Washington, September 22, 1966.

SUBJECT
Recommended FY68-72 Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces (U)

I have reviewed our Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces for FY68-72 in preparation for the FY68 budget. The tables on pp. 3-4 summarize our force goals. Detailed force and financial summaries are displayed in the tables attached to this Memorandum./2/ I recommend that we:

1. Complete development of and deploy a MIRVed Poseidon, for $700 million in FY68, and $3.2 billion in FY68-72. Plan on a total force of 31 Poseidon submarines.

2. Maintain 1000 Minuteman missiles, consisting by FY72 of 600 Minuteman IIs and 400 IIIs, the latter with improved third stages and Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs), for $1.1 billion in FY68, $3.6 billion in FY68-72.

3. Procure area penetration aids for all Minuteman and terminal penetration aids for Minuteman III, at an FY68 cost of $125 million and a total of $214 million in FY68-72. Complete development of Polaris penetration aids and preserve a 1970 Operational Availability Date (OAD), but disapprove a JCS recommendation for procurement in FY68 of penetration aids for Polaris. Procurement of these would cost $333 million in FY68-72.

4. Adopt a 1.5 crew-to-aircraft ratio and a 43% alert rate for the strategic bomber force instead of continuation of JCS recommended 1.8 crew ratio and 53% alert rate; approve in principle a bomber dispersal plan and an increase in the number of B-52s per base to 30 where savings will result. The estimated savings are $100-200 million in FY68, and about $1 billion in FY68-72.

[Here follow 2 pages of tables.]

Our strategic nuclear forces should deter attack on the U.S. and its Allies and, if deterrence fails, limit damage to our society and those of our Allies. To accomplish these objectives, we design our forces around two related concepts; Assured Destruction--that is, the clear and unmistakable ability to destroy the societies of the USSR and/or the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) even after a surprise attack; and Damage Limiting, which entails the ability to reduce by both offensive and defensive means the damage an enemy can inflict on the U.S. and its Allies.

Deterrence must work over a range of situations. It must prevent not only a massive surprise attack, but also Soviet escalation to general nuclear war from local war. The Assured Destruction capability is designed to deter a potential aggressor, even in crisis situations when the alternatives to initiating nuclear war might otherwise lead him to go to war.

The Soviets seem to view our forces, as we do theirs, as a potential first strike threat. The recent deployment of the new, relatively small SS-11 ICBM in hardened and dispersed silos and Soviet interest in small and mobile missile technology reflect their concern to protect their strategic offensive forces against a U.S. first strike. Our force structure planning should take account of the interactions implied by their interest in having a protected retaliatory force.

Three broadly different posture alternatives are available. First, we could seek only an Assured Destruction capability (although we would in any case achieve a substantial Damage-Limiting capability in the process of building an Assured Destruction capability). Second, we might add a light Damage Limiting increment that would give some protection against probable types of Soviet attacks, and more complete protection against small attacks that the CPR may be able to mount in the 1970s. Third, we might try to add a major Damage Limiting capability to keep U.S. fatalities very low against the heaviest possible Soviet attack, and regardless of Soviet force structure responses.

Plainly, we must and will maintain whatever forces are needed to meet the Assured Destruction objective, while keeping flexibility to meet unpredictable changes in the threat. Under the second option, we would choose Damage Limiting programs that insure against the failure of deterrence under many, but not all, circumstances. The third alternative is certain to be very expensive. Moreover, because its rigid objective is probably infeasible, I reject this option.

Relative U.S.-USSR Strategic Capabilities. The table on the following page compares estimated Soviet strategic offensive forces with those of forces the U.S. programmed for the same years.

U.S. vs Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces/a/

	1966		1968		1971
	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR
ICBMs/b/
Soft Launchers	0	142-146	0	135-145	0	10-100
Hard Launchers	934	168-218	1054	465-550	1045	630-900
Mobile	0	0	0	0	0	20-0
TOTAL	934	310-364	1054	600-695	1045	660-1000

MR/IRBMs
Soft Launchers	0	574	0	546	0	286-300
Hard Launchers	0	135	0	135	0	185-265
Mobile	0	0	0	0-24	0	75-150
TOTAL	0	709	0	681-705	0	546-715

SLBM Inventory Launchers

512

121-136

656

121-148

656

127-244

Bombers and Tankers/c/
Heavy	600	150-165	510	130-155	255	100-130
Medium	80	515-675	76	370-500	210	245-410
Tankers	620	180-205	620	155-205	620	90-165
TOTAL	1300	845-1045	1206	655-860	1085	435-705

The Soviets are building at least two types of single silo launch sites, a large one that we expect to hold the large payload (9,000-12,500 pound) storable liquid fueled SS-9 ICBM system, operational in limited numbers in 1966, and a small one probably intended for the SS-11, a small payload (1,000-2,000 pound) storable liquid fueled missile, also operational in 1966.

The Soviets have recently increased the rate of deployment of the SS-11 missile launchers to a level about 20 percent above their previous maximum. As a result I estimate that they will have between 600 and 700 operational launchers in FY68 instead of the 514-582 estimated in NIE 11-8-65, with the increase consisting of SS-11 missiles.

We have not yet observed any evidence of Soviet Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) programs, of Soviet penetration aid developments, or of the re-entry technology required for highly accurate missiles. We might not see such programs, however, until about three years before their deployment in significant force.

In addition to the offensive forces shown, two relatively large-scale Soviet defensive programs appear to be underway: a probable long range anti-ICBM system around Moscow (16-32 launchers expected to be operational in 1967 or 1968); and a system near Leningrad and across European USSR intended for either ballistic missile defenses, long range surface-to-air bomber defenses, or some combination of the two. Soviet defense priorities, as we assess them, suggest a probable emphasis on ABM. As an ABM, however, the technology of the Leningrad system appears to be much closer to some of the early systems considered by the U.S. than to Nike-X, except perhaps for the use of an X-ray kill warhead above the atmosphere.

The CPR Nuclear Threat. The earliest operational Chinese ICBM is not likely to appear till the mid-1970s. Given the utility to the CPR of being able to threaten her neighbors and U.S. Far Eastern bases, it seems likely that the Chinese would try first to develop and deploy an MRBM. Indeed, some test firings of medium range missiles have been in progress over the past several years.

The CPR also has one "G" class ballistic missile submarine for which a missile could be available in 1967-69, useful primarily as a threat to Asian targets. As a force to retaliate for a U.S. strike against the CPR, however, this system is vulnerable, since the "G" class boat's long transit time to the U.S. (40-45 days) would allow our Naval forces to destroy the submarine (or submarines) in the early 1970s.

The CPR also has almost 300 bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons against Asian targets. But only 15 of these have ranges beyond 600 miles, and the Chinese are unlikely to undertake the costly development of a long range bomber to attack CONUS.

Against the Expected Threat. Our Assured Destruction capabilities based on programs approved last year or on the programs I am now recommending can survive a well-coordinated Soviet surprise attack, even if the Soviets used all their available strategic offensive forces against our own.

U.S. Weapons Surviving Soviet First Strike, 1972/a/

[table (5 columns and 6 rows) not declassified]

As shown, even after a Soviet first strike, some [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] U.S. weapons could be reliably launched against the USSR by either the programmed or recommended forces. [3 lines of source text not declassified] An even higher percentage of the recommended forces would reach their targets. The table below shows the damage potential of various sizes of U.S. retaliatory attacks in the absence of strong defenses.

[table (6 columns and 7 rows) not declassified]

I believe that a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will deter a deliberate Soviet attack on the U.S. or its Allies. Even if the Leningrad associated sites are an effective ballistic missile defense, or if the Moscow defense were deployed at other cities as well, the programmed U.S. missile force, with the penetration aid program of this and prior years, could inflict more than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

Although the Chinese may attain the capability to threaten U.S. bases and Asian neighbors, the CPR nuclear forces, between now and 1972, will not pose a threat either to U.S. retaliatory capability or to the viability of our society. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

Against Higher-Than-Expected Threats. We cannot now be sure that the USSR would not deploy a very heavy ABM in the FY68-72 time period. The effect of adding a very extensive Soviet ABM (which would cost them the equivalent of $25 billion over a five year period) is summarized below:

	FY69	FY70	FY71	FY72
Soviet ABM
Reliable Area Interceptors	750	1350	1875	2475
Reliable Terminal Interceptors	675	975	1425	1800
[1 row not declassified]

This illustration shows that the procurement of Poseidon to replace Polaris A-3 on 31 existing SSBNs and of Minuteman penetration aids, maintains our Assured Destruction capability at an adequate level. I am recommending that we include both these measures in the missile force.

Against a strong Soviet missile force with accurate MIRV but in the absence of an extensive ABM the Assured Destruction capability of the recommended missile force would not fall [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. In fact, our sea-based forces alone could inflict [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] fatalities against such a Soviet threat.

The worst case against which we should hedge now--unlikely, but possible in the early 1970's--is one in which the Soviets deployed SS-9s with accurate MIRV as well as an extensive ABM defense. The Soviet ABM could destroy our offensive re-entry vehicles directly, and also force us to equip missiles with penetration aids at the expense of lethal payload. The Soviets might also defend preferentially, protecting some targets with more interceptors than expected, thus complicating our targeting problem.

The Soviets might deploy MIRV on SS-9s as follows:

	FY69	FY70	FY71	FY72	FY73
Number of SS-9s with MIRV	0	0	50	100	150

Each SS-9 is assumed to carry six MIRV with a yield of three megatons per re-entry vehicle, with a CEP of 2,000 feet in FY 1971 and 1,500 feet thereafter. Against the combined threat with both the heavy ABM deployment and MIRV on SS-9s, penetration aids for Poseidon would be desirable, and the recommended force therefore would include 31 SSBNs converted to Poseidon, penetration aids for both Minuteman and Poseidon, as well as the other elements of the previously approved missile force. If the Soviets do not employ sophisticated tactics such as preferential defense, the Soviet fatalities that could be inflicted by the recommended missile force against the combined threat are as follows:

	FY69	FY70	FY71	FY72	FY73
Soviet Fatalities	[numbers not declassified]

More extreme threats are possible, but they are so unlikely, given the state of Soviet technology and the high cost to the USSR of mounting such forces, that they do not warrant taking now any actions in addition to those included in the recommended U.S. force. I will, however, discuss below some available hedging actions for our missile force. In any case, even against the most extreme threat, the combined Assured Destruction capability of the Recommended U.S. Missile Force and the Programmed Bomber Force is clearly adequate, and would amount to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] fatalities.

Our offensive forces make it dangerous and expensive for the Soviets to move in the direction of extreme threats to our Assured Destruction capability. The incremental 5 year cost to the USSR of the depicted SS-9 and ABM threats would be about $30 billion, approximately a forty percent increase in the present Soviet expenditure rate on strategic forces. Yet, evaluating the Soviet Assured Destruction capability with extreme conservatism, as a Soviet planner might do, this Soviet missile force with only these SS-9s, SLBMs, and the older missiles would inflict less than 10% fatalities on the U.S. after a pre-emptive strike by programmed U.S. forces. If this was an unsatisfactory Assured Destruction capability for the Soviets and they reoriented their planning at the same budget level to maintain Assured Destruction, they would have to reduce their spending on ABM or MIRV. The USSR would have to reduce vulnerability to the very accurate programmed U.S. offensive forces, by expensive measures such as further dispersal of missile payload (the SS-11 deployment appears to be the beginning of this), by hard point defenses (HPD), or by adoption of mobile missile basing schemes thereby reducing the total Soviet missile payload that would otherwise be available at a given budget level. The reduction in Soviet missile payload, in turn would make the U.S. Assured Destruction task less expensive or, alternatively, the development of higher-than-expected threats even less likely.

Of course, the Soviets could increase their strategic budget. But we can, in planning our forces, foreclose any seemingly "easy" and cheap paths to their achievement of a satisfactory Assured Destruction capability and a satisfactory Damage Limiting capability at the same time.

If it became desirable to supplement our planned strategic offensive forces, we could either (1) add hard, fixed-based missiles--such as an undefended advanced ICBM--with relatively low cost per unit of alert payload in inventory, but high cost per unit of payload surviving an attack; or (2) add sea- or land-based mobile systems or fixed-site missiles with hard point defense, all of which have relatively high costs per unit of alert payload in inventory, but are relatively insensitive to the Soviet offensive threat.

This distinction is illustrated in the following table with Minuteman representing the first class of offensive forces and Polaris representing the second class. In this calculation the low Soviet attack inflicts [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on U.S. land-based forces and the high attack inflicts [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

Ten-Year Costs Per Thousand Pounds of Payload
(Millions of Dollars)

			Reliable and Surviving
	In The Inventory	On Alert & Reliable	Low Soviet Attack	High Soviet Attack
Minuteman II	4.5	6.2	6.9	62.0
Polaris A-3	14.2	31.8	31.8	31.8

Future candidate systems in these two classes are considered below:

1. Poseidon: To hedge against an extreme threat, we could consider construction of new Poseidon submarines in addition to the recommended conversion of Polaris A-3 to Poseidon submarines. If long lead time items were switched from the SSN to the SSBN programs in FY67, 10 new Poseidon submarines could be constructed and delivered, 5 each in FY71 and FY72, at $1.46 billion in FY68 and $2.4 billion in FY68-72.

2. Advanced ICBM: We are studying new ICBMs of increased payload, and basing schemes to protect the missiles against the MIRV threat. These studies are essential to determining the utility of an advanced ICBM as part of the force mix. Definitive results are not expected in time for the FY68 budget. A decision on an Advanced ICBM before completion of these studies would be premature. By end FY73, 50 Advanced ICBMs could be available in a mobile or defended configuration. Undefended, they would cost $1.8 billion to develop and $15 million per missile to deploy. Annual operating costs for 300 missiles would be about $600 thousand per missile, including flight testing. Ten year costs of a mobile or defended ICBM might be approximately twice as high.

3. Interim Minuteman Defense: Although hard point ballistic missile defenses would be intended for an advanced ICBM, they could be deployed as an interim measure in FY71 or FY72 to protect Minuteman, if the extreme Soviet threat appeared. For $240 million in FY67-68 Nike-X production funds, Minuteman could be defended on the following schedule:

	FY71	FY72	FY73
Minuteman Squadrons with Terminal Defense	0	6	6
Sprint Interceptors	0	1000	2000
Zeus Interceptors	0	500	500

The FY68-72 costs of this defense would be approximately $5.3 billion, and the defenses could also be useful for an Advanced ICBM.

4. Ballistic Missile Ships (BMS): A ballistic missile ship was studied extensively in connection with various proposals for an Allied Nuclear Force. Built to look like a merchant vessel, such a ship would rely on deception, speed, or fleet defense for protection. The vulnerability of this system is, of course, the principal reservation. Long lead time funding of some $86 million would maintain the option of procuring ballistic missile ships on the same schedule as that of new Poseidon submarines. If the option were exercised, FY68-72 costs would be $1.4 billion for 10 ships and $2.6 billion for 20. About $0.8 billion of the $2.6 billion is for Poseidon missiles, which could be later used in Poseidon submarines.

I believe that it is not necessary to commit ourselves now to exercising our options on any of these hedges.

Strategic bombers might be called on in the future to support conventional operations on a much wider scale than they are doing now in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the Assured Destruction capability of our strategic missile force will almost certainly deter the Soviets from a surprise attack except, perhaps, in an extreme crisis or an escalating war. In these cases we would have received sufficient warning to put the strategic bomber force on high alert. Our bombers should therefore be primarily designed for such situations, rather than for all-out immediate use in spasm nuclear exchanges.

Our bomber threat appears to affect enemy force planning, just as do our missiles. Bombers force the enemy to divert resources to defend against aircraft as well as against ICBMs. In this role, they have their chief advantage; and in this role, they are not needed in large numbers.

Reductions in manned aircraft operating expenses would be consistent with this view of the bombers role. A 43% alert rate, down from 53%, will be sustainable with the recommended new 1.5 crew ratio. At this rate, our alert bombers could deliver more than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] against the present Soviet defenses, and [number not declassified] against the projected, improved FY71 defenses. Location in the interior of the U.S. is desirable, where suitable bases exist, to protect against a future sea-launched missile threat. In general, B-52s should have the ability to disperse in times of crisis and be distributed with 30 per home base where economies will result. By May 1967, the Air Force will have completed a basing study to determine the feasibility of these basing concepts.

Such operating adjustments will provide a large enough surviving bomber fleet to meet the entire Assured Destruction payload requirement, will save $200-400 million annually, and will probably make it possible to extend the B-52 G/H's life to FY77 without additional modification. This will allow an added margin of safety in the timing of some of our strategic missile development and procurement decisions.

Damage Limiting forces, unlike those for Assured Destruction, cannot and need not work with near perfection under all conditions, but should insure against the most probable risks, including those posed by the growth of Chinese nuclear forces. The implications of Soviet reactions for our own choices of Damage Limiting forces must also be taken into account.

Evaluation of Damage Limiting Programs Against the Soviet Threat. So long as we have secure retaliatory forces, any kind of nuclear war with the Soviets is unlikely. Of the ways in which one might start, a surprise attack in normal times is especially unlikely; it would be much more likely to arise from a crisis or limited war, giving both sides enough strategic warning to increase their alert status. The Soviets might start a nuclear war for fear of a pre-emptive strike by the U.S., as part of a massive attack on Western Europe, or to prevent the loss of a limited war. In each case, the Soviets could be expected to try to preserve as much as possible of Soviet society and military power. Thus, they might devote a large part of their strategic offensive forces to reducing the U.S. offensive threat.

The Damage Limiting ability of various U.S. postures will be evaluated under the following kinds of wars:

[3 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) not declassified]

The Soviet damage potential against the U.S. in three kinds of war is depicted, with the Soviet threat in 1976 assumed to consist of 1000 ICBMs, 211 submarine launched missiles, and 46 heavy bombers.

United States Fatalities

		Withheld Urban Attack
	Comb. Military- Urban Attack By USSR	Collateral Fatalities	Remaining Urb. Damage Potent.	U.S. Pre-emptive Strike
1971
U.S. Approved Program	30-45%	3-5%	18-19%	28%
1976
U.S. Approved Program Extended	22-45%	2-4%	20%	24%

Two factors tend to decrease U.S. fatalities between 1971 and 1976: the gradual decline in the Soviet bomber threat, and improved U.S. counter-military capabilities. Without programmed U.S. defenses, however, the USSR's damage potential could be over 100 million (50%) U.S. fatalities in a mixed Soviet attack.

We have also analyzed the effects if the U.S. initiated either of two balanced Damage Limiting programs, assuming at this point that we evoked no response from the USSR except for provision of penetration aids for projected Soviet missiles. (Soviet responses are considered below.) Posture A includes Nike-X with a limited Sprint defense at 25 cities, an improved bomber defense using F-111s, and expanded civil defense. Posture B includes a heavy Sprint defense of 52 cities. Incremental expenditures for these postures, measured from the Approved Program as a base, are shown in the following table.

Costs of Alternative Defense Postures (In $ Billions)

	Approved Program		Damage Limiting Increment Over Approved Programs
		Level-Off	Posture A		Posture B
	Dev+Inv	Annual	Dev+Inv	Annual	Dev+Inv	Annual
Civil Defense	0.8	0.1	0.8	0.0	0.8	0.0
Nike-X	1.4	0.0	8.0	0.3	17.5	0.6
Air Defense	0.4	1.3	1.5	-0.3	1.5	-0.3
TOTAL	2.6	1.4	10.3	0.0	19.8	0.3

The table below compares the performance of the Approved Program with that of Postures A and B.

[table (5 columns and 4 rows) not declassified]

[9-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] These figures underscore the importance of improved civil defense.

The light defenses of Posture A are sensitive to large Soviet counter-urban attacks, although they keep the damage level below that of the Approved Program. The heavier and much more costly Posture B defense is less sensitive to the size of the counter-urban attack.

Interaction of U.S. and USSR Force Planning. U.S. offensive forces, apparently viewed by the Soviets as a potential first strike capability, exert pressure on the Soviets to protect their retaliatory forces. The effect of U.S. defensive measures--say, an ABM--on the Soviets, almost surely, would be to move them to offset the U.S. defense by expanding their offensive force. Our encouraging prospects in the development of U.S. anti-submarine defenses, however, may discourage major Soviet reliance on SLBMs. The long term viability of these measures, and their implications for ASW force requirements are under study.

The following table shows the results if the Soviets choose to restore their Assured Destruction capability against U.S. Damage Limiting Postures A and B; because of the prospect of U.S. ASW defenses, possible Soviet land-based responses are assumed. The assumed response to Posture A is procurement of 200 large mobile missiles at a 10 year cost of about $10 billion; to Posture B, 650 missiles at a cost of about $20 billion. Results of equal expenditures on defended missiles would be similar.

[table (5 columns and 6 rows) not declassified]

Addition by the Soviets of relatively invulnerable missiles as a Soviet response to a U.S. Damage Limiting program can regain their retaliatory potential against a U.S. first strike without fully restoring Soviet first strike potential against the U.S.

[2 paragraphs (21 lines of source text) not declassified]

Poseidon Deployment. Because Poseidon is so much more effective per dollar than Polaris A-3 and because Poseidon provides insurance against a higher-than-expected Soviet threat, I believe that we should ultimately convert 31 Polaris submarines to Poseidon. A fleet of 31 Poseidon boats will have [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of a fleet of 41 Polaris A-3 boats. Only an unexpectedly serious Soviet ASW threat that would require dispersal of our forces on a larger number of SSBNs could change this. Disposition of the last 10 submarines, which cannot economically be converted to Poseidon, need not be decided now. We are studying the option to deploy new Poseidon submarines after the last conversion of the 31 now planned.

We plan on an operational availability date (OAD) in 1970 for the Poseidon missile carrying Mark-3 re-entry systems. Possible Mark-3/Mark-17 mixes will be re-evaluated yearly as new estimates of the Soviet ABM are made and a capability to deploy a MK-17 MIRV on Poseidon will be preserved. The total FY68 cost of the Poseidon program is $700 million; and the FY68-72 R&D, investment, and operating costs are $3.2 million.

[1 paragraph (2-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Last year I commented on some of the command and control vulnerabilities of the FBM force. The Navy has generated a number of alternative solutions to these problems on which recommendations will be made this October.

Minuteman. I have approved the inclusion in the Minuteman III program of an improved [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] at an additional FY67-72 cost of $400 million. When Minuteman III becomes operational, there will already be 600 Minuteman IIs in the force. Rather than replace these with Minuteman IIIs prior to the completion of the Force Modernization Program in early 1972, we will take as a tentative planning objective a force consisting of 600 Minuteman II and 400 Minuteman III, with additional Minuteman III to be procured thereafter as replacements.

Since all 600 Minuteman IIs will be available by July 1969, I am also recommending a rate of 40 [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Mark-17s per month, which will lead to the complete replacement of all Mark-LLAs by end FY70. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] By buying full complements of warheads [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in FY68, we will maintain the flexibility to tailor Minuteman III re-entry packages to Soviet defenses and target systems. In succeeding years we will adjust production quantities to avoid having excess reentry systems.

[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] I am also approving development of a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] at an FY68 cost of $25.6 million and an FY68-72 development cost of $288 million to achieve an IOC by end FY71.

Titan. As newer missiles phase into the force, Titan II will lose its unique advantages, while remaining expensive to operate. The end FY66 Titan II inventory can support a follow-on test (FOT) program of 6 launches per year without cutting into the operational force until the end of FY70, at which time it would be necessary to phase down approximately one squadron per year. I recommend that the $18 million in FY67 funds for 6 new Titans not be released.

Penetration Aids. The effectiveness of penetration aids against Soviet ABM defenses is now under review. Pending completion of that review, I recommend that production of the penetration aids for the Minuteman programs be approved.

[1 paragraph (8-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

The FY68 cost of the Minuteman penetration aid program is $91 million, with a total cost of $230 million in FY68-72. Disapproval of deployment of the Polaris A-3 penetration aids will save $218 million in FY68, and a total of $333 million in FY68-72.

Missile Flight Test Programs. We have re-examined our ballistic missile flight test programs, with two major conclusions:

--The number of missiles in operational flight tests (OT) should be determined on the basis of the number of significantly different missile configurations, rather than as a fixed percentage of the total force.

--FOTs should be viewed as providing data for updating our estimates.

These considerations suggest an optimum OT rate of approximately 40 launches per configuration, and an FOT rate of 20 per configuration per year, yielding savings of approximately $330 million during FY66-71, without appreciable loss to our knowledge of systems effectiveness, compared with the previously approved program.

Strategic Bomber Forces. A study of B-52G/H lifetime based on the recommended lower crew ratio and considering possible modifications, suggests that our B-52s will be able to operate effectively even after 1975 against projected or even better-than-expected Soviet air defenses. Therefore, I do not believe that an AMSA development program must meet an initial operational capability date of FY74, even if it is decided that the B-52 should be followed by an AMSA. However, as an insurance program, I have started concept formulation to define and evaluate a suitable bomber design.

I recommend that 3 squadrons of Hound-Dog A be retired in FY67, and the remaining 6 squadrons in FY68; Hound-Dog B should be retained pending the outcome of the Terrain Matching Guidance (TERCOM) development program. This program will maintain enough Hound-Dogs for their SIOP mission, primarily to attack area bomber defenses and lower-priority airfields, while resulting in FY67-71 savings of approximately $30 million.

[1 paragraph (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Nike-X Deployment. The following table shows the components entering the Nike-X defenses of Postures A and B, and their cost, in addition to the $1.4 billion of RDT&E funds to be spent:

	Limited Defense Posture		Heavy Defense
	No. of Units	$ Billions	No. of Units	$ Billions
Radars
TACMAR Radars	7	$1.7	3	$1.0
MAR Radars	0	0	8	2
VHF Radars	6	.3	6	.3
Missile Site Radars	26	3.4	40	7.9
DM-15-X2 Interceptors	1200	1.1	1200	1.1
Sprint Interceptors	1100	.7	7300	3.1
Total Investment Cost		$7.2		$15.6
FY67-76 Operating Cost		$1.0		$ 1.8
AEC Costs		$ .7		$ 2.0

[2 paragraphs (12 lines of source text) not declassified]

In view of the uncertainty of Soviet targeting and force structure response, and given the substantial cost and relative ineffectiveness of either Posture A or Posture B, I disapprove the JCS recommendation to deploy Nike-X for a FY72 IOC.

Deployment of a New Manned Interceptor. The Soviets would probably use their bombers primarily in attacks on urban areas rather than on time-urgent military targets, since the time to reach target is so much longer for bombers than for ballistic missiles. Therefore, air defense is an important component of a Damage Limiting posture.

The F-12 and F-111 interceptors, equipped with the improved ASG-18/AIM-47 fire control and missile systems, and used with an effective Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), would be better than the present force in operating from degraded bases, countering concentrated bomber attacks, operating independently of a vulnerable fixed ground environment, and dealing with bombers attacking at low-altitude or carrying air-to-surface missiles.

With strategic warning we estimate that 32 UE F-12s or 48 UE stretched F-111As could achieve the same number kills before weapons release as the current force which has a 10 year cost of $3.0 billion. The 10 year systems cost for the 32 UE F-12 force have increased from the previously estimated $1.9 billion to $2.9 billion. Estimates for the F-111 force remain at $1.5 billion. The F-111 force therefore appears substantially more efficient than the F-12s against the currently projected threat. Supplementary calculations indicate that it is comparable in efficiency to the F-12 force against possible future threats.

The 48 UE F-111 force would operate from 4 main bases, 8 dispersal bases and 30 recovery/recycle bases. Sixteen combat support aircraft, that would be flushed with the interceptors, would carry missiles, ground support equipment, spares, and personnel to support the F-111 turn-around at the recycle bases. With 42 AWACS aircraft to provide airborne control, we could reduce the present ground environment, retaining only enough radars and BUIC centers for peacetime control.

The investment costs for this force include $676 million for the F-111 and $790 million for AWACS. Since the modernized force would ultimately have operating costs about $250 million per year lower than the present posture, the additional investment costs would be recouped by FY78.

Given the advantage of the F-111 interceptors--an aircraft already in long term production--and in the absence of a decision to deploy Nike-X, the decision to modernize our air defense structure can be deferred for one year.

The F-12 development program will be reoriented in FY 67 and FY 68 to include further design studies for the F-111 interceptor, cost studies, and adaptation of the Navy AWG-9 fire control system for ADC use, using the YF-12 as a test bed. The AWACS development program which supports both tactical and CONUS defense missions, will be continued as a high priority effort.

SAM-D. We have a new surface-to-air missile system (SAM-D), in Advanced Development oriented primarily toward Field Army air defense and Fleet air defense but with potential application to CONUS defense. These efforts will define a building block approach to the system, and reduce costs. At this stage of development, a deployment decision would be premature. We are also examining the utility of Nike-X in a surface-to-air role. Preliminary results are encouraging.

Civil Defense. The Damage Limiting Postures A and B include an expanded Civil Defense Program with dual purpose shelters in new non-federal public and private construction in addition to the shelters resulting from the present shelter survey and stocking program, but no special purpose shelter construction. The table shown below summarizes the protection offered by this program and compares it with the Approved Program, considering the location of shelters and limits on the movement of population.

The Approved Program extended to 1976 would cost $1.5 billion. Last year we proposed a one year, $10 million experimental program to evaluate shelter development in new construction. This program would give us information on the feasibility of incorporating dual purpose shelters in new construction, and on the necessary incentive schemes to stimulate shelter development. Although this proposal was not approved by the Congress, continued study indicates that such a program would provide for an efficient, controlled Expanded Civil Defense Program over time by incorporating shelters in new public construction and that this expansion can be matched to the deficits that will remain after conclusion of the shelter survey program. It is presently estimated that for $800 million we could add 50 million useful spaces, and save an additional 3 to 4% of our population over the approved program. An additional $1 billion spent on special purpose shelter construction, to meet the residual deficit, would save less than one percent of the population, and would not be warranted.

	Approved Program		Expanded Program
	Number of Shelter Spaces In Millions	Percent of Population With Protection Factor of 40 or more/a/	Number of Shelter Spaces In Millions	Percent of Population With Protection Factor of 40 or more/a/
1966	140	35%	N.A.	N.A.
1971	230	64%	240	70%
1976	280	67%	330	88%

Accordingly, I am recommending $186.3 million for the FY68 Civil Defense program to include $10 million for an experimental shelter development program. Pending completion of the experiment, I am including a nominal $25 million for shelter development in FY69. The further development of this program will depend on the results of this experimental program.

[1 paragraph (17 lines of source text) not declassified]

Washington, September 27, 1966.

Walt:

This is a personal note to express my concern that we may not be grappling seriously and urgently enough with the question of an ABM freeze.

My purpose here isn't to pass judgment on the issue, but to stress the need for doing more than we are now doing, in order to be able to reach a deliberate decision on that issue before such a decision is forced on us by a series of inter-acting Soviet deployment and ad hoc U.S. budgetary decisions.

In the broadest sense, the question is where trends in strategic offensive and defensive weapons (on which we recently had an excellent DOD briefing in the Thursday group) are taking us, and whether there is any alternative to drifting into the more dangerous and unstable strategic world which these trends may foreshadow. We may not be able to find an alternative (such as a viable ABM freeze), but we ought to be looking for one before events carry us further downstream. We ought not to assume that because the Soviets are now deploying ABM's they might not draw them back if we proposed some alternative means of meeting both sides' security needs.

The bureaucracy may be too unwieldy to meet this in time without a prod from the President. Failing this, all you are likely to get is a staffing out of possible ABM weapons effects by various ABM weapons proponents. (We are currently arranging to get the DOD study and briefing to which you were exposed and which Bob Ginsburgh was kind enough to tell me about.) This doesn't fully meet the President's need as he reaches for decision, however.

Proposal: I would urge setting up a Wise Man's Group, made up of inside and outside talent, which would work full-time on this problem, on the QT, in order to present to the President a careful evaluation of alternative courses--before the range of options is precluded by the march of events, here and in the U.S.S.R.

Henry Owen/2/

Washington, October 11, 1966.

SUBJECT
Henry Owen's Memo to You on the ABM Problem

I share Henry Owen's serious concern about the ABM deployment issue (see attached memo)./2/ I think, however, that he grossly underestimates the extent and seriousness of the consideration that is and has been given to this difficult problem within the U.S. government.

I have followed this question for the past six or eight years and in general have been impressed during the past few years with the relatively high level of sophistication of the analysis in OSD of the role of ABMs in our strategic offensive-defensive posture. I think Henry is wrong in his impression that Defense is being forced into a decision without giving the question serious or sophisticated attention. The issue is certainly not being handled simply as "a series of interacting Soviet deployment and ad hoc U.S. budgetary decisions." I think it most unfair to state that without a prod from the President "all you are likely to get is a staffing out of possible ABM weapons effects by various ABM weapons proponents." Henry has obviously been talking to the wrong people. Finally, this problem has been a central issue in arms control thinking in ACDA and the rest of government for the past few years.

With regard to Henry's specific proposal, I am not sure what he would really want the "Wise Man's Group" to do at this point or just who he thinks he could get to work fulltime on this problem. The proposal seems somewhat reminiscent of the Gaither Panel of 1957./3/

With regard to independent review of the issue, I would note that for the past six years I have been working on this problem with a very good PSAC panel made up of the most knowledgeable scientists on the subject./4/ This group has given and is currently giving useful independent evaluations of ABM proposals, intelligence on the Soviet program, and the broader strategic issues involved. On the basis of my experience with this and other panels, I would emphasize the difficulty of getting useful advice on a problem of this extreme complexity unless there are specific government proposals or alternatives framed in advance. Therefore, since it is now apparent that McNamara will not propose an ABM deployment or the introduction of other major new strategic systems as part of the FY-1968 budget, I would particularly question the utility of organizing a new "Wise Man's Group" at this time. Such a review might be useful before we make a final commitment on this subject (next year?), but I think we should think the plan through very carefully before launching another Gaither Panel exercise.

Spurgeon

In a telephone conversation on October 16, 1966, President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara first discussed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That part of their conversation is summarized in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI, Document 162, footnote 4. McNamara then went on to report that he had just gone over the fiscal year 1968 defense budget estimates submitted by the military services. The President interjected, "Hold on and let me get my hat," and McNamara responded, "you'll need more than your hat; [you'll need] a storm shelter."

McNamara then reported that these military estimates totaled $98 billion. That figure he found "just unbelievable and there's no damned reason in the world for it and it won't come out that way." When President Johnson asked what the military asked for last year, McNamara said it was about $75 or $72 billion. The President said that $10 billion had been added, and McNamara agreed but said that that would be reduced. "But the $98 billion is just unbelievable. The next 60 days are just going to have to be budget cutting days." "I've just got a helluva task on my hands," he shortly commented. Working with Deputy Secretary Vance, McNamara concluded, "I can get it down to a reasonable level by Christmas time, but it's going to take every minute between now and Christmas to do it." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, October 16, 1966, 7:03 p.m., Tape F66.29, Side A; this transcript was prepared specifically for this Foreign Relations volume)

NIE 11-8-66

Washington, October 20, 1966.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

The Problem

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic attack forces through mid-1968, and to estimate general trends in these forces over the next 10 years or so.

Summary and Conclusions

A. The Soviets retain their belief in the primacy of strategic attack and defense forces, to deter the US and to support their foreign policy. Soviet strategic attack forces will continue to include a variety of weapon systems, with chief emphasis upon ICBMs. The Soviets are building forces which we believe will give them, in the next year or two, greatly increased confidence that they have a retaliatory capability sufficient to assure the destruction of a significant portion of US industrial resources and population. They will probably also seek, through both strategic attack and defense programs, to improve their ability to reduce the damage the US can inflict on the USSR should deterrence fail and war in fact occur. We do not believe, however, that the Soviets will expect to achieve by the mid-1970's strategic capabilities which would make rational the deliberate initiation of general war./2/

B. ICBM Force. The Soviets now have about 335 operational ICBM launchers. We estimate that the USSR will have some 670-765 operational launchers in mid-1968. This is considerably more than we anticipated in our last estimate and reflects our belief that construction of launchers has been started at a higher rate than ever before.

C. In mid-1968, about half the operational launchers will be for the small and relatively inaccurate SS-11. This missile is suitable mainly against large, soft targets such as cities. Deployment of the SS-9, a large missile more suitable for attacking hard targets, is also continuing, though at a slower rate than the SS-11.

D. The present Soviet stress on dispersed single silos, especially those for the SS-11, probably reflects decisions taken several years ago to improve sharply the survivability and thus the retaliatory capabilities of the ICBM force. In mid-1968 about 80 percent of the total launchers will be hard.

E. The Soviets might not find it advantageous to build ICBM forces much larger than those we estimate for 1968. On the other hand, they might consider their deterrent to be significantly more convincing and their military power improved if they can acquire an ICBM force about as large as that of the US. We therefore estimate a Soviet ICBM force of some 800-1,100 operational launchers in mid-1971 and some 800-1,200 in mid-1976./3/

F. A 1976 force of about 1,200 launchers would probably consist primarily of small, less expensive ICBMs. A force of 800 or so would probably incorporate greater qualitative improvements and significant numbers of larger ICBMs. Characteristic of future deployment will be hard silos and possibly mobile launchers. Qualitative improvements will probably include much better accuracies and may include sophisticated reentry vehicles and penetration aids. The development of the force will probably be marked by interruptions and leveling-off phases as new, more effective systems are introduced and older systems are phased out.

G. We think that ICBM forces falling anywhere within these estimated ranges could be considered as meeting a broad Soviet criterion for a credible deterrent. Thus we intend our estimate of future force levels as a range of uncertainty, either side of which would reflect the same basic Soviet strategic concept. For a period so far ahead, however, much will depend on the interplay between US and Soviet decisions taken in the interim.

H. The Soviets have recently conducted feasibility tests of what may be a depressed trajectory ICBM or a fractional orbit bombardment system. We cannot determine which, if either, of these systems will be deployed. Either could become operational during 1968 but probably would not be deployed in large numbers.

I. MRBM/IRBM Forces. No major changes in the MRBM/IRBM force have been noted during the past year. We estimate that the current force comprises somewhat over 700 operational launchers, some 135 of them hard, deployed at about 200 sites. This force is capable of delivering a devastating attack against Eurasian targets but is predominantly soft and concentrated. We believe that throughout the period of this estimate the USSR will maintain some 500-700 MRBM/IRBM launchers. Qualitative improvements are expected to include solid propellant missiles, more hard launchers, and probably mobility for some portion of the force.

J. Missile Submarines. The Soviets presently have some 45 ballistic missile submarines (8-10 nuclear-powered) with a total of about 130 launchers, and an equal number of cruise missile units (21-23 nuclear-powered) with about 250 launchers. No new ballistic missile submarines have become operational since 1963. We believe, however, that a new class of ballistic missile submarine--which almost certainly will be nuclear-powered and may carry 8 or more missiles with a range of some 1,000 to 2,000 n.m.--will be operational by mid-1968. We estimate that by 1976 the Soviets will have some 60 to 70 ballistic missile submarines, including about 30 of the new type. We believe that production of cruise missile submarines will continue, but at a reduced rate, into the 1970's. We estimate that some 55-65 of these units will be operational in 1976.

K. Regular open ocean patrols by Soviet missile submarines have been stepped up in recent months. This patrol activity will probably continue to increase. By the early 1970's, as much as 30 percent of the ballistic missile submarine force may be on station in potential missile launch areas at any one time. This number could be augmented by whatever portion of their cruise missile submarine force the Soviets allocate to a strategic attack mission.

L. Strategic Bomber Force. Long Range Aviation is now composed of 950-1,000 bomber/tanker aircraft, 200-210 of which are heavies and the rest mediums. The primary mission of the heavies is intercontinental attack; at present, the Soviets could probably put about 100 heavy bombers over US target areas on two-way missions. The medium bombers are mainly for use against Eurasian targets, though a few squadrons might be employed for initial strikes against Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Iceland. The Soviets could augment the force over North America by using medium bombers on one-way missions, but we think this unlikely. The Soviets may develop a new medium bomber during the period of this estimate, but probably not a new heavy. We estimate that by 1976 attrition and retirement will have reduced the heavy force to some 70-100 aircraft and the medium force to about 300-500./4/

M. Space Systems. For some years the USSR has been orbiting several types of satellites including reconnaissance types. Within the next 5 to 10 years the Soviets will probably develop and employ a variety of space systems (such as navigation and communications satellites) to further support their strategic attack forces. The Soviets have long had the capability to orbit a nuclear-armed satellite and have frequently alluded to "orbital rockets." Recent feasibility tests could lead to a multiple-orbit bombardment system. For the foreseeable future, however, ICBMs are likely to be much more effective and far less costly. This, plus the political liability which would be incurred by orbiting a nuclear weapon, lead us to believe that the Soviets are unlikely to deploy a multiple-orbit bombardment system in space during the period of this estimate.

N. Research and Development. The Soviets continue to pursue a vigorous R&D program to develop and improve strategic attack systems. A high level of R&D activity is expected to continue. The USSR appears to be about as capable as the US of developing new strategic systems and subsystems which its leaders feel are important enough to justify the expenditure of resources. In deciding to deploy any new weapon system, however, the Soviets would have to weigh the prospective gain against the economic cost and the capabilities of the US to detect and counter it.

[Here follow the Discussion section (Parts I-VII, pages 6-34) and Annex A and B (pages 35-47 and following page 47).]

TCS 9594-66

Washington, October 27, 1966.

SUBJECT
NIE 11-8-66, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack"/2/

1. Attached is the extremely sensitive, all-source National Intelligence Estimate, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack." In my judgment, its conclusions can be summarized as follows:

a. The Soviets are building powerful strategic attack forces along with the strategic defense and other elements of their military establishment. Their main object in building these forces is to deter the US and support their own foreign policy.

b. Over the past year, the Soviets have started to build ICBM launchers in larger numbers than ever before. By 1968, they will have a considerably bigger operational force than we anticipated in our estimate of a year ago. Most of the ICBMs will be in dispersed silos to protect them from attack. This force should give the Soviet leaders greater confidence in their deterrent because of its ability to inflict mass destruction upon the US even if the US were to strike first.

c. In their planning for the years beyond 1968, the Soviets must consider such things as the cost of building more ICBM launchers, their technical ability to develop better systems, and the possible course of US military programs. They may decide that there is little strategic advantage in building an ICBM force much larger than the one they will have in 1968. On the other hand, they may seek to strengthen their deterrent and military power still more by increasing their ICBM force to about the size of the one now planned by the US. In either case, they will probably introduce new ICBMs with greater ability to survive US attack and greater effectiveness to strike at US forces. But the Soviet leaders almost certainly do not expect to build forces so powerful that they could launch a first strike against the US without receiving unacceptable damage in return.

d. The Soviet strategic attack forces will continue to include numerous missile submarines. In about 1968, the fleet will probably begin to have improved submarines with longer range missiles, more like US Polaris submarines than are present Soviet types. Missile submarines will increase their patrolling in the open seas, and in a few years a number of them may be on station within missile range of the US. The USSR will keep large numbers of bombers and missiles which could deliver massive attacks against Europe and Asia. It will continue to have a small force of bombers to use against the US.

e. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not agree with certain major views expressed in the NIE. He estimates that "programs already underway, plus a continuing strong R&D effort, reflect a Soviet determination to rise from a position of strategic inferiority to one of at least numerical parity with the US in the belief that such a position would markedly enhance the aggressive pursuit of Communist aims." He considers that the Soviets will build somewhat more ICBM launchers than forecast in the NIE and that the estimate underplays the role of bombardment aviation in Soviet intercontinental attack capabilities.

2. This estimate on Soviet strategic attack forces will be followed within the next few weeks by estimates setting forth our latest findings on Soviet strategic defenses and Soviet general purpose military forces.

3. I commend the entire document to your attention, especially its Summary and Conclusions.

Dick

Washington, November 17, 1966.

Dear Dean:

I am attaching for your comments a Defense draft NSAM on the subject of chemical and biological warfare policy./2/ It has been prepared in response to a State request for a Defense position./3/

The draft states that the President does not now expect to authorize first use of lethal CB weapons. With respect to incapacitants, it reflects the actual situation as it now exists by stating that the President may authorize their use in certain situations of national urgency. In my view, we should keep this option open until we have better information concerning specific incapacitating agents, their military effectiveness, and the political consequences of their use. Accordingly, I have asked the members of my staff to conduct a study on the role of incapacitating agents. The results of this study will be reflected in next year's Draft Memorandum for the President on Theater Nuclear Warfare. In the meantime, I believe policy guidelines such as those in the attached draft NSAM would be appropriate and desirable.

I share your interest in reaching an early joint position which we can recommend to the President. I would be happy to discuss the draft policy with you at your convenience, if you wish.

Sincerely,

Bob/4/

NIE 11-3-66

Washington, November 17, 1966.

SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES

The Problem

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic air and missile defense forces through mid-1968, and general trends in these forces through 1976.

Conclusions

A. The Soviet leaders give a higher priority to strategic defenses than does the US; they allocate about equal resources to their strategic attack and their strategic defense forces. The Soviet object in building their strategic defenses is to contribute to deterrence and to foreign policy support, and to limit the damage the US could inflict on the USSR. The Soviets will continue to emphasize strategic defense throughout the next 10 years, and will pursue their efforts to meet the changing US threat. They will seek, through both offensive and defensive programs, to improve their strategic position relative to that of the US. (Paras. l-5)

B. The Soviets have steadily improved their strategic defenses against aerodynamic vehicles over the last decade, by upgrading their air surveillance system and by developing and deploying both manned interceptors and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. Through these systems they have achieved a formidable capability against subsonic and low-supersonic aircraft attempting to penetrate at medium and high altitudes to principal target areas. Current systems are progressively less effective against higher performance aircraft, standoff weapons, and low-altitude penetrations. At present, Soviet strategic air defenses have virtually no effectiveness at altitudes below about 1,000 feet./2/ (Paras. 10-16, 20-22, 29-32)

C. The Soviets will be deploying over the next few years improved air surveillance radars, air defense communications and control systems, and defensive weapon systems with capabilities against aero-dynamic vehicles. They are now deploying an interceptor with improved low-altitude capabilities. We believe they will also deploy new interceptors with a better capability to defend against standoff weapons and higher performance aircraft. Although we think the Soviets will continue to work on the problem of defense against penetrations below 1,000 feet, we do not expect any system with such capabilities to be operational before about 1970. (Paras. 17-19, 23-28, 38)

D. Since 1964 the Soviets have been constructing complexes for a new missile system for strategic defense, which we call the Tallinn system. There are now probably 20-25 complexes (each with multiple launch sites) under construction. We believe all of these will become operational in 1967 and 1968. The deployment concept appears to include both forward defense on likely approaches to the industrial region of European USSR and local defense of selected targets. We believe that the rate at which new complexes have been started has increased in the past year or so, and that this system will be widely deployed throughout the USSR. (Paras. 33-34, 37)

E. The information available at present is insufficient for us to estimate with high confidence the capabilities and mission of the Tallinn system. Such evidence as we have leads us to believe that the system has significant capabilities against high-speed aerodynamic vehicles flying at high altitude and that its mission is defense against the airborne threat./3/ Depending on the characteristics of some components, however, the system could have capabilities against ballistic missiles. We have therefore assessed the potential of the Tallinn system in both the SAM and antiballistic missile (ABM) roles. (Para. 35)

F. In the SAM role, we believe the Tallinn system represents a considerable improvement over currently operational Soviet SAMs in terms of range (on the order of 100 n.m.), altitude (up to 100,000 feet), and ability to deal with supersonic targets (up to Mach 3 or 3.5). We do not believe it is the Soviet answer to the low-altitude threat. If the system was designed as an ABM, then data would have to be fed to the complexes from off-site radars in order for them to defend areas large enough to provide a strategic ABM defense. Some of the Tallinn complexes are in locations where they could take advantage of such data from known radars of appropriate types, but some are not. With such data, the Tallinn complexes may be capable of exoatmospheric intercept of incoming ballistic missiles at distances out to about 200 n.m., and thus each complex could defend a fairly large area. Without such data, the ABM capabilities of each complex would be seriously reduced and limited to local and self-defense. (Paras. 36, 51)

G. After an intensive ABM research and development program, the Soviets decided at least five years ago to deploy an ABM system at Moscow. This system (which we call the Moscow system) will achieve an initial capability in the next year or two, and all sites now under construction will be completed by about 1970. We believe that it is a long-range exoatmospheric system with a large kill radius, and that the primary purpose of its present deployment is the defense of Moscow. (Paras. 39, 43-47)

H. The Moscow ABM system probably will have a good capability against a numerically limited attack by currently operational US missiles. Its capabilities could be degraded by advanced penetration systems, and it could not cope with a very heavy attack. Furthermore, the system utilizes data from large radars for it to function most effectively. Without these radars, the capabilities of the system would be seriously reduced, though if the launch sites were designed to operate autonomously, the system could still intercept some missiles targeted against Moscow. The present deployment will cover only a part of the Polaris threat to Moscow. (Paras. 48-50)

I. We cannot now identify any wholly new ABM system in development and we do not expect any to become operational before the early 1970's. In view of the presently limited capabilities of the ABM defenses now under construction, we believe the Soviets will devote substantial efforts to upgrading their present hardware, developing improved ABM systems, and improving their detection and tracking capabilities. The Soviets might decide that ABM defenses for the general defense of the USSR are too costly. We think it likely, however, that they will extend their ABM defenses. But we think they will be cautious about committing themselves to a fixed policy with respect to ABM deployment over the long term. They will probably adjust whatever program they pursue on the basis of a number of factors, including the capabilities of present defenses to deal with penetration aids, the advances in ABM technology, the cost of additional deployment relative to the protection it is likely to afford, and the US reaction to Soviet strategic developments./4/ (Paras. 52, 55-60)

J. In the course of their ABM program, the Soviets have developed large radars which have good capabilities for tracking ballistic missiles and space vehicles. A number of radars of this type, now under construction, will become operational in 1967-1968. Although they do not all have the same functions, we believe that in the aggregate they will provide the USSR with a national space surveillance capability. Within the next 5 to 10 years the Soviets will probably develop and employ a variety of space systems (such as infrared detection and other types of warning) in support of their strategic defensive forces. (Paras. 40-42, 53-54, 62-63)

K. We have no positive evidence that the Soviets are developing antisatellite defenses, but we believe they have had an incentive to do so for some time. It would be technically possible for them to have a limited antisatellite capability already, based on existing radars and missiles and requiring a nuclear weapon to achieve a kill. When their new space surveillance radars are operational in 1967-1968, they could have a capability to destroy satellites by either nuclear or nonnuclear means after the satellites had passed over the USSR a few times. The Soviets may also explore techniques for neutralizing satellites without destroying them. A manned satellite inspection and antisatellite system could be developed in the 1970's. We believe, however, that the Soviets would seek to destroy or neutralize US satellites only if they believed general war were imminent. There might also be some other special circumstances in which they would use antisatellite systems in peacetime, such as an occasion in which they believed they were retaliating against US interference with their own satellites. (Paras. 61, 64-67)

L. Over the past decade or more the Soviets have developed an extensive civil defense program, which is now administered by the Ministry of Defense. The current program is characterized by widespread public training, the use of simple shelters, and plans for urban evacuation in advance of hostilities. Shelter space is available for less than one-sixth of the urban population, and adequate shelter for key personnel only. We have detected no recent major changes in the priority or pace of the program and we have no indication that the Soviets would regard a stepped up civil defense effort as a necessary adjunct to extended ABM deployment. We anticipate continued slow but steady improvement in overall civil defense effectiveness. (Paras. 68-73)

[Here follow the Discussion section (Parts I-VI, pages 6-23) and an Annex (pages 24-27).]

TCS-8649-66

Washington, December 1, 1966.

SUBJECT
National Intelligence Estimate 11-3-66, "Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses," dated 17 November 1966

Attached is National Intelligence Estimate 11-3-66, "Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses."/2/ It is the third in our current series of estimates on Soviet military capabilities. In my judgment, its conclusions can be summarized as follows:

1. The crucial question in this estimate concerns the status of Soviet defense against ballistic missiles. We know the Soviets have been engaged in research and development in this field for more than ten years. The intelligence community is agreed that an anti-ballistic missile system has been under construction in the Moscow area since 1962 and will begin to be operational in the next year or two. It will probably have good capabilities against a limited-scale attack on Moscow by present US ICBMs. We believe that its effectiveness could be reduced by advanced penetration systems, and that it could not cope with a very heavy attack or with Polaris attacks from certain directions. At present there is no indication that this system is being installed anywhere else in the USSR. (I might add that I am confident that we could detect the installation of such a system elsewhere, perhaps two or three years before it reached operational status.)

2. There is, however, another new defense system under construction at a number of locations. It will begin to be operational next year. The intelligence community does not have enough information about this system to be certain of exactly what it is designed to defend against--whether ballistic missiles or aerodynamic vehicles. The general nature of the system, its equipment, and the pattern of its deployment lead me to believe it is an improved defense against high-speed, high-altitude aircraft, and also against the air-to-surface missiles that such aircraft may launch. But I cannot rule out the possibility that it is a defense against ballistic missiles. My views about this system are shared by the intelligence officers of the Department of State, the US Navy, and the Atomic Energy Commission, and by the Director of the National Security Agency.

Disagreement with these views is expressed by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the intelligence officers of the US Army and US Air Force. Their view is that while a confident judgment cannot now be made as to whether this system is for defense against ballistic missiles, aerodynamic vehicles, or both, it is more likely to be an anti-ballistic missile system with an additional capability to defend against high-flying supersonic aerodynamic vehicles. (Because of the uncertainties and our differences of view, we have included in the estimate an evaluation of the capabilities of this system in both roles.)

3. We are all agreed that the Soviets could have a limited anti-satellite capability now. Furthermore, they are building a space surveillance radar network which could support a much improved system. In a year or so they may be able to destroy our reconnaissance and other satellites by non-nuclear means; they may explore techniques for neutralizing satellites without destroying them. But we do not think they would actually try to neutralize or destroy US satellite unless they thought war were imminent or unless there were other special circumstances, such as an occasion in which they thought they were retaliating against US interference with their satellites.

4. The USSR has excellent defenses against present Western bombers operating at high and medium altitudes. Present systems will become less effective as the US introduces higher performance aircraft and air-to-surface missiles. The Soviets are working to improve their capabilities against these prospective threats, in part by developing much better interceptor aircraft and air defense control systems. Their low altitude defense is now a major weakness and will remain so for at least the next several years.

This estimate on Soviet strategic defenses completes our present series on the main elements of Soviet military capabilities.

I commend the entire document to your attention, especially its more formal Conclusions.

Dick

Washington, December 1, 1966.

Dear Bob:

Thank you for the opportunity once again to review your five year force structure memoranda./2/ These documents continue to provide an invaluable summary of DOD programs and a concise analysis of the major issues related to future force plans. They also raise a number of important policy issues which bear on our foreign relations. In the following paragraphs, I would like to set forth my views with respect to certain of the memoranda. In some instances, I am suggesting specific follow-up actions. However, if you believe it would be desirable for us to discuss any of these matters before we undertake further specific staff action, I should be happy to do so.

Your memorandum on Strategic Forces raises two issues of particular interest to me:

1. What effect can we expect growing Soviet capabilities to have on their policy and actions and what implications does this have for US policies and our future military programs? (Included in this question is, of course, the possible deployment of a US ABM); and,

2. What international political implications should we expect to grow out of the improving Soviet strategic missile force, Soviet ABM deployment, etc., and how should those implications be handled?

Your memorandum to the President makes it quite clear that our own offensive systems are going to maintain our assured destruction capability under any circumstances. While it is clear that Soviet capabilities will become increasingly potent and secure I do not think the situation of mutual deterrence has changed fundamentally from that which we have had to face over the past several years.

However, I do think that we ought to consider whether the Soviets will assess the situation as we do. I do not think it probable that they will make an erroneous assumption, but we must make every effort to insure that the Soviets do not reach the conclusion that a more convincing second strike capability gives them greater latitude for the use of conventional military force.

Your memorandum provides an excellent summary of the present and projected strategic balance. However, in order to understand better the implications for our security policy of this complex and dynamic situation I would like to suggest that our staffs cooperate in examining in some detail the interaction of US and Soviet strategic capabilities past, present and future. Future projections should also take account of estimated Chinese strategic nuclear capabilities and how they affect the US-Soviet strategic relationship as well as the situation between the US and China. I would hope that such an analysis would illustrate, for a range of scenarios the major changes in the strategic nuclear balance from 1960 to the present and their military effects, and how this balance might change at specific future dates through 1975, as new capabilities appear on both sides.

This would provide a data base, which in conjunction with other factors, would permit a clearer assessment of the implications for our security position of projected US, Soviet and CPR postures, and the impact of these changes on our foreign relations. Among other things, a careful and detailed analysis might serve to sharpen our thinking and provide a better basis for discussions with our allies who are likely to be increasingly concerned, or at least uncertain, about the effect on their security of changing strategic capabilities.

I am asking Foy Kohler, in his new capacity as Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, to discuss this suggestion with whomever you designate from DOD. In view of the sensitivity of the subject matter, I propose to limit participation in this analysis to a very small group in State, and I assume you will want to do the same with regard to DOD participation. It may well be that a presentation to the President of our analysis and conclusions might eventually be desirable. I am enclosing at Tab A a list of some of the issues/3/ that I think might be illuminated by the proposed joint analysis, though I suggest this be considered as a point of departure, rather than a comprehensive or final description of the proposed analysis.

This leads to my second question. Even though we may be persuaded that mutual deterrence persists and the validity of our commitments is unchanged, the conclusions to be drawn from the new developments in both Soviet and US nuclear capabilities will not be immediately clear to all our allies, nor to third parties on the international scene. It will be important for us to think through what impressions we want to convey and how we wish to convey them. It is, therefore, imperative that we have a clear, consistent and agreed line within the government which can be followed both at home and abroad.

The ABM is a special, but integral part of the foregoing problem. I have emphasized previously my great interest in ABM developments and the political importance I attach to any decision regarding a US deployment, whether it be positive or negative. The clear evidence of a Soviet ABM program, and your recent public statement about it/4/ place this matter in a new perspective. I believe it is certain that we will face growing Congressional and public pressures to begin an ABM deployment ourselves. I recognize that there are persuasive arguments for and against deployment, and the decision will not be an easy one. I want to emphasize, however, one point I have made in the past. I do not believe foreign policy problems should in any way prevent us from deploying an ABM system at such time as it is determined to be necessary for the security of the US.

Nevertheless, we can anticipate concern from some of our allies if we do make a decision to deploy. Thus, we will need to plan together very carefully how we approach our allies on this matter, and particularly how we deal with the difficult question of possible overseas deployment of such a system.

There will be several opportunities in the near future for a comprehensive US Government statement on the strategic balance including the President's State of the Union Message,/5/ your annual presentation of the five year defense program to the Congress, and my contemplated foreign policy review, which I discussed with you several weeks ago. In addition, I believe we will need to cover the subject in some way at the NATO meeting in Paris this month. Finally, there is a pressing need for an agreed governmental line given the increasing interest shown in this subject by both the US and foreign press community.

In order to assure the international understanding and reception of these problems that we want, I am proposing that the enclosed set of guidelines (Tab B)/6/ be utilized in preparing any statements, public or private, which will impact on international audiences. If you agree, our staffs might jointly refine these guidelines from time to time to keep them abreast of developments, referring to your consideration and mine any major unresolved policy issues. I would, of course, appreciate any suggestions you would care to offer for additions or adjustments to the guidelines I am enclosing. I am also sending copies of these guidelines to Bill Foster and Len Marks asking for their comments and suggestions.

In reviewing your several memoranda on general purpose land, air and lift forces, two major questions appeared to me to warrant further comment:

1. Can we define more precisely the circumstances in which US conventional forces, including strategic lift, will have relevance in a future that will unquestionably include continuing military conflict and threats of violence in various parts of the world, and

2. How should US and allied military capabilities relate to one another?

As you have pointed out, it is not easy to establish future requirements for general purpose forces. The wide variety of possible contingencies, the uncertainties as to the scope and timing of future conflicts, and the diversity of the forces involved do not allow the sort of rigorous analysis that can be applied to strategic force requirements. It is just these general purpose forces, however, that provide us with the flexibility we require to pursue our foreign policy objectives.

Clearly we have today far more powerful mobile and balanced forces than we had six years ago, and I am impressed by the rate at which their development is proceeding. Nevertheless, the level of conflict in the world is frighteningly high, and while we have no mandate to police the world and no inclination to do so, our security is directly related to the security of others. Obviously, we must deal with the sources of conflict and try to eradicate them if possible before violence erupts. But there remains the problem of containing and settling conflicts that may occur and of minimizing direct involvement of US forces while maximizing their deterrent influence. I assume that it would assist in your force planning analysis if we were able to help define somewhat more clearly what appear to be the most likely future conflicts which may confront us, and their nature. We might also investigate more deeply the kind of settlement to such conflicts we would hope to see.

I have no illusions about the difficulty of this task and I doubt that we can expect precision in such definitions. But, perhaps we can go further than we have heretofore. I believe, for example, that my own staff can be set to work examining in greater depth the future international environmental and developing reasonable politico-military assumptions useful for force planning.

I gather from your memoranda that your own staff is looking at future contingencies with a view to establishing future logistics requirements. These two staff efforts seem to me to be logically related if indeed they are not complementary. Both of them also bear some relationship to the work of the interagency Contingency Coordinating Committee, which has developed a number of plans that might provide a point of departure.

Finally, one area which I believe has not received a recent and thorough examination, from either the political or the military points of view, is how and in what ways indigenous country military efforts should relate to US efforts. I have in mind questions ranging from the contribution US military assistance might make in reducing reliance on early use of US force to the future needs for bases, overflight rights and access to foreign territory. All of these are essential elements in planning the size and nature of our own conventional forces and especially of our future strategic mobility needs. Moreover, such an examination of indigenous capabilities in relation to our own seems to me central to the formulation of a concept for the role which US force should be prepared to play in the future.

I would like to suggest that our two Departments jointly address these problems. We have, by way of example, made an effort to identify some illustrative questions which might be analyzed (Tab C)./7/ I wish to emphasize the fact that they are only illustrative, and again, I am asking Foy Kohler to pursue this line of inquiry with your representatives to see how far we can usefully carry such a joint analysis. Foy will of course have available the assistance from our geographic bureaus and policy planning staff which should be able to contribute significantly to this undertaking.

In view of my pending departure for Asia,/8/ I have not had adequate opportunity to review all of your remaining memoranda to the President. Several appear, however, to raise important foreign policy questions warranting further comment.

Your memorandum on European Forces and Strategy is one which raises important foreign policy issues. However, since those are being addressed in connection with John McCloy's Report for the President,/9/ I will not comment further at this time.

My views on the issues raised in your MAP memorandum, except insofar as they are touched on in this letter, will be provided to you in a separate communication.

I would prefer to withhold comment on the remaining memoranda until I have had a chance to review them more thoroughly, particularly your memoranda on Theater Nuclear Forces, ASW forces, and perhaps on Research and Development.

May I congratulate you and your staff for an impressive and extremely useful series of analyses.

As in the past, given their interest in these matters, I am sending copies of this letter to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and to Walt Rostow./10/

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dean

JCSM-742-66

Washington, December 2, 1966.

SUBJECT
Production and Deployment of the Nike-X (C)

1. (U) Your informal memorandum, dated 29 November 1966,/2/ requested the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on your draft memorandum for the President, subject: "Production and Deployment of the Nike-X."/3/ Detailed comments, in line-in/line-out form, are contained in the Annex hereto./4/ These comments refine the factual data and are not intended to produce a text which represents the judgments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot agree with the over-all rationale in the draft memorandum in the following respects:

a. They consider that your discussion of assured destruction and damage limiting does not address the need for a suitable interrelationship between these two capabilities.

b. They do not agree that Soviet decisions as to the future development of their offensive missile force are as directly dependent on the US ABM decision as is implied in the draft memorandum.

c. They believe that the problems and uncertainties of coping with a US ABM defense would reduce the risk of a Soviet attack.

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their recommendation that a decision be made now to initiate deployment of Nike-X for an initial operational capability in FY 1972.

4. (U) Without attachment, this memorandum is downgraded to Secret.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Austin, Texas, December 6, 1966.

THOSE PRESENT WERE
The President
Secretary McNamara
Deputy Secretary Vance
General Wheeler
General Johnson
Admiral McDonald
General McConnell
General Greene
W.W. Rostow

Secretary McNamara reported that agreement had been reached between the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary, and Members of the Joint Chiefs on all but five major issues: the ABM defense system; advance strategic bomber; advanced ICBM; the Army force structure; and the appropriate number of nuclear fleet escort ships.

The latest Defense budget figures for submission to the President were these:

FY 1967 Vietnam Supplemental, $14.7 billion (NOA)
Overall Defense budget FY 1968--$77.7 billion (NOA)
Overall expenditures Fiscal 1967--$68.3
Overall expenditures Fiscal 1968--$74.6/2/

The President asked if the Joint Chiefs confirmed Secretary McNamara's statement. The Chairman so stated, and Admiral David McDonald added that in his experience the Secretary and the Chiefs have never been "so close together," except on the five specified issues.

General Wheeler then stated the case for the deployment of an ABM system. He said two new facts had to be taken into account: (1) the USSR was deploying an ABM system around Moscow, and they were deploying a system widely throughout the USSR which might have ABM capabilities; (2) they were installing at an accelerated rate hardened ICBM's, the S-11, a city buster. By 1971 they might have between 800-1100 ICBM's.

We do not know the objective of Soviet nuclear policy: whether it is parity with the U.S. or superiority. But, taken together, their new program could reduce our assured destruction capability; complicate our targeting; reduce confidence in our ability to penetrate; reduce our first-strike capability; and improve the Soviet capability to pursue aims short of nuclear war.

The Chairman then quoted from Secretary McNamara's paper/3/ the latter's key judgment:

"After studying the subject exhaustively, Mr. Vance and I have concluded we should not initiate ABM deployment at this time for any of these purposes. We believe that:

"1. The Soviet Union would be forced to react to a U.S. ABM deployment by increasing its offensive nuclear force with the result that:

a. The risk of a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S. would not be further decreased.

b. The damage to the U.S. from a Soviet nuclear attack, in the event deterrence failed, would not be reduced in any meaningful sense.

The foundation of our security is the deterrence of a Soviet nuclear attack. We believe such an attack can be prevented if it is understood by the Soviets that we possess strategic nuclear forces so powerful as to be capable of absorbing a Soviet first strike and surviving with sufficient strength to impose unacceptable damage on them (e.g., destruction by blast and radiation alone of approximately [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]). We have such power today. We must maintain it in the future, adjusting our forces to offset actual or potential changes in theirs."

General Wheeler expressed disagreement with this judgment. He said we cannot predict confidently how the Soviet Union would react to counter our deployment of an ABM system. The costs would constitute an important diversion of resources. The development of multiple warheads would reduce the kilotonnage of their nuclear payloads; they would face grave uncertainties in targeting against our ABM's. He said deterrence was not only technology, it was a state of mind. Our having an ABM system would increase our deterrence capability no matter what they did.

On the other hand, a lack of a deployed ABM might increase the possibilities of war by accident; create an imbalance or a sense of imbalance between the U.S. and USSR; suggest that we are interested only in the offense; suggest also that the U.S. was not willing to pay to maintain its present nuclear superiority.

We would be denying to many of our own people a chance to survive a nuclear exchange: 30-50 million lives might be saved by Nike-X.

Therefore, the JCS recommends to the President that we initiate deployment of the Nike-X system in order to maintain the present overall favorable nuclear balance and give to us some or all of the following advantages:

--damage limiting capability;

--the imposition of new uncertainties should the Soviets contemplate initiating nuclear war;

--to demonstrate that we are not first-strike minded;

--and to maintain the kind of favorable power environment which helped us during the Cuba missile crisis.

Specifically the JCS recommends that we immediately decide to develop Option A to protect 25 U.S. cities. The cost in Fiscal 1968 would be $800 million; for the period Fiscal 67-76, $10 billion.

The President asked if there was any difference between the JCS and Secretary McNamara concerning the costs. Secretary McNamara said "No."

The President then asked if our position would be better if the Soviet Union did not react to our deployment. The Secretary agreed that our position would be better; but that it was "inconceivable" that the Soviet Union would not react to counter our deployment of an ABM system.

The President then asked what determined the difference in judgment between the Secretary and the JCS.

Secretary McNamara replied that the difference lay less in rational calculation than in the inherently emotional nature of the issue. It was extremely hard to make the case for a policy which appeared to be denying protection to our people, when the Soviet Union was willing to employ large resources to protect its people. He said he was fully aware that if the President decided against deploying an ABM system he would face a most difficult time politically and psychologically. Why, then, does he recommend against?

First, the Soviet Union has been wrong in its nuclear defense policy for a decade. They have systematically spent 2 or 3 times what we have on defense. It has not been worth it. Their defenses are not worth a damn. We still can impose unacceptable losses on them even after a first strike. Because they are making an error in deploying ABM's is no reason we should also make that error.

Second, we must be clear why it would be an error for us. If we go ahead with the $10 billion ABM program and they did not [2 lines of source text not declassified]. Therefore, they would have to do something about it. Their security would depend on their doing something about it. They would have to bring back their assured damage capability to something like 80 million U.S. fatalities under their planning case, which is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. As they did so, we could not hold to our initial $10 million [billion?] ABM system. We would have to expand in response to what they did, both our ABM and our offensive systems.

Secretary McNamara concluded that we would be launching ourselves and the Soviet Union into two decades of escalatory action in the nuclear field in which the costs on each side would prove to be of the order of $31-40 billion. We would each end up no better off than we are at present.

Secretary McNamara then said there are certain rational roles for a limited ABM system, in particular these four:

--to protect our offensive force, notably our Minutemen;

--to protect in the time frame 1975-85 against a ChiCom ICBM capability;

--to protect against an accidental firing of a single missile;

--to protect against a small blackmail Soviet attack.

In the face of the terrible dilemma faced by the President, Secretary McNamara is inclined to recommend, as a fallback from his judgment against the ABM system, a limited system with these four capabilities. On the basis of that system we could explore whether the Soviet Union was willing to negotiate a freeze acceptable to us.

The President then asked, "Is there any middle ground in this debate?" Secretary McNamara said that the emotionalism attaching to the ABM issue made middle ground hard to find.

The President asked what would the view be in the Congress?

Secretary McNamara said about 25% of the Congress--the Liberals--would oppose the ABM. Senators Russell, Stennis, etc., would strongly favor it, and they would have about 40% of the Congress with them. The balance of 35% would remain in the middle and be subject to persuasion. The President asked who might be on that middle ground. Secretary McNamara replied Senators like Kuchel and Javits.

He pointed out further that the Congress had been interesting itself in this matter for a long time. Last year they voted $165 million for ABM's, and when he inquired what they had in mind, they didn't know; they merely wanted to move in that direction.

The President asked again, "What is a middle alternative?"

Secretary McNamara pointed out that we did not have to make a final decision one way or the other right now. For example, we had important technical problems to overcome with respect to the warheads for the Olympia ABM. We had to install at Kwajalein a quite revolutionary system for '69 tests of the ABM. It is quite risky in fact to start building [a] plant for the ABM system before those tests are complete. In short, there are technical reasons to go slow.

With these unsolved technical problems as a background, we could move forward with a limited system to get the four objectives Secretary McNamara had earlier stated. As for the fifth objective--population protection--we would not be able to walk away from that forever, but we would have some time to see if anything could be worked out with the Soviet Union to avoid the interacting escalation in the nuclear arms race that was otherwise inevitable.

Deputy Secretary Vance then added that he did not believe we could stand for long with Posture A, which promised to protect 25 cities. Under pressure from other cities and regions, the Congress would go for a full program. It would be wiser to face from the beginning that if we started down the road to population protection, it is really Posture B that we were undertaking--a $20 billion rather than a $10 billion program.

General Wheeler said that, given the lead time, we ought to begin to build factories now for certain of the components about which we are technically sure. We do not have that capability and it should not be delayed.

Secretary McNamara came back again to the point that a decision not to deploy would create emotional and political problems in the country, and that a decision to deploy merely to protect offensive forces would face the same emotional problem. There would be a strong impulse to protect people, not missiles. As for the factories, he said the components are complex; there are many parts to be tested.

Our experience is that the system will prove more expensive than we presently calculated.

General Johnson said the critical question was U.S. casualties. An ABM system would cut our casualties in a nuclear exchange. Secretary McNamara replied that he completely disagreed because the USSR would react to re-establish its assured damage capability.

General Johnson said that there were constraints on their ability if they did react. Secretary McNamara replied that both an Air Force study and an NIE had indicated that the Soviet Union could not afford not to react./4/

The President wondered if the best opportunity for agreement among us would not be a decision to move ahead on a limited basis and to see what we can negotiate with the Soviet Union. Admiral McDonald said the Soviet Union was now moving ahead both with ABM's and to increase its offensive nuclear force. Secretary McNamara said that their defensive effort was wasted.

General McConnell said that their defensive effort was not wholly wasted. They had imposed heavy additional costs on the U.S. to assure our continued penetration ability.

Secretary McNamara said we have over-reacted. We have more than insured that we can still maintain our assured damage capability. The Soviet ABM's have not saved Soviet lives.

General McConnell said he can't forget that we are dealing with the descendants of Genghis Khan. They only understand force.

Secretary McNamara agreed and said that is why, at whatever cost, we must maintain our assured second-strike damage capability. Deputy Secretary Vance added that that is why we have gone ahead with Poseidon and other means to assure our ability to penetrate an ABM system.

Secretary McNamara asked if the JCS would wish to express any views if there were a press conference. The members of the JCS replied that none of them desired to meet the press.

The subject then turned to the second item in which there was disagreement; that is, the advanced strategic bomber (AMSA)./5/

Austin, Texas, December 6, 1966.

Mr. McNamara asked General McConnell to state the position of the Joint Chiefs with respect to AMSA. General McConnell said that the Chiefs wish to proceed to contract definition. He said he wanted to make very clear that this did not mean full-scale development. General McConnell said further that the Chiefs wish to do full-scale development of the engines required for an advanced manned strategic aircraft, but went on to point out that this engine would have uses for other aircraft as well as AMSA. He stated, thirdly, that the Chiefs wish to proceed with further avionic development for the AMSA. He said the Chiefs wish to proceed to contract definition so that we would be in a position to seek to obtain an IOC in 1974. General McConnell went on to say that it was his own personal belief that it would not be possible to get an IOC of 1974, even if we proceeded on the schedule recommended by the JCS. He said he believed that a more likely IOC would be 1976.

Mr. McNamara pointed out that he and Mr. Vance did not feel that we need an IOC of 1974. Further, he said it is not clear that we need a new manned bomber.

The President then asked General McConnell the difference between the FB-111 and the AMSA in respect of speed and other characteristics. General McConnell said the AMSA would have a slightly higher speed, more range, and a substantially greater bomb carrying capacity. He said the latter factor was of greatest importance. General McConnell said he wanted to repeat that he is not asking for full-scale development.

Mr. McNamara then said it is doubtful that we will need a new manned bomber because of difficulties associated with penetration of the Soviet Union during that time period. He also said that missiles plus the FB-111 force which the United States will have at that time may be enough to meet our force requirements.

Mr. McNamara said that it was his opinion, and that of Mr. Vance, that we did not need to move as fast as the Air Force is requesting, and that we should go forward with the development of engines and avionics which are not unique to the AMSA.

General McConnell then said he wanted to point out that the Air Force had done a number of studies which had indicated that a mixture of bombers and missiles is more cost effective than missiles alone.

The President said he would consider the matter and give his decision at a later date.

Mr. McNamara said that the difference between the recommendation of the Chiefs and that of himself and Mr. Vance was merely when we might need such an advanced intercontinental ballistic missile. He said we do not disagree that preliminary work should be started.

General McConnell stated that the Joint Chiefs recommend that we develop an ICM at a total cost in FY 1968 of $36 million. This $36 million would be broken down into $10 million for various component development, and the balance for contract definition. General McConnell said the Secretary of the Air Force would not go to contract definition but would spend $19 million for component development. General McConnell said the Joint Chiefs could live with a $19 million program.

Mr. McNamara responded that he thought we could work this out as he and Mr. Vance were recommending a program of $19 million, and the only question between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. McNamara and Mr. Vance was how fast we should proceed.

General McConnell emphasized that for the expenditure of $2-1/2 million in offense, we could cause the Soviets to spend $80 million in defense. Mr. McNamara pointed out that this was the very point he and Mr. Vance had been making in the ABM discussion.

Mr. McNamara said that the Army has recommended that two more brigades be authorized in the Active Army, with a possibility of adding another division to the Active Army force structure in Calendar Year 1967. He said the Army proposed that these additional forces be equipped with equipment taken from the Reserve. He pointed out that thus the effect of authorizing these additional forces would merely be one of substituting the deployment time of Active forces for Reserve forces. He then asked General Johnson to speak to this issue.

General Johnson said that normally we use Active forces to build a time bridge, during which time Reserve forces are called to active duty and brought to a point of training where they can be deployed. He said that with respect to part of our Reserve force, i.e., the Selected Reserve Force, we have reduced the training time required before that force could be deployed from 14 to 11 weeks. He said we expect to reduce it further to reach a goal of 8 weeks.

General Johnson then said he wanted to point out that we had certain additional "bills" which had been laid before us: (1) the requirement of three divisions to meet NATO commitments; (2) 40,000 personnel to maintain the proposed barrier in South Vietnam; and (3) a corps contingency force of three divisions. He said that to meet these "bills" we have only five division forces in the continental United States in the Active Army. He said this caused him concern because of indications of possible aggressive action by the North Koreans, and the possibility that the situation might become more unstable in Cyprus and Jordan, and that the United States might be required to supply forces for these contingencies.

General Johnson said if he were queried by the Congress as to the adequacy of our ground forces, he would have to say we were very thin. He said, therefore, he recommends that the additional forces he has requested be authorized.

Mr. McNamara said that we are equipment limited--that this did not mean we did not have additional equipment, but that we had bought equipment for only the authorized force structure. He said, therefore, what General Johnson was talking about was merely shifting equipment from the Reserve to the Active Army, thus substituting a slight reduction in reaction time.

He said an alternative to General Johnson's proposal was the calling up of Reserves. He said further that he and Mr. Vance had raised with the Joint Chiefs last week the desirability of calling up Reserves, and they did not recommend we do so at this time. The President then asked each of the Chiefs whether they favored a call-up of Reserves at this time. Each of the Chiefs replied in the negative.

Mr. McNamara stated that we were proposing to go forward with the construction of one DLGN, which had been authorized in the FY 1967 budget, and the construction of two DDG's. He said that Admiral McDonald would recommend that we add another DLGN in the FY 1968 budget. He pointed out, however, that he thought there was a broader issue that Admiral McDonald might wish to address--the entire shipbuilding program.

Admiral McDonald said he wanted to point out that there had been no major Navy escort ships constructed since 1962. He said last year the Department of Defense had supported two DDG's but no DLGN. He said he felt this year we ought to have one more DLGN over and above the one authorized by the Congress in FY 1967, and that if we did not put in another DLGN, we would end up in the same wrangle with the Congress that we had last year.

Admiral McDonald said the basic issue is how many nuclear escorts there should be per carrier. He said he and the Navy believe there should be two per nuclear carrier, while Mr. McNamara and Mr. Vance felt there should be only one. Admiral McDonald said he did not feel we were pushing too fast on nuclear power, because the Navy was asking for only these two DLGN's and was not asking for any other nuclear powered ships.

Admiral McDonald said he also wanted to mention the issue of nuclear submarines. He said nuclear submarines were one of the most important elements of our ASW program. He said currently we have 105 submarines in our ASW program, and that this figure was agreed to by both the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He said the Navy feels that all of these submarines should be nuclear powered, but that up to now the Office of the Secretary of Defense believes that we should have only 68 nuclear submarines. Admiral McDonald said that in the past we had been constructing five nuclear attack submarines per year, and the Navy feels we should continue at five per year until we get a higher number.

Admiral McDonald said his main concern is what happens in 1968 and beyond, and that we need at least five per year for the next three years.

Mr. McNamara pointed out that the Navy hopes in 1968 to have a newer class of submarine. Therefore, he said both he and Mr. Vance have felt it advantageous to put two of the five submarines which were tentatively scheduled for FY 1968 over until next year, which would thus permit the Navy to take advantage of the newer technology that would be available in such a new class.

The President reserved decision on this issue.

The President on three different occasions during the discussions asked whether it was correct to state that, apart from the five issues which had been presented to him, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement with the budget. Each of the Chiefs said that this was the fact. Admiral McDonald stated that he thought the Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense and Mr. Vance were closer together this year than any other year that he could remember.

Washington, December 8, 1966.

Dear Boss:

Nick has asked that I inform you of the following since it might bear on conversations you will be having in Paris./2/

Yesterday, Secretary McNamara held a meeting attended by Nick, Foy, Dick Helms, Don Hornig, Cy Vance and myself./3/ He showed us a memorandum which he had given to the President on the problem of production and deployment of the Nike-X./4/ McNamara's long and thorough memorandum went into the pros and cons of the whole question. The President had studied it and asked those of us at the meeting to prepare, individually, memoranda describing what we each thought Soviet reaction would be to a light defense against Soviet missile attack which would cover 25 large cities and a second heavier defense which would cover 50 cities.

This operation overlapped a discussion which I had with Ambassador Dobrynin the day before./5/ I reported this to the meeting and was authorized by the President/6/ to pursue the matter with Dobrynin. I enclose copies of the memcons./7/

All of this has been very closely held here. My guess is that the Soviets will take us up on this; but the matter is, of course, urgent because of McNamara's budget problem. However, the Soviets will be preoccupied with a meeting of the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet. One of the reasons we went as far as we did was to try to head off any decision they may be making at the Supreme Soviet which will approve their plan for 1967.

Sincerely,

Llewellyn E. Thompson/8/

Washington, December 8, 1966.

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your letter of November 17 transmitting a Defense draft NSAM on chemical and biological warfare policy./2/ Our initial reaction is that there are large areas of agreement between your draft and the CB paper developed in State/3/ and previously sent to Defense and other interested agencies. Both drafts are now being studied by members of my staff. After completion of this work, it may be useful to follow up on your suggestion to discuss any remaining issues. You will recall that Bill Foster stressed the desirability for developing basic national policy in the CB field in a letter to the Committee of Principals in October, 1963./4/ More recently, on April 19, 1966, Butch Fisher addressed a letter on the same subject to the Deputies./5/ In view of ACDA's continuing interest in our CB policy, I suggest that it would be desirable to invite Bill, as well as Dick Helms and Len Marks, to join the discussions. I will subsequently be in touch with you about a mutually agreeable time.

Sincerely,

Nick