Washington, April 19, 1966.

SUBJECT
Proposed Exchange with the Soviets on the Control of Nuclear Weapons

I think you should be aware of the proposal discussed in the attached correspondence for reciprocal exchange with the Soviets of information on procedures for insuring control of nuclear weapons. Although I think that it will be submitted to the White House routinely for clearance if State decides to go ahead with it, Secretary Rusk might bring up the matter at some future Tuesday luncheon.

The proposal was originally made by Ambassador Thompson in a letter to John McNaughton (attached--Tab A),/2/ and Bob McNamara has approved a draft note and statement (attached--Tab B)./3/ The JCS oppose the proposed exchange for reasons summarized in paragraph 7 of their statement (attached--Tab C)./4/

In principle, I think this proposal is a good idea. In practice, however, I am afraid that, unless it is handled extremely carefully, it could create some real problems that would be counterproductive. The points in paragraph 7 of the Chiefs' paper are illustrative of the kinds of problems that might be involved in such an exchange.

The most serious problem is that such a dialogue would naturally lead to questions about the nature of Presidential control and our arrangements with our allies. While one obviously could refuse to discuss the subject or give only very general replies, this could have the effect of creating additional suspicions rather than reassuring the Soviets. If it became known to Congress that such an exchange had taken place, this might lead to renewed interest on the part of various Congressional committees such as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as to the details of Presidential authority for the release of nuclear weapons. This is a subject on which the President is very sensitive for obvious political reasons and about which the less said the better.

At the same time, I think there may be merit in the idea of reassuring the Soviets about our control procedures and informing them of some of the specific equipment, such as Permissive Action Links (PALs), that we might wish to encourage them to incorporate in their own weapons. If we decide to go ahead with this project, I would recommend that we simply give the Soviets the specific information that we think they should have, rather than instituting a dialogue or exchange on this subject. In transmitting the information, we could indicate that we would of course be interested in a similar reassurance on their own procedures but not make this a precondition or part of a dialogue on the subject.

I have discussed the problem along the above lines with Ambassador Thompson and called to his attention the special area of Presidential interest in the proposal. He indicated that he wants to give the matter further thought to decide whether it should be pursued at all at this time. I have also asked Ben Read to make sure that any action State decides to take on this proposal be cleared with the White House.

Spurgeon

Washington, April 28, 1966.

I. PREFACE

The Panel (membership attached as Appendix A)/2/ was formed in May 1964 by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and asked to review our Nation's present and planned capability in Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW).

The ASW Panel was to assess for the President:

1) the extent and nature of the submarine threat,

2) the technical possibilities for coping with this threat,

3) the extent to which the programs we are undertaking or are projecting will take advantage of the available technical opportunities for coping with the submarine threat, and

4) the organization for developing and applying the technical means for solving ASW problems.

The PSAC ASW Panel examined the Navy's ASW program during the period May 1964-July 1965. This report was completed in August 1965./3/ Time has not stood still since that date, and in particular the Navy has accelerated or undertaken many important efforts that implement in part certain of the Panel's recommendations. For example, the Navy has expanded its exercise program and continued to develop an improved analytical capability; the Captor program has been accelerated; much greater coherence is seen in the torpedo-countermeasures program; greater emphasis has been given to anti-ship torpedoes; etc. The Panel is aware of these developments, in broad outline, but for the most part it has not investigated these matters in sufficient detail to attempt to revise the report to take into account new progress. The Panel believes that its assessment of the total ASW program remains valid and that its recommendations require further action.

In carrying out its mission, the Panel undertook to examine all relevant technical areas, recognizing that this involved many aspects of technology and a wide variety of naval programs. We also sought to take full advantage of the wealth of experience accumulated by our naval personnel and by other technical groups, both through an examination of their writings and through personal contacts and discussions. Finally, we sought to gain as much first hand experience as our schedules would allow with the current operational and R&D ASW equipment and with our ASW forces.

In so doing, the Panel has considered the present families of ASW platforms: 1) submarines, 2) surface ships (destroyers), 3) fixed-wing aircraft, and 4) helicopters; ASW sensors: 1) fixed acoustic surveillance systems, 2) submarine-borne active and passive sonar, 3) ship-borne active and passive sonar, 4) variable-depth sonar (VDS) either towed or free-swimming, 5) helicopter-dipped sonar, 6) sonobuoys, 7) airborne magnetic anomaly detection (MAD), and 8) radar; ASW weapons: 1) MK-37, MK-44 and MK-46 acoustic homing torpedoes, 2) mines, and 3) nuclear armed torpedoes or depth charges, including such delivery methods as anti-submarine surface launched rockets (ASROC), submarine launched rockets (SUBROC), and drone anti-submarine helicopters (DASH); and ASW fire-control and data-processing techniques and equipment.

In addition to these primary technical areas, the Panel has examined in some depth the Naval organization for R&D in ASW, including in particular the Navy's programs and techniques for developing, testing and evaluating systems and equipment. The Panel has also been concerned with manning requirements and training, ship automation, reliability and serviceability, the methods by which ASW effectiveness is measured, and the rationale for force-level determination. The Panel explored deeply with the Navy the detailed nature of the intelligence available on the Soviet submarine threat, and some members of the Panel went more extensively into the total store of intelligence.

Members of the Panel participated in ASW carrier task force exercises, visited shore-based sound surveillance systems, flew in shorebased and carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft and in helicopters, sailed on destroyers hunting submarines, spent several days on nuclear-powered killer-submarines (SSKN) of the most advanced types (Plunger-Thresher), and witnessed trial firings of Polaris missiles from nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The Panel also visited naval laboratories and facilities, as well as the headquarters of ASW, both Atlantic and Pacific. In addition, the Panel has had constant contact with the staffs of DDR&E and the Department of the Navy, as well as a joint meeting with a United Kingdom ASW panel under Dr. John Kendrew.

Thus, we believe that we have examined the relevant technical areas. We have benefited greatly by our contacts with naval personnel and by the work of other technical groups. Although we were able to visit many naval establishments and to examine much equipment firsthand, we were not able to do so to the extent that we would have liked and have instead had to rely to a great extent on the available technical data. We believe that the available data have been provided by the Department of Defense and the Navy; as we received these data we were gradually led to the conclusion that one of the primary weaknesses in our ASW program was the scarcity of technical and scientific personnel in positions which carried real management responsibility and/or authority.

In this report, the technical material and supporting arguments are to be found in Sections III through VII; conclusions and recommendations are contained in each of these sections; however, the major ones have been extracted and are to be found in the summary section (Part II). A first reading of the material should include at least Parts II and III.

II. SUMMARY

The submarine threat to the United States is very substantial and will remain so indefinitely. As a measure of its intensity, we can note that the Soviet Union has a fleet of approximately 350 long range submarines of which 40 are nuclear and 310 conventional; that China has already built one and will probably build more copies of the Soviet diesel-electric G-class submarine which is capable of firing short range ballistic missiles while surfaced; and that such lesser powers as Indonesia and Egypt have been given Soviet submarines and can, therefore, pose a threat to elements of our naval forces in limited wars. Without question, submarines will with time become available to more and more nations perhaps including South American nations.

We found it useful to classify the submarine threat in the following important categories:

1. Submarines carrying nuclear weapons which can be used against CONUS by the Soviet Union now and by China in perhaps five years, as a deterrent force.

2. USSR submarines which would be used against our Naval forces (i.e., carrier and amphibious landing force) and against merchant shipping which might be carrying out theater support in a limited war.

3. Submarines of small powers which might be used as in para 2. Although we do not have detailed knowledge of the technical characteristics of the newer Soviet submarines, we have some quantitative data to support the conclusion that, with the possible exception of the most recent classes whose acoustic characteristics are not well known, current Soviet submarines are relatively noisy--except, of course, when they work on battery. In addition, nuclear submarines may possess a very small separate machinery plant to allow long endurance "creep" operation at reduced noise level. This does not mean that the Soviets may not now be developing relatively quiet nuclear subs, as we have done, or even fuel-cell powered quiet submarines. In fact, it is hard for us to assume otherwise since the Soviets certainly have the technical capability to do so and they are surely aware of the fact that noise is a key weakness in their subs.

Our capability in ASW depends on a composite of sensors, ordnance, platforms to carry the sensors and ordnance, and tactics for their utilization. The sensors which are used for detection and classification, location, and tracking of submarines include active and passive sonar, MAD, radar, and even visual sighting. These sensors must work in the open ocean, which is a complex medium with poorly determined properties that vary with both time and location. The platforms in which the sensors are installed include surface ships, submarines, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, sonobuoys, as well as fixed platforms in our coastal water and other critical areas. The effectiveness of each element, or combination of elements, of course, also depends strongly on the technical characteristics and the tactics of the enemy submarines.

No one device or tactic plays a predominant role in our capability to detect, classify, locate and kill enemy submarines, and our capability is indeed a result of the combined use of the elements which make up our ASW forces. We do not foresee at this time any single new invention, development, or discovery which would by itself drastically alter this interdependence. The Panel does recognize that if large surface-effect naval vessels such as the Captured Air Bubble (CAB) ship could be successfully developed, they would, because of their great speed, be substantially less vulnerable to submarines than present types of vessels. It also recognizes that a reduction in the noise output of USSR submarines would greatly reduce our over-all effectiveness, but would affect the elements of our ASW forces differentially to different degrees.

Assessing our ASW capability for various threats is an extremely difficult task. It cannot be done convincingly by combining in a simple way the performance capability of each of the many elements that make up our ASW forces. It must depend in good part on empirical data from imaginatively and carefully designed naval tests and exercises. These are costly and difficult to design, execute and evaluate, but are nevertheless essential if we are to have any confidence in any assessment of our ASW capability. Although efforts to test and evaluate our ASW forces have been greatly expanded in the past two years, and the quality of the at-sea exercises shows continuing improvement, much still needs to be done in this very difficult aspect of ASW. As a result, we are now in the position that any such assessments are largely based on incomplete, inconsistent and fragmentary data; and any reliable quantitative assessments of our over-all capability is virtually impossible at this time.

Quantitative evaluation is fundamental not only in assessing our over-all capability, but also in assessing the desirability of various courses of action at all levels in the ASW program, from exploratory development, to component selection, to force design and procurement, to the selection of tactics and ASW strategy. Unless the marked improvement in this area which we have observed over the past two years continues and is expanded, we shall be forced to continue to rely too heavily on judgment in areas in which the rapidity of technological advance has provided opportunities and problems well beyond the scope of past military experience. Although the design, execution and evaluation of appropriate analytical studies, naval tests and exercises are difficult, they must be pursued with increased vigor.

In assessing our capabilities, we note that some of the individual components of our ASW forces, such as nuclear powered submarines (SSNs), are clearly qualitatively superior to their Soviet counterparts. We are impressed by the dedication and general quality of the officers in our ASW forces. These forces can clearly cope with the existing submarine threat from any of the smaller nations, although not without some losses. We note also that the Navy has carried out successfully numerous difficult intelligence missions, using components of the ASW forces, but the analysis of our ASW capabilities against the Soviet threat is still a complex problem. We can, however, say that our currently programmed (5 year) ASW forces would have extreme difficulty in denying to the Soviet Union a submarine-launched nuclear second strike capability which is a substantial augmentation of their land-based strategic nuclear forces./4/ Our active ASW is not good enough and our detection net is too soft do this.

By addressing ourselves to the specific threat, we may be able to acquire the capability of denying the Chinese a credible nuclear deterrent as long as the Chinese deterrent is based solely on a few G-class subs with short-range missiles aimed at West Coast targets. A detailed study of this threat and of possible techniques to counteract it is clearly warranted.

Although we believe that being prepared for an all-out non-nuclear war in Europe in the style of World War II may be somewhat unrealistic, we emphasize that in most of the information provided to the Panel, a large fraction (1/2 to 1/3) of currently programmed ASW forces was justified primarily for this purpose. Nevertheless, our capability is poor to protect against substantial loss in sustained conveying of groups of 50 to 150 slow merchant ships in the face of a concerted attack by a Soviet submarine force. The fact that the Navy was unable to present to the Panel a current carefully-thought-out and realistic convoy doctrine or policy (and probably has an insufficient number of torpedoes if the USSR uses countermeasures) is symptomatic of the uncertainty even the Navy has in this matter.

Regarding the protection of carriers, amphibious forces and replenishment groups against the USSR submarine force, we appear to be placing a great deal of reliance on the effectiveness of the SQS-26 sonar used in bottom-bounce and convergence zone modes. Our limited (and inadequate) collection of oceanographic data does not support confidence in the bottom-bounce and convergence zone operations over large areas of the oceans and this leads us to doubt that detection will be achieved with a consistency sufficient to permit effective escort protection in many of the situations postulated for its use. Moreover, we believe that the potential effectiveness of our SSN/SS barriers has been overestimated, principally because enemy attacks, variations in enemy tactics, and even simple torpedo countermeasures have not been realistically assessed. Thus, we conclude that our carriers, amphibious forces, and replenishment groups are likely to be much more vulnerable to submarine attack, either by the USSR or by the smaller nations possessing USSR submarines, than has been stated in Memoranda to the President and presentations to the Congress on the basis of the Official Navy Study Cyclops II. In the case of small nations, for which submarine effectiveness is alleged to be very poor because of the inexperience of native crews, we note in particular that identification of the nation to which a W-class submarine belongs poses difficult technical and political problems and that the operational readiness of these submarines could rapidly be enhanced through appropriate use of "volunteer" crews.

Considering the total submarine threat to the U.S., the very costly, but, in our view, inefficient program we mount to counter the important categories of the threat, and considering the high cost and low effectiveness of adding to our force structure many of the platforms, devices, techniques, etc., now being considered by the Navy, we conclude that some portion of the budget originally planned for the further operation and acquisition of present types of systems should be re-allocated to improvement programs to increase those systems substantially in effectiveness from their present marginal levels. Many of these systems, in fact, have considerable potential for improvement. Further acquisition of larger numbers of marginal or ineffective systems would provide far less ASW defense for our dollar than will such improvement programs.

The structuring and utilization of the various elements in our ASW forces constitute a systems problem in its most challenging form. The interdependence of the elements with each other must be appreciated and accounted for. Major commitments either for development or deployment in any one area must be made in the light of an assessment of the net contribution of each element to the over-all system. We cannot afford to neglect systems analysis and management here, even though they are far more difficult than in the strategic military areas where they have been very effectively utilized. On the contrary, because of the greater complexities and the greater number of subtleties involved, it seems to us that an over-all systems approach to ASW would be more fruitful, would reduce unnecessary duplication and redundancy, and could provide more insight than it does in those areas where it is more easily applied. How else can we possibly measure the increase in effectiveness we get for each dollar spent in ASW, or even the relative value of investing in different elements of our ASW forces, or the priority which we should assign to different development projects?

The responsibility for ASW in the Navy now is diffused through the many bureaus, laboratories, etc., in the Navy, and we find little evidence of effective testing, analysis, evaluation or decision-making concerning our over-all ASW forces. Rather, we have the impression that our ASW posture is largely a residue of tradition, of history, and of considerations of "balanced forces" rather than response to the realities of the current and projected threat and the current and projected technology. It is quite natural that past history, tradition, and internal forces within the Navy would have strong influences, but they cannot be allowed to overwhelm whatever hard data, analysis, test results, etc., one can bring to bear on the problem. Clearly, the Navy recognizes its dilemma and has tried in the last year to focus much of the responsibility for ASW in two newly created positions: the Director of ASW Programs under the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Manager of ASW Systems Projects under the Chief of Naval Materiel. Although we support these actions as steps in the right direction, we consider them inadequate to cope with the problem in spite of the obvious competence, dedication, and serious intent of the individuals chosen to occupy these positions. The new offices do eliminate in part the excessively piecemeal approach of the old organization, but they seem to have inadequate technical staff and insufficient line authority and responsibility in ASW.

We conclude that the Navy is not yet organized to maximize its ASW capability, and that to do so would require a major reorganization which would recognize and treat ASW as a technical system and provide greater management focus for responsibility and authority. In order to achieve marked improvements in our ASW effectiveness per dollar spent, there must be a high-level organizational element within the Navy with a strong technical staff which would have the responsibility for examining all the elements of ASW and their interrelationship, and would also have the authority to control the major portion of the resources allocated to ASW. It would be only too easy simply to recommend a Polaris type management system for handling ASW. But we recognize that the ASW problem is characterized more by its differences than by its similarities to the Polaris system. We do, however, recommend that the Department of Defense develop a management system for ASW which will have the substance and authority that the Special Projects Office had; but this will evidently require more effort and more technically competent people to manage adequately this more complex and more varied field.

1. General.

The Panel has heard the Navy on a number of occasions on matters relating to the rationale underlying force level development, threat and desired capabilities of Naval forces. The Panel was convinced that the information that was presented to it was inadequate and that the rationale underlying the development of forces has not been adequately developed. In its deliberations the Panel has arrived at a number of conclusions in this area that do not coincide with those of the Navy, and strongly believes that the Navy should devote much greater efforts to the development of a rationale for the employment of ASW forces and of justification for its development and procurement programs.

Our primary general conclusion is that our over-all ASW capability is very poor in relation to what we should expect from a program which costs the nation approximately $3B per year. The principal reason seems to us to be an inability to take full advantage of technical opportunities available to us, which is directly traceable to management policy which in effect gives excessive emphasis to quantity, to the relative neglect of quality (technical performance, availability, reliability, ease of maintenance, etc.) in force development. This is reflected most clearly in a relative lack of effective operational tests and evaluation of components and systems, and hence in a lack of a realistic factual basis on which decisions might be based. This is further reflected in a collection of components that are not well matched, or capabilities for individual components that are clearly out of phase. (The mismatch between destroyer sonar detection ranges, fire control accuracy, and weapon acquisition range is one example. Another is the lack of balance between torpedo countermeasures capability, which is practically nonexistent, and other characteristics of torpedoes such as range, lock-on range, etc., which have been continually improved. Another is the lack of balance between sonobuoy detection capability, which utilizes narrow band spectral analysis (LOFAR) of low frequency line structures, but is not directional, and correlation analysis using sonobuoy (CODAR) localization which depends on broad band noise with average higher frequencies and hence much greater attenuation. A final example is the great emphasis placed on anti-submarine torpedoes and the relative lack of effort on anti-shipping or anti-surface ship torpedoes.) These deficiencies will not be corrected by further procurement of the present systems. Thus, the Panel does not endorse several major components of the present ASW procurement program, and instead, concludes that a major effort should be made to improve the quality of our ASW posture rather than increase the numbers of those components that are often inadequate to their mission./5/ An increase in the numbers of such components over the next five years at the proposed rate means only a modest increase in total numbers, but it is questionable whether this will correspond to an equivalent increase in over-all effectiveness. However, the institution of several major developmental programs over the next five years is almost certain to lead to a very major improvement in our ASW capabilities in the period five to fifteen years from now, provided that these programs are well executed.

In adopting this conclusion, the Panel recognizes that over the next five years major improvements in our ASW posture can come about only as the result of improving the presently-existing components. In addition, the proposed developmental programs, if they are to be properly executed, will require a major reorganization in the management of ASW.

In concluding that many of the proposed increases or replacements in present ASW forces are not justified, the Panel examined the threat, with the results which follow:

a. General War with USSR. The Panel recognizes the capability of the USSR to use surface-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and surface-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) in an attack on the Continental United States (CONUS). The limited size of such attacks, plus the possibility of early detection and warning, reduce the attractiveness to the USSR of this as a first strike alternative. The USSR SLBM and SLCM's could be used in a second strike as a follow-on to their first strike or in the event of a first strike by the U.S. Our present ASW forces might detect the build-up for a first strike, but have a limited capability for interdicting one. The U.S. capability would diminish and could become largely ineffective in the event the Soviets elected to use such submarine forces as a second strike. A numerical build-up of our SSN and DE-1052 destroyer forces over the next five years would lead to only minor improvements in both our capability to detect or interdict.

b. Non-nuclear War with USSR. The Panel believes that the large number of Soviet submarines would lead to very large U.S. and allied shipping losses during the early months of such a war--perhaps sufficiently great to materially reduce the effectiveness of allied ground forces, though the Panel has not examined this point in detail. An increase in the number of ASW components could possibly produce a proportional decrease in shipping losses in convoys, but the Panel believes that alternative tactics to convoy operations could also decrease such losses.

c. General War with Communist China. The Panel believes that the Chinese Communists could deploy in five years a small number of missile-carrying submarines which would pose a threat to West Coast cities and act as a deterrent against our use of nuclear weapons. While such a threat is not decisive, it does provide China with a negotiating tool. The Panel believes that development of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] techniques may effectively neutralize this threat. The development of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] tactics will require extensive operational tests. Success in these tests should lead to increased consideration of a forward Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) and to the development of special [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] aids.

d. Limited War. The Panel concludes that there is a definite threat to carrier task forces and to amphibious forces in limited war situation. Such forces are vulnerable primarily because of inadequate sensors.

In view of these considerations, the Panel recommends acceleration in certain development programs, changes in the organization of the R&D program, and reduction in several procurement (or replacement) programs.

[Here follow Sections (or Parts) III-VII.)

JCSM-296-66

Washington, May 5, 1966.

SUBJECT
The Foreign Intelligence Effort of the United States

1. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, in response to a memorandum for you by the Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, dated 19 April 1966,/2/ subject as above, has prepared a reply and forwarded it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft memorandum and consider that it is responsive to the request.

3. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, consulted with the offices of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), the commanders of the unified and specified commands, and the Services and considered their views.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a memorandum, substantially the same as that contained in the Appendix hereto, be forwarded to the Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, on a "Special Handling--Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals" basis.

5. Without attachment, this memorandum is Unclassified.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

John C. Meyer/3/
Major General, USAF
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

SUBJECT
Principal Intelligence Gaps and Deficiencies (C)

1. (C) In your memorandum of 19 April 1966, you requested my views and comments regarding the principal gaps and deficiencies which, in my opinion, inhibit performance within the Department of Defense of its responsibilities and functions which significantly affect the national security.

2. (S) In the light of the above criterion, I have endeavored to identify and select those questions to which intelligence is currently not able to supply a fully satisfactory response and each of which is of such importance as to represent either a significant area of strategic uncertainty in force-oriented and strategic planning or a significantly inhibiting factor in the conduct of military operations. In this process, I have solicited the views of the major components of the Department of Defense, including the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

3. (TS) The following is a list of those subject areas which represent important gaps and deficiencies measured against the needs of the Department of Defense for intelligence support. This list is not exhaustive but is intended rather as a statement of those unanswered questions which, because of their importance, currently assume an exceptional degree of prominence within the Department of Defense. The items are not listed in order of importance; each is significant in its relation to major elements of the Department of Defense mission.

a. Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRV). Significant Soviet capability to employ MIRV will affect the force requirements and technological planning for future US ballistic missile defenses (BMDs).

b. Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to BMD. There is substantial evidence that the Soviets are deploying a BMD. The capability and characteristics of such a system are not known to us at this time; however, depending upon its effectiveness, such a system could drastically affect the strategic balance and US deterrent capability. BMD developments against short-range (battlefield) and medium-range ballistic weapons are also of concern.

c. Soviet Allocation of Fissionable Material. The wide range in the estimate of nuclear material available to the Soviets and the manner in which this material is allocated to major categories of nuclear weapons, such as strategic bombs, strategic missiles, and battlefield weapons, creates uncertainties in assessment of Soviet capabilities. Consequently, US planning must be based on assumptions the validity of which cannot be stated with adequate confidence.

d. Soviet and ChiCom Nuclear Weapons Development Program. More information is needed on the scope and direction of both Soviet and ChiCom nuclear weapons development programs. Although we have monitored individual Soviet nuclear tests over the past years and estimated their design parameters, we have inadequate over-all intelligence on Soviet broad objectives for the future. On ChiCom nuclear weapons development, we appear able to maintain a degree of surveillance over their testing program, but we continue to lack sufficient information on the broad objectives of their weapons program; in particular, we lack sufficient indication of their intentions and capabilities to develop deliverable weapons and to minimize weapons diameters.

e. Soviet and ChiCom Capabilities and Intentions With Respect to Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems. The present and future capabilities of the Soviets and ChiCom to employ nuclear weapons directly affect US war plans and tactics. For example, we lack information on the Soviet intent and capability to deploy a solid propellant ICBM, field a mobile ICBM, develop new strategic aircraft, or employ ballistic missile submarines and on the ChiCom intent and capability to produce strategic delivery systems. Insufficient knowledge forces planning to be based on assumptions which, if incorrect, can invalidate plans, affect national security, and waste resources.

f. Soviet Activities in Enhanced Nuclear Weapons Effects (Specifically Hot X-Rays) (S-RD). Specific knowledge of Soviet work in these areas is needed for US strategic missile development and hardening antiballistic missile planning and for establishing concepts of operation.

g. Soviet Capabilities and Intentions in Space. There is a deficiency in our present ability to detect launch, including zero orbit and the first orbit of Soviet space vehicles and their potential military application, and to provide early detection and subsequent tracking of altered orbits of such vehicles. In addition, the Soviet Union has conducted several sophisticated space experiments about which the United States had no foreknowledge and has not yet duplicated. Some knowledge of the technological advances which made this possible would assist our space program, particularly the manned orbiting laboratory.

h. Surveillance of ChiCom Military Movements as an Indicator of Intentions in Southeast Asia. The situation in Southeast Asia could be altered rapidly by the introduction of large numbers of Red Chinese into the North Vietnam area. One of the first indications would be a buildup of ground and air forces in Southern China and naval surface and submarine forces in adjacent sea areas. We are not getting intelligence coverage of these areas with the timeliness, frequency, and quality required.

i. Soviet and ChiCom Capabilities in Support of Protracted Operations. More knowledge is needed of those aspects of force structure and logistics support capabilities that determine the size of committed forces and the duration for which they can be committed. In the case of the Soviet Union, this consideration applies to both nuclear and nonnuclear operations and will similarly apply to Communist China when that country attains significant nuclear capability.

j. Effectiveness of the Soviet's Stored Obsolescent Weapons. Information is lacking regarding the total capability represented by obsolescent Soviet weapons in storage and their ability to reactivate, man, and support them. In particular, their ability to obtain pilots for tactical aircraft is not known.

k. Communist General Purpose/Tactical Military Capability. There is a persistent over-all deficiency in intelligence available on communist general purpose/tactical forces. Specific deficiencies include current and future information on detailed order of battle, combat and service support, mobilization capability, electronic surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, tactical air support, tactical nuclear weapons and doctrine, and tactical air defense capabilities and systems, ground and air, low and high altitude (with special regard for future air defense systems). This over-all deficiency embraces considerations of timeliness, accuracy, and degree of detail and particularly the posture and capabilities of mobile weapons systems. It continues to inject significant uncertainties into force-oriented and strategic planning and into the establishment of readiness postures.

l. Soviet Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW). There is insufficient information available on Soviet antisubmarine warfare capabilities to enable an assessment of the threat posed by this capability against nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines.

m. Soviet and ChiCom Research and Development. The principal gap in scientific and technical intelligence, which has the most significant effect on our national security, has been the inability to obtain definitive information on applied development projects and programs in the time period between the end of general research and the appearance of development testing or deployment.

n. Soviet and ChiCom Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Biological and Chemical Warfare. Lack of specific knowledge of biological and chemical warfare activities prevents our effective defense planning for offensive and defensive material and for establishing operational posture.

o. Soviet and ChiCom Mapping, Charting, and Geophysical Data. The principal intelligence gap and deficiency for the DOD mapping, charting, and geodetic community is the almost complete inability to penetrate the rigidly controlled society of the communist world for the procurement of communist-produced topographic, charting, and geophysical materials. Both countries have completed major programs of effort during the last ten years covering the fields of topographic mapping, aeronautical and nautical charting, and geophysical activities such as geodesy, gravity, and geomagnetics. We have obtained practically none of these data. These deficiencies have a pronounced influence on the geodetic positioning of targets and will directly bear on the success or failure of military operations.

p. Counterinsurgency Intelligence. There is a general deficiency in detailed basic and operational intelligence on newly emerging countries, particularly in Africa South of the Sahara, and in other areas such as Latin America which are potentially vulnerable to insurgency. Contingency operations must be planned which require detailed data on external and internal subversive elements and infrastructure; the degree of loyalty and capability of indigenous defense forces; biographic data on potential leaders, both loyal and subversive; and basic information on accurate graphics, key communications, public utilities, and other operational and supporting facilities.

q. Lack of Reliable Information on Plans, Policies and Intentions of Communist Countries. This deficiency continues to be one of the most difficult to solve and, additionally, continues to pose a great strategic, as well as political, uncertainty in military planning and preparedness.

r. ChiCom Economic, Industrial, and Technological Base. There is inadequate information on the extent of development of the ChiCom economic, industrial, and technological base and its ability to support political, military, and subversive activities in Asia, Southeast Asia, and other areas. Additionally, much is needed on the ChiCom role relating to other communist countries, and the apparatus by which it influences them, especially North Vietnam.

4. (U) In addition to the above, as you are well aware, we are beset with many intelligence deficiencies and problems associated with the conduct of military affairs in Southeast Asia. Although of immediate importance, these have not been specifically delineated in the above list since they have been, and are continuing to be, comprehensively addressed in response to a White House memorandum signed by Mr. McGeorge Bundy to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 4 January 1966, subject: "Review of the US Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities in Selected Areas of Southeast Asia and the Far East," and which was based on the PFIAB report to the President, dated 9 December 1965, same subject.

5. (U) On behalf of the Department of Defense, may I assure you of our continued and wholehearted cooperation.

Washington, May 10, 1966.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On June 17, 1964 the then Director of the Office of Emergency Planning in a letter to you furnished information on the Supply-Requirements Study for Nuclear War and Reconstruction/2/ being carried out by various departments and agencies under guidance from this Office.

The initial aspect of this work dealt primarily with the development and testing methods and techniques. We subsequently undertook a more definitive study which could serve as the basis for reaching decisions about nuclear war stockpile objectives.

This study has now been completed, and I am enclosing a set of documents which describe it./3/ The economic guidelines contained in the tables of the enclosed material should now be used by your Department and other participating departments and agencies carrying out the analyses of individual materials needed to reach decisions about nuclear war stockpile objectives.

A set of the documents is also being sent to Mr. Edmund Getzin, Chief of Industrial and Strategic Materials Division, with a request that he review them prior to a meeting that we will have with department and agency representatives later this month. Mr. Getzin is your representative on the Interagency Working Group on National Supply-Requirements Studies. Members of the Working Group are responsible for coordinating the preparation of analyses of individual resources and materials within their respective agencies.

The work on the analyses should advance as rapidly as possible. The schedule for carrying it forward will be established at the meeting of the Working Group on National Supply-Requirements Studies. The continued cooperation of your Department in this endeavor will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Farris Bryant

JCSM-344-66

Washington, May 21, 1966.

SUBJECT
Chemical and Biological Warfare Policy (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:

a. A memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-22689/66, dated 22 April 1966, subject as above./2/

b. A memorandum by the Deputy Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), for the Deputies to the Committee of Principals, dated 19 April 1966, subject as above./3/

c. JCSM-112-65, dated 16 February 1965, subject: "Draft Policy Paper--Chemical and Biological Warfare (U)."/4/

2. (S) In reference 1a, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide comments on an ACDA paper, attachment to reference 1b, which sets forth that agency's tentative conclusions on policies which the United States should adopt with respect to chemical and biological weapons. The Deputy Director, ACDA, believes that, while the suggested policies are in the national interest, there may be compelling military and political factors which militate against their adoption.

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to a request from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), provided, in Appendix B to reference 1c, a proposed National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) on chemical and biological weapons. No action has been taken on the proposed NSAM. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to hold the view that a national policy on chemical and biological weapons should be established as a matter of priority. They further believe that policy matters regarding arms control and disarmament aspects should not be considered until such time as a national policy has been established or, at least, until a DOD position is determined.

4. (S) The proposed NSAM forwarded in reference 1c continues to reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Accordingly, they recommend that:

a. The proposed NSAM contained in reference 1c be used as the basis for establishing the DOD position on the chemical and biological warfare policy issue in question.

b. Efforts be made to attain a national policy as soon as possible.

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff be afforded an opportunity to comment on any possible DOD revisions to their proposed NSAM, as well as to participate in the review of any over-all State/Defense/ACDA inter-agency policy proposals prior to final adoption.

d. ACDA and other interested governmental agencies be advised that no action within the Department of Defense will be taken on the ACDA paper in reference 1b until such time as, preferably, a national policy on chemical and biological weapons has been established or, at least, until such time as a DOD position is determined.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler/5/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, May 23, 1966.

SUBJECT
Interaction of U.S. Assured Destruction and Damage Limiting Forces (U)

Last year's Memorandum to the President on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces/2/ paid particular attention to larger-than-expected threats to our Assured Destruction capability. These threats were postulated without explicit study of their desirability or feasibility from the Soviet viewpoint and without evidence of Soviet trends in those directions from intelligence indicators. Postulation of such threats furnishes an appropriate analytical tool for an extreme test of our Assured Destruction capability; nevertheless there is a risk that it may obscure possible U.S. opportunities to influence Soviet behavior. Taking larger-than-expected threats as "given" fails to credit our Damage Limiting forces with the virtual attrition that they in fact exact of the Soviets in planning their own forces.

The Soviets apparently view our forces, as we do theirs, as a potential first strike threat. They therefore must design their capabilities to protect their own Assured Destruction capability against a U.S. first strike. To the extent that Soviet resources are thus expended, and hence diverted from alternative uses in improving the U.S.S.R.'s Damage Limiting posture, our own Assured Destruction task becomes easier.

It is in our interest for the Soviets to spend sizable sums in guarding their Assured Destruction capability, provided these expenditures are primarily reflected in defensive measures such as missile launch facility hardening, missile dispersal or missile mobility, rather than in increases in their offensive forces' payloads. Diversion of Soviet resources to defensive measures would reduce the cost of maintaining our relative Assured Destruction position for a given level of Soviet expenditure on strategic programs and would also contribute to U.S. and Allied Damage Limiting by reducing their ability to inflict damage on us.

The implications for U.S. policy concern the value of continuing to maintain a counter-military threat against the Soviet strategic offensive forces; specifically they concern the value of achieving low CEP to force the Soviets to adopt very expensive vulnerability-reducing methods such as mobility and hard point defense. Although Soviet responses cannot be predicted with confidence, a Soviet response that optimized their Assured Destruction capability against a U.S. threat with much lower CEP than we have now, would result in a reduction in Soviet first strike Damage Limiting capability over a wide range of Soviet Assured Destruction budgets.

An illustration of the pressure imposed by U.S. strategic offensive forces on Soviet forces was made in the DDR&E study, "A Summary Study on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces of the U.S. and U.S.S.R." of September 8, 1964./3/ The study contains an analysis (p. 68) showing that if the Soviets optimized their Assured Destruction capability against a small U.S. counter-military offensive capability they could purchase large, soft missiles at $1.33 million per kilopound ($M/KP). The cost to the Soviets of the same payload triples--to $4M/KP--if survivability through hardening and dispersal must be purchased. Virtual attrition seems to be exerting major influence on Soviet force planning, as shown by the Soviets' large scale deployment of SS-11s and by their pursuit of small and mobile missile technology.

My staff has undertaken a further analysis of the pressures that programmed U.S. forces indirectly bring to bear on the Soviet Damage Limiting capability. This analysis proceeds in three steps.

In the first step, a Soviet force is designed to negate the U.S. Assured Destruction capability in a Soviet first strike assuming that the Soviets were not in fact concerned with maintaining an effective Assured Destruction capability. It is basically the approach used in the extreme cases of last year's Draft Presidential Memorandum.

Then, the programmed U.S. forces are applied against this Soviet posture, and surviving Soviet forces strike U.S. urban targets. Resulting U.S. fatalities are so low that the assumed enemy posture could not constitute a high-confidence (to the U.S.S.R.) Soviet Assured Destruction capability.

Finally, at the same Soviet budget level used in the first step, a new Soviet force is designed for first strike Damage Limiting, subject to a constraint on Soviet second strike Assured Destruction stemming from the pressure exerted by our capabilities. This constraint markedly reduced the Soviets' ability to erode our Assured Destruction capability within the fixed Soviet budget level.

Soviet First Strike Only Damage Limiting Threat. A re-examination of SS-9 requirements, taking all reliabilities into account, indicates that the Soviets would need some 350 SS-9s, each carrying 10 MK-17 MIRV's, to achieve high expected damage against programmed U.S. land-based forces with high confidence. Assuming the existence of such a Soviet capability, and applying reasonable adjustments to National Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP) factors to reflect the assumed introduction of MIRV, the expected damage against U.S. forces is .92 with a 1500 foot SS-9 CEP, but only .77 with a 2100 foot CEP. (We now project a CEP of 3000 feet for the SS-9 in 1970, with no evidence of an appreciable Soviet effort to reduce this figure.) These missiles alone cost some $9 billion (about $1.5 M/KP) beyond the cost of the remainder of Soviet Offensive forces.

Next, we design a least-cost Soviet defense to keep Soviet fatalities at [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of their total population in the face of a counter-urban attack by the surviving U.S. forces. This fatality level corresponds to the delivery of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] warheads in the absence of Soviet defenses, and roughly equates to the level that might be expected from leakage through a very good defense against a U.S. retaliatory attack. This defense consists of 1800 area interceptors and 1000 terminal interceptors at 15 cities, at a total five-year cost of approximately $6.4 billion plus a non-recurring cost for research and development, tooling and production facilities, etc., which is irrelevant to this calculation. Of this cost, approximately 80 percent is for area defenses. This is consistent with results obtained in analyses of light Nike-X deployments.

Thus, for a total increment of some $15 billion over a base U.S.S.R. budget, the Soviets can reduce the Assured Destruction capability of our programmed missile forces to a highly unsatisfactory level through 1969-1974. The base budget is the cost of their R&D program, their missile programs, their SLBM programs, their bomber program and their air defense programs.

Assured Destruction Capability of the Soviet Force. We have analyzed a pre-emptive U.S. strike as a Soviet planner might do, in evaluating the Soviet Assured Destruction capability. The programmed U.S. forces are laid down in a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet intercontinental strategic military target system designed above (i.e., the MIRVed SS-9s plus the other Soviet ICBMs, SLBM bases, intercontinental bomber bases, etc.). If the Soviet area defenses did not cover their SS-9 missile fields, as would be the case with the present locations of the SS-9 silos, U.S. fatalities would be less than 10%. If the Soviet area missile defense is assumed to protect Soviet military targets and to operate without leakage residual Soviet forces are estimated to inflict 22% U.S. fatalities (200 equivalent one MT weapons) in the absence of U.S. ABM. Thus the Soviet deterrent would depend entirely on the precise siting and effectiveness of their ABM as a component of hard point defense. (Even a very light U.S. ABM deployment would be able to negate the remaining Soviet forces.)

Soviet First Strike Damage Limiting with Assured Destruction Constraint. As a last step, the Soviets take measures to maintain their Assured Destruction capability. They are allowed to replace the forces assumed above with more survivable forces at the same cost as the Soviet Damage Limiting force. The resulting posture (shown in table below is very similar to the missile force predicted in the NIPP), but the SS-9s are assumed to carry MIRVs. Additional mobile missiles and an area only defense are also purchased at the expense of Soviet terminal defenses. The SS-9s and the area defenses can be considered as the Damage Limiting increment added to the Assured Destruction backbone of their posture.

If this entire force is sent against the U.S. in a Damage Limiting first strike (i.e., no part is withheld for a later Assured Destruction capability), the residual U.S. missile forces can still deliver more than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] equivalent weapons against the U.S.S.R. instead of the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] equivalents that the U.S. could deliver against the Soviet Damage Limiting only posture. Again, this figure exceeds the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] equivalent criterion for an effective U.S. Assured Destruction capability that was suggested in last year's Presidential Memorandum.

TABLE 1: Soviet Intercontinental Forces of the Damage Limiting Posture (#1) and of the Assured Destruction Posture (#2)

Launchers	69	70	71	72	73	74
Posture #1
Soft SS-7 (1x2)	102	80
Hard SS-7 (1x3)	70	70	70	70	55	30
Hard SS-9 MIRV (1x1)	300	350	350	350	350	350
Posture #2
Soft SS-7 (1x2)	102	80
Hard SS-7 (1x3)	70	70	70	70	55	30
Hard SS-9 MIRV (1x1)	125	125	125	125	125	125
Hard SS-11 (1x1)	300	375	425	475	525	550

The Soviets, by viewing our forces as a first strike threat to their Assured Destruction capability, must spend much more to achieve a first strike Damage Limiting capability. This does not argue that the Soviets are incapable of achieving both a satisfactory (to them) Assured Destruction capability and a Damage Limiting capability. But it does mean that, by carefully designing our own forces, we can foreclose any "easy" roads to Damage Limiting for the Soviets. Furthermore, low U.S. CEPs prevent simple proliferation of hard ICBM silos from being a useful Soviet response; Soviet mobility or defense would be required. Thus, a simple increase in total Soviet offensive payload is not a likely response to the strong U.S. counterforce capability.

Characteristics of U.S. Damage Limiting forces that place this constraint on Soviet forces should, therefore, receive continued attention. For example, the high accuracy attainable with the MK-17 (rather than the MK-11A) can be thought of as making an indirect contribution to Assured Destruction.

Proposed changes in U.S. forces (such as the addition of large payload missiles) should be evaluated in light of possible Soviet responses, and especially in light of the constraints they impose on the Soviet mix of Assured Destruction and Damage Limiting. Analyses not based on such consideration are likely to be incomplete, and the decisions based on such incomplete analyses, misleading.

In this year's Presidential Memorandum, I propose to include an interaction analysis. Thus, in addition to postulating Soviet threats and finding what forces would be required to overcome them, various possible new U.S. systems--both for Assured Destruction hedges or for Damage Limiting--will be considered in terms of the effects they would be likely to have on the U.S.S.R.

Alain Enthoven

Washington, May 27, 1966.

The President and the Vice President met with the NSC Staff on Friday, May 27, largely to get acquainted. The President began the meeting by outlining his philosophy of our foreign policy. He made these points:

1. We have to stay strong militarily, not because we want to use force but just because we have now learned that force is sometimes necessary to keep peace. "My father used to tell me that love would solve 95% of the world's problems but that you had to be strong to solve the other 5% because some people do not understand the language of love and friendship." Later in the meeting he came back to this theme. Thinking about the $60 billion defense budget, he said "Think what wonders I could perform with that money if I could put it into agriculture and health and education."

2. This strength is not to set up a fortress America. In this world which is now 3 billion people and will be 6 billion in not too long a time, we just can't survive by keeping to ourselves. So in our own interests we have to worry about the other fellow.

3. More than that we can't rest while other people are miserable in such numbers. "They are human beings just like we are. They laugh like we do. They cry like we do when they are hurt. They eat like we do, although not so well. They need clothes and shelter like we do." So a nation blessed with the riches ours has can not sit back while others like ourselves are in misery.

The Vice President spoke generally on the same theme of circulating the ideals of the Great Society into a world wide effort against poverty, disease, and illiteracy.

The President picked up one of the Vice President's remarks and said he wanted to make very clear his position on Vietnam. He said he obviously was under all kinds of pressure to "get out with General Fulbright, go in with General Goldwater, and General Gavin wants me to 'hunker up like a jackass in a hailstorm'." He said he had looked at all the choices. He didn't see how any President of the United States could do other than what he has chosen to do. He admits he could be wrong. But having decided on this course, he is absolutely determined to see it through. No one should be under any illusion that we will be pulling out.

The President said he was very happy with the memos, analyses, and recommendations coming from the staff. What he would like to see more of now is "ten new ideas" in his reading folder every night. He said these were beginning to flow but he wanted more and more of them.

H.S.

Washington, May 31, 1966.

SUBJECT
CIA Intelligence Report on the Status of the Anti-Missile Defense System for Moscow

Bromley Smith asked that I prepare a note for you commenting on the attached report which summarizes the current status of our knowledge of the anti-missile defense system in the Moscow area since he felt it might have considerable impact on our own military planning.

This is not a new development. Information on this system has been accumulating for several years. There has been agreement in the intelligence community for over a year and a half that it was almost certainly intended for some sort of anti-ballistic missile defense and that it was probably based on the use of relatively high-yield weapons for exoatmospheric defense. The principal new piece of information reported in the memorandum is that the Soviets are now beginning to construct missile launchers, probably for the Galosh missile, at several of the radar sites associated with this system. This move had been anticipated for several months since launchers were observed under construction at the prototype installation at the Sary Shagan anti-missile development center.

The central question is how effective the Moscow ballistic missile defense would be against US strategic missiles in the late 1960s and early 1970s when it would presumably be fully operational. While it is impossible to give a precise answer to this question since we can only guess how the Moscow system would operate, I think it is possible to make some significant general observations on the system's capabilities that indicate quite persuasively that by itself the Moscow system would not be particularly effective even in the defense of Moscow and would have only a small perturbation on our over-all war plans.

1. Physical Vulnerability. The Moscow system is extremely soft and hence highly vulnerable to a well-planned large-scale attack. It appears to depend for early warning and initial tracking on the Hen House radars located at Olenegorsk in northern Murmansk and Skrunda on the Baltic coast. Both of these radars are very soft and essentially undefended. The large Dog House radar at Moscow, which may be back-up early warning and tracking radars for the system, and the radars at the triads which probably do the final tracking of the incoming missile and the tracking of the defensive missiles are also extremely soft. Finally, the defensive missiles will fire from exposed above-ground launchers.

2. Penetrability. By the 1969-70 period our programmed penetration aids for Minuteman-Polaris will probably be very effective against a Moscow-type system (high altitude intercept). By dispensing chaff and decoys, each missile will present the defense with some 7 to 21 separate re-entering targets even when very high-yield warheads are employed. Hence, a very small number of our offensive missiles would probably overwhelm the system.

3. Fire Power. The Moscow system will not have a high rate of fire. So far, we see only some 64 missile launchers under construction. When the entire projected deployment of 8 double triads is completed (some of this is not yet really started), the total system would consist of only 128 launchers. This is very small compared to the requirements of a really effective ABM system and the Soviet threats McNamara has hypothesized in his US force level projections. For example, in his Memorandum for the President in connection with the FY-1967 budget for strategic offensive-defensive forces,/2/ McNamara examined a worst-possible Soviet threat in the early 70's in connection with the decision to initiate deployment of the Poseidon missile to increase the fire power of the Polaris submarine fleet. In this analysis he assumed that the Soviets put MIRVs (multiple independent re-entry vehicles) on enough of their ICBM force to completely eliminate our Minuteman force in a pre-emptive strike. (I would note that there is no evidence that the Soviets have done anything leading towards a MIRV capability.) McNamara also assumed that our penetration aids programs would all fail catastrophically and that aircraft would be unable to inflict any damage on the Soviet Union because of SAM defenses. He then assumed that the Soviets would deploy 4,500 exoatmospheric ABM interceptors which could effectively engage 3,000 separate incoming targets. Even in the face of this concatenation of extreme threat assumptions, he concluded that with the added fire power of Poseidon we would still be able to approximate the amount of damage required to meet his criteria of assured destruction.

Although it is not discussed in the attached document, the big area of disagreement about Soviet ABM capabilities in the intelligence community is over the functional identity of the so-called Leningrad-Tallinn system which has been suspected, particularly by DIA, as being a possible ABM system. This system is now being deployed at a number of locations from the Baltic to the Urals. CIA is now almost certain that this system is in reality a long-range air defense system to supplement or replace the SA-2 system. DIA is now in the process of reevaluating their position on this system. I agree with CIA.

In summary, there is nothing particularly new in the attached report. Although we are beginning to accumulate details that may indicate how the Soviet system actually works, we are fundamentally in the same position concerning Soviet capabilities and intentions in this area that we have been in for the last year or two. There is no question that the Soviets are interested in ABMs and are undertaking at least a limited deployment at Moscow. We have not, however, seen real evidence of a massive national deployment or of a really effective system at Moscow by the standards we are now considering.

In line with Bromley's concern, I believe that this information will not have any special impact on the DOD since they have already assumed much worse threats in their military planning. I also do not believe the information on the Moscow system will have any special impact on Congress since McNamara has already briefed the Congress on an estimated Soviet ABM threat that is, if anything, more extensive than the current facts indicate. (See attached extract from McNamara's classified testimony.)/3/ I would emphasize that the above views are my own. They are based on what I think we have seen and not what the Soviets might do in the future. There is no agreed-upon or disagreed-upon net evaluation within the US Government of the effectiveness of the Soviet ABM system and our ability to penetrate it. To correct this situation, Bob McNamara has just (May 21) directed Johnny Foster (DDR&E) to prepare such a study,/4/ working with the Services and cooperating with CIA and Don Hornig's office. Although the organization of the study has not yet been worked out, Don Hornig and I together with some of our consultants, who are extremely well informed on this subject, will be involved in the review of the study. The study is now tentatively scheduled for completion on August 1, 1966.

Spurgeon

Washington, May 18, 1966.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM/5/

USSR Pushing Ahead With Antimissile Defenses for Moscow

The Soviets are pushing ahead with deployment of antimissile defenses. Probable launch positions now are being constructed at one of the four ABM electronic sites which form an arc to the north and west of Moscow. The missile has not yet been identified. While there is no evidence of deployment elsewhere, the Soviets can be expected to extend ABM defenses to the same areas where the extensive deployment of new long-range surface-to-air missile defenses is under way.

NIE 11-4-66

Washington, June 16, 1966.

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

The Problem

To review significant developments in Soviet military thinking, policy, and programs, and to estimate main trends in Soviet military policies over the next five years or so.

Scope

This estimate assesses broad trends in Soviet military policy and doctrine. It does not attempt to recapitulate existing NIEs on Soviet strategic attack, strategic air and missile defense, and general purpose forces. Our most recent detailed estimates on the size, composition, and capabilities of these principal components and the supporting elements of the Soviet military forces are as follows:

NIE 11-8-65: "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack," dated 7 October 1965, Top Secret, Restricted Data (Limited Distribution).

NIE 11-14-65: "Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces," dated 21 October 1965, Secret.

NIE 11-3-65: "Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses," dated 18 November 1965, Top Secret./2/

Summary and Conclusions

A. There has been no basic change in established Soviet military doctrine or force structure, but recent trends point to adjustments in Soviet defense policy. The present political leaders seem more attentive than was Khrushchev to professional military advice, and they have been willing to authorize increases in both defense expenditures and military manpower. Current military writings reveal a search for ways to broaden the options available to the USSR in the application of its military power. (Paras. l-5)

B. The Soviets retain their belief in the primacy of strategic attack and defense forces, both for deterrence and for foreign policy support. In addition, however, they now show increasing interest in improving the capabilities of their general purpose forces to meet contingencies short of general nuclear war. We believe this interest is in part responsive to past developments in US and NATO capabilities and to US advocacy of flexible response. Additional factors include the tensions arising from the Vietnam war and the resulting US military buildup, as well as Chinese hostility towards the USSR. (Paras. 6, 7, 12-14)

C. A sharp increase in Soviet defense expenditures is evidently to occur this year. We attribute it primarily to planned expansion in military R and D and to the cost of long lead-time deployment programs for strategic systems which were authorized in previous years. It probably also stems in part from some recent increase in operating costs, including military manpower. The Soviet leaders have probably authorized further growth in military and space expenditures during the 1966-1970 Five Year Plan period. We believe, however, that in the interests of their ambitious economic programs they will seek to limit the growth in defense spending to no more than the average rate of growth in GNP. (Paras. 3, 4, 17-22)

D. The Soviet leaders probably expect to achieve a substantial improvement in their strategic position vis-a-vis the US during the next several years. Chief among their current strategic attack programs is the rapid deployment of ICBMs in dispersed and hardened silos, which will add substantially to the survivability and retaliatory capability of the force. Major current air and missile defense programs include improved means of warning and control, better defenses against aircraft and aerodynamic missiles, and what we believe to be ABM defenses under construction. Through these and other programs, we think the Soviets are working to alleviate their present strategic inferiority, and to gain greater assurance of deterring the US in the various crises and confrontations they must allow for as they contemplate possible developments in the world situation./3/ (Paras. 26, 30, 31, 36)

E. The past restructuring of Soviet theater forces for general nuclear war has resulted in certain characteristics which could be serious handicaps in non-nuclear warfare, particularly if at all prolonged. We estimate that the Soviets will undertake gradual improvements in their general purpose forces which will make them somewhat better suited than at present for conventional operations. Ground units will probably be provided with greater tactical mobility and improved combat and logistic support, becoming more quickly responsive and better able to engage in sustained combat. The Soviets will also maintain a large and versatile tactical air component. They will continue to expand their naval presence in the open oceans, and will acquire greater capabilities to move unopposed military forces to distant areas. The Soviets may regard improved general purpose forces as having increased relevance as their strategic capabilities grow, but we do not think they expect alterations in the strategic situation so great as to permit them to undertake substantially more aggressive courses of action./4/ (Paras. 32-35, 37)

F. Soviet military policy will continue to be heavily influenced by external developments. In recent years Soviet forces in the Sino-Soviet border area have been strengthened in minor ways, and we expect a gradual increase in Soviet military strength confronting China. In Eastern Europe the USSR continues to develop the forces of its Warsaw Pact allies, despite their increasing tendency to assert their independence. The USSR is thus far disposed toward caution with respect to the present weakening of NATO, perhaps because of concern over the possible loosening of constraints on a revival of independent German power. But the Soviets weigh the adequacy of their military programs primarily against US capabilities, and they will continue to be sensitive to major new developments in US military policy and forces. (Paras. 8-11, 14)

G. Within the USSR, a high level of effort in military R and D will almost certainly be continued, despite resource allocation problems. The Soviets probably regard such an effort as imperative in order to prevent the US from gaining a technological advantage and also to gain, if possible, some advantage for themselves, but in deciding to deploy any new weapon system they would have to weigh the prospective gain against the economic costs and the capabilities of the US to counter it. (Paras. 15, 23)

H. We do not expect that Soviet military forces will come to be structured according to some quite new and clear-cut strategic doctrine. This will almost certainly be prevented by such factors as the momentum of existing programs, the multiplicity of claims on resources, and the differing views of various groups as to priorities. (Para. 5)

[Here follows the Discussion section (pages 5-16).]

Washington, June 22, 1966.

SUBJECT
The Asia Foundation: Proposed Improvements in Funding Procedures

The Asia Foundation (TAF), a Central Intelligence Agency proprietary, was established in 1954 to undertake cultural and educational activities on behalf of the United States Government in ways not open to official U.S. agencies. Over the past twelve years TAF has accomplished its assigned mission with increasing effectiveness and has, in the process, become a widely-known institution, in Asia and the United States. TAF is now experiencing inquiries regarding its sources of funds and connections with the U.S. Government from the aggressive leftist publication, Ramparts./2/ It is conceivable that such inquiries will lead to a published revelation of TAF's CIA connection. In the present climate of national dissent and in the wake of recent critical press comment on CIA involvement with American universities, we feel a public allegation that CIA funds and controls TAF would be seized upon, with or without proof, and magnified beyond its actual significance to embarrass the Administration and U.S. national interests at home and abroad. Some immediate defensive and remedial measures are required [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

[3 paragraphs (11 lines of source text) not declassified]

In the long run, we feel TAF's vulnerability to press attack can be reduced and its viability as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy in Asia can be assured by relieving it of its total dependence upon covert funding support from this Agency. In the belief that TAF contributes substantially to U.S. national interests in Asia, and can continue to contribute if its viability is sustained, CIA requests the Committee's study and attention to possible alternative means of supporting it.

[6 pages of source text not declassified]

Washington, July 1, 1966.

Walt--

The FY 1968 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile proposal has been ill-starred. When it came in in January,/2/ Mac looked at it but got away before we could get the Bureau of the Budget analysis and paper work completed. Bob Komer sent the package to the President in March recommending approval. It is not clear whether the President or Joe Califano looked at it, but we were requested to return the package to the Pentagon to get Secretary McNamara's signature on it and also to obtain the formal concurrence of the Joint Chiefs. This was done about the middle of March and ever since Cy Vance and General Wheeler have been in negotiation, characterized more by its heat than its light.

The new proposal does not carry the Secretary's signature (it is also signed by Vance),/3/ and it is my recommendation, as well as Keeny's, that we should not at this time press for a McNamara signature. Gen. Wheeler did concur in the submittal but the JCS price was to force deferring the retirement of [number not declassified] weapons previously scheduled for retirement in FY 1968 as a result of joint action by BOB and Vance's staff.

I have no doubt, and the BOB staff agrees, that the [number not declassified] weapons will be retired either in FY 1969 or possibly in FY 1968. I would not be surprised to see this matter disposed of next Fall in connection with the Secretary's budget memorandum projecting weapons requirements through 1975.

Keeny and I have both gone over this package and recommend that it be sent forward to the President.

Charles E. Johnson/4/

Washington, July 8, 1966.

SUBJECT
Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 8 July 1966

PRESENT
Mr. Rostow, Ambassador Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. Helms
Mr. Bill Moyers and Mr. Cord Meyer were present for Items 1 and 2

[Here follow a list of additional participants and discussion of agenda item 1.]

a. Mr. Meyer capsuled the substantial accomplishments of The Asia Foundation and the endorsements it has received throughout the years. Ambassador Johnson supported these statements. Mr. Meyer pointed specifically to the vulnerability of The Asia Foundation cover and how a gadfly publication such as Ramparts had the capability to inflict considerable damage and apparently that was their intention.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

c. There was some discussion of the real costs of a full endowment solution. Mr. Vance felt that the sum requested was too small. The others agreed that Mr. Meyer was instructed to arrive at a more appropriate figure which could then be checked with the principals for a telephonic vote./2/

d. Mr. Meyer then went on to point out that this was only one conspicuous example of a problem which would grow larger, and he specifically mentioned the need of a new institution created by legislation and based on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] lines which could provide general support grants to this and similar organizations whose activities are of proven value to the United States abroad.

e. He cited a speech by Eugene R. Black at the recent Wesleyan University commencement dealing with grants in aid./3/ It was emphasized that substantial private contributions and those of foundations are inhibited, if not precluded, by CIA association with such organizations as The Asia Foundation. Mr. Rostow pointed out that the CIA had many times taken up the slack when other agencies were unable to come up with funds. Mr. Meyer's suggestion was greeted with considerable interest, and Mr. Helms suggested that any committee on this subject be headed in the White House in order to give it sufficient impetus. Mr. Moyers agreed to approach Mr. Harry McPherson/4/ and urged that talks continue between Mr. Meyer, Mr. McPherson and other interested parties./5/ It was noted that although the committee would not operate under 303 aegis, its determinations and findings might well have a bearing on future proposals before the 303 Committee.

[Here follows discussion of other agenda items.]

Peter Jessup

Washington, July 11, 1966, 10:15 a.m.

1. Defense and AEC resubmit for your approval the proposed FY 1968 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,/2/ and certain related adjustments to the FY 1967 stockpile as previously approved by you on April 19, 1965./3/ The requirements set forth are consistent with the long-range Defense forecast (through 1974) of weapons and special nuclear materials presented in your current Budget.

2. The stockpile proposal was first submitted to you last January and it was returned to Defense to obtain formal JCS concurrence (although the JCS had previously concurred informally in the proposal). The JCS looked again at certain of the figures and some minor changes have resulted in the new submittal, largely resulting from a decision to stretch out the retirement of certain tactical and strategic bombs that are becoming obsolete and the retirement of the Nike Hercules warheads.

3. An important aspect of the new proposal is that the approved FY 1967 stockpile figure is being reduced from [numbers not declassified]--a reduction of [number not declassified]. The proposed FY 1968 stockpile will be further reduced [number not declassified] to a total of [number not declassified]. Thus, the current proposal will cause a net reduction of [number not declassified] from the currently authorized stockpile total--or a reduction of nearly [number not declassified] from the total you approved in April 1965. The reduction of megatonnage of yield would be proportionately larger because a large number of high yield weapons are being retired. At the same time, however, we are getting a more modern stockpile better tailored to specified military missions.

4. The recommended stockpile is within the projected availability of special nuclear materials, and the number of new weapons is within AEC capability to produce. There are potential plutonium requirements in the possible deployment of the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Poseidon/Minuteman warheads which, if approved, would substantially increase plutonium and weapons fabrication requirements in future years. On the basis of present estimates, however, there will be enough plutonium available by the end of FY 1967 to meet the firm Defense special nuclear requirements through 1974, not including the above possible additional requirements.

5. The Bureau of the Budget has reviewed this proposal. BOB believes that some obsolete weapons should be retired on a faster schedule than is now being proposed. It does not recommend that you disapprove this stockpile action, but BOB will make this a budget issue for discussion with Defense this Fall. There is no immediate major cost impact from maintaining the approximately [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in the inventory in FY 1968. The important thing will be to make sure that the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] do not become a part of the permanent base that is used for estimating requirements.

6. I recommend that you approve the proposed stockpile and sign the attached memoranda to Defense and AEC.

W.W. Rostow/4/

Approved/5/
Disapproved
See me

Washington, July 12, 1966.

SUBJECT
FY 1968 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

I approve the proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile for the end of FY 1968 submitted to me by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission on June 6, 1966./2/

Accordingly, I approve a total of [number not declassified] complete nuclear weapons ([number not declassified] nuclear warhead elements) as the stockpile composition for the end of FY 1968. I also approve a total of [number not declassified] complete nuclear weapons ([number not declassified] nuclear warhead elements) as the adjusted stockpile composition for the end of FY 1967. This will mean a planned production by the Atomic Energy Commission of [number not declassified] nuclear warhead elements and a planned retirement of [number not declassified] nuclear warhead elements during FY 1968, resulting in a net reduction of [number not declassified] nuclear warhead elements during FY 1968 under the adjusted FY 1967 stockpile.

I have directed the Atomic Energy Commission to produce and retire those quantities of atomic weapons and atomic weapons parts necessary to achieve and maintain the approved FY 1968 stockpile. I have also directed the production of the additional weapons required for quality assurance and reliability testing.

I authorize you, in coordination with the Atomic Energy Commission, to make such changes in the total stockpile not to exceed ±10% of the specifically stated numbers of nuclear warhead elements to be produced and retired in FY 1967 and FY 1968, as may be necessary to adjust production schedules to meet AEC material availabilities or production capability. I further authorize you to make minor changes (±10%) in strategic, tactical, air defense or anti-submarine warfare warhead totals that may be required because of adjusted delivery assets or changes in military requirements. Any changes indicative of a major shift in defense policy or AEC production capability will be submitted for my approval.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Washington, August 2, 1966.

SUBJECT
Transmittal of Study Report--Penetration Capability of U.S. Missile Forces versus Soviet ABM Defense 1967-1973

REFERENCES
(1) Memorandum, Secretary of Defense to DDR&E dated 21 May 1966 requesting study of U.S. Missiles ability to penetrate Soviet Defenses/2/

(2) Memorandum, DDR&E to Secretary of Defense dated 8 June 1966 outlining study approach/3/

Attached are Summary Volume I and Volume II of the Penetration Study/4/ prepared by my staff in response to your request of May 21, 1966. Volumes III and IV are separate reports prepared as inputs to my staff for the purpose of this study by CIA and DIA respectively, entitled "Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Capabilities" and "The Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Program and Deployment";/5/ these are available through Special Activities Office control.

The results of the study, for a "high" estimate of the projected number of Anti-Ballistic Missile interceptors show that the U.S. can maintain approximately [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in the Soviet Union through 1973, in agreement with studies presented by ASD(SA) in the draft 1968-1972 Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces Presidential Memorandum,/6/ if a simple, unsophisticated model of defense capability is assumed. On the other hand, if the Soviets are assumed to have the capability to operate these forces in a coordinated manner, using "preferential" defense of some locations at the expense of others and to operate some of their long range interceptors in a precommitted "loiter" mode to intercept reentry objects [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], then they may limit their fatalities to about [number not declassified] through 1971 and to substantially less than that thereafter against the presently programmed U.S. Missile Forces.

As indicated in the Introduction and Threat discussions in the report, the study results are strongly influenced by the Threat projection, about which there remains considerable uncertainty. These uncertainties involve questions as to: 1) which of the two systems that the Soviets are building that can have ABM capability will be proliferated as the main ABM component; 2) what the rate of interceptor build-up will be; 3) what mode of defense (as discussed above) their interceptors will operate in; 4) how effective their first strike on U.S. Missile Forces will be (including the possibility of MIRV or Terminally Guided Reentry Vehicle), and 5) the success of the U.S. in continuing to have accurate intelligence on interceptor deployment.

The study results, in general, are U.S. conservative in that the choice of assumptions regarding the reference case ABM deployment rate, the lack of defense command and control constraints, the Soviet Offense effectiveness, and the effects of simplifications needed to model the engagements for computation all tend to provide an upper bound to Soviet ABM effectiveness. Alternatively, changes in certain key assumptions could reduce the level of Soviet/7/ fatalities significantly, under certain circumstances. These assumptions are 1) that the U.S. penetration aids will be effective in drawing interceptors; 2) that the Soviets do not have mobile interceptors about which we are unaware and that we will continue to obtain intelligence regarding their fixed sites and 3) that the U.S. will develop changes to its SIOP to have a planned option for nearly 100% utilization of Missile Forces for Assured Destruction by 1970./8/ In the early 1970's, when the major part of the U.S. reentry systems can be in the form of small warheads, the dependence on penetration aids effectiveness can be reduced.

The U.S. does not presently have in its inventory any missile payloads that individually "penetrate" Soviet Defenses. Our "penetration aids" are in reality [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

There are other penetration aids that can potentially "penetrate" if the details of the defense are known and which therefore are not particularly sensitive to the numbers of interceptors. Penetration in this way involves [6 lines of source text not declassified]. Thus while U.S. defense design has had to worry in detail about these tactics, the offense has not yet been able to plan to use them with confidence. As the Soviet defense design matures and as we begin to get sufficient intelligence about their systems to probe for weak spots, such "penetration" tactics will probably become available with confidence and be cheaper to apply than is the exhaustion tactic. These penetration concepts are undergoing exploratory development under the ABRES program and the bus deployment techniques now being developed for payload dispersal on Minuteman III and Poseidon are both well suited for quick adoption of payload variants.

As soon as you have had a chance to review the contents of the report, I would be glad to set up a meeting with you, Cy, Alain and Harold to discuss its implications.

John S. Foster, Jr.

Following completion of its report on the central management of resources under emergency conditions, including nuclear war (see Document 44), the White House Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) placed more emphasis on the study of emergency conditions in a limited war situation. In May 1966 a draft of a Resource Mobilization Plan for Limited War was completed and submitted to the Department of Defense and other government agencies for review and comment. As summarized in a May 20 letter from OEP Director Farris Bryant to McNamara, the Plan, among other things, "provides for an Office of Defense Resources, including the organizational and staffing arrangements, together with general operating procedures and emergency actions which would be put into effect upon the activation of ODR by the President." It also "recognizes the role of private industry in any mobilization effort, realizes the need for flexibility to meet the demands of a situation which are not precisely predictable, and places a heavy burden on the Federal Departments and Agencies in their respective areas of responsibility." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 70 A 4443, 381 National Resources (Jan-May) 1966)

In a May 24 memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense's General Counsel, and several Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Solis Horwitz requested review of and comments on the proposed Plan. (Ibid.) The Joint Chiefs of Staff soon concurred in the plan. (Memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara (JCSM-386-66), June 9, 1966; ibid., 381 National Resources (Jun-1966)) In a July 2 letter to Bryant, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance concurred in "the basic concept for such an emergency agency, its organizational structure, planned emergency actions to be taken by its director, and the proposed legislation and executive order for its establishment," but outlined "several substantive items" which needed "clarification and correction prior to issuance of the plan to make an organization such as the proposed ODR fully effective." (Ibid.)

Under cover of an August 30 letter to McNamara, Bryant enclosed a copy of the Resource Mobilization Plan for Limited War, as revised in July 1966, following comments by the Department of Defense and other Federal departments and agencies, along with a revised Annex A to the Plan, "which contains the classified Office of Defense Resources emergency plan actions." Bryant noted that these documents were to "be used as a guide by your Department in preparing the supporting plans for resource mobilization." Because the Plan was prepared under the OEP's continuing responsibility for the development of civil emergency preparedness measures, however, Bryant added that distribution of the Plan "at this time should not be given any special significance." (Ibid.)