Washington, January 4, 1967.

SUBJECT
ABM Deployment

The Administration is now considering a proposal to initiate in FY-68 the deployment of a "light" ABM defense of the United States. While there are many pros and cons to this complex question, I believe that on balance such a system is not only unnecessary at this time but, in fact, contrary to our net strategic interests.

The purpose of this ''light" ABM system would be primarily to provide a high level of protection against any Chinese missile capability that would emerge in the 70s and to increase the survivability of our Minuteman force against a massive Soviet counterforce attack. It is not claimed that the system would be able to defend U.S. cities against a heavy, sophisticated Soviet missile attack.

My objection to the deployment of the proposed ABM system is not based on any difference with the DOD's evaluation of the system's technical capabilities. Although one cannot rule out the possibility of catastrophic failure of such a complex system, I know of no specific reason to question the conclusions that the proposed system is probably capable of providing effective defense against early Chinese ICBMs and of increasing the survivability of our Minuteman force. The DOD has accurately stated the limitations of such a system against a massive sophisticated Soviet attack. While I believe that the weight of evidence indicates that the Soviets are not undertaking a massive ABM deployment but only a rather pedestrian effort around Moscow, I consider the DOD's somewhat more cautious appraisal entirely reasonable in the circumstances. In any event, I am in full agreement with the DOD's conclusion that the appropriate U.S. response to a Soviet ABM deployment is an improvement of our penetration capabilities and not an ABM deployment.

Accepting then the stated limited objectives of the proposed system, I believe that it is by no means demonstrated that it is in fact necessary to initiate deployment of such a system in FY-68.

--Protection against China. I am not convinced that there is a real military case for deploying a system at this time against a future Chinese ICBM threat. While a limited ABM deployment would have an IOC of less than four years and could be fully deployed in six years, it is unlikely that the Chinese will have even a token ICBM capability before the mid-70s. If the Chinese seek to achieve an earlier direct nuclear threat to the United States, it will probably come in the form of short-range submarine-launched ballistic or aerodynamic missiles. Against this threat, the proposed "light" ABM deployment would be relatively ineffective since short-range ballistic or aerodynamic missiles could be directed against undefended targets on the coast or fly under the ABM defenses. More fundamentally, it is by no means clear that there is a military requirement for such a system even when the Chinese ICBM force comes into being. Our massive strategic forces provide us with a very high confidence capability to conduct a pre-emptive strike against a small force of soft ICBMs with relatively slow reaction times. Therefore, as a "blackmail" weapon against the U.S., such a Chinese force would appear to have little value and would in fact be an open invitation to a catastrophic disarming attack by this country against China. As a deterrent, such a Chinese force would also appear to have little value since the Chinese could not hope to use it without assuring the total destruction of China. We have pursued our policies in the past in the face of a tremendously larger Soviet deterrent force, and there does not appear to be any clear reason why we would not continue to do so in the future in the face of a very small early Chinese ICBM capability.

--Protection of our Minuteman Force. Although I believe there is no question that such a system would improve the survivability of Minuteman, it is by no means clear that there is any requirement to accomplish this on the proposed time scale. We are making a major investment in Poseidon and the upgrading of Minuteman to assure our penetration capabilities against the worst plausible Soviet missile and ABM threats through the mid-70s. The Soviet threat will in all likelihood not evolve this rapidly; and, even if it does, there will still be adequate time in the future to deploy defenses for our strategic forces. In this connection, it is by no means clear that the proposed system is in fact the most cost effective way to defend hard sites such as Minuteman. This question should be examined in detail as part of the broader study that is now under way to determine appropriate follow-on systems to Poseidon and Minuteman to maintain our strategic posture in the period after the mid-70s.

If the above were the only considerations, it might still be argued that the expenditure of $6 billion over the next five or six years would be a relatively small price to pay for the added insurance that such a system might give in the event that we have seriously misjudged Chinese or Soviet capabilities or intentions. I believe, however, that a decision to deploy would probably have the following highly undesirable consequences that will be to our net disadvantage.

--Soviet-U.S. Relations. Despite our efforts to explain the limited objectives of our ABM deployment, the decision would very probably lead to a substantial escalation in Soviet strategic offensive and defensive armaments, which in turn would almost certainly escalate the level of our own forces. The latest NIE concludes that the future of the Soviet ABM deployment will in part depend on the Soviet reaction to our own strategic decisions./2/ Whatever the true nature of the present Soviet ABM deployment, I believe that a decision on our part to deploy an ABM system would assure that they will undertake an extensive ABM deployment. Moreover, this decision will put pressure on the Soviets to increase the level of their missile forces beyond whatever their present plans may be and to upgrade the penetration capability of their existing missile forces. This would in turn put pressure on us to increase our strategic forces and upgrade the capability of our ABM system. Even if such an arms race does not actually increase the immediate danger of war, it would certainly increase the tensions between the U.S. and the USSR. Although it is difficult to evaluate the impact of this development on internal Soviet affairs, the increasing demands of a major build-up in Soviet military expenditures will put increasing pressure on the present civilian Soviet leadership with the danger that there will be a trend back to Stalinist attitudes.

--Western Europe. The decision could have a very divisive effect on our relations with Western Europe. Despite our efforts to explain the limited purpose of our "light" deployment, it would probably prove very difficult to explain to Western Europeans why a similar deployment could not be helpful in protecting them from Soviet "blackmail," particularly since such a system might be technically quite effective against existing Soviet IRBMs targeted on Western Europe. If the Europeans should press us to assist them in developing their own ABM, there would appear to be real political problems in denying them this defense; and, despite any plans to the contrary, we would probably end up paying most of the bill. A more likely consequence, however, would be that the decision would feed the forces of neutralism in Western Europe to the detriment of NATO since it would be argued that Europe is now a defenseless pawn in an arms race in which they could not meaningfully participate.

--Far East. A decision of this magnitude based in large part on the Chinese threat would greatly enhance the image of Chinese military capabilities in the Far East. Despite our arguments that this will increase our flexibility in dealing with China, the net effect would probably be to increase substantially Chinese prestige with its neighbors. It would be extremely difficult to explain to Japan and India why they should not also have an ABM system to protect them from Chinese "blackmail," and there is little question that we would have to subsidize most, if not all, of the cost of such systems in these countries.

--U.S. Domestic Relations. Although it will be argued that any decision on this problem will remove it as a political issue, I believe that the proposed "light" defense will actually be a very poor solution from the point of view of domestic politics in that it will satisfy no one. On the liberal wing, the decision will be widely attacked as an unnecessary and dangerous expense further undercutting the prospects of the Great Society. On the conservative wing, the decision will be attacked as inadequate and as a devious device to avoid coming to grips with the real problem of providing real protection for the U.S. population against a Soviet attack. The majority of people, who are not really particularly interested in this problem anyway, will be presented with a spectacle of a major Administration decision which is attacked on all sides.

The effect of this decision on the plans for the Great Society may in fact be much greater than is now apparent. Although the estimated cost of $6 billion for the "light" defense (even if it in fact increases by a factor of two, as could easily be the case on the basis of past experience) would appear to be easily absorbed over the next six years, I believe that this is simply the first installment on a much larger system. I believe that the system at the proposed level is politically unviable and that it would be very difficult to prevent it from expanding over the next few years into the complete Nike-X defense system that the military really wants. It will be extremely difficult to explain to some parts of the country why they are not defended while other parts of the country are. Despite protestations as to the inherent limitations of such a system, there will be a major military-industrial lobby to explain the potential defense capabilities of an expanded system. It is estimated that the cost of such a system would be on the order of $20 billion, which again could easily increase by a factor of two. To this would have to be added the cost of a nationwide shelter program, an improved air defense program to balance the capabilities of the ABM system, and eventually radically improved strategic forces to compensate for the almost inevitable increases in Soviet strategic forces to compensate for our defensive effort.

--International Arms Control. The decision would come at a particularly unfortunate time from the point of view of arms control. There appear to be real prospects that in the next month or so we will come to agreement with the Soviet Union on a Non-Proliferation Treaty which is acceptable to our allies./3/ This treaty will be meaningless unless the major non-nuclear countries sign it. The fact that the United States and the Soviet Union concurrently undertake another major step in the escalation of nuclear armaments may well be seized upon by such countries as India and Japan as a reason for not signing the treaty. Beyond this, as the pace of the ABM development accelerates, I believe that a serious question will develop as to whether the Limited Test Ban Treaty/4/ can survive since it will be argued with increasing vehemence that many of the problems associated with the effectiveness of such a system cannot be fully answered without further atmospheric testing.

In view of the above considerations, I recommend that--

1. We should not make a formal decision to deploy a "light" ABM defense in connection with the FY-68 budget.

2. We should state in the budget message that the subject is under continuing study and that, if a positive decision to deploy is reached, a supplemental request will be submitted.

3. We should encourage a continued Congressional and public discussion of this entire issue.

4. We should continue an intensive effort to involve the Soviets in serious discussions of this issue--with the objective of clarifying the nature of their present ABM system and obtaining agreement to freeze further deployment of ABMs for an agreed period of time.

Washington, January 4, 1967.

PRESENT

Secretary McNamara	The Vice President
Gen. Wheeler	John Foster
Gen. Harold K. Johnson	Secretary Harold Brown
Adm. David McDonald	Secretary Stanley Resor
Gen. John McConnell	Lt. Gen. Harold Mangrum
Cyrus Vance	Dr. Donald Hornig
Gen. Alfred Gruenther	Dr. George Kistiakowsky
Dr. James R. Killian	Mr. Robert Kintner
Dr. Jerome Wiesner	Mr. Bill Moyers
Herbert F. York	Mr. Walt Rostow

SUBJECT
ABM's

The President thanked those who had come from out of town for attending, and asked Secy. McNamara to pose the issue.

Secy. McNamara stated, in accordance with a draft paper which had been distributed,/2/ that we faced essentially this choice with respect to an ABM system:

--do nothing;

--set up a limited so-called "thin" system with a capability: to protect against Chicom missiles; accidentally launched missiles; nuclear blackmail; and to furnish additional protection for our Minuteman;

--install a system capable of protecting our population against heavy sophisticated Soviet attack.

He stated that he would now solicit the views of the JCS, the Science Advisors to the President, and others.

He turned to Gen. Wheeler, who spoke for the JCS. Gen. Wheeler proposed, as the JCS had in the Austin meeting with the President,/3/ that we install a Nike-X system on a scale capable of protecting 25 major population centers. This would provide a damage-limiting capability; introduce uncertainties about Soviet capabilities which would make them more cautious at a time of crisis; stabilize the nuclear balance; demonstrate that the U.S. was not first-strike minded; and deny the Soviet Union a first-strike capability.

The proposed Nike-X deployment could not cope with all attacks upon us, but it would provide substantial population protection. It would also provide the four benefits cited for the limited "thin" system.

In short, the JCS reaffirmed its previous position of support for Nike-X deployment to protect 25 population centers.

The views of the Science Advisors were then solicited by seniority, beginning with Dr. Killian.

Dr. Killian stated that he had addressed himself to this important matter, putting political considerations aside, although he was aware that they were extremely important. He was not persuaded about the need for the minimum first-step in the form of a limited system. Beyond the first step an ABM system would be "extremely dangerous." If politics required the first step, the thin system of Secy. McNamara was the most sensible. He hoped it would not be necessary. He recognized that it might, however, be an advantage to have committed ourselves to the first step in negotiating with the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kistiakowsky stated the issue was of very great importance. He agreed completely with the arguments of those who were against massive deployment of an ABM. The argument was complex, but in essence it was this: our system of deterrence is designed now to prevent a nuclear war. The mounting of an ABM system constitutes preparation for nuclear war. It would lead to a radical acceleration of the arms race, in which "all hope would be lost" for arms control agreements.

He felt the same arguments applied to a limited "first step." The international effects would be the same; but they would be stretched out over time. The pressure for expansion of the system would be great and irresistible.

Moreover, he did not believe it would even be effective against Chicom nuclear blackmail. They would prove ingenious and could turn, for example, to submarine-launched delivery systems, or to a dirty bomb exploded, say, 50 miles off shore.

He also doubted that the thin system was the optimum for protecting Minuteman against Soviet attack.

Therefore, he recommended against deployment while we undertook a major diplomatic effort to persuade the Soviet Union to stand down. Conceivably, we might put into the budget certain long lead time items for an ABM system to increase our bargaining leverage.

Dr. Wiesner stated that he supported the arguments presented by his two predecessors. An ABM system cannot buy defense against Soviet attack. He stated that U.S. and Soviet decisions to deploy ABM's would lead to greater casualties in a nuclear war, not less. There is a built-in tendency to overbuild in compensation for the erection of a defensive system. The history of Soviet anti-aircraft in relation to the expansion of our own Strategic Air Command illustrates this tendency. It is inherent in an offensive-defensive race.

With respect to Communist China, there is no need for an ABM system. We can rely on normal deterrence. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

The Chinese already have missile-carrying submarines, and our ABM's would provide no protection against them.

Finally, Dr. Wiesner said that the introduction of an ABM race would lead to great uncertainty and destabilize the arms race. We shall certainly overbuild in response to the Soviet ABM's. He noted that he had spent a great deal of his mature life working on defensive systems: first, anti-aircraft, than ABM's. He is now convinced that in the game of nuclear deterrence, defense doesn't work. The offense will always overcome. He noted the irony of his present position in opposition to the JCS since, at an earlier time, the JCS had strongly opposed him when he was supporting an air defense system. (General Wheeler noted that it was a different JCS.)

Dr. Hornig concurred with what had been said by his predecessors. He noted the issue had been reviewed by three Science Advisory panels. He concluded that it was not feasible to have an effective defense against missiles. The facts were that the Soviet Union had taken steps to deploy a limited system around Moscow. It was a poor system and penetrable. His own people believe the second system now being deployed in the Soviet Union is not ABM but air defense. Against this background and the problems of escalation inherent in an ABM deployment, he believed it unwise to take the major step recommended by the JCS.

As for a thin system, he believed that the balance vis-a-vis the Chinese was such that we did not require an ABM system for that purpose; although a thin system could help against an accidentally launched missile; against an Nth country with nuclear capability stirring up trouble; and it could provide some additional protection to our Minuteman.

If it were believed that it would help in our negotiations with the USSR for an ABM-missile freeze, he would tend to support a limited system. He would, however, proceed slower than the thin system proposed by Secy. McNamara until we had a definitive response from the Soviet Union.

Gen. Gruenther stated that he subscribed to the limited thin system outlined by Secy. McNamara. He would support this light deployment for the four purposes sketched by the Secretary.

He wished to underline the disagreement in the intelligence community about the functions of the Tallinn system; all hands did not agree that it was strictly anti-aircraft. He said that we should not put excessive hopes in diplomatic negotiations on this question. In saying that, he wanted it understood that he believed in arms control as the right solution to the security problem in a nuclear age; he was a member of Mr. John McCloy's advisory committee to ACDA. He was, simply, not optimistic about negotiating prospects.

Dr. York, former Director of Research and Engineering in the Department of Defense, stated his agreement with the science advisors. He supported a policy of: "Let's do nothing now." He said the case against full-scale deployment of Nike-X had been understated. The workings of the system could lead to an increase in casualties in a nuclear war. The most that might be said is that casualties might be cut.

What is certain, he said, is that the arms race would accelerate, and the net result would be, in the future, as in the past, that more American lives would be at risk each year. If the installation of our defensive system were the last move in the arms race, then, of course, less lives would be at risk. But that would not be the last move, and in the end, more U.S. lives would be in jeopardy.

As for the Soviet system, in his judgment, it is so ineffective that we can afford to defer a decision. He repeated: we should do nothing at this time.

We have a very vigorous R&D effort going forward. It creates a better potential ABM system each year. We should maintain that vigorous effort.

The President then asked Secy. McNamara to summarize. He said our choices are:

1. Do nothing.

2. The thin system with its four limited functions. It was estimated to cost $4.2 billion. We must count on the actual cost being 25 to 50% higher than that. It would cost $250 million a year to operate.

3. Installing Nike-X to protect the population in substantial numbers in 25 cities. This system is now estimated to cost $13 billion to build. We must expand that realistically to $20 billion. In fact, his estimate is that it would cost $40 billion in 10 years.

The argument against deployment was that the Soviet Union must build a system which will [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and have enough striking power left to inflict such casualties on the U.S. that we would not strike the Soviet Union in the first place. An ABM system is not capable of reducing U.S. casualties to the point where the Soviet Union would not be able to carry out its policy in this matter.

The counter-argument is that we could try and protect our population to some degree. His view is that the effort to protect would lead to an offensive increase in the Soviet Union which would more than offset our initial effort to protect our population.

As for the limited thin system, it might play some role in pushing the Soviet Union into negotiations, but we could not guarantee that. It offered some protection against a Chicom attack. He said that he would be more concerned than he now is, with our policy of bombing North Vietnam, if the Chicoms had ICBM's. A thin system could protect us against the kind of missile accident that, statistically, might happen with the passage of time and the multiplication of missiles. He referred to the Mace incident of January 4./4/ It might also provide some protection against nuclear blackmail.

He felt the decision about a limited thin system was "marginal."

As for the case for doing nothing, the President had heard the pros and cons.

The President asked Secy. McNamara for his recommendation. He said he would prefer to withhold judgment now and present his view to the President later./5/

The President then summarized: the Chiefs wish to go all the way; the scientists say No; but if we go we should go with a thin system because it might help our negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Secy. McNamara said it was his judgment that it would help; that the argument has some merit. There has been some evidence in the past 3-4 weeks. But the ABM problem is extremely difficult: once you start you are pregnant. It will be virtually impossible to stop.

The President then asked for a summary of intelligence on the Soviet system.

Secy. McNamara, asking Gen. Wheeler to correct him if he disagreed, stated that the assessment of Nov. 17, 1966, based on July information, showed disagreement in the intelligence community./6/ The majority agreed that a limited ABM system was being deployed around Moscow which was penetrable by heavy U.S. attack or through Polaris missiles. In addition, a wide-scale system was being deployed which might contain as many as 240 missiles by 1971. There was some evidence that this so-called Tallinn system was solely designed against aircraft; but others believed it was an ABM system, or dual purpose. In December we acquired new evidence that it is more probably anti-aircraft, since some units are not linked to the radar which is required to track missiles./7/

Secy. McNamara concluded by stating that, in his view, it made no difference. No defensive system could be effective. He recalled that when he became Secretary of Defense he first investigated the ability of SAC to penetrate the Soviet Union. To his surprise he found that the best estimates indicated that [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The Soviet Union has spent 2-1/2 times as much as the U.S. on defense and has not gotten any serious protection for those expenditures. The Soviets have an irrational bias towards defensive systems. Their present deployments around Moscow are not militarily justifiable, but represent an instinctive, almost theological desire to protect Moscow as the center of Russian life.

The President again thanked those present. He stated he would take their views into account. He was particularly grateful for those outside the government who again showed their willingness to serve. When he came to make his decision he would do so with greater confidence because they had come. He had talked with others about this matter, including General Eisenhower./8/

W.W. Rostow/9/

In the evening of January 4, 1967, Secretary McNamara telephoned the President. After a brief discussion of details on strategic stockpile sales in the defense budget, the two talked extensively about the ABM problem. When the President asked McNamara what he thought of the meeting with the Joint Chiefs and the former science advisers (see Document 166), McNamara replied:

"Well, the only reason I didn't give a recommendation when you asked for it, I didn't want them to hear what I say in view of you might decide differently . . . I still favor doing nothing as we initially recommended three or four weeks ago, but it would be a helluva political crisis if you did nothing. The forces pushing you to do something are very, very strong indeed. But I myself agree fully with Killian and the science advisers. I don't think we'll buy anything worth going ahead. But if we're to go ahead, then I think the best thing to do is the 'thin' system."

McNamara also mentioned that the President could ask for the views of the contractors who would profit from an ABM deployment. He said that he met with these high-level business executives about 2 weeks earlier, and "without qualifications" they were all opposed to an ABM system against the Soviet Union. When the President asked who these businessmen were, he gave their names. McNamara continued that these contractors were willing to support fully the "thin" system, however, and had worked out its technical capabilities, time schedule, amount of money required, and the protection it would provide against China and for the U.S. offensive systems.

President Johnson said that McNamara seemed to be saying that the full ABM system was "not worth the price," and McNamara replied, "To be absolutely honest with you, Mr. President, I don't." He believed, however, that Congress would "absolutely crucify him and through me you" if he testified against it, as he was prepared to do. But, McNamara continued, "I feel it's wrong."

The two discussed the difficulty in advocating a "thin" system, which would be a first step, and according to McNamara the Joint Chiefs would go along with a "thin" system on these terms. But the administration might be pushed, as McNamara put it, toward a heavy system costing $20 or $40 billion "that won't buy a damn thing." They also discussed proposing the "thin" system as a "contingency" and going to a full system if an agreement limiting ABMs could not be negotiated with the Soviet Union, but McNamara did not think much of this strategy.

President Johnson then asked, what if the administration started on a "thin" system and then got an agreement with the Soviet Union? "Oh, oh, yes, oh, yes, yes, yes, there's a real possibility of that, Mr. President," McNamara responded. He went on to summarize the Thompson-Dobrynin talks on ABM systems, and noted that he believed that the Soviets were willing to talk on the issue. Dobrynin had very recently given Thompson "a fair amount of information," from which McNamara theorized that the Soviets' ABM system was to protect Moscow "only as a symbol of all Russia, and that this Tallinn system probably is not an ABM system." Their ABM system might be extended "to Leningrad, Kiev, and a few other major centers," but the Soviets did not intend it to be "a very widespread deployment." Thus "it might be fairly simple to negotiate a limitation with them if we were willing to limit to something like Moscow. So I think there is a real possibility here of fruitful discussions."

At the end of their conversation, the President remarked, "So what it adds up to is you're against contingencies and really if you were in my position, you'd do nothing." "I guess, Mr. President," McNamara replied, "what I mean to say is that I'd go down fighting, and I'm damn sure I'd go down. [He laughs.] A lot easier for me to say." The President interjected, "Do you think that's wiser for us to do?" McNamara responded, "Well, I don't know, I don't know;" and he added that if the decision was to do nothing, the administration would have to wage "a tremendous publicity campaign" with editors, scientists, and opinion leaders to win public support.

President Johnson then turned to the budget. He said that Senator Russell wanted to see him before he closed it. McNamara urged him to see Russell before the opening of the next session of Congress. Russell, he warned, "is just going to tear us apart this year. He will probably want to tell you that we ought to go all the way on nuclear power for service ships and increase the bombing of North Vietnam and just a lot of other things. We ought to push ahead on a manned bomber and push ahead on the ABM and push ahead on new air defense and so on."

When the President asked whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff were "reconciled" to the budget, McNamara responded affirmatively, adding that "there's no great emotional feeling that they ought to have more." The Chiefs had had "a good hearing" and the decisions "were not bad." But the problem was that these were "emotional issues," and when the Chiefs testified before Congress, they would be told, "surely, you're a man and not a mouse," and they would like to add these programs to the defense budget. Put in these terms, the Chiefs would say "yes." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, January 4, 1967, 6:40 p.m., Tape F67.01, Side A; transcript prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this Foreign Relations volume)

Washington, January 5, 1967.

SUBJECT
Planning for Improving Survivability of the National Command Authorities (NCA)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that the President be asked to approve development of a plan to improve survivability of the National Command Authorities (Tab "B")/2/ based on a concept of pre-designation of the composition of Alternate NCA Groups, to include legal successors to the Presidency in each Group. The concept envisions three Alternate NCA Groups displacing to the three NMCC Alternates upon direction of the President under conditions of crises escalation. The purpose of the displacement is to insure that, in the event of general war, at least one Alternate NCA Group might survive to carry on the affairs of the nation. The JCS have suggested the following composition of the Alternate NCA Group, based on established lines of succession to the individual offices comprising the NCA:

[3 lists (5 lines of source text in each list) not declassified]

As you may recall, we studied the problem of DoD command and control support to the President in some depth in 1964,/3/ and, in doing so, we examined possible courses of action the President might take in respect to Alternate Decision Groups during intense crises or general war.

Although our study pointed out there might be some advantages to pre-designation and pre-location of Alternate Decision Groups that included legal successors to the Presidency, the nature of the problem would undoubtedly prevent such an arrangement. That is, many of those in the line of succession are the ones that the President will need most to assist him in coping with the situation. Further, those of the legal successors most suited to assume the Presidential role of the Commander-in-Chief are the very men the President will want most with him, and those of the legal successors most available for relocation are the men who would be least qualified to face the immediate responsibilities to which they succeeded./4/

Our study stated that " . . . the major decisions relating to utilization of an Alternate Decision Group that does not include the President will be made by the President at the time of crisis. The decisions will name the leader of the group, determine its composition, and select a time or condition for relocation. These are problems that are particularly sensitive to the desires of a particular President, to the relationships he has established with his Cabinet and with other personal advisors, and to the estimate of the situation he develops at the time the groups might be employed."

In our opinion this is a sound and realistic appraisal of the problem of pre-designation of Alternate Decision Groups that include Presidential successors, since the selection of an Alternate Decision Group is essentially a political matter resting solely with the President and based on conditions existing at the time. Accordingly, we recommend that you not approach the President on this matter.

We have prepared a memo for your signature (Tab "A")/5/ that acknowledges the receipt of the JCS proposal, noting that due consideration will be given to their suggestions along with other emergency planning actions. This type of response will satisfy administratively the recommendations of the JCS.

Recommend you sign Tab "A."

Solis Horwitz

SNIE 11-10-67
TCS 6228-67

Washington, February 14, 1967.

US INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES TO MONITOR CERTAIN
LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS

The Problem

To estimate the capabilities of US intelligence to monitor unilaterally limitations on certain Soviet strategic capabilities over the next five years or so.

Note

The Intelligence Community has been asked to assess its ability to monitor unilaterally limitations on the further deployment and improvement of certain Soviet strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems, and Soviet capabilities for evading the provisions of such limitations.

For the purposes of this assessment the following limitations are assumed to be included in the agreement:

a. ABMs and SAMs which may have a significant ABM capability. There would be a prohibition against initiation of construction of new sites, additional launchers at present sites, mobile launchers, and new associated radars. It is also assumed that the construction of additional long-range surveillance radars (Hen House, Dog House, or other comparable types) would be prohibited. Research, development, and testing would not be precluded.

b. Fixed, land-based strategic missiles (ICBMs, IRBMs, MRBMs). There would be a prohibition against any additional deployment, hard or soft, beyond those sites now complete or under construction. Research, development, and testing would not be precluded.

c. Missile-launching submarines and surface ships. There would be a prohibition against any construction of new ballistic or cruise missile submarines. Submarines now under construction could be completed. There would be a total prohibition against the construction or modification of surface ships to launch strategic missiles. Some Soviet surface ships are now equipped with surface-to-surface cruise missiles which could conceivably be used for strategic attack purposes; such missiles are not considered in this estimate, however.

d. Land-mobile ICBMs, IRBMs, MRBMs. A total prohibition would be imposed on the introduction of such systems.

e. Qualitative changes. With regard to qualitative changes, flight testing of MRVs, MIRVs, and certain other penetration aids would be prohibited. Except as specified in subparagraph (a) above, no limit would be placed on other changes in missile characteristics.

Two general supporting provisions will also be considered for inclusion in any broad agreement:

a. A general provision against radically new types of strategic systems. The effort here would be to rule out unusual possibilities not foreseen and discussed during the negotiations. Such possibilities would not be enumerated, but the provision would reflect the intention of both countries to avoid steps which could damage the basic agreement.

b. Exchange of information on strategic forces. From our own standpoint, we could not rely on such information, but it could be of some assistance. The stated purpose would be to preclude the chance that the agreement might be violated through misunderstanding.

In our assessment, we do not consider the effect which such an agreement would have on specific US collection requirements and mechanisms; nor do we estimate the likelihood that the Soviets will develop or deploy any of the weapon systems under consideration.

Conclusions

A. In the continued absence of a large-scale Soviet program of deception and concealment we believe that we would almost certainly detect any extensive new deployment in strategic forces, although the Soviets could probably effect small-scale increases without our knowledge. The timing of detection and identification would vary with the nature and size of the program. We probably would identify a land-mobile offensive system, for example, but perhaps only after it had become operational in substantial numbers.

B. We would almost certainly detect any large-scale test program, but we could not always expect to assess accurately the test objectives or even the precise nature of the system being tested. Our capabilities are generally better in the case of offensive than of defensive weapons. We believe, for example, that we could detect and identify Soviet testing of multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs); we could probably also detect test activity associated with an ABM system, but are not confident that we could identify it as such before it became operational.

C. Our capabilities for detecting qualitative improvements in the deployed forces are better in the case of defensive weapons than offensive ones. Our chances of determining whether a SAM system had been provided with significant ABM capabilities are at present about even, but we think that they will improve. On the other hand, we see no prospect of determining whether MIRVs (if developed) or other significant improvements had been incorporated in deployed offensive missiles.

D. Soviet employment of deception and concealment on a large-scale would, of course, degrade our capabilities. The principal effect would be that of delay. Thus, while we still believe that substantial new deployment would almost certainly be detected, detection would come later in the program, perhaps not until after significant deployment had occurred. Some of the deception and concealment measures which the Soviets could employ would probably be recognizable as such, but their purpose might not be readily apparent. Additionally, we assume that the Soviets will not interfere actively with US collection systems.

E. Factors affecting intelligence collection will vary over the period of this estimate but intelligence is not expected to be able to guarantee that the Soviets have not violated one or more provisions of the agreement under consideration.

F. Finally, we wish to note that the demonstration of violations of the arms control agreement under consideration would almost certainly involve the use and possibly the compromise of very costly and highly sophisticated intelligence collection methods.

Discussion

1. The basic problems for intelligence, as it relates to verification of a weapons limitation agreement, are to collect information to interpret it correctly, and to satisfy US decision-makers of the validity of those interpretations in time for them to take appropriate action. No single source of information can be exclusively relied upon for these purposes, although the unique capabilities of overhead photography and signal intelligence will inevitably make them essential sources. Regardless of sources, however, intelligence cannot be expected to guarantee that the Soviets have not violated one or more provisions of the agreement under consideration. In general, our confidence in detecting and identifying violations will increase in proportion to the extent of deployment or testing involved.

2. We have generally been successful in identifying new programs during the test phase and, except for defensive systems, test data has been an important source of information on characteristics. It should be remembered, however, that new strategic weapon systems will have been under development for several years before they are detected in the test phase. Our collection capabilities are lower with respect to production; we have identified many plants involved in weapons production, but have acquired little evidence on production rates. In regard to deployment, however, we have a high degree of confidence in our estimates of current order-of-battle for Soviet strategic forces; the physical magnitude of most of these programs and of their supporting elements has made them readily identifiable.

3. Over the period of this estimate, we believe that our capabilities to collect detailed information about Soviet strategic programs will increase, but at the same time, qualitative improvements in some Soviet weapon systems will probably be difficult to detect and evaluate. During the period of this estimate, we believe that the Soviets could probably effect minor increases in various elements of their strategic forces without our knowledge, but that any large-scale net deployment in any of these elements almost certainly would be detected--in some cases early in the program, in others not until later.

4. In the following discussion, we will attempt to quantify the degree of confidence which we have in our ability to detect further deployment or improvements to certain specific Soviet strategic weapon systems under most normal circumstances. We reserve to a later section our consideration of Soviet capabilities to evade detection through deception, concealment, or interference.

[Here follow Part II: "Strategic Weapons Deployment" (pages 8-15); Part III: "Qualitative Improvements to Strategic Weapon Systems" (pages 16-19); Part IV: "Soviet Capabilities for Concealment and Deception" (pages 20-25); Part V: "Problems of Demonstrating a Violation" (pages 25 ff.); and a 7-page Annex.]

Washington, February 14, 1967, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Scientists' Petition on Chemical and Biological Weapons

This morning (11:00 a.m.) Mr. Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director of ACDA, and I received on your behalf the attached petition and transmittal letter,/2/ opposing any actions weakening the present prohibitions and restraints on the use of chemical and biological weapons and specifically criticizing the U.S. for the use in Vietnam of "non-lethal" anti-personnel chemical weapons and anti-crop herbicides.

The petition has been signed by over 5,000 scientists and physicians, including 127 members of the National Academy of Sciences. I was informed that the group would discuss the petition with the press at 2:00 p.m. today./3/

Specifically, the petition urges you to:

--Institute a White House study of government policy regarding CB weapons.

--Order an end to the employment of anti-personnel and anti-crop chemical weapons in Vietnam.

--Declare the intention of the United States to refrain from initiating the use of chemical and biological weapons.

The covering letter commends the United States for its recent support of the UN General Assembly Resolution calling on all States to observe the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol/4/ and recommends that the United States should now accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

Mr. Fisher and I had a very good discussion with the scientists who delivered the petition. The group has clearly given this problem a great deal of responsible thought. They are seriously concerned about the broader implications of the problem, and this is not simply a disguised criticism of the Administration's policy in Vietnam.

In our initial reaction, I recommend that we simply state we are studying the petition and that I acknowledge the letter on your behalf along these same lines.

As a follow up, I would recommend that at an early press conference in response to a question on the petition, you make a statement clearly stating that we have a "no first use" policy with regard to chemical and biological warfare, with the exception of riot gases and herbicides. Although this would not directly respond to all the points in the petition or transmittal letter, it would deal directly with the most important general question. As you recall, I suggested such a statement in a memo to you (copy attached)/5/ setting forth the concern of your Science Advisory Committee on the general problem of biological warfare. Although Secretaries McNamara and Katzenbach both agreed with the proposed statement, McNamara preferred not to push the matter at that time in the face of JCS objections unless there were a clear and urgent reason for doing so. If you are interested, I believe it would be possible to clear such a statement within the government, particularly if the statement were a low-key reiteration and clarification of the position we have already taken in supporting the UN resolution.

Donald Hornig

1. Hornig to acknowledge petition, stating the matter under study.
2. Hornig to clear statement on "no first use" of chemical and biological weapons with McNamara and Katzenbach./6/

Washington, February 18, 1967, 9 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the records in our minutes of meetings of the 303 Committee (and its predecessor group, 5412 Committee) which refer to CIA connection with support for youth and student groups. The first such reference is 25 February 1959; the last is 3 December 1964./2/

Those present at the meetings are noted.

You should know that the basic work of the 303 Committee is to examine new programs; although, in the period I have been here, I have asked for reexamination of certain programs when current issues arose.

Clark Clifford's committee may be more deeply engaged in studying the whole of the CIA program; although I am not sure about this.

W.W. Rostow/3/

Washington, February 14, 1967.

Chronology of Briefings of 303 Committee on Youth and Student Activities

"The DCI pointed out to the Group that there are a number of Agency programs under way which began before the approval of NSC 5412/2 and thus the establishment of the Special Group.

Members present were: Christian Herter, Gordon Gray, Mr. Irwin, Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell

"The DCI showed the Group the summary of actions approved by it since its inception. Mr. Dulles repeated what he had said at last week's meeting to the effect that this summary represents only the individual actions taken by the Special Group and that some of them have since been incorporated in continuing CIA programs." (We do have the summary referred to here; it does not include [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].)

Members present were: Christian Herter, Gordon Gray, Mr. Irwin, Allen Dulles

"Mr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized for the benefit of the new members of the Special Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor group during the past year, and also a list of significant projects which antedate the beginning of 1960 and which it is planned to continue. (We do have the list mentioned; [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].)

Members present were: Messrs. McNamara, Gilpatric, Bowles, Bundy, Dulles, Gen. Cabell, Bissell

"Youth and Student Organizations. A program designed to oppose the international communist fronts in the youth and student field, the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS). To this end, CIA supports and works through the International Student Conference, Coordinating Secretariat of National Unions of Students, U.S. National Student Association, World Assembly of Youth, Young Adult Council, World University Service and the International Union of Socialist Youth, to preserve youth movements from communist leadership and to gain support of youth organizations from communist leadership and to gain support of youth organizations and potential political leaders for Western causes."

Members present at 31 August 1961 meeting were: General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Dulles, General Lansdale

"Mr. McCone stated that he agreed, and in addition to the continuing reviews made inside CIA and with the State Department, he had reviewed all of the covert action programs twice with higher authority. Mr. Alexis Johnson also affirmed that constant reviewing was being done in the Department of State and that he was satisfied with the importance and necessity of the covert action activities currently undertaken by CIA." (We have the briefing outline used by the DDP on covert political action and PM projects. Mr. Meyer covered "all other covert action" but no outline is available. It is likely that he covered Youth and Student activities.)

Members present were: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone. Present from Bureau of the Budget were Mr. Gordon, Mr. Staats, Mr. Hansen and Mr. Amory. Present from CIA were Mr. Helms, Mr. Meyer, [2 names not declassified]

f. 30 October 1964 Minutes/4/

[1 paragraph (15 lines of source text) not declassified]

Members present were: Mr. Bundy, Ambassador Thompson, Mr. Vance, Mr. McCone and Mr. Meyer

"World Youth Festival--The CIA paper entitled, 'Program of Covert Counteraction against the 9th World Youth Festival, Algiers, August 1965,'/5/ was approved promptly. Mr. McCone noted that the site of this event would produce more difficulties than those encountered in the relatively friendlier areas of Helsinki and Vienna. Mr. Bundy observed that he was personally acquainted with the considerable educative impact on young Americans participating in this type of confrontation with a Communist organization, a useful by-product to an important effort." (The paper referred to does not detail the instruments available to CIA to carry out the covert action. It implies the use of democratic youth and student organizations.)

Members present were: Mr. Bundy, Ambassador Thompson, Mr. McNaughton, and Mr. McCone

[Here follow paragraphs d. and e. of Document 134.]

TCS 6232-67

Washington, March 2, 1967.

US INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES TO MONITOR CERTAIN LIMITATIONS ON
SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS

1. This Memorandum to Holders is prompted by a difference between the judgment made in SNIE 11-10-67, "US Intelligence Capabilities to Monitor Certain Limitations on Soviet Strategic Weapons Programs," dated 14 February 1967, (Top Secret Ruff Trine Zarf Limited Distribution), and previous estimates on our capability to detect Soviet testing of multiple orbit bombardment system (MOBS). Paragraph 27 of SNIE 11-10-67 states, "the similarity between flight testing of a MOBS and the orbiting of certain types of satellites would make identification of such testing virtually impossible, [1 line of source text not declassified]."

2. A review of that judgment indicates that paragraph 27 of SNIE 11-10-67 should be changed to read as follows:

3. In addition, column II, item 7 of paragraph B.2. of the Annex to SNIE 11-10-67 should be changed to read as follows:

Probably during full system testing, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

In response to the recommendation of Donald Hornig for a Presidential statement affirming a "no first use" policy with regard to chemical and biological warfare (see Document 154), President Johnson requested that Walt Rostow investigate the possibility of such a statement. Spurgeon Keeny drafted a specific statement for Rostow to forward for clearance or comment by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and ACDA Director Foster. The draft statement reads as follows:

"There should be no misunderstanding about our policy with regard to biological and chemical warfare. We have never used biological weapons, and we do not intend to initiate the use of biological weapons in the future. We have not engaged in gas warfare since World War I when such weapons were widely used, and we do not intend to initiate the use of gas warfare in the future. Riot control agents and herbicides, both of which are widely used by responsible governments, clearly do not fall in this category, and we have explained our position on them many times." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Warfare, Chemical and Biological, Box 51)

In a March 10, 1967, note to Rostow, Keeny explained that he had kept Rostow's memoranda to the three principals "very short since the principals and their staff know the background of this problem. Moreover, I did not want to appear to prejudice the questions one way or the other except to the extent of indicating Presidential interest in making a statement if it is acceptable to the principals." (Ibid.) A copy of Rostow's brief March 10 memorandum to the three principals, which transmitted the statement for clearance or comment, is ibid.

In a March 17 memorandum to Rostow, Katzenbach responded that he concurred in the proposed public statement but suggested that the last sentence be changed, as follows:

"Riot control agents that are widely used by police forces throughout the world, and herbicides that are commonly employed in many countries, clearly do not fall in this category, and we have explained our position on them many times."

Katzenbach believed that his proposed change "would be more in line with our past statements and make it clear that these agents are widely used domestically and not solely by governments against people of other countries." (Ibid.)

No reply from Foster has been found. For McNamara's response, see Document 178.

Washington, March 13, 1967.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

Note

This Memorandum to Holders is prompted by a recent review of Soviet submarine order-of-battle which requires us to change the judgments made in NIE 11-8-66, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack," dated 20 October 1966, Top Secret, Restricted Data, Limited Distribution, on the size and composition of the Soviet missile submarine force.

Discussion

1. In NIE 11-8-66, we estimated that as of 1 October 1966 the Soviet missile submarine force had some 45 ballistic missile submarines (8-10 nuclear-powered) with a total of about 130 launchers, and an equal number of cruise missile units (21-23 nuclear-powered) with about 250 launchers.

2. A recent review of Soviet submarine order-of-battle indicates that as of 1 October 1966 there were 36 ballistic missile submarines in the Soviet Navy (7 of them nuclear-powered) with a total of about 100 launchers. The cruise missile submarine force--whose primary mission is to counter naval task forces--was found to have a slightly greater number of units than previously estimated, and a greater proportion of nuclear-powered units. Since the latter are equipped with more missile launchers than the diesel-powered boats, approximately 265 launchers (rather than 250) were found to be in the cruise missile submarine force.

3. We continue to believe that a new type of ballistic missile submarine will enter service by mid-1968. Since fewer ballistic missile submarines are now operational than previously estimated, however, our projection of the number of such units which will be operational in 1976 has been reduced from some 60-70 to about 55-65. There is no change in our estimate of the total number of cruise missile submarines for 1976 (i.e., 55-65 units) but we believe the proportion of nuclear submarines in the cruise missile force will be somewhat higher at that time (i.e., about 45 out of 60, rather than 40 or so out of 60).

4. A new table listing the estimated Soviet missile submarine strength for 1966 through 1968 follows. The new table supersedes that in Section IV of NIE 11-8-66.

Estimated Soviet Missile Submarine Strength, 1966-1968

	1 Oct 1966	Mid-1967	Mid-1968
Ballistic Missile Submarines
Nuclear
H-I (3 tubes)	3	2-1	1-0
H-II (3 tubes)	4	5-6	6-7
New class (8 or more tubes)	0	0	1
Subtotal	7	7	8
Diesel
Z-Conversion (2 tubes)	6	6	6
G-I (3 tubes)	22	22	22-20
G-II (2 tubes)	1	1	1-3
Subtotal	29	29	29
Total Ballistic Missile Submarines	36	36	37
Cruise Missile Submarines
Nuclear
E-I (6 tubes)	5	5	5
E-II (8 tubes)	20-21	24-25	28-29
Subtotal	25-26	29-30	33-34
Diesel
W-Conversion (1 to 4 tubes)	13	13	13
J-Class (4 tubes)	7-10	9-12	11-15
Subtotal	20-23	22-25	24-28
Total Cruise Missile Submarines	45-49	51-55	57-62

5. In addition, the final sentence of the last paragraph of Section VII A of NIE 11-8-66 should be deleted and replaced by the following:

In any case, we believe we could identify a MOBS sometime during its test program which would probably extend over a year or two. If the Soviets follow established test procedures, identification is likely to occur about a year prior to attainment of an accurate, reliable system.

(Note: paragraphs 1-4 approved by USIB--13 March 1967; Paragraph 5 approved by USIB--2 March 1967)

TCS-6236-67

Washington, March 18, 1967.

Dear Walt:

In SNIE 11-10-67/2/ we used, as usual, some verbal expressions to describe our estimated capability to detect land mobile ICBM's, IRBM's, and MRBM's, and new missile-launching submarines in the USSR. You asked that we give you a translation into number.

First with regard to Land Mobile ICBM's, IRBM's, and MRBM's:

We can quote no discrete odds for detection in the early stages of deployment. Our word "possible" in this context simply means that we are not certain of being able to detect nor do we feel it is impossible that we will detect. Your mathematical friends define this use of "possible" as "non-zero probability."

As to extensive deployment of these weapons systems we feel our chances of detecting are greater than even and less than overwhelming--say in the general bracket 65% to 85%

Second, with regard to Missile-launching Submarines:

As to detecting units of an entirely new class before IOC, we have put the odds in the 65% to 85% bracket.

As to detecting new units of an existing class before delivery to the fleet, we put the odds about even; 50-50.

The enclosed article which Sherman wrote some time back may further enlighten./3/

Sincerely,

Dick

Washington, April 12, 1967.

SUBJECT
Termination of Covert Funding Relationship with The Asia Foundation

Pursuant to the recommendations of the Katzenbach Committee, as approved by the President of the United States,/2/ the Director of Central Intelligence has ordered that covert funding of The Asia Foundation (TAF) shall be terminated at the earliest practicable opportunity. In anticipation of TAF's disassociation from the Agency the Board of Trustees on March 21, 1967, released to the American and foreign press a carefully limited statement of admission of past CIA support./3/ In so doing the Trustees sought to delimit the effects of an anticipated exposure of Agency support by the American press and, if their statement or some future expose does not seriously impair TAF's acceptability in Asia, to continue operating in Asia with overt private and official support. To date, the March 21 statement has produced no serious threat to TAF operations in Asia, and the Trustees are now prepared to attempt to acquire the necessary support for TAF to go on as a private institution, partially supported by overt U.S. Government grants. This will take time and TAF meanwhile faces the immediate problem of the need for funds during FY 1968.

TAF's present resources are sufficient to sustain operations through July 31, 1967, the end of the Foundation's fiscal year. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] To meet these obligations, and to allow TAF management to plan rationally for FY 1968, immediate firm commitments must be acquired on future levels and sources of support. This Agency is prepared to provide whatever assistance remains within its authority and competence to offer. To undertake further necessary action, however, the Agency requests that the Committee now designate the Agency or official to whom TAF management should look for future guidance and direction with respect to United States Government interests.

a. With the encouragement and support of CIA, and the guidance of other elements of the United States Government, the Trustees of The Asia Foundation on March 21, 1967, publicly declared that TAF is a private organization; that its Trustees have accepted funds from CIA intermediaries in the past and, by inference, can no longer do so; and that they fully intend to continue programming in Asia with support from both private and overt official sources. It is imperative that this declaration be supported by normal or near-normal TAF operations in Asia over the months ahead. [4 lines of source text not declassified] It has further authorized the Trustees to seek pledges of support from heads of private foundations and other prospective private donors; but, as a practical matter, no immediate results can be anticipated.

[4 paragraphs (22 lines of source text) not declassified]

c. The above immediate arrangements would insure the continuance of TAF programs at near-normal levels during the critical year ahead, during which time TAF Trustees and appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government can endeavor to arrange adequate permanent sources of support from private and official sources for FY 1969 and beyond. If by December 31, 1967, it becomes apparent that adequate support is not forthcoming, the Agency recommends that serious consideration be given to phasing down or terminating the Foundation.

[Here follow paragraphs 3. "Factors Bearing on the Problem," and 4. "Coordination."]

The Agency recommends that actions proposed in paragraphs one and two above be approved.

In early Spring 1967, the White House Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) completed a revised edition of its study, "Resource Mobilization Plan for Limited War." Regarding the planning and drafting of this study in 1966, see Document 138. The 31-page revised study, dated April 1967, covered the means whereby the U.S. Government could effectively mobilize the central management of resources in emergency circumstances short of a nuclear attack. It included the basic measures, policy and legal documents, and the organization structure required in the event of an emergency requiring the mobilization of the nation's resources during a limited war. Emergency action documents providing the basic authorities required for the mobilization of the nation's economic resources were included in a classified Annex A of the plan. Annex B comprised resource sections developed by the federal agencies. A copy of the entire plan was distributed to the Department of Defense under cover of a May 1 letter from OEP Director Farris Bryant to Secretary of Defense McNamara. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, 381 National Resources (S-2667) 1967)

Washington, May 3, 1967.

Dear Walt:

I have reviewed the proposed public statement on chemical and biological warfare policy which you forwarded with your memorandum of 10 March./2/ I am attaching the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the President's information./3/

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the President should not be advised to make a public statement on this subject at this time. I agree that it would be preferable that the President not make a public statement now. However, if the President should decide a statement is desirable, I recommend he use the statement provided to Dr. Hornig in January. I am attaching a copy of that statement for your information./4/

Sincerely,

Bob/5/

RR IM 67-24
TCS-7036/67

Washington, May 1967.

NEW TREND IN SOVIET ICBM DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM/2/

Summary

There is mounting evidence that a significant slowdown occurred in the rate of silo construction starts in the Soviet SS-11 ICBM deployment program after mid-1966. Although new construction is continuing, it appears likely that the rate of construction starts for this relatively light payload ICBM has been cut back by more than 50 percent from the high rate attained in the first half of 1966. Curtailment of the rate of construction starts appears to have affected at least half of the ten SS-11 complexes--specifically, the earliest five complexes, where some 300 SS-11 silos have already been started or completed--and suggests that the entire program is tapering off even though it may continue for some time. It is believed that there are currently more than 500 SS-11 silos in the USSR, of which about 150 have been completed and are now operational. Virtually all of those now under construction are likely to become operational by mid-1968.

On the other hand, new silo construction for the USSR's other current ICBM system, the heavy-payload SS-9, has continued into 1967 at a steady pace and there are clear indications that further construction starts are planned. There are an estimated 180 SS-9 silos in the USSR, including about 70 already operational; most of those that are now under construction will be operational by mid-1968.

The curtailment of the SS-11 program may indicate that the USSR is approaching its force goal for this ICBM system which, because of its limited accuracy and relatively small payload, is suitable primarily for attacking cities and other soft targets. However, the leveling off of the rate of silo starts for this system does not necessarily indicate that the USSR is approaching a programmed limit in deployment of ground-launched ICBM systems. Coinciding with the change in the SS-11 program, construction activity at new missile launch areas at the Tyuratam Test Range indicates that one and possibly two new systems are under development. As yet, there is no evidence to indicate whether the next round of deployment will replace or supplement the existing ICBM force, but the new systems may foreshadow the end of additional construction for one or both of the current deployment programs in the near term, perhaps during 1967.

On the basis of current evidence, the Soviet ICBM force will attain a level of some 900 operational launchers by mid-1968 and 1,000 or more by mid-1969, if there is no phase-out of earlier generation systems. While this number could be increased still further by the introduction of new systems, any substantial increment effected by these newer systems would be expected to occur in the 1970-75 period.

Washington, May 27, 1967.

SUBJECT
Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 27 May 1967

PRESENT
Mr. Rostow, Ambassador Kohler, Mr. Vance, and Mr. Helms
Admiral Taylor was present for all items.
Mr. Cord Meyer was present for Item 1.
Mr. Charles Schultze was present for Items 1 and 2.
Mr. Donald Jamison was present for Item 3.

a. In the discussion of the future of The Asia Foundation,/2/ the following points were made: The principals and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget felt that it was wiser to transfer [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in its entirety in a secure manner to the Foundation's account rather than filter portions through AID or State at this time.

b. Ambassador Kohler agreed that the State Department would nominate a senior official to undertake the responsibility of liaison to tide the Foundation through its difficult realignment period and set it on its path to self-sufficiency in 1969. Mr. Rostow suggested the name of Ambassador Winthrop Brown (if his new responsibilities would permit an added chore). Mr. Meyer indicated that such a person would have the full cooperation of a CIA officer thoroughly conversant with the project.

c. It was fully agreed that the Foundation was definitely in the national interest and should be protected and nurtured.

d. Mr. Schultze pointed out that in the future TAF would have to count on multifarious sources and, regardless of the results of the Rusk Committee findings, there never would be a single solution. He also indicated that, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a proper husbanding of resources should leave the Foundation with sufficient assets to face the future in 1969. He also wanted it emphasized that the Foundation would be competing for federal funds with other worthy causes.

[Here follow agenda items 2-5.]

Peter Jessup

Washington, June 10, 1967.

SUBJECT
FY 1969 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

I approve the proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile for the end of FY 1969 and the proposed adjusted stockpile composition for the end of FY 1968, submitted to me by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission on April 3, 1967./2/

Accordingly, I approve a total of [number not declassified] nuclear warheads as the stockpile composition for the end of FY 1969. I also approve a total of [number not declassified] nuclear warheads as the adjusted stockpile composition for the end of FY 1968. This will mean a planned production by the Atomic Energy Commission of [number not declassified] nuclear warheads and a planned retirement of [number not declassified] nuclear warheads during FY 1969, resulting in a net reduction of [number not declassified] nuclear warheads during FY 1969 under the adjusted FY 1968 stockpile.

I have directed the production and retirement of those quantities of atomic weapons and atomic weapons parts necessary to achieve and maintain the approved FY 1969 stockpile, as well as the production of the additional nuclear warhead parts necessary for transfer to the United Kingdom pursuant to the agreement for cooperation. I have also directed the production of the additional weapons required for quality assurance and reliability testing.

I have authorized the Atomic Energy Commission in coordination with the Department of Defense to initiate production of such long lead time nuclear warhead parts as may be necessary to prepare for FY 1970 production of warheads required by the approved Five Year Defense Program.

I authorize you, in coordination with the Atomic Energy Commission, to make such changes in the total stockpile not to exceed [number not declassified] of the specifically stated numbers of nuclear warheads to be produced and retired in FY 1968 and FY 1969 as may be necessary to adjust production schedules to meet AEC material availabilities or production capability.

I further authorize you to make minor changes [number not declassified] in strategic, tactical, and fleet anti-submarine/anti-air warfare warhead totals that may be required because of adjusted delivery assets or changes in military requirements. Any changes indicative of a major shift in defense policy or AEC production capability will be submitted for my approval.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Washington, June 26, 1967.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA, Filed by LBJ Library, Box 10. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

NIE 11-4-67

Washington, July 20, 1967.

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

The Problem

To review significant developments in Soviet military policy and programs, and to estimate main trends in Soviet military policies over the next 5 to 10 years.

Scope

This estimate assesses broad trends in Soviet military policy and doctrine. It does not attempt to recapitulate existing NIEs on Soviet strategic attack, strategic air and missile defense, and general purpose forces. Our most recent detailed estimates on the size, composition, and capabilities of these principal components and the supporting elements of the Soviet military forces are as follows:

NIE 11-8-66, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack," dated 20 October 1966, Top Secret, Restricted Data (Limited Distribution)./2/

NIE 11-14-66, "Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces," dated 3 November 1966, Secret./3/

NIE 11-3-66, "Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses," dated 17 November 1966, Top Secret./4/

Conclusions

A. In the past year, there has been no major change in the broad Soviet military policy, which continues to place primary emphasis on strategic weapons. Outlays for defense have accelerated with the continuation of large-scale deployment of strategic missiles, both offensive and defensive, and continued research and development (R&D) on new strategic weapon systems. The Soviets are building forces which we believe will give them, in the next year or two, greatly increased confidence that they have a retaliatory capability sufficient to assure the destruction of a significant portion of US industrial resources and population. They will probably also seek, through both strategic attack and defense programs, to improve their ability to reduce the damage the US can inflict on the USSR should deterrence fail and war in fact occur. We believe that the Soviets would not consider it feasible to achieve by the mid-1970's strategic capabilities which would permit them to launch a first strike against the US without receiving unacceptable damage in return./5/

B. The most important issues of military policy at present center upon the strategic relationship with the US. Certain major deployment programs are either slowing or nearing completion. The Soviet leaders are probably now considering further development and deployment of strategic systems for the 1970's. For the present, we rate the chances as less than even that they would agree to any extensive program of arms control or disarmament.

C. The Soviets almost certainly believe that their strategic position relative to that of the US has improved markedly. In the next year or so they will approach numerical parity in ICBM launchers, which we believe to be their present goal. They are aware, however, of planned improvements in US strategic offensive missile forces which in their view would threaten to erode their strategic position. Possible Soviet responses could take the form of a considerable increase in the numbers of ICBM launchers, development of mobile ICBMs, a greater emphasis on ballistic missile submarines, or qualitative improvements such as the development of very accurate ICBMs, possibly equipped with multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

D. The Soviets have probably concluded that if no arms control agreement is reached a US decision to deploy ABMs will soon be forthcoming, and are probably concerned lest a US ABM deployment seriously degrade their retaliatory capabilities. A US decision to deploy either heavy or light ABM defenses would probably lead the Soviets to develop and deploy penetration aids and possibly MIRVs for their ICBM force, or they might increase the size of that force. Systems designed to elude US ABM defenses, such as aerodynamic vehicles or space weapons, might be given greater emphasis. Whatever their specific responses to developments on the US side, we believe that the Soviets will hold it essential to maintain what they would consider to be an assured destruction capability.

E. We continue to believe that the Soviets will deploy ABMs in defense of areas other than Moscow, but their decision may await the availability of an improved system. In any case, given the lead-times involved, ABM defenses will probably not become operational outside the Moscow area before the early 1970's. We would expect to detect construction of such additional defenses two to three years before they became operational./6/

F. Developments in the general purpose forces indicate a greater concern with meeting contingencies short of general war and a recognition of the possibility of postponing, limiting, or avoiding the use of nuclear weapons. In part this represents a reaction to the US and NATO strategy of flexible response, but it also represents a more general interest in broadening the range of Soviet military capabilities. Sealift and airlift have been considerably expanded. We do not believe, however, that the Soviets are developing the sea and air combat capabilities required for distant limited military action against opposition. They evidently see advantages in wars fought by proxy with indigenous forces rather than by their own forces, a practice which reduces both military risks and adverse political reactions. In extending their influence abroad they will continue to give economic and military aid on a large-scale, and to use political and diplomatic means.

G. The Soviets now describe China as a power with a policy "clearly hostile" to the USSR. They have increased their military strength in areas close to the Chinese and Mongolian borders, and are moving to strengthen the defenses of Mongolia. At present they appear to regard the Chinese as posing more of a border security problem than a major military threat, but they almost certainly see the potential threat of China as increasing over the longer term. So long as the Sino-Soviet conflict persists, Soviet military planners will have to take account of the possibility of large-scale war with China and China's emerging strategic nuclear capabilities.

H. The internal situation appears generally favorable to the continuation of a strong military effort. The present leaders seem more responsive than was Khrushchev to the opinions of the military hierarchy. Estimated military and space expenditures for 1967 represent an increase of 16 percent over 1965, a marked change from the more stable level of spending during 1962-1965. The adverse effects on the economy of large military and space programs will exert some restraining influence on military spending. We believe that military expenditures will continue to rise, but at a rate generally consonant with the growth of the Soviet economy.

I. A strong effort in military R&D will be continued despite resource allocation problems. The Soviets probably regard such an effort as imperative in order to prevent the US from gaining a technological advantage and also to gain, if possible, some advantage for themselves. But in deciding to deploy any new weapon system they would have to weigh the prospective gain against the economic costs and the capabilities of the US to counter it.

J. Soviet foreign policy will continue to be based primarily upon political and economic factors, but the military capabilities that the Soviets are developing and the military relationships that are evolving will affect their attitudes and approaches to policy. They will probably seek to gain some political or propaganda advantage from their improving military position, and may take a harder line with the US in various crises than they have in the past. We do not believe, however, that their improved military capabilities will lead them to such aggressive courses of action as would, in their view, provoke direct military confrontation with the US. The Soviet leaders recognize that the USSR as well as the US is deterred from initiating general war, and will continue to avoid serious risk of such a war./7/

[Here follows the Discussion section (Parts I-V, pages 6-23).]

JCSM-425-67

Washington, July 27, 1967.

SUBJECT
Initiation of Nike-X Production and Deployment (C)

1. (S) Reference is made to your draft Presidential memorandum, dated 17 January 1967, subject: "Production and Deployment of the Nike-X (C),"/2/ which recommended that negotiations be initiated with the Soviet Union "designed, through formal or informal agreement, to limit the deployment of antiballistic missile systems." It was further recommended that the decision not to deploy Nike-X be reconsidered "in the event these discussions prove unsuccessful."

2. (S) Subsequent attempts to negotiate such an agreement with the Soviet Union have indicated little promise of success. Ambassador Thompson, in his recent discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made the assessment that the Soviet Union would not be ready for talks on this subject until completion of the Nonproliferation Treaty talks.

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are agreed that the timing of a Nike-X deployment decision is critical to an effective defense of the United States. Among the actions recommended to maintain a reasonable strategic posture in JSOP 69-76,/3/ no other single action is considered more necessary than the deployment of Nike-X. Delay of Nike-X deployment provides the Soviet Union with the combined advantages of continuing their own ballistic missile buildup without complicating their attack strategy and, concurrently, continuing their antiballistic missile deployment, which already poses significant problems to the US strategic offensive forces.

4. (S) Since the United States first proposed negotiations to limit both strategic offensive and defensive forces in 1964, the Soviet Union has shown no evidence of slowing down the deployment of such forces nor have they stated any intent to do so. Indeed, USSR representatives have indicated no interest in this subject at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference and intelligence information indicates that the Soviets have accelerated their deployment of such forces. At the same time, the communist Chinese are advancing toward a strategic capability at a faster rate than had been anticipated as evidenced by their recent detonation of an air-dropped thermonuclear device. The apparent progress they are making toward developing an intercontinental ballistic missile with an initial operational capability as early as 1970 adds to the urgency of initiating a Nike-X deployment.

5. (S) In JCSM-804-66, dated 29 December 1966, subject: "Production and Deployment of Nike-X (C),"/4/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised against delay in deploying Nike-X, pending initiation or conclusion of arms control negotiations. They stated that, in addition to the military advantages to be gained, initiation of Nike-X deployment would provide the United States useful negotiating leverage. The Soviet Union is now benefiting from a US limitation on ballistic missile defenses, whereas the United States is without compensating benefits. While there is considerable incentive for the Soviets to engage in protracted and indecisive negotiations, there is no apparent advantage now for their agreeing to a limitation on ballistic missile defense. A Nike-X deployment decision would either stimulate Soviet participation in meaningful negotiations or disclose their lack of serious interest in this matter. In view of recent events, Ambassador Thompson's assessment, and the negative Soviet attitude evident following the President Johnson-Premier Kosygin talks,/5/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a decision now to deploy Nike-X is even more advisable.

6. (S) For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that further delay in the deployment of Nike-X is detrimental to the interests of the United States. They again recommend that production and deployment of Nike-X be initiated now to provide an initial operating capability in FY 1972 and that the funds appropriated by Congress for FY 1967 and those funds included in the FY 1968 budget be released for this purpose.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, August 2, 1967, 11:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

I have just had a long and useful telephone conversation with Bob McNamara on both the ABM issue and the question of Senators worried about stalemate.

1. With respect to ABM's, he has completed a first draft--and plans to circulate on next Monday/2/ a second draft--of a speech which would announce that we were going to proceed with a Chinese-oriented thin ABM system. The speech is scheduled for delivery September 17 at San Francisco before the UPI editors. As you know, the system would also have a capacity to protect to a significant degree our Minuteman against Soviet attack. Although he has some reservation about the dates given for a ChiCom ICBM delivery capability against the U.S., the speech would, essentially, accept those dates.

2. He would prefer to hold to the mid-September date of delivery--assuming you approve his recommended decision incorporated in the speech--because there are two or three loose ends he would like to clear up on the technical side.

3. As for the press handling of this matter, he suggests that we use the unclassified version of his Congressional testimony published January 23, 1967./3/ Starting on page 38 there is an extended passage describing the difference in our approach to the Soviet and the ChiCom capabilities. We should emphasize that we are working at highest priority to develop the technology of an ABM system and that deployment has in no way been delayed by decisions we have taken because the system is now in a development stage (in fact, Bob believes that the first production orders related to deployment could only rationally be given in December of this year, given the unresolved development problems).

4. I would add that in backgrounding on this matter tomorrow and in the days ahead, we should try to deflate the notion that we are in a hysterical race between a ChiCom development of an ICBM system and our development of an ABM system. The simple fact is that the ChiComs have shown themselves systematically extremely cautious in military operations and extremely respectful of U.S. military power, including our nuclear power. They have talked an aggressive doctrine but behaved cautiously at the time of Quemoy Matsu; the Tibet engagement against India; the India/Pak war; and in Viet Nam. They obviously have some nuclear devices now which could be dropped from aircraft. They have not proceeded to do so. There is every reason to believe on the record that they will be deterred by our overwhelming retaliatory power. This does not mean that we shall not deploy, necessarily, a thin ABM system against them. It does mean that there is no reason for panic.

5. In any case, I believe you will wish personally to design the press handling of this matter in the government.

[Here follow Rostow's account of McNamara's thoughts on dealing with U.S. Senators concerned about a possible stalemate in the Vietnam war; and notice that McNamara would be away from Washington for 3-4 days.]

Walt

Washington, August 7, 1967.

SUBJECT
Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 7 August 1967

PRESENT
Mr. Rostow, Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, Mr. Nitze, and Mr. Helms
Admiral R.L. Taylor was present for all items
Mr. William Broe was present for Items 4, 8, and 9
Mr. John Marsh was present for Item 5
Mr. Cord Meyer was present for Items 6 and 7

[Here follow agenda items 1 and 2.]

Mr. Helms indicated that he had been visited by Joseph Rauh, Jr., an attorney representing the NSA on behalf of the UAW. Rauh's tentative proposal was that the title and mortgage be handed over (approximate cost $64,360). On its part, the Agency felt the unspent accrued funds be allocated to the NSA, thus constituting a write-off. Mr. Helms indicated, however, that in view of general student leader intransigeance on negotiations, this was a propitious solution. The principals went along with this as an efficacious egress from an awkward situation.

[Here follows discussion of item 4.]

[Agenda items 5-9 (1 page of source text) not declassified]

[Here follow agenda items 10-14.]

Peter Jessup

Washington, August 9, 1967, 10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

I believe you will wish to read at least the summary at the beginning of this estimate./2/

The situation it describes is not alarming; but I suspect it will be exploited as a political issue in 1968.

The Soviets are increasing the number of their hardened ICBM's while we are increasing the number of our warheads.

Therefore, it will be argued, they are "closing our nuclear superiority gap."

The argument will be buttressed by evidence, from the statistical war games that are played each year, that:

--the number of Soviet targets is increasing faster than our megatonnage on targets;

--a nuclear exchange would result in increasing U.S. fatalities and industrial damage, decreasing Soviet fatalities and Soviet damage;

--we now have to take the Chinese Communist threat more seriously.

Again, no one thinks we are moving to a position where a Soviet first strike is likely to become rational in the foreseeable future. But the numbers will be moving unfavorably over the coming year; and you may wish to begin to work out with Bob McNamara/3/ how we deal with the political problem which may arise.

Walt