliver their largest nuclear weapons by missile and to attack from any direction, although a January 1960 Khrushchev statement referring to a 'fantastic weapon' then in the hatching stage may have referred to the 100 megaton bomb. It seems improbable that his present 'new weapon' would refer to such a previously well publicized capability. It is unlikely in the absence of appropriate nuclear tests that the Soviets have had the opportunity to develop significantly larger nuclear weapons that could be used with confidence.

10. It is similarly difficult to conceive of radiological weapons that would fit Khrushchev's description. It is now possible, through appropriate selection of weapons and burst altitude, to contaminate very large areas with lethal radioactivity. These effects probably could be somewhat enhanced by alterations in weapon design, perhaps including the salting of weapons with materials such as cobalt. Such capabilities would not appear to be new or very significantly superior to those now possessed by the major nuclear powers.

11. In the biological warfare field, we have no information that agents capable of the extermination of mankind have been developed. Other scientific developments with weapons potential, such as lasers, do not appear to meet the mass destruction criteria of Khrushchev's description.

12. If in fact a monstrous new weapon exists, Khrushchev's statements imply that it is in the developmental rather than production state. If the weapon is 'very effective' against the Chinese but not against the West, anti-personnel weapons such as biological or radiological weapons, are suggested. We have, however, no evidence of spectacular developments in the fields."

Recommendations on U.S. public reaction will follow.

JCSM-809-64

Washington, September 17, 1964.

SUBJECT
Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) (S)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 21 August 1964, subject as above./2/

2. Within the context of the reference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to advise the Secretary of Defense as regards what functions they believe the Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) should be capable of performing, and the number of people they believe the facility must house in order to perform these functions and to support the facility.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, if a DUCC is approved and constructed as an element of the National Military Command System (NMCS), it should be capable of performing those functions which support the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their role as principal military advisors to the President. If the President and his civilian and military advisors are to relocate to the DUCC, the facility must have the capability of performing the following pre-attack military functions as they pertain to international crisis situations and general nuclear war:

a. To maintain a minimum data base on the world-wide status of forces, Single Integrated Operational Plan, and force generation levels to ensure that the President will have adequate information to support a decision to authorize, if necessary, the use of nuclear weapons.

b. To maintain a capability to receive from external sources pertinent information on surveillance and analysis of the world situation, and indicator/warning data and current intelligence; and to maintain minimum facilities to conduct intelligence briefings on information and data received.

c. To provide an effective means of: (1) communications with the commanders of the unified and specified commands; and (2) negotiations with allied and foreign governments and the United Nations.

d. To receive, process, and use, as available and as necessary, information from the National Military Command Center and existing Alternate Command Centers and Command Posts of the NMCS and other government agencies.

e. To maintain a state of readiness, including a current data base, to translate during the period of tactical warning from a standby condition to a fully capable primary Command Center to the extent permitted by the facilities provided, and prescribed by pertinent directives.

4. During the trans-attack and post-attack periods of a general nuclear war, a DUCC may be required to operate independently with information received directly from sources external to the Washington complex. In order to provide for this contingency, the DUCC must have the capability, within the context of a minimum facility, of performing the following functions in addition to those specified in the above paragraphs:

a. To receive and display information on the military and political situation in order to determine as quickly and accurately as possible the time, magnitude, and objective of the attack.

b. To disseminate decisions, orders, and instructions as to the appropriate action to be taken in response to an attack or threat of attack.

c. To communicate, by the surest and most effective means possible, with the major elements of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System.

5. Communications requirements vary considerably between critical international crises and general war. A need exists for an extensive world-wide network of reliable communications during crisis situations. After general war begins, the emphasis would then switch to survivable communications among the major command centers of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System primarily for the strategic direction of the military forces. However, there would remain a need for communications with the principal civil defense centers, and for negotiations with the principal adversary. Therefore, it appears that the functions of command communications would require that the DUCC be equipped with communications which approximate the capability now planned for the Alternate National Military Command Center.

6. It appears that the concept and capability reflected in the National Emergency Airborne Command Post would represent the minimum capability required in a DUCC to serve as an emergency command post for decision-making by the President. It is envisioned that the decision group, which would relocate to the DUCC, would comprise the National Command Authorities with a minimum number of advisory personnel, and that they would remain in the DUCC in a post-attack situation only until the National Command Authorities could be relocated to a site from which the functions of government could more adequately be discharged. Basically, however, advisory information would be provided the DUCC by existing and surviving alternate command facilities equipped with larger data bases. A minimum data base would be maintained in the DUCC and staff support, to the extent feasible, would be provided to the decision group.

7. The determination of the precise number of people the DUCC must house in order to support the total mission of the facility, including the operation of the national government in crisis situations as well as the conduct of general nuclear war, would necessitate considerable liaison with the White House, and other departments and agencies of the national government. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that approximately 50 military personnel would be required to perform their part of the above functions in the manner described in the preceding paragraph. The figure does not include personnel for facility maintenance, communications, security, and housekeeping support for which about 175 additional people can be identified at this time. Additional functions and personnel possibly would be required to operate the national government in accordance with the desires of the President, and to the extent outlined in the reference. These latter requirements should be provided by the appropriate Departments and Agencies concerned, in order that the composite functional and personnel requirements, and hence the optimum size of the facility, may be established.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler/3/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, September 18, 1964, 4:22 p.m.

498. Joint State-Defense-USIA Circular. Reference: Circular 495./2/ Secretary McNamara issued following statement today on weapons developments announced by President yesterday:

As you know, President Johnson announced yesterday that the United States is able to intercept and destroy armed satellites. I would like to give you, within the limits of military security, some additional information about this capability.

The two anti-satellite systems which the President discussed are operated by the Army and the Air Force. They are under the operational control of the Continental Air Defense Command. They make use of certain Navy facilities as well.

The Army system uses the Nike Zeus missile while the Air Force system employs the Thor missile. Both systems utilize the data from our global space detection and tracking network which includes various radars, sensors and computers.

The Army program to develop an anti-satellite capability was begun in May of 1962 and the Air Force program early in 1963.

It is especially significant that both the Army and the Air Force successfully intercepted satellites a year after I directed them to achieve this capability. The Army system was operational on August 1, 1963, the Air Force system on May 29, 1964.

The two systems have been effectively tested and have intercepted satellites in space, their missiles passing so close as to be within the destruction radius of the warheads.

The bases at which these anti-satellite systems are deployed is classified information.

To date, we have invested $80,000,000 to achieve this capability. This figure does not include the funds we are spending on items like the Space Detection and Tracking System and the Anti-Intercontinental Ballistic Missile system.

The family of over-the-horizon radars also announced yesterday by President Johnson is one of the most dramatic examples of new developments.

These new systems will bounce radar signals off the ionosphere and send them to the earth far beyond the horizon. Missiles being launched reflect or otherwise influence these signals which are received back at the transmitting station or at other points far beyond the horizon. These signals are then processed by electronic techniques to provide target detection and identification. Capabilities also exist against aircraft.

More than $50,000,000 has been invested in this program to develop and produce installations for these missile and aircraft detection systems. This radar will provide detection of missiles within seconds of launch at a distance of several thousand miles. End Text.

If transcript Q and A period, now being prepared, reveals additional relevant material posts will be informed./3/

Rusk

Washington, September 23, 1964.

RE
Summary of the existing plans for emergency use of nuclear weapons

On March 26 you approved recommendations from McNamara and the Joint Chiefs to put into effect updated instructions for expenditure of nuclear weapons in emergency conditions./2/

This instruction covers four emergency situations. Two of them are essentially defensive and would allow the use of nuclear weapons only against military targets in the air or at sea. These are: 1) active defense against air and space nuclear attack on the U.S., and 2) naval and air action against an imminent seaborne missile attack on the U.S.

In these two cases the commanders could act without contacting the President if the necessary delay would make it impossible for them to prevent the imminent attack.

The other two cases are 1) retaliation to a nuclear attack on the U.S., and 2) reply to a major assault on major U.S. forces at sea or in foreign territory. In these two cases every effort to contact the President must be made (with the qualifying phrase in the second case: "every effort consistent with the preservation of his command"). The authorized retaliation for an attack on the U.S. is a strategic attack on the Soviet Union. The authorized retaliation in the other case is against hostile forces but not repeat not against the Soviet Union itself.

The instructions reveal an interesting difference between situations in which nuclear weapons would do enormous civilian and industrial damage and situations in which they would be used in the upper atmosphere or on the high seas. In the latter cases commanders have latitude to decide that the delay in contacting the President would be excessive. This is in line with a belief which Eisenhower had that when the destructive force of nuclear weapons would hit only military forces, the decision on their use was a very much less serious matter. It is possible that we ought to take account of this distinction in anything we say in the next few days.

McG.B.

NIE 11-8-64

Washington, October 8, 1964.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STATEGIC ATTACK

The Problem

To estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet forces for strategic attack and in Soviet capabilities for such attack through mid-1970.

Scope Note

This estimate covers those Soviet military forces which are suitable for strategic attack. Other major aspects of the Soviet military strength are treated in separate estimates on air and missile defense, on theater forces, on the nuclear program, and on the space program. Trends in the USSR's overall military posture and in Soviet military policy are examined in an annual estimate, the next issuance of which will be in the first quarter of 1965.

Summary and Conclusions

A. Major changes in Soviet programs for the development of strategic attack forces have become apparent during the past year. In 1962-1963, certain ICBM and ballistic missile submarine programs came to an end, and a pause ensued in the growth of these forces. At the same time, the pace of ICBM research and development increased markedly. More recently, the USSR has resumed ICBM deployment in a new and improved configuration, and the probable advent of a new submarine which we believe is designed to carry ballistic missiles probably marks the start of yet another deployment program. (Para. 1)

B. Soviet military policy in recent years has been to build up strategic offensive and defensive capabilities, maintain and improve large general purpose forces, and pursue research and development programs in advanced weapons. In our view, the primary concern of Soviet military policy for the next several years will continue to be the strengthening of the USSR's strategic deterrent. The evidence to date does not indicate that Soviet deployment programs are directed toward a rapid numerical buildup. We do not believe that the USSR aims at matching the US in numbers of intercontinental delivery vehicles. Recognition that the US would detect and match or overmatch such an effort, together with economic constraints, appears to have ruled out this option. (Paras. 2-4)

C. A stress on qualitative factors suggests that the Soviets see technological advance in weapons as a means by which they can improve their strategic position relative to the West. In the ICBM force, for example, major qualitative improvements currently being achieved include hardening and dispersal (which will sharply increase the number of aiming points), as well as better accuracy and larger payloads. (Paras. 4-5)

D. By the end of the decade, Soviet intercontinental attack capabilities will rest primarily upon an ICBM force of some hundreds of launchers, supplemented by a sizable missile-submarine fleet and a large but reduced bomber force. These forces will represent a marked improvement in Soviet retaliatory capability and a considerable strengthening of the Soviet deterrent. In the light of current and programmed US military capabilities, however, we do not believe that the Soviets will expect to achieve, within the period of this estimate, strategic attack capabilities which would make rational the deliberate initiation of general war. (Para. 5)

E. Major developments since mid-1963 include a proliferation of test facilities at Tyuratam, flight-testing of two third-generation ICBM systems (the SS-9 and SS-10), and the beginning of construction of hard, single-silo ICBM launchers, probably for one or both of the new systems. The deployment of second-generation ICBMs has probably ceased, and a pause between the second- and third-generation programs has slowed deployment. We believe that the Soviets now have about 200 operational ICBM launchers, and that the total number of operational launchers in mid-1965 will approximate the low side of the 250-350 range previously estimated. These figures do not include R&D launchers at Tyuratam./2/ (Paras 6-8, 10-18, 31)

F. Research and development on third-generation systems has been generally successful. The SS-9 system appears to be an outgrowth of the SS-7 with improved accuracy and a larger payload. We have little information on the characteristics of the SS-10. Both new systems could enter service in 1965. We believe that work is underway on still other ICBM systems, which we cannot as yet identify. We continue to believe that the Soviets are developing a very large ICBM, capable of delivering [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. We estimate that it could enter service in the period mid-1966 to mid-1967. In addition, the Soviets might be developing a new, small ICBM employing improved propellants. If they are, it could become operational as early as 1967. (Paras. 19-26)

G. The Soviets are now emphasizing deployment of single-silo hard launchers for ICBMs, and we expect this emphasis to continue. We expect third-generation deployment to include the expansion of both second-generation complexes and the initiation of additional new complexes. (Paras. 9, 27)

H. The growth of the Soviet ICBM force over the next several years will be influenced by a number of factors. In economic terms, the program must compete for funds with other military and space activities and with the civilian economy. In the technical field, we believe that research and development is proceeding on additional, follow-on ICBM systems, and we doubt that with these in the offing the USSR will fix upon any one or even two existing systems for urgent deployment on a large scale. We are also mindful that the interruptions that marked second-generation deployment programs may recur. In strategic terms, the Soviets evidently judge that an ICBM force in the hundreds of launchers, together with their other strategic forces, provides a deterrent. On the basis of the evidence now available to us, we do not believe that they are attempting to deploy a force capable of a first-strike which would reduce the effects of US retaliation to an acceptable level./3/ At the same time, we expect them to continue a vigorous R&D effort in the hope of achieving important technological advances, in both the offensive and defensive fields, which would alter the present strategic relationship in a major way. (Para. 30)

I. We estimate a Soviet ICBM force of 400-700 operational launchers for mid-1970; in our previous estimate, we projected this force level for mid-1969. By mid-1970, we believe that the force will include most or all of the launchers now deployed, some 125-200 single-silo SS-9/10 launchers, and 10-20 launchers for very large ICBMs. We believe that the attainment of as many as 700 operational launchers by mid-1970 would be likely only if the Soviets begin deploying a new, small ICBM at a rapid rate about 1967. The Soviet ICBM force which we estimate for mid-1970 will represent a substantial increase in numbers and deliverable megatonnage. Further, the trend to single silos will increase the number of aiming points represented by individual launch sites from about 100 at present to some 300-575 in mid-1970, the bulk of them hard. This will greatly improve the survivability, and hence the retaliatory capability, of the force./4/ (Paras. 32-37)

J. In the past few years the Soviets have improved the readiness and reaction time of their ICBM force. Our evidence now indicates that from the normal state of readiness, the soft sites which constitute the bulk of the present force would require 1-3 hours to fire. Hard sites would require about half an hour or less. A higher state of alert (i.e., 5-15 minutes to fire) can be maintained at most soft sites for a number of hours and at most hard sites for days. (Paras. 38-40)

K. There is ample evidence that the Soviets designed their soft ICBM systems to have a refire capability. We have re-examined the factors likely to affect refire time, and conclude that it would require little longer to fire the second missile than the first. Our present estimate of refire time is 2-4 hours, considerably less than previously estimated. We believe that, on the average, two or more missiles are provided per soft launcher for initial firing, refire, and maintenance spares. We believe that hard ICBM sites do not have a refire capability. (Paras. 41-43)

L. We have little evidence on the hardness of Soviet ICBM sites. Given the many uncertainties in this area, only a very tenuous estimate can be made, but our best judgment is that Soviet hard ICBM sites have a hardness in the 300-600 psi range. This implies a design overpressure in the 200-400 psi range, somewhat higher than previously estimated./5/ (Paras 49-50)

M. Qualitative improvements in the force can be expected as new ICBM systems enter service. Currently operational ICBMs have CEPs on the order of 1-2 n.m. The SS-9 will probably have an accuracy of 0.5-1.0 n.m. with radio assist, or 1.0-1.5 with all-inertial guidance. By mid-1970, the Soviets could achieve accuracies on the order of 0.5 n.m. or better. The SS-9 will probably carry a payload [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as compared with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for second-generation ICBMs. We do not believe that the Soviets have yet developed penetration aids or multiple warheads, but they may do so in the future, particularly if the US deploys antimissile defenses. (Paras. 44-48)

N. Deployment programs for the 1,020 n.m. MRBM and the 2,200 n.m. IRBM are now ending, and almost certainly will be completed by mid-1965. We estimate that at that time the MRBM/IRBM force will have a strength of about 760 operational launchers, 145 of them hard. The bulk of the force (about 90 percent) is deployed in western USSR, with the remainder in the southern and far eastern regions of the USSR. This force is capable of delivering a devastating first strike or a powerful retaliatory attack against targets in Eurasia, and can attack such areas as Greenland and Alaska as well. Some of the MRBM/IRBM launchers are probably intended to support ground operations. (Paras. 51-55)

O. We doubt that the Soviets will expand their MRBM/IRBM force during the period of this estimate. It is possible, however, that operational capabilities will be improved by the introduction of a new missile system, which probably would be deployed in single-silos. Such a system, employing unproved propellants, could become operational in the 1966-1968 period and would probably replace some of the soft launchers now operational. (Paras. 56-59)

P. The Soviets now have operational some 40-50 ballistic missile submarines, including 8-10 nuclear powered. Most of these submarines are equipped with 350 n.m. missiles and must surface to fire. One or two are equipped with a new 700 n.m. submerged-launch missile, and others will probably be retrofitted. The USSR also has operational about 30 cruise-missile submarines, including 11-14 nuclear powered. The majority are equipped with 300 n.m. missiles designed for low altitude attack, primarily against ships. The remainder carry a newer 450 n.m. version of this missile, which probably has an improved capability to attack land targets. Current Soviet missile submarines carry relatively few missiles: the ballistic missile classes, two or three, and the cruise missile types, up to eight. The entire present force has a total of 120-140 ballistic missile tubes and 135-150 cruise-missile launchers. (Paras. 60-71)

Q. We believe that the Soviets have under construction a submarine which we estimate to be the first of a new nuclear-powered, ballistic missile class. We estimate that it will employ the submerged launch 700 n.m. missile, and have a few more missile tubes than current classes. The first unit will probably become operational in 1965. Beyond this new class, we consider it unlikely that the Soviets will develop an entirely new follow-on ballistic missile submarine system within the period of this estimate, although they will probably continue to improve existing systems. We believe that they will also continue to construct cruise-missile submarines. By mid-1970 the Soviet missile submarine force will probably number 100-130 ships, about half of them cruise-missile submarines and about half ballistic. (Paras. 72-75)

R. In the past year, limited numbers of Soviet missile submarines have engaged in patrols in the open oceans. We expect a gradual expansion of this activity. By the end of the decade, Soviet missile submarines will probably be conducting regular patrols throughout the North Atlantic and Pacific, and possibly into the Mediterranean. (Para. 76)

S. We have no recent evidence of major changes in the capabilities and structure of Soviet Long-Range Aviation (LRA). The force now includes some 190-220 heavy bombers and tankers and 850-900 mediums. It is being improved primarily through the continued introduction of Blinder supersonic dash medium bombers and through modification of older bombers for air-to-surface missile delivery, for aerial refueling, and for reconnaissance. Use of both medium and heavy bombers of the LRA in support of marine operations has increased. (Paras. 80-86)

T. Considering noncombat attrition factors and the requirements for Arctic staging and aerial refueling, we estimate that the Soviets could put somewhat more than 100 heavy bombers over target areas in the US on two-way missions. Recent trends lead us to believe that medium bombers do not now figure prominently in Soviet plans for an initial bomber attack against North America. Nevertheless, should they elect to do so, we believe that at present the Soviets could put up to 150 Badgers over North American target areas on two-way missions. We have serious doubt about how effectively the Soviets could launch large-scale bomber operations against North America. We consider it probable that initial attacks would not be simultaneous, but would extend over a considerable number of hours./6/ (Paras. 91-97)

U. The Soviets will probably maintain sizable bomber forces, which will decrease gradually through attrition and retirement. Although continued Soviet work on advanced transports could be applied to military purposes, we think it unlikely that the Soviets will bring any follow-on heavy bomber into operational service during the period of this estimate. We believe that Blinder medium bombers, some equipped with advanced air-to-surface missiles, will be introduced during much of the period of this estimate. By mid-1970, Long-Range Aviation will probably include some 140-180 heavy bombers of present types and 300-500 mediums, mostly Blinders./7/ (Paras. 87-90)

V. Although the USSR almost certainly is investigating the feasibility of space systems for use as offensive and defensive weapons, we have no evidence that a program to establish an orbital bombardment capability is seriously contemplated by the Soviet leadership. We think that orbital weapons will not compare favorably with ICBMs over the next six years in terms of effectiveness, reaction time, targeting flexibility, vulnerability, average life, and positive control. In view of these considerations, the much greater cost of orbital weapon systems, and Soviet endorsement of the UN resolution against nuclear weapons in space, we believe that the Soviets are unlikely to develop and deploy an orbital weapon system within the period of this estimate. (Paras. 98-103)

[Here follow the Discussion section (Parts I-VII, pages 9-37) and Annexes A and B (pages 38-49 and following page 49).]

NIE 4-64

Washington, October 21, 1964.

LIKELIHOOD OF A PROLIFERATION OF BW AND CW CAPABILITIES

The Problem

To assess the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to achieve biological and lethal chemical warfare capabilities during the next three years or so.

Scope Note

This estimate excludes the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies, since these countries have been considered in NIE 11-10-63: "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Chemical Warfare," dated 27 December 1963, Secret;/2/ and NIE 11-6-64: "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Biological Warfare," dated 26 August 1964, Secret./3/ These estimates also contain general information on BW and CW agents, delivery systems, military doctrine, and defense measures.

Our consideration of BW agents includes all those suitable for use against personnel, livestock, crops, and materiel; consideration of CW agents excludes incapacitating and riot control agents, and smoke, flame, and defoliant chemicals.

This estimate does not concern itself with BW or CW as instruments for clandestine use in assassination, small-scale terrorism, and the like.

Summary and Conclusions

A. For any reasonably modernized state, and even for many of the less developed nations, there are few obstacles in the way of acquiring at least some BW and CW capability. The technology underlying BW and CW is widely known or easily obtainable through open sources; the physical facilities required to develop and produce agents are in great part quite easily adaptable from existing chemical and pharmaceutical facilities; the means of delivery comprise a wide range of conventional weapons and even non-military equipment; and, overall, the costs are relatively small, at least for an offensive capability appropriate to most states' conceivable needs. (Paras. 8-12)

B. Yet despite these considerations, there is not now a trend toward the proliferation of BW or CW capabilities in the world. Such proliferation could occur during the next few years, notably through a snowballing process of mounting fear and suspicion, and of action and reaction on the part of particular sets of adversaries among the middle and smaller powers, but proliferation cannot now be judged likely. (Paras. 17-24)

C. A number of factors work to restrain BW and CW proliferation. The very fact that many states could achieve a capability with relative ease gives these weapons the quality of a two-edge sword. Prudence would dictate that countries deciding to acquire an offensive or retaliatory capability should also undertake to develop a defensive capability, and the requirements of doing so would add to the price, almost prohibitively if adequate provision were made for civilian needs. Most military doctrine on CW, and even more so on BW, lays emphasis on the defensive aspects of the problem, which is some evidence of a reluctance to be the first user. And finally, there exists an almost universal popular moral and psychological abhorrence of these forms of munitions, which adds to official reluctance to contemplate their use. (Paras. 2-7, 17-24)

[3 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) and 4-line table not declassified] (Paras. 1, 16)

G. Almost any semi-industrialized country could easily acquire token native capabilities in either field (i.e., enough for one or two attacks on important targets). Any country could quietly acquire through commercial channels at least a token capability in the less toxic World War I-type CW agents. (Paras. 1, 16)

H. Present evidence does not warrant an estimate that any nation is now determined to achieve a meaningful operational capability in either BW or CW during the next few years. We believe that most states will remain reluctant to do so. Nonetheless, some may proceed toward this goal, as a deterrent or retaliatory measure in case a potential adversary develops a capability, as a supplement to nuclear weapons, or possibly as the best available substitute for them. [3 lines of source text not declassified] (Paras. 17-24)

[Here follow the Discussion section (pages 4-8); Part II. Capabilities (pages 8-9); Part III. Intentions (pages 9-11); and Appendix (page 13).]

NIE 4-2-64

Washington, October 21, 1964.

PROSPECTS FOR A PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
OVER THE NEXT DECADE

The Problem

To estimate the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to develop and produce nuclear weapons over the next decade and to estimate the consequences thereof.

Conclusions

A. France has already developed deliverable nuclear weapons. Communist China has conducted its first nuclear test./2/ The other nations which we now believe may develop nuclear weapons in the next decade are India, and perhaps Israel and Sweden. (Paras. 1, 19, 23, 26)

B. India's decision as to whether to start a nuclear weapons program will depend on its evaluation of a number of domestic and foreign factors including the scope and pace of the Chinese program, any changes in Sino-Soviet relations, and outside assurances. On balance, we believe the chances are better than even that India will decide to develop nuclear weapons within the next few years. India now has the basic facilities necessary for a modest weapons program, including a plutonium separation plant. India could produce by 1970 about a dozen weapons in the 20 KT range. Thereafter, when reactor capacity is expected to increase substantially, India's ability to produce fissionable material will increase proportionately. (Paras. 12-19)

C. [6 lines of source text not declassified] (Paras. 20-23)

D. Sweden will continue its peaceful nuclear program, but we believe the chances of its developing nuclear weapons during the next decade are less than even. (Paras. 24-26)

E. Soviet and US policies have had some effect in hindering the proliferation of nuclear weapons. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] (Para. 41)

F. In terms of broad international implications, the impact of the proliferation which is already occurring--in France and Communist China--will be far greater than the impact of the further proliferation by smaller powers which we can foresee. In military terms, basic power relationships between the USSR and the US are not likely to be changed significantly. But the French and Chinese nuclear programs will make relations within and between alliance systems increasingly difficult in years to come. Communist China's recent detonation of its first nuclear device will have an important impact throughout Asia, and in Southeast Asia will reinforce Chinese efforts to achieve Asian hegemony through political pressures and indirect support of local "wars of liberation." (Paras. 45-46)

G. The military impact of proliferation among the smaller powers would derive primarily from the possibility that more aggressive activities by these states could lead to confrontations involving the major powers. US and Soviet involvement in such crises could create the potential for escalation, but both countries would have incentives to urge prudence and caution on all parties. (Paras. 47-48)

H. The chances of unintentional or unauthorized explosion of nuclear weapons will rise as the number of countries possessing them increases. Although the odds are strongly against it, there is some possibility that the accidental firing of a nuclear warhead into the territory of one of the major powers could touch off an immediate nuclear exchange. An accidental nuclear explosion might, particularly if property and many lives were lost, restrain some countries not involved in the accident from undertaking a weapons program. In the country where the accident occurred, domestic opposition might become strong enough to cause abandonment of a weapons program already underway, as well as create intense pressure for the withdrawal of any nuclear weapons stationed in the area by allied nations. (Paras. 49-50)

[Here follows the Discussion section, which includes: I. General Considerations (pages 4-7); II. Survey of Individual Countries (pages 7-15); III. Policies of the Present Nuclear Powers Toward Proliferation (pages 15-16); and IV. Broad Implications of Nuclear Proliferation (pages 16-17).]

Washington, October 29, 1964.

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, November 12, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Extract--2 pages of source text not declassified.]

Washington, November 16, 1964.

Dear Bob:

A few weeks ago you asked me to examine and report to you personally on the history of Air Force dissents to national intelligence estimates./2/ The examination resulted in the attached report,/3/ which I submit to you in complete confidence. It indicates Air Force dissents have been numerous and, in recent years, far exceeded the dissents of the Army, the Navy or DIA.

The most disturbing issue, of course, has been the Soviet ICBM's. You will note in Tab B that the Air Force has consistently taken the position of crediting the Soviets with a greater current and prospective capability than the other members of the intelligence community. In retrospect the Air Force has been wrong though the estimates have taken a somewhat downward trend in recent years. It is interesting that in February, 1960 the Air Force estimated the Soviets would have 250 ICBM's in mid-61 and 800 in mid-63. This is far above what actually occurred. Incidentally, the community's estimates of 140 to 200 ICBM's in mid-61 and 350 to 450 in mid-63 proved to be high. Again in August of 1960, the Air Force estimate of 950 ICBM's in mid-64 and 1200 in mid-65 is obviously high. In our most recent exercise (October 8th, 1964), the Air Force was about 20% above the community with respect to the current situation but I note that as they look into future years they consistently project a greater capability than the accepted view of the balance of the community.

With respect to heavy bombers, there have been consistent differences. However I find that in July, 1962 the community, as indicated in Tab C, lowered the estimate on Soviet Bisons and Bears. The Air Force dissented and in this instance the Air Force appears to be correct, as the community estimate was somewhat low. I think the community and Air Force views in this area are now compatible.

Tab D sets forth an Air Force dissent on capabilities of the Soviet Theater Forces. They here took the position that Soviet doctrine maintains that nuclear weapons will play a dominant role in all phases of a general war and that the initial phase of such a war may be decisive. The Air Force dismisses the concept of a non-nuclear war of substantial proportions.

With respect to the main trends in Soviet capabilities and policies (Tab E), the community has concluded that the Soviet's objective is the attainment of a substantial deterrent and pre-emptive attack capabilities. The Air Force dissents from this view and takes the position that the Soviet rulers are endeavoring to attain at the earliest practical date a military superiority over the United States which would be decisive.

There are other dissents relating to the introduction of new bombers, the attitude toward nuclear propelled aircraft, which are of lesser importance than the four mentioned above.

I wish you to handle this communication on a very personal basis as the existence of the study would obviously create misunderstanding within the community which might better be avoided.

Sincerely,

John A. McCone/4/

Washington, November 20, 1964.

Dear Mr. Howard:

Your letter of September 18, 1964,/2/ requests the views of this Department on a proposed Department of Defense Dispersal Plan for nuclear weapons in the FY '65 stockpile.

There are certain underlying aspects of nuclear weapons planning which the Department of State considers it important to explore further with the Department of Defense, in order to establish a more adequate basis for our future appraisal of detailed dispersal plans such as this one. I have some suggestions to this end below. For the present, in view of the wide variety of pending action decisions which need to be made in connection with the FY '65 plan, the Department has no objection to its being forwarded to the President.

I wish to make clear, however, that the Department of State does not concur in the FY '65 planning figures shown for support of non-U.S. forces with nuclear weapons. We consider this to be a matter for subsequent and separate consideration, as indicated most recently in Secretary Rusk's letter of July 28, 1964, to Secretary McNamara./2/ It remains our view that additional major dispersals of nuclear weapons in support of non-U.S. forces should await joint State/Defense consideration of the concept of tactical nuclear warfare in Europe, although we continue of course to stand ready in exceptional circumstances to consider individual dispersal actions pursuant to the provisions of NSAM 197./3/

In this general connection, it is also the view of the Department of State that prior to final decision on the proposed FY 65 dispersals to U.S. forces in Europe, highest-level consideration and evaluation should be given to the following foreign policy aspects of the matter:

1. To the extent dispersal of additional weapons to U.S. forces causes our NATO allies to gain the impression that more nuclear weapons are essential for an effective defense by U.S. forces, we can reasonably expect pressures to mount for further dispersals to non-U.S. forces.

2. To the extent we increase the magnitude of the disparity between weapons held by U.S. forces and those held in support of non-U.S. forces, we lay a basis for possible serious discord in the Alliance.

It is requested that these foreign policy aspects of the proposed dispersals to U.S. forces in Europe be considered in the Department of Defense at appropriate level prior to transmittal of planning figures to the White House and that the transmitting memorandum to the President make note of the State view expressed in the preceding paragraph, as well as of the fact that this Department does not concur in the planning figures for dispersal to non-U.S. forces.

As to the further State-DOD exploration referred to above, it would be most useful if a number of inter-related subjects in this general area could be discussed by the special committee composed of Mr. McNaughton, General Goodpaster and myself./4/ I am therefore proposing that the following be considered at an early date by that group:

1. If we are to share in meaningful recommendations to the President on nuclear weapons questions of this sort, my present feeling is that some earlier State participation in the whole process is needed. Dealing with the final dispersal plan alone, as important as this is, is not wholly adequate, since it touches only one late-stage aspect--the parceling out of a total stockpile amount which necessarily had to be agreed at a considerably earlier date. One possibility I think should be considered would be for the Department to comment from a foreign policy point of view on proposed FY '66 and subsequent stockpile figures during the process of preparing a recommendation to the President.

2. As discussed above, the FY '65 plan envisages a large increase over presently-authorized levels for nuclear support of non-U.S. members of NATO. The Department of State has previously taken exception to planned increases of this magnitude, pending joint consideration of a concept for tactical nuclear warfare which would put the proposed weapons support and our various commitments into some more meaningful context than presently exists. A continued piecemeal approach to this matter, under NSAM 197, is not satisfactory, except as a temporary expedient, and we consider it increasingly important that we come to an agreed national policy on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as a basis on which to decide pending and future dispersal actions. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

I am of course aware that a number of studies have been and are now being conducted by various offices within the Department of Defense. Indeed we have had close and full association with many of these efforts, and this has been most helpful to us. What is still needed, however, is to press on until we have distilled a consensus within the Executive Branch on the vital policy issues underlying the potential employment of tactical nuclear weapons. Until that point is reached I do not believe we have adequate basis to make major decisions on further dispersal of such weapons in support of non-U.S. forces.

3. While our previous comments have been primarily directed toward the question of nuclear support of non-U.S. forces, this is clearly only a facet of the total problem, and we need therefore to address continuing study to the inter-relationship of U.S. and non-U.S. forces in NATO Europe as regards nuclear weapons. With respect to the ADM question mentioned above, for example, it would be helpful to know more about the concept and planned mode of operation which underlay the dispersal of ADMs to U.S. forces in Europe. This would undoubtedly have relevance to the problem of ADMs for non-U.S. forces, especially since it is our understanding that the ADMs for which dispersal to allied forces is planned are being held for the present by U.S. theatre forces. Circumstances and details undoubtedly differ with respect to other present and planned weapons systems, and my only point here is to emphasize that decisions on arming and equipping U.S. forces must be reckoned with in terms of the possible effect on non-U.S. forces. Thus, while we must of course continue to think in terms of the concern expressed in NSAM 305/5/ about growth of excessive stockpiles abroad in support of non-U.S. forces, it is unrealistic to think solely in those terms, since the problem of nuclear weapons for allied forces cannot be dealt with in isolation, and any continued buildup of nuclear support for U.S. forces obviously increases political and other pressures for similar treatment for allied forces. One great merit of the national policy on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe to which I refer above is that it would serve as a background against which to make decisions in this area as required, whether U.S. or non-U.S. forces are involved.

Sincerely,

Llewellyn Thompson

CM-267-64

Washington, November 23, 1964.

SUBJECT
Draft Memorandum for the President on Strategic Offensive Forces, Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces and Civil Defense by FY 1966-1970 (U)/2/

1. I have forwarded, by JCSM-973-64,/3/ the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject draft memorandum for the President. Except as noted below, I agree with the views expressed in JCSM-973-64.

2. In light of the offensive-defensive approach to the problem of determining the optimum balance of the major components of our general nuclear war posture, and the recent studies of this problem as a single package, I have reached certain new conclusions with respect to these forces and activities.

3. My personal views concerning these forces, including the six major issues in this area of the FY 1966-1970 program, are indicated below:

a. Development and Deployment of a New Manned Bomber

I believe that it would be prudent to maintain a force of manned strategic aircraft throughout the foreseeable future, and support the Air Force PCP's and the strategic aircraft program as expressed in JCSM-791-64 of 12 September 1964/4/ and JCSM-925-64 of 31 October 1964./5/ Should you nevertheless continue to feel that there should be a delay in the decision whether to proceed with the Project Definition Phase, I then recommend that you reconsider the two-year moratorium proposed in your memorandum. The advantages inherent in increased dispersal and in the speed of AMSA as compared to the B-52, and the smaller tanker requirement of AMSA in relation to a strategic version of the F-111, appear to me to weigh in favor of a new manned bomber, while recognizing the economies apparent in a B-52/SRAM combination. Considering the uncertainties regarding extension of the life of the B-52 until FY 1975 or beyond, and the estimated ten-year interval from go-ahead on PDP to attainment of a 200 AMSA force, it would appear desirable to go ahead in the near future with a decision to proceed with the Project Definition Phase in order to keep a timely option, and minimize the risk of a temporary degradation of our manned bomber capability. Pending such a decision, I recommend that advanced avionics and propulsion development be expedited, that the prerequisite phase proposed by the Air Force be completed as soon as practicable and that the decision with respect to initiating the formal Project Definition Phase be made at that time.

b. The Size of the Strategic Missile Force

As indicated in your memorandum for the President, even with a $30 billion balanced damage limiting program, U.S. fatalities associated with an early urban attack would be very heavy. I believe we should take every reasonable step to ensure that we maintain a substantially greater assured destruction capability than the Soviets. I am concerned by the effect upon our relative superiority if we reduce the previously approved Minuteman force from 1200 to 1000, with a substantial impact being felt in the early years, and also phase out many of our Atlas and Titan missiles. I concur with your recommendation to phase out Atlas and Titan-I by the end of this fiscal year provided we retain the previously approved Minuteman program, with as many as practicable of the added 200 being scheduled in the next two years. My views in this regard are influenced by the greater hardness of Minuteman as compared to all of these missiles, the reduced time required for launch of Minuteman, and doubt as to whether Atlas-F will be capable of demonstrating adequate reliability in the operational test program in a reasonable time prior to retirement. The $515 million saving as a result of the Atlas and Titan-I phase-out should provide an appreciable portion of the funds required for the additional 200 Minuteman missiles.

c. The Over-all Level of the Anti-Bomber Defense Program

Although a balanced defense requires a major reorientation of our effort, I believe we should avoid significant reduction of our present over-all capability against the Soviet manned bomber threat until that threat is appreciably reduced. A shift of funds and effort from less effective to improved systems is desirable, but should be accomplished without significant drop in total capability.

(1) I would be inclined to phase out the DEW Line Extension aircraft and radar picket ships in order to shift the funds into support of more advanced systems, recognizing the possibility that by outflanking our warning systems Soviet bombers could deliver many megatons more quickly following their missile attack. It would appear that this risk is limited by current utilization of USAF airborne radar resources to perform random patrols, and that increased utilization could reduce the risk further. The calculated risk involved emphasizes the need for expediting improved warning systems such as over-the-horizon radar and AWACS.

(2) With regard to the century series interceptors, in my opinion, a decrease should not be made prior to evidence that the anticipated 1967 reduction in the Soviet bomber is a fact, or sufficient numbers of either the F-12A or an interceptor version of the F-111 are available to cope with the threat. With respect to elimination of the F-89 aircraft now in the Air National Guard inventory, I believe that in view of their age and performance, the added risk involved could be taken if the resources thus gained were applied to more advanced systems.

d. The Production and Deployment of a New Manned Interceptor

In their action on JSOP-69 last March,/6/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended either the procurement of 18 IMI aircraft (CSAF) or the retention of the option to initiate the procurement of IMI by means of inclusion in the FY 1966 budget of the necessary funds for the first increment of procurement subject to a review of this position following completion of an integrated review of all components of air defense (CJCS, CSA, CNO and CMC). The CJCS Special Studies Group has completed the study of Alternate General Nuclear War Postures./7/ Although the question of whether the F-12A is preferable to an interceptor version of the F-111 has still not been resolved, I believe the Special Studies Group study justified the requirement for procurement of a new manned interceptor. Accordingly, I recommend that the FY 1966 budget include sufficient funds to permit the procurement of either 18 F-12A's or 18 F-111's, whichever are determined to be preferable in studies to be conducted between now and FY 1966.

e. The Production and Development of the Nike-X Anti-Missile System

Recent studies establish the need for balanced strategic offensive and defensive forces. At the present time, we have relatively strong strategic offensive forces and also weapon systems for defense against the Soviet manned bomber. However, until such time as we establish an anti-ballistic missile capability, we cannot attain any semblance of a balance in our offensive and defensive forces. The existing lack of ABM defense warrants the inclusion of approximately $200 million for preproduction funding in the FY 1966 budget, in order to begin to attain this capability at the earliest practicable time. In my judgment, this production decision should not be delayed for a year because of the existence of uncertainties concerning the preferred concept of its deployment, the relationship of Nike X to other elements of a balanced damage-limiting effort, the prospects for the fallout shelter system, or uncertainties concerning possible Soviet reaction to our improving our defensive posture.

f. The Construction of Fallout Shelters for the Entire Population

As indicated in the draft memorandum for the President, an effective nation-wide fallout shelter program would provide a high return for the money expended. This program offers defense against either bomber or missile attack and could reduce rural fatalities by over fifty per cent. In view of this relatively economical means of saving approximately twenty-two per cent of the total population, I do not believe we should restrict the FY 1966 funding for this program to the limited amount recommended in the draft memorandum. In my opinion, the Defense Department, with Executive Branch support, should lead the major effort to convince the Congress of the need for this program. I urge that the FY 1966 budget contain provision for the required development and for the maximum practicable support of construction necessary to provide fallout shelters for the entire population.

5./8/ In summary, I concur generally with the views expressed by my predecessor with respect to continental air and missile defense forces in JSOP-69, and I am convinced that some increases in the force levels now programmed or recommended are well justified for our national security.

Earle G. Wheeler

Washington, November 23, 1964.

Dear General Wheeler:

I appreciate your sending me a copy of the 1964 Report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council./2/

There are some findings of the report on which I should like to comment. First, I agree completely that political and psychological factors will be important, and in some situations may be determining, in the decisions to release nuclear weapons. It is for this reason that I have always felt that we need not only a wide range of options, but also effective means for exercising initial and continuing control by the President, over the use of all types of nuclear weapons. I believe it would be helpful, if it has not already been done, to brief the President on what can and cannot be accomplished with existing systems and procedures in exercising selective control over the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. We should then seek means of remedying deficiencies in pres-ent control systems.

Second, I was impressed by the description of the restrictions of SACEUR's flexibility in the use of NATO forces in limited aggression situations. I concur in the judgment that "situations may arise in which the risk inherent in degrading NATO's general war posture in Europe is more than offset by the advantages of bringing decisive conventional forces to bear in a limited conflict." While we must exercise considerable care to avoid the impression among our allies that we are prepared to contemplate a World War II conventional hostility limited to Europe, or that we would not carry out our nuclear commitments, it is important that we place our emphasis on the more likely sort of contingencies, with the expectation that in time our allies will agree with the wisdom of such action. This suggests that SACEUR should prepare, by the way of planning or training, more than he has in the past for contingencies in which some degrading of his general war posture is permitted by higher authority in order to cope with a limited conflict. In particular, I would hope additional effort would be directed at the problem of unpremeditated conflict arising from the present unsettled situation in Central Europe. I understand that this, and other ideas to improve SACEUR's capabilities for situations less than general war are under continuing discussions among Ambassador Thompson, Mr. McNaughton and General Goodpaster. I hope that we will be able to reach a considered judgment about this matter at an early date.

Third, I fully endorse the position that there should be continuing inter-agency work on improving our crisis management capability, to include a timely development of contingency plans identifying the politico-military courses of action in anticipation of a crisis. Pursuant to an exchange of correspondence between the Secretary of Defense and me, we have established a small senior level coordinating committee precisely to fill this need. (A copy of that correspondence is attached for your information.)/3/

Fourth, I am entirely in accord with the suggestion that there should be close State-Defense collaboration in developing the portions of the JSCP and JSOP having to do with national and military objectives and strategic concepts. I suggest that our staffs discuss soon how this might most effectively be done. In this connection, I assure you that we will make every effort to avoid creating delays in the JSCP and JSOP timetables as a result of Department of State participation.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk/4/

Washington, November 28, 1964.

Dear Bob:

This is in response to your memorandum of November twentieth to Ambassador Thompson/2/ which attached a series of draft Memoranda for the President covering various aspects of the Department of Defense Five Year Force Structure and Fiscal Planning (1966-70)./3/

May I take this occasion, as I have in the past, to state my profound admiration for the outstanding success you have had in bringing conceptual clarity to the presentation of DOD military programs and budgets. I have found once again this year in reviewing the draft Memoranda to the President a highly impressive exposition of US military programs and objectives. However, partly as a result of the complexity and volume of the material, and partly as a result of my involvement in other pressing matters, I will limit my substantive comments at this time to two particular draft memoranda leaving open the possibility of forwarding additional comments on subsequent memoranda at a later date.

With regard to the role of tactical nuclear forces in NATO strategy, I feel that your memorandum blocks out for the first time the beginning of a rational conceptualization of the role of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. I do, however, have the following observations to make:

a. It seems to me of vital importance that we turn our attention to the consideration of the utility and limitation of the potential utilization of tactical nuclear weaponry in other areas of the globe. I particularly have in mind the Far East where we maintain the second largest overseas nuclear arsenal and where, insofar as Southeast Asia is concerned the prospect for a major US military involvement cannot be overlooked. While I appreciate the fact that various studies have been conducted from time to time on the role of nuclear weapons in the Far East and Southeast Asia, I would like to suggest that an analytical technique similar to that contained in your October twenty-sixth draft Memorandum to the President which deals exclusively with Europe,/4/ be applied to the Far East. If you believe it feasible, such an effort might be included within the studies to be conducted by the Special Studies Group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as proposed in your draft Memorandum to the President. However, whether this or some alternative solution is favored by you, I would be prepared to make available Department of State personnel to participate in such a study which I believe should be conducted on a relatively urgent basis.

b. With regard to the European portion of the problem, which is so extensively treated in your draft memorandum, I believe that you and I are in essential agreement on the limitations which attach to existing strategic posture as well as to the political implications which would be involved in any major and precipitant change. I think the central political feature is the one which you identify in your paper, namely that our allies' declaratory policy is for a variety of reasons closely wedded to reliance on nuclear deterrence. How much confidence one may have in the assumption that our allies' declaratory policy would be effectively implemented once war was initiated is, as you so correctly point out, open to serious question. What is not open to serious question, however, is that our allies strongly adhere to this position and any attempt to move them gradually toward increased reliance on a major conventional defense, which you suggest, will require a combination of persistence and patience which will call for our best efforts. I, therefore, endorse your proposal for a joint State-Defense developed program to prescribe manner, pacing and tactics; I believe this can be accomplished as a logical extension of the work of the Thompson Strategy Group./5/

With regard to your memorandum on Strategic Forces, I should like to make the following observations:

a. Your analysis of the effect of US strategic missile capability above that required for "assured destruction" concludes that a 200 missile reduction in the Minuteman program is acceptable. (We assume that target procurement figures cast two or three years ahead are provisional and subject to review in the light of what the Soviet Union is doing.) What is not entirely clear from your memorandum is the effect which such a reduction would have upon damage limitation in Western Europe. I can readily imagine that the result would be negligible; nevertheless, having repeatedly assured the Europeans that US forces cover targets threatening Western Europe with approximately the same priority as those which threaten the US, we have assumed the obligation to demonstrate that we have in fact considered their interests. Especially in view of the fact that this proposal is likely to receive considerable publicity, during Congressional testimony if not before, I would like to be assured that in fact your analysis does demonstrate that the 200 missiles involved in the reduction, if procured and targetted against threats to Western Europe, would make no appreciable difference in a damage limiting sense. If this cannot be demonstrated, I believe you and I should consider the matter further. However, even if it can be demonstrated, I think it is of vital importance that the case be developed in whatever detail required in anticipation of our having to make the case to our allies on the assumption that they will learn of the proposed reduction. I would appreciate receiving your views on this matter at your earliest convenience.

b. I was not able to determine whether your projected 200 missile Minuteman reduction was based on a force availability which assumed existence of the MLF or made the contrary assumption. (The two charts in your memorandum appear contradictory on this point.) This is a factual question we should try to clear up before the proposed Minuteman reduction becomes public since it has obvious implications both in terms of Congressional presentation and foreign consideration of the MLF proposal.

c. With regard to the SRAM missile, it strikes me that it is important, particularly at this stage of our negotiations with our European allies on alliance nuclear arrangements, to avoid giving an erroneous impression that the US is re-launching itself upon the development of a Skybolt-type of missile. While I do not anticipate that there should be problems, given the clear technical differences between the SRAM and the Skybolt, nevertheless this distinction might initially be overlooked. It seems to me prompt joint State-Defense preparation is called for: (i) to develop a public presentation program designed to minimize misunderstanding on the part of our allies as to the relationship (or lack thereof) between the SRAM and Skybolt and (ii) to develop a US position in anticipation of the fact that the British and/or the French may express an interest in securing the new missile once its projected availability becomes known.

d. Perhaps the most complicated issue in your Strategic Forces Memorandum deals with the question of anti-ballistic missile programs. Indeed, I take it, it is in deference to these complexities that you have decided to postpone for another year the decision on deployment of this system. I have expressed to you in past years my very considerable interest in the question of an anti-ballistic missile weapons system. I will not repeat my arguments, but I will say that I continue to feel that the possibility of developing a technologically feasible, as well as reasonably economic defense against ballistic missiles is a matter of immense political import. It has implications which extend to the nature of our alliance system as well as to future relations with the Soviet Union and secondary nuclear powers. In view of the fact that if your recommendation is accepted we will have delayed for one year the basic decision on deployment of an ABM system, I think it vitally important that State and Defense enter into an urgent joint study of the various political implications associated with a decision to deploy an ABM system. If you would designate a point of contact with whom we might deal on this matter, we will take the initiative in seeing that the issues which concern us are identified in such a way as to permit them to be given appropriate consideration as an integral part of the development of next year's Five Year Force Structure memorandum on this subject.

e. Finally, there are several specific and for the most part probably minor issues which relate to the Strategic Forces Memorandum which we would like to pursue at an early date. For example, reference is made to the prospective requirement for additional facilities in Turkey and Iran. This is a matter we would like to pursue with your staff to gain a fuller understanding of what you have in mind. Also, as a strictly non-substantive problem, I would like to propose that the title of your Strategic Forces Memorandum be changed from "Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces" to "Strategic Retaliatory and Defensive Forces." This is simply reverting to the terminology of previous years. However, I feel that from a political point of view your earlier terminology had some distinct advantages in avoiding a connotation which could have unfavorable political implications. On these and other similarly minor specific points, I will have my staff contact your Comptroller staff with whom they have been working over the past year.

I might say in this latter regard, that I am deeply appreciative of the very excellent cooperation which your entire Comptroller staff, and in particular Dr. Enthoven, has accorded us. As a result of your staff's effort, I believe our understanding and appreciation of the problems identified in your Five Year Force Structure Memoranda has been immeasurably enhanced.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dean

Washington, December 8, 1964.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In my memorandum of September 16, 1964, referring to the OEP report of August 31, 1964, to the President on "Civil Emergency Preparedness",/2/ I indicated our intention to work closely with you on specific programs. One of these programs, included in the five-year projection, to which the President has given approval, is directed at correction of deficiencies in arrangements for headquarters emergency operating facilities.

This program has been developed, conceptually, in accordance with criteria provided by the Emergency Planning Committee (EPC) in its initial report which was approved by the President. The Committee concluded that maximum delegations should be made, preemergency, to officials outside of Washington and that protected emergency sites be provided within 15 to 35 miles from the White House. These sites are to be used day-to-day by organizational units related to emergency activities, including at least one individual who could act for the department or agency in an emergency.

The Department of State has been selected for inclusion in the first year's increment of the program. This determination is based on the importance of the mission of the Department and the fact that the Department does not have an emergency facility of its own. It is contemplated that the State Department site will also accommodate small emergency units of AID and the Export-Import Bank.

The use of the Special Facility/3/ by State is not in accord with the established policy governing the use of this already overcrowded facility, and would in an emergency, I am sure, be less satisfactory from an operating point of view.

Our staffs have had preliminary discussion on this proposal. We realize that accomplishment of our objectives may present problems and further staff attention is necessary with respect to such things as the size and use of facilities, location, and funding. I would appreciate receiving as soon as possible your favorable reaction to this proposal and designation of the appropriate staff of your Department with whom my representatives may work.

Sincerely,

Edward A. McDermott

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Defense Department Budget for FY 1966

With but minor exceptions, I have now completed my review of the Department of Defense military program and financial budget for FY 1966. The program, which I recommend for your approval, will require new obligational authority and expenditures for Military Functions, Military Assistance and Civil Defense as shown below (in billions):

	FY '64	FY '65	FY '66
NOA	$51.0	49.7/a/	49.0
Expenditures	51.2	49.8/b/	49.8

The military forces supported by this budget are summarized in the attached tables at Tab A./2/ The recommended force structure was based on requirements for national security and was not limited by arbitrary or predetermined budget ceilings. In my review of the budgets proposed by the Services, I have attempted, as last year, to eliminate all non-essential, marginal, and postponable expenditures, with the objective of minimizing the costs of supporting the required forces.

In developing the program and reviewing the budget proposals, I have had the continuing counsel and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although the force structure does not include all the forces or force modernizations recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or individual members thereof, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that the program supported by this budget will increase our over-all combat effectiveness and will provide effective forces in a high state of readiness for defense of the vital interests of the United States. Tab B lists specific comments of the Chiefs on my proposals./3/

The recommended program has been reviewed with the Secretary of State, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the President's Science Advisor. They are in agreement with my recommendations except with respect to the following programs:/4/

1. Minuteman II Retrofit. I favor delaying by six months the previous schedule for retrofitting Minuteman II missiles into Minuteman I silos, to insure adequate time for the development of a highly reliable missile system. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget agrees that funds should be appropriated on this basis, on the understanding that further delay may be necessary and funds will be released only to support a retrofit schedule which is optimized from the point of view of missile reliability and cost.

2. CX-(HLS) Transport Aircraft. Your Science Advisor is not convinced that the development of this new, large transport aircraft is required. He believes that the same over-all lift capability can be provided at lower cost with less airlift, if more roll-on roll-off ships are constructed and used as forward floating depots. I agree that we should make greater use of the new roll-on roll-off ships and have included four in the FY 1966 budget, but I am convinced that additional airlift is also needed and that it can be supplied most economically by developing the CX-(HLS). I recommend that we include funds for the development in the FY 1966 budget, but initiate, jointly with the Science Advisor, a study to determine by April 1, 1965 the best mix of airlift and sealift in the forces. Dr. Hornig concurs in this approach.

3. The Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL). The Science Advisor and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget have doubts concerning the requirements for the MOL. I recommend, and both Dr. Hornig and Mr. Gordon agree, that funds for the project be included in the FY 1966 budget, but that they not be released until we are agreed that the program of military, engineering, and scientific experiments and steps toward operational capability is worth the cost and does not duplicate approved programs in any other agency. I am convinced that at least a major portion of the funds will be required to support a program of experiments involving heavy military reconnaissance payloads, manned or unmanned.

4. TFX Production. The Science Advisor has suggested stretching out the TFX production schedule to permit more of the Air Force planes to be equipped with the superior Mk II avionics. I disagree with this suggestion. The TFX with Mk I avionics is a far greater advance over the F-100's and F-105's, which would have to be retained longer in the force if the TFX schedule were stretched, than the TFX with Mk II avionics is over the TFX with Mk I avionics.

The budget at present contains no provision for an increase in military pay in FY 1966. The increase called for by the comparability formula which I presented to the Congress in my posture statement last year would be about $250 million.

We are still working on a number of minor budget issues. I do not anticipate that decisions on these matters will materially affect the budget totals.

I will be ready for a meeting with you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 21, 22, or 23 to discuss our final proposals.

Robert S. McNamara

Washington, December 10, 1964.

SUBJECT
Papers on the FY '66 DOD Budget

1. Secretary McNamara has submitted the attached memorandum (Tab 1)/2/ on the FY '66 DOD budget for consideration at the meeting with you tomorrow at 12:45 p.m. This is the only vital paper for tomorrow, and the most important stuff is in the first 2 pages. The views of the Chiefs on all aspects of the budget are summarized in Tab B to this memo,/3/ and Bob hopes you will read them.

2. The Defense budget is in extremely good shape and there are really no major items seriously at issue. The four items in the memorandum are by their nature difficult problems that by common agreement are being called to your attention. I understand, however, that Mr. Gordon and Dr. Hornig are in general satisfied with the solutions suggested in the memorandum and there should not be a very extended discussion on these items.

3. There are a number of major actions involved in the current budget that are not reflected in the attached memorandum since they are not in dispute. These issues include the following: the reduction in the Minuteman force, the decision not to go ahead with an advanced manned bomber, the decision not to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system, the decision not to proceed with an advanced manned interceptor, the decision to eliminate the "shelter incentive" plan from the civil defense program, the decision to eliminate the MMRBM, and the decision to go ahead with a deep underground command and control center for the Pentagon and the White House. I am attaching for your information at Tab 2 a background paper on recommended strategic offensive and defensive forces that covers these and other issues./4/ This is not essential reading for tomorrow, but it is a most important basic paper on our overall strategic posture, and I think you will want to read it when you have time.

4. I am also attaching at Tab 3 a very interesting draft memorandum on the role of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO strategy that was prepared as background for the FY '66 budget submissions./5/ Although this paper is preliminary in nature, it has been recognized by the State Department and the BOB as an important policy statement that will affect future budget decisions; it may be referred to in tomorrow's discussion (see page 2 for the Summary of McNamara's preliminary conclusions).

5. Finally, I attach at Tab 4 a copy of a memorandum on nuclear materials production schedules through FY 73./6/ In view of the conflict between declining DOD weapons requirements and AEC production aspirations, this subject will present problems in the AEC budget this year and may also be discussed at tomorrow's meeting.

McG. B.
SMK/7/

Washington, undated.

SUMMARY OF FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES

[table (11 columns and 6 rows of source text) not declassified]

1. Since 1961 we have increased the number of weapons on alert threefold and alert megatonnage more than threefold. We have now reached a plateau both in weapons and megatons, with future planned reductions in bombers offset by increases in missiles. Our remaining bomber/tanker forces in FY 1970, armed with over [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] can send [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

2. The only major disagreements the Chiefs have with this program are: (a) that they prefer an ultimate force of 1200 Minuteman missiles instead of the 1000 we have recommended--if next year it seems desirable to increase the number of Minuteman missiles from 1000 to 1200, we have the option to do so; and (b) the Chiefs also recommend a faster rate of development of a potential follow-on bomber.

1. No major changes are planned in these forces. There will be some phase down of older interceptors and redundant radars. We are not approving the procurement of a new manned interceptor (YF 12-A) or the Nike X anti-missile missile, but we are planning to spend $400 million in FY 1966 to continue the development of the Nike X and retain the option to decide to deploy either the Nike X or the YF 12-A in subsequent years.

2. The Chiefs prefer to include pre-production funds for the YF 12-A and the Nike X, which would make possible their deployment nine months to a year earlier.

	FY 61	FY 62	FY 63	FY 64	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	FY 69	FY 70
Combat Ready:
Army Divs.	11	14	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
Marine Divs.	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Marine Air Wings	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
A.F. Tactical Fighter Wings	16	23	20	21	22	23	23	24	24	24

1. A substantial part of our increase in defense expenditures over the past four years has gone into the increase in the number and strength of Army combat ready divisions and Air Force tactical fighter wings. The latter are now being equipped with F-4s and in FY 1966 we will make our first large procurement of the F-111 (TFX).

	FY 61	FY 62	FY 63	FY 64	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	FY 69	FY 70
Attack Carriers	15	16	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	14
Antisubmarine Warfare Carriers	9	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
Nuclear Attack Submarines	13	16	16	19	23	31	41	47	52	56

We are planning to reduce the number of carriers from 15 to 14 in FY 1970 and to 13 in FY 1972. This reduction is already being reflected in our procurement of carrier aircraft. While we are not increasing the number of antisubmarine carriers (ASW) we are making great qualitative improvements in all our ASW capabilities and are adding to the force nuclear attack submarines whose primary mission is ASW.

2. The JCS, except for the Chief of Staff, Army, approve the programmed number of Army divisions. Except for the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, they approve the reduction in the number of the tactical carriers. They approve the tactical air force program except that the Chief of Staff, Army and the Chief of Naval Operations believe that 21 wings would be adequate as contrasted with the 24 we are programming. They recommend building six nuclear attack submarines in FY 1966 instead of the four, and sixteen destroyer escorts instead of the ten we recommend; three of the Chiefs also recommend construction of a nuclear powered guided missile frigate in FY 1966.

	FY 61	FY 62	FY 63	FY 64	FY 65	FY 66	FY 67	FY 68	FY 69	FY 70
30-day airlift to:
SE Asia (thousands of tons)	14.7	20.0	23.6	25.4	29.0	36.1	48.5	54.8	67.0	78.9
Europe (thousands of tons)	32.0	42.4	50.3	54.4	61.1	73.6	96.6	108.1	128.8	150.1

1. We have greatly increased the totally inadequate strategic airlift which we possessed in 1961. We are beginning to receive deliveries of operational C-141s, the new jet transport plane. We now propose to initiate development of a new, much larger, and more economical transport jet plane known as the CX(HLS). If we procure only the three squadrons of CX(HLS) now programmed, we will increase our 30-day airlift to Southeast Asia from 15,000 tons in FY 1961 to 79,000 tons in FY 1970 and to 89,000 tons in FY 1971.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with these recommendations. We plan to further increase the strategic mobility of our forces by starting construction in FY 1966 of four fast forward deployment ships.

Washington, December 15, 1964.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Central Intelligence Agency, Vol. 11, Box 9. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

NIE 11-3-64

Washington, December 16, 1964.

SOVIET AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH MID-1970

The Problem

To evaluate the capabilities of the Soviet air and missile defense forces, and to forecast probable trends in Soviet air and missile defense programs through mid-1970.

Conclusions

A. The combination of area and point defenses provided by the USSR's present force of interceptors and short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems affords a good defense for major target areas against medium and high altitude bomber attacks. However, the air defense system has limited low altitude capabilities, and special difficulties are posed by supersonic aircraft and air-to-surface missiles (ASMs). We believe that a major Soviet effort during the remainder of this decade will be focused on meeting these particular problems. (Para. 55)

B. We believe that improvements in the Soviet air defense system over the next few years will make progressively more difficult successful penetration by manned bombers to major target areas. Successful penetration by manned bombers will require increasingly sophisticated forms of attack. Soviet air defense capabilities can be degraded by the increasingly complex forms of attack which the West will be able to employ, including air-launched missiles, penetration tactics, electronic countermeasures, and low-altitude attack. Despite these limitations of their air defense system, the Soviets would expect to destroy a number of the attackers. We doubt, however, that they would be confident that they could reduce the weight of attack to a point where the resulting damage to the USSR would be acceptable. (Para. 57)

C. There are critical uncertainties in our knowledge of Soviet R&D and deployment in the antiballistic missile (ABM) field. From the evidence now available, however, certain general conclusions can be drawn: first, the Soviet R&D effort has been extensive and of long duration, and the USSR several years ago probably solved the technical problem of intercepting ballistic targets arriving singly or in small numbers; second, some initial ABM deployment activity was probably begun as long ago as 1960, but both the deployment and R&D programs were evidently interrupted and modified; third, the magnitude of R&D and the probable early deployment activity point to a strong Soviet desire to obtain ABM defenses rapidly; fourth, R&D continues, a new antimissile missile (AMM) has appeared, and some additional deployment activity may now be underway, but the USSR does not have any operational defenses against strategic ballistic missiles today. (Para. 58)

D. Much of our evidence indicates that the USSR has been exploring methods of ABM defense which differ in important respects from those now favored by the US. Low frequency radars may play an important role in the Soviet program. An early Soviet effort may have involved a missile designed to have dual capabilities against ballistic and aerodynamic vehicles. The new AMM which was recently displayed by the Soviets is probably designed to conduct exoatmospheric intercepts at considerable ranges, using a large nuclear warhead to achieve its kill. We believe, however, that the Soviets have probably not conducted many AMM firings to exoatmospheric altitudes, and that they have probably not attempted full system tests involving interceptions at these altitudes. (Paras. 37-42, 59)

E. The Soviets began construction of three defensive complexes at Leningrad in 1960-1961. We believe that the Leningrad system was originally designed to have a capability against ballistic missiles, and perhaps against aerodynamic vehicles as well. However, we believe that the initial design has been changed. We cannot determine the nature of this change, or whether it was caused by serious technical difficulties, a realization that the system was vulnerable to penetration aids, or important new developments in the state-of-the art. There are similarities between new construction at one of the Leningrad complexes and two recently discovered defensive complexes under construction in northwestern USSR. In light of these similarities, at least these three complexes may now be intended for the deployment of the same defensive system. (Paras. 46-47)

F. We are unable to associate the new complexes with any systems equipment, and any explanation for the mission of these complexes and the modified Leningrad complex is open to some doubt. There is some support for the belief that the complexes are for a SAM system to defend against aerodynamic vehicles. On the other hand, we have noted intensive Soviet research on missile defenses for several years and indications that the USSR has been working toward new and different ABM capabilities. In light of this factor and other considerations, we think there are also persuasive reasons for believing that the new complexes are related to missile defense. However, any judgment at this time on their mission is in our view premature. (Paras. 47, 50)

G. We have observed at Moscow three developments which may indicate ABM deployment there. A large radar now under construction could be the acquisition and early target tracking element of an ABM system. Other facilities also under construction could serve as the final target tracking and missile guidance element. SA-1 sites which are now being modified could be used as the AMM launch positions for the systems. However, the activities we have observed thus far may not be related, and some of them may represent improvements in Moscow's defense against aerodynamic vehicles or serve a space function. The missile to be employed is a major unknown; the recently displayed AMM could be used at Moscow to conduct exoatmospheric intercepts of ballistic missiles, perhaps at distances of several hundreds of miles from the city. In sum, we continue to believe that the Soviets may be deploying ABM defenses at Moscow, but we do not yet understand how the installations we have observed would function as an ABM system. (Paras. 41, 51-54)

H. If ABM deployment activity is now underway at either Moscow or the other locations we have noted, the USSR is likely to have some initial strategic ABM defenses operational within the next two years or so. Limited deployment, especially at Moscow, could be a special, highest-priority effort to defend the Soviet capital with an early and still unproved system. But widespread ABM deployment activity, whenever it occurred, would imply that the Soviets consider their ABM systems good enough to justify extraordinarily large new expenditures. It would indicate that the Soviets had achieved excellent R&D successes, and perhaps, that they had taken high-risk production and deployment decisions. We cannot exclude this possibility, but our evidence suggests that the Soviets have been proceeding cautiously since they modified their program. (Paras. 60-61)

I. In considering whether to provide ABM defenses for many of their urban-industrial centers and other targets, the Soviet leaders will have to weigh the great cost of such an effort against the likely effectiveness of the ABM systems available. Area defenses might offer considerable savings over point defenses, but we cannot be sure of this and in any event a major commitment of resources would be required. The Soviets may defer widespread deployment pending further R&D work on existing systems, or in the hope of achieving better systems at a later date. They might even decide that the cost of large-scale ABM deployment would not be commensurate with the protection it could offer against anticipated Western strike capabilities. We are certain that the Soviets will push ahead with their R&D effort, but we cannot forecast whether or when they will achieve ABM systems with capabilities and costs justifying widespread deployment. (Para. 62)

J. We believe that the Soviets are now constructing a series of large, new radars, most of which will probably be completed in 1966. We believe that some or all of these radars will be linked together as a space surveillance system. Such a system will, we think, have a capability considerably in excess of that required merely to detect the passage of US space vehicles. In our view, the chances are better than even that the Soviets intend to provide themselves, not only with a space surveillance system, but with an antisatellite capability as well./2/ If existing types of missiles were used in an antisatellite system, a nuclear warhead would probably be required, but a missile for non-nuclear kill could be developed in about two years after flight tests began. (Paras. 63-66)

[Here follow the Discussion section (Parts I-IX, pages 5-24) and Annexes A and B (pages 25-27 and following page 27).]

Washington, December 17, 1964.

Dear Mr. McDermott:

In the absence of the Secretary and Ambassador Thompson, I am responding to your letter of December 8, 1964,/2/ concerning emergency operating facilities for the Department of State.

We are aware of the fact that our use of the Special Facility as an operational relocation site is contrary to the intended purpose of that installation. Consequently, we welcome your decision to include this Department's requirements in the initial phase of the recently approved five-year plan for providing protected emergency sites around the perimeter of the National Capital area. Pending the completion and occupancy of an alternative facility, we assume, of course, that there will be no change in current arrangements with respect to the availability of the Special Facility for our emergency operations.

Since this project will require major contributions from our management and budget staffs, we believe that our Bureau of Administration should participate actively in both its preliminary planning and developmental stages. Accordingly, Mr. Richard R. Brown, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Administration, as well as Joseph F. Vaughn of my staff, will be available for necessary consultation with your representatives.

We are most appreciative of the consideration which your Office and its predecessors have given to the emergency operational requirements of the Department of State.

Sincerely,

Jeffrey C. Kitchen/3/

LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 22, 1964.

SUBJECT
Conference between the President, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the LBJ Ranch, Texas, on Tuesday, 22 December 1964, at 1020 CST

The following were present at the conference:

President Johnson
Secretary of Defense McNamara
Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance
General Wheeler
General LeMay
Admiral McDonald
General Johnson
General Greene
Major General Clifton (intermittently)
Colonel Forbes, JCS recorder

The main subject of this meeting was the Defense Department budget.

Mr. McNamara opened the meeting with a statement that the major issues have been considered and that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are agreed on about 95% of the items. Each Chief was then invited to discuss points he would like to bring up./2/

General Wheeler listed three points which he considered a "package"--the Strategic Missile Force, the Fallout Shelter Program, and the Antiballistic Missile Program. He stated that he was concerned about the reduction from 1200 to 1000 Minutemen in this budget, especially since it is coming at the time we are phasing out/3/ Atlas and Titan missiles.

There was an interruption and discussion of a telephone call to Secretary McNamara concerning Viet Nam.

Mr. McNamara gave a rather lengthy explanation of why he felt we could delay the decision on the 200 extra Minutemen missiles.

General Wheeler then spoke of the national fallout shelter program and his feeling that it should be speeded up if we are going to make our whole strategic force compatible with the protection of our own people. Secretary McNamara generally agreed with his point but stated that he felt that pushing ahead on civil defense while not pushing ahead with the antiballistic missile might not be of any great value. General Wheeler then pressed on with further support for the antiballistic missile and a proposal for $200 million for preproduction funding. Mr. McNamara made other statements which confirmed his view that the fallout shelter program and the antiballistic defense program should go together and that we are not ready at the moment to go ahead with either of these programs any more strongly than we are.

During the time that the President left the meeting, General Johnson and Secretary McNamara discussed post-D-Day aid to allies and the military assistance program as well as the military sales program. General Greene discussed Marine Corps Organized Reserves with Mr. McNamara.

At 1058 President Johnson rejoined the conference and General Wheeler continued his discussion. He made a strong plea for raising military pay this year. There was a lengthy discussion between President Johnson and other Chiefs on the pay situation. All of the Chiefs joined in on this subject and Secretary McNamara told the President that he would sit down with the Chiefs and examine the matter so all of them are talking on the same basis. There was a further discussion between General Wheeler and President Johnson on Congressman Rivers presenting a pay bill that they would have to testify about. In concluding this matter, President Johnson said that he would very carefully consider any recommendations from the Secretary of Defense and would discuss them with the Director of the Budget.

General LeMay then added a few words on the pay situation and reiterated the fact that there should be funds for the Project Definition Phase of the manned bomber and an improved interceptor for the Air Defense Command. He feels that the time lag is too long. Secretary McNamara stated that it was the Chiefs' view that it is too early to say that we don't need a new bomber and it is too early to say that we do need one. The Chiefs say that we should work on advanced engines, avionics, and Project Definition Phase. Secretary McNamara stated that his proposal would only delay this decision by five months.

Admiral McDonald then spoke about ship force levels, stating that antisubmarine warfare ships were short in the building program. The second point was gunfire support in connection with amphibious landing capabilities, and Secretary McNamara then agreed to put two additional rocket ships into the shipbuilding program.

Admiral McDonald then led a discussion on the replacement of major escort ships. General Greene then discussed the Marine Corps Organized Reserves at mobilization time. Mr. McNamara agreed that there were problems here but they needed to be sorted out. General Johnson then spoke about the fine equipment that we have in Viet Nam and out in the Far East and that the Army is doing well. This led to a discussion of the pay system, and finally General Johnson made a request for some more money for the Nike X.

Secretary McNamara adjourned the meeting at 1252.

Summary: The only positive decision I saw was the addition of two extra rocket ships and the determination that the Secretary of Defense should come forth with new recommendations on military pay.

The other problem areas that are open for further discussion are the manned bomber, the advanced manned interceptor; General Wheeler's "strategic package": Minuteman missiles, fallout shelters and the antiballistic missile; the Navy shipbuilding program of new ships.

CVC