Washington, November 13, 1965.

Dear Bob:

I have reviewed the draft memoranda on the Five Year Force Structure for FY 67-71 which you forwarded to me on October 28./2/ As in past years, I am immensely impressed at the very high caliber of your analyses. I find these memoranda extremely useful in obtaining a better understanding of the current status of our force posture and likely future problems. In this connection, I would like to note that your staff, in particular Alain Enthoven and his people, have been most cooperative in providing us with an appreciation of the emerging problem areas.

I would like to comment on several issues which I believe to have major significance for our national security policy. The first deals with our NATO policy./3/ You and I continue to be in agreement that the position which the US has evolved over the past several years concerning the importance of a realistic non-nuclear capability in Europe remains an important tenet of US policy. In this connection, the further work which you are now having done within the Department of Defense to define more precisely both the requirements for and the capabilities of a non-nuclear military effort in Europe will undoubtedly prove useful. But the problem to which I believe we must both address ourselves is the priority of effort which we wish to apply to a series of policy issues which currently confront us within the alliance.

I know you are fully aware of the numerous problems which currently bear on our European relations. First and foremost among these are the German/nuclear sharing issue and the future role of France within NATO. Clearly these matters are so important that they should take first priority in our diplomatic relations with Europe. While giving primary attention to the solution of these problems, I agree we should continue to pursue other important objectives, including those relating to what the US considers to be an appropriate strategy and force posture for the alliance.

However, we are not likely to persuade our allies fully to adopt our judgments on force posture, at least in the short run. It could be seriously counterproductive if we were to press our views with regard to emphasis on a major non-nuclear option to the point that it further complicated our political problems. While I personally cannot accept the point of view, there would be those in Europe who would question our resolve to defend Europe in the event of Communist attack if they interpreted our emphasis on a non-nuclear buildup as reducing the importance we attach to a nuclear deterrent.

I note that you feel that there may be some inconsistency in our retaining the current US military posture in Europe (or in CONUS-based support) if we cannot bring our allies to a full acceptance of our views on strategy with resultant major improvements to their own non-nuclear force posture. Despite the limited sympathy of the Europeans with our strategic views, we have managed to induce our allies to develop forces which do contain a capability for a considerable non-nuclear effort. This, together with our present nuclear options, represents a strong deterrent, and a significant war-fighting capability. While I agree that we should work toward elimination of inadequacies in our allies' force postures, it seems to me that we are going to have to accept some imbalances for the time being. Thus, I do not see that the threat to reduce, even less so, the actual withdrawal of a portion of US forces from Europe, as is touched upon in one of our memoranda, would serve our policy interests during the next several months while we pursue the German/nuclear sharing problem and the problems which will undoubtedly arise out of the evolving issue with regard to France's role in NATO.

I personally hope that full discussion of the nuclear problem in connection with the NATO nuclear force issue will serve to close the gap between us and our allies on strategy, particularly as the European leaders come to understand fully the issues involved in the use of nuclear weapons.

There are other related matters which bear on our NATO policy which are treated in your memoranda and on which I might briefly comment:

a. With regard to the constraints on a further tactical nuclear weapons buildup, I agree that the general guidelines established by NSAM 334/4/ should be maintained. However, I would hope that we could have some additional clarification concerning the relationship to NSAM 334 levels of certain specific proposals, such as the ADM and 155 Howitzer programs, and any others you may see arising in the early future. My staff will be following up on these problems.

b. If the question of land-based MRBM's is again surfaced in NATO, it will be necessary for us to work out carefully the tactics for handling this matter with our allies. I gather you feel that the military case for such weapons is not persuasive. For our part, we see some political problems which would result from a land-based deployment of such weapons, though we have not recently reviewed our position on this matter. This is clearly an issue which requires continuing close contact between State and Defense. The outcome of current discussions on the ANF/MLF problem will have a bearing on this.

c. I agree in principle on the desirability of shifting the QRA role from aircraft to Pershings, as Pershings demonstrate the necessary capability, but anticipate this may raise certain political problems. At such time as you are prepared to make a specific proposal with regard to this shift, I would appreciate an opportunity to review it and to work out with you the precise tactics for presenting the proposal to our allies.

d. Your proposed command and control study seems to me to have very considerable merit. This question has generated so much interest among allied governments in the past, that any US study of this issue can be expected to arouse considerable attention in the future. Accordingly, I suggest that our staffs work out very carefully the terms of reference and the method for proceeding with this study, and upon its completion that we consider together its political implications before it is presented to NATO.

As a matter which bears upon our NATO policy but obviously has broader implications as well, I have been impressed by the increasing reliance which our strategy places on the ability to deploy US forces to various trouble spots around the world. I appreciated the degree to which your efforts have been directed toward improving the ability of the US to project its military power where it is required and to do so in ways designed to support our foreign policy. In the face of growing demands on US forces, I feel it is important that we stay abreast of the status of our deployment capabilities and accordingly, I have asked Alex Johnson to keep in touch with your staff on this matter.

The third major issue on which I should like to comment deals with damage limiting programs and especially the ABM. I want to make clear that I do not believe that foreign policy problems should in any way prevent us from deploying a system that could contribute significantly to the defense of the US at such time as you believe such a program is feasible and necessary. Nevertheless, there will be certain political problems that will have to be dealt with if a decision is made to deploy an ABM. As you know, the UK already has asked to discuss the political implications of an ABM deployment with us, and other countries have shown some interest. I would like to see us take advantage of the additional time afforded by the deferral of the ABM deployment to discuss the political aspects of the ABM program as it affects our allies. This will require additional studies both by State and Defense, and the joint development of a course of action. I propose that we address ourselves to that task without delay. I am, therefore, suggesting that Alex Johnson get in touch with appropriate people in Defense on this matter at an early date.

There are several other issues which I can only briefly touch upon in this letter, but I believe you and I should set aside time to discuss them at greater length, and I would hope in the fairly near future:

a. While we need to do some very hard thinking about how the military assistance program can be improved, the foreign policy significance of MAP is such that I would not want to proceed on the assumption that major adjustments in rationale, scope or content of that program can be made until such changes are thoroughly and carefully examined.

For example, in your draft memorandum to the President on this subject, certain conclusions are advanced about the ability to reduce reliance upon indigenous forces and the MAP support for such forces on the assumption of a changing threat and the further assumption that the growing US capability can to a degree substitute for indigenous forces. This issue requires very careful examination. The extent to which we wish to assume such responsibility, even provided the governments in question were prepared to accept such a change, is by no means a clear or easy issue to decide. Moreover, in view of the more immediate problems which appear to confront us in connection with meeting our overseas obligations (a point which I have alluded to above), it is not entirely clear to me whether or when we can assume such increased responsibilities.

A second major question concerns the relationship between the military aid which should be provided Pakistan and that for India. While I fully agree that the relationship between these two countries must be carefully scrutinized before we decide upon the content and levels of future military aid, I feel we cannot settle this question at the present time. This illustrates what to me is a very troublesome question about MAP, namely to what extent do we take any part in military efforts which might encourage other nations to engage in local arms races or to use violence in neighborhood quarrels. Until such broad issues are resolved we should leave open the specific MAP allocations to India and Pakistan.

I suggest that Alex Johnson discuss with Dave Bell and appropriate people in Defense how we might best proceed to examine in greater depth these and other issues which surround the military assistance program so that they might formulate proposals for you and me to consider at an early date.

b. I noted last year my interest in having a further exposition of the tactical nuclear problem as it affects theaters other than Europe. Particularly with our growing commitment in the Far East, it seems to me that we need a great deal more insight into the utility of and limitations on the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in that theater. While your memorandum to the President on tactical nuclear weapons this year alludes briefly to this problem, I am convinced that a great deal more work needs to be done. Since the questions of tactical nuclear weapons so intimately relates political and military considerations, I believe this is an effort which might jointly be undertaken by State and Defense. I would welcome your views on this entire problem.

Finally, we would like to work with your staff, as in the past, on your presentation to Congress of the five year military program. My staff is available to be of as much help as possible in insuring that this presentation takes full account of the political issues involved in our relations with other countries. Perhaps we can be particularly helpful in working with you to develop the review of the world-wide situation which normally opens your presentation.

In view of the fact that I will be out of the country until November 24,/5/ during which time I presume there will be further discussions on your draft memoranda within the Executive Branch, I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this letter to Messrs. McGeorge Bundy, Charles Schultze and Dave Bell.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dean/6/

NIE 11-3-65

Washington, November 18, 1965.

SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES

The Problem

To estimate the capabilities and limitations of Soviet strategic air and missile defense forces through mid-1967, and general trends in these forces through 1975.

Conclusions

A. Confronted by powerful Western strategic attack forces, the USSR is sustaining its vigorous effort to strengthen its defenses. We believe that the Soviets are responding to those challenges to their security that they can now see or foresee from aircraft, ballistic missiles, and earth satellites. (Paras. l-5)

B. The Soviets have achieved a formidable capability against aircraft attacking at medium and high altitudes, but their air defense system probably is still susceptible to penetration by stand-off weapons and low-altitude tactics. The Soviets probably foresee little reduction in the bomber threat over the next ten years. To meet this challenge, they are improving their warning and control systems and are changing the character of their interceptor force through the introduction of new high-performance, all-weather aircraft. In addition, there are recent indications that the Soviets are now employing light AAA in some areas for low-altitude defense. (Paras. 3, 4, 8-19)

C. The Soviets probably will continue to improve and to rely on the SA-2 as the principal SAM system. We believe that they will develop an improved or new SAM system for low altitude defense; such a system would probably be deployed more extensively than the SA-3. Deployment of a long-range SAM system probably is now underway in the northwestern USSR and probably will be extended to other peripheral areas and to some key urban locations in the interior./2/ /3/ (Paras. 20-26)

D. For nearly ten years, the Soviets have given high priority to research and development of antimissile defenses. We estimate that they have now begun to deploy such defenses at Moscow. These defenses could probably achieve some capability as early as 1967, but we think a more likely date for an initial operational capability is 1968. We do not yet know the performance characteristics of this system, or how it will function. (Paras. 27-34)

E. The Soviets will almost certainly continue with their extensive effort to develop ballistic missile defenses to counter the increasingly sophisticated threat that will be posed by US strategic missile forces. We cannot now estimate with confidence the scale or timing of future Soviet ABM deployment. We believe, however, that the Soviets will deploy ABM defenses for major urban-industrial areas. By 1975, they could deploy defenses for some 20 to 30 areas containing a quarter of the Soviet population and more than half of Soviet industry. (Paras. 36-37)

F. The Soviets could already have developed a limited antisatellite capability based on an operational missile with a nuclear warhead and existing electronic capabilities. We have no evidence that they have done so. In any event, we believe that the Soviets would prefer to have a system which could track foreign satellites more accurately and permit the use of non-nuclear kill mechanisms. We estimate that the Soviets will have an operational capability with such a system within the next few years. We believe, however, that the Soviets would attack a US satellite in peacetime only if, along with a strong desire for secrecy, they were willing for other reasons to greatly disrupt East-West relations./4/ (Paras. 38-41)

[Here follow the Discussion section Parts I-V, pages 4-14) and Annex (page 15).]

Washington, December 10, 1965.

SUBJECT
CIA Memorandum on Status of Soviet ICBM Force

The attached CIA memorandum on the status of the Soviet ICBM program/2/ does not contain any new worries, and I am not really clear as to why it was issued at this time.

The estimates are essentially the same as those contained in the most recent NIE on Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack (NIE 11-8-65, dated October 7, 1965)./3/ Actually, the specific estimate in the attached that, in mid-1966, there will be about 315 operational ICBM launchers (of which 90 will be of the new single-silo type) lies at the bottom of the range of 310-364 (of which 90-140 would be new single-silo type), as estimated for mid-1966 in the '65-NIE. The estimate in the attached of 440 launchers in mid-1967 is about in the middle of the range of 420-476 launchers estimated for that time in the '65-NIE.

The estimates in the '65-NIE were up somewhat from the '64-NIE/4/ which estimated that in mid-1966 there would be 285-320 launchers and in mid-1967 there would be 330-395 launchers. The change in the '65-NIE reflected the firm information on the introduction by the Soviets of complexes of single-silo launchers which one might compare with our own Minuteman system. The numbers in the attached, however, are within the range predicted in the '64-NIE for mid-1966 and only 10 percent higher than the range predicted for mid-1967.

The Soviet build-up does of course make the option of a disarming preemptive strike less and less plausible. However, this has been recognized in DOD planning for a couple of years. As you know from the most recent DOD budget exercise, DOD planning has now passed far beyond numbers like these. We are now worrying about much more massive missile deployments coupled with possible Soviet MIRVs (multiple independent reentry vehicles) and the extensive deployment of a Soviet ABM system.

To give you a little perspective as to how bad things have looked in the past, I would remind you that the '58-NIE/5/ estimated that the Soviets would have around 315 ICBMs in mid-1961, and that the '59-NIE/6/ estimated that they would have this number in mid-1962, and that the '61-NIE/7/ gave them this capability around mid-1964.

This isn't to say you shouldn't still be scared, but I don't see anything new in the attached to contribute to this emotion.

Spurgeon

Washington, December 18, 1965.

SUBJECT
B-52 Airborne Alert (U)

I have carefully considered your reclamas on the discontinuation of the B-52 airborne alert./2/ A staff evaluation of your proposal is contained in the enclosure to this memorandum./3/ I believe that the very great improvements in the survival potential of our Strategic Retaliatory forces, resulting mainly from the deployment of Minuteman and Polaris, make an airborne alert no longer necessary. Moreover, in view of the improvements in our intelligence and warning systems since the airborne alert was established, I believe that the airborne alert is no longer the way to get maximum effectiveness out of the bomber force, even in the face of surprise attack.

This decision is intended to provide adequate resources to support B-52 training requirements. SAC should continue to fly the amount of airborne alert type indoctrination flights the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider optimum within the resources provided for the normal flying program. The airborne alert spares stockpile and missile (Hound Dog) spares need no longer be reserved for airborne alert.

Robert S. McNamara/4/

Washington, December 28, 1965.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Box 41. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

Despite initial opposition from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during 1964 and 1965 the civilian leadership in the Department of Defense proceeded to develop plans for the construction of a Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC) in the Washington, D.C., area and continued to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views. Regarding this internal debate and the evolving plans on this issue, see Documents 3, 4, 52, 77, and 92.

The Department of Defense also promoted this project in Congress, and included funds for further research on the specific size, operations, and functions and for its construction in the Army's portion of the military construction authorization bills in early 1964. Aware of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's reservations and believing the issues were too complex and sensitive, the House Armed Services Committee did not approve funds for the Deep Underground Command Center but instead created a special subcommittee to study the issue thoroughly. (Memorandum from Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering Eugene G. Fubini to Deputy Secretary Vance, February 25, 1964; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 70 A 4662, 381 DUCC (10 Jan 64) 1963 and 64 Papers) The appropriations for FY 1965 as enacted by the Congress did not include funds for construction or research for this facility, and the chairmen of key Congressional committees also rejected the Department of Defense proposal to use other authorized funds for feasibility studies. (Letters from Vance to Representative George H. Mahon, September 30, 1964, and to Senator Carl Vinson, October 1, 1964; letter from Vinson to Vance, October 1, 1964; letter from Mahon to Vance, October 6, 1964; and letter from Senator Carl Hayden to McNamara, October 9, 1964; all ibid.)

The Department of Defense deferred action temporarily (letter from Vance to Vinson, October 9; ibid.) but continued to study the cost and configuration of the proposed facility. In early 1965, for instance, the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering made tentative recommendations for possible sites. (Memorandum from James M. Bridges, Special Assistant (Command and Control), to Harold Brown, March 4, 1965; ibid., 381 1966) A large map of the Washington, D.C., area outlining proposed layouts for the DUCC, and a table comparing tunnel length for two DUCC configurations are attached to a March 8 memorandum to Brown. (Ibid.)

The House Armed Services Committee reduced the Defense Department's FY 1966 request for $26.2 million for the DUCC to $6 million, which would permit the Pentagon "to more fully develop plans and to again present the actual construction authorization request" next year. (Letter from Congressman L. Mendel Rivers to McNamara, May 25; ibid.; FRC 330 70 A 4443, 381 DUCC (10 Jan 66) 1965 & 1966 Papers)

In its response, the Department of Defense informed the House Committee that it proposed, among other things, to dig one shaft to "advance both the design and construction time and permit research and development efforts associated with the rock properties at the site to proceed concurrently. This would permit us to obtain early verification of our current estimates of subsurface rock conditions (based on preliminary test drillings) which have a direct bearing upon the cost and technical problems associated with the major construction of entrance and exit tunnels and the main underground facility." (Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) Paul R. Ignatius to Rivers, June 14; ibid.)

Nevertheless, the Department of Defense's interest in the project gradually waned. When, for example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to obtain, among other things, the President's views "as to the nonmilitary functional and personnel requirements of those departments and agencies of the National Government" to be provided for in the DUCC, they were much later informed that no response would be made to their proposal. (JCSM-985-64 to Secretary McNamara, November 27, 1964, and memorandum from Maurice W. Roche to the JCS, August 10, 1965; both ibid., FRC 330 70 A 4662, 381 1966)

Moreover, Congress authorized only $4 million for this project in FY 1966, and letters from four Committee Chairmen told the Defense Department "not to go ahead with any designs without Congressional approval." (Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert N. Anthony to McNamara, February 16, 1966; ibid., FRC 330 70 A 4443, 381 DUCC (10 Jan 66) 1965 & 1966 Papers) Although McNamara had earlier approved an FY 1967 request to Congress for $21,898,000 for the DUCC, he expressed "doubt that we should proceed to spend $4 million until after Congress acts on '67" (handwritten note to Ignatius, February 18, on Anthony's February 16 memorandum), and he shortly decided not to seek Congressional clearance for continued planning for the DUCC project and agreed to divert the Army specialists engaged on the DUCC to other military construction projects. (Handwritten notation, March 3, on Ignatius' memorandum to McNamara, February 25; ibid.)

Congress again failed to provide funding for the Deep Underground Command Center in the Department of Defense budget for FY 1966, but Vance agreed to ask the Congress to authorize FY 1967 funds for early initiation of work on the facility. (Memorandum from Ignatius to Vance, April 15, and unsigned April 15 note from Vance's office to Ignatius; both ibid., FRC 330 70 A 4662, 381 1966) Nothing seemed to come of this initiative, however, and no later documentation on the Deep Underground Command Center has been found.

Washington, January 6, 1966.

MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretaries of the Military Departments
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Defense Research & Engineering
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
The Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT
DoD Human Resources Intelligence Collection Study and Outline Plan (U)

REFERENCES
(a) JCSM-422-65, subject as above, dated 29 May 1965/2/
(b) DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency," dated 1 August 1961/3/
(c) DoD Directive TS-5105.29 "Defense Intelligence Agency (Intelligence Activities)," dated 21 February 1963/3/

I have reviewed the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Study and Plan on Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection which was forwarded by reference (a).

The Outline Plan contained in reference (a) is approved. DIA will assume technical direction and coordination of HUMINT activities within DoD. I expect that implementation of the approved Outline Plan will result in resource economies in the form of an increased scope of HUMINT operations or in a release of resources for use in other Defense programs.

The Department of the Army will assume responsibility for conducting over-all DoD individual HUMINT training in accordance with policies and instructions promulgated by DIA under provisions of reference (b). Authorities and responsibilities set forth in reference (c) remain unchanged.

The Secretary of the Army, in collaboration with the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, is requested to develop a plan for DoD-wide HUMINT training within 120 days. A copy of the completed plan should be provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comments.

I endorse the Study finding that the successful accomplishment of sensitive HUMINT missions will be mainly dependent upon the caliber of personnel assigned to the program. Consequently, I wish to underscore the importance of assuring that only highly competent personnel are assigned to HUMINT duties by the military departments, DIA, and other DoD components involved.

Cyrus Vance

Washington, January 22, 1966.

SUBJECT
Minuteman Force Posture (U)

In my draft memorandum for the President on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Nuclear Forces, dated October 16, 1965,/2/ the planning figures of 700 Minuteman II and 300 Minuteman III were used. These figures were based on an extrapolation to 1970 of the present Soviet target system and the present philosophy that underlies the US Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP). The calculations that lead to these figures take proper account of other programmed U.S. strategic forces in the same time period, e.g., the Polaris force. However, no account has yet been taken in these calculations of the implications of possible Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses.

The immediate questions that should be answered this year are:

1. What is a proper mix of Minuteman II and Minuteman III missiles, and hence how may MK 12 and MK 17 re-entry vehicles should be procured for use on Minuteman missiles?

2. How should penetration aids to accompany MK 12 re-entry vehicles be distributed through the Minuteman III force, against various possible Soviet ABM threats?

Clearly, these are complex questions. Overall U.S missile force postures will depend on the types of Soviet ABMs we assume. The distribution of Minuteman II/Minuteman III will depend on the Polaris/Poseidon mix, and will be affected by possible development and eventual deployment of a small re-entry vehicle of the MK 100 type for Minuteman. Perhaps most importantly, the desirable mix of Minuteman II/Minuteman III will depend on the strategic objectives we assign to the U.S. offensive forces, as reflected in the type of SIOP assumed to govern the use of these forces in the time periods and environments of interest.

In addition to providing very important source material for rather near-term Minuteman force posture decisions, I expect that a study of these questions would be of significant aid in a number of other areas:

a. Strategic Operations against ABMs, including use of TAPS and other elements of a Minuteman control system.

b. Design of MIRVs that might have to be used against hard targets as well as against defended cities.

c. Compatibility of Assured Destruction and of Damage Limiting criteria in designing force postures that include MIRVs and that must penetrate ABMs.

I should like you to perform such a study in stages. The first stage will be to consider the types of SIOP, and hence the type of SIOP guidance, that might seem appropriate for the employment of U.S. missile forces against a Soviet target list protected by ABM defenses. To be specific, I suggest you consider SIOP guidance for the programmed U.S. forces at end FY 1971, against National Intelligence Estimates of Soviet strategic offensive forces and two Soviet ABM threats:

1. An ABM deployment consisting of some 1,000 area interceptors;

2. An ABM deployment consisting of some 1,000 area interceptors plus 1,000 terminal interceptors, deployed at the 25 largest Soviet cities in rough proportion to their population.

The second stage will be to carry out two calculations:

1. A simple, pilot analysis of the performance of the programmed force, against the particular ABM threat and in the face of a specific Soviet attack. The programmed force would be operated under the SIOP guidance resulting from Stage I of the study.

2. An Assured Destruction calculation to measure the number of fatalities that could be inflicted by this U.S. force against the same Soviet threat if the entire U.S. force were applied to Soviet urban-industrial targets.

After my review of the results of the first two stages, I would like to specify a small number of alternative combinations of U.S. force postures, Soviet offensive threats and ABMs, and scenarios. For each such combination, an evaluation of both the Damage-Limiting capability and of the Assured-Destruction capability of each U.S. posture will be requested.

I would like to receive the SIOP guidance requested above, together with the rationale behind it, by February 15, 1966. This discussion may assume a good knowledge of the present SIOP on the part of my staff. It should discuss how a SIOP in the face of an ABM would differ from our present plan. It can be in outline form, but it should be complete enough to allow a simulated laydown of arbitrary mixes of the U.S. strategic weapons available in 1971, against a Soviet target list of the size and structure that might be predicted for that time on the basis of National Intelligence Estimates. For this purpose, details of the assumed Soviet SBM are not highly relevant. Much more important are questions of targeting philosophy, such as, for instance, the desirability of attacking ABM radars as part of a counter-military task, and the desirability of choosing urban-industrial targets on a rank-order basis, instead of on a basis of maximum total fatalities.

Robert S. McNamara/3/

Washington, February 1, 1966.

Dear John:

The Secretary has concluded that we should give consideration to offering the Russians a reciprocal exchange of information on our respective procedures for insuring control of nuclear weapons. Although it is obvious that propaganda underlies the clamor recently raised by the Soviets alleging inadequacies of American control over nuclear weapons stockpiled with Allied forces, it is possible that the top Soviet leaders are not fully aware of the extensiveness and effectiveness of these controls. We doubt that the Russians would agree to such an exchange of information, but the very fact of such an offer on our part would provide us with a counter to their propaganda charges of alleged neglect toward nuclear control. They would also be aware that unwillingness to discuss their own procedures would increase their vulnerability on this propaganda front. Finally, raising the idea of such an exchange might also cause the top leaders to familiarize themselves more thoroughly with our procedures, and might even lead them to review and to tighten their own arrangements.

We therefore believe that we should consider making such an offer, in terms which would put on record a reaffirmation of the seriousness with which we regard the problem and a refutation of their erroneous statements regarding our controls. In case of Soviet acceptance of the offer, we believe it should be possible to provide information--without disclosing data which must be kept secret--which will strengthen our case, we may elicit some useful information from the Soviet Union, and we would have opened a dialogue in an area of important mutual concern. We believe it would be possible to engage in such an exchange without getting into questions about aspects of our custodial control procedures which might be unconvincing to the Russians; it is clear that they will not be so forthcoming with respect to their own arrangements, if, indeed, they will discuss them at all--as to place us in the position of being more reticent than they. If they do not agree to a reciprocal exchange of information, as is likely, we can still provide them information on our control procedures if we wish.

While the Soviets have placed the main emphasis in their propaganda on our nuclear weapons stockpiled with and for the use of Allied forces, we believe it would be preferable to focus our comments on the general subject of insuring Presidential control, so as not to accentuate questions of trust with respect to Allies. (This would, incidentally, also blunt Soviet suspicion that we were only attempting to smoke out questions of Warsaw Pact nuclear supporting arrangements.)

Enclosed are a draft note proposing such an exchange; and an illustrative draft of a statement/2/ setting forth some information on our control arrangements, which could be passed to the Soviet Government. We would of course want to inform such Allies as Germany and the United Kingdom in the first instance, and NAC, in advance.

I would appreciate Defense's comments and concurrence on the proposition and the enclosed drafts.

Sincerely,

Tommy

Washington, February 9, 1966.

SUBJECT
AEC Review of Nuclear Control Procedures

Commissioner Palfrey has indicated to Chuck Johnson that he intends to approach you personally for a reconsideration of your decision not to give the AEC [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]./2/ It might be just as well to take care of this before you leave./3/

As I mentioned in my last memo,/4/ there are indications that the AEC intends to make a major move into the area of Presidential control. They are currently holding up the [3 lines of source text not declassified].

The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is a classic case in that it raises all of the key issues in the area of Presidential control.

[5 paragraphs (10 lines of source text) not declassified]

Since the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is dealing with defensive weapons, these questions are less critical in this context. But the release of this Agreement with its comprehensive list of issues might open up a great debate over the President's emergency powers.

As you are aware, the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] provides for [8 lines of source text not declassified].

A letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the President on 6 December 1963/5/ indicated that it was the view of State, Defense and Justice that [6 lines of source text not declassified].

If the AEC were given access to the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] they might challenge [7 lines of source text not declassified].

As you are aware, [6 lines of source text not declassified].

Recommend that you dissuade the AEC from further efforts to review Presidential command arrangements and confine their activities to safety provisions for the weapons in the field.

RCB

I conclude that the President and SecDef must themselves serve as the reviewing authority for Presidential nuclear control procedures. This is one of those rare cases in which national security will not permit any further checks and balances./6/

Washington, February 17, 1966.

SUBJECT
Special Committee/2/

Attached is a copy of the minutes of our Strategy Discussion Group Meeting last Tuesday. I thought that this was a very useful discussion as it enabled us to get on the table some of the issues that have been concerning all of us with respect to the future direction of the Special Committee.

I was particularly struck by the fact that we face a very real dilemma as we proceed with future meetings of the Working Groups. On the one hand, if we are to make the Special Committee a useful and meaningful activity, which is an objective we share, we will have to engage the other members in a thorough discussion of current nuclear planning ultimately focused on the question of specifying how the Europeans can become more effectively involved in nuclear planning and crisis consultation. On the other hand this seems certain to involve not only the release of sensitive military information but also disclosure of sensitive political relationships between heads of government; most importantly, it will require our coming to grips with the question of just how much of a voice we are prepared to give our allies in the planning of nuclear forces and in consultations regarding their use. Although in general we want to be forthcoming, there is obviously a point beyond which we are not prepared to go. Moreover, the decision as to the extent to which it is in the US national interest, both generally and specifically, to so engage our allies, can only be made at the highest levels of government.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, it seems to me the following guidance should be applicable for all US personnel in the conduct of meetings and discussions under aegis of the Special Committee and its Working Groups:

1. That US staff, in preparing proposals for internal US review, be guided by the principle of maximum allied participation in the various stages of nuclear planning and consultation, but

2. That such proposals clearly identify instances that will require disclosure of sensitive military or political information or which will lead to commitments for any significantly increased allied involvement in any aspect of US nuclear planning and consultation, so that,

3. These proposed disclosures and commitments may be subject to explicit review by our Strategy Group and we may take whatever actions for securing subsequent approval as may appear appropriate (including specifically forwarding proposals to our respective superiors and the President where this is indicated).

If you agree with the preceding suggestion, I propose that our Group meet again early in March to conduct the review suggested in 3. above, as well as to consider other related business.

UAJ

Washington, February 15, 1966, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT
Strategy Discussion Group Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

State:
G--Mr. Johnson
G/PM--Mr. Weiss
G/PM--Mr. George
G/PM--Mr. Sloss
EUR--Mr. Leddy
EUR--Mr. Schaetzel
EUR--Mr. Spiers
EUR--Mr. Baker
EUR--Mr. Gilman
S/P--Mr. Owen

DOD/ISA--Mr. McNaughton
DOD/ISA--Mr. Wyle
DOD/ISA--Gen. Seignious

JCS--Lt. Gen. Goodpaster
JCS--Capt. Matthews
JCS--Col. Donaldson

DCA--Gen. Starbird

Colonel Donaldson of the Joint Staff reported on the first meeting of Working Group I (Intelligence and Data Exchange) which was held in Paris on February 7-8. He characterized the meeting as being generally very successful, and no major issues arose. Agreement was reached on a questionnaire to be sent to the Standing Group, SACLANT and SHAPE which would develop information on current arrangements for exchange of intelligence and related data. The initial scope of the Working Group is to consider data related to the use of nuclear weapons in the NATO area only. The terms of reference of the Working Group were broadened to include data on allied forces as well as intelligence data. At the next meeting the members of the Working Group will exchange papers on what data they believe their Heads of Government will need for consultation regarding the use of nuclear weapons. In response to a question by Mr. Johnson, Colonel Donaldson indicated that the data to be exchanged will include political as well as military information.

Mr. Johnson noted that it appeared that this Working Group will quickly get into issues involving high level political relationships between Heads of Government which would directly concern the President. He asked whether the Working Group was receiving adequate political guidance. Colonel Donaldson noted that Mr. Gannett of EUR was working with the US representatives of the Working Group. Mr. Johnson noted that it was important that we did not start down paths which would commit the President to provide information, or to enter into consultations which he might not be willing to undertake. He noted that, based on his experience with crisis situations, he felt sure the President will want to maintain freedom of action as to whom he consults with, about what, and under what conditions. For example, the President would not be likely to relish the idea of 14 colored phones ringing in his office during an acute international crisis. General Goodpaster noted that at the military level also the question of exchange of military information will require very careful looking at; he would not want exchange of military information to be automatic.

General Starbird reported on the initial meeting of Working Group II which was held in Paris, February 8-10. The Working Group agreed to submit three questionnaires designed to obtain an inventory of current communication resources in NATO. The first questionnaire is directed at Supreme Commanders and is designed to elicit information on the communication capabilities which they have between each other and to the NAC, the Standing Group and national authorities. The second questionnaire is directed to national authorities, and is designed to elicit information on communication capabilities between national authorities and NATO civilian and military bodies. The third questionnaire is directed to communications capabilities between member nations. Questionnaires are being addressed to all 14 NATO countries. They will not go into communication capabilities below the level of the Supreme Commanders. Working Group II hopes to hold a meeting with Working Group I once the questionnaires are completed to provide the results of their survey and to obtain guidance from Working Group I as to what data Heads of Government may wish to exchange.

General Starbird noted that the committee effort so far is largely "marking time" until they can receive inputs from Working Groups I and III. Nevertheless, the following issues have already emerged:

(a) There is a problem with respect to release of data by the US on the capabilities of secure voice equipment. General Starbird has requested USIB to reexamine a previous decision not to release such data to NATO.

(b) It is clear that certain countries will not be in a position to release data on certain sensitive communication facilities (e.g., Heads of Government communication capabilities between the US and the UK cannot be released unilaterally by the US).

(c) The UK, supported by Canada, took the position that consultation would obviously be centered in NAC and was initially opposed to sending out a questionnaire relating to communications between governments. General Starbird convinced them that the effort to elicit information would not prejudge the means of consultation, and they finally agreed to the third questionnaire.

Mr. Johnson asked what the US philosophy was on the use of NAC for consultation. Mr. McNaughton and Mr. Spiers replied that it is considered as an option, but not the only one and this is one of the questions to be explored by the Special Committee. Mr. Johnson noted that he considered secure written communications to be generally preferable to secure voice, General Starbird pointed out that Ambassador Cleveland had noted the possible requirement for secure voice between the NATO PermReps and their Heads of Government.

Mr. McNaughton summarized the arrangements being made for Working Group III which meets February 17-18 in Washington. He pointed out that ISA already had recommended to Mr. McNamara against the inclusion of substantive conclusions in the report from Working Group III to the Special Committee, and Mr. McNamara has agreed. Mr. McNaughton said they were not sure what bilateral discussions would take place, but clearly Mr. McNamara would have to talk with Minister Healey about F-111's, and would want to talk to Minister Von Hassel about German aid for Turkey. He would probably also want to talk to the Turkish Defense Minister about Mr. McNaughton's forthcoming visit to Turkey.

As to where the Special Committee is to go from here, Mr. McNaughton acknowledged that they are faced by a dilemma. On the one hand, there really is a desire on Mr. McNamara's part to get the Europeans (and when Mr. McNamara says the Europeans, what he really means is the Germans and, specifically, Von Hassel) more heavily involved in the details of nuclear problems. But, as we get further into detail, we run into areas where the US just doesn't have all the answers as yet, or if we do, the answers raise major policy issues. For example, the problems involved in deploying ABMs and ADMs in Europe. Mr. McNamara wants a follow-on meeting in April which would deal with tactical nuclear forces. Mr. McNaughton couldn't predict where they would go from here. They would probably want to establish groups of experts to meet between meetings of the Working Group, but they had made no final decision on this as yet.

Mr. Johnson asked what the philosophy was on the approach to the meetings and specifically whether they want to string them out or come to conclusions rapidly. Mr. McNaughton pointed out that here again there was a dilemma. If Working Group III went on for too long, it could become an institution and be subject to attack by the French. On the other hand, they certainly wanted to extend its life beyond the June Ministerial Meeting, again with the French in mind. How long the Working Group III meetings are extended really depends on how well the first few meetings go. He thought that Mr. McNamara and Minister Healey were optimistic. Mr. Johnson said that he favored keeping it going as a Working Group as long as it was productive.

Mr. Schaetzel said that it is important to make a record to show that we really tried to make the group succeed, but if we prolonged it indefinitely, it would play into French hands. Mr. McNaughton's view was we should certainly keep the group going for a while, but not forever. He also noted that it was the Germans' clear view, as expressed in the paper they sent us, that they do not want the Special Committee to compete with the hardware solution. Mr. Spiers noted that much of the problem arises from UK pressure to make the Special Committee a substitute for a hardware solution. Mr. Johnson stated that this UK position is counterproductive. Mr. Johnson summarized the objectives as expressed by the group as being "without prejudice to the hardware solution to make the Special Committee as meaningful as possible and to keep it going so long as it was being productive." Mr. Weiss noted there was a dilemma between providing enough information and sense of sharing to keep the Europeans engaged, while at the same time not committing the US government to consultation procedures and planning that we are not prepared to follow through on.

Mr. McNaughton then noted several possible proposals that had been made for involving the Allies in nuclear planning. These include (a) placing national representatives at SAC, (b) hot lines between national governments, (c) joint studies of such subjects as MRBMs, ABMs and ADMs, as suggested in Mr. Leddy's memorandum,/4/ and (d) examination with the allies of the requirements for the next generation of weapons systems.

At this point, Mr. Johnson asked whether we were trying to press our conclusions with respect to force structure and strategy on the allies. Mr. McNaughton acknowledged that to some extent Mr. McNamara does want them to reach the same conclusions as we have reached. (For example, that there is no need for additional MRBMs.) But, he also said Mr. McNamara was mindful of the need not to overdo this. Mr. McNaughton said that he very much agreed with the approach suggested in Mr. Leddy's memorandum to set up groups of experts under Working Group III to discuss specific problems. The problem was what subjects could we get into and which subjects should we avoid because we didn't have all the answers, or couldn't provide the necessary information. Mr. Spiers noted that a number of useful proposals had now been made which would involve the allies in nuclear planning and suggested that we set up a US Working Group under the aegis of the Strategy Discussion Group to examine these proposals and to develop a US position on what we were prepared to offer.

Mr. McNaughton again emphasized that Mr. McNamara thinks of the objectives of Working Group III principally in terms of the Germans. Ideally, he would like to see US-UK-German discussion of these issues for the principal purpose of educating the Germans and of involving Minister Von Hassel more in the details of nuclear planning. Mr. McNaughton noted the strong objections of the Italians to trilateral meetings, and asked State how serious we felt these Italian objections were.

Mr. Schaetzel replied that there is no question that this a real problem and that we cannot ignore the Italian objections if we want to keep them committed to NATO. He pointed out that the people in Italy who raised these objections were real friends of the US and supporters of European unity. Mr. McNaughton asked how can we proceed fruitfully to achieve our objectives with the Germans? Mr. Schaetzel suggested that we should meet with the Germans bilaterally rather than trilaterally. Mr. McNaughton expressed the view that this was not as effective. Mr. Johnson stated that State had no question but that the Germans were the key target, but we, nevertheless, had the problem of how to deal with the Italian objections to trilateralism.

Further expounding on Mr. McNamara's views with respect to the Special Committee, Mr. McNaughton said that Mr. McNamara does see it as a possible alternative to a hardware solution, that he is anxious to push on to conclusions as rapidly as possible but that he (Mr. McNaughton) has cautioned Mr. McNamara about pushing too fast.

General Seignious, seconded by General Goodpaster, pointed out that this first set of briefings would give the Europeans a great deal to absorb. General Goodpaster went on to express his view that this sort of discussion with the Germans was quite productive based on their experience with the German military. However, he pointed out that it was going to take time for them to absorb US thinking on these complex issues. Mr. Weiss and Mr. Johnson agreed that it was going to take time. General Goodpaster also stressed that the Joint Chiefs would want to take a very careful look at the proposal to put national representatives at SAC.

Mr. McNaughton said that he personally liked the idea of discussing the ABM problem with the Germans, but thought that their conclusion would be that ABM was just fine for Germany and what do we do then? Mr. Schaetzel supported the idea of discussing ABMs with the Germans and the British and felt they would be most interested.

General Goodpaster said it was his view that the important thing is not what we discuss, but to engage the Allies in real discussions. He personally felt, based on his discussions with the German military, that there were some real possibilities in the Special Committee if we really engage the Allies in detailed discussion. He also felt it was healthy for them to know that we do not know all the answers.

Mr. McNaughton said that the idea of technical experts groups was a good one and that we ought to discuss this at the Working Group III meeting this week. General Seignious suggested that the expert groups might well occupy themselves in absorbing the material presented at the briefings. In response to a question from Mr. Sloss, Mr. McNaughton said that they were not in a position to distribute the material from the JCS briefings. Thus, it was agreed that it would be useful to bring experts here from the other member countries to study the briefing materials in greater detail.

a. Mr. Spiers was asked to take the leadership in developing and analyzing proposals for involving the allies in nuclear planning and consultation.

b. Mr. Weiss was asked to participate with Defense in developing the first draft of a paper on tactical nuclear weapons to be presented to the next meeting of Working Group III.

c. Mr. McNaughton said he would explore further with Mr. McNamara the idea of experts groups to meet between meetings of Working Group III.

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
JAEIC Comments on the Report of the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Group Meeting of 27 February 1966

1. The subject report is attached for your information./2/

2. On 27 February the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Group (Bethe Panel) met to consider recent analysis of a class of Soviet thermonuclear devices with yields in the 3-25 MT range that were tested during the 1961-62 test series. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

3. The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) agrees in general with the principal findings of the Panel, which are as follows:

a. [14 lines of source text not declassified]

b. [11 lines of source text not declassified]

c. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

d. The recent Soviet model studies do not warrant any changes to the previously estimated yield-to-weight ratios of Soviet devices.

4. JAEIC notes that additional work is underway to consider other design models that might reasonably explain the technical data on these Soviet devices. It is hoped that after further analysis a more definitive statement about the characteristics of these and other Soviet devices may be possible.

Donald F. Chamberlain

Washington, March 2, 1966.

SUBJECT
Programmed Future Strategic Ballistic Missile Force Capabilities (U)

Enclosed is a summary table drawn from an evaluation of the programmed U.S. missile force against likely estimates of the future Soviet target system. These estimates are based upon the median estimates of this threat presented in the N.I.E. on Soviet capabilities for strategic attack (N.I.E. 11-8-65)./2/ Enclosed also are tables containing the detailed assumptions for the analysis. Most of the previous calculations that you have seen for this time period have treated the U.S. Assured Destruction capability in the face of a maximum plausible Soviet threat. By contrast the enclosed calculations are relevant to the U.S. combined Assured Destruction/Damage Limiting capability against a more likely Soviet threat. These calculations strongly suggest that U.S. capabilities to attack the likely Sino-Soviet target system will increase sharply over the period 1966 to 1971. By 1971 our ballistic missile force alone, operating in pre-emption, would be able to destroy the major part of their strategic offensive forces. To compare the 1971 force with the current force, we have assumed that [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. In terms of residual opposing weapons, instead of average kill against the target systems, the performance is even more impressive. When bomber weapons are also included in U.S. counter-military strikes, this effectiveness would be further enhanced.

The calculations summarized above utilized a targeting procedure as much like that of the SIOP as we could make it. We used a median threat without ABMs or extremely high numbers of Soviet hardened missiles to test the ability of our missile forces to destroy military targets for the Damage Limiting mission. We are now in the process of calculating performance when targeting is designed to minimize Soviet damage potential, instead of following [2 lines of source text not declassified].

I expect to use the calculations in this paper in the next Presidential Memorandum on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces, and compare the results with others that assume larger missile forces withheld for the urban-industrial task. Additionally, since the results are so striking, a copy of the enclosed table has been made available for the back-up book for your congressional testimony. I will, of course, send you the full paper if you are interested in pursuing this any further.

Alain Enthoven

TABLE I
SINO-SOVIET TARGET LIST

[table (6 columns and 12 rows) not declassified]

TABLE II
U.S. FORCES--INVENTORY BOOSTERS

[* number and text in table not declassified]

TABLE III
OPERATIONAL FACTORS/1/

	SIOP-4		1967
	Non-Reprog. Rel./3/	CEP	Non-Reprog. Rel.	CEP	Yield
System
Minuteman I	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]
Minuteman II	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]
Minuteman III	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]
Titan II	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]
Polaris A2/A3 (66% At Sea)	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]

	1969			1971
	Reprog Rel	Non Reprog Rel.	CEP	Reprog Rel.	Non Reprog Rel.	CEP	Yield
System		[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]
Minuteman I	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]
Minuteman II	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]/2/	[*]
Minuteman III	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]/2/	[*]
Titan II		[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]
Polaris A2/A3 (66% At Sea)	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]

[* entry in table not declassified]

TABLE IV
OVERALL SUMMARY OF RESULTS
BALLISTIC MISSILES ONLY

[table (13 columns and 10 rows) not declassified]

JCSM-147-66

Washington, March 7, 1966.

SUBJECT
Military Strategy for Fiscal Years 1968 Through 1975

1. JCSM-15-66,/2/ dated 10 January 1966, subject: "Changes and Revisions in Content and Transmittal Procedures of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), Parts I-V and Part VI (U), "informed you of certain procedural changes instituted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the JSOP.

2. Transmitted herewith are:

a. A resume of the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning over-all military strategy for the period 2-10 years hence (Appendix A).

b. Tentative major force-level decision-issues which the Joint Chiefs of Staff will address in Part VI of the JSOP (Appendix B)./3/

c. Parts I-V of JSOP 68-75/4/ (Appendix C, forwarded separately).

3. Force levels considered necessary to implement this strategy together with supporting rationale will be forwarded as Part VI of JSOP 68-75 about mid-March 1966. At that time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide you with their analyses and recommendations on the major decision-issues listed in Appendix B.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the separate force analyses of the draft memorandums for the President, prepared for the upcoming budget year, be developed within the context of the over-all military strategy contained in Appendix A as supported by the more detailed treatment in JSOP 68-75. They further recommend that Appendix A be utilized as the principal basis for your draft memorandums for the President on over-all US military strategy and force levels for Fiscal Years 1968 through 1975.

5. Without attachments, this memorandum is Unclassified.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler/5/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MILITARY STRATEGY FOR FY 1968 THROUGH 1975 (U)

Part I

Introduction

1. (U) The basic missions of the US Armed Forces are two: (1) to deter or deal decisively with any military attack against the United States and its possessions and (2) to protect and project US interests on a global basis in support of national goals.

2. (U) Five major goals/7/ of US foreign policy are:

a. To deter or defeat aggression at any level, whether of nuclear attack or limited war or subversion and guerrilla tactics.

b. To bring about a closer association of the more industrialized democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Asia in promoting the security and prosperity of the Free World.

c. To help the less developed countries carry through their revolution of modernization without sacrificing their independence.

d. To assist in the gradual emergence of a genuine world community, based on cooperation and law, through the establishment and development of such organs as the United Nations, the World Court, the World Bank and Monetary Fund, and other global and regional institutions.

e. To search for means of reducing the risk of war, of narrowing the areas of conflict with the communist world, and of encouraging the re-emergence in communist countries of the nationalism and individualism which are already changing and dividing the once-solid communist bloc.

3. (C) The United States must take an active part in shaping a world compatible with freedom or yield to the communist powers a major opportunity to shape the world to our disadvantage. The role of US military forces in this concept is (1) primarily, to deter the use of hostile force and, if deterrence fails, to enable the United States together with its allies to defeat the enemy, and (2) secondarily, to participate in nonwar diplomatic, economic, and psychological operations to the degree their unique capabilities and their primary role permit. Derived from the national goals and fundamental military role for US forces are basic military objectives.

4. (S) Four basic military objectives of the United States are:

a. Protect and defend the United States and preserve both its status and freedom of action as a dominant world power. The military forces required to achieve this objective must first be capable of deterring or dealing effectively with any military attack against the United States.

b. Be capable of supporting US world-wide interests. The military forces of the United States should be able, in conjunction with allied and friendly forces as available, to deter or deal effectively with any military attacks against other areas essential to US security.

c. Support US foreign policy and diplomatic efforts abroad. Included herein are military programs to assist friendly governments in the prevention and defeat of subversion, insurgency, and aggression which threatens their survival. Concomitant tasks of US forces are the capability to protect US property as well as US and selected nationals and their properties as required. This responsibility extends, as appropriate, to ensuring the freedom of the sea, air, and space regions for the United States and friendly powers and to denying their use for purposes adverse to US interests.

d. Maintain active forces in a high state of readiness, strategically deployed, mobile, and adequately supported to conduct military operations so as to achieve US objectives, minimize damage to the United States and her allies, and force a conclusion of hostilities on terms advantageous to the United States and its allies, while keeping hostilities at the lowest scale of conflict commensurate with the achievement of US objectives.

5. (TS) The over-all strategic concept designed to support US national goals and achieve US military objectives is to prevent or to defeat aggression wherever and whenever US national interests are adversely affected. This requires (1) a military posture of sufficient strength and flexibility to permit exercise of the initiative by the United States in the conduct of military, political, and economic affairs and (2) the coordination and exploitation to best advantage of all instruments of national power. Deterrence, collective security, and flexible response are the basic elements of this concept.

6. (C) Deterrence of a nuclear exchange is the first responsibility of US strategy since national survival is clearly at stake; at the same time, US strategy must also provide for the capability to deter aggression at any lesser level of conflict. To insure deterrence, US forces must be clearly capable of making both direct and indirect attack on the United States or its interests grossly unattractive and unprofitable. The military capability to control, defeat, or destroy the enemy and the firm resolve of the United States to use its forces if required must be obvious as well as real.

7. (C) Collective security involves the acquisition, the development, and stability of those allies who can now or ultimately will contribute to US security interests world-wide.

8. (S) Flexible response is essential to the prevention of conflict escalation and is, therefore, an inextricable element of deterrence. Flexible response requires a combination of modern, mobile, and balanced forces which will permit the exercise of a wide range of options to employ military forces under varying conditions and threats to achieve US objectives.

9. (C) Translation of these considerations into a force structure depends on the interaction in the world environment between US national goals and the threat to their accomplishment.

Part II

Global Strategic Appraisal

1. (U) Today's world appears to be somewhere between (1) a bipolar world and a polycentric world; (2) an environment in which the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) are challenging Free World interests and an environment in which the CPR is challenging USSR as well as Free World interests; (3) a globe divided on lines of ideology and political organization and on lines of race and economic development; and (4) a world of law organized to respect the inter-dependencies of modern life and a world of conflict disorganized by competing ideologies and social turmoil.

2. (S) The most dangerous threat to US interests is posed by the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. This threat is so serious--regardless of the estimated intentions of Soviet leaders--that it must receive primary cognizance in the formulation of military strategy and in the development of adequate countering force levels. Concurrently, it must be recognized that, without ever resorting to a strategic nuclear attack, the USSR and/or the CPR could expand the communist-dominated world until the United States and its allies are finally isolated and subjected to piecemeal domination.

3. (S) The USSR now has the capability to conduct a massive nuclear attack against Eurasia with manned aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, and submarine-launched missiles. The Soviet strategic offensive force of ICBMs, SLCMs/SLBMs, the heavy bombers, and some medium bombers can wreak enormous damage on the United States in a first strike but cannot at the present time destroy enough of the US strategic nuclear force to preclude retaliatory destruction of the Soviet Union as a viable society. Additionally and apart from Soviet nuclear capabilities, the USSR/Warsaw Pact and the CPR have significant conventional forces which pose major threats to the Free World.

4. (TS) Without a clear belief that they would emerge as the dominant world power, Soviet leaders are not likely to initiate deliberately a strategic nuclear exchange. This does not preclude the possibility of strategic nuclear war through escalation or miscalculation. Further, the United States cannot safely discount the possibility that Soviet leaders might launch a pre-emptive strike if they considered themselves irretrievably committed in a confrontation or if they believed a nuclear attack on the USSR was imminent.

5. (S) The fact that the United States and the USSR each has the ability to inflict extensive destruction on the other, regardless of which strikes first, has a paradoxical impact on the formulation of military strategy. It decreases the likelihood of strategic nuclear war but increases the necessity that the United States maintain a balanced strategic nuclear force superior to that of the Soviet Union. It increases the importance of conventional military power but inhibits its application in direct confrontation between major powers because of the risks of escalation. It diminishes the role of lesser powers in high-intensity conflicts but enlarges their role in mid- and low-intensity conflicts.

6. (S) The US and USSR strategic nuclear capabilities are expected to remain superior to those of any other nation for the period of this appraisal, provided no unbalancing arms control or disarmament agreements are negotiated. The actual and potential nuclear capability of the United Kingdom is not considered to be in competition with US interests. France's nuclear efforts are weighted more toward a political and psychological effect than toward a direct military threat and are aimed primarily at gaining leadership in Europe. However, in the current worldwide environment and considering the militant and sometimes irrational orientation of Chinese communist officials, the growing nuclear capability of the CPR--although expected to remain less than that of France for the next decade--constitutes a significant political, psychological, and military threat to US security interests.

7. (TS) The CPR has initiated a long-range, broad-based program in support of nuclear weapons development. A weaponized version of their 1964 fission device probably is available now in limited numbers, and Communist China at this time has some bombers--but no missiles--capable of delivering nuclear weapons. There are indications of some developmental work on ICBMs and construction of missile launching submarines; however, the CPR appears to be concentrating first on obtaining MRBMs. By 1970, the CPR could have sufficient medium range missiles and warheads to threaten peripheral states. Hence, nuclear attack and nuclear blackmail become feasible CPR courses of action in the Western Pacific-Asian area. Additionally, the CPR may be able to pose a limited nuclear threat to the United States and to the USSR by the early 1970's. Communist China certainly will attempt to exploit these capabilities, as well as its large conventional forces, to threaten its neighbors and to undermine US commitments in the Asian area without, however, subjecting its growing potential to serious risk.

8. (S) There is no longer a communist bloc in the traditional sense of a monolithic structure subservient to Moscow. Independent factions are developing because of the growing tendency of East European countries to emphasize national rather than ideological and bloc ambitions as well as because of the increasingly bitter Sino-Soviet dispute which has its deepest roots in national rather than ideological differences. The trend in Europe toward independent national policies probably will be enhanced by increased East-West trade and other forms of communications stimulated by historical orientation. Although there may be some temporary accommodations for purposes of expediency, the Sino-Soviet rift is likely to persist and, in the absence of overt war between the United States and either the USSR or the CPR, to crystallize. Competition between the USSR and CPR may intensify their activities in areas of interest to the United States; on the other hand, the rift, for as long as it continues, lessens the magnitude of the otherwise combined military threat to the United States.

9. (S) There has been a trend toward a general stabilization of the US-USSR relationship--although this trend could be reversed suddenly. Contributing to this stabilization are the maturing of the Soviet society, the continued economic advancement of West Europe and Japan, and the divisive tendencies within the communist group of nations.

10. (C) This stabilization of US-USSR relations has significant ramifications:

a. The focal point of the cold war is shifting to the underdeveloped two-thirds of the world.

b. The cold war has become less linear and more triangular, with the CPR, the USSR, and the United States--each with its allies--at the apexes.

c. The Soviet Union and the CPR, without disavowing their intent ultimately to achieve world domination, have reoriented their strategies; i.e., the Soviets' espousal of "Wars of National Liberation" and the Chinese communists' doctrine of "People's Wars" to wear down, isolate, and destroy opposing advanced states.

11. (C) The underdeveloped world is particularly susceptible to communist insurgency because of the prevailing militant and immature nationalism coupled with the instability inherent in the modernization process. The coming decade is likely to be critical because of revolutionary trends stemming from the inability of governments to cope with social and economic problems; further, exacerbation of this situation by the disruptive competition between the USSR and CPR for influence in these areas must be anticipated. Whether the continuing conflicts in the underdeveloped regions will be primarily military or primarily political and economic will depend on two factors: (1) the success of the current US military effort in Vietnam and (2) the ability of the Free World to execute effective political, economic, psychological, and military preventive programs.

12. (S) In summary, of all the forms of warfare, general nuclear war, although the most dangerous threat, is the least probable for the next decade. Continued low-intensity conflict, particularly in the underdeveloped portion of the world, is almost certain. Limited war in the underdeveloped areas is a continuing possibility because (1) militant and immature nationalism prevails in many states; (2) there remain many traditional unresolved issues between neighboring states and races; and (3) there will be the possibility of escalation of Soviet or CPR-instigated insurgencies. Limited war in the developed portion of the world is unlikely because (1) the dangers of escalation are magnified by the intimate involvement of both US and USSR interests and (2) the relative postures of the advanced states are sufficiently balanced that each would be reluctant to initiate a limited war without explicit US or USSR backing which is considered unlikely in the absence of extreme provocation (e.g., a serious threat to the allied position in Berlin or Western military intervention in an East German uprising).

13. (S) Fundamental to the entire question of the likelihood of conflict is recognition that the most important single factor in deterring Moscow, Peking, or their allies from the use of force in any portion of the conflict spectrum is opposing military power--the existence of superior US strategic nuclear capabilities and US military presence at, or an obvious capability to deploy military power rapidly to, the point of contest. With its allies the United States is presently superior militarily and has the potential to exert superior military force globally if it decides that the situation merits the requisite military, political, and economic decisions. Nevertheless, the Sino-Soviet schism bears so importantly on US strategic planning that, should there be a USSR-CPR accommodation, the basic threat and consequent Free World force posture will have to be reassessed.

14. (S) At present the balance of strategic military power appears to favor the United States. There are a number of factors, however, which could lead to upsetting this favorable balance, such as unmatched technological breakthroughs in nuclear strategic systems by the USSR, failure to consider basic US-USSR disparities in deciding on force levels, unverified arms control agreements or unbalanced arms reductions, and major shifts in alliances and alignments.

15. (TS) The Soviet Union is improving its strategic nuclear posture relative to that of the United States. It undoubtedly will seek continued qualitative and quantitative force improvements and may be seeking to enhance its relative posture through arms control agreements. Primary Soviet efforts have focused on a build-up of ICBMs; the hardening and dispersing of missile sites; developing active air and missile defense systems; an increased mobility of land-based and sea-based ballistic missile systems. There is evidence that the Soviets are deploying a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, and are working on larger nuclear warheads with compatible delivery vehicles; and they have the capability to develop and deploy multiple independently guided re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The Soviets probably could attain an operational capability with a MIRV in the period 1970-1975. They could already have developed a limited antisatellite capability based on an operational missile (e.g., the SS-4) with a nuclear warhead and on existing electronic facilities. A breakthrough or major advance in any of these areas could alter, in their favor, the present ratio of the US-USSR strategic nuclear postures unless the United States, through its own vigorous development and modernization program, keeps pace.

16. (TS) There are three basic disparities between the United States and the USSR which must be considered in determining the minimum US strategic nuclear force levels. First, the Soviet Union, as a closed society, has an advantage in thwarting intelligence collection; it can secretly increase its forces quantitatively and qualitatively with less chance of detection than if the United States made the same attempt. Second, the Soviet Union probably has less inhibitions about executing a first strike. Third, there are significant differences in population distribution which, in conjunction with higher missile payload capacities, favor the Soviet Union. Hence, equality in US and USSR strategic nuclear forces is less than parity for the United States when the asymmetry in intelligence, in population distribution, and in willingness to strike first are considered. Thus, the strategic nuclear advantage must be clearly in our favor both actually and in the view of potential enemies.

17. (C) Arms control is a desirable objective for national security policy if it actually reduces the likelihood of the outbreak of war. However, an arms control or disarmament agreement which resulted in a state or a group of states improving its military posture vis-a-vis other states probably would be more destabilizing than stabilizing. There is ample evidence that the USSR and other communist states do not subscribe to the idea of arms control in the same way Western governments do, to include the traditional and doctrinal attitude of communist states toward treaties and agreements. A fully adequate verification system in effect prior to implementation of any arms control or disarmament agreement is essential to US security.

18. (TS) Comprehensive or threshold test ban treaties are cases in point. There are serious gaps in US hard intelligence about Soviet knowledge and capabilities in the newest weapon effects areas; in fact, there are indications that the USSR already may have made gains in nuclear weapons technology beyond current US capabilities. Should probable Soviet developments in BMD systems with drastically improved nuclear effects warheads be deployed prior to compensating accomplishments by the United States, the military balance of power could be critically upset in favor of the USSR. Vigorous nuclear testing within the restrictions of the present Limited Test Ban Treaty is necessary to permit the United States to increase effectiveness and better to assure survival of its offensive nuclear weapons and defensive systems against the effects of the improved Soviet nuclear weapons. To stop or even further to limit testing would foreclose the possibility of attaining essential knowledge of BMD, of improved silo hardening, of better penetration aids, and of other strategic weapon technology for the United States.

19. (TS) Space competence is important to national security just as it is to national growth and prestige. In recent Moscow parades, the Soviets displayed what they alleged to be an orbital missile. Despite a number of Soviet allusions to "orbital rockets," probably advanced for propaganda purposes, it is not believed that the USSR has an orbital bombardment capability, and there is no evidence of an intention to develop such systems. It is estimated that the Soviets will not deploy offensive weapons in space within the next ten years. However, it is clear that Soviet space technology is well advanced, and their current peaceful objectives in this medium sooner or later may be accompanied by hostile demonstrations or acts seeking to obtain a military advantage in space. A lack of parallel or countervailing space capabilities would place the United States at a disadvantage, regardless of its earth-based strategic deterrent strength.

20. (S) A significant destabilizing element in the world environment is the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. There are a number of countries which have the capability to become members of the "Nuclear Club" if they make such a decision, with India, Israel, and Sweden being the most likely to do so in the short run. In the long run, the FRG and Japan probably will become the serious contenders. Such nuclear proliferation as may occur over the next ten years is not likely to affect materially the existing thermonuclear duopoly. Although widespread independent national nuclear capabilities are basically deleterious to US security interests, it may not be within the reasonable power of the United States to preclude nuclear proliferation. Even though multilateral nuclear partnership arrangements tend to reduce unilateral US military flexibility, the political and psychological requirements of national policy may be such as to override the military disadvantages. Hence, considering all factors, additional nuclear sharing arrangements may become desirable in specific instances to maintain favorable power relationships.

21. (TS) Evidence indicates that the Soviets can support substantial toxic chemical warfare (CW) operations and that research on improving toxic nerve agents and efforts to develop nonlethal incapacitating agents is continuing. The Soviets have a variety of chemical munitions and delivery vehicles for dissemination of chemical agents and they possess a wide range of good defensive CW equipment. While Soviet CW munitions probably will be used in the tactical sense, the Soviets have consistently grouped toxic agents with "weapons of mass destruction" in political and classified military writings. Decision to use such weapons probably will be taken at the highest political level in the Soviet government.

22. (S) Another factor which could affect the world balance of power in the mid-term is a weakening of alliances, together with a concomitant realignment and greater independence of action within and among the major power sectors. As Western nations grow stronger economically, as their sense of nationalism increases, and as the fear of nuclear war recedes, the Western alliances are becoming less united, and the member states are more inclined to base their individual military forces on national interests rather than alliance requirements. The resurgence of nationalism in East Europe and the broadened relations between Eastern and Western Europe probably will militate against success of Soviet efforts to achieve any additional military, economic, or political integration of the Warsaw Pact. While both East and West European alliance systems can be expected to become less unified, it appears that the communist alliance system will suffer greater disintegration as its members improve their economic status.

23. (S) Coupled with the foregoing trend in the alliance structure of the communist and noncommunist camps is the move toward progressive withdrawal and decreasing military presence in colonial areas by former colonial powers. As colonial power presence has diminished, a corresponding vacuum has developed. France, the Netherlands, and Germany are no longer Asian powers. The United Kingdom is gradually withdrawing militarily from the overseas areas. The power equation has been drastically altered in Africa, although France, Belgium, Portugal, and the UK will retain some presence and influence on that continent. To maintain a power balance, the United States has had and probably will continue to have to fill such military vacuums to varying degrees.

24. (C) The United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union each appear economically capable of increasing significantly their military efforts. Since 1945, the US gross national product has risen from approximately $330 billion (in 1964 prices) to $675 billion in 1965 while defense expenditures, as a percentage function of GNP, have declined from 12.9 percent in 1954 to 7.9 percent in 1965. Although the balance of payments problem has an adverse impact on US forward deployment and military assistance programs, the United States is in a better economic position than either the USSR or the CPR to support increased military expenditures and to engage in economic warfare. The economy of West Europe is certainly such that it could support an increased military defense effort as well as simultaneously provide substantial assistance to underdeveloped areas.

25. (C) The increasing economic gap between the developed and underdeveloped areas of the world contributes significantly to international tensions. Economic modernization is a slow, painful process which requires a major effort just to keep up with the population growth. There are already three billion people in the world, most of them living in underdeveloped regions. The United Nations Population Commission estimates that, if present trends continue, the world population will be nearly 7.5 billion by the end of this century. Low agricultural output is a significant limitation in the underdeveloped world. The ability of the United States to produce and distribute food can become an even more significant element of national power. The ability and success of the Free World vis-a-vis that of the communist world to foster democratic capitalism versus communism in the underdeveloped areas will impact on peace and stability during the mid-range period, as well as over the long run, on the balance of world power.

JCSM-167-66

Washington, March 22, 1966.

SUBJECT
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1968-1975 (JSOP 68-75), Part VI, Analysis and Force Tabulations (U)

1. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved and forward herewith Part VI, JSOP 68-75./2/ Parts I-V, JSOP 68-75 were forwarded by JCSM-147-66, dated 7 March 1966./3/

2. (U) Part VI, JSOP 68-75, contains the military advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to the force level objectives they recommend for the mid-range period. It includes an assessment of the current Department of Defense Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program, and examines alternatives and risks. Phasing required to achieve their recommended force levels and weapon systems development programs for the period FY 1968-1975 is also included. Particular emphasis is placed on these issues which must be addressed in conjunction with the FY 1968 budget.

3. (S) JSOP 68-75 force objectives were assessed on the basis that requirements which exceed the capabilities of the recommended permanent active establishment would be met either by some combination of partial mobilization, full mobilization and extension of terms of service, or by temporary activation of additional forces. Since the decision to meet these requirements without the selective call-up of reserves appears to be a continuing one, certain temporary adjustments in the force recommendations may be required. These temporary active force adjustments for the nearer time frame, relating specifically to the reserve call-up alternative and keyed to operations in Southeast Asia, are reflected in the Force Tables or, as appropriate, by annotation. Further temporary adjustments may be required as a result of extended deployments and other operations relative to Southeast Asia.

4. (U) As indicated in JCSM-147-66, dated 7 March 1966, specific major decision issues which require resolution in the FY 1968-1975 force programs are set forth in Appendices A and B hereto./4/

5. (U) The views of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff are contained in the separate memorandum attached herewith./5/

6. (U) Without attachments, this memorandum is downgraded to Secret and removed from the Restricted Data category.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler/6/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

CM-1279-66

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1968-75, Part VI (U)

1. (U) JCSM 167-66/2/ forwarded Part VI of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 68-75./3/ As indicated in the Force Tables of Part VI and the footnotes thereto, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not reach complete agreement on certain programs. There are, however, fewer divergencies in JSOP 68-75 than in past JSOPs. It is also noted that where there are differences of opinion on force levels, these are in many cases differences in timing rather than in concept or substance. Finally, our experiences associated with the war in Vietnam were heavily weighted in the deliberations and resultant recommendations on General Purpose forces.

2. (U) My views on the major program issues contained in the various programs are indicated in the following paragraphs.

3. (TS) Strategic Offensive/Defensive Forces

Studies, analyses and war games completed during the last year indicated trends that are not favorable to the United States. In order to maintain a credible deterrence we must take great care to assure that we retain clearly superior strategic offensive forces over the USSR. This concern is reflected in the unanimous agreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff on an IOC of FY 1974 for a follow-on manned bomber, deployment of Poseidon commencing in FY 1971 and an IOC of FY 1973 for an Advanced ICBM. I agree with these recommendations.

I continue to believe that our defensive forces are inadequate in their damage limiting role and in their contribution to a credible deterrence. I accord top priority to the acquisition and deployment at an early date of a ballistic missile defense, and fully agree with the unanimous recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to commence deployment of Nike-X in FY 1972. While some questions such as point defense of our offensive forces have not been resolved, I do not believe we should delay the decision to deploy Nike-X.

I continue to support the requirement for a follow-on manned interceptor. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not agreed on the ultimate numbers of F-12s to be deployed, they are agreed that deployment of the F-12 should commence in FY 1972. In view of the intelligence lead times and the USSR capability to deploy supersonic long range bombers, I consider it prudent to include sufficient funds in the FY 1968 budget to permit deployment of 12 F-12s in FY 1972. The force levels after FY 1972 should be dependent on future evaluations of the USSR bomber threat. I continue to believe, along with the majority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that except for normal attrition we should not decrease the number of Century series interceptors in our Continental Air Defense Force prior to the occurrence of a reduction in the strategic bomber threat or the deployment of a follow-on manned interceptor.

4. (S) General Purpose Forces

In agreement with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (less the Chief of Staff, US Army), I recommend a force level of 27-1/3 division forces. While our recent experience would tend to substantiate an increase in permanent active Army divisions, I join with the Chief of Staff, Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in deferring judgment on the number and mix of active divisions and brigades until the resolution of the Southeast Asia situation is clearer as well as our future NATO commitments and the resolution of questions concerning rapid deployment and rapid reinforcement. For these same reasons I also defer judgment on the number of sustaining support increments in the permanent active structure.

The war in Vietnam, gold flow considerations and uncertainties regarding overseas bases all support the unanimous recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a force level of 16 attack carriers and 16 attack carrier air wings in FY 1969. I am in agreement with these force levels. I continue to support, as do the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (less the Chief of Staff, Air Force), the increase in antisubmarine carriers from 9 to 11.

With regard to the number of Air Force tactical fighters, our experiences in Southeast Asia and the results of studies indicate an increase in total numbers is required. Recognizing the divergencies of views on total numbers of tactical fighters required, I believe that a reasonable program would be to level off at 30 tactical fighter wings (about 2200 aircraft) pending a more thorough study of our total national tactical air requirements.

5. (S) Air and Sealift Forces

I support the approved program for the C5A of 96 aircraft in FY 1972. Beyond FY 1972, I join with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (less Chief of Staff, Air Force) in deferring judgment on increased force levels pending a better understanding of our strategic mobility requirements for rapid deployment and rapid reinforcement.

6. (U) Accordingly, I recommend approval of the force levels which are supported unanimously by the Joint Chiefs of Staff together with the force levels I have indicated in the above paragraphs for certain of the programs on which there are divergent JCS views. With respect to divergencies not addressed in the above comments, I will provide my views in the review of Presidential Memorandums or programming documents.

Earle G. Wheeler/4/

Washington, April 7, 1966.

SUBJECT
Determination of a DoD Position on Chemical and Biological Warfare

As you are aware, the Department of Defense has been participating since November 1963 in an interagency effort to develop a national policy on Chemical and Biological (CB) Warfare. This effort was initiated at the instigation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with the approval of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Mr. McGeorge Bundy)./2/ Before even posing the question of a national policy a Defense position had to be established and efforts in this direction have been going on with JCS and several offices of OSD contributing. The various actions were closely coordinated with members of your Policy Planning Staff and with Mr. Barber.

My staff have reviewed the progress to date for me, and I find that the thrust of the effort has essentially evaporated. Rather than resurrect the effort and proceed from where we left off, we should make a fresh start. The only stipulations I would suggest are that (1) we concentrate on arriving at a DoD position irrespective of whether we proceed from there to an official national policy position, and (2) we start with face-to-face discussions rather than the distribution of memoranda.

I cannot overemphasize the importance of a DoD position. Lack of this is reflected in ambiguity and indecision in the CB planning of the military departments and OSD offices. If we are to spend our resources wisely, an agreed upon position has to be generated. Dr. MacArthur of my staff is quite willing to assume responsibility for the coordination of the OSD position provided you are in agreement. If you would nominate a senior member of your staff, Dr. MacArthur would like to meet with your nominee at an early date and agree on a course of action.

Finn Larsen/3/

Washington, April 19, 1966.

SUBJECT
Chemical and Biological Warfare Policy (U)

Since November 1963, in compliance with a request of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, this Agency has been conducting studies on the arms control and disarmament aspects of chemical and biological warfare. Concurrently, in response to the same directive the Departments of State and Defense have been conducting studies concerning those areas relating to CB weapons where they have prime responsibility and interest. The ultimate objective of these related studies is to formulate an agreed inter-agency statement of policy which could be developed into national policy guidance.

The attached paper, titled "Chemical and Biological Warfare Policy", which is forwarded for your consideration and comment, represents the tentative conclusions of this Agency on policies which the U.S. should adopt with respect to these weapons. It reflects the hypothesis that the spread of lethal chemical and biological weapons to states which do not now possess them is, prima facie, not in the national interest. Part III, titled "Basic Elements of Policy" proposes policies flowing from the hypothesis that are designed to minimize the risk that U.S. actions in the field of CB weapons might encourage other nations to acquire capabilities to use these potentially destabilizing weapons.

While it is believed that the suggested policies are in the national interest, there may be compelling military and political factors which militate against their adoption. It is requested, therefore, that in commenting on the attached draft, implications of the policies relating to military capabilities and international relations be emphasized. Your comments on arms control aspects would also be welcome.

In light of the delay since inter-agency studies on CB weapons were inaugurated, early action on this matter would be appreciated.

Adrian S. Fisher

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE POLICY/2/

I. Purpose

To propose for discussion a policy for the US to adopt with respect to chemical and biological weapons. Attention is focused on those aspects of policy which relate to arms control and disarmament.

II. Background and Scope

Since November 1963, in response to a request by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, this Agency has been studying the arms control aspects of CB weapons. Also in November 1963, the Department of State proposed an inter-agency review of the entire CB field, with its goal a statement of related national policy./3/

Since that time, two draft policy papers on CB warfare have been prepared and circulated for informal comment, one by the Department of Defense in December 1964,/4/ and one by the Department of State, in May 1965./5/ While each of these papers has helped to narrow down the pertinent problems which require resolution, ACDA's concern is that neither one stresses the issue of proliferation commensurate with the evolving threat as we see it. ACDA views the spread of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to states not now possessing them, particularly the developing states, as not in the national interest and as a threat to world peace. Although studies made in early 1964 estimated CB proliferation not to be imminent, there have been an increasing number of signs since that time, particularly from Israel, the UAR, Iraq and Indonesia, which may indicate the beginnings of a dangerous trend.

The policies discussed in this paper are designed to minimize the risk that US actions in the field of CB weapons might encourage other nations to acquire capabilities to use these destabilizing weapons. They reflect, for the most part, official statements and policy decisions on such matters as use of CB weapons, sales of CB munitions to foreign nations, technical assistance and public information in the CB field, all of which have proliferation implications.

We have also suggested a definition for the term "CB Weapons of Mass Destruction", which appears without definition in the US draft outline of a GCD treaty/6/ and for which an agreed definition would be necessary in the event proposals for the control of CB weapons are entertained as separable measures. It is our view that all CB weapons are not "weapons of mass destruction" as frequently categorized.

In addition, this paper suggests an approach to the difficult problem of control of CB weapons. In so doing, it recognizes that first priority must continue to be placed on the prevention of nuclear war, and that efforts to control CB weapons should not hinder or delay our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

Our immediate objective in proposing these policies is to present the proliferation aspects of chemical and biological weapons for discussion and comment by interested agencies of the Government. Our ultimate intent is to arrive at an agreed position which can be incorporated into the national policy recommendations that will result from the current inter-agency review of the whole field of chemical and biological weapons.

A collateral, but important, objective of this paper is to be prepared for the unexpected introduction of the question of control of CB weapons at a future disarmament conference, or to take advantage of an opportune time for Western initiative.

III. Basic Elements of Policy

1. The term "CB Weapons of Mass Destruction" refers only to lethal chemical and biological weapons; it excludes all other CB weapons such as the non-poisonous tear gases, "CN" and "CS," and any analogous weapons having the primary purpose of only temporary incapacitation without residual injurious effect.

2. Smoke, flame and incendiary agents should not be considered as CB weapons.

The US should continue to adhere to its declared policy of "no-first-use" of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, but this policy should not extend to those non-toxic CB weapons, as specifically designated by the President, which cause only temporary incapacitation without residual injurious effect.

1. Assistance to Others--The US should not assist any other state or groups of states to acquire CB weapons of mass destruction.

2. Discouraging Acquisition--The US should take no actions that would encourage any other state or group of states to acquire CB weapons of mass destruction and should, as appropriate, discourage such acquisition.

3. Information Exchange--While the US should continue for the pres-ent to honor its existing cooperative arrangements with the UK, Canada, Australia, and France, it should not enter into agreements with any additional states dealing with the exchange of technical data on CB weapons of mass destruction.

4. Public Information--The US should maintain close control of information about CB programs. CB information released to the public should be limited to that necessary to establish the distinction between lethal and non-lethal CB weapons and to justify military use of tear gas where such use is necessary for humanitarian reasons.

1. Non-Proliferation--Efforts to achieve a CB non-proliferation agreement should not be sought publicly or with the USSR until after a nuclear non-proliferation agreement has been achieved. Thereupon, the US should support efforts to forestall the acquisition of CB weapons of mass destruction by additional nations and should be prepared to enter into international agreements designed to achieve that objective. In the event that a nuclear non-proliferation agreement can not be obtained, the desirability of a CB non-proliferation agreement should then be considered in the light of conditions prevailing.

2. CB Free Zones--The US should support the creation of CB Free Zones after the establishment of Nuclear Free Zones. When an NFZ has been established then the US should support expansion of the denuclearized zone so as to also exclude CB weapons of mass destruction from the designated zone. Should the issue of CB Free Zones be pressed before NFZ's are established, the question of US support would be contingent on conditions then prevailing.

3. Ban on "First-Use"--Although the US should continue to adhere to its declared "no-first-use" policy on CB weapons of mass destruction, it should not so bind itself by international agreement, unless such action by the US would assist materially in obtaining adherence by other nations to a more comprehensive agreement, such as a CB non-proliferation agreement, which the US may wish to support.

4. Other Agreements--Other, more far-reaching agreements looking towards the eventual elimination of chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of all nations should be sought when adequate means of verification are available to protect national security.

[Here follows Part IV, Discussion, pages 7-23.]