Washington, August 2, 1965.

This is a summary of readiness to put into effect civilian mobilization measures as necessary to support an increased military commitment to Vietnam.

--The Nation faces the present situation with greater economic strength and preparedness to mobilize our civilian effort in support of national defense than ever before in our history.

--The Defense Production Act of 1950/2/ contains authority to meet the immediate problems of the buildup. It provides for priorities and allocations and other actions for expediting defense production. Authorities for price and wage stabilization have expired. Legislative proposals are ready if needed.

--The Director of the Office of Emergency Planning coordinates, on behalf of the President, all mobilization activities of the Executive branch. Executive Order 10480/3/ gives him the priorities and allocations authorities conferred upon the President by Title I of the Defense Production Act.

--The Defense Materials System provides machinery for expediting and allocating materials for defense production. It is administered by the Business and Defense Services Administration (Department of Commerce) under redelegation from the Director of OEP. It successfully supports Defense, AEC, and NASA programs today, and can be expanded.

--Although the economy may be able, in general terms, to accommodate a stepped-up military effort, there will be instances where specific industries, materials, components, or facilities will require action under the Defense Production Act to facilitate production.

--The state of our strategic and critical materials stockpiles, having a market value of about $8 billion, is very good. Sixty-three of the 77 stockpiled materials equal or exceed stockpile objectives for limited or conventional war. Although the inventories for the remaining 14 materials are adequate to meet a limited war of short duration, they should be brought to the level of established stockpile objectives, and we are taking steps to this end without unduly affecting markets.

--We are in touch with the Council of Economic Advisors and other agencies to watch economic indices affecting mobilization.

--Economic stabilization measures are of two types--indirect controls and direct controls. Indirect include: taxes, credit controls, and other monetary measures within the responsibility of the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board. Some of these measures are part of our day-to-day economic system.

Direct controls include those for prices, wages and salaries, and rents as well as rationing. Authority for such controls does not exist today. Legislative proposals are kept ready, but capability to administer these controls does not exist since substantial national organizations would be required. Preliminary plans and arrangements have been developed as a part of our regular preparedness. A national organization could be established and in operation in a period of 60-90 days.

--No major national manpower problem is foreseen. Manpower shortages, to the extent they would exist, would be in critical skills and localized. These shortages could generally be met through existing voluntary manpower measures already established by the Department of Labor and endorsed by the National Labor-Management Manpower Policy Committee. Care will have to be exercised in meeting military requirements for medical personnel to minimize the effect on civilian communities. Selective Service is ready to meet increased calls for military personnel.

--In the transportation field there are three areas of possible shortages: ocean shipping (where the Maritime Administration has already pulled 14 ships from the National Defense Reserve Fleet), air cargo, and rail freight. Shortages occur in rail freight today. Necessary action to meet national defense requirements can be taken by the President under existing law.

--To evaluate the potential economic and industrial impact of increased defense spending, and to plan effectively the mobilization effort, we must have a clear and detailed statement from the Department of Defense on the size, composition, and phasing of defense requirements. I will review this matter with the Secretary of Defense so that we can provide coordinated civilian support.

Buford Ellington

Washington, September 3, 1965.

Dear Cy:

The Department of Defense study, Command and Control Support to the President, transmitted with your letter of March 6, 1965,/2/ contributes significantly to the development of a comprehensive Executive Branch approach to crisis management. The President's command and control support requirements are of obvious concern to the Department of State and to me personally.

I am of the personal view that much of the prevailing thinking about the problems of conducting essential governmental processes after sustaining a nuclear attack is inadequate and dated and fails to grapple realistically with the formidable obstacles which would confront officials surviving such an encounter. Of necessity, this basic reservation colors and qualifies some of the comments which follow.

Many of the observations and recommendations contained in this study confirm the validity of present State/Defense understandings and arrangements which have enhanced the President's ability to give direction to politico-military operations. I have in mind particularly the exchange of personnel between our Operations Center and the National Military Command Center, the monitoring by one department of the other's significant message traffic, and other machinery for managing crisis situations at the Presidential level. Moreover, the study emphasizes the value of such activities as the recently inaugurated State-Defense-CIA cooperation in politico-military contingency planning and in the development and conduct of major JCS exercises.

We also note that the current study reinforces the previously advanced justification for the construction of a Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC). The National Military Command System's Master Plan and the JCS Continuity of Operations Plan/3/ contemplate State Department representation in both the sea and airborne alternates, as well as the ANMCC. We will give further study to operational concepts and physical arrangements applicable to State Department functions both at and in support of such command posts.

Under its terms of reference, the DOD study group was instructed to state projections of Presidential support obtainable from non-DOD sources in "general terms" only. We concur in the view that a Presidentially directed response to varying crisis levels, up to and including general war, requires the marshalling of a wider range of governmental resources than those of the Department of Defense. Hence we believe that there is a need to explore more specifically the conceptual requirements for non-DOD command and control support to the President which will supplement the analysis of Department of Defense support developed by the DOD study group. Initially, such an undertaking would appear to call for a careful stock-taking by other key agencies of their own responsibilities and capabilities in this field. The Department of State, accordingly, will initiate a study along these lines at an early date. We hope such a study will contribute to government-wide understanding of the components of a total "national command" concept.

We shall be giving study to improving our own Command and Control System in the days ahead. Undoubtedly this work will include consultations between our respective Departments and joint consideration of pertinent materials, including the present study. If this exercise results in additional suggestions or proposals which might be worth your consideration in connection with review of command and control procedures, we will be in communication with you.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dean

NIE 11-6-65

Washington, September 16, 1965.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR CONCEALING STRATEGIC
WEAPON PROGRAMS

The Problem

To estimate Soviet capabilities for secretly developing and deploying strategic weapon systems and to examine factors bearing on Soviet intentions in this regard, over the next few years.

Scope Note

In this estimate, we assume that Western collection efforts will continue at approximately their present levels. Soviet capabilities for concealing strength under terms of an inspection agreement have not been considered, since these capabilities would have to be assessed in detail in relation to each of the many possible forms which such an inspection agreement might take. We have, however, considered in general the effect which arms control might have upon Soviet concealment.

In this estimate "concealment" is defined as an effort designed to limit Western knowledge of Soviet military programs. Its usual aim is to induce an underestimate of Soviet capabilities. It would also hamper targeting and reduce Western ability to develop countermeasures to Soviet weapons systems.

The Estimate

1. By definition, if the USSR should achieve complete and successful concealment of weapons systems, the fact would be unknown to US intelligence unless and until the Soviets chose to reveal it. It cannot, of course, be conclusively proven that successful concealment of this sort has not happened. It must be acknowledged at the outset that successful concealment is and will remain a possibility.

2. The Soviets have instituted concealment measures in all phases of their strategic weapons programs. The extent of these efforts and their success have varied from program to program and even within programs. In general, however, the Soviets have been most successful in denying information on strategic weapons programs in the research and development phase. They have been less successful as a program progresses to systems testing, and have not, we believe, been able to conceal any large-scale deployment programs.

3. To some extent, these concealment efforts of the Soviets represent an extension of the devotion to secrecy that permeates their society. This factor alone would account for the rigorous physical security measures protecting strategic weapons facilities from observation by nearby inhabitants, as well as by clandestine agents or attaches.

4. Such concealment efforts as the Soviets have undertaken appear to have been directed toward hiding precise locations in operational deployment of a system and denying information on its characteristics. They clearly know of some of the various advanced intelligence collection methods employed by the US and almost certainly suspect the existence of others. But complicating Soviet concealment efforts is the variety of collection programs employed by the West which, in the process of all source analysis, results in a total body of intelligence greater than the sum of its parts. Thus, to be effective, a Soviet effort completely to conceal a strategic weapon program would require a complex and generally costly variety of safeguards. We believe that they now have insufficient incentive to undertake such an effort.

5. On the other hand, it is unlikely that Soviet efforts to conceal certain aspects of their strategic weapons programs will diminish, and they may increase. We cannot predict the extent to which contemplated improvements in US collection capabilities may be offset by an intensification of Soviet concealment efforts. But even if the Soviets undertake no additional measures, we consider it unlikely that our ability to detect, identify, and assess a new weapon system in the pretesting stage of development will improve. For the foreseeable future, new Soviet weapon systems are likely to have been under development for several years before they are detected in testing or in deployment, and the increasingly complex technology of modern weapons will probably lengthen further the time between initial research and deployment.

6. We believe that the Soviets have, or could develop, greater capabilities for concealment than they have practiced, and it is possible that their policy will change. If they should come to believe that the credibility of their deterrent is well-established, they may increase concealment activity in order to improve their retaliatory capabilities. While it is difficult to foresee technological breakthroughs, we consider it improbable that they could successfully conceal the deployment of strategic weapons in such numbers as to alter significantly the present strategic relationship.

7. The preceding paragraphs have discussed Soviet concealment primarily in the context of past and present conditions, that is, without an arms control agreement. In general, we do not foresee that an arms control agreement would significantly affect either US intelligence capabilities or Soviet concealment capabilities except as specific provisions might facilitate or discourage particular modes of intelligence collection or inspection. The effectiveness of any specific provisions of the agreement would depend on their content and the machinery for enforcing them, and cannot be estimated in the abstract. Certain general considerations can, however, be set forth.

8. The conclusion of an arms control agreement would probably signify that the Soviets had decided to accept, at least for a time, the strategic balance envisaged in the agreement. However, the Soviets might conclude such an agreement in hopes of freezing US strategic forces while secretly trying to build up their own. In the first case, they might subsequently decide that, because of international developments or for other reasons, they required substantially larger forces. In such circumstances they might choose to abrogate an agreement openly rather than to attempt to evade its provisions; they took a similar action during the Berlin crisis of 1961 when they ended the moratorium on nuclear testing. If they decided to abrogate, they would almost certainly make secret preparations for a resumption of the arms competition in advance of the announcement.

9. Nevertheless, under certain arms control agreements, the Soviets might see concealment as offering a strategic advantage which was worth the risk. If, for example, the US and the Soviet Union should be limited by an agreement to small numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, possession of even a few additional vehicles could significantly change the strategic equation. Depending on the provisions of the agreement, and the rules for policing it, they might assess the risk of detection as small, but they could hardly dismiss it as non-existent. And they would have to consider that if the concealed forces were detected, the arms control agreements would be abrogated in circumstances politically disadvantageous to them, and the West would make strenuous efforts to redress any real or presumed disparity.

10. If the Soviets should employ concealment to violate the arms control treaty, we believe that their aim would be to change the strategic balance. Any smaller stakes would hardly justify the risks. Such an effort would imply a Soviet decision to accept the complexity and cost of an all out concealment effort, thus degrading the reliance we could have in our detection capabilities. Even in the face of determined Soviet concealment efforts, there is a good chance that violations involving large scale testing or deployment would be detected, but this cannot be guaranteed. In view of our limited capabilities to detect the early phases of weapons programs, we cannot assure detection sufficiently timely to preclude attainment by the Soviets of a significant lead in acquiring an increased strategic capability.

11. Our capabilities for detecting smaller accretions to Soviet strategic strength are much less certain, especially in an arms control environment, and, depending upon the terms of any arms control agreement, even small accretions could be significant. Some such accretions might be detected but we cannot give assurance that any would be.

NIE 11-12-65

Washington, September 22, 1965.

REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

The Problem

To estimate the immediate and longer term foreign reactions to a US decision to deploy ballistic missile defenses.

Assumptions

1. The US will within the next year or so announce a decision to initiate deployment of ballistic missile defenses, either:

a. A small program, along with such other defensive measures as a fall-out shelter plan. This program would be intended and officially described as a defense against a light, unsophisticated ballistic missile attack, or

b. A much larger program, together with other defensive measures more extensive than those envisaged under the smaller program. This larger program would be clearly intended to provide a substantial, but not complete, defense against a Soviet strategic missile attack.

2. Either program could be subsequently expanded.

3. The US will not have an initial operational capability under either program until the early 1970s.

Discussion

1. Most countries would make no distinction between the two assumed programs. They would not believe a US claim that it was deploying such costly ballistic missile defenses simply to guard against a minor threat; they would look on the smaller program as merely the first stage of a larger one. Accordingly, immediate reactions would be influenced more by the decision to deploy than by the size of the program.

2. In the non-Communist world, initial reactions to the US decision would depend to some extent on how the program was publicly presented. If it were announced as a logical development in the US military effort and as a response to Soviet progress in the ABM field, and especially if there were prior consultations with friendly governments, reactions in general probably would be mild and not unfavorable. There would be, nevertheless, some unfavorable reactions, but we believe that these too would be generally mild, of short duration, and unlikely to have a significant effect on the relations of these countries with the US./2/

3. Any such program would certainly be reported fully in US news media, particularly the military-industrial trade journals. In addition, the purpose and nature of the program would be described in public announcements and in news reports attributed to official sources. Thus, the Soviets probably would correctly estimate the general capabilities of either of the assumed programs, but they would be unlikely to accept official US explanations that the smaller program was intended primarily to counter the type of threat which may eventually be posed by Communist China. The Soviets almost certainly would see any US program for ballistic missile defenses as a move to reduce the effectiveness of their strategic attack forces and would take into account its effect upon their strategic position.

4. In assessing the significance of the US decision, the Soviets would be influenced by the value which they attach to ballistic missile defenses and, to a degree, by the status of their own program. The magnitude of the Soviet ABM effort points to a strong desire to obtain missile defenses rapidly. We believe that the Soviets have no such defenses operational at present, but we know that they are pushing ahead with their R and D effort. They have made, moreover, a stronger attempt in the last year or so to convey the impression that they have succeeded in developing effective ABM systems. If the Soviet program were progressing well at the time the US decision is announced, they probably would take a calmer view of the US move than if their program were lagging. It is possible that they would see the US announcement as having been precipitated by recent Soviet claims in the area of missile defense.

5. The Soviet assessment would go beyond the military significance of the US decision and consider as well political motivations. The Soviets would first of all view the decision as evidence that the US was intent upon maintaining its strategic position vis-a-vis the USSR. While they would recognize that their own ABM program had contributed to the US decision, they would judge that the US in this instance was willing to see, or at least saw no way to avert, a continuation of the arms race. Further, it is conceivable that they would view the decision as a move to force them to make military expenditures which would keep their economy under strain. They might even interpret it as a sign that the US considered nuclear war somewhat more likely in the longer term, particularly if the announcement came at a time of crisis in, for example, Vietnam. Associated expenditures for a shelter program would probably strengthen the voice of those advocating this interpretation. The Soviets would be likely to interpret the coupling of the US announcement with a disarmament proposal for, say, reducing strategic delivery vehicles as part and parcel of a scheme designed to restrict their strategic capabilities.

6. In the propaganda field, the Soviets almost certainly would charge the US with reducing the prospects for disarmament, and probably would accuse the US of seeking to increase its capabilities for nuclear war. Over the longer term, however, the Soviets probably would stress two propaganda lines: one, that the concept of "Fortress America" was again gaining ascendancy in the US; the other, that Soviet missile defenses were superior to those of the US, and that the latter could not cope with a Soviet strategic missile attack.

7. In their military planning, the Soviets probably have already taken into account the likelihood that the US would develop an ABM capability. Nevertheless, they would feel compelled to respond to the US move in several ways. Programs which they would consider include: improving the penetration capabilities of their strategic ballistic missile systems; expanding their ICBM and SLBM development programs beyond present plans; adopting targeting concepts consistent with a smaller number of key targets, whose defenses they would seek to saturate; placing greater emphasis on strategic bomber systems and cruise missile submarines, in order to complicate the US defenses; seeking to develop space weapons; and finally, intensifying work on their ABM program. It should be noted, however, that the Soviets will probably undertake some of these advanced weapons programs even if the US implements no ballistic missile defense program.

8. Alternatively, it is possible that, in view of internal Soviet policy debates stemming from the resource demands of the military, the US decision might increase pressures on the Soviet leaders to stabilize some aspects of arms competition. In this context, a simultaneous new offer on arms control might have some prospects. We rate the chances of a positive Soviet reaction, however, as low.

9. In any event, we believe that the US decision to deploy ballistic missile defenses, by itself, would not significantly worsen US-Soviet relations. Nor would it be likely to have any direct or basic effect on Soviet policies in existing problem areas, i.e., Vietnam or Berlin. And we believe that the US decision would not change any of the key determinants of Soviet policies toward Western Europe or Communist China.

10. The Chinese missile and nuclear programs are in such early stages of development that the US decision would have little immediate impact on them. We have estimated that the Chinese could not have an ICBM strike capability until sometime after 1970. Meanwhile, the Chinese would be likely to persist in their efforts to develop a shorter range nuclear capability and proceed to experiment and explore in the field of advanced weapons. If in time, however, the Chinese would come to judge the US ballistic missile defenses as highly effective, they might make only a token deployment of any crude ICBM or submarine-launched ballistic missile system which they might develop, while continuing R and D on more sophisticated systems. We believe that the US decision in itself would not cause the Chinese to develop a submarine-launched cruise missile fleet to threaten the US, a program which they might in any event undertake.

11. In the political field, Peking would exploit those exaggerated impressions of China's military strength which would arise from the public discussion of the smaller program as a defense against China. At the same time, the Chinese almost certainly would claim that the US was stepping up its efforts at "nuclear blackmail." The US decision, however, might increase the anxieties of the Chinese leaders that the US intends ultimately to attack China.

12. We believe that the West European reactions to the US decision would be generally mild./3/ There would be some initial, unfavorable public commentary, stemming primarily from concern over a possible intensification of the arms race and a further diminution of the prospects for East-West detente. This concern would probably be heightened by Soviet political reactions and, particularly, by fears that the USSR would make drastic responses of a military nature; misconceptions about the limitations and military significance of ballistic missile defenses might add to these fears. The announcement of the decision might be used in some quarters as proof of a shift in US policy toward a "Fortress America" concept, and in others as evidence that the US was beginning to think nuclear war more likely over the longer term. There would also be, however, a large amount of apathy regarding the decision, since most West Europeans of all political leanings regard the likelihood of general nuclear war as remote. In addition, if adequate explanations were given by the US in advance or at the time of the public announcement, unfavorable reactions caused by such attitudes could be dampened.

13. Those West European officials who assert there already is a growing divergence between US and West European strategic interests would probably cite the US decision as further justification of their position. If the US announcement of the smaller program emphasized defense against Communist China, critics of US policy would allege that increasing American involvement in Asia would, sooner or later, compel the US to reduce its commitments to Western Europe. De Gaulle and his supporters would assiduously propagate such views. On the other hand, those governments and officials who favor close relations with the US and continue to place their trust in US willingness to defend Western Europe against a Soviet attack would probably support the US decision. They would regard the deployment of ballistic missile defenses as enhancing American capabilities to deter the USSR. They would probably see no lessening in the ability of the US to inflict unacceptable damage on the USSR, even if the Soviets responded by strengthening their offensive missile forces or intensifying work on their ABM program. Over the longer term, we see little likelihood that the West Europeans would conclude that improved US defenses weakened the deterrents to the outbreak of nuclear war. In general, we believe that the deployment of ballistic missile defenses by the US would not be a major factor in US-West European relationships in the foreseeable future.

14. The UK would probably be interested in acquiring missile defenses, but it would not be prepared to spend much money on a deployment program until a highly effective system was available. Although the West German Government would also support the US decision, Bonn would probably be disquieted by the contrast between a nascent US strategic missile defense and its own defenselessness against Soviet missiles. Some West German officials might argue that the risks of general war would no longer be shared equally with the US, and they would be encouraged in this argument by de Gaulle. Thus, the already growing West German desire for more influence in the nuclear strategy of the Western Alliance might in the longer term be further strengthened by the US decision. These same West German officials might even express a desire to acquire missile defenses, but the majority view in the government would probably be against such a step, at least until there was convincing proof that such defenses would actually be effective against the Soviet threat to West Germany.

15. Asian reactions to the US decision probably would be mixed, but generally mild./4/ Since most Asians are more concerned with the Chinese Communist threat than with that posed by the USSR, the fact that the US rated the Chinese nuclear threat as requiring an "anti-Chinese" ballistic missile defense would tend to heighten fears of Communist China in some quarters. On the other hand, some Asians would be likely to view the US decision as further evidence of a continuing US policy to contain China. At the popular level, there would be even more apathy about the US action than in Western Europe, and any unfavorable public reactions probably would be short-lived. Those Asian governments and officials who now support most US policies would accept the US decision, and those who do not would oppose it. We believe that, on balance, the US decision would have no basic or significant effect on US relations with the Asian nations.

16. Over the longer term, as Chinese strategic capabilities became more apparent, India and Australia might wish to obtain ballistic missile defenses from the US, but high costs would probably discourage them. The geographic situation of Taiwan would make its defense against ballistic missiles most difficult; nevertheless, the GRC might seek to acquire such defenses. The Japanese, although not presently as concerned as some other Asians that China poses a military threat to them, might develop an interest in obtaining ballistic missile defenses.

17. We believe that most of the Latin American and African governments and their peoples would not react strongly, if at all, to the US decision. They would probably see the US move as another manifestation of American military power. In general, however, any US action implying that Communist China had the capability to attack the US with ballistic missiles would considerably upgrade China in the opinion of the Latin Americans and Africans.

18. There are, at present, no countries other than the USSR and Communist China which might acquire missile forces which could attack the US and which might have the motivation to do so. The possibility will always exist, nevertheless, that the Soviets or perhaps the Communist Chinese would attain a highly influential relationship with some radical rebel government in the Western Hemisphere, such as was the case with Cuba in 1962, and exploit this relationship to establish missile bases threatening the US.

Washington, September 25, 1965.

Dear Pat:

On August 12, you provided me with a talking paper which expressed the interest of your Government in holding discussions with representatives of the United States on various aspects of a possible deployment of a United States anti-ballistic missile defense system./2/ I fully appreciate the interest of your Government in this problem.

We have been engaged in an examination of the political implications of a possible deployment decision; our preliminary study of these implications has not yet been completed. Meanwhile, our Department of Defense has certain additional technical studies in progress that could bear on a U.S. decision./3/

Accordingly, it is our view that discussions of this question, in which we believe other members of the Alliance may be interested as well, would be more useful if they were held after we have progressed somewhat further with both our technical studies and our analysis of possible political implications.

I shall be in touch with you when we have completed more of our homework.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Dean

Washington, September 29, 1965.

SUBJECT
Letters from Prime Minister Wilson on Nuclear Weapons Arrangements

The two letters suggested for Tuesday luncheon discussion (Tab B) stem from the President's recent approval of the SACLANT ASW nuclear weapons dispersal plan which is the subject of attached State-DOD correspondence (Tab C)./2/ In brief, this plan calls for the storage in the UK of nuclear depth charges, intended for anti-submarine use by UK, US, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] forces which would be operating pursuant to NATO planning and under SACLANT command.

The UK has no objection to the NATO plan as such, but wishes to clear up two questions satisfactorily before the storage provisions of the plan are implemented. These questions were addressed in two letters rather than one because there is no real connection apart from the tie-relationship suggested. The proposals are these:

1. The first letter proposes that the long-standing US-UK Memorandum of Understanding/3/ be amended to show accurately what NATO-commanded US and UK forces are to come within its terms./4/

2. The second letter proposes a US-UK understanding to the effect that nuclear weapons will be released [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] only at such time as they are also being released to UK forces.

This matter was discussed extensively within the Department, with the Department of Defense and the White House staff, and with the British Embassy prior to the sending of the letters. It is our view that the President should accept the proposals made, replying to the Prime Minister with separate letters of assent. We believe also that action should be taken concurrently to inform [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of certain conditions governing release of weapons, i.e. (1) there is to be no alert loading of any aircraft under the SACLANT plan; U.S. custodial requirements are such that weapons can be released [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] only upon granting of Presidential release of U.S. weapons for NATO use and (2) in terms of the SACLANT plan, this means that weapons will be released [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] only when they are also being released for UK use. This action could in our view best be taken by the Department after consulting the British Embassy. The background and reasons for these recommendations are set forth in the annex at Tab A./5/

That you take the foregoing line when the matter is discussed with the President./6/

/6/Ball initialed his approval of the recommendation.

97. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 11-8-65

Washington October 7, 1965.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

The Problem

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic attack forces through mid-1967, and to estimate general trends in these forces over the next decade or so.

Note

Estimates of Soviet strategic attack capabilities for the present and the next few years can be made with high confidence; those for the period five to 10 years in the future are, of course, highly tentative. The Soviet planners themselves may not yet have set clear force goals for the 1970-1975 period. Even if they have, it seems certain that such decisions will be modified repeatedly in response to changes in military technology, in other Soviet weapons programs, in US forces, in resource availability, and in the general Soviet view of world affairs.

Conclusions

A. Over the next 10 years, we estimate a considerable strengthening of Soviet strategic attack forces, particularly in retaliatory capabilities, with chief emphasis on ICBMs. We do not believe, however, that the Soviets will expect to achieve, within the period of this estimate, forces which would make rational the deliberate initiation of general war. We believe that they will continue to adhere to the concept of a deterrent force. A stress on qualitative factors suggests that the Soviets see technological advance in weapons as a means by which they can improve their strategic position relative to the West. (Paras. 4-7)/2/ /3/

B. ICBM Force. The present Soviet ICBM force of 224 operational launchers represents a formidable capability in terms of deliverable megatonnage but it is a predominantly soft, concentrated force. Apparently recognizing its vulnerability, the Soviets are now deploying ICBMs in dispersed single silos. Within the next two years, the number of ICBM launchers will approximately double, but the number of separate launch sites will increase from about 100 to at least 300. (Paras. 8-10, 25, 31)

C. We estimate that the Soviet ICBM force in 1975 will be somewhere between 500 and 1,000 operational launchers. A force near the high side of the range would probably consist primarily of small ICBMs in single silos. By contrast, a force near the low side, though including substantial numbers of small, single silo launchers, would probably incorporate greater qualitative improvement and significant numbers of larger ICBMs, perhaps with multiple warheads and penetration aids. It is possible that within the next 10 years the Soviets will deploy a rail mobile ICBM system. (Paras. 23, 26-30)/4/

D. MRBM/IRBM Force. During the past year, the Soviet MRBM and IRBM force leveled off at about 735 operational launchers, some 135 hard, deployed at almost 200 sites. It is capable of delivering a devastating first strike against targets in Eurasia, but like the present ICBM force it is soft and concentrated. By 1975, the Soviets will probably have replaced the major portion of the force with new solid-fueled missiles deployed in dispersed hard sites and on mobile launchers. The flexibility and survivability of such a force may lead them to conclude that the same target system could be covered with fewer launchers. We estimate that in the 1970-1975 period Soviet MRBM/IRBM strength will stabilize at some 350-700 launchers. (Paras. 38, 40, 42-46)

E. Missile Submarines. The Soviet Navy has 43-48 ballistic missile submarines, including 8-10 nuclear-powered, with a total of 120-140 tubes. Construction of ballistic missile submarines of current classes ended in 1963. We estimate, however, that the Soviets will produce a new class which could become operational in 1968. It will almost certainly be nuclear powered and will probably carry more missiles than are carried by current classes, perhaps 6-12. A new submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of about 1,000 n.m. will probably enter service in two or three years, and by 1975 a 2,000 n.m. missile may be available. At that time the Soviets will probably have some 60 ballistic missile submarines, including about 20 of a new type. Only recently have Soviet ballistic missile submarines regularly carried out ocean patrols; this activity will increase, and by 1975 about 25 percent of the force will probably be on station. (Paras. 47, 49, 51, 53-54, 65)

F. In recent years, the USSR has emphasized construction of cruise missile submarines. The Soviet Navy now has 39-43, including 16-18 nuclear-powered with a total of 195-210 launchers. These submarines were initially intended to counter naval task forces, but their mission may be expanded to include land targets. Construction appears to be tapering off, but will probably continue at a reduced rate for several years. By 1975, the Soviets will probably have 60-70 cruise missile submarines, possibly including some of a new type. At that time, they will probably also have available new types of cruise missiles. (Paras. 47, 55-57, 65)

G. Bomber Force. Long Range Aviation, a force of some 200 heavy bombers and 800 mediums, is in general much better suited for Eurasian than for intercontinental operations. This force will decrease gradually through attrition and retirement. The Soviets may develop another new aircraft of medium bomber range, but we believe it unlikely that they will introduce a follow-on heavy bomber into Long Range Aviation. By 1975, the heavy bomber force will probably be reduced to about 50 aircraft, and the medium bomber force to some 250-500, comprised largely of Blinders./5/ (Paras. 66, 70, 72-76)

H. Space Weapons. Our evidence does not indicate that the USSR is developing offensive space weapons, but it is almost certainly investigating their feasibility. We do not believe that they will deploy such weapons within the next 10 years. This conclusion is based upon our judgment that such systems will not compare favorably in cost and effectiveness with ground-based systems and, to a lesser extent, upon our view that the Soviets would see political disadvantages in deploying weapons in space. The USSR has, however, orbited reconnaissance and communications satellites, and is probably developing other military support systems. (Paras. 83, 86, 87)

[Here follow the Discussion section (Parts I-VII, pages 5-31), Annex A (pages 33-45), and Annex B (following page 45).]

NIE 11-14-65

Washington, October 21, 1965.

CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

The Problem

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces through mid-1967, especially against the Central Region of NATO, and general trends in those forces over the next ten years.

Conclusions

A. The new Soviet political leaders appear to have modified Khrushchev's policy of curbing military costs at the expense of the general purpose forces. This change is probably attributable primarily to international tensions arising from the war in Vietnam, but it also reflects the increased influence of the ground force marshals. (Paras. 1-9)

B. Revisions in the force levels, organization, and deployment of the general purpose forces are virtually certain to occur in the course of the next ten years. The Soviets will probably improve the capabilities of their general purpose forces for non-nuclear war. The provision of more advanced weapon systems will increase the military effectiveness of the general purpose forces, but will also increase their cost. Over the longer term we foresee some reductions in personnel strength designed to hold this increasing cost within limits acceptable to the Soviet leadership. (Paras. 10-12)

C. We estimate that the USSR now has about 108 line divisions which are capable of participating in the initial operations of a war. These divisions have virtually all of their equipment. Their peacetime manning levels range from at least 90 percent of war strength in the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe to about 60 percent in the interior of the USSR. We estimate that the USSR has an additional 31 cadre divisions manned at an average of about 20 percent of full strength. Our confidence in these figures is higher than last year as a consequence of more intensive study and new information. (Paras. 13-27)

D. The Soviets have significantly increased their tactical rocket and missile support in the past year. Further increases are likely, as well as the introduction of systems of improved range and mobility. We believe that as the capabilities of tactical aircraft improve the numbers of aircraft in Tactical Aviation will gradually decline./2/ (Paras. 28-36)

E. During the past year there has been a marked increase in the tempo of Soviet naval activity; a larger number of units have operated at a distance from Soviet waters. We believe that Soviet naval capabilities for operations far from home bases will continue to increase over the next ten years with the introduction into the forces of more long-range submarines and support ships. (Paras. 47-53, 59)

F. The USSR is seriously concerned about the Polaris threat to the homeland and has intensified efforts to improve its antisubmarine warfare capabilities. We estimate that, even so, the Soviet capability to detect, identify, and destroy submarines operating in the open seas will remain severely limited for the next several years. (Paras. 54-57)

G. The Soviets have shown increasing interest in airborne and amphibious capabilities in support of theater operations. Over the next ten years they will probably improve these capabilities and seek to develop some capability for distant limited military action. (Paras. 60-66)

H. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies have 45 divisions and about 2,900 combat aircraft immediately available for employment against the Central Region of NATO. We believe, however, that if the Soviets planned to attack NATO they would reinforce these forces, if circumstances permitted, with additional ground and air forces from the western USSR. (Paras. 67-76)

Discussion

1. Despite the rapid and costly development of Soviet forces for strategic attack and defense, the general purpose forces remain the largest and most expensive element in the Soviet military establishment. Khrushchev, concerned with economic growth and consumer satisfaction, sought to check rising military costs. Because he gave priority to strategic attack and defense, he could accomplish this only by reducing the share of the military budget allocated to the general purpose forces. In 1960 he initiated drastic reductions in their strength. As the result of military opposition, which was strengthened by the Berlin crisis in 1961, these reductions were suspended, but Khrushchev continued to press for further cuts in the general purpose forces.

2. Khrushchev's policy of cutting back the general purpose forces was based on a strategy of deterrence which placed first reliance on strategic rocket forces. These forces, he held, would also be most effective should deterrence fail, since a general nuclear war would be of short duration and its outcome would be determined by the initial nuclear exchange. Subsequent operations, in his view, could have only minor effects, and large scale theater operations would be inconceivable in the aftermath of a massive nuclear exchange.

3. Khrushchev's views were strongly opposed by the military establishment in general. The more conservative marshals vigorously defended the utility of large general purpose forces, contending that large-scale and protracted land campaigns would be indispensable for victory in a general nuclear war; they concluded, not that these forces had no further role to play, but rather that they faced new and demanding requirements. The position eventually adopted by most important Soviet military leaders, including Marshal Malinovskiy, was a compromise. This accepted the decisiveness of nuclear weapons and the probability that a general war would be short, but it also held that such a war might be protracted and that the requirement for large theater forces continued into the nuclear era.

4. The men who displaced Khrushchev face the same problems that confronted him regarding the proper allocation of Soviet resources. They are no less concerned than he to promote economic growth and to strengthen Soviet strategic attack and defense capabilities, but they appear to have relaxed the pressure which he exerted to limit expenditures for the general purpose forces. This change is probably attributable primarily to the increased international tensions arising from the war in Vietnam, but it reflects also the increased influence of the Soviet marshals.

5. The recent restoration of Marshal Chuykov to command of the ground forces is the most definite indication of a change in policy. He is a strong advocate of the maintenance of large ground forces. His bold public defense of his views when he was relieved of that command in 1964 made his return to it unlikely unless there had been a change in policy in the direction which he advocated. Consequently we believe there will be a slight increase in the strength of Soviet general purpose forces, and that they will number some two million men by the end of 1965./3/

6. Khrushchev's fall was accompanied by expressions of military disapproval of his preoccupation with nuclear armed missiles to the detriment of other military requirements. Ever since 1961 there have been indications of a growing acceptance of the possibility of non-nuclear conflict between nuclear powers. In June of this year Marshal Rotmistrov, predicting a nuclear stalemate between the US and the USSR, suggested that the ground forces might again become the decisive factor, in either a nuclear or a non-nuclear situation. Twice within the past six months Marshal Malinovskiy has spoken of the possibility of a non-nuclear war. Marshal Sokolovskiy recently observed that a situation of nuclear stalemate requires constant reappraisal of the relative roles of strategic and general purpose forces.

7. Thus the Soviet conviction that any conflict between nuclear powers must inevitably and quickly escalate into general nuclear war is now undergoing some modification. We believe that the Soviet leaders are increasingly prepared to contemplate the possibility of non-nuclear warfare between nuclear powers. Nevertheless, they almost certainly still consider that any conflict with NATO in Europe would carry grave risk of escalation to general nuclear war.

8. There has been no perceptible weakening of Soviet insistence that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in limited war would trigger a strategic exchange. While this doctrine serves deterrent purposes in part, it also represents an apparent Soviet conviction that escalation under such circumstances would be well-nigh uncontrollable. We do not believe that Soviet doctrine regarding the limited use of nuclear weapons will change in the foreseeable future, and we consider it highly unlikely that the USSR would initiate the use of such weapons in a limited conflict. If the Western powers were to do so, we believe that, doctrine notwithstanding, the Soviets would seek to prevent escalation to general war.

9. There have been no major changes in deployment of Soviet general purpose forces during the past year. However, after the collapse of border talks between the USSR and Communist China in August 1964, Soviet forces on the Manchurian border were strengthened by a motorized rifle division which was probably redeployed from the western USSR. Moreover, within the past year, internal shifts in the Far East moved elements of two other Soviet divisions closer to the Chinese border. Khrushchev's successors have avoided reopening the territorial issue, and the border problem appears to have lapsed into a state of armed quiescence. However, the Soviet units moved there in last year's crisis remain in position.

10. Revisions in the force levels, organization, and deployment of the general purpose forces are virtually certain to occur in the course of the next ten years. Such changes are more likely to result from technical military and economic considerations than from external political developments. A substantial relaxation of tensions between the USSR and the West would tend to aggravate tensions between the USSR and Communist China, and vice versa. Hence the Soviet authorities are not likely to find in the development of the international situation any warrant for a substantial reduction in general purpose forces, although the degree of tension may have marginal effects, as in the Berlin crisis of 1961.

11. Economic considerations will continue to be a major factor affecting the development of the general purpose forces. The provision of more advanced weapon systems will increase their military effectiveness, but will also increase their cost. Over the longer term we foresee some reductions in personnel strength designed to hold this increasing cost within limits acceptable to the Soviet leadership.

12. The principal changes over the next decade will probably be in the structure of the general purpose forces, particularly if the Soviets should decide to emphasize preparation for contingencies other than general nuclear war. Such a decision would imply, among other changes, a smaller number of larger divisions and increased provisions for combat and logistic support. Some restructuring along these lines is probable, but it is likely to occur only very gradually.

[Here follow Parts II-VI, pages 5-21, and Tables I-VI, pages 22-25.]

In addition to studying many scientific and technical issues, the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) also created panels to make recommendations on specific national security subjects. One of these was a Strategic Military Panel; see Document 101. Another was an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Panel, which Donald F. Hornig, the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, established in May 1964 following conversations with Secretary of Defense McNamara. The ASW Panel met June 29-July 1 and August 12-13, 1965, to prepare a report on ASW problems, such as those likely to be posed by the People's Republic of China, for the PSAC. (Status Report on Activities of the President's Science Advisory Committee and Its Staff, September 10; Johnson Library, White House Confidential File, FG 726, PSAC, Box 407) Attached to this Status Report is a September 18 memorandum from Hornig to President Johnson indicating that at its September 19-21 meeting, the PSAC would among other things have a final discussion of the work of the ASW Panel, which was writing a report that "will recommend major changes in the forces, in the tactics, and in the research and development program if the forces are to be effective."

A draft report prepared by the ASW Panel was forwarded to McNamara under cover of a 6-page letter from Hornig to McNamara, October 23. The report has not been found, but Hornig's covering letter summarizes many features of it in detail. (Ibid., National Security File, Agency File, Office of Science and Technology, Vol. 1 [1963-65], Box 42) Under cover of an October 25 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Hornig forwarded a copy of his letter to McNamara, and noted that "In many respects the results [of the report] are disturbing, although they follow the pattern of conclusions by previous expert panels." Bundy replied in an October 26 letter that he was "very much interested" in reading Hornig's letter to McNamara and hoped "you and your people will be able to follow up on it." (Both ibid.)

The PSAC's Status Report, dated November 9, indicated in part that the preliminary report of the ASW Panel had been forwarded to the Defense Department "and is the subject of great controversy at this time. The principal areas of controversy relate to force levels. It appears that the DOD will establish a task force to examine in great detail the questions raised by this report." (Ibid.)

In a December 14 memorandum to President Johnson on ASW forces, which Hornig noted the President had requested, Hornig opposed the purchase of ten destroyer escorts (DE-1052s) and advocated reducing the purchase of nuclear submarines (SSNs) from five to three in the FY 1967 budget, which would save $413 million. "In my view," Hornig added, "our security would not be reduced." His memorandum laid out in some detail his reasons for these recommendations. (Ibid.)

For an extract from the final Report by the Anti-Submarine Warfare Panel, see Document 124.

Washington, October 22, 1965.

As we discussed during the last Nike-X briefing,/2/ I believe it is important that we include in the FY 67 Research and Development program sufficient funds to:

(1) Assure the development of a "short leadtime" anti-ballistic missile defense directed against the Chinese threat,

(2) An "optimum" anti-ballistic missile defense directed against the Chinese threat,

(3) An "optimum" anti-ballistic missile defense against a Soviet attack on our offensive weapon system launchers.

Unless Mr. Vance or I specifically approve the additional expenditures in writing, do not include in the anti-ballistic missile Research and Development programs for FY 67 any funds to be expended on production engineering, procurement of components for deployment, or any other activities associated with deployment.

Robert S. McNamara/3/

Washington, October 29, 1965.

PROPOSED ARMY-BTL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

The Panel has reviewed the current Army-BTL proposal to deploy a ballistic missile defense system capable of defending the United States against unsophisticated or light ballistic missile attacks. The Panel understands that the system, which consists of a high altitude, area defense for the entire country and a limited deployment of terminal Nike-X defense for high value targets, is primarily directed against a future Chinese nuclear capability and is intended to insure that the United States will be essentially invulnerable to Chinese nuclear attack for a considerable period of time. At the same time, the system is specifically designed to permit growth to meet more massive and more sophisticated forms of ballistic missile threat from any quarter.

If the decision to deploy is made in FY-1967, the Army estimates that the proposed system would have an IOC in 1970 and would be completely deployed by 1973 at a cost of from $8 to $12 billion, depending on the number of locations defended by terminal defense.

In its deliberations, the Panel was deeply conscious of the fact that deploying a ballistic missile defense system is one of the most important military systems decisions that the United States has ever had to face. There is full agreement that the threat to American and world security posed by the emerging Chinese nuclear capability will be extremely serious.

There would clearly be considerable military and political advantages in a defense system that could insure that this country would not be subject to Chinese blackmail threats and, more important, that would give the government greater flexibility in its dealings with the Chinese Communists by denying them even a minimal nuclear deterrent for a great many years to come.

With regard to the magnitude of the commitment, the concept of a secure defensive shield against Chinese strategic attack could in the long run involve much greater expenditures for continental defense than those required simply for the proposed limited deployment. Future extensive deployment of Nike-X terminal defense (particularly since "growth potential" is a design requirement) would probably follow. Moreover, to achieve a tight defense, substantial additional expenditures would be required for ASW and air defense to plug obvious loopholes in the proposed Army-BTL system. Finally, if as a consequence of deployment of the Army-BTL system we become interested in the possibility of defense against more massive threats, a substantial expansion of our civil defense program would surely have to be considered.

The Panel has examined on technical and military grounds whether the proposed Army-BTL system is designed correctly to match the evolution of the Chinese strategic nuclear threat.

At the same time, there appear to be far-reaching military, economic and political consequences of the decision to deploy ballistic missile defense that may be to the long-term net disadvantage of the United States. The proposed system would have considerable capability against the Soviet ICBM force in its present configuration. The Soviets must therefore react to U.S. deployment of such a system in order to maintain their deterrent (or their capacity for assured destruction) at the present level. This reaction would most logically involve the development and deployment of penetration aids in the Soviet ICBM force but might well also in the longer term push the Soviets to higher levels of strategic force deployment, to which we, in turn, might well react.

A decision to deploy could also have a significant effect on our allies in Europe and Asia. It is not clear whether it would increase their confidence in our resolve to defend them or their fear that we were abandoning them while constructing a Fortress America. The question would probably have to be faced as to whether we were prepared to assist our allies in obtaining a similar defense. Finally, a decision now to spend $8 to $12 billion to defend ourselves against a Chinese strategic threat would probably enhance China's military stature in the eyes of the world years before China could actually have a real nuclear strategic capability, and at a time when we have been attempting to minimize the significance of the Chinese threat. What effect this would have on the actions of our allies and neutrals in Asia requires careful examination.

Finally, the question arises why we should consider undertaking a massive expansion of our strategic defensive forces in the face of a relatively weak Chinese threat when we have not chosen to do so against our much stronger Soviet opponent. Our intent would presumably be to maintain a defensive military posture against the Chinese capable of denying them any deterrent capability whatever for at least a limited period of time. We never achieved this posture with respect to the Soviet Union; however, it may be possible to achieve it against the Chinese because of our great technological advantage.

In its deliberations, the Panel has attempted to focus on the technical aspects of the problem. The Panel recognizes, however, that some of the broader issues noted above must weigh heavily in any final decision on deployment of a ballistic missile defense system.

At present, the Chinese clearly have no ICBMs and, for practical purposes, no intercontinental aircraft. They do have fission bombs; a Chinese copy of a Soviet ballistic missile type submarine (although it may not have any missiles); short-range cruise missiles; and an active ballistic missile development program, which includes a missile test range of about one thousand nautical mile range, static firing stands, and probably Chinese copies of the Soviet SS-4/MRBM. They also have a very strong motivation both to expand their ballistic missile submarine force and to develop an ICBM capability.

The general thinking in the intelligence community is that the Chinese may have a limited ballistic missile submarine capability in the latter part of this decade and that an initial Chinese ICBM capability might appear as early as in the 1970-1975 time period. However, there is also agreement that it is not possible to estimate with any accuracy at this time the evolution of the Chinese nuclear strategic threat during the next decade.

The proposed Army-BTL system, which basically consists of components originally designed to provide a full-scale defense against the Soviet ICBM threat, appears, on the one hand, inadequate to cope with an initial Chinese capability composed of submarine-launched ballistic and air breathing missiles and, on the other hand, more effective than necessary for defense against the early Chinese ICBMs.

The concept of the proposed system is that the high altitude area defense would essentially defend the entire country against unsophisticated small attacks and that terminal Nike-X defense, deployed only at "high value" targets, would cover any leakage and would also provide additional defense against submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the case of coastal cities.

The area defense component of the system could provide a very effective defense against the initial Chinese ICBM capability which probably would not be equipped with adequate penetration aids. It is designed to acquire targets at 1600 n.m. and to launch interceptors when the target is 1000 n.m. away so that interception takes place at ranges up to about 300 n.m. from the defensive missile launching sites and at altitudes of 300,000 feet or higher. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] This should give relatively high confidence of kill against individual warheads with limited penetration aids.

The area defense component of the proposed system can be expected to cope with some 15 to 30 individual warheads directed against a given contiguous target area before exhaustion of its interceptors. Thus, although the defense can always be overwhelmed in any one area by a large attack, the area component could provide a very high confidence defense against an initial small Chinese ICBM force with limited penetration aids. However, since there is no discrimination in the area component of the system, it can probably be exhausted by the use of light relatively unsophisticated, unhardened, exo-atmospheric decoys. Although there is considerable debate as to exactly how simple it is to develop such decoys, it seems unlikely that the earliest Chinese ICBMs would be so equipped. However, this would be the natural path of Chinese development to counter an area defense, and one probably could not count on a very extended effective life of such a system.

The terminal defense component, which uses atmospheric discrimination and rapid response Sprint missiles, also would have no difficulty at defended locations in handling the initial Chinese ICBM threat since it was originally designed to deal with relatively sophisticated missiles. However, against the initial Chinese ICBM threat, the terminal defense component appears somewhat redundant, when coupled with the area defense system. With the development of exo-atmospheric decoys, widely dispersed, the terminal defense component would become essential for the system to be effective. In that situation, it seems clear that the constraints imposed on the offense to penetrate both area and terminal defense would exact a heavy price in payload on target, and it would probably take the Chinese many years to acquire this capability. It should be noted, however, that initially the Army-BTL system provides terminal defense for only a limited number of U.S. cities. Thus it must be recognized that, if the Chinese are able to penetrate our area defense, they can always damage us by attacking the "n + 1" city in any system designed to defend "n" cities. Therefore, only a deployment of terminal defense batteries much more extensive than that contemplated in the Army-BTL proposal can in the long term hope to accomplish the original objective of an essentially invulnerable defense of the U.S. against the Chinese; even such a defense can eventually be penetrated. Consequently, at some point in the future it would presumably be necessary to accept a "damage-limiting" and "assured destruction" posture with respect to the Chinese.

Considering the submarine threat, the Panel believes that both the area and the terminal components of the system are vulnerable to such attacks. Neither component has any capability against air breathing cruise missiles flying at low altitudes. The area system would also be ineffective against submarine-based ballistic missiles launched on minimum energy trajectories of less than 100 n.m. More important is the fact that a 350 n.m. missile, which is the normal armament of the Soviet G-class submarine of which the Chinese have produced one copy, would be invisible to the area defense when launched at 100 n.m. The defense would thus have to rely on the terminal component, which in turn could not cope with missiles launched at distances of less than about 50 n.m.

If our ASW is as ineffective as some people fear, this means that there is a loophole to the proposed system that could probably be exploited by the Chinese with what might be their initial capability. If, on the other hand, our ASW forces are more able and can be made more effective to handle the Chinese submarine threat than is now apparent, then the need for a defense against submarine-launched missiles is decreased. However, even if ASW becomes relatively effective, it would appear that some form of advanced "air defense" such as SAM-D will probably also be required to plug the loophole in the proposed Army-BTL system posed by submarine-launched ballistic and air breathing missiles. This raises the question as to whether a SAM-D-type system alone or in combination with an improved ASW posture is not the correct answer to the submarine threat.

The proposed Army-BTL system clearly also has considerable capability against the present Soviet threat. No matter how much we advertise the fact that the defense is directed at the Chinese, the Soviet Union and the rest of the world will probably consider that the principal significance of the system relates to its impact on the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear confrontation.

At the present time, the area defense component of the proposed Army-BTL system would be quite effective against Soviet re-entry vehicles since the Soviet Union has apparently not yet decided to deploy penetration aids, nor is there even any evidence of a Soviet penetration aids development program. Rapid U.S. deployment of an area defense (in particular, the simplified system discussed below) might lead the Soviet deployment of penetration aids by a year or two if the Soviets were slow to react, and it might buy us a short but possibly significant strategic advantage. However, it seems extremely improbable that the Soviets would not soon be able to equip their force with the penetration aids required to overcome an area defense.

There do not appear to be any developments implicit in the proposed system that would in any way change the unfavorable exchange ratio with Soviet offensive forces previously estimated for the Nike-X terminal defense system although analysis of the combined area and terminal defense has not been carried out.

A decision to deploy the proposed Army-BTL system would probably not initially result in a major political reaction on the part of the Soviets since they seem to accept defensive systems as natural militarily. However, if they have either not decided to deploy a ballistic missile defense system of their own or have decided on only a limited deployment for the general Moscow-Leningrad area, our decision to deploy might well influence them to undertake a full-scale ballistic missile defense. More important, for the long term, it would appear that such a decision on our part might well push the Soviets to higher strategic force levels, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Such an increase in Soviet force levels would probably again put pressure on the U.S. to expand its strategic forces.

The possibility that the Soviets may announce during the coming year that they are actually deploying a ballistic missile defense system is an added problem that must be weighed in deciding whether or not to deploy a system of our own. Despite the accumulation of information that may relate to this activity, it is still uncertain as to what the Soviets are actually doing. The Soviets may already actually be engaged in a limited deployment of a ballistic missile defense system. In any event, it is clear that the Soviet activities that may be related to ballistic missile defense and, in particular, to deployment have been substantially expanded throughout the last year.

If the Soviet Union were to announce to the world the deployment of a ballistic missile defense, which it claimed was very effective, the domestic political pressures for a similar action on our part would certainly be increased. Moreover, if such announcement by the Soviets were to occur during a major confrontation with this country, it might have a significant impact on world opinion. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has frequently claimed successful development, if not deployment, of an effective ballistic missile defense and has, in fact, intensified through recent pronouncements and a much-publicized film that they have a ballistic missile defense capability. World reaction to all these claims has been minimal.

There is little question but that the proper military counter to a Soviet ballistic missile defense system would be to improve the capability of the U.S. strategic forces to penetrate, in particular by the incorporation of improved penetration aids in our existing missile force. This would have the effect of assuring that we maintain the same basic deterrence posture relative to the Soviet Union that exists at present.

The Panel believes the probability is sufficiently great that either the Soviets will announce, or we will discover, the existence of a deployed Soviet ballistic missile defense system in the next year or two so that there should be a greatly increased effort to assure that we are in a position to incorporate appropriate penetration aids in our strategic missile systems as rapidly as necessary. In the past, the Services, particularly the Air Force, have been slow in developing programs for the incorporation of penetration aids despite continued pressure from OSD. Programs for penetration aids, specifically aimed at countering potential Soviet ballistic missile defense systems, have now been evolved by the Services and we hope that rapid progress will be made.

There is considerable uncertainty about the time schedule of the emerging Chinese strategic nuclear threat. One may imagine that it will appear late (i.e., after 1973, the time of complete deployment of the Army-BTL system, were the go-ahead given now) or it might appear early, say in 1970. This uncertainty in the threat raises serious questions regarding the deployment of the Army-BTL system, and we discuss these questions below.

Because of the possible early threat, the Panel is concerned with the length of time required for deployment of the proposed system. In fact, the time to achieve the performance as predicted in the proposed Army-BTL system may be considerably longer than assumed, considering the advanced technology involved.

The Panel believes that it may be technically feasible to obtain a useful area defense against the plausible initial Chinese ICBM capability with shorter deployment time and at much lower cost than that of the proposed Army-BTL system. The high cost of the Army-BTL system is largely a consequence of overdesign in the attempt to build a growth capability into the system by means of a terminal component that is not really required initially. For example, the use of the very expensive MSRs at the Zeus missile farms is closely coupled to the requirements for terminal defense.

The Panel considered a simplified area defense in which the Minimar and MSR radars were omitted from the system. Acquisition could be achieved by VHF (~150 megacycles) or UHF (~ 400 megacycles) radars such as those used in SPADATS; and the defensive Zeus missiles could be controlled by MTRs, or by inertial guidance. The effects of blackout, including self blackout, particularly on the VHF radars, as well as the feasibility of using light decoys to penetrate the defense, would have to be considered in detail in evaluating such a system. A system of this variety would cost substantially less than the proposed Army-BTL system, perhaps as little as $1 billion, and could involve only "off-the-shelf" hardware. It could surely be deployed more quickly than the proposed Army-BTL defense.

Although the over-all capabilities of such a simplified system would clearly be less than the Army-BTL system, it would probably be as effective as the Army-BTL system in dealing with the early Chinese ICBM threat. The Panel believes that more detailed study will probably show that such a simplified system is feasible and that it can in fact be rapidly deployed. The ability to deploy such a system would provide an effective hedge against an early Chinese ICBM deployment. With this hedge, we would have more time to resolve the uncertainties in our intelligence on the Chinese nuclear strategic threat and in the technology of ballistic missile defense.

It is also important to recognize that our massive strategic offensive forces provide additional safeguards against the early Chinese ICBM threat. In the face of these U.S. forces, a few unhardened and easily located Chinese ICBMs would not constitute a very plausible blackmail threat or deterrent capability. Provided our defenses against the Chinese submarine missile threat are effective, the U.S. by taking preemptive action could be protected with a high level of confidence against the initial Chinese ICBM force. The level of confidence in such a preemptive disarming attack would of course decrease as the level of the Chinese ICBM force increases.

In this context and with a rapidly-deployable simplified system as a hedge, the Panel believes that we will have sufficient time to react to the Chinese ICBM threat as it becomes more apparent. In addition, there is an actual danger that a premature decision to deploy a defensive system would permit the Chinese to build around it if they are not already firmly committed to their future strategic systems. They might, for example, give additional emphasis to submarine or ship-launched missiles instead of undertaking an ICBM program. Moreover, the sooner the Chinese are clearly faced with the problem of having to penetrate a high altitude area defense the sooner we can expect them to introduce exo-atmospheric penetration aids into their evolving ICBM force.

For all of the reasons discussed above, the Panel does not believe that there should be a decision this year to deploy the proposed Army-BTL system.

The Panel is aware that a number of alternatives to an actual decision in connection with the FY-1967 budget to deploy the Army-BTL system are being considered in DOD.

One such proposal is to make a firm decision to deploy the Army-BTL system at a time dictated by the future evolution of the Chinese strategic nuclear threat. On this basis the actual funding of the deployment decision would be delayed for at least one year. This proposal is presumably based on the idea that the announcement of such a decision would be of some domestic value in allaying criticism that the Administration was not reacting to the Chinese threat and to undercut the impact of any Soviet announcement that they were deploying such a system. The Panel believes that this proposal would present us with all of the problems inherent in the decision to deploy a ballistic missile system without doing anything to advance the day when a defensive system would be available. Moreover, it would tend to tie us unnecessarily to a specific system at a time when technology is changing very rapidly. The Panel finds very little to recommend this proposal.

A second proposal that is being considered is to postpone the formal deployment decision but to spend some $200 million in FY-1967 for long lead time items. It is argued that this action would, in essence, save one year in both the IOC and full deployment times if it is subsequently decided to deploy the Army-BTL system. On examination, it appears that the $200 million in question is essentially equivalent to the full first-year expenditures for the deployment of the system. This expenditure really amounts to building up in FY-1967 the organization that would be necessary in FY-1968 to spend $1.2 billion. This type of operation would make it more difficult next year to decide against deployment. This action would also tie us very closely to the specifics of the proposed Army-BTL system and would make it much more difficult to continue objective study of the problem since efforts would of necessity be focused on the very difficult management problem of building an organization capable of directing the single most complex military system ever undertaken. Although it is argued that this action would defer the political repercussions that may be involved in a formal deployment decision, the world at large would probably interpret this action as a decision on our part to deploy the Army-BTL system.

On balance, the Panel does not believe it would be wise to initiate the program for the procurement of long lead time items in the absence of a decision to deploy.

On the basis of the above considerations, the Panel recommends that:

1. A decision should not be made this year to deploy the proposed Army-BTL system.

2. A commitment should not be made this year to deploy the proposed Army-BTL system at a future date to be determined by the evolution of the Chinese strategic nuclear threat.

3. The proposed $200 million in pre-production funds for the proposed Army-BTL system should not be spent in FY-1967.

4. The DOD should intensify its study of the problem of countering short-range, submarine-launched, ballistic and air-breathing missiles which may well be the initial Chinese nuclear strategic threat.

5. The DOD should design and evaluate a simplified area defense system which would be relatively inexpensive, use off-the-shelf components, and be rapidly deployable.

6. The DOD should continue the R&D program in support of the proposed Army-BTL program and should carry out any necessary test and evaluation of components for a simplified area defense system. The DOD should also continue support of general technology relating to ballistic missile defense, in particular in the field of re-entry phenomena.

7. The DOD should vigorously continue its efforts on penetration aids against either a potential Soviet area or terminal defense system.

Dr. Marvin Goldberger, Chmn.
Dr. Hans A. Bethe
Dr. Lewis McA. Branscomb
Dr. Sidney D. Drell
Dr. Richard L. Garwin
Dr. Richard Latter
Dr. Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky
Dr. Jack P. Ruina
Dr. Kenneth M. Watson
Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner
Mr. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.

In their book, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), Alain G. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, who worked in the Systems Analysis Office of the Department of Defense during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (Enthoven serving as the newly-created Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) from 1965 to 1969), summarized the strategic thinking of Department of Defense officials.

In determining strategic force requirements, the two wrote that U.S. defense officials decided that the "assured destruction" capability of U.S. strategic offensive nuclear forces would be sufficient to destroy 20 to 25 percent of the Soviet population and 50 percent of Soviet industry. This was a "judgment reached by the Secretary of Defense and accepted by the President, by the Congress, and apparently by the general public as well." Studies by the Systems Analysis Office concluded that following a Soviet nuclear attack, U.S. retaliation with 100 1-megaton-equivalent U.S.-delivered nuclear warheads would kill about 37 million people (15 percent of the total Soviet population) and destroy 59 percent of Soviet industrial capacity. Doubling the megaton delivery to 200 would increase the percentages to 21 percent fatalities and 72 percent industrial capacity destroyed. Higher levels would increase the destructive percentages, but the returns would be sharply diminishing compared with the expense involved. (Ibid., page 207) The studies of the Systems Analysis Office also concluded that the number of U.S. and Soviet citizens killed in a nuclear exchange would be very high, regardless of whether the United States had no ABM defense system, an ABM defense of 25 cities, or defense of some 52 cities. (Ibid., pages 184 ff.)

The figures cited by Enthoven and Smith in their book, as well as additional estimates presented in their tables, were publicly known and debated at the time. Indeed, Enthoven's office likely developed the estimates for Secretary McNamara, who used the same figures in his annual posture statements to Congress. See, for example, Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget (prepared January 22, 1968), page 57. For additional references to assured destruction of the Soviet population and industrial capacity, see Documents 103, 128, 139, 160, 200, and 210.