Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Elimination of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council

As part of a continuing effort to increase the efficiency and quality of various study programs, I have for some time questioned the value of continuing the work of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC) of the National Security Council (established by NSC 5816)./2/

When the NESC was established by President Eisenhower in 1958, neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization nor the Office of the Secretary of Defense included a capability for performing the type of study assigned to the NESC. The original directive charged the NESC with providing "integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR, in the event of general war, to inflict direct injury upon the Continental United States and to provide a continual watch for changes which would significantly alter those net capabilities." Subsequent directives have altered this task on an annual basis. For example, the most recently completed NESC study was an evaluation of a "war conducted in 1964 between the U.S., its Allies, and the Soviet Bloc based on current U.S. war plans."/3/ Further, the over-all purpose of the report was to "evaluate the validity and feasibility of this type of analysis as a basis for providing guidance for political-military planning. . . ."

Having studied the 1964 Report, I do not feel that a brief survey of this type qualifies as a basis for planning guidance. As a broad survey of the problem, it is not without merit; but our strategic planning today is increasingly based upon more detailed studies of specific problem areas, such as those included on the Secretary of Defense's annual "Project List" and other studies conducted by the Joint Staff and military departments.

For example, the Special Studies Group (SSG) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has developed a broader base of expertise than that of the NESC staff. Both groups have explored similar issues, used the same sources of input, obtained the same computer support and have performed the same type of analysis. Because of the close relationship of strategic studies to forces, the budget, and other on-going Defense Department studies, the usefulness of the SSG studies has been understandably greater than the annual survey of the NESC.

The economy involved in eliminating a major study group is obvious. We can, I feel, make better use of our limited study skills while simultaneously improving the product delivered to the consumer. Participation in DoD studies by other government agencies is, of course, welcomed when warranted by the subject matter. Similarly, we remain responsive to requests for study reports from other interested agencies of the government.

In summary, while the annual study program of the NESC had value and relevance in 1958, its contribution today is marginal when compared to the battery of specific studies which have become major functions of the JCS and DoD during the intervening years. It therefore appears logical to terminate the requirement for the NESC. Attached is a draft implementing directive for signature./4/

Johnson City, Texas, December 28, 1964.

1. Reviewed the subjects covered in the briefing notes, Nos. 1 through 27/2/ which should be made a part of this memorandum. In this connection, I emphasized the following:

Reduction in manpower of the Soviet armed forces represented a reappraisal and a new estimate but not a reduction. There was no evidence of a reduction through demobilization.

2. Emphasized that new ICBM's, bigger and better, indicated Soviet policy of qualitative improvement with no attempt to match the U.S. quantitatively. We cannot explain this policy except that they hope for a breakthrough in strategic offensive techniques which will offset U.S. quantitative advantage.

3. Ground forces developing marine type units, are placing great emphasis on sealift and airlift, with apparent intent of developing a Commando capability for operations distant from the USSR. This is new because Soviet military forces have been landlocked since, and for that matter, prior to World War II.

4. The Soviet Air is relatively static. A new supersonic fighter plane being introduced but no evidence of supersonic long range bomber, although the Soviets have capability for such a development.

5. Air defense an enigma. After reviewing all evidence presented in attached papers, I concluded that Soviets were on an unexplained approach to either ABM or aircraft defense with a strong possibility that they had or were approaching a new technique. The status of construction in some of their facilities did not permit an accurate analysis of Soviet state of the art or air defense.

6. Soviets continue to expand special nuclear material production facilities, and I reviewed the figures in the paper, also photography of plant development.

7. In pointing out the extensive new Henhouse radar developments, I stated that these facilities, which were very expensive, exceeded requirements for tracking satellites, were not properly located for Early Warning, and therefore were quite possibly directed toward an anti-satellite capability to "blind" us from photographic intelligence gathering and we must be alert for this eventuality.

8. In summary, we were seeing a dynamic, progressive Soviet military program that was not being cut back, that was sophisticated, that was directed toward quality rather than quantity, and that there was a possibility of a breakthrough of some sort which would redress the present balance of power. This I said must not be overlooked and we must continually be on the alert for such a development.

[Here follow numbered paragraphs 9-12.]

The briefing was comprehensive. The President had few questions and very few remarks.

Washington, January 28, 1965.

Dear Bob:

The Department of State has no objection to your raising with the President the question of discontinuing the Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC) of the National Security Council. The case you present in your draft memorandum of December 23 to the President/2/ is a persuasive one and the Department believes the President would be well advised to consider whether he wishes to retain the Subcommittee, at least in its present form.

The participation of representatives of this Department in the preparation of strategic studies at the working level has been useful to this Department. Therefore, it is hoped that arrangements can be made to continue such participation.

Moreover, although surveys such as the last NESC study may not qualify as a basis for planning guidance, the Department believes that a similar broad survey of a possible major conflict between the United States and Communist China could serve a useful purpose in clarifying issues and highlighting areas which could usefully be the object of more detailed consideration.

If you agree, we suggest that Ambassador Thompson meet soon with Mr. Vance and General Wheeler to discuss these matters.

Sincerely,

George W. Ball/3/

JCSM-84-65

Washington, February 4, 1965.

SUBJECT
Issues Regarding National Planning Raised by the 1964 NESC Report (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the 1964 NESC Report/2/ pursuant to our meeting with you on 6 July 1964. This memorandum covers only those questions relating to national planning. Issues regarding NATO defenses were dealt with in JCSM-8-65, dated 8 January 1965, subject: "Issues Concerning NATO Raised by the 1964 NESC Report (U)."/3/

2. The 1964 NESC Report raised three major questions regarding planning:

a. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff lack guidance for the preparation of military plans which could be provided by a Basic National Security Policy or other compilation of strategic planning guidance having national endorsement? (Pages 2-3, 33, NESC Report)

b. Should JSOP and JSCP sections dealing with national and military objectives and strategic concepts be discussed among planners of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other appropriate agencies? (Pages 4, 33-34, NESC Report)

c. Should US military and political departments undertake more extensive cooperation in identifying specific potential crisis situations and examining them in the light of the political-military measures which they might require? (Page 34, NESC Report)

3. With respect to the requirement for a Basic National Security Policy, its compilation into a single document is desirable in principle, but, at the present time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not lack policy guidance for the preparation of military plans. Necessary guidance is obtained through both face-to-face meetings and a continuing exchange of written memoranda with the Secretary of Defense. Guidance also results from meetings with the President, National Security Council meetings, National Security Action Memoranda, National Country Policy papers, and National Planning Task papers. Any effort to condense this guidance into a single document could result in a paper so broad that it would be difficult to keep it meaningful and yet up-to-date. To the degree that such a document contained specific guidance, it could place inflexible restrictions on military planning and limit the scope of military advice on subsequent national security problems.

4. Lack of a Basic National Security Policy has not handicapped the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing basic short-range (JSCP), mid-range (JSOP), and long-range (JLRSS) plans, as well as specific contingency plans. Reliance on these documents has permitted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide suitable military advice for specific purposes. It seems evident that questions such as "Are we prepared and preparing for the most likely kind of war?" (Page 2, NESC Report) should never be foreclosed by a master planning document.

5. With regard to the related problem of close coordination of military and political planning, interagency discussion of national objectives and national security policies would provide a useful exchange of ideas. The substance of approved documents such as National Security Action Memoranda, National Policy papers, and related military documents (e.g., JSCP, JSOP, and JLRSS) could provide a basis for these discussions, although it should be understood that the intent of the discussions is not to address these documents themselves or to suggest changes in them. Rather, such a process would give increased background knowledge and perception to the military and political officers concerned and could well provide for better inputs to future political and military plans. These discussions, conducted at the division chief/action officer level, would be informational in nature and supplemental to the liaison now carried out at higher levels. Political-military problem areas that are identified can be added to the list of National Planning Tasks.

6. As to the need to undertake a more extensive examination of possible crisis situations, the following provisions for political-military crisis planning are already in effect:

a. Bimonthly meetings between Department of State representatives and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Thursday planning group meetings attended by representatives of State, Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other appropriate agencies. This body monitors the current list of Policy Planning Tasks, including potential crisis situations.

c. Joint Staff participation in those Policy Planning Tasks which have military implications.

d. Preparation of National Policy Papers dealing with specific countries. There is input and participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in each of these papers. They constitute an additional area of State-Military cooperation which can contribute to crisis planning.

e. Finally, there are in existence some 200 contingency plans prepared by unified and specified commands as a result of both broad and specific directives in the JSCP. These plans represent the military planning for crisis situations in a wide variety of situations and a large number of countries and areas.

7. There is no evident need to provide additional organizations for crisis planning. This type of planning is being carried out along with other forms of planning for particular countries, areas, and circumstances. To segregate crisis planning from other planning would tend to make it less effective and could result in a failure to consider all appropriate factors. The principal need is to assure that timely and adequate planning is accomplished, and the recent establishment of an inter-agency group to facilitate the timely initiation and coordination of political-military planning should be of value in this regard./4/ Such a group will provide an important and necessary means of insuring that all relevant factors and views are considered in national security planning. Specifically, formal representation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in such a group would permit a more effective contribution by them to national security planning. The modus operandi of this group will require further study and consultation between the participating parties.

8. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that:

a. Compilation of a Basic National Security Policy into a single document is desirable in principle, but, at the present time, they do not lack policy guidance for the preparation of military plans.

b. National objectives and national security policies should be discussed with the Department of State and other appropriate agencies at the division chief/action officer level. The Joint Staff has been authorized to set up meetings with the Department of State and other appropriate agencies for this purpose.

c. With regard to planning organization, participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the high-level interagency group will facilitate the timely initiation and coordination of political-military planning.

9. The Chief of Staff, US Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps concur in the views expressed in paragraph 8, above, as an interim measure. However, they believe that, in the interest of improved national security, a Basic National Security Policy should be developed to guide interdepartmental planning. Further, they consider that reactivation of the NSC Planning Board would improve national security planning.

10. In addition, the Commandant of the Marine Corps believes that the establishment of a National Command Center, in support of the Planning Board and manned by a suitable staff, would further improve national security planning and management./5/

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCSM-112-65

Washington, February 16, 1965.

SUBJECT
Draft Policy Paper--Chemical and Biological Warfare (U)

1. Reference is made to:

a. A memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-29945/64, dated 10 December 1964, subject as above, which forwarded a draft, "National Policy Paper--Chemical and Biological Warfare," for comment and recommendation, plus draft national policy paper./2/

b. A memorandum by the Director, Correspondence and Directives Division, Office of the Secretary of Defense, dated 31 December 1964, subject as above,/3/ which advised that the primary goal of the draft policy paper is the preparation of a National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM), that efforts should be focused accordingly, and that detailed comment on the background material is not required.

c. JCSM-184-64, dated 13 May 1964, subject: "Chemical and Biological Weapons,"/4/ which forwarded to you draft responses to items of chemical and biological information requested by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

d. JCSM-404-64, dated 13 May 1964, subject: "Chemical and Biological Weapons,"/5/ which forwarded to you supplemental information for the coordinated State/Defense review of chemical and biological policy.

2. The draft national policy paper, forwarded by reference 1a, includes an abstract which contains specific statements of chemical and biological policy. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this abstract are reflected in the line-in line-out recommendations attached at Appendix A./6/

3. In accordance with the request in reference 1b, a proposed NSAM based on the policy views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated in this revised abstract, is attached at Appendix B. In the event that substantive changes are considered necessary to the proposed NSAM, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request the opportunity to review and comment on such changes.

4. The draft paper in reference 1a was useful in the consideration of national policy for chemical and biological weapons. However, the source information contained in references 1c and 1d provides a more comprehensive consideration of chemical and biological operations and it is suggested that it be used as the primary source in support of the proposed national chemical and biological policy.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.J. Kirn/7/
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

JCSM-129-65

Washington, February 26, 1965.

SUBJECT
Conceptual Approach to the National Military Command System (NMCS) (U)

1. Reference is made to:

a. A memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ADM), dated 28 January 1965, subject as above./2/

b. JCSM-4-64, dated 10 January 1964, subject: "Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) (S)."/3/

c. JCSM-446-64, dated 25 May 1964, subject "Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) (S)."/4/

d. JCSM-914-63, dated 2 December 1963, subject "Alternate Facilities and Supporting Communications Required for the National Military Command System (U)."/5/

2. Reference 1 a requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit their views on a report, subject: "Department of Defense Command and Control Support to the President."

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in broad general agreement with the principles and concepts developed in the study (see Appendix A hereto) and believe that the study provides an excellent basis for furthering rapport and understanding among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other governmental agencies concerned with planning for command and control at the national level. The first assumption in the terms of reference states that it is extremely unlikely that the President would leave the Washington area during a crisis situation. It is noted that the study nevertheless advocates the principle of multiplicity of centers for Presidential protection and infers that the likelihood of Presidential relocation would significantly increase as a crisis intensifies, even if the crisis is short of general war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider these points to be valid both prior to and after construction of a Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC); however, continued improvement of national command and control capabilities depends on a better understanding between all principals of the conditions under which the President might seek protection.

4. With regard to the alternate command centers of the National Military Command System (NMCS), the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

a. The study's recommendation prejudges the conclusions of a separate study currently being undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the optimum number of National Emergency Command Post Afloat (NECPA) ships required for the NMCS.

b. The National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) program, in which one or more of three EC 135 aircraft are maintained on continuous ground alert status, represents the minimum acceptable airborne command post posture.

c. There is firm need to assure, to the extent feasible, the survival of the Presidency during any future conflicts; and the circumstances of a future crisis or conflict may be such as to preclude the relocation of the President to one of the existing alternate facilities. In this light, the proposed DUCC represents a potentially effective means for assuring survival of the Presidency to an extent not now provided by the NMCS.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Concur in the study's comments on the NEACP.

b. Agree in principle on the NECPA as an important element of the NMCS. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are currently addressing the optimum posture for the NECPA and upon completion will forward their recommendations.

c. Consider that, if a DUCC is approved and constructed, the study's detailed concepts and principles regarding the DUCC generally provide a basis for determination of detailed functional requirements, concept of operation, and detailed design.

d. Are in general agreement with much of the detailed discussion in the body of the report regarding the role of the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC). However, as indicated in Appendix B hereto, they do not feel that the study recognizes that the ANMCC is fully as valuable as the other alternates of the NMCS when its unique capabilities for supporting all levels of crisis and war are considered. Moreover, they have previously noted that it is essential to continue the ANMCC in its current role for the foreseeable future.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The study be forwarded to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Office of Emergency Planning, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency for comment regarding the principles and concepts underlying those parts of the study particularly applicable to their operations (see Appendix A).

b. They participate in any evaluation of the comments received by the Secretary of Defense from other agencies and in the identification of subsequent steps to clarify the conceptual approach to command and control.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler/6/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Based on their analysis, it is the interpretation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the following constitute the underlying principles and concepts developed in the Study:

a. For all levels of crisis and war, the President needs utmost flexibility in many aspects of crisis management including centers to be used, immediate advisors, other staff elements to be informed, and options for military action.

b. In crises short of general war, the constitution of the Presidential advisory staff support (support which is estimative analytical, and advisory) is highly dependent upon the nature of the crisis. In contrast, capabilities for information support (defined by the study to include watch, monitoring, communications, decision implementation functions, and emergency action procedures) of the President and his advisors must be developed insofar as possible in advance of a crisis and can be developed more independently of a particular type of crisis. Advisory staff support and information support, although they must work closely together, can be somewhat separated both functionally and organizationally.

c. During intense crises and general war, protection of the President as an individual is as important or even more important than protection of the Presidency through use of legal successors. Although Alternate Decision Groups might be established and relocated, it is doubtful that the principals forming the groups will be named before the crisis and it is doubtful that more than one group will be formed./7/

d. For crises less than general war, the President and his advisory group do not need an elaborate, national command center permanently staffed by representatives of several agencies; however, the direction of the Armed Forces will be exercised through the National Military Command System (NMCS).

e. During an intense crisis, protection of the President depends on his seeking protection prior to the onset of general war. He will only occupy a protected center if he can manage the intense crisis as well as he could from the White House Cabinet Room./8/ (For Washington level support during the intense crisis, the Presidential advisors located with the President will primarily depend on their soft centers and their staffs in Washington.) For managing the general war, it would be highly desirable for the President to be collocated with his general war advisory staff support and the related information support. In light of these needs for both intense crises and general war, the Alternate Command Centers of the NMCS and other centers that the President might occupy must be capable of operating as national (versus departmental) command centers.

f. The basic missions of the alternate command centers of the NMCS have the following priority:

(1) Support the President (located at the Center) during the intense crisis and the strategic exchange phase of a general war.

(2) Support the President or an alternate decision group (located at the Center) during the strategic exchange phase of general war.

(3) Locate the President after the onset of general war.

(4) After onset of general war, provide military information and advisory staff support to the President or a legal successor located elsewhere.

(5) Protect information and advisory staff capability for the follow-on phase of general war.

In assigning the above missions and priorities, the study concludes that direction of the strategic exchange phase of a general war should be directly from the Presidential location to the commanders of unified and specified commands, their alternates, or successors.

g. Under a "no warning attack" at a time of international calm, only marginal protection can be provided to the President or his designated successors.

h. An alternate command center should be evaluated with respect to the following criteria: survivability, accessibility, endurance, staff support, communications support, flexibility, and cost. The study heavily emphasizes survivability and accessibility for individual centers and a multiplicity of centers of comparable capability.

i. For the strategic exchange phase of a general war, the President and the Presidential Group will be directly and primarily concerned with military operations, civil defense, diplomacy and negotiations, and informing and leading the public. The President can extensively delegate responsibility for nonmilitary resource allocation, economic mobilization, and maintenance of local law and order. Accordingly, during this phase, the advisory and information support to the Presidential Group should be preponderantly military.

j. The National Military Command Center (NMCC) should provide information support to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, non-Department of Defense officials, and their attendant advisory staffs. Under certain circumstances, the NMCC will provide advisory support. The NMCC must have the capability to "get information" from many sources (such as CINCs and Service Headquarters) and should not attempt to store all possible information, but only that essential for its primary mission, in its data base.

k. The NMCC and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in exercising strategic direction of the Armed Forces. They should also support the President and his advisors in detailed monitoring and control of selected military actions when such actions may have grave national significance. A system built to satisfy only one of these roles will not necessarily be adequate for the other.

With regard to the Fort Ritchie Complex and the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC), the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their previous position that these facilities are essential to our command and control capabilities in the foreseeable future. They concur with much of the analysis relating to the Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC) and the ANMCC and with many of the conclusions regarding their capabilities, functions, and relationships within our over-all national command and control capabilities. However, they are concerned that the study does not support these facilities strongly enough. Specifically:

a. The value of the ANMCC as one possible relocation site for the President or an alternate decision group is recognized (pages V-35, 36 and VI-36) but its capabilities for the strategic exchange phase are equated to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This conclusion seems contrary to two principles in the study. First, survivability is stressed and the ANMCC is significantly harder than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. More important, the study stresses collocation of the President and his principal advisors with their supporting military staff. Such collocation could be achieved much more effectively at the ANMCC than at [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or Camp David. The study correctly proposes a multiplicity of sites available for relocation. If the individual sites for Presidential or alternate decision group relocation are compared, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would rate the effectiveness of the ANMCC as somewhere between that of a National Emergency Command Post Afloat ship and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

b. There is not sufficient stress within the study on the potential value of the ANMCC in supporting a decision group on board the National Emergency Airborne Command Post during the strategic exchange phase after Washington has been destroyed.

c. The study correctly recognizes the unique value of the ANMCC for the follow-on phase of a general war. However, since the dividing line between the initial and follow-on phases would be blurred at best, the study does not point out the great advantage of conducting both of these phases from the same location.

d. The study implies that a functional and technical analysis of the ANMCC would indicate potential savings. Such analyses are continuously taking place and they may equally indicate that, if the principles and concepts in the study are approved, additional investments in the AJCC would be warranted.

e. The report does not explicitly recommend continuation of a continuously manned ANMCC. The summary paragraphs discussing the AJCC (pages VI-72 and VII-10) are not consistent with the analyses and conclusions in the body of the report. For example, they indicate that "the ANMCC is not suited to use by the President or an alternate decision group during an intense crisis or the initial stages of a general war." If the report is rewritten, the body of the report should incorporate the above points and these summary paragraphs should be made consistent.

JCSM-131-65

Washington, March 1, 1965.

SUBJECT
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1970-74 (JSOP-70), Parts I Through V (Strategy and Objectives) and Part VI (Force Tabs and Analysis) (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved, and forward herewith, Parts I through VI of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1970-74 (JSOP-70)./2/ The entire JSOP-70 is designed to provide military advice by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the development of FY 1967 budget justification for departmental FY 1967 program objectives as they pertain to major combatant forces, and the basis for reassessment of the current Department of Defense Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program.

2. Parts I through V consist of the following:

I Purpose--States the purposes of the JSOP and its various annexes.

II Strategic Appraisal--Analyses the world-wide threat through the mid-range period.

III Military Objectives--Describes military objectives which are considered necessary in support of national objectives.

IV Strategic Concept--Describes anticipated employment of forces on a functional and geographical basis.

V Basic Undertakings--Describes basic undertakings envisioned for the unified and specified commanders during the period.

3. Part VI contains the force tabulation of the major combatant forces recommended to carry out the strategy presented in Parts I through V. These forces are presented in the format specified by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in a memorandum dated 19 January 1965, subject: "Force Tabs of JSOP-70."/3/ Amplifying views of the individual Chiefs are attached as separate Tabs to the Force Tables./4/ The further views of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, will be forwarded by separate memorandum./5/

4. A summary analysis of the personnel implications of force level changes and an order-of-magnitude summary of dollar costing of the objective force levels were considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in arriving at the recommended force objectives.

5. In arriving at the proposed force levels the present situation in Southeast Asia was only indirectly considered, and had little, if any, influence upon the JSOP-70 force levels. This is pointed out to identify a specific problem area that requires both a near term and long term solution. By separate action, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are addressing this problem and will provide you with their views on this subject.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler/6/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, March 5, 1965.

NOTIFICATION OF SECRETARY'S POLICY PLANNING MEETING
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 1965, AT 10:00 A.M. IN THE
SECRETARY'S CONFERENCE ROOM

SUBJECT
Some Reflections on National Security Policy, February 1965/2/

Since I must leave for a trip to Germany on March 11 and I greatly desire the guidance of my colleagues, I have scheduled a meeting on this somewhat long paper for Wednesday, March 10./3/ It is an effort to outline the main directions for U.S. policy in the months and years ahead in the light of three quite general characteristics of the world scene:

a. The growing assertiveness of governments both within the Free World and within the Communist world;

b. The fact that this growing assertiveness in the Free World has not been accompanied by a development of military power (aside from U.S. power) capable of coping with either Soviet or Chinese Communist military strength; and

c. The fact that conventional nationalism does not permit nations to grip their major economic, security, and even regional political problems successfully.

Paragraph 11 (pages 22-25) sets out the major functional tasks of U.S. security policy that flow from this view of the world scene.

Part II then explores these questions:

a. The extent to which these functional tasks might be carried forward in the present environment by the creation or further development of regional organizations and devices in which the U.S. is integrally involved. Paragraph 15 (pages 31-32) underlines the special concept of regionalism suggested here and its twofold objective: "To permit nations to grip collectively problems that do not lend themselves to satisfactory solution on a national or bilateral basis"; and "To permit nations to deal with the U.S. (and, where relevant, other industrialized powers of the Free World) on a basis of greater dignity than bilateralism permits."

b. The appropriate degree and character of U.S. involvement on the world scene in the future, which is set out against an analysis of whether we are or are not in some sense "over-committed" (pages 44-48).

One operational question of some interest is raised by this analysis, not dealt with in the text: Would the further elaboration of regional economic development arrangements, symbolized by the emergence of an African Development Bank and the movement towards an Asian Development Bank, help meet the kind of criticism we now confront with respect to foreign aid by Senator Fulbright and others?

W.W. Rostow/4/

Washington, March 5, 1965.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
February 1965

With the passage of time since the acute bipolar confrontations in Berlin and Cuba, in 1961-62, the shape of the world scene is altering. The environment in which we must seek to protect and advance the nation's abiding interests is changing its shape.

Briefly stated, we are somewhere between a cold war between two great blocs and a world of nation states; we are somewhere between a world organized rationally, respectful of the inescapable interdependencies of modern life, and the chaos of old-fashioned nationalism; we are somewhere between a world split on lines of wealth and race and differing stages of modernization and a community of partners in the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

If we are to use our limited but real margin of influence to produce from this lively, dangerous but not unhopeful, situation a world of nation states, organized in ways which respect their interdependencies, operating as a global community under the UN Charter, we need fresh bearings and, in some cases, new lines of action.

To set the stage for this exposition, it may be useful to present the problem we confront in the form of a series of paradoxes which characterize the essentially transitional passage of history through which we are passing and which we must seek, within our capabilities, to shape.

--Although the danger of overt Communist aggression, nuclear or conventional, has been evidently reduced, there is no indication that policy in Moscow or Peiping is restrained from the overt use of force by any factor other than credible opposing force--mainly U.S. military force.

--Although there has been in Western Europe and Japan a remarkable increase in economic power and political confidence and assertiveness, this revival has not been accompanied by a proportionate rise in nuclear or conventional military capacity; and, similarly, the rise of nationalist impulses and fragmentation within the Communist world has not been accompanied by an equivalent diffusion of nuclear or conventional military capacity away from Moscow and Peiping.

--There are strong forces at work on the world scene tending towards the diffusion of nuclear power, although the net security advantage of a small nuclear capability is, in almost every case, negative on any objective assessment.

--The most dangerous current military threat to the security of the Free World is subversion and guerrilla warfare in the developing nations, although in an industrial and atomic age this form of aggression is the most economical in men and resources and the most primitive.

--Although nationalism--often xenophobic in tone--is strong and rising in the developing nations, they lack a capacity to solve their security or economic problems on a national basis; and even on a regional basis they require intimate collaboration with the more advanced powers to solve their major domestic and security problems.

--Although the proportion of U.S. resources devoted to national security purposes (including foreign aid) has been declining, there is much talk of U.S. over-extension on the world scene.

It is against the background of these puzzlements that this paper, after summarizing the nation's interest, examines in Part One the environment we confront and the broad lines of policy required to resolve the paradoxes in a manner consonant with our interests; while Part Two comes to rest on the possible role of regional arrangements in this reconciliation and on the appropriate character of U.S. involvement on the world scene.

Part One

[Here follow the first two sections of Part One: "U.S. Interests and Objectives" (paragraphs 1-2) and "The Underlying Military Situation" (paragraphs 3-9).]

10. Thus, the central objectives of national security policy are to continue to maintain the capacity to project U.S. military strength around the borders of the Communist world, as a deterrent to Communist nuclear and conventional forces, in an environment of somewhat enflamed nationalism; to develop and maintain a political environment within which we can actively project our capacity to assist in the deterrence and defeat of Communist techniques of attraction and indirect aggression; to convert present conventional nationalist impulses into constructive courses of action which would permit the nations and peoples of these regions to grip their military, economic, and political problems more effectively and to do so in ways which enlarge their own capacity to shape their destiny; and on the foundations of a Free World where nationalist assertiveness is gradually organized in communal arrangements, where reactions against dependence are converted into the acceptance of responsible partnership, to work constructively to draw the presently Communist world into pacific relations to the world community.

11. In the light of this definition of objectives, the major tasks of U.S. national security policy can be set out under the following headings:

a. To maintain as basic insurance a U.S. nuclear and conventional military establishment of a scale and character sufficient, along with those of our allies, to deter overt aggression or to deal with it should deterrence fail in the various regions.

b. To maintain a political environment and a technical capacity which permits us to project our military power onto the European and Asian mainlands in a manner such as to deter overt aggression by the most economical means possible, or to deal with such aggression if it is mounted.

c. To mount programs, regional or national, as well as universal, designed to satisfy by other means the impulses of fear, pride and prestige now leading nations towards the development of national nuclear capabilities.

d. To create and maintain a political environment and to refine the methods and tasks required to frustrate effectively and to render unattractive as future tactics the forms of indirect aggression now being mounted against various parts of the Free World.

e. To damp the regional quarrels which threaten to disrupt various Free World regions and to expand opportunities for Communist influence and penetration.

f. Gradually to bring the more assertive and ambitious leaders in developing nations (Sukarno, Nasser) to an acceptance of their limitations and to policies of increased regional restraint and concentration on their domestic tasks by programs of constraint and incentive.

g. To damp and gradually to eliminate the frictions imposed by continuing colonial problems.

h. With respect to c-g, above, to refine our use of the tools of economic, technical, and military aid, which are a critically important, if limited, lever in damping the disruptive potential of reactive nationalism in the developing world.

i. Against a background of such policies (designed to discourage among Communists the view that the present environment offers important opportunities for expanding their power and influence) to work constructively with the forces of fragmentation within the Communist world, by moves which exploit limited areas of overlapping national interest which may exist, and to draw nations presently under Communist regimes into the orbit of the world community. The critical effort in this field will be, of course to work steadily in the direction of a Central European settlement which would reconcile German unity with effective measures for European security and arms control--an historical process in which the political liberalization of Eastern Europe and an expansion in its non-military ties to the West may play a central role.

j. To develop with the nations of Western Europe and Canada more effective means of dealing with North Atlantic problems and also to draw them, and, where appropriate, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand into policies of concert and support with respect to b-i, above.

This category of policy is evidently, critical in both the short run and the long run.

In the short run our world position depends on maintaining the essential structure of Atlantic unity, now precariously held together against Gaullist disruption, and moving forward in the critical fields of nuclear policy; trade and agricultural policy; and in monetary affairs. Failure in any of these areas of active negotiation could weaken the fabric of the Alliance.

In the long run, the acceptance of wider responsibilities on a world basis by our Atlantic allies and an acceptance of wider regional responsibilities by Japan, Australia, and New Zealand is essential to the execution of this strategy.

[Here follows Part Two: "Regionalism and the Appropriate Degree and Character of U.S. Involvement on the World Scene" (paragraphs 12-23).]

24. The argument here is that, broadly speaking, we face in other regions of the world, each in a context that is unique, the same kind of problem that we have already confronted and in which we have done much pioneer work in the past generation with respect to the Atlantic world and Latin America. It is further assumed that there is no region in the world to whose evolution we can be indifferent, given the character of our national interest, although our regional interests vary and are of different weight.

25. Before concluding our observations on regionalism, it is worth posing a prior question; namely, whether or not the United States is now, in some meaningful sense, overextended on the world scene.

Do our military and economic commitments on the mainland or Eurasia, as well as in Africa and Latin America, constitute an increasing or intolerable strain on our resources?

Is the potential strength of our adversaries increasing relative to our own at a rate which justifies considering a retraction of U.S. commitment?

Is there some other sense in which we are over-committed?

So far as U.S. resources are concerned, Appendix B/2/ makes clear that both over-all defense expenditures and foreign aid expenditures are a declining proportion of our annual output. Defense expenditures for FY 1965 are down to 7.5% of GNP, having fallen away from 9.5% a decade earlier; economic and military aid expenditures (excluding PL 480 and Export-Import Bank loans) are down to .48% of GNP from a figure of 1.1% in 1955. Economic assistance, at about the same absolute level as 1955 ($2 billion) has fallen from .51% of GNP to .32% of GNP. So long as the U.S. economy continues to expand at a reasonable rate there can be no serious anxiety about our capacity to sustain present military and foreign aid commitments or to expand them substantially, if necessary, without endangering the progress of our domestic life.

There is, of course, a continuing problem of assuring that outlays abroad in support of our security commitments do not endanger our balance of payments or the confidence felt in the dollar as a reserve currency. This real problem lends itself to resolution by many devices other than a retraction of defense outlays or foreign aid expenditures, notably because these expenditures are already substantially cushioned in their impact on the balance of payments and because national security should continue to enjoy a priority higher than, for example, long-term private investment in Western Europe or certain other private outlays abroad.

We could also be judged to be overextended if our potential adversaries were increasing their industrial capacity or military outlays at a rate which, if matched by us, could impose intolerable strains on our domestic life. This is, evidently, not the case. While there is no cause for complacency with respect to the evolution of either Soviet or Chinese Communist military capabilities, they do not appear to be evolving in ways or at a pace beyond our capacity to deter within the range of recent or existing percentage allocations of our over-all resources. We are most likely to be embarrassed by qualitative, rather than quantitative, changes in the military capabilities of our major adversaries.

What, then, accounts for recent discussions of "over-commitment"?

First, the rise of national assertiveness, in forms as various as Gaullism, the burning of libraries, and Buddhist antics in Saigon, has converged with the sense of release from Soviet nuclear blackmail after the Cuba missile crisis, to make the world appear both less tractable and less dangerous than it was in, say, the period 1961-62. There is a widespread, if ill-defined, feeling that if foreigners don't like us, let's pull back, and that some pull-back would be safe.

Moreover, our painful and frustrating experience in Laos and Viet Nam makes men search for solutions and perspectives which would permit our withdrawal while believing that no grave damage would be done to vital U.S. or Free World interests.

What passes for "over-commitment" is, in this sense, simply frustration in achieving our objectives by existing means in the turbulent and assertive environment we confront, compounded by Communist methods for expanding indirectly their power and influence in that environment, combined with a correct perception that other nations are seeking ways to solve their problems which involves less brute depend-ence on the United States than in the past.

There is a second sense in which we are very heavily committed, if not over-committed, as compared to earlier times. Every region on the planet is now part of a sensitively interacting world community. In the immediate postwar years, major decisions could focus on the Atlantic world, Japan, and relations with Moscow. Now not only have the countries of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia entered the game but Communist China and the individual countries of Eastern Europe appear on the stage with independent or quasi-independent personalities. This proliferation of states and emerging centers of power and influence diminish our capacity to influence or control given situations by means we have used in the past; and requires new methods and involvement of new kinds if we are to bring our residual margin of influence to bear on issues of vital interest. The number of U.S. relationships and problems capable of forcing a decision at the highest levels of the government has thus vastly multiplied. The working levels of government can be--and have been--expanded to deal with this phenomenon at home and in the field. But we can have only one President and one Secretary of State. And here the real burden of commitment and active engagement has been enlarged.

The burden of this paper is, then, that what we confront is not a question of continuing existing policies and commitments or pulling back. What we face is the task of transforming our relations with the nations of the Free World, region by region, in such a way as to permit them an enlarged role in their own destiny while permitting us to perform the minimum security, economic, and political functions required in their interests and in ours. This concept does involve a kind of selective relaxation of presence and pressure, as we encourage the nations themselves increasingly to take responsibility for assessing their interests and formulating responsible proposals for collective action. It does not, however, permit a significant withdrawal of U.S. security commitment and presence. And, as our experience with the OECD as opposed to the OEEC suggests, as well as our experience with CIAP, partnership in regional organizations (as opposed to dependence) tends to increase rather than to diminish the range and intimacy of contacts and common enterprise.

If all goes well, then, the present phase of rather anarchic nationalism abroad, with its counterpart in neo-isolationist impulses at home, should give way to relations of enlarging partnership in one region after the other.

That, in any case, is what the state of our environment and the character of our abiding interests appear to require. But it will not happen without a clear U.S. sense of direction, quiet leadership, and persistence.

Washington, March 11, 1965.

SUBJECT
Release of Nuclear Weapons to Air Defense National Guard Units

1. In the attached memorandum Secretary McNamara last year requested authority for emergency release of nuclear air defense weapons to National Guard units./2/ Under present arrangements, National Guard air defense units would be slow to act in an emergency due to administrative requirements for federalization. The requested authority would permit release of weapons and operational employment in accordance with emergency action procedures approved for regular forces.

I held up this action last year because of the risk of misunderstanding, in the light of the controversy over control of nuclear weapons. This is in fact a quite routine adjustment of emergency procedures, but it might not have seemed so in 1964. Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff now feel that it should be approved, and I agree.

McG.B.

Approve/3/
Disapprove

Washington, March 23, 1965.

SUBJECT
Discontinuance of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee

The President on March 11, 1965, approved the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense/2/ that NSC 5816, "A Net Evaluation Subcommittee," be rescinded. The Subcommittee, having served its purpose with distinction, was discontinued on March 18 by National Security Action Memorandum No. 327./3/ The type of study which the Subcommittee has conducted since 1958 will be accomplished by other means.

Copies of NSC 5816 now in the custody of the member agencies may be destroyed or otherwise disposed of in accordance with the regulations of the member agency relating to the custody and destruction of classified materials and with Executive Order 10501,/4/ as amended by Executive Order 10964./5/

Bromley Smith

Washington, March 31, 1965.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am pleased to enclose for your use revised "Guidance for Non-Military Planning"/2/ which I reported on at Cabinet meeting March 25./3/ This provides new assumptions for use by Federal departments and agencies in the further development of their civil emergency preparedness. It supersedes the document of the same title issued October 31, 1963, by the Office of Emergency Planning./4/

The new guidance has been brought up to date by the Committee on Assumptions for Non-Military Planning, established by the President. The Committee, as you know, consists of representatives from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency, with the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning serving as chairman. I am glad to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the participation of your representative, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Weapons Acquisition and Industrial Readiness, Mr. James Davis, and the members of the working group, Mr. Eckhard Bennewitz and Mr. Henry A. Damminger. The final document owes a great deal indeed to their substantive contributions and constructive comments.

The new guidance differs in several respects from the document it supersedes. It is more specific where lack of specificity was found to be a handicap to use. It also reflects a much greater emphasis on the necessity to prepare for less-than-nuclear situations up to and including large-scale conventional wars. There is corresponding reduction in the likelihood (but not the importance) of nuclear war.

It is important that civil emergency preparedness--both current arrangements and future plans--reflect this change of emphasis and other more specific planning factors covered in the guidance. I therefore suggest that you review your emergency plans and programs to assure their responsiveness to these contingency assumptions. If in the course of your review you discover the need for special situation assumptions, I will undertake to see that they are provided, working with the members of the Committee on Assumptions as appropriate.

Sincerely,

Buford Ellington

NIE 11-4-65

Washington, April 14, 1965.

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

The Problem

To review significant developments in Soviet military thinking, policy, and programs, and to estimate main trends in Soviet military policies over the next six years.

Scope

This estimate focuses upon broad trends in Soviet military policy and doctrine. It does not attempt to recapitulate existing NIEs on Soviet strategic attack, air defense, and general purpose forces. Our most recent detailed estimates on the size, composition, and capabilities of these principal components and the supporting elements of the Soviet military forces are as follows:

NIE 11-8-64; "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack," dated 8 October 1964, Top Secret, Restricted Data (Limited Distribution)/2/ and Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-8-64, dated 7 April 1965./3/

NIE 11-3-64; "Soviet Bloc Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1970," dated 16 December 1964, Top Secret./4/

NIE 11-14-64; "Capabilities of the Soviet General Purpose Forces, 1964-1970," dated 10 December 1964, Secret./5/

Conclusions

A. Soviet decisions since Khrushchev's fall do not indicate any general alteration in his military policies. During the next six years, we believe that the main aim of the USSR's military policy and programs will remain that of strengthening the Soviet deterrent./6/ In the strategic field, we expect the USSR to increase the numbers and effectiveness of a variety of weapon systems and, in particular, greatly to improve retaliatory capabilities. These programs may include the deployment of anti-missile defenses. But we think it highly unlikely that the Soviets could achieve a combination of offensive and defensive forces so strong as to persuade the leadership that it could launch a strategic attack upon the West and limit to acceptable proportions the subsequent damage to the USSR. (Paras. 18, 46-52)

B. The Soviets will continue to press their dynamic military and space R&D programs. Soviet security considerations demand vigorous efforts to prevent a Western military technological advantage which might threaten the credibility of their deterrent. Beyond this, we believe that the Soviet R&D effort represents an attempt to achieve major technological advances in the hope of offsetting present Western strategic advantages. Should the Soviets achieve a technological advance which offered the prospect of significant improvement in military capabilities, they would seek to exploit it for political and military advantage, but their decisions as to deployment would involve a weighing of such advantage against economic considerations and US capabilities to counter. (Paras. 29-32)

C. With respect to theater forces, capabilities for nuclear combat will remain a prime Soviet concern. Certain recent trends, however, point to a growing concern with non-nuclear war, and we expect Soviet military policy to devote increasing attention to this contingency. Further, there is some evidence that the Soviets intend to develop greater capabilities for distant, limited military action, an area in which they are presently at a great disadvantage. (Paras. 40-43, 56-57)

D. The new Soviet leaders will continue to apply economic restraints to the expansion of military programs. The Soviet economy could support a substantially increased military effort. Nevertheless, the demands of costly military and space programs conflict directly with the requirements of the civil economy, and the newly announced agricultural program does not portend any early easing of economic constraints. Barring important changes in the international situation, we consider major shifts in the level of Soviet defense spending to be unlikely. (Paras. 20, 25-27)

E. Soviet military policy will also be heavily influenced by external developments. In Eastern Europe, if present trends toward autonomy continue, the Warsaw Pact will evolve toward a conventional military alliance, and the range of contingencies in which the USSR can rely on effective support from its Warsaw Pact allies will narrow. In Asia, the hardening of the Sino-Soviet dispute will probably force the USSR to recognize the military implications of China's hostility and ambitions, and the USSR will probably strengthen conventional forces in Soviet Asia. In Western Europe, the Soviets would consider their military problem to be sharply altered by any important changes in the political cohesion or military effectiveness of NATO. But the Soviets will continue to weigh the adequacy of military programs primarily against US capabilities, and to judge the desirability of proposed programs against probable US reaction. (Paras. 33-36)

F. Beyond the general mission of deterrence, we doubt that any single doctrinal design, meeting the tests of comprehensiveness and feasibility, will govern the development of Soviet military forces over the next six years. Old debates which seem certain to outlive Khrushchev's departure, the momentum of deployment programs, the clash of vested interests, attempts to capitalize on some technological advance, an urge to match or counter various enemy capabilities--these are some of the factors which are likely to inhibit any far-reaching rationalization of military policy around a single doctrine. (Para. 51)

[Here follows the Discussion section (Parts I-IV, pages 4-17).]

Washington, April 21, 1965.

The President would like to have it understood publicly that there has been, and will be, no delegation of responsibility to the field for the use of any war gases. To this end, he has recently informed a number of private citizens that this is his policy./2/

I would suggest that you refer to this policy in one of your public statements during the next month, making clear that the policy is one of long standing in the United States Government.

McG.B.

Washington, undated.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL
SUPPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

[Here follow the Introduction and Chapters I-VI.]

Chapter VII

Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

The President increasingly becomes the focal point of crisis management as a crisis intensifies. He devotes more time to the crisis and considers selected operations in greater detail. The President needs and operates with extreme flexibility--flexibility in constituting his immediate decision group; in defining alternate courses of action that must be considered; in determining, to the extent feasible, the timing of the U.S. responses and therefore the time allowable for staff inputs; flexibility in seeking detailed information on selected military operations; in establishing and employing the organization and operational command chain including reducing the number of echelons of command; flexibility in determining the sensitivity of selected information relating to the crisis; in communicating with allied, neutral and enemy heads of state; and in establishing constraints or accepting risks in conducting the crisis.

The President will select the Presidential Group that will assist him in directing a given crisis. This has invariably been true in the past and it is reasonable to assume that it will continue to be so in the future. Since the Presidential Group will include personal advisors, and statutory advisors and their subordinates, it will reflect military, political, diplomatic, intelligence and other such interests that might be relevant to the crisis. As a crisis develops, the composition of the Presidential Group will normally grow and alter.

So far the U.S. has experienced only a very few of the infinite number of crisis situations with which command and control support arrangements must be prepared to cope. Crisis situations, far more intense than any yet experienced, but nevertheless short of a large scale intercontinental nuclear exchange, are possible. These should be given more consideration in the development of U.S. command and control arrangements. For example, as indicated below, consideration of intense crises can have a significant impact on plans for presidential protection.

During a crisis the President and the Presidential Group will probably use mission-oriented interagency groups to assist them in estimating the present situation, and in developing and evaluating alternate courses of action. These groups may be asked to consider broad or narrow aspects of the crisis. The President and the Presidential Group expect that such support has melded military, political, domestic and diplomatic factors. Accordingly, the constitution of the Presidential Group and their need for staff support implies the need for interagency staffing before estimates and advice are advanced to the Presidential Group.

For severe crises, the composition and extent of the advisory staff support to the President will be uniquely determined at the time of the crisis by the nature of the crisis including such factors as timing, areas and participants, scope of conflict, the opportunity and the need for secrecy, escalatory potential, and diplomatic constraints. On the other hand, the routine information support capabilities needed to support these individuals are much more predictable. These capabilities include communications and message distribution, provision of factual data on force status and plans, routine staff support in implementing and promulgating decisions, conferencing and display facilities, and the staff which operates and provides these capabilities. Accordingly, it is desirable and feasible to separate conceptually and organizationally the problem of providing the advisory staff support from that of providing the routine information support. It is difficult to improvise information support during a crisis and it is possible to anticipate the requirements for this support before the crisis. The reverse is true for staff advisory support.

Presidential councils are informal and consultative in nature. The President receives his information support through his advisors and, accordingly, crisis management would not be enhanced by establishment at the national level of an elaborate "National Command Center" manned by a large, permanent interagency staff.

Many avenues are available that would improve interagency effectiveness in crisis anticipation and management. The following are recommended: increased attention at all levels of the Joint Staff with crisis management, freer interaction at all levels between members of the Joint Staff and their counterparts in other agencies, greater interagency review of military and political contingency plans, increased inter-agency participation in war gaming and exercising, and increased attention within the Joint Staff on nonmilitary factors affecting crisis anticipation and management.

Within the military establishment the concept of handling crises within command posts or operations centers is well established. The NMCC is similar to, but both narrower and broader in its scope than the conventional operations center. It is narrower in that its support to decision makers is rendered through the medium of their staff advisors, and ordinarily it does not itself provide advisory staff support except when an emergency does not permit referral to such advisors. It is broader in that the principal users of NMCC information support are not only the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, but also various elements of OSD and authorized persons in the White House, State Department and CIA.

The NMCC performs the functions of (1) warning and alert, (2) information support, and (3) implementation. Its principal suppliers of information to the NMCC are the operating forces, the service operations centers, and the DIA through the Intelligence Support and Indications Center.

The fundamental character of the NMCC is that of a DoD information support facility operated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the DoD as a whole. In the performance of its functions the NMCC should exchange information freely with analogous information centers elsewhere within the Government.

The management arrangements under which the NMCC operates should preserve its close working relationship with the Directorate for Operations in the Joint Staff and also should reflect its essentially

informational character and DoD-wide scope.

Future development of the NMCC should emphasize evolutionary improvement as opposed to sweeping change. Such evolution will be helped by increased efforts to evaluate NMCC performances both in actual crises and in exercises. The establishment of suitable performance standards for the NMCC will also be helpful in its development.

Exercises of a variety of types and scope are necessary not only for the improvement of the NMCC but also to familiarize participating decision makers with its facilities and with command problems. For some of these exercises, senior members from all affected agencies and their staffs should participate.

At any stage of crisis or general nuclear war, enemy options range from a deliberate heavy attack against national command centers to strenuously avoiding these targets. In addition, there are a host of foreseeable and unforeseeable events that could lead to nuclear strikes on Washington or to Washington remaining completely undamaged. In providing for command and control support to the President, all of these contingencies must be considered. In providing survivability for the President, the worst cases must be planned for.

There are many factors militating against presidential relocation during crises short of general war. However, if the enemy decides to escalate a crisis to general war, he can easily destroy unprotected national centers without the President's receiving tactical warning. If tactical warning of an attack is received, it is not clear that the President's wisest course would be to seek immediate protection. Accordingly, capabilities should be provided for presidential protection in a highly survivable command center during any phase of crisis. This center must allow the President and the Presidential Group to manage intense crises short of general nuclear war as well as these can be managed from the White House.

The unique value of the President required that all possible measures be taken to insure his personal survival of an attack on the U.S. However, provision for a successor is also necessary. Accordingly, capabilities should allow relocation to a highly survivable center of an alternate Presidential Group headed by a presidentially designated alternate Commander-in-Chief. The command and control support for this alternate group could be much more austere than those for a relocated President.

It is important to recognize the national-level character of those alternates that might be used by the President or an Alternate Decision Group as contrasted with the DoD-level role of the NMCC.

A DUCC in Washington would be the only facility that could adequately satisfy the presidential needs for accessibility combined with survivability and adequate staff support. However, since a DUCC cannot be operational for at least five years, in the interim only the NECPA ship and a National Mobile Land Command Post (NMLCP) come close to approximating the requirements of: adequate staff support; high volume (not necessarily survivable) communications between the alternate and soft Washington centers; continuous operation for a period of days or weeks; and high survivability of the alternate itself. The NEACP falls short of meeting the first three criteria: the ANMCC fails on the last.

For the time period before a DUCC could be operational, the study developed the following three different configurations of alternates ranging from most austere to the most adequate:

a. Two functionally similar NECPA ships

b. Three NEACP aircraft, plus (a) above

c. An NMLCP with a staff capacity somewhat less than an NECPA, plus (b) above.

The Study recommends alternative (b) above. An NMLCP is not recommended unless greater emphasis is placed on providing flexible capabilities for presidential relocation during intense crises short of general war.

The JCS assisted by DCA and the Navy should conduct a study that develops plans for remedying the operational defects of the current two-ship NECPA element. This study should: i) detail the functional needs and criteria for support of the Presidential Group during intense crises and during the strategic exchange phase; ii) compare the costs and schedules of significantly improving the Northampton or obtaining a replacement hull; and, iii) consider operating concepts with the current or new ships.

The operational concept and support plans of the NECPA and the NEACP should be revised to provide for greater endurance, survivability and accessibility. For the NECPA, this planning should include increased protection from various forms of attack, larger and faster transportation capability between Washington and the ships, and operations closer to the Washington area during crises. For the NEACP, the planning should include use of aerial refueling, permanent dispersal of the aircraft, capability for post-strike use of several bases that have prelocated logistics and communications support, and plans for locating the aircraft closer to Washington during severe crises.

Because of its relatively low survivability, the ANMCC is not suited to use by the President or an Alternate Decision Group during an intense crisis or the initial stages of a general war. The AJCC should be continued with primarily the following functions: act as a potential reconstitution site in the follow-on phases of a general war; provide a dispersed back-up to Washington communications; and support other NMCS centers for day-to-day operations and crises. A detailed functional and technical analysis of the current and planned AJCC should be conducted in order to develop a better understanding of how particular capabilities and costs contribute to each of these functions. The study should indicate potential savings.

Washington, May 5, 1965.

Several of us have looked this over and find that it is a very logical study,/2/ which fully appreciates the situation in regard to the President. The conclusions, as to the requirements for command and control support for the President, are sound.

The conclusions in Chapter VII are logical, and they would indicate the following actions:

(a) That the President choose a Presidential Group that will assist him in directing a crisis when it occurs.

(b) That further study be made of the means for the protection of the President during times of intense crisis.

(c) That interagency effectiveness in crisis anticipation and management be improved.

(d) That we should not attempt to establish a formal National Command Center with adequate staff support on a full-time basis, but that we plan for the establishment of such a command center if it were to be needed.

(a) Someone in authority should take an active hand in lining up the proper Presidential support to go with the emergency plans, which are charged to the Office of the Military Aide at present. We have gone about as far as we can go with the present guidance. Fundamentally the President should have recommendations made to him as to the specific locations of his possible successors, including the Vice President, and see that appropriate staff assignments are made so that if a nuclear attack occurred, and the President were lost, the command function could be carried on by one or more successors.

The above includes the advance designation for certain members of the State Department, Defense Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to go to the location of the Vice President, and that the Vice President and the agencies be so directed; and that the proper communications be established at these points when the Vice President goes.

(b) The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense and you as the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs should review the "highly classified" command and control designations, and recommend to the President whether or not these should be continued. The last review was with President Kennedy, as far as I know.

(c) Most important, it behooves us to improve our own decision support to the President. As you can see from this study, decision support falls in several categories, including information, staff, etc. It is quite obvious from even the recent experience in the Dominican Republic situation that it takes from three to four days to extemporize a situation room and staff to meet a Presidential requirement even in a minor crisis in which our own security is not threatened. This could be improved with a little thought and some preparation on a more permanent basis. The staff and decision support of the President of the United States can be put on a better established basis now that we are so well acquainted with the working habits of the President, as well as his decision-making procedures.

I would suggest that the time has come for the White House to attain a capability to meet the crisis situations which appear to be a "norm" rather than an exception.

(a) That you designate a member of your staff to write a reply to Secretary Vance based on the above.

(b) That you designate a member of your staff to work out the basis for our own improvements in this area.

(c) That the President designate a member of his staff to supervise the "successor location" item of emergency planning.

C.V.C.

Washington, May 10, 1965.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

The Problem

To review the evidence acquired since the publication of NIE 11-8-64, and to assess its implications for the Soviet ICBM forces through mid-1966.

Scope Note

NIE 11-8-64, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack," dated 8 October 1964, Top Secret Restricted Data, is a comprehensive estimate of Soviet capabilities in the field of strategic attack. This memorandum has been prompted by new evidence which requires us to review our judgments of Soviet ICBM programs and, in particular, the pace of ICBM deployment. A new estimate in the 11-8 series, which will deal with all Soviet strategic attack systems, will be issued in late 1965.

Discussion

1. In NIE 11-8-64, we estimated that deployment of second-generation ICBMs in soft sites and three-silo hard sites had come to an end, and that the Soviet ICBM program was moving into a new phase characterized by dispersed single silos. Subsequent evidence has confirmed these trends, but single silos apparently have been started at a faster pace than previously estimated.

2. We have now identified about 125 single silos, all begun since about January 1964. The actual number under construction is probably larger. When compared to past rates of starting ICBM launchers, the present level of activity is high; the largest number of ICBM launchers previously started in a single year was about 90. The building rate, however, is not without precedent nor does it represent what could be termed a maximum effort; at one point in 1963 about 140 ICBM launchers were under construction in a variety of site configurations, and MR/IRBM launcher construction was also continuing.

3. We believe that the most advanced of these launchers will not reach operational status until late 1965. This means that the mid-1965 operational ICBM strength will be about 225,/2/ somewhat lower than our previous estimate of 235-260./3/ On the other hand, the pace of single-silo deployment could carry the force by mid-1966 beyond the high side of the previously estimated range of 285-320. Considering the estimated time to bring launch groups to operational status and making allowance for undetected launchers now under construction, our new estimate for mid-1966 is:

Soft Launchers	146/4/
Hard (3 silo)	78
Single Silo	126-l78
TOTAL (Rounded)	350-400/5/

The number of hardened ICBM launchers will increase from the present figure of 78 to 200-250 in mid-1966. The force will become more dispersed, with 150-200 separate hardened sites in mid-1966 in contrast with the present 26.

4. We cannot yet determine what missiles are intended for the new silos. The Soviets have tested two third generation ICBM systems, the SS-9 and the SS-10. We believe that the SS-9 which has followed a normal test program will be deployed in at least some of the silos. The SS-10 was test fired eight times between April and October 1964 but, for reasons we cannot explain, there have been no test firings since. It too may be deployed in some of the silos.

5. Finally, there is evidence pointing to the development of other missiles, including one which is probably small, at the test range. Thus, it is possible that some of the silos are intended for a new ICBM, which has not been identified in test firings./6/ If so, the deployment of the launchers so far in advance of the flight tests of the missile would represent a departure from previous Soviet practice. Such an innovation would imply confidence that no major changes in the weapon system will be required; it could stem from a desire to reach a planned ICBM force level more quickly than would otherwise be possible. An intensive and successful test program would be necessary for this missile to become available for extensive deployment as early as mid-1966. Thus it is possible that many of the new silos listed as operational in mid-1966 will at that time lack missiles.

6. It is not now clear how far the Soviets will push the current deployment program or whether it will be succeeded by follow-on programs. Though by mid-1967 the Soviets almost certainly will have more than the 330-395 operational launchers estimated in NIE 11-8-64, it is yet too early to revise our estimate that the Soviets will achieve a force of 400-700 ICBM launchers over the next five years. We expect, however, that evidence collected before the publication of NIE 11-8-65 this far will help to clarify Soviet goals./7/

Washington, May 24, 1965.

SUBJECT
National Command System

I have attached two JCS papers that you might like to scan. I have not heard any more about the command system study since I spoke to you about it in February.

JCSM 129/2/ indicates the Chiefs' general agreement with the study with the exception that they felt it underrates the Alternate Command Center at Fort Ritchie. At that time the Chiefs deferred judgment on the Command Post Afloat.

In the second paper, JCSM 364 (17 May),/3/ they concluded that two command ships are essential, and that the capabilities of the USS Northampton should be improved. The Chief of Naval Operations disagreed, and argued that one ship was sufficient.

In the last analysis, the value of any command facility must be determined to a great extent by the probability that the President will, in fact, make use of that facility.

RCB/4/

Washington, June 1, 1965.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

The President has noted the request for nuclear weapons dispersal authorization for FY 1965/1966 contained in the Department of Defense memorandum dated May 24, 1965,/2/ and has taken the following actions in connection therewith:

1. The Atomic Energy Commission is authorized to:

a. Transfer to the Department of Defense, on call by the Secretary of Defense or his designee, sufficient numbers of separable nuclear components and complete atomic weapons to provide in Department of Defense custody as of June 30, 1966, up to a [number not declassified] nuclear elements. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which are planned to be dispersed until end FY 1966 and which do not appear in the approved stockpile for FY 1966.

b. Transfer additional weapons to the Department of Defense custody on a one-for-one basis, but not to exceed [number not declassified] weapons, to replace weapons recalled by the Atomic Energy Commission to support modernization, quality assurance and retirement programs;

c. Replace, on a one-for-one basis to the extent practicable, any nuclear components, complete atomic weapons, or non-nuclear components in the Department of Defense custody which become irretrievably lost or damaged beyond repair.

2. The Department of Defense is authorized to:

a. Obtain custody of up to a total of [number not declassified] elements;

b. Disperse atomic weapons in the United States without limit providing the total number of nuclear components and complete atomic weapons in Department of Defense custody does not exceed that authorized in paragraph 2a above;

c. Disperse nuclear weapons to areas outside the United States in the numbers indicated in the last column of Appendix A hereto/3/ of the representative FY 1966 dispersal plan with the provisos that: (1) The total in each area may be exceeded by 10% in the event of unforeseen contingencies, (2) weapons for which dispersal in support of non-U.S. NATO forces is authorized for planning purposes only will be dispersed in support of U.S. forces in the areas pending additional and specific dispersal authorizations on a case-by-case basis and (3) the grand total of weapons outside the US (areas under foreign sovereignty and areas under U.S. control other than U.S.) will not [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Such dispersals will be subject to the yield restriction outlined in NSAM 143 and the policy with regard to PAL devices contained in NSAM 160./4/ To the maximum extent possible, weapons earmarked for ultimate use in support of forecast allied nuclear capabilities will be dispersed and made available for U.S. forces, pending attainment of a capability by the allies.

d. Continue to disperse nuclear weapons and provide nuclear weapon support to non-U.S. forces in accordance with the current authorizations for dispersal as tabulated in the column "Non-US Forces--Authorized FY 1964" (Column C) of Appendix B hereto.

3. It is understood that the currently authorized area level of nuclear warheads to be stored in Europe is adequate in numbers and megatonnage to meet requirements now recognized for use by U.S. or non-U.S. NATO forces. There will necessarily be changes required in the stockpile due to such things as modernization, redistribution among users, and possible changes in force dispositions. It is expected that the next and succeeding dispersal plans focus principally on changes of this sort as far as Europe is concerned, and that any recommendation for significant net increases in the European stockpile beyond the level authorized by this NSAM will be made only on the basis of new circumstances.

McGeorge Bundy/5/