Washington, December 9, 1966.

SUBJECT
Policy on the Use of Biological Weapons

After an extensive review of the subject, your Science Advisory Committee has recommended in the attached memorandum (Tab A) that the U.S. Government publicly state that it is our policy not to initiate the use of biological weapons.

This recommendation was made prior to the recent adoption by the U.N. General Assembly (91 in favor including the U.S., 0 against, and 4 abstaining) of a Resolution (Tab B)/2/ calling for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 on the "Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare."/3/ This Resolution implicitly associates us with the principle of "no first use" of biological and chemical warfare agents. However, in our statement on the Resolution to the U.N. General Assembly, which made clear that riot control agents and defoliating chemicals are not covered by the Geneva Protocol, we failed to state explicitly what our policy on biological weapons is./4/

I believe that our support of the U.N. Resolution goes a long way toward answering the criticism that the U.S. is the only major power that has not signed the Geneva Protocol and the charge that our use of riot gas and defoliants in Vietnam might escalate into chemical and biological warfare. I am afraid, however, that this improved position could be undercut by our failure to be explicit in stating that it is our policy not to initiate the use of biological weapons.

I understand that you will receive in the next few weeks a petition signed by several thousand scientists relating to our position on chemical and biological warfare./5/ This could be handled with the least fuss and controversy if a prior low-key statement of "no first use" for biological weapons were on the record.

I have discussed the problem with Secretary McNamara and Under Secretary Katzenbach, and they both agree that our public position would be much stronger if we clarified this point.

I recommend, therefore, that at a forthcoming press conference, probably in answer to a question, you make a brief statement (Tab C)/6/ on the U.N. Resolution that would set forth explicitly that it is the policy of the United States not to initiate the use of biological warfare weapons. If you concur, I will clear the statement with DOD and State.

Donald Hornig

Washington, December 8, 1966.

SUBJECT
Use of Biological Weapons

Your Science Advisory Committee has reviewed the problem of biological warfare and has concluded that we should formalize our policy of "no first use" of biological weapons. In view of public uncertainty as to our policy in this field and the mounting domestic and international concern regarding the use of biological and chemical weapons, the Committee recommends that, at a suitable opportunity, an official statement be made along the following lines:

"As a matter of policy, the United States has never made military use of biological weapons and our policy will continue to be not to use such weapons unless they are first used against us."

In explaining the use of riot control agents and defoliants in Viet Nam, senior officers of your Administration have made clear that it is against our policy to initiate the use of chemical warfare. There has not, however, been comparable public statement concerning a policy of "no first use" of biological weapons.

The United States is the only major power that did not sign the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which essentially proscribed the first use of biological as well as chemical agents. In the absence of a publicly stated position, this leaves us particularly vulnerable to charges that it may be our intention to employ such agents.

On the basis of a continuing review over the past few years of the various biological agents, both "lethal" and "non-lethal," that are presently under study by the Defense Department, your Committee has concluded that the problems associated with these agents appear to outweigh any military advantages that might be attained by their use. In general, the risks associated with these weapons are so great and the uncertainties as to their military effects so large that your Committee believes it extremely unlikely that we would, in fact, consider initiating the use of these weapons in a military conflict.

The risk associated with massive use of biological weapons is essentially impossible to predict. In many applications there is the possibility of creating a new focus of endemic infection which might constitute a continuing hazard. In addition, we have scanty experience with the ecological consequences of disturbing the natural biological equilibrium of an area by the introduction of substantial quantities of viable, infectious organisms. Finally, there is at least a theoretical possibility that the use of biological agents on a large scale may result in mutations producing new strains of unusual virulence or even a new form of the disease for which treatment is not available.

At the same time, we have been presented with no scenarios, nor have we thought of any ourselves, in which the military value seems significant. This applies particularly to the so called incapacitating biological agents which are intended to make the subject very sick without killing him. It is not possible at this time to predict the reliability of any of these agents and some would have significant lethality when applied in massive doses to a large population. There is also considerable uncertainty as to how effective such agents might be in reducing the military potential of enemy forces in an actual combat situation.

For these reasons, your Science Advisory Committee concludes that a policy of "no first use" of biological weapons is sound and recommends that it would be advantageous to formalize it in a public statement.

Donald Hornig

Washington, December 10, 1966.

There are five purposes for which we might want to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system (ABM). They are:

1. To protect against a Communist Chinese missile attack.

2. To protect against an accidental missile launch.

3. To protect against "nuclear blackmail," which could take the form of a light attack on a single target of moderate value.

4. To help protect our land-based strategic offensive forces.

5. To protect our cities against a large Soviet missile attack.

Today there are three options open to you.

a. Do nothing at this time except continue a vigorous research and development program.

b. Deploy a "thin" ABM system, which would meet Items 1 through 4 above.

c. Deploy a "thick" ABM system, which would meet Items 1 through 4 and would, in addition, give local protection to 25 selected cities. This option is recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I will discuss each one of these options briefly.

a. The arguments in favor of Option a are: 1) it is unnecessary now to deploy a system against the Chinese threat because they are 8 to 9 years away from having any significant ICBM capability; 2) we have such missile superiority over the Soviet Union with our Polaris submarines which are essentially invulnerable, and our penetration aids for both sea and hardened land-based missiles, that it is unnecessary to protect our land-based strategic forces with an ABM; 3) the chance of an accidental missile launching is remote; 4) a blackmail attack is unlikely, because an attacker would know that he was risking all-out nuclear war which would destroy his country; 5) a system designed to protect our cities would ultimately leave us in essentially the same position as we are now vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, because they would be forced to react to preserve their assured destruction capability. In the end, each would have the capacity to kill [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and we would have wasted $30 to $40 billion.

It has been argued that one need only expend about $10 billion to deploy a system which would give protection to 25 selected cities. This argument, however, ignores the fact that if we were to deploy such a system, the Soviet Union would be forced to take countermeasures in the same fashion as we have done. This would require us to thicken our system to meet such countermeasures. In the end, our commitment to defend our cities would force us into deployment of a very thick system at a total cost of between $30 and $40 billion.

Further, if we were to deploy a system protecting only 25 cities, the pressures in the Congress would be tremendous to extend such a system to protect other population centers not covered by the $10 billion system.

Finally, there are still difficult technical problems remaining to be solved, such as the development of the extended range Spartan missile and its associated [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] required for exoatmospheric intercept, the development of the high acceleration Sprint missile for local defense, the development of the very complex radars, and the integration of all of these into a reliable system.

The argument against this option is the probable attitude of the Congress and our people. The first reaction of most Americans will inevitably be in favor of an immediate start on deployment, if for no other reason than the Soviets are deploying an ABM system.

b. The second option, i.e., to deploy a "thin" system, would meet the first four objectives listed in the first paragraph of this memorandum, probably at a cost of between $4 and $5 billion. It would have to be made clear that this system would not be expanded to attempt to protect our cities against a heavy Soviet attack. This system would not only meet the first four objectives but, for a limited period of time, would also have the side benefit of reducing population losses in the United States against a Soviet attack by 20 or 30 million. This benefit would disappear in time as the Soviets improved their missiles--as we have done--by the development of penetration aids and multiple warheads. If this option were chosen, the deployment decision could be coupled with talks with the Soviet Union, seeking to reach an understanding with respect to the further deployment of both ABM's and offensive missiles. A decision in favor of this option would draw the teeth of much of the argument that the Soviets have a defense and we do not. However, there would be continuing pressures from some sources to expand to a "thick" system.

c. The third option would, as indicated above, deploy a system designed to meet the first four objectives and to protect 25 selected cities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that you decide in favor of this option. For the reasons given above, this would not produce a stable situation because the Soviet Union would be forced to react and thus would negate the effectiveness of the system. In the end, we would spend $30 to $40 billion in thickening this system, and would not be able to protect our country from devastation from a Soviet missile attack.

The Congress is divided on the issue of deploying an ABM system, but we believe that a substantial majority favor going ahead with some form of deployment. The group in favor of proceeding with an ABM deployment is led by Senator Russell and has strong backing in the Armed Services Committees of both Houses.

Cyrus M. Vance/2/

Washington, December 10, 1966.

SUBJECT
Soviet Reaction to ABM Deployment

The following is a rather hasty paper. I hope, over the weekend, to put something more thoughtful together.

A key question is whether the Russians consider that we are responding to a large-scale deployment on their part, or whether they see us as escalating the competition.

The analysis shown to us assumes that a Soviet ABM deployment is under way. Now, while there is little doubt that the Moscow system is an ABM system, there is a real question whether the Tallinn system which is being deployed rapidly (23 sites as of 12/7/66) is for air defense or ABM use. The most recent NIE (10-26-66)/2/ concludes that it is probably an air defense system, although it may have marginal ABM capabilities. All of the people I have had look at the problem (the PSAC Reconnaissance Panel, Chairman Dr. Edwin Land, and Strategic Offense and Defense Panel, Chairman Dr. Marvin Goldberger) concur in this view (but DIA does not).

The essence of the problem is that the radars at the Tallinn sites are too small to give an area capability unless early warning and acquisition are performed by the Hen House radars at distant locations. But (1) the large Hen House radars are soft and undefended, and (2) some of the sites are not covered by Hen House radars; e.g. the last three discovered are too far East. If not used in conjunction with Hen House radars, this is a point defense system with a radius of coverage of about 30-200 miles. In that case, some of them are very poorly sited, e.g. one on a peninsula in the Crimea (Feodosiya) which would largely defend water, although it is excellently sited to bar intrusion by aircraft.

Therefore, I conclude that it would be incorrect to proceed from the assumption that a general deployment is underway in the USSR and we must take into account the possibility that the Soviets do not see themselves as having initiated one. In this case they would regard the deployment of a general system--even a "thin" one--if undertaken on anything like a crash basis as a new threat to their deterrence and would react strongly to it.

One might note, though, that for this same reason they might react favorably to proposals to mutually limit ABM deployments on a mutual example basis.

In judging possible Soviet reaction, one cannot underestimate the extent to which they apparently feel themselves "under the gun." My basis for saying that is that I am possibly the only American who has recently spoken directly to Marshal Malinovsky, the Minister of Defense (November 7, 1964)/3/ and who has seen the reddening of his face when he says, "Your Mr. McNamara thinks he can overwhelm us with his thousands of rockets." For this reason I see their increased hard missile deployment rate as an effort to catch up and eliminate the threat of a first strike by us. I suspect they are keenly aware of our advantage in both missiles and aircraft and would react as strongly as they could if their deterrence were threatened.

Consequently, if we are to have any hope of stabilizing a race which in the end poses increasingly serious threats to both sides and becomes increasingly expensive, it seems unwise to start down a new road unless: (1) there is better evidence than we have now that we face a new threat, (2) the deployment would give us a real military advantage (which it appears not to), (3) it can be done in a way which minimizes the provocation or new challenge unless there is reason to believe that the pressure would produce a "truce."

For all these reasons, I would continue to delay a deployment decision until the diplomatic possibilities have been more thoroughly explored and the intelligence has improved. If this is not practicable, I would start slowly on an experimental basis with a "thin" system--for the additional reason that there are still many technical problems to be solved before a sensible system can be put together.

One other factor should also be considered. Some will argue that the continued engagement of their technical talent in these areas will impoverish the civilian economy. The effect might be the reverse--that by being forced to work on priority problems of the greatest technical sophistication they will acquire a higher technological capacity than they would otherwise achieve--if fewer cars, consumer goods, etc. There is reason to believe that although their technology definitely lags ours in substantially all areas, their relative position may be improving (e.g. as shown by a comparison of their radars or aircraft with ours in 1950 and in 1966). I think it is clear that their best engineering, quality production and management is in the defense industries. But I have seen first hand that there is no shortage of highly trained scientists and engineers in the non-defense area (they train twice as many as we do). I have also noted that key people in science (e.g. Keldysh, President of the Academy), in the electronics, computer and communications industry have a defense or military background. Hence, one can hypothesize that there may in fact be a strong "spin off" such as we ascribe to DOD, NASA and AEC.

Don

Washington, December 10, 1966, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Soviet reaction to U.S. deployment of Nike-X, Postures A or B

1. A U.S. ABM program to reduce fatalities in a nuclear exchange to the range of 5-15 million would force the Soviet Union to respond to re-establish the credibility of its assured destruction capability--both to themselves and to the world. They regard this capability as the bedrock of their security, now secrecy has been virtually lost.

2. They would seek the cheapest way to accomplish this objective, given the severe resource allocation conflicts they now confront--and will continue foreseeably to confront.

3. The precise mix they would choose I cannot confidently predict; but it might well include ICBM's with very large warheads.

4. Among the ways they might envisage to achieve this objective will be negotiations to stabilize the nuclear arms race with the United States; although that route will confront at least three severe problems:

--inspection and sea-based ICBM's;

--warheads as opposed to launching vehicles, as the unit of measure in an agreement;

--the parity question: can they accept a freeze which appears to lock them into permanent nuclear inferiority?

They will carefully weigh the advantages and costs of an agreement against the advantages and costs of the next cheapest way to re-establish an adequate assured destruction capability.

5. I recommend that we war-game and staff out the problem stated in para. 4, as a matter of urgency.

WR

Washington, December 13, 1966.

There are five major issues between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Messrs. McNamara and Vance./2/

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend deployment of the Nike-X to protect our population against a Soviet attack. The initial system is estimated to cost $10 billion with $800 million in FY '68. This system would be designed to provide a light area defense of the Continental United States and a local defense of 25 selected cities. The Joint Chiefs would preserve the option to expand the local defense system to 50 selected cities at an estimated cost of $20 billion using present cost factors. Messrs. McNamara and Vance believe that because of the usual cost under-estimation and engineering changes to overcome defects in systems tests, the necessary redesign to overcome Soviet countermeasures, the eventual cost of such a program would reach $30 to $40 billion.

Messrs. McNamara and Vance recommend against the deployment recommended by the Joint Chiefs because they believe the Soviets will take the necessary countermeasures to overcome our system just as we are doing to overcome theirs. They believe that ultimately the Soviet Union and the United States will end up in the same position after the unnecessary expenditure of millions of dollars. Messrs. McNamara and Vance believe that if any ABM system is to be deployed, it should be a "light" deployment, specifically and exclusively designed to satisfy the following four purposes.

a. To protect against a Communist Chinese missile attack.

b. To protect against an accidental missile launch.

c. To protect against nuclear blackmail which could take the form of a light attack on a single target of moderate value.

d. To help protect our land-based offensive forces.

Messrs. McNamara and Vance estimate the cost of such a system should run between $3 and $4 billion.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that we proceed to obtain a firm contractor proposal for the development of a new strategic bomber and that we begin engine development in FY '68 to achieve an initial operational capability in FY 1974. The Secretary of the Air Force estimates the FY '68 cost at $47 million, FY 67-72 cost at $1.2 billion and the total development cost at $1.5 billion (production costs are not included in these figures and would add several billions). General McConnell has stated that he is not asking for a decision to go into production. General McConnell has stated that the principal reason he believes we should have an AMSA is because it will have a substantially greater bomb-carrying capacity than the FB-111.

Messrs. McNamara and Vance recommend $26 million in FY '68 for continuation of component development, i.e. engines and avionics. They recommend disapproval of action to obtain a firm contractor proposal for system development because they do not believe an initial operational capability in FY 1974 is needed. They further believe it is doubtful we will need a new manned bomber because of difficulties associated with penetration of the Soviet Union in the mid and late 1970s. In addition, they believe that missiles, plus the FB-111 force which the United States will have at that time will be enough to meet our force requirements. Messrs. McNamara and Vance point out that the monies to be expended on engine and avionics development will give us an engine and avionics that could be used for other aircraft and therefore believe that the expenditure of such funds is wise and prudent.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend $36 million of R&D funds in FY '68 for development of a propulsion and guidance system to meet a 1973 initial operational capability date. The $36 million would be broken down into $10 million for component development and the balance for contract definition. The Secretary of the Air Force would not go to contract definition but would spend $19 million for component development.

Messrs. McNamara and Vance recommend $19 million in FY 1968 which will permit us to carry on component development and begin system development next year if this should be desirable after review next summer. They see no need for an initial operational capability in 1973. At the recent meeting in Austin General McConnell stated that the Joint Chiefs could live with the $19 million program.

Messrs. McNamara and Vance recommend a total 1968 land force 32-1/3 division force equivalents (27-1/3 Army, 5 Marine) with 18-1/3 active Army divisions and 4 active Marine divisions. The Chief of Staff of the Army would add 30,000 men to the active Army now, and possibly an additional 45,000 in March or April of 1967, to provide 2 additional brigades now and a whole division later in the active Army. The equipment for these forces would be borrowed from similar units in the Reserves. The purpose of this plan, as explained by the Chief of Staff of the Army, would be to reduce the time required to deploy such forces.

Messrs. McNamara and Vance do not believe this is necessary or that it would significantly reduce the deployment time of such forces. They pointed out at the meeting in Austin that an alternative to General Johnson's proposal would be the calling up of Reserve units. However, none of the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Reserves should be called at this time. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the position of the Chief of Staff of the Army, in fact, their support is lukewarm.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend construction of one nuclear-powered guided missile frigate (DLGN) in FY 1968 for $151 million, construction of the DLGN already authorized by the Congress in 1967, and the construction of two guided missile destroyers (DDG) in FY 1968 for $167 million. Messrs. McNamara and Vance recommend construction of the two DDGs in 1968 and the FY 1967 DLGN. They point out that the latter will provide us with one nuclear-powered escort for each of the planned nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. They recommend against the 1968 DLGN because they believe one nuclear escort per nuclear carrier is enough. The Chief of Naval Operations believes we should plan two nuclear escorts per nuclear carrier. This is the nub of the controversy between the Navy and Messrs. McNamara and Vance. In addition, Admiral McDonald points out that there has been no major Navy escort ship construction since 1962. Admiral McDonald states that we are not pushing too fast on nuclear power because the Navy is asking only for these two DLGNs and not asking for any other nuclear-powered surface ships.

Cyrus M. Vance/3/

Washington, December 21, 1966.

Under my responsibility to activate the Emergency Broadcast System, I direct that in the event the Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command, declares Air Defense Emergency Red condition, the White House Communications Agency shall be authorized to activate the Emergency Broadcast System and the Office of Civil Defense shall be authorized to follow with the dissemination of appropriate warning messages.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Washington, December 22, 1966.

SUBJECT
Production and Deployment of the Nike-X

A number of events have occurred during the last year which, taken together, tend to bring to a head the long-standing issue of whether to produce and deploy a U.S. anti-ballistic missile defense:

1. The Soviet Union has accelerated the deployment of hard ICBMs beyond the rates forecast in the last year's NIE/2/ (but not beyond the "higher than expected" case on which the U.S. Defense Program was based).

2. The Soviet Union has started the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow and a second type of system, which may have an ABM capability, in other parts of the country.

3. The Chinese Communists have launched and demonstrated a nuclear-armed, 400-mile range ballistic missile,/3/ and there is some evidence that they may be preparing to test a booster in the ICBM range.

4. Our own anti-ballistic missile system, the Nike-X, has now reached a stage of development where it may be feasible to start concurrent production and deployment.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reaffirmed their recommendation that a decision be made now to deploy, with an initial operational capability in FY 1972,/4/ a Nike-X system which would provide for area defense of the continental U.S. and local defense of 25 cities against a "low" Soviet threat.

6. The Congress for the first time since 1959 has appropriated funds to prepare for the production and deployment of an ABM defense system.

There are five somewhat overlapping but distinct purposes for which we might want to deploy an ABM system:

1. To protect our cities against a Chinese Communist missile attack in the 1970s.

2. To protect our land-based strategic offensive forces (i.e., Minuteman) against a Soviet missile attack.

3. To guard against nuclear armed missiles launched by accident towards the United States.

4. To discourage the use of "nuclear blackmail", i.e., the threat of attack with one or a few missiles against targets of moderate value.

5. To protect our cities (and their population and industry) against a heavy, sophisticated Soviet missile attack.

After studying the subject exhaustively, Mr. Vance and I have concluded that we should not initiate at this time an ABM deployment for the last purpose. We believe that:

1. The Soviet Union would be forced to react to a U.S. ABM deployment by increasing its offensive nuclear force with the result that:

a. The risk of a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S. would not be further decreased.

b. The damage to the U.S. from a Soviet nuclear attack, in the event deterrence failed, would not be reduced in any meaningful sense.

The foundation of our security is the deterrence of a Soviet nuclear attack. We believe such an attack can be prevented if it is understood by the Soviets that we possess strategic nuclear forces so powerful as to be capable of absorbing a Soviet first strike and surviving with sufficient strength to impose unacceptable damage on them (e.g., destruction by blast and radiation alone of approximately [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]). We have such power today. We must maintain it in the future, adjusting our forces to offset actual or potential changes in theirs./5/

There is nothing I have seen in either our own or the Soviet Union's technology which would lead me to believe we cannot do this. From the beginning of the Nike-Zeus project in 1955 through the end of this current fiscal year, we will have invested a total of about $4 billion on ballistic missile defense research--including Nike-Zeus, Nike-X and Project Defender. And, during the last five or six years, we have spent about $1.2 billion on the development of penetration aids to help ensure that our missiles could penetrate the enemy's defenses. As a result of these efforts, we have the technology already in hand to counter any defensive force changes the Soviet Union is likely to undertake in the foreseeable future.

We believe the Soviet Union has essentially the same requirement for a deterrent or "Assured Destruction" force as the U.S. Therefore, deployment by the U.S. of an ABM defense which would degrade the destruction capability of the Soviet's offensive force to an unacceptable level would lead to the expansion of that force. In that event, we would be no better off than we were before.

2. With respect to the other four purposes, a limited ABM deployment might offer sufficient advantages to justify the cost (estimated at about $4 billion to produce and deploy, and about $200 million per year to maintain and operate)./6/ Such a deployment, which could be completed by 1973, might:

a. Hold U.S. fatalities from a Chinese Communist missile attack in the mid-1970s below two million, if their operational inventory reaches 75 missiles; or possibly zero, if the number does not exceed 25.

b. Ensure the survival of about 200-300 Minuteman in a heavy, sophisticated Soviet attack in the mid to late 1970s.

c. Provide a very high degree of protection against accidental attacks.

d. Virtually eliminate the threat of "nuclear blackmail".

e. Reduce, as a by-product, U.S. fatalities from a Soviet attack against our cities in the early 1970s, if the Soviets do not react immediately to our ABM deployment.

In the pages which follow I will explore in detail the foundation for these conclusions:

The latest National Intelligence Estimate, dated Oct. 20, 1966,/7/ indicated that the Soviets have accelerated the deployment of two hard ICBMs, the SS-11 and SS-9. (The SS-9 is a large, storable liquid-fueled missile, roughly the size of our Titan II, with a warhead yield of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and a CEP of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The SS-11 is a small, storable liquid-fueled missile, about the size of our Minuteman, with a warhead yield of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and a CEP of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]). The November 1965 NIE/8/ estimated that by mid-1968 the Soviets would have operational about 100-110 SS-9s and 200-250 SS-11s; we now estimate that they will have 130-140 SS-9s and 320-400 SS-11s by that date./9/

By mid-1971, we believe they could have a total of 800-1100 operational ICBMs on launchers, compared with last year's estimate of 500-800 by mid-1970. We believe the higher end of the range of estimates will prevail if the Soviets decide to emphasize quantity in an effort to match the size of our ICBM force, and the lower end if they choose to emphasize quality. In the first case, they would concentrate on the SS-11 which is a relatively simple and cheap missile. In the second case, they would place added emphasis on the SS-9 which is a more expensive and also, for certain purposes, a much more effective missile. The SS-11 because of its relatively poor CEP and small payload would have little value against hard targets such as our Minuteman silos, and it is therefore essentially a retaliatory weapon for use against cities. The Soviets also have some older ICBMs but these are already being phased out and few are expected to be left in the operational force by 1971.

Although we still have no direct evidence of such an effort, the Soviets might also develop and install multiple independently-aimed reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on their SS-9s. However, an effective capability with such reentry vehicles would require much greater accuracies (lower CEPs) than have thus far been achieved by Soviet ICBMs. If they were to start now, they could probably achieve an operational capability by about 1971-72; and we would probably be able to detect the testing of such a system perhaps two years earlier. Improvements in both accuracy and penetration capability could also be made in the SS-11s, and in addition the Soviets might deploy a new solid fuel, highly accurate small ICBM.

We have known for some time that the Soviet Union was working on anti-ballistic missile defense. After several false starts, the Soviets now appear to be deploying one type of system (which is definitely designed for ballistic missile defense) around Moscow and another type of system, designated "Tallinn", (which may be designed for defense against manned bombers, or ballistic missiles, or both) across the northwest approaches to the Soviet Union and at a few other locations.

The Moscow system appears to consist of a series of complexes deployed at some of the outer ring SA-1 sites, about 45 n.mi. from the center of the city. Each complex has two "Triads" (one large and two small radars operating together) and 16 launchers apparently designed for the "Galosh" missile which the Soviets displayed in 1964. (Six complexes are under active construction and a seventh is now dormant.) In addition, there is a large phased-array radar southwest of Moscow (called Dog House) oriented towards our ICBM threat corridor and additional large phased-array radars (called Hen House) sited at two locations to the northwest. These three radars may be intended as forward acquisition radars for the Moscow system, while the Triad radars handle the target and interceptor missile tracking functions. The Moscow system could have an initial operational capability in 1967 or early 1968, and a full operational capability with six complexes (96 launchers) by 1970-71. (By that time the Soviets could also construct two more complexes to fill out the southern part of the ring, for a total of 128 launchers.)

The Galosh itself is a large, relatively slow acceleration missile probably designed for exoatmospheric interception much like our new extended range interceptor missile, which we now call "Spartan". We have no evidence thus far of a Soviet terminal defense missile such as our Sprint. If used for both area and terminal defense, the Galosh system would be very expensive, at least $15 million per missile on launcher (dividing the total investment cost by the number of missiles on launchers) where only 16 missiles are provided per complex. Even if two reload missiles were provided for each launcher, the cost per missile would still amount to about $6 million. But there is a real question whether the reloading speed of the Galosh (now estimated at 10-30 minutes after arrival of the missile at the launcher) would be fast enough to be of any use in a single engagement. Similarly, there is a question whether a single Triad, the radars of which are mechanically steered, could handle more than eight launchers. (We ourselves have abandoned this type of radar for ABM defense because of its grave limitations.)

With regard to the second defensive system, there is still disagreement within our Intelligence Community as to its primary purpose. One view is that it is primarily an advanced surface-to-air missile system designed against high altitude, high speed manned bomber attacks, and the pattern in which it is being deployed, the configuration of the sites and their equipment, and the characteristics of the radars, all lend credence to this view. Several "farms" of missile launchers are located in a barrier line across the northwestern part of European Russia and around Leningrad and Moscow, and some parts of the southern approaches. At least 22 complexes have been definitely identified, most of which consist of three launch sites, each with six launch positions and one radar. These could be operational by 1967-68, and more may be under construction. The local radars associated with the launchers are of limited capability and would appear to need the support of the much larger but vulnerable Hen House radars if the system is expected to perform with a reasonable degree of effectiveness in the ABM role.

If it is indeed designed as an advanced surface-to-air, anti-aircraft missile, it would be most effective in defending against high-altitude penetrating bombers of the B-70 or SR-71 type; it would be ineffective against low-altitude penetrating bombers such as the B-52 or FB-111. It is this incongruity, together with the fact that this type of ABM system would be much cheaper than the Galosh, which leads the proponents of the other point of view to believe that it is an ABM system, or at least has some minimal ABM capability. And while we know something about the geographical deployments of this system, and about its launchers and radars, we still know very little about the interceptor missile itself.

The latest intelligence estimates (NIE 11-3-66) concludes " . . . that the Moscow ABM system will have a good capability against a numerically limited attack on the Moscow area by currently operational missiles, but that its capabilities could be degraded by advanced penetration systems and it could not cope with a very heavy attack. Moreover, the present deployment will not cover all of the multi-directional Polaris threat to Moscow." With regard to the Tallinn system in the ABM role, the NIE concludes:

"Many of the Tallinn system complexes are so located that presently known Hen House or Dog House radars could not furnish useful target tracking data to them. Where this is the case, or if the Hen Houses or Dog House were destroyed or blacked out, the capabilities of the system would be seriously reduced and limited to local and self-defense. Thus, under these assumptions [including the alternate characteristics which would have to be assumed for the missile to give it an ABM capability]/10/ if Hen House or Dog House data were available, the Tallinn complexes could defend areas large enough to provide a strategic ABM defense; without such data, they could not."

In summary, we have firm evidence of Soviet ICBM deployment through mid-1968 and fairly good estimates through mid-1971. Our knowledge of Soviet ABM deployments is much more sketchy. We are reasonably certain that the deployment of the Galosh around Moscow will be completed but until we know more about the Tallinn type of system or see evidence of Galosh deployments around other cities, we can only conjecture about the ultimate scale, effectiveness and cost of the Soviet ABM effort. However, knowing what we do about past Soviet predilections for defensive systems,/11/ we must plan our forces on the assumption that they will have deployed some sort of an ABM system around their major cities by the early 1970s. Whether made up of Galosh only, or a combination of Galosh and a Tallinn type system, or even some combination of Galosh and a terminal missile of the Sprint type, a full scale deployment would cost the Soviet Union something on the order of $20 to $25 billion.

In considering the issue of whether to deploy the Nike-X, it might be useful to review briefly the history of the U.S. ABM effort, the kind of system originally envisioned, the evolution of technology in that field and the attitudes of past Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Chiefs of Staff, the Congress, etc.

The predecessor of the current ABM development program, the Nike-Zeus was begun in FY 1955. Up until the launching of the Sputnik in October 1957, the project proceeded at a leisurely pace. Congressional attitudes towards the program ranged from incredulousness regarding its operational feasibility (especially in view of the problems then being encountered in anti-bomber defense) to concern over a new "roles and missions" fight between the Army (Zeus) and the Air Force (Wizard).

In the aftermath of Sputnik a new sense of urgency developed with regard to all aspects of advanced military technology. From FY 1955 through FY 1957, a total of only $12.2 million was applied to Nike-Zeus R&D but in FY 1958 alone the total rose to $66 million and in FY 1959, to $237 million. By the spring of 1958, when the FY 1959 Budget was before the Congress, the Army had already proposed the production of initial sets of equipment. Secretary of Defense McElroy, however, argued that "we should not spend hundreds of millions on production of this weapon pending general confirmatory indications that we know what we are doing." His view prevailed for the moment.

It was not until the FY 1960 Budget that Nike-Zeus deployment became a real issue. The Army's initial request included $875 million for Zeus--$35 million for R&D, $720 million for procurement and $115 million for construction. President Eisenhower, however, sent to the Congress a request of $300 million for R&D and test facilities only. The House Appropriations Committee recommended the addition of $200 million "for the acceleration of the Nike-Zeus and/or the modernization of Army firepower." Secretary McElroy agreed to accept $137 million for the acceleration of Nike-Zeus and $63 million for Army modernization. The Senate approved these amounts and added $200 million more for Army modernization. The final enactment provided $375 million for Nike-Zeus and/or Army modernization.

In the fall of 1959, in connection with the development of the FY 1961 Budget, the Army proposed a new Nike-Zeus deployment plan consisting of 35 local defense centers (one for each defended area), 9 forward acquisition radars and 120 batteries. The typical battery was to consist of 50 missiles on launchers and 16 radars, a missile-to-radar ratio very close to that of the current Soviet Galosh system. An initial operational capability was to be achieved by FY 1964 and the entire program completed by FY 1969, with a total investment cost estimated at $13 to $14 billion, of which $1.5 billion would be required in FY 1961.

The system was designed around a relatively slow speed and limited range interceptor missile and mechanically steered radars. Because of the missile's slow speed, it had to be fired long before the incoming target reentered the atmosphere, thereby precluding the use of the atmosphere as a means of distinguishing real warheads from other objects such as decoys or tankage fragments; and the limited range of the missile reduced the potential kill radius. (Indeed, the plan called for the firing of three Zeus against each attacking ICBM.) Because the radars were mechanically steered (like the local Galosh radars), the traffic-handling capabilities of the system were low, leaving it vulnerable to saturation attacks.

This plan was rejected by President Eisenhower, who pointed out in his FY 1961 Budget message that:

"The Nike-Zeus system is one of the most difficult undertakings ever attempted by this country. The technical problems involved in detecting, tracking, and computing the course of the incoming ballistic missile and in guiding the intercepting Zeus missile to its target--all within a few minutes--are indeed enormous.

"Much thought and study have been given to all of these factors and it is the consensus of my technical and military advisors that the system should be carefully tested before production is begun and facilities are constructed for its deployment. Accordingly, I am recommending sufficient funds in this budget to provide for the essential phases of such testing. Pending the results of such testing, the $137 million appropriated last year by the Congress for initial production steps for the Nike-Zeus system will not be used."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with one dissenting vote, supported the President's position and the Congress agreed to limit the program to research and development.

The weaknesses in the Nike-Zeus system led in 1961 and 1962 to the development of a new and different system known as Nike-X. To help solve the problem of discriminating actual warheads from decoys and other objects, a new, high acceleration terminal defense missile, the Sprint, was designed. Because of its fast reaction time, this missile would permit the defense to wait until the enemy attack penetrated well into the atmosphere where the lighter objects, such as unsophisticated decoys, would be separated from the warheads, thus permitting the defense to concentrate more of its fire on the latter. To solve the problem of limited handling capacity, a new family of phased-array radars was developed. These radars employ a relatively new principle; instead of scanning the skies with an electronic beam by mechanically rotating the entire radar structure, the structure is covered with thousands of sensors and is kept stationary while the electronic beam does the rotating. Because an electronic beam can be rotated a million times faster than a mechanical structure, the phased-array radar has a far greater search and tracking capacity. In other words, it can simultaneously handle many more incoming objects, thus eliminating one of the major limitations of the old Nike-Zeus system.

With the phased-array radar and Sprint missiles, the defense battery could bring firepower to bear on all targets entering an area 20 miles high and 25 miles in radius. However, even if these batteries were deployed around all our major cities, a large part of the nation would still be left undefended and the attacker would have the option of ground-bursting his warheads outside the defended areas, thus producing vast amounts of lethal fall-out which could be carried by the winds over the defended areas. Moreover, a terminal (or local) defense compels the defender to allocate his resources in advance, leaving the attacker free to concentrate his resources against whatever targets he may choose at the moment of the attack.

To fill in this gap, we initiated in the spring of 1965 the development of a new long-range interceptor with a high yield, high temperature X-ray warhead. This missile, the Spartan, is designed to reach out over 400 nautical miles from its launcher and attack incoming objects at altitudes of up to 280 nautical miles. Its warhead is to be capable of destroying ballistic missile reentry vehicles at ranges of five to ten miles if they are hardened, and 10 to 100 miles if they are not. About a dozen properly located batteries of such a missile could provide some coverage over the entire United States. Together with the Sprint, it could provide a defense in depth, permitting all incoming objects to be attacked first well above the atmosphere and then the surviving objects a second time as they enter the atmosphere. Moreover, by overlapping the coverage of the Spartan batteries, some of the attacker's inherent advantage against terminal defenses alone could be overcome, since the defender at the moment of the attack would also have the choice of concentrating his resources over those targets he chooses to protect.

The deployment of an ABM system did not become a serious issue again until earlier this year. It was clear to us from the beginning, i.e., 1961, that the Nike-Zeus as then conceived would not be an effective ABM system against the type of ballistic missile attack the Soviets would be able to launch by the end of the decade. Accordingly, both in President Kennedy's and your administrations, we have steadfastly maintained that the development of a more effective ABM system should be pursued on an urgent basis but that no production or deployment should be undertaken until much more was known about the system's technical capabilities and its likely effect on the strategic situation generally. This view found substantial support within the Executive Branch and in the Congress up until recently, although an abortive attempt was made by some members of the Senate in 1963 to authorize an appropriation for the deployment of the Nike-Zeus. However, in acting on the FY 1967 Defense Budget, the Armed Services Committees and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees of both Houses recommended, and the Congress appropriated, about $168 million to prepare for the production of the Nike-X system. It is, therefore, clear that the deployment of this system will be a major issue in the next session of the Congress.

Attachment 1/12/ provides a description of each of the major elements of the Nike-X system and its current development status. Briefly, the system would consist of a number of different types of phased-array radars and two types of interceptor missiles, which could be deployed in a variety of configurations:

a. Multi-function Array Radar (MAR)--a very powerful phased-array radar which can perform all the defense functions involved in engaging a large, sophisticated attack: central control and battle management, long-range search, acquisition of the target, discrimination of warheads from decoys or "spoofing" devices, precision tracking of the target, and control of the defense interceptor missiles.

b. TACMAR Radar--a scaled down, slightly less complex and less powerful version of the MAR, which can perform all the basic defense functions in a smaller, less sophisticated attack.

c. Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR)--a relatively low frequency, phased-array radar required for the very long-range search and acquisition functions involved in area defense. To achieve the full potential of the extended-range Spartan, the target must be picked up at much greater distances in order to compute its trajectory before the Spartan is fired.

d. Missile Site Radar (MSR)--a much smaller, phased-array radar needed to control the Sprint and Spartan interceptor missiles during an engagement. It can also perform the functions of the TACMAR but on a considerably reduced scale. Actually, a number of different sizes are being studied. This "modular" approach will permit us to tailor the capacity of the radar to the particular needs of each defended area.

e. The extended-range Spartan--a three stage missile with a hot X-ray, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] capable of intercepting incoming objects at a range of over 400 nautical miles and at altitudes of up to 280 nautical miles. This missile makes use of some of the components of the old Nike-Zeus.

f. Sprint--a high-acceleration interceptor missile which can climb to 80,000 feet in 10 seconds. It is designed to make intercepts between 5,000 and 100,000 feet at a range of 25 miles.

In addition to these major elements of the system, an entire new infrastructure, including base facilities, communications, logistics support, etc., will be required. The exact cost of this infrastructure cannot be determined until a specific deployment plan is decided upon, but it would surely be substantial for any deployment.

The technical principles involved in the radars are now fairly well established. One R&D MAR-type radar has been constructed at the White Sands Missile Range. A contract has been let for the power plant of a second MAR-type radar, which is to be constructed on Kwajalein Atoll. The Missile Site Radar is well along in development and the construction of one of these radars on Kwajalein Atoll has also begun.

Testing of the Sprint missile was started at White Sands in November 1965 with one complete success, two partial successes and three failures. The failures are attributed mostly to insufficient quality control but some of the missile's components may have to be redesigned. The tempo of testing will steadily increase during the current fiscal year and we are advised by our technical people that the missile will eventually reach its design goals. The nuclear warhead is also well along in development and does not appear to present any particular problem.

The Spartan is still on the drawing boards. It represents a very substantial redesign of the original Nike-Zeus and we will not know until it is flight tested a year and a half hence how well it will perform. However, we are less concerned with the missile itself than we are with its warhead. A significant number of development tests will have to be performed, all underground, before the design parameters can be established; and then we will have to proof test the resulting warhead, again underground. (The feasibility of a full yield test underground has still to be established, but it may be possible to use a scaled-down test.) Accordingly, there is still considerable technical uncertainty concerning the warhead. Although alternative warheads could be used on the Spartan, they would be less effective against a heavy, sophisticated attack.

Facilities for testing both the Sprint and the Spartan will be constructed on Kwajalein Atoll. These, together with the TACMAR and MSR and the programs for the computers will give us all of the major elements of the Nike-X system which are essential to test its overall performance against reentry vehicles fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. (We feel we know enough about the PAR technology to be able to use the mechanically steered radars already on Kwajalein as simulators.) The system will be tested in stages, starting with the MSR and Sprint tests in January 1969, then the Spartan missile in July 1969 and the TACMAR radar between July and December 1970. Upwards of 100 test shots will be launched from Vandenberg to Kwajalein during the period 1969-72 to test the system thoroughly as a whole. The most important objective of this effort is to determine proper system integration and computer programming, since the individual components of the system will have already been tested ahead of time.

But even after this elaborate test program is completed, a number of technical uncertainties will still remain unresolved. Chief among these are the following:

1. Large Sophisticated Attacks. Notwithstanding the number of test shots planned, the ability of the system to cope with a large sophisticated attack will still remain to be demonstrated, except to the extent that such attacks can be simulated in the computers.

2. Discrimination of Decoys and Other "Spoofing" Devices. Although the MAR-type radars are specifically designed to deal with this problem, discrimination will always remain an unresolved issue. We have been studying and developing such devices for many years and we are now installing some of them in our offensive missiles. No doubt new devices and the counters to them will be invented in the future, and the contest between the offense and the defense will continue as it has in the area of manned bombers.

3. Blackout. Detonation of nuclear devices high in the atmosphere can seriously degrade the effectiveness of the defense's radars. These detonations can be either the defensive warheads (self blackout) or deliberate explosions of the incoming warheads (precursor blackout). They have the effect of producing an area in the atmosphere similar to an opaque cloud which the radars cannot see into or through. The size of the area is a function of how high the burst occurs and of the frequency of the radars. The blacked-out region is larger at higher altitudes and appears larger to lower frequency radars. At the lower altitudes, the blackout region is essentially the visible fireball. For the terminal defenses employing Sprint missiles in the lower atmosphere and radars in the microwave region (about 1200 megacycles), the blackout effects can be minimized and are well understood from previous testing.

For the area defense the problem is more severe. For one thing, the number of tests conducted by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union at the altitudes of interest for area defense (above 200,000 feet) is relatively small. In the U.S. tests, the data collected are not complete enough to answer all the technical issues, although our continuing study of the available data is increasing our knowledge of the blackout effects. However, we can never resolve all the uncertainties with the existing data. We know there will be blackout effects and we know that we can choose a radar frequency and proliferate radars to minimize them. But we do not know how many precursor nuclear blasts the Soviets would have to place over the United States to black out our radars. And, we do not know how much they learned from their nuclear tests. Consequently, we do not know precisely what their uncertainties would be in using this as an offensive tactic. We do know that the blackout effects can be offset by raising the frequencies of the radars, and we are doing this in the case of the PAR. However, because the area defense radars must detect small targets at long ranges and because the price of a radar set operating in this manner increases with the frequency, there is a limit on how far we can go in this direction to counter blackout.

4. Programming the Computers. The management of a sophisticated ballistic missile attack engagement presents an extremely complex problem. To control the phased-array radars and guide the missile, powerful computers and sophisticated "programs" are needed. The size of the computer varies with the type of radar. For the area defense (with PAR), computer speeds and capacities equivalent to the best of today's commercial computers are adequate. The MSR and the MAR will need much more powerful computers, development of which has been underway since 1962. However, it is not the computer itself which is our major concern, but rather the production of the "programs" which must be designed in advance to reflect every conceivable eventuality the system may confront. Our experience in programming the SAGE computers against manned bomber attacks has revealed some of the complexities, and the costs, of such an undertaking. Whether we can provide for all of the variables involved in such a vastly more complex problem as anti-missile defense has yet to be demonstrated. Here, again, we will have a much better idea of what is actually involved in programming the computers when the prototype system on Kwajalein is demonstrated in the 1970-72 period.

5. Production and Operational Problems. We have learned from bitter experience that even when the development problems have been solved, a system can run into trouble in production or when it is put into operation. All too often the development prototype cannot be produced in quantity without extensive re-engineering. Production delays are encountered and costs begin to spiral. Sometimes these problems are not discovered until the new system actually enters the inventory and has to function in an operational environment. The Terrier, Talos, and Tartar ship-to-air missiles are a good example; after spending about $2 billion on development and production of these missiles, we had to spend another $350 million correcting the faults of those already installed and we still plan to spend another $550 million modernizing these systems.

In this connection, it is worth noting that had we produced and deployed the Nike-Zeus system proposed by the Army in 1959 at an estimated cost of $13 to $14 billion, most of it would have had to be torn out and replaced, almost before it became operational, by the new missiles and radars of the Nike-X system. By the same token, other technological developments in offensive forces over the next seven years may make obsolete or drastically degrade the Nike-X system as presently envisioned. We can predict with certainty that there will be substantial additional costs for updating any system we might consider installing at this time against the Soviet missile threat.

This question can be answered only within the context of the general nuclear war problem as a whole and our overall national security objectives. For many years the overriding objective of our national policy with regard to general nuclear war has been to deter the Soviet Union (or any other nation) from launching a surprise nuclear attack against us or our Allies. As long as that remains our overriding objective, the capability for "Assured Destruction" must receive first call on all of our resources and must be provided regardless of the cost and the difficulties involved. Programs designed to limit damage to our population and industrial capacity in the event the deterrent fails can never substitute for an "Assured Destruction" capability in this context, no matter how much we spend on them. It is our ability to destroy the attacker as a viable 20th century nation that provides the deterrent, not the ability to limit damage to ourselves.

What kind and amount of destruction we would have to be able to inflict on an attacker to provide this deterrent cannot be answered precisely. However, it seems reasonable to assume that in the case of the Soviet Union, the destruction of, say, [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Such a level of destruction would certainly represent intolerable punishment to any industrialized nation and thus should serve as an effective deterrent to the deliberate initiation of a nuclear attack on the United States or its Allies.

Once sufficient forces have been procured to give us high confidence of achieving our "Assured Destruction" objective, we can then consider the kinds and amounts of forces which might be added to reduce damage to our population and industry in the event deterrence fails. But here we must note another important point, namely, the possible interaction of our strategic forces programs with those of the Soviet Union. If the general nuclear war policy of the Soviet Union also has as its objective the deterrence of a U.S. first strike (which I believe to be the case), then we must assume that any attempt on our part to reduce damage to ourselves (below what they would estimate we would consider "unacceptable levels") would put pressure on them to strive for an offsetting improvement in their deterrent forces. Conversely, an increase in their "Damage Limiting" capability would require us to make greater investments in "Assured Destruction", which, as noted earlier in this memorandum, is precisely what we are now doing. It is in this context that we should examine the desirability of increasing our "Damage Limiting" capabilities against a heavy, sophisticated Soviet attack in the 1970s.

As I noted earlier, the major elements of the Nike-X system, as they are now being developed, would permit a variety of deployments; two have been selected for the purposes of this analysis. The first, which I will call "Posture-A", represents a light U.S. defense against a Soviet missile attack on our cities. It consists of an area defense of the entire continental United States, providing redundant (overlapping) coverage of key target areas; and, in addition, a relatively low-density Sprint defense of the 25 largest cities to provide some protection against those warheads which get through the area defense./13/ The second deployment, which I call "Posture B", is a heavier defense against a Soviet attack. With the same area coverage, it provides a higher-density Sprint defense for the 50 largest cities.

Shown on the following table are the components and the costs (which, if past experience is any guide, are understated by 50 to 100 percent for the systems as a whole) of Posture A and Posture B, together with the time frames in which the deployments can be completed:

	Posture A		Posture B
	Number	Invest. Cost ($ Billion)	Number	Invest. Cost ($ Billion)
Radars
TACMAR	7	$1.9	3	$0.6
MAR	0	0	8	2.8
PAR	6	0.8	6	0.8
MSR	26	3.8	95	8.4
Invest. Cost		$6.5		$12.6
Missiles
Spartan	1200	$1.7	1200	$1.7
Sprint	1100	0.7	7300	3.1
Invest. Cost		$2.4		$4.8
DoD Invest. Cost		$8.9		$17.4
AEC Invest. Cost		1.0		2.0
Total Invest. Cost (ex-R&D)		$9.9		$19.4
Annual Operating Cost		$0.38		$0.72
No. of Cities w/Term.Def	25		50
IOC with Decision 1/67	FY 71		FY 71
Deployment Completed	FY 74		FY 75

In addition, if technically feasible, we would have to provide some improvement in our defense against manned bomber attack in order to preclude the Soviets from undercutting the Nike-X defense; we would also want to accelerate the fallout shelter program. The investment cost (including R&D) of the former is estimated at about $1.5 to $2.4 billion and would provide for a small force of F-111 or F-12 type interceptors (e.g., 48 F-111s or 32 F-12s) and about 42 aircraft warning and control aircraft (AWACS). With the introduction of these new types of aircraft, we might be able to phase out most of the present interceptor aircraft and a large part of the ground-based aircraft warning and control network, thus producing an actual saving in operating costs over the longer term. The expanded fallout shelter program would cost about $800 million more than the one we are now pursuing. We would also need some of our anti-submarine warfare forces for use against Soviet missile submarines, but we are not yet clear whether these ASW forces would actually have to be increased over the currently planned levels. In any event, the "current" estimates of the investment cost of the total "Damage Limiting" package would amount to at least $10.5 billion for Posture A and at least $20 billion for Posture B ("final" costs for each of these Postures would probably be 50 to 100 percent higher)./14/

To test the contribution that each of these Nike-X deployments might make to our "Damage Limiting" objectives, we have projected both the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces (assuming no reaction by the Soviets to the U.S. ABM deployment) to FY 1976, by which time Posture B, the heavier defense, could be fully in place. These forces are shown on the table which follows:

Projected U.S. and Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces, Mid-1976
(assuming no reaction by the Soviets to U.S. ABM deployment)

	U.S.	USSR
ICBMs (Hard Launchers)
Large (Titan II/SS-9 Class)	27	276-249
Small (Minuteman/SS-11 Class)	1000	500-950
SLBMs
Large (Poseidon Class.)	496	0
Small (Polaris/SSN-5 Class)	160	307-399
Total No. of BM Warheads	6931	1083-1608
Bombers (for U.S./Soviet Attacks)
Heavy	255	70-110/a/
Medium	210	300-500/a/
ABM (Anti-ballistic Missile Defense)
Area Interceptors		800-3250/b/
Terminal Interceptors		0-1500/b/
Air Defense
Fighters	700	1700-2400/c/
SAM Batteries	116	1440-2400/c/

Note: Forces for other years are shown in Attachment 2.

The fatalities which these Soviet forces could inflict upon the U.S. (with and without a U.S. ABM defense) and the fatalities which the U.S. forces could inflict on the Soviet Union (with a Soviet ABM defense) are shown on the following table:

	Number of Fatalities/a/ in an All-out Strategic Exchange (in millions), 1976/b/ Assumes No Soviet Reaction to U.S. ABM Deployment
	Soviets Strike First, U.S. Retaliates		U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate/c/
U.S. Programs	U.S. Fat.	Sov. Fat.	U.S. Fat.	Sov. Fat.
Approved	100	[*]	80	[*]
Posture A	15	[*]	15	[*]
Posture B	10	[*]	5	[*]

[*entry in table not declassified]

The first case, "Soviets Strike First, U.S. Retaliates", is the threat against which our strategic forces must be designed. The second case, "U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate", is the case that would determine the size and character of the Soviet reaction to changes in our strategic forces, if they wish, as clearly they do, to maintain an "Assured Destruction" capability against us.

These calculations indicate that without Nike-X and the other "Damage Limiting" programs discussed earlier, U.S. fatalities from a Soviet first strike could total about 100 million; even after absorbing that attack, we could inflict on the Soviet Union about [number not declassified] fatalities. Assuming the Soviets do not react to our deployment of an ABM defense against them, which is a most unrealistic assumption, Posture A might reduce our fatalities to 15 million and Posture B, to about 10 million.

Although the fatality estimates shown for both the Soviet Union and the U.S. reflect some variations in the performance of their respective ABM systems, they are still based on the assumption that these systems will work at relatively high levels of efficiency. (In fact, for the purpose of these calculations we have assumed that the Soviet ABM system will be just as good as the Nike-X, even though we believe the system, or systems, which they are now deploying are, in fact, far inferior.) If these ABM systems do not perform as well as our technical people postulate, fatalities on both sides could be considerably higher than shown in the table above, or the costs would be considerably higher if major improvements or additions had to be made in the systems to bring them up to the postulated level of performance.

If the Soviets are determined to maintain an "Assured Destruction" capability against us and they believe that our deployment of an ABM defense would reduce our fatalities in the "U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate" case to the levels shown in the table above, they would have no alternative but to increase the second strike damage potential of their offensive forces. They could do so in several different ways: by deploying a new large, land-based ICBM (either mobile, or hardened and defended), or a new submarine-launched missile like our Poseidon, or by adding large numbers of hardened but undefended SS-9s or SS-11s. They have the technical capability to deploy any of these systems with highly accurate MIRVs (or single warheads) by the mid-1970s. Shown in the table below are the relative costs to the Soviet Union of responding to a U.S. ABM deployment with a land-mobile ICBM system:

Level of U.S. Fatalities Which Soviets Believe Will Provide Deterrence/a/ (Millions)	Cost to the Soviets of Offsetting U.S. Cost to Deploy an ABM
22	$1 Soviet cost to $4 U.S. cost
33	$1 Soviet cost to $2 U.S. cost
44	$1 Soviet cost to $1 U.S. cost
55	$1-1/4 Soviet cost to $1 U.S. cost
66	$1-2/3 Soviet cost to $1 U.S. cost

If the Soviets choose to respond to our ABM deployment with such a system (200 missiles against Posture A and 650 against Posture B), the results would be as shown below:

	Number of Fatalities in an All-out Strategic Exchange (in millions), 1976 Assumes Soviet Reaction to U.S. ABM Deployment
	Soviets Strike First, U.S. Retaliates		U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate
U.S. Programs	U.S. Fat.	Sov. Fat.	U.S. Fat.	Sov. Fat.
Approved (no response)	100	[*]	80	[*]
Posture A	90	[*]	75	[*]
Posture B	75	[*]	70	[*]

[*entry in table not declassified]

In short, the Soviets have it within their technical and economic capacity to offset any further "Damage Limiting" measures we might undertake, provided they are determined to maintain their deterrent against us. It is the virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent against us. It is the virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent which casts such grave doubts on the advisability of our deploying the Nike-X system for the protection of our cities against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they could launch in the 1970s. In all probability, all we would accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side.

As I noted at the beginning of this memorandum, a limited, i.e., light, deployment of the Nike-X (estimated investment cost, about $3.5 billion) might offer a high degree of protection for our cities against the kind of ballistic missile attack the Chinese Communists may be able to launch in the 1970s; and, with some special additions (estimated investment cost, about $660 million), ensure the survival of a significant portion of our Minuteman force even against a heavy, MIRVed Soviet attack. Such a deployment would have an inherent capability to provide a very high level of protection against accidental and "nuclear blackmail" attacks. And, as a by-product, it would-also have some capability to reduce U.S. fatalities from a Soviet attack against our cities in the early 1970s, provided the Soviets do not immediately react to our ABM deployment.

Shown below are the components and costs of a "light" Nike-X deployment designed to achieve the foregoing purposes:

	Basic CONUS System	Hawaii & Alaska Increment	Minuteman Defense Increment	Total System
Radars
PAR	3	1	1	5
MSR	13	2	2	17
Missiles
Spartan	390	30	50	480
Sprint	120/a/	50	285	455
Investment Cost ($ Mil.)
DoD	2835	404	561	3800
AEC	211	27	97	335
Annual Oper. Costs ($ Mil.)	148	27	27	202
IOC with Decision Jan. '67				1 Jul 71
Deployment Completed				1 Oct 73

The Chinese Communist nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development programs are apparently being pursued with high priority. On the basis of recent evidence, it appears possible that they may conduct either a space or a long-range ballistic missile launching before the end of 1967. Such an event might suggest that the Chinese are aiming at an initial operating capability (IOC) for an ICBM as early as 1969, and that the threat to the United States is more imminent than is actually the case. In our judgment, it still appears unlikely that the Chinese could achieve an IOC before the early 1970s and deploy a significant number of operational ICBMs before the mid-1970s, or that those ICBMs would have great reliability, speed of response, or substantial protection against attack.

Nevertheless , it would seem prudent to initiate the deployment of a "light" Nike-X system (described in the preceding section) at this time. The effectiveness of this system in reducing U.S. fatalities from a Chinese Communist attack in the 1970s is shown in the table below:

	Chinese Strike First (Operational Inventory)
U.S. Fatalities: (In Millions)
Without ABM	5	10
With ABM	0	1

This "light" defense could probably preclude damage in the 1970s almost entirely. As the Chinese force grows to the level it might achieve by 1980-85, additions and improvements might be required, but relatively modest additional outlays could probably limit the Chinese damage potential to low levels well beyond 1985.

In contrast to our sea-based Polaris/Poseidon forces, our land-based Minuteman forces (even though they are installed in hard underground silos) could become vulnerable to a Soviet surprise attack, if the Soviets continue to increase the size and, more important, greatly improve the accuracy of their ICBM forces. However, even assuming the strongest Soviet threat projected in the latest National Intelligence Estimates for mid-1974, and even assuming that the Soviets use all of their accurate ICBMs against our Minuteman forces, about 470 missiles would still survive. The "light" Nike deployment could increase the number of surviving missiles to 730. Together with the sea-based missile forces, we would have more than enough for "Assured Destruction", even if the Soviets deploy an extensive ABM system of the sort described in the latest National Intelligence Estimates.

But the most severe threat we must consider in planning our "Assured Destruction" forces is an extensive, effective Soviet ABM deployment combined with a deployment of a substantial hard-target kill capability in the form of highly accurate SS-11s or MIRVed SS-9s. By equipping their SS-9 boosters with six MIRVs (each with a CEP of 0.25 n.mi. and a yield of 3MT), the Soviets could destroy large numbers of our Minuteman missiles. An extensive, effective Soviet ABM system could then intercept and destroy a large part of our residual missile warheads. (These Soviet offensive and defensive threats are both higher than those projected in the latest National Intelligence Estimates.)

We could not count on more than two years of warning between the first intelligence indications of a Soviet MIRV development effort and the start of deployment of the system. Assuming that the Soviets start such a development immediately and press forward with their ABM deployment at a rate of 1000 interceptors per year (beginning in FY 1968), they might achieve the build-up shown below:

Greater-Than-Expected Soviet Threat

	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
Soviet Threat to Minuteman
SS-9	150	150	150	150	100
SS-9 MIRV (Six 3-megaton RVs/Missile)	0	50	100	150	200
SS-11 (improved accuracy)	300	550	800	925	925
Total No. of BM Warheads	450	1000	1550	1975	2225
Soviet ABM Defense
Area Interceptors Terminal Interceptors	3200	4200	5200	6200	7200

The effect of such a deployment could be to reduce the number of U.S. Minuteman surviving attack to the levels shown below:

	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
Minuteman Surviving/a/	710	340	205	120	90

To offset the possibility of such a decline in the damage potential of our land-based missile forces, we have authorized the development and production of the Poseidon. Should still additional offensive power be required, and such a requirement is not now clear, we are considering the development and deployment of a new Advanced ICBM (a large payload missile with an as yet undetermined basing system designed to reduce vulnerability to a Soviet MIRV threat). The deployment of the Nike-X as a defense of part of our Minuteman force would, however, offer a partial substitute for the possible further expansion of our offensive force.

Shown below is the contribution the "light" Nike-X deployment (described on page 22) might make to the survival of our Minuteman force against the greater-than-expected Soviet threat, compared with the "No Defense" case:

	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73		FY 74
No Defense Case
MM Surviving	710	340	205	120		90
Nike-X Defense
ABM Interceptors	0	55	495	805	855
MM Surviving/a/	710	340	370	300	280

Thus, the "light" Nike-X deployment (with a total investment cost of about $4 billion and an annual operating cost of about $200 million) would be able to maintain the Minuteman force's retaliatory capability even against the higher-than-expected threat.

As I noted earlier, a limited deployment of the Nike-X would, as a by-product, also help to reduce U.S. fatalities from a Soviet attack. Shown below is the contribution such a system could make in 1974 if the Soviets do not react to our ABM deployment:

	Number of Fatalities in an All-out Strategic Exchange (in millions), 1974
	Soviets Strike First, US Retaliates		US Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate
U.S. Programs	US Fat.	Sov. Fat.	US Fat.	Sov. Fat.
No ABM Def	100	[*]	80	[*]
Lt ABM Def (No Sov Reaction)/b/	85	[*]	65	[*]

[*entry in table not declassified]

But with a limited and low-cost reaction the Soviets could offset the benefits of this Nike-X deployment.

With regard to our NATO Allies, two questions arise: (1) What would be their reaction to our deployment of an ABM system?; and (2) Would they want to deploy such a system?

Some European governments and many European specialists in defense and arms control matters have exhibited a growing interest in ABM defense. At the insistence of several European countries, ABM defense was discussed at the recent NATO arms control experts conference. The European and Canadian attitude as expressed at the NATO meeting was generally hostile to a U.S. ABM deployment. The same attitude was expressed by the U.K. delegation at the recent U.S.-U.K. bilateral talks on ABMs. This reaction appears to be based on a desire to avoid an accelerated arms race which Europeans believe would upset the detente. There is also some fear on the part of the British that an ABM race would price them out of the nuclear business.

Even if the U.S. offered the Europeans a similar system, it is unlikely that they would accept; only Germany has expressed a mild interest thus far. This is so for several reasons. First, the cost (at least $6 billion, and probably more, for a meaningful system) would involve a substantial increase in their defense budgets. Second, the European preoccupation with deterrence rather than defense makes it unlikely that they would pay for such an ABM system. Third, the Europeans are unlikely to achieve the degree of political and decision-making unity which would be necessary to deploy an effective ABM system.

Perhaps the most difficult problem we will have to face in a decision not to deploy at this time an ABM system for defense of our cities against a Soviet ballistic missile attack is the attitude of our Congress and our people. The first reaction of most Americans to the events I have described at the beginning of this memorandum will inevitably be in favor of an immediate start on production and deployment, if for no other reason than the Soviets are deploying such a system. More mature reflection on all of the factors involved in this vastly complex problem should convince at least the majority of the informed public that any attempt on our part to build an ABM defense which could keep our fatalities in a Soviet "second strike" below what the Soviets consider would deter a U.S. attack, would almost certainly force them to respond by increasing their offensive forces and would therefore be self-defeating. But a massive program will have to be undertaken to present all of the relevant information, and in an understandable form, to both the Congress and the general public. Without such an understanding, we cannot hope to gain their support for a sensible ABM program.

In view of the great uncertainties surrounding both the Soviet and Chinese Communist missile threats over the next five to ten years, and the advantages that even a limited ABM defense might offer in dealing with possible accidental and "nuclear blackmail" attacks, a "light" deployment of the Nike-X may be worth its cost. But none of the four purposes for which deployment of Nike-X might make sense would justify a crash program at this time. Even without an ABM defense, and even if the higher-than-expected Soviet threat develops, our surviving offensive missile and bomber forces could inflict at least [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on the Soviet Union in 1974. Moreover, we do not know when, if ever, the higher-than-expected Soviet threat will develop. Nor do we believe that the Chinese Communists could have a significant number of ICBMs before the mid-1970s. (The possibilities of accidental or "nuclear blackmail" attacks probably would not, in themselves, justify even a "light" deployment of the Nike-X.) Finally, much work remains to be done in the development, test and evaluation of the Nike-X system.

Accordingly, Mr. Vance and I recommend that:

1. We not deploy the Nike-X system at this time for the defense of our cities against a Soviet missile attack.

2. We initiate, on an orderly basis, a "light" deployment of the Nike-X, specifically and exclusively designed to satisfy the first four purposes.

3. You approve a total program of about $ million for FY 1967 and $ million for FY 1968, including RDT&E, procurement, construction, etc. (The Congress in FY 1967 provided a total of $614.7 million for Nike-X compared with $446.8 million in the budget request. The additional $167.9 million was for production.)

4. You authorize the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union designed, through formal or informal agreement, to limit the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems.

Washington, December 22, 1966, 4:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

You are aware of the debate about whether the massive Tallinn system is or is not ABM.

The latest evidence from the CIA,/2/ summarized below, suggests it is not ABM-associated.

"The identification of six new complexes since July provides further evidence that the Tallinn system will be extensively deployed. Three of the new complexes are too far East to receive inputs from known ABM radars; this supports the view that the intended mission of the system is defense against aerodynamic targets. It is estimated that 75 complexes containing 240 launch sites will be deployed by 1971."

Walt

JCSM-804-66

Washington, December 29, 1966.

SUBJECT
Production and Deployment of Nike-X (C)

1. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed your revised draft memorandum for the President, dated 22 December 1966, subject: "Production and Deployment of the Nike-X,"/2/ and have noted the alternative proposal for Nike-X deployment recommended therein. They do not consider that detailed comments on the draft memorandum are required; however, they suggest that the draft memorandum should be amended to set forth more adequately a rationale supporting the recommended deployment.

2. (S) The DEPEX II deployment of Nike-X that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to you is designed to counter an evolving USSR and CPR threat to the United States. They consider that the proposed Nike-X deployment alternative will not be able to cope with all aspects of the evolving threat. They agree, however, that this modified deployment will provide some measure of area and city defense, provide partial protection of Minuteman sites, guard against the consequences of accidental launch of nuclear missiles toward the United States, and discourage the use of "nuclear blackmail."

3. (S) The inclusion of ABM systems in any arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union raises complex political, military and psychological problems, many of which stem from the developing communist Chinese nuclear capability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the military aspects of such negotiations should be carefully weighed prior to and during negotiations; they are prepared to provide appropriate advice as needed. In any event, deployment of Nike-X should not be delayed pending initiation or conclusion of arms control negotiations since, apart from the military requirement, implementation of the proposed deployment of Nike-X would provide the United States useful negotiating leverage.

4. (S) In summary, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their previous recommendations stated in JCSM-742-66, dated 2 December 1966, subject as above,/3/ they support the proposed deployment of Nike-X as a first step in attaining a critically-needed ballistic missile defense capability, recognizing and emphasizing that the ultimate deployment of Nike-X must be predicated on present and future developments in offensive and defensive strategic systems.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

CA-4864

Washington, December 31, 1966, 2:16 p.m.

SUBJECT
Recent Developments in Strategic Forces

1. This message provides background information and guidance concerning developments bearing on the strategic (nuclear) relationships of the US with the Soviet Union and Communist China.

2. Posts may, of course, employ freely what has been said publicly by US officials. (Paragraphs C1a, C2f, C5a, b, c, and C6b, c, d below.) The remaining material in sections B and C is available for informal discussions with officials of other governments if they themselves inquire. In view of the complexity of technical and other aspects and the need to relate inter-governmental exchanges with on-going studies and conclusions in Washington, it is requested that serious governmental inquiries be referred to Washington for guidance. We do not wish press stories out of other capitals about USG views on ABMs or our assessment of strategic facts. It is expected there will be further public discussion of these matters here in connection with presentations to Congress. Therefore suggest posts abroad not use this material for background briefings but refer press inquiries to Washington.

3. It is recognized that the material will not be equally useful or appropriate for all posts. Additional classified information will in due course be provided to allies.

4. Policy implications of the developments discussed below continue under review. On the one hand, this review may lead to further arms control efforts. On the other hand, further consideration is being given to US deployment of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. The material below is not intended to prejudge or prejudice either approach.

5. Addressee posts are requested to report any significant and spontaneous host country press or other comments on strategic developments. Negative reports are not required.

1. Objectives of US Strategic Forces

a. Our strategic forces are the product of necessity rather than of aggressive designs against any nation. Changes in our strategic forces will not adversely affect US efforts for constructive interchange with the Soviet Union and with Communist China. Rather, further changes will afford a prudent basis for continuing such efforts.

b. We would much prefer to see strategic armaments remain at pres-ent levels and, indeed, would hope to reduce them. But to date, many of our efforts to halt the arms race have not borne fruit. We shall continue these efforts, but meanwhile, we must also continue to maintain the strength and flexibility essential to deterrence.

c. It is in our interest, and that of our allies, to preclude any possibility of miscalculation by the Soviet Union or Communist China. Preventing miscalculation and maintaining deterrence requires the continuing effectiveness of tactical nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities as well as strategic capabilities. In the Soviet case our purpose of maintaining a spectrum of capabilities is to assure that they are not tempted to exploit mutual deterrence at the strategic level by risking conflict at lower levels of the hostilities spectrum.

d. Over the past twenty years, the US has developed forces and arms control techniques to ensure that its military strength will remain constantly responsive to the peaceful purposes of deterring aggression and preventing the outbreak of war. Our concern is to preserve military stability, for it is from instability that tension, miscalculations and war could come.

2. Present Trends in Perspective

a. In the light of the foregoing objectives, the main points respecting on-going changes in strategic capabilities are as follows:

(1) Our purposes in maintaining strong strategic capabilities are peaceful.

(2) The effectiveness of the US strategic deterrent is not impaired by changes in Soviet capabilities, or by the ChiCom nuclear weapons effort.

(3) There is no gap in strategic technology, including anti-ballistic missile (ABM) technology in the Soviet Union's favor. In fact US ABM technology is more highly developed.

(4) Our nuclear guarantees to our allies remain valid.

(5) Changes in our own strategic capabilities do not reflect any change in our intentions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or Communist China, but represent prudent measures to maintain deterrence.

(6) We have no intentions of increasing tensions; we are determined to maintain a strong strategic posture in the face of continuing Soviet and ChiCom efforts.

b. We desire these points to be understood by the Soviet Union and Communist China as well as others.

C. Questions and Answers

1. What changes is the Soviet Union making in its strategic offensive and defensive capabilities?

a. On November 10, 1966 Secretary McNamara stated publicly that the Soviet Union has initiated deployment of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system./2/ On December 6 he said that the Soviets appeared to have begun an accelerated build-up of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well./3/

b. In building up their ICBM force, the Soviets are continuing to disperse their missiles in hardened silos. The Soviets are evidently seeking to remedy to some extent the inferiority and vulnerability of their ICBM deterrent force. We do not find this surprising or alarming.

c. The first known Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) deployments are in the Moscow area. These may become operational over the next several years. We regard this system as limited in technical sophistication and consider it inferior to our Nike-X anti-ballistic missile development. The Soviet Union has always invested heavily in defensive systems, and their initiation of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) deployment is consistent with past practice. However, we have concluded that they are expending their resources on a system we could readily overcome.

d. We do not know how far either of these trends in offensive and defensive capabilities will be carried. We shall maintain the effectiveness of our deterrent by retaining the capability to inflict very severe damage on the Soviet Union under any circumstances.

2. What changes is the US making in its strategic capabilities?

a. Our Minuteman and Polaris forces have been designed to provide a secure, survivable, non-provocative deterrent which would be capable of inflicting very severe damage on the Soviet Union even if it should initiate a first-strike. Our planned build-up of these systems is now almost complete. We are not now planning further increases in the number of Minuteman and Polaris launchers.

b. Because we had for some time foreseen the possibility of changes on the Soviet side, including the possibility of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) deployment, we have developed significant qualitative improvements. We now plan to introduce the Minuteman III and Poseidon ballistic missiles in the late 1960's to replace some of the older versions of Minuteman and many of the present Polaris ballistic missiles.

c. A principal qualitative change is that Minuteman III and Poseidon will be able to launch heavier payloads than our present missiles. These heavier payloads do not mean that we are planning to increase the megatonnage that could be directed against the Soviet Union. They will add to our ability to launch adequate numbers of devices such as decoys and multiple warheads which will ensure that we can penetrate Soviet defenses.

d. One point that should be recognized concerning changes in offensive capabilities is that the Soviet Union is introducing quantitative changes whereas the US is now pursuing qualitative changes. As a result, the Soviet Union can be expected to narrow the numerical gap in ICBMs that has for some time existed in our favor. However, more is involved than numbers in determining the effectiveness and significance of strategic forces. Although we could, if there were need, substantially increase our own number of launchers, qualitative superiority will continue to yield a number of advantages.

--A more flexible force;

--A more accurate force, which is able to employ relatively small warheads with greater effect than would be the case with larger warheads launched with lesser accuracy;

--A more survivable force which includes not only ICBMs dispersed in hardened silos but also a substantial, wholly invulnerable sea-based component.

--A force with a greater capability to penetrate defenses.

e. Although we do expect to maintain an overall numerical edge for some time, our emphasis on qualitative improvements will meet our deterrent needs in the face of the probable Soviet offensive build-up and its introduction of anti-ballistic missile (ABMs).

f. In his December 6 statement Secretary McNamara said:

"It is vital that these three major points are clearly understood by the American public:

"1. Even if the new intelligence estimate for mid-1968 proves accurate, the US, without taking any actions beyond those already planned, will continue to have a substantial quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Soviet Union in ICBMs at that time.

"2. The US has as many ICBMs today as the latest national intelligence estimate gives the Soviet Union several years hence.

"3. Our strategic offensive forces have today and will continue to have in the future the capability of absorbing a deliberate first strike and retaliating with sufficient strength to inflict unacceptable damage upon the aggressor or any combination of aggressors."

3. How can we be sure that we can penetrate Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses?

a. The type of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense that technology now permits--and this is true of Soviet technology as well as our own--does not represent a kind of impenetrable umbrella that could offer sure protection against incoming missile warheads.

b. The way to think of an anti-missile missile is a very advanced interceptor. In effect, it would be assigned to "shoot down" or neutralize an incoming warhead just as a SAM (surface-to-air missile) or fighter might be assigned to intercept a manned bomber.

c. Depending on the particular ABM techniques, this effort to intercept incoming warheads might take place outside the atmosphere, or it might occur after the warhead has reentered the earth's atmosphere. Both approaches might be involved, the one supplementing the other.

d. In confronting this kind of defense, we will employ a number of different techniques which we have been working on for some years. Obviously, we are not going to discuss these in detail. However, broadly speaking, they can be thought of as complicating the defense's tasks of identifying incoming warheads and of destroying them if they are identified.

e. A key point is that Soviet defenses would have to intercept a very large number of objects, including large numbers of warheads. In addition to attempting to cope with a large number of warheads, we are sure that they will not be able to distinguish effectively between what might be decoys or other penetration devices and what might be warheads. They would have to "shoot" at everything, and they would exhaust their supply of interceptors in doing so, if they were not already overwhelmed by the scale of attack. In effect, then, we can confront them with more targets than their interceptors could manage.

4. What about deploying our own Nike X ABM?

a. In the face of Soviet ABM deployment, we are giving priority to ensuring the effectiveness of our offensive deterrent force. In this way, we are precluding the emergence of an "anti-missile gap" which could occur if we could not penetrate their defenses.

b. As for the Nike X anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system which we are developing, we are satisfied on technical grounds that it is more advanced than the Soviet system. But like Soviet ABMs, Nike X would not provide "perfect" defense against a large-scale attack by a sophisticated missile force. A major deployment would be costly, and its potential effectiveness would depend in part on such uncertainties as the changes the Soviets might make in their own capabilities in response to such a deployment. Under some assumptions, US defenses would be relatively ineffective. Under other assumptions, US defenses might limit damage and reduce casualties.

c. A more limited deployment might be effective against some forms of light Soviet attacks or accidents and very effective against a Chinese Communist nuclear missile capability. It could also be designed to protect our strategic offensive forces. (The Soviet system, for example, can be expected to be highly effective against any small nuclear force.)

d. All of these considerations have a bearing on the question of deploying Nike X. The development effort is being continued, and we are continuing to examine the questions of whether to deploy and what level of defense might be sought. We have not at this time arrived at any decision.

5. Would the US favor a freeze on ABM deployment?

a. In his news conference of December 21, 1966 Secretary Rusk made the following statement in response to questions:/4/

"We would regret very much the lifting of the arms race to an entirely new plateau of major expenditures.

"As you know, we made earlier to the Geneva Conference proposals for freezes and limitations on the further production of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.

"We would like to see some means developed by which both would not have to go into wholly new and unprecedented levels of military expenditure, with perhaps no perceptible result in the total strategic situation.

"This is a matter that is before the Geneva Conference. We and the Soviet Union are co-chairmen.

"I presume that there will be further contacts on this matter. But I cannot go into more detail at this point."

b. Secretary Rusk added that there has been no progress on the matter thus far at the Geneva Conference, that the Conference is to resume in February, and that he could not anticipate at this point what might be the results.

c. Our original freeze proposal to which Secretary Rusk referred was in the following terms:

"The US, the Soviet Union and their respective allies should agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. For our part, we are convinced that the security of all nations can be safeguarded within the scope of such an agreement and that this initial measure preventing the further expansion of the deadly and costly arms race will open the path to reductions in all types of forces from present levels."/5/

d. Several suggestions have been made for freezing or limiting anti-ballistic missile (ABM) deployment only, that is without a corresponding freeze on offensive systems. We have not proposed any of these approaches. They continue to be studied.

6. How significant are Communist China's nuclear weapons and missile development programs?

a. We had estimated that Communist China would be able to deploy medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) initially in the next several years. They have not tested a short-range guided missile with a nuclear warhead, and they thus seem to be progressing on a schedule consistent with our estimate.

b. While they do not yet have a militarily useful nuclear capability, they could pose a potential nuclear threat against their neighbors in Asia within a few years. At the time of the initial ChiCom nuclear test in 1964, President Johnson made the following statement concerning our defense commitments:

"The US reaffirms its defense commitments in Asia. Even if Communist China should eventually develop an effective nuclear capability, that capability would have no effect upon the readiness of the US to respond to requests from Asian nations for help in dealing with Communist Chinese aggression. The US will also not be diverted from its efforts to help the nations of Asia to defend themselves and to advance the welfare of their people."/6/

c. The President also announced that it would be our policy to provide support to non-nuclear countries threatened by ChiCom "nuclear blackmail".

d. In October 1966 in Malaysia the President made the following further statement: "The leaders of China must realize that any nuclear capability they can develop can--and will--be deterred. A peaceful China can expect friendship and cooperation . . . a reckless China can expect vigilance and strength."/7/

e. We would suppose that Communist China is interested in and possibly working on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as well as on MRBMs, since an ICBM might be viewed as having political and psychological values from Communist China's standpoint. We can't predict when a token ICBM might be demonstrated. It is possible that Communist China might have a few ICBMs by the early 1970's.

f. As for our capabilities vis-a-vis the Communist Chinese, we will for the foreseeable future have such a marked superiority that it would be suicidal for them to attempt a nuclear attack on the US. They will have no prospect whatever of mounting a disarming strike against us. We, on the other hand, will continue to possess a vastly larger, much more reliable, and substantially more flexible force. In addition, we could for some years negate any ChiCom nuclear threat to the US, with a light anti-ballistic missile deployment if it should be determined that such a deployment would be desirable.

7. Has the US considered the effects of ABM deployment on our allies?

a. We have been giving this matter considerable attention. We have discussed aspects of the ABM question with a number of our allies and anticipate further discussion. To date, such discussions have been very general and have concerned such matters as the status of US ABM development, strategic and other implications of ABM deployment, and arms control aspects.

b. We have also been undertaking preliminary technical studies of the possible utility of ABMs for defense of other countries. Our purpose has been to obtain a better understanding of potential cost and effectiveness. Our analysis of such basic questions has not yet been completed. (FYI. We do not wish to encourage discussion of overseas deployment of ABM at this time. End FYI.)

c. We plan to keep our allies advised of our plans as we have in the past.

Rusk

JCSM-812-66

Washington, January 3, 1967.

SUBJECT
Planning for Improving Survivability of the National Command Authorities (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:

a. DOD Directive S-5100.30, dated 16 October 1962, subject: "Concept of Operations of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System."2

b. DOD Directive S-5100.44, dated 9 June 1964, subject: "Master Plan for the National Military Command System."/2/

c. JCSM-103-64, dated 25 February 1964, subject: "The Continuity of Operations Plan for the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (COOP-OJCS) (U)."/3/

2. (S) The references provide the concept and plans to insure the survivability of a command and control system and the necessary staff personnel to support the National Command Authorities (NCA) in the strategic direction of US military forces throughout the entire spectrum of cold, limited, and general war. Currently, there is no adequate plan to insure the survivability of the NCA or their authorized successors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a credible policy of controlled response requires that such a plan be prepared. Therefore, the plan outlined herein is submitted for your consideration and recommendation to the President.

3. (S) As reflected in reference 1c, present continuity planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides the necessary flexibility to adapt to whatever relocation action the President may select in an emergency. However, there is no assurance that such relocation action will be initiated in sufficient time nor, if initiated in time, that it would ensure survival of the present NCA. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a plan should be developed to disperse designated successors to the NCA to existing facilities of the National Military Command System (NMCS) in the following manner:

a. Based on the established line of succession to the individual offices comprising the NCA, the following three groups of alternate NCA should be designated:

[3 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) not declassified]

b. The proposed alternate command groups have been kept small to improve their mobility. However, provision would be made for one or two individuals to accompany each member of the groups, if desired. For example, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has not been included in any of the groups in this concept in the event you desire that he accompany you.

c. According to the situation and Presidential desire, the groups of alternate NCA would relocate during a crisis escalation, one to each of the three alternate command centers of the NMCS. Command center communications would permit participation of the relocated groups in national deliberations.

[1 paragraph (8-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that specific procedures should be established to execute this plan as a means of preventing all legal successors to the NCA, and their key advisors, from becoming casualties at the same time. Timely dispersal of designated persons in line of succession to the NCA to the alternate command centers of the NMCS is believed to be the best method for assuring that recognized NCA are available for direction of military operations. The persons designated by law as successors to the NCA should be briefed on the plan and made familiar with its procedures.

5. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a memorandum substantially the same as that contained in the Appendix hereto,/4/ which advocates the development of such a plan, be forwarded to the President, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff