Washington, undated.

MILITARY STRATEGY FOR FY 1970 THROUGH FY 1977 (U)

Part I

Introduction

1. (U) This Volume of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan develops the military strategy for the period FY 1970-FY 1977. It emphasizes those elements of the strategic concept which influence major issues that should be addressed in the FY 1970 Department of Defense budget. It also considers the implications of the current conflict in Southeast Asia relative to the strategic concept for the mid-range period.

2. (U) General. As one of the elements of national power, military force is justified on the basis of its contribution to the support of national policy. US national security policy is not contained in any single, nationally-approved document. It is constantly and dynamically evolving through informal and formal processes. It emerges from this process that US national security interests will be served best by fostering a peaceful international community which is not inimical to the US Government and is based upon consent of the governed, dignity of the individual, and respect for the rule of law. Attainment of this world of peace with justice through peaceful means is a US national goal in the most fundamental sense. Nevertheless, throughout the mid-range period the presence and exercise of US military power will continue to be essential to protect the interests of the United States and its allies, while conditions favorable to peaceful attainment of this goal are being pursued.

3. (U) National Security Objective. The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free and independent nation, safeguard its fundamental institutions and values, and preserve its freedom to pursue its national objectives as the leading world power. The development of a world community which lends itself to this objective is implicit in its meaning.

4. (S) Basic Military Objectives. The basic US military objectives derived from the national security objective are:

a. Deter any military attacks against the United States; if deterrence fails, deal effectively with such attacks by conducting the operations required to terminate hostilities under conditions of relative advantage to the United States, while limiting damage to the United States.

b. Deter, in conjunction with available friendly forces, any military attacks against other areas the security of which is essential to US objectives; if deterrence fails, deal effectively with such attacks by conducting the operations required to terminate hostilities under advantageous conditions which facilitate achievement of US and compatible allied objectives, while minimizing damage to US and allied interests.

c. Assist in the self-defense efforts of selected governments to prevent or defeat subversion, insurgency, and encroachments, when the stability and survival of these governments are important to US objectives.

d. Ensure freedom of the sea, air, and space regions for the United States and friendly powers, maintain surveillance over the use of those portions of these regions important to US security, and deny their use for purposes adverse to US interests.

e. Employ military forces and resources to accomplish such other missions as may be directed by US national political authority, to include:

(1) Support of US foreign policy and diplomatic undertakings.

(2) Protection, in areas outside the United States, of US nationals, their properties, and lawful interests; US property; and selected foreign nationals and property.

(3) Assistance in the maintenance of order under constituted authority within the United States.

Part II

Global Appraisal

5. (C) The increasing economic gap between the developed and developing areas of the world is a principal factor contributing to international tensions. Progress is hindered by deficiencies in their technological and educational base, primitive production means, inefficient land distribution, overpopulation, archaic customs, religious, racial, or caste rigidity, the inability or unwillingness of governments to cope with these conditions, and in some cases, a lack of resources. The progressive withdrawal of colonial powers will create power vacuums. These developing areas will be characterized by social and political turbulence, which the communist states will try to aggravate and exploit. Both the USSR and the Chinese Peoples Republic (CPR), each desirous of improving its relative position in the world power structure, have reoriented their strategies; i.e., the Soviets' espousal both of peaceful coexistence and of "wars of national liberation," and the Chinese communists' doctrine of "peoples war." Whether the problems will be settled through armed conflict or through peaceful means will depend primarily on whether the Free World will retain a willingness and capability to execute successfully effective political, economic, psychological, and military programs for the prevention or defeat of subversion and insurgency.

6. (S) The Sino-Soviet rift is likely to persist and may widen. As it continues, the rift lessens the likelihood of a coordinated military threat to the United States. At the same time, competition between the USSR and Communist China for leadership in the communist movement probably will increase. These individual activities probably will conflict with interests of the United States. Accordingly, the planning that precedes major decisions should, where appropriate, include consideration of what effect these decisions might have on USSR-CPR relations.

7. (S) A significant element in the world environment is the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons. Canada, India, Israel, and Sweden have the capability to develop nuclear weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Japan could also attain such a capability. The emergence of new nuclear powers during the period of this appraisal, while not necessarily leading toward nuclear conflict, would produce more pressures for arms control, and nuclear guarantees or sharing, and would complicate the risk assessment in crises. The greatest continuing threats to the United States and its allies will be posed by the Soviet Union and Communist China.

8. (C) Another factor is a trend toward weakening of alliances. As western-oriented nations grow stronger economically, and the threat of war appears to diminish, their common interests will recede, their national interests will attain new prominence, and they will be less willing to meet common military needs. On the other hand, the resurgence of nationalism in East European nations and the pressures to broaden relations between Eastern and Western Europe will militate against the success of Soviet efforts to maintain the current level of military, economic, and political integration of Eastern Europe.

9. (TS) Space competence is important to national security just as it is to national technological progress and prestige. The Soviets have the capability to orbit a nuclear-armed satellite and frequently have alluded to "orbital rockets." Recent Soviet feasibility tests could lead to orbital bombardment systems. The United Nations resolution against offensive weapons in orbit and the celestial bodies/outer space treaty are steps in the direction of agreements defining rules for space use. There would be political liabilities for any nation which repudiated or violated their provisions. Nevertheless, hostile offensive orbital systems, even in limited numbers, would seriously augment the principal threat of ballistic missile attack against the United States. Accordingly, the US strategic posture should provide capabilities for surveillance of and active defense against potential orbital threats, as protection against possible covert or precipitous overt violation of agreements and against possible threats by nations not parties to agreements.

10. (U) The maritime capabilities of most of the major nations are essential elements of their economic and strategic power. This factor alone will account for a continued interest in the oceans and in the traditional principle of freedom of the seas. The strategic importance of the ocean areas will continue to increase as science and technology provide better ways of exploiting their military and economic value. The exploitation of the oceans for food and marketable products will assume increasing importance, as will rights to oil and minerals from the ocean bed. Increasing international interest in the ocean gives rise to problems of territorial sovereignty over the contiguous sea areas extending in many cases beyond traditional limits of territorial waters. Conflicting concepts of the extent of territorial waters, with particular regard to territorial seas that do or may comprise international straits, will be a continuing source of serious international friction. US interests require that the principle of freedom of the seas, in the sense of free passage, be preserved. Increasing pressures for extended rights to commercial exploitation should be recognized in US strategy. The United States should seek legal solutions to those pressures, but should recognize that it may have to enforce such solutions once they are reached.

11. (C) The aviation potential of most of the major nations is a significant element of their national power. In addition to the important capabilities provided by military aircraft, civil air carriers complement merchant shipping and show the flag throughout the world. The use of air transportation to provide US assistance to some of the less developed nations provides an incentive for those nations to develop aircraft support facilities which may be of use to the United States in future contingencies.

12. (S) US forces could be hampered or delayed in responding to certain contingencies by lack of overflight rights and adequate bases. In anticipation of this problem, the United States should seek to obtain and maintain overflight and foreign base rights in strategic areas throughout the world.

13. (S) Additional limited arms control measures, such as nonproliferation treaties, additional nuclear test bans, nuclear free zones, agreements on peaceful use of outer space, and mutual force reductions may be negotiated during the mid-range period. The achievement of general and complete disarmament is highly unlikely, although the United States and the USSR, as the two leading nuclear powers, will continue to consider such measures. There is ample evidence to indicate that the USSR and other communist states will not agree to a complete verification system such as required by the United States.

14. (S) The most dangerous threat to the United States is posed by the rapidly growing strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. This threat is so serious in its potential consequences, regardless of the estimated intentions of the Soviet Union, that it must receive primary cognizance in the formulation of military strategy and in the development of force levels. Although Soviet strategic offensive forces can inflict enormous damage upon the United States in a first strike, they cannot, at the present time, destroy enough of the US nuclear offensive and defensive forces to preclude retaliatory destruction of Soviet Union urban-industrial resources. However, the Soviets are continuing to build forces, which it is believed will increase their confidence in a retaliatory capability sufficient to assure the destruction of a significant portion of US industrial resources and population. They are also active in efforts, through both strategic offensive and defensive programs, to improve their ability to reduce the damage the United States can inflict on the USSR should deterrence fail and strategic nuclear war occur. In addition, the USSR has the capability to conduct a massive nuclear attack against Eurasia. In the absence of continued US improvements in strategic capabilities, Soviet offensive and defensive systems could attain in the course of their development significant counterforce and defensive damage-limiting capability against the United States. It is necessary, therefore, for the United States to make timely improvements in its strategic offensive and defensive capabilities, to preserve a credible deterrent to convince the Soviets that they cannot achieve a viable first strike option.

15. (S) Irrespective of the unlikelihood of deliberate Soviet initiation of a strategic nuclear attack, the possibility of strategic nuclear war through escalation or miscalculation cannot be dismissed. Further, the United States cannot safely discount the possibility that Soviet leaders might launch a preemptive strike if they considered themselves inextricably involved in a major confrontation over critical objectives. Finally, they might launch a preemptive strike if they believed nuclear attack upon the USSR were imminent.

16. (S) The US and USSR strategic nuclear capabilities are expected to remain superior to those of all other nations for the period of this appraisal. However, by 1970, the CPR probably will have sufficient missiles and warheads to attempt nuclear blackmail in the Western Pacific-Asian area. In the early 1970s, the CPR is expected to be able to pose a limited nuclear threat to the United States and to the USSR.

17. (S) Strategic power relationships could be upset by: unmatched technological advances in weapon systems, particularly in strategic nuclear systems; violations of major arms control agreements; unbalanced arms reductions; and major shifts in alliances and alignments. For example, if the Soviets were to achieve warheads having significantly improved nuclear effects for their ballistic missile defense systems, prior to compensating accomplishments by the United States, the military power relationship would be upset, perhaps critically, in favor of the USSR. For these and other reasons, a vigorous US nuclear test program is necessary within the restrictions of the present Limited Test Ban Treaty.

18. (S) The Warsaw Pact and the CPR have significant general purpose forces which pose major threats to Western Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, and a limited threat outside these areas. The USSR will gradually modernize its general purpose forces to improve their capabilities to engage in sustained nonnuclear as well as nuclear warfare. The emphasis probably will be on improving active combat support and service support units. It is believed that the resulting augmentation will be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the number of divisions, so that toward the end of the mid-range period there will be a reduced number of larger divisions with better support, with no significant change in the total number of men in the ground forces. Soviet capabilities for airborne and amphibious assault remain tied to support of Eurasian operations. These contiguous capabilities are being expanded markedly as the capacity and efficiency of air and sealift forces are increased. The expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet and the development of very large transport aircraft will also improve Soviet capabilities to move unopposed military forces to distant areas. However, developments thus far do not signify any urgent Soviet program to acquire capabilities for opposed distant operations.

19. (C) The increasing maritime strength and capability of the Soviet Union derive from three elements of seapower: a combatant navy, a merchant marine, and a fleet of oceanographic, survey, and fishing vessels. The Soviet merchant marine and oceanographic fleet can be classed with those of the leading nations of the world. The Soviet navy, although not a balanced force by Western standards, is quantitatively the second largest in the world, and is undergoing qualitative improvement in both the strategic and general purpose categories. As Soviet maritime capabilities continue to grow, the USSR will increase its capability to meet its own shipping requirements and to expand its political influence throughout the world through economic and military assistance.

20. (S) Evidence indicates that the Soviets have stockages to support substantial chemical warfare operations and that training of personnel in their use has been extensive. Research to improve toxic nerve agents and efforts to develop nonlethal incapacitating agents are continuing. The Soviets have a variety of chemical munitions and delivery vehicles for dissemination of chemical agents and a wide range of defensive chemical warfare equipment.

21. (C) The likelihood of conflicts involving US interests during the mid-range period, as well as their form and outcome, will depend upon the degree to which the United States and its allies maintain a military capability that provides a credible deterrence and effective flexible response throughout the spectrum of potential conflicts. However, even if the US posture is improved to counter the growing and increasingly complex threat, deterrence will not be infallible, and conflicts will occur. Some judgments on the likelihood of conflict are possible in the context of such continuing US posture improvements.

a. Strategic nuclear war, although the most dangerous threat, is the least likely of all levels of warfare.

b. A conventional war of the dimensions of World War II is the least likely of all forms of nonnuclear warfare, primarily because of the probability of escalation to or beyond the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

c. Nonnuclear conflicts, limited in scope and/or objectives, are more likely.

d. Continued low-intensity conflicts, particularly in underdeveloped areas of the world, are certain and these conflicts may increase in frequency.

Part III

Regional Appraisals

22. (U) This Part expands the global appraisal in Part II into more specific appraisals for each of the major regions of US security interest. These regional appraisals, and the preceding world appraisal, provide the background for the strategic concept which follows in Part IV. Together, the appraisals and concept serve as a basis for subsequent presentation in Part V of force planning guidance for over-all objective force level analysis and derivation in succeeding Volumes and Annexes of JSOP 70-77. The sequential treatment of regions and areas does not imply a fractionalization of the threat or a priority among mutually exclusive area concepts, since the threats to all areas are in some respects identical and in most respects overlapping. The regional and area concepts and the US global concept for strategic nuclear offensive and defensive operations are interrelated.

23. (S) NATO Europe, with its industrial, economic, technological, and military strength and potential, is second only to the United States in strategic importance as a Free World power center. Loss of this area to communism would be intolerable. The principal strategic significance of the Mediterranean and North African areas results from their geographical location with respect to the southern flank of NATO Europe. The Mediterranean is one of the primary trade routes for Western Europe and, with its airspace, is the principal avenue for deployment of US forces into the southern flank of NATO and into the Middle East and North Africa. The United States continues to maintain bases in some countries bordering the Mediterranean for the support of NATO, communications, training, storage of pre-positioned war reserve stocks and weapons, custody of part of the NATO nuclear stockpile, and potential staging facilities.

24. (C) The US objectives for NATO and the Mediterranean area, including North Africa, seek to insure the security of those areas against communist aggression and influence and to further their economic growth and political stability. The United States should support North Atlantic Alliance efforts to keep the peace and maintain the independence of its members in a way which would provide a basis for detente, further Atlantic ties, foster European unity, and promote arms control. In addition, the United States encourages a prominent role for the other members of the Alliance in worldwide peacekeeping.

25. (C) The pressures of national sovereignty and regional rivalries will continue to be major obstacles to the achievement of a more closely integrated European defense community than that now represented by NATO. However, during the mid-range period, the United States should pursue the goal of an economically, militarily, and politically integrated Western Europe as the principal way in which Western Europe can realize its full potential. The United States believes that Europe should be "outward-looking" and accept its share of world responsibilities. The United States supports the movement of other eligible European nations such as the United Kingdom toward full-fledged membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). Admission of the United Kingdom to the EEC could stimulate the creation of new European defense arrangements. These developments could provide the added military capability required to cope with most nonnuclear contingencies which will threaten Europe, and contribute to worldwide peacekeeping, while the United States provides the preponderance of the nuclear deterrent, and the additive forces to cope with major aggression.

26. (S) The uncertain character of French cooperation in the event of war in Europe, and the denial of the use of French territory and facilities in peacetime, adversely affect the readiness and capabilities of NATO to respond to Warsaw Pact aggressions. Current efforts by NATO and French military authorities to identify a workable formula for wartime cooperation between the two forces indicate that, though French forces have been withdrawn from NATO, France is still willing to consider under what conditions it would resist various Warsaw Pact aggressions in concert with its allies. The denial of French territory and airspace divides NATO territory and military defense into two principal regions making mutual support far more difficult than in the past. The weakening of the center emphasizes the importance of the problems of the flanks. Unless overflight of France is granted, the support and reinforcement of the southern flank will be provided principally by NATO forces in the Mediterranean area and deployments from the CONUS. Support or reinforcement of the northern flank without further weakening the center will necessitate increased reliance on NATO's Atlantic naval forces and deployments from the CONUS.

27. (S) The United States now relies upon a line of communication (LOC) through the UK-Benelux countries to support forces in Central Europe. This restricted LOC must be shared with other NATO Allies and the demands of the civilian populace. It is more vulnerable to attack than was the LOC through France. To exploit fully all LOC capabilities within this area, much greater reliance must be placed upon capabilities to protect channel convoys and the use of inland waterways. In addition, highways and railroads must be improved in the region of the FRG-Benelux frontier.

28. (S) The NATO nations are militarily dependent upon the United States. The US strategic deterrent and general purpose forces are essential to Western European security. Continued US efforts to maintain the credibility of this deterrent to both the Warsaw Pact and US NATO Allies are necessary.

29. (S) The Soviet leaders apparently desire to avoid involvement of their own forces in war with the West, but have not renounced as an ultimate goal the extension of Soviet influence throughout the world. Even though the policies and strategy by which the Soviets seek to realize their ends show signs of evolving in response both to political changes in the world and to the continuing existence of a credible Western deterrent, the fundamental issues underlying the tension between East and West have not been resolved. Soviet policy, which is supported in varying degrees by the Eastern European countries, will continue to be based on economic and political means, propaganda, subversion, and military power.

30. (S) The Soviet leaders actively exploit opportunities outside Europe to achieve positions from which to threaten or harass NATO wherever they can do so without military risk to the Soviet Union. This is especially true in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Within Europe, the Soviet leaders appear to have followed a more cautious line in recent years, influenced significantly by the continued maintenance of strong NATO forces.

31. (S) The military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact constitute a formidable element of the threat. While the Warsaw Pact leaders probably believe that they now possess sufficient military power to deter NATO from resorting to all-out nuclear war, except under extreme threat to its critical interests, they are, nevertheless, expected to continue to spend large sums on improving their capabilities. In particular, the Soviets probably will continue to:

a. Seek by every possible means, including research, development, and production, to acquire a clear military advantage over NATO. They can be expected to exploit any significant increase in their military capability.

b. Pursue their objectives from a position of impressive military strength based on nuclear, massive conventional, chemical, and biological capabilities.

c. Improve and expand their nuclear and antiballistic missile capabilities.

d. Deploy naval forces and merchant fleets worldwide on an increasing scale and in increasing competition with NATO countries.

e. Increase the Warsaw Pact forces' capabilities for a wide range of military operations.

32. (S) In the Mediterranean and North Africa, the USSR and CPR can be expected to continue attempts to exploit instability and local sources of friction in order to neutralize or eliminate other influence. The USSR may attempt to increase its presence in this area by providing equipment and advisors, and by attempting to exercise some measure of indirect control over local military operations, thereby improving the foundation for further Soviet penetration of the Middle East. The Arab nations' compelling desire for, and attempts to acquire, relatively large and modern military forces will continue. Also, precipitous military actions can be expected to recur periodically, with or without foreign encouragement, as a result of traditional animosities or the ambitions of individual leaders.

33. (S) While the continuing Arab-Israeli confrontation will be the most dangerous threat to peace throughout the Arab world, other local quarrels will persist in North Africa. Libya feels threatened by potential United Arab Republic (UAR) political expansion and military aggression, although the greatest threat to Libyan stability stems from internal friction between those who support the monarchy, and those who, like Nasser, espouse a radical socialist form of government. The moderate positions of the Tunisian, Moroccan, and Libyan Governments with respect to Israel have evoked the distrust of the radical Arab States. Border disputes between Algeria and Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya could develop into open hostilities, particularly in view of the buildup of USSR-provided military equipment in Algeria.

34. (S) Notwithstanding the divisive factors described above, the North African nations have shown some willingness to act in concert with or support the remainder of the Arab nations whenever Israel is involved. The Arab nations have the capability to deny their oil to the West, close the Suez Canal, sabotage Western-owned oil installations, and nationalize the oil industry. However, for economic reasons, such actions would probably not be of long duration. Should they provide bases for Soviet military deployments/operations in the Mediterranean, the adverse consequences would include a diminution of US prestige and influence in the area in peacetime, and a heightened threat to US and NATO operations in wartime.

35. (S) Continued unrestricted use of the Strait of Gibraltar is essential to the United States and its allies. It is also in the interest of both NATO and the United States that the continuing discussions between Spain and the United Kingdom be concluded in a manner which preserves over-flight rights and access to Gibraltar.

36. (S) The UK force drawdowns in Malta have had an unsettling effect on the Maltese political and economic situation. A failure of the Maltese economy could lead to a takeover by leftist groups. The United States should monitor the situation in Malta closely, and, if necessary, take steps to deny its use as a base for military operations by the Soviet Union.

37. (S) The Middle East's strategic significance stems from its geographic location, the Suez Canal, its vast oil resources, its ports, the potential for use of its important forward staging and base areas, and its potential as a foundation for increased Soviet influence. Most of the forces and factors that have given this region a high potential for conflict in the past will continue into the mid-range period. The June 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict points up the unpredictability of specific alignments in the area and the miscalculations which deep-seated enmities can stimulate; reinforces the improbability of a near-term accommodation between the two sides; and emphasizes the need for an enduring solution. Other divisive intraregional quarrels will persist, such as the Yemen dispute and the maneuvering for control of South Arabia subsequent to UK withdrawal from Aden. Despite the adverse reflection on the USSR aid investment which the outcome of the Arab-Israeli conflict caused, the USSR objective to reduce further US and UK influence in the Arab world was advanced. For the longer term, while direct combat involvement of Soviet forces in the area during the coming decade is unlikely, force deployments cannot be ruled out in all circumstances, due to USSR proximity and the likelihood of its continued alignment with the Arab cause.

a. Israel will seek to maintain the military superiority over the Arab nations which it demonstrated in the recent short but intensive war. The USSR, by recent resupply actions following the establishment of the cease-fire, has clearly demonstrated an intent to continue the provision of war materiel to the Arab nations. However, the Soviets are likely to reappraise the worth of their military assistance to the Arabs, and military aid is likely to be on a more selective basis. There is a better than even chance that Israel will decide to develop a nuclear capability during the mid-range period. The probability would be heightened by [illegible--any?] of several factors, e.g.: sizeable rearming of the Arabs; a settlement of the current situation which does not provide for Israel's security, right of innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal, and bilateral negotiations between Israel and Arab nations; and increased membership by other nations in the nuclear weapons community with consequent lowering of the onus against entry.

b. Iran, the pivotal CENTO state, has hoped to use this defense organization to counter what it considers the Arab threat. The Shah, concentrating on the solution of economic problems, brought about in part by excessive expenditures on military hardware, has recently demonstrated a desire for greater Iranian independence in political, military, and economic matters. Nevertheless, the Shah and any probable successor will likely continue to look to the West, particularly the United States, as a major source of protection against Soviet expansionist actions, as well as against any threat by Arab radicals, particularly from Iraq.

c. CENTO is a link, albeit a weak one, in the containment chain around the communist world. UK participation probably will continue. Barring a political upheaval, it is expected that Turkey, Iran, and probably Pakistan will continue CENTO membership. However, unless unforeseen circumstances necessitate a US decision to commit major military strengths directly to CENTO on a continuing basis, which is unlikely, CENTO's military importance will continue to be minor. Hence, the security of this region will rest primarily on US bilateral arrangements.

d. Although existing bases in Turkey can facilitate execution of US contingency plans, their use for actions unrelated to NATO or not in Turkish interests may be denied. Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia provide critical communications, surveillance, detection, and other support facilities, which will continue to be important.

38. (S) Sub-Saharan Africa is certain to experience political and social turmoil during the next decade. The greatest threat to peace stems from the instability occasioned by changes in leadership and the coupling of the modernization process with racial and tribal tensions. This instability and receding Western influence leave an environment susceptible to communist exploitation. Communist influence probably will increase if Western Europe continues to reduce its levels of assistance. Sub-Saharan Africa is of significance largely because of its potential were it to fall within the sphere of communist influence. In addition, base, transit, and overflight rights, and other such requirements are significant in the event operations develop which involve US participation. Both sea and air base facilities assume greater significance in use of alternate routes during any closure of the Suez Canal. South Africa presents special problems to the United States. It has the most significant armed forces in Africa south of the Sahara and its facilities would be of increased value in the event of Suez Canal closure. However, South Africa's apartheid policy runs counter to US national policies. This cause of friction between the two governments makes less likely, as time progresses, any arrangements for mutual military support and cooperation.

39. (S) South Asia, with its vast land mass and large population, is strategically significant because of its long-range potential. Its loss to communism would be seriously disadvantageous to US interests and long-range objectives in Asia.

a. India is wary of Pakistan's cooperation with the CPR, and appears determined to check further Chinese expansion in the northern border area. If the CPR maintains its bellicose attitude, India probably will seek additional US, British, and Soviet assistance, but is not likely to invite direct foreign military presence unless there is a renewal of large-scale hostilities in the Sino-Indian border region. India will face many political difficulties aggravated by inflation, religious strife, student unrest, internal communist agitation, and slow progress in overcoming governmental inertia in dealing with food supply and population growth problems. Military self-sufficiency may be substantially realized toward the end of the mid-range period, but India will require foreign assistance in the interim if it is to achieve its planned military capability. India could be the next nation to develop a nuclear weapon capability, which, while tending to offset the CPR strength, would constitute a major stimulus to Pakistan to move closer to the CPR and/or to seek, through a combination of external assistance and its own effort, to attain some military nuclear capability.

b. Pakistan, through its membership in CENTO and SEATO, had hoped to counterbalance India, which it has viewed as the more immediate threat to its security. Prospects for permanent settlement of the Kashmir dispute and improvement of relations with India are dim. The conflicting difficulties of seeking security against India, the USSR, and the CPR could cause Pakistan to continue its drift toward nonalignment or toward the CPR in contrast to its previous pro-Western stance. Hence, only minimal participation in regional defense treaty organizations is to be expected.

40. (C) Asia has become the arena for open military conflict arising from three interrelated confrontations: US-CPR, USSR-CPR, and US-USSR. US policy in Asia since 1949 has emphasized containment of the multiple threats posed by the USSR and the CPR. SEATO was created for this purpose and has proven to be a useful instrument. A policy emphasizing containment will continue during the mid-range period, dealing with the threats generated by subversion, insurgency, and armed intrusion in Asian mainland areas and in the adjacent Western Pacific. The threat of such aggressions stems directly or indirectly from the CPR. US political, economic, psychological, and military measures taken in the peripheral areas should be oriented to an over-all strategy centered on Communist China.

41. (C) The end results of US efforts in Vietnam will influence strongly the future of Asia and will bear critically on the prospects for US influence on the developing nations of the world. Additionally, long-term Asian issues which will impact on the US security interests are: the extent to which India, Japan, and Australia develop their military capabilities and display a willingness to play a positive role in the affairs of Asia; the willingness and ability of the United Kingdom to continue to play a power role in Southeast Asia; the ability of the Philippines to resist a growing threat to its political stability; the ability of Indonesia to achieve stability and become a constructive factor in Southeast Asia/Southwest Pacific affairs; the ability of South Korea to maintain a stable, noncommunist government and deter aggression; and the extent to which the free countries of Asia will seek increased mutual accommodation to create a counterweight to Chinese power.

42. (S) CPR military capabilities will improve over the next decade, with continued emphasis on the attainment of significant nuclear weapons capabilities. Long-term CPR goals include achievement of major power status, dominance in Asia, ideological leadership of international communism, and the expulsion of US power and influence from Asia. Corollary objectives include: control over territory now held by the Government of the Republic of China (GRC), detachment of Japan from its alliance with the United States, neutralization of India as a competitor for regional power, and the restoration of Chinese suzerainty over Korea and mainland Southeast Asia. The CPR is not likely to resort to overt military intervention or aggression so long as it considers the probable losses greater than the likely gain and can anticipate success through other means. Nevertheless, the use of CPR military force must be anticipated if Chinese border areas are threatened, if the CPR leaders wrongly assess US intentions, or if a neighboring communist state, such as North Vietnam, is near collapse or requests Chinese assistance. The CPR military capability to attack the Republic of Korea, Southeast Asia, and India is significant. The major weaknesses of CPR armed forces are in sea power, logistic support, and lack of modernization of their substantial air forces, which would limit the scope of their military operations. The CPR now has a limited capability for nuclear strikes against peripheral Asian targets which it can be expected to exploit politically. This capability is expected to increase significantly during the mid-range period.

43. (S) The USSR also poses a serious threat in the Pacific area because of its ability to provide material assistance to insurgent movements and modern arms to governments susceptible to Soviet influence, and because USSR forces have a capability to strike, harass, or neutralize a large portion of the US military forces in the Pacific-Asian area. Moreover, the expansion of the Soviet merchant marine and the development of very large transport aircraft will improve Soviet capabilities to move unopposed military forces and equipment to distant areas.

44. (S) Japan is by far the strongest nation in Asia in economic terms. At its own pace, it probably will increase its military strength and may slowly and cautiously assume larger security responsibilities in Northeast Asia. The possibility that Japan will eventually assert a position of leadership in Pacific-Asia warrants specific consideration in US planning. As Japan enlarges its role in Asia, preservation of close US-Japanese ties is important to US interests worldwide. US base rights in the Japanese homeland and on Okinawa and available skilled Japanese manpower and industrial support are major elements in support of US military posture throughout the Western Pacific. Pressure for the restoration of the Ryukyus to Japanese sovereignty and control in some form can be expected, but continued US use of the Ryukyuan bases will remain fundamental to US strategic concepts for the area.

45. (C) South Korea, with its growing economy and industrial base, is an anchor point of US forward strategy in Northeast Asia. The presence of US combat forces on South Korean territory provides evidence of a firm commitment, adding to the credibility of the US deterrent in Northeast Asia. So long as the United States continues its firm commitment to assist in the defense of South Korea and provides appropriate military and economic assistance, South Korea probably will continue as a cooperative ally in Asia, will be able to provide forces for its own defense, and may contribute forces to other operations in Asia. Overt aggression from the north remains a possibility in the mid-range period but the more immediate danger probably will be the growing incidence of communist infiltration, propaganda, and subversive activity from North Korea. A North Korean intensification of this activity would add to the difficulties of the ROK Government in providing combat forces outside of Korea and would increase pressure on the United States for additional MAP assistance and a continued US presence in Korea.

46. (S) The GRC has a capability for continued and improved economic viability on Taiwan, but does not have sufficient military power to reestablish itself on the mainland or to defend Taiwan unaided against a large-scale sustained CPR assault. The military importance of the GRC in terms of US security interests stems from US access to bases and facilities on Taiwan, the denial of these facilities to the CPR, and from the substantial threat GRC armed forces pose to the mainland tying down CPR forces in the coastal provinces. While military limitations and concern over US response will deter the CPR from attempting military conquest of Taiwan, the CPR may periodically undertake military action in the Taiwan Straits area to test GRC defenses and probe US determination. The present US objective of preventing a CPR military seizure of Taiwan will continue; however, it is also in the US interest to avoid involvement in, and to discourage GRC initiation of, a war with the CPR in an attempt to restore its control over the mainland.

47. (S) The Philippines provide major US base facilities essential to the forward strategy in the Pacific-Asian area. The Philippine Government is expected to continue its alliance with the United States but will require strong US support. For the mid-range period, the threat of external attack, other than the potential Chinese intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) threat, is not great; however, the potential for subversion and insurgency is significant and rising. This threat stems from a variety of dissident minority groups, including the illegal Communist Party and remnants of its military arm--the Huk. In addition, a strong Muslim group, which does not fully support the government, exists in the southern islands, and Indonesian claims to the southern island, though now dormant, can become an issue during the mid-range period. These factors, together with signs of a breakdown in law and order and extensive unemployment, are causing a progressive deterioration of governmental control. Additionally, an element of extremism is emerging that includes considerable anti-US sentiment and opposition to the Philippine Government for sending forces to Vietnam. These conditions are inimical to the longstanding US interests in the Philippines.

48. (S) The United Kingdom has stated its intention to reduce further its military forces in the Far East during the next few years. It is in the US interest to encourage the United Kingdom to delay its final departure from the Singapore base as long as possible and particularly until the situation in Southeast Asia is resolved. The United States, because of its heavy commitments elsewhere, is not in a position to assume the added responsibility for the security of the Singapore-Malaysia area.

49. (S) Australia and New Zealand have close defense ties with the United States and basically adhere to a forward defense strategy in Asia. As the military presence of the United Kingdom recedes and CPR bellicosity continues--both likely eventualities--Australia and New Zealand will rely increasingly on the United States rather than the United Kingdom. Australia is increasing its military potential and, over the long run, could become the only non-Asian nation, other than the United States, with significant power in the Pacific.

50. (S) In Indonesia, in view of the anticommunist violence which accompanied the 1965 change of regime, the present government has a large stake in preventing a return of communist power. Indonesia's membership in the United Nations has been renewed, Indonesian relations with the West have improved, and there has been a distinct withdrawal from the formerly strong associations with the CPR, North Vietnam, and North Korea. The CPR can be expected to attempt to regain its former influence in Indonesia. The USSR will seek to restrict or eliminate Western influence in Indonesia, as well as to thwart any CPR move to regain ascendancy. While continuing to seek military assistance and aid from both the United States and the USSR, Indonesia probably will strive to maintain a nonaligned position in its relation with the USSR and the West.

51. (S) Southeast Asia currently presents the most serious and complex problems facing the United States in sustaining its containment policy. The United States has chosen to take a stand in Vietnam against communist use of "peoples war" and "wars of national liberation." Involved in the outcome of this conflict are such long-term issues as: (a) the confidence of other nations in the US collective security policy and, consequently, their will to resist aggression and insurgency; (b) the future of US influence in the affairs of Asia; (c) the prospect of more or fewer communist-inspired and supported insurgencies throughout the underdeveloped world; (d) leadership of the world communist movement; and (e) the extent of progress by the CPR toward its basic goal of dominating Asia and excluding Free World interests and influence. The US purpose in Vietnam will continue to be to assist the Government of Vietnam in defeating communist subversion and aggression, in winning the allegiance of the people, and in attaining an independent, noncommunist society functioning in a secure environment.

52. (S) In Thailand, deployments of US forces are largely to meet the needs of the Southeast Asia conflict, including operations in Laos. The facilities developed during this conflict could be used to provide a base for future US/SEATO deployments, should this become necessary. Thailand is faced with a growing problem of insurgency primarily in the northeast sector, supported by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnam. The Thais, with aid provided through the US Military Assistance Programs, will probably be able to hold this insurgency in check as long as US/allied effort continues to contain the primary threat in South Vietnam. The United States looks to Thailand to play a role in strengthening regional resistance to aggression and has declared that full support of the SEATO Treaty would be provided in the event of direct communist attack. The other nations of the Southeast Asian peninsula--Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore--will be unable to provide, without outside assistance, for their own defense against either external communist aggression or major internal subversion. The neutral status of Laos and Cambodia has been undermined by their use as sanctuaries by North Vietnam/Viet Cong combat forces. Accordingly, although the United States respects the neutral status of these countries, operations by US forces are required to negate such use by the North Vietnam/Viet Cong forces.

53. (S) The primary threat to North America will be from Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The ballistic missile threat is expected to increase. That threat may be supplemented by weapons deliverable from orbit or with depressed trajectories, if such systems are developed. The CPR will represent a growing threat in the 1971-1980 time frame. Since the most likely air or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack approach is via the polar regions, Canada's aerospace and participation in NORAD continue to be of great significance. Inasmuch as submarine-launched missiles pose a threat off both coasts of North America, it is important that US-Canadian antisubmarine warfare arrangements be continued. It is expected that military relations between Canada and the United States will continue to reflect the fundamental identity of common defense interests, but may be affected by Canada's growing nationalism and by its increasing sensitivity to any form of US pressure.

54. (S) In most of Latin America, political, sociological, and economic instability, frequently exploited by communist subversion and insurgency, will continue. The principal threat to US interests will continue to be such communist subversion and insurgency. Although now remote, the possibility of insurgencies of serious proportions occurring simultaneously in several Latin American countries, must be taken into account. The communists seek to: (a) erode US influence, exploiting the anti-US character of Latin American ultranationalism; (b) undermine the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Alliance for Progress; (c) neutralize Latin American armed forces; and (d) subvert legitimate reform and nationalist movements. Cuba will continue to be the main base in Latin America for communist subversion as long as the Castro regime retains control but, in the near-term, Cuban-instigated movements are not expected to reach sufficient proportions to overthrow Latin American governments. However, other sources of violence and discontent may well overthrow weak governments because of lack of public support or military disenchantment.

55. (S) A prime communist objective will be to weaken the OAS and prevent the establishment of regional peacekeeping forces which could thwart a communist takeover of any nation in the area. It is not likely that the USSR, Communist China, or Cuba would participate in direct military operations and risk a confrontation with the United States. However, communist countries can be expected to provide material, economic, psychological, and political support of communist-inspired activities in Latin America, together with training of local communist leaders.

56. (S) Most Latin American governments and their armed forces will probably remain pro-United States and anticommunist, although nationalist tendencies will become more pronounced. If the military leaders cannot obtain what they believe to be sufficient US military equipment, their US-orientation will diminish and they will continue to seek and obtain military assistance from other sources.

57. (S) Close cooperation in countering communist insurgents can be expected between certain countries; e.g., Guatemala and Honduras, Bolivia and Argentina, and Colombia and Venezuela. Nevertheless, most Latin American security forces would be unable to cope with widespread insurgency without external assistance.

58. (S) Latin American desire to stay clear of a nuclear power struggle has resulted in a Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ) Treaty having been agreed to by most Latin American countries. The NFZ will undoubtedly come into existence but the Treaty is worded so that there should be no adverse effect on US transit and overflight rights. However, there are other important factors associated with this Treaty, such as extravagant territorial sea claims, which are potentially inimical to US interests.

Part IV

Strategic Concept

59. (S) General. The principal objective of US military strategy is the deterrence of aggression at any level, with emphasis on deterrence of strategic nuclear attack on the United States since national survival would be clearly in jeopardy. Should deterrence fail, the principal objective of US military strategy is the termination of hostilities under conditions of relative advantage while limiting damage to the United States and minimizing damage to US and allied interests. Accordingly, the three basic elements of the US strategic concept are collective security, credible deterrence, and flexible response.

60. (S) Collective Security. The first goal of collective security is to acquire and assist allies who will contribute to US security interests worldwide, particularly through mutual efforts to counter threats posed by the Soviet Union and Communist China and their respective allies. The second goal is to obtain the cooperation and assistance of other nations in programs to eliminate internal weaknesses and instability which attract and facilitate subversion, insurgency, and armed aggression.

a. The United States should enter alliances and other collective security arrangements selectively, stressing maximum reliance upon indigenous forces to protect their national and regional interests. US participation should be based upon the degree to which US interests are involved; the threat; and the willingness, desires, and capabilities of the peoples concerned to support mutual goals.

b. Inherent in collective security is forward defense. This comprises a combination of elements, including strong indigenous military forces; forward-deployed US forces; pre-positioned equipment and supplies; forces fully capable of rapid deployment, quick entry into combat, and sustained operations, as necessary; and US strategic mobility capabilities; all complemented by US strategic nuclear power. Collective security embodies cooperative efforts toward common goals, which include combined action to counter aggression and to assist other nations. There must be increased emphasis on regional efforts toward self-help and economic and military assistance by third nations.

61. (S) Credible Deterrence. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. Credible deterrence is a function of obvious capability and known determination to employ it when necessary. Deterrence could fail for a number of reasons, important among which are miscalculation of intent or resolve, underestimation of military capabilities, or commission of an irrational act. Forces structured solely to deter may be insufficient to achieve US objectives if deterrence fails. It is important that deterrent credibility be established for all levels of conflict. There is an essential relationship among all the levels of deterrence.

a. The United States must be known to possess a level and mix of strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems, which have sufficient survivability and assured capability to penetrate under all conditions of war outbreak, to guarantee unacceptable damage to any state, or combination of states, and which have, concomitantly, the capability to limit damage to the United States and its allies.

b. Deterrence of an enemy's use of nuclear weapons within a theater requires survivable, controlled, and versatile strategic offensive and defensive forces and dual-capable (nuclear and nonnuclear) general purpose forces, capable of rapid and discriminate response at levels of intensity appropriate to the circumstances.

c. Deterrence of nonnuclear aggression is based on both US and allied dual-capable general purpose forces and US strategic forces. Requirements include continued efforts by Free World nations to strengthen their military capabilities; US forces capable of arriving in potential conflict areas quickly, in strength, and prepared for peacekeeping and such combat operations as may be necessary; strategic mobility capabilities; and US forces deployed to selected forward locations as evidence of US determination and unequivocal involvement.

d. Deterrence of subversion and insurgency is best accomplished through preventive efforts aimed at establishing effective political, economic, technological, psychological, sociological, and military programs. The key military requirements are to deter outside military support to insurgency, to assist in the creation and employment of indigenous military and paramilitary forces capable of contributing effectively to internal security and stability, and to participate in support of other government agencies in nonmilitary programs.

62. (S) Flexible Response. A capability for flexible response requires the United States to have an array of options to cope with all the levels and scopes of conflict. This will provide a capability for controlled increases or decreases in the application of military power to US advantage throughout the spectrum of warfare. US initial engagement, and subsequent increases in commitment if necessary, should be on a scale and intensity such that the enemy will have neither the time nor the capability to accommodate to our efforts, thereby insuring his timely defeat, minimum costs in US and allied lives and resources, and achievement of US objectives. Additionally, US forces must be capable of executing national options of response that are not limited to the location and manner of conflict selected by the enemy.

a. To defeat subversion and insurgency, US strategy must encompass and integrate diplomacy, military and economic aid, technical assistance, cultural exchange, economic sanctions, psychological operations, and unconventional warfare. Preventive programs must be continued and strengthened. Maximum possible use must be made of indigenous forces to deal with local insurgents; in addition, US forces may be necessary to support local forces, to engage and defeat the insurgents, and to interdict or defeat external support.

b. The United States must have the capability of committing general purpose forces in accordance with terms of alliances, in support of UN resolutions, and on the basis of US unilateral decisions. This objective necessitates a high degree of flexibility, a strategic deployment capability to all points of the globe, a versatile capability to engage enemies whose capabilities range from primitive to sophisticated, and the ability to deploy to and fight in all environments.

(1) Against the background of the relative total military capabilities of the United States and the USSR, the strategic implications of conflict at sea become significant as a means for bringing military pressure to bear in support of limited objectives.

(a) In the case of the United States and its allies, it provides options to deter and coerce the Soviet Union and its allies to the advantage of Free World interests.

(b) In the case of the Soviet Union and its allies it provides options to bring military pressure to bear in selected instances against vulnerable US and allied sea lines of communications to gain limited objectives.

(2) US employment of coercive options at sea should take into consideration joint employment of over-all US military strength if major interests are at stake.

c. General purpose forces must include a strong tactical nuclear capability for the option of effective quick response in raising the threshold of conflict against enemy superiority, when necessary to defeat the enemy, and to respond to possible enemy use of tactical nuclear weapons. For such quick response, tactical nuclear weapons must be collocated with dual-capable forward-deployed forces.

d. At the level of strategic nuclear war, US strategy must provide multiple options to national authorities, to include a selection of execution choices as to countries and tasks under varying conditions of war outbreak. Under all conditions, US strategic offensive and defensive forces must comprise a capability to inflict unacceptable damage upon the war-supporting and urban-industrial resources of the enemy. Concomitantly they must be capable of: destroying or neutralizing (with or without collateral damage constraints) a comprehensive military target system; limiting damage to the United States and its allies; maintaining continued strategic superiority; conducting selective attacks; and terminating hostilities under conditions of relative advantage to the United States. These capabilities would also provide options to deter and coerce the enemy. General purpose forces also figure importantly in US options for flexible response at the level of strategic nuclear war. They contribute both during and subsequent to strategic nuclear operations and exploit the advantage achieved in these operations, thus furthering progress toward achievement of US objectives in the post-termination period.

63. (S) Europe, the Mediterranean, and North Africa

a. NATO Strategy/2/

(1) The over-all US military objective for NATO, essentially the same as that of the other member nations, is to prevent war by creating an effective deterrent to all forms of aggression. For this purpose the Alliance needs a full spectrum of military capabilities ranging from conventional forces through tactical nuclear weapons to strategic nuclear forces.

(2) To provide the minimum requirements for the deterrent strategy the Alliance must act jointly and maintain at least:

(a) A credible capability for direct defense (i.e., either defeats aggression on the level at which the enemy chooses to fight or places upon the aggressor the burden of escalation) to deter the lesser aggressions such as covert actions, incursions, infiltrations, hostile local actions, and limited aggression (i.e., any nuclear or nonnuclear military action in which it appears that an armed attack imperils neither the survival of nation(s) nor the integrity of military forces).

(b) A credible capability for deliberate escalation (i.e., scope and intensity of combat deliberately raised but, where possible, controlled) to deter more ambitious aggressions.

(c) A credible capability to conduct a general nuclear response [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] as the ultimate deterrent.

(3) Should aggression occur the military objective must be to preserve or restore the integrity and security of the North Atlantic Treaty area by employing such force as may be necessary. In the fulfillment of this objective, the area of Allied Command Europe is to be defended as far forward as possible. In this event the Alliance should:

(a) Meet initially any aggression short of a major nuclear attack with the available direct defense.

(b) Conduct a deliberate escalation of the conflict if the aggression could not be held and the situation restored by direct defense.

(c) [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

(4) The political and military control arrangements of the Alliance should permit timely political consultation required by indicators of attack, and consultation required for the use of nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear weapons should be consistent with the following guidelines:

(a) [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

(b) [5 lines of source text not declassified]

(c) [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

(5) A capability for rapid augmentation of the forward posture is necessary so that maximum use may be made of any period of political tension which may precede a possible aggression or to take advantage of any forewarning provided by any other indications. This capability must provide:

(a) For the timely deployment of any active forces not located near their emergency defense positions.

(b) For supplementing effective local forces in-being on the flanks through an improved NATO capability for rapid reinforcement without impairment of M-Day defensive capabilities elsewhere.

(c) For the provision of trained, equipped, and readily mobilizable reserve forces which might be committed to NATO.

(6) Plans for rapid augmentation capability should take full account of the mobilization and force expansion capabilities of NATO countries, provide a base for longer-term increases in a prolonged test of political determination, and take account of the possibility that neither French forces nor French territory, air space, or facilities would be available to NATO in a crisis or war.

b. Additional US Aspects of Strategy for Western Europe

(1) Provisions for the defense of Western Europe should include the option for US and allied forces, appropriately reinforced, to defend, without the use of nuclear weapons, against aggression by Warsaw Pact forces against NATO forces, with the objective of demonstrating to the Soviet leaders the escalatory risk involved in pursuing further military aggression.

(2) The United States must prepare unilateral plans for Europe which provide, among other things, for the participation of French forces and the use of French territory and facilities in the event of war, and for the control and use of nuclear weapons should the NATO system not function properly. In addition, the United States should plan for alternatives in those situations in which, due to the multinational character of NATO decision-making, combined action critical to US objectives may be infeasible or subject to unacceptable delay.

(3) Defense of the European area, undertaken by the United States in conjunction with participating allies, will be conducted as far forward as possible along the general line of [7 lines of source text not declassified]. In all cases this will require securing and controlling essential bases and LOCs, including control of the sea and air approaches thereto.

(4) Although sea forces of the Atlantic Command must be prepared primarily to respond to overt aggression at any level, in conjunction with land, air, and amphibious operations, mid-range strategy should give greater emphasis than heretofore to the protection of US/allied maritime interests under conditions short of a major war in continental Europe. In this context, the strategy should provide for a naval posture with a recognizable capability to deter or respond to any hostile act or threat of aggression at sea with a degree of force sufficient to oblige the aggressor to choose between intensifying the confrontation, with a clear prospect for defeat at any higher level of engagement, or withdrawing. One measure that is expected to be adopted in furtherance of this objective is establishment of a permanent nucleus of a NATO standing naval force (STANAVFOR).

c. US Strategy for the Mediterranean and North Africa. US strategy must be one which maintains continued freedom of access and operations in the Mediterranean and stresses noninvolvement of US military forces in Africa. Primary reliance should be placed on peacekeeping forces of the United Nations when military action in North Africa is required. If the United Nations does not respond, the United States should next seek solutions using NATO institutions and forces or ad hoc multilateral arrangements. Only when all other means have been exhausted and US national interests are involved should a unilateral commitment of US forces be made. This general policy should not preclude timely action by the United States, including deployment of land, sea, and air forces, when other means threaten delay which jeopardizes US objectives. Essential to this strategy are actions which will:

(1) Ensure maintenance of LOCs into and through the Mediterranean.

(2) Encourage maximum use of indigenous forces for internal security and defense of those countries important to the defense of Western Europe.

(3) Maintain base rights, port facilities, transit, and overflight rights to support LOCs to Europe's southern flank.

(4) Provide LOCs and entry rights and facilities to ensure introduction of US forces into the area and into the Middle East and Africa South of the Sahara.

(5) Continue contact and influence with both military and civilian elements of countries in the area to foster US orientation.

64. (S) Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. US military strategy supports the following major US objectives for these areas: to limit communist influence; to prevent the establishment of Soviet bases; to promote a sufficient degree of internal security to allow orderly national development and stability; to discourage arms races; to encourage peaceful settlements of disputes between nations; to preserve uninterrupted access to strategic resources and facilities; to ensure retention of and/or access to essential bases and facilities; and other strategic capabilities such as use of the Suez Canal, overflight and transit rights, and staging services.

a. In the Middle East, US policy seeks to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of the nations in the area. In furtherance of this policy, US military strategy is:

(1) Use of peacekeeping forces of the United Nations, or of ad hoc multilateral arrangements to maintain stability. Participation by US forces should not be sought unless the multilateral arrangement includes Soviet participation and/or the participation of US forces appears to be a prerequisite to a multilateral agreement to act.

(2) Unilateral commitment of US forces only when other means do not materialize and US objectives are threatened.

(3) Assistance, including logistic support, of indigenous forces in the forward defense of CENTO in the event of Soviet aggression. Should the forward defense fail, lodgments should be retained, to the extent practicable, in the Karachi, Persian Gulf, Aden Gulf, and Suez areas.

b. In Sub-Saharan Africa, US military strategy is:

(1) Take full advantage of existing and potential indigenous military and paramilitary resources to prevent and/or defeat subversion, infiltration, and insurrection.

(2) Encourage initial response by allied and regional forces in event outside assistance is required.

c. In South Asia, US military strategy is:

(1) Rely on defense primarily by allied and indigenous forces against communist aggression.

(2) Plan for US support, to include tactical air, air defense, naval, and logistic support forces.

(3) Manage arms support and sales in such a manner as to hold the India-Pakistan arms race in check.

(4) Seek to establish facilities, such as on Aldabra and Diego Garcia, in strategic areas.

65. (S) The Pacific Area

a. Problems in Asia cannot be met by the same formula the United States has applied to Europe. In particular, broad-based, collective security is more difficult to achieve, subversion and indirect aggression are more prevalent, and deployments to and operations in areas along the mainland periphery are more difficult to maintain in Asia than in Europe.

b. The basic tenet of US military strategy in Asia is containment. A strategy of containing Asian communism has three interrelated elements: (1) deterring or defeating direct or indirect aggression; (2) strengthening the areas threatened by aggression or subversion; and (3) influencing the leaders of the CPR and other Asian communist nations to abandon their expansionist policies and seek a constructive relationship with the outside world.

c. The US strategy for containment of Asian communism for the duration of the Vietnam conflict will be close-in containment of Communist China, North Vietnam, and North Korea while assisting in the defense of free nations of the area against communist aggression. The post-hostilities strategy will be dependent upon the military and political conditions under which hostilities are terminated. Either a close-in or offshore strategy, or a combination of both, would: (1) lend credibility to military alliances; (2) keep open land, sea, and air routes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans; (3) give Free World access to strategic exports from the area; and (4) help independent countries achieve political stability within a framework of economic development and progressive social change.

d. An example of the types of conflict for which US forces must be provided in the mid-range period is the current war in Southeast Asia, the successful prosecution of which requires the maintenance of simultaneous pressure against all elements of the enemy's war-making capability. In South Vietnam, this involves extensive ground, air, and naval operations against the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese main forces and major base areas, while continuing political, social, and economic development and vigorous offensive operations against Viet Cong provincial forces and guerrillas. Against North Vietnam this involves a comprehensive and coordinated air/naval campaign which will: (1) bring military pressure on its internal war-supporting resources; (2) effectively impede the importation of external resources; and (3) increase interdiction of infiltration routes in North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and along the coast. This strategy envisions a degree of pressure which is beyond the enemy's capability to accommodate and seeks the following military objectives: (1) to make it as difficult and costly as possible for North Vietnam to continue effective support of the Viet Cong and to cause North Vietnam to cease direction of the Viet Cong insurgency; (2) to defeat the Viet Cong and North Vietnam forces in South Vietnam and force the withdrawal of North Vietnam forces; (3) to extend Government of South Vietnam domination, direction, and control over South Vietnam; and (4) to deter the CPR from direct intervention in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific and to be prepared to defeat such intervention if it occurs. Until these objectives are realized, the United States must retain the initiative and maintain momentum in the conflict using such forces as are required.

e. In the event that cessation of Southeast Asia hostilities is brought about by a military truce or a de facto "fading away" of the enemy, planning should provide for retention in South Vietnam of a balanced combat and logistic capability sufficient to assure the security of the United States/Free World military assistance forces (US/FWMAF) from major attacks or intensive harassment by Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces. The size of retained forces can be reduced gradually as evidence of Viet Cong/North Vietnamese compliance with any agreements and desire for peace accumulates.

f. In the event that cessation of Southeast Asia hostilities is brought about by a political settlement that entails major withdrawal of US military forces from Vietnam, the alternative containment posture for the United States should provide for forces and activities in the Pacific-Asian area in the range between the pre-Vietnam levels (1 August 1964) and the current levels, including: (1) a Military Assistance Advisory Group in South Vietnam; (2) advisory, logistical, security, and tactical forces and facilities in Thailand; (3) balanced forces in the offshore areas and Korea; (4) back-up ready forces elsewhere in the Far East and Pacific, and in the CONUS; (5) major US naval forces in the South China Sea/Gulf of Siam area or elsewhere in the Western Pacific for rapid response in troubled areas; and (6) facilities and materiel in forward areas to permit rapid deployment of combat forces.

g. In the event of a war with the CPR or the CPR and the USSR, the US military strategy for the defense of the Far East is for the United States and allied nations to defend as far forward as possible while conducting offensive naval and air operations against the enemy, including the CPR proper. This requires a military capability for an active defense of the continental areas of South Korea, South Vietnam, and Thailand, as well as a capability for offensive operations. Within this strategy, the United States must hold, as a minimum, the strategic area encompassed by the general line of [2 lines of source text not declassified]. In addition, control of the seas must include the Strait of Malacca, South China Sea, Formosa Strait, East China Sea, Japan Sea, Bering Sea, and the Bering Strait. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

h. Some reduction in US forces in Korea may become possible in the future, depending upon the outcome of the conflict in Southeast Asia and based upon: assurances of continuing AID and MAP support; an agreed ROK-US strategic concept for defense, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and a residual US presence as part of a credible deterrent and defense posture. Proposals for withdrawal of US forces from Korea must also be considered in context with the evolving patterns of ROK-Japanese and US-Japanese relations, and the capabilities of the ROK Government to deal with the existing and projected threat from the north.

i. The United States should strongly resist pressure for any change in the existing arrangements for US control of the Ryukyus in view of their strategic importance. US strategy and base planning, while holding firm on the requirements for continued unrestricted use of the bases in the Ryukyus, should include planning for alternative arrangements should these become necessary.

j. [12-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

k. The post-hostilities posture in the Pacific-Asian area should include those military assets, bases, and facilities needed to continue the forward deployment of US forces in order to strengthen the resolve of friendly countries, to deter aggression by communist countries, and to assist in the defeat of such aggression if it occurs.

66. (S) The Americas

a. Canada should be encouraged to continue its close and traditional cooperation with the United States, and broaden its military, economic, and political activities in intrahemisphere affairs. An important step would be for Canada to become a member of the OAS. It is essential to the defense of North America that good US-Canadian relations be maintained in order to support expansion of NORAD capability to make it effective in meeting the threat.

b. Instability in Latin America will require that the United States act to prevent or defeat aggression or insurgency inimical to US interests and assist in maintaining the security and integrity of selected nations. Of particular interest are those nations in which subversion would threaten the use of the Panama Canal and those most susceptible to the establishment of communist regimes. The presence of the US Military Assistance Advisory Groups and US Military Groups in the countries of Latin America must be maintained as a fundamental element of US influence in the Hemisphere. It will continue to be necessary to provide US military materiel to Latin American countries on a selective basis in order to modernize Latin American security forces, participate in the choice and composition of such forces, minimize third country incursions, and maintain close rapport with the Latin American countries.

c. US military forces must be prepared for deployment into the Latin American area preferably as part of a regional force, but unilaterally if necessary. Overflight rights, airfield facilities, ports, storage-withdrawal rights, and staging areas will be required on a case-by-case basis.

d. In addition to the maintenance of stability, emphasis in the event of war will be placed on: (1) defending the Panama Canal; (2) preventing the establishment of enemy bases in Latin America or the use by enemy forces of any Latin American facilities; and (3) retaining access to strategic materials and existing industrial capacity of the area. The United States must retain bases in Panama in order to ensure that US security interests are protected relative to the present lock canal, and any future sea-level canal, and to provide for hemispheric security activities. The United States must also control the sea approaches thereto and be capable of secure rerouting of shipping around South America. Close US-Chile relations are critical to the achievement of the latter objective. The retention of Guantanamo to support US operations in the area and to maintain US presence in Cuba is required both for operational reasons and for its contribution to US prestige in the Caribbean. The United States also has a requirement for maintaining sound surveillance stations, missile tracking stations, and military air routes in the area.

e. In the event of strategic nuclear war between the United States and the USSR, initial US support to the area will be limited to that accruing from US defense of the Panama Canal and control of associated sea and air lines of communication.

Part V

Force Planning Guidance

67. (U) This Part of the strategy presents broad guidance to serve as a bridge between the strategic concept and the analyses and judgments essential in the planning process continued in the succeeding Volumes and Annexes.

68. (C) The US strategic offensive and defensive forces should have an assured predominance over the collective capability of the USSR, the CPR, or any other state or group of states. These forces must be sufficient to ensure that following a strategic nuclear war the United States will retain a position of strategic advantage relative to other nations of the world.

69. (C) A clearly superior US strategic nuclear military posture requires offensive and defensive forces which are capable, under all conditions of war outbreak, of assuring destruction of the enemy's urban-industrial areas (i.e., assured destruction) while limiting damage to the United States (i.e., damage limiting) and, to the extent practicable to its allies.

70. (S) [6 lines of source text not declassified] Forces assigned the damage-limiting task provide the capability through offensive and defensive means to reduce the effect of the enemy's attack. Damage-limiting forces should be in balance with assured destruction elements. An effective damage-limiting capability requires a combination of offensive forces, ballistic missile defense, air defense, space defense, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces, and civil defense. A force of survivable strategic offensive forces, intelligence and early warning systems, strategic defensive forces, command and control systems, and effective passive defense measures will strengthen the credibility of the US deterrent against attacks on the United States and its allies. This in turn will strengthen the assurance that the fear of escalating nonnuclear conflicts works to the advantage of the United States. A proper mix of US strategic offensive and defensive capabilities would tend to make increased defensive efforts and expenditures the enemy's preferred response option, and would exact greater direct and indirect attrition of the enemy's attack, so as to reduce the potential for damage to the United States and its allies if deterrence fails.

71. (S) A mix of strategic offensive forces is necessary to permit a range of options at varying levels of intensity of attack against alternative target systems. A combination of land and sea-launched missiles and manned aircraft carrying bombs and missiles, equipped with active and passive defense systems, will be required through the mid-range period. Such a mix provides options ranging from a show of force to the assured destruction task. These forces must be survivable, continue to be maintained in a high degree of alert, and must be capable of discriminate and controlled use.

a. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] To the extent feasible, US deployment of forces for this option should emphasize their commitment to the Communist Chinese threat in order to reinforce the deterrent effect upon Communist China, reassure US allies in Asia, and derive the potential benefits of [3 lines of source text not declassified].

b. Residual strategic offensive and general purpose forces must provide an effective capability, [4 lines of source text not declassified].

c. Command and control facilities and arrangements must be secure, reliable, and survivable to ensure that strategic forces are immediately responsive to political and military decisions on the initiation, conduct, and termination of hostilities.

72. (S) The United States should have active and passive defenses in depth for protection against attack from land, sea, air, and space, by all types of weapon systems, whether employed selectively or simultaneously. A foremost requirement for the defense of the United States is the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system. Such a system should provide a significant limitation of damage to US population, military capabilities, industrial and other resources. This defense must be integrated with an improved defense against aerodynamic vehicles, improved ASW capabilities, a comprehensive civil defense program, and a program for protection of military forces against attack effects, to assure the necessary damage-limiting capability.

73. (S) The United States requires reliable and near real-time surveillance of enemy and friendly forces. Enemy forces must be kept under surveillance prior to the outbreak of hostilities in order to obtain technical intelligence, to perform mission identification, to monitor arms control agreements and treaties, and to provide strategic warning. During hostilities, surveillance must provide tactical warning. In the exercise of command and control, surveillance is required to insure that US forces and resources are employed with maximum effectiveness. This surveillance should provide indications of enemy strategy, and knowledge of enemy tactics, order of battle, and the effectiveness of enemy and US weapons. Timely and precise analysis of the relative success of an exchange is required so that the best interests of the United States can be served in controlling the progress of hostilities and achieving advantageous war termination. These missions will require aircraft, satellite systems, ocean surveillance systems, and other systems and sensors.

74. (S) General purpose forces, supported by appropriate strategic mobility capability, are an integral part of the over-all US deterrent posture. They constitute the principal means to meet threats at levels less than strategic nuclear war. Their capabilities also provide options to deter and coerce the enemy. General purpose forces will usually operate in association with allies, under the collective security and forward defense aspects of the strategic concept. This requires consideration of allied or other friendly in-being and potential force capabilities. Whenever feasible, these capabilities should be developed as the first line of defense against aggression. US military assistance should be considered in that context.

75. (C) Active and Reserve general purpose forces should be balanced in combat capability and sufficient in quantity, quality, mobility, and logistic support to provide forward deployed forces and a strategic reserve of US-based forces which, in conjunction with allied forces, can assure the defense of key strategic areas and essential LOCs, and respond to contingency situations. They should be supported by appropriately structured strategic lift forces and pre-positioned materiel, and include a training, replacement, and rotation base in the United States for deployed forces.

76. (S) General purpose forces must be capable of operating in a nuclear or nonnuclear environment. They should be equipped with both single-purpose and dual-capable weapons systems for air, land, and sea operations. These should include air and missile elements on quick reaction alert. Tactical nuclear capabilities should provide a variety of options for responding to, initiating, and waging nuclear warfare at all levels below strategic nuclear war. They must be capable of selective application for military advantage in circumstances where significant military gain without further expansion of conflict is likely. In addition, they should be capable of conducting military operations in strategic nuclear war in conjunction with strategic offensive and defensive forces.

77. (S) During the mid-range period, there will be a continuing requirement for a substantial US military presence in and around Europe facing the Warsaw Pact. Even after the Vietnam conflict has ended, substantial deployed forces, including forces afloat, and land and sea-based prepositioned equipment and supplies will be required in the Pacific-Asian area to face the Soviet and CPR threats and to contribute to area stability.

78. (S) US military forces must be capable of employing chemical and biological weapons, of conducting operations in a toxic environment, and of defending against their use by an enemy.

79. (TS) Unconventional warfare forces should be prepared to exploit the resistance potential in areas which are denied to the United States, overrun, or likely to be overrun by enemy forces. US personnel should have the capability to assist indigenous elements in the creation, support, and direction of capabilities to conduct guerrilla warfare and other unconventional operations to reduce the enemy's combat effectiveness, industrial capacity, LOCs, and will to resist, and to assist in establishing friendly political controls in hostile areas. Means should also be provided to assist in evasion and escape of US and allied military personnel and other selected individuals from enemy-held territories.

80. (S) In all types of conflict, military psychological operations to support national and military objectives should be planned and conducted in coordination or integrated with like operations of governmental and nongovernmental agencies and/or friendly indigenous assets.

81. (TS) [7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

82. (S) Although a fully developed forward base structure is desirable, it is not possible to establish or maintain such a structure in all parts of the world where US general purpose forces may be employed. Therefore, US general purpose forces must be capable of deployment into and operation in areas in which bases are lacking, relatively austere, or hastily prepared, and be capable of conducting amphibious and airborne assault operations.

83. (C) A survivable and readily expandable reserve and mobilization base for augmentation of Active Forces is essential. Strategic airlift and sealift forces, both military and civil, are a critical requirement for this element of the force as well as for the Active element of the force. The balance between Active and Reserve component forces should be determined based upon two considerations:

a. The size and composition of Active general purpose forces must be sufficient to meet continuing military requirements, as well as those in contingency situations, considering the availability and readiness of Reserve component forces. These Active Forces should be sufficient to meet the requirements of contingency situations for a period of time sufficient to permit timely and orderly mobilization of Reserve component forces and industrial mobilization in those situations where successful termination of the conflict cannot be accomplished without such mobilization.

b. Reserve component forces must be of sufficient strength and appropriate type to augment Active Forces in the event of a direct confrontation with the USSR or the CPR and in contingencies when operations are of either an unexpected scope or prolonged duration. Such forces must be sufficient in size to meet the requirements of these situations until additional forces can be mobilized.

84. (C) The combination of Active and Reserve forces, augmented by further mobilization of military and industrial resources, must provide the capability to carry out US strategy throughout the full range of potential conflict situations that confront the United States. As substantial uncommitted Active land, sea (including amphibious), or air forces are deployed in response to contingency situations, additional forces must be readied so that the United States continuously has sufficient forces to be capable of initiating or responding to, on a timely basis, an expansion of conflict in area, type, intensity, or duration, or of responding to an unforeseen contingency. Such forces should be maintained for the duration of the contingency/conflict.

85. (S) General purpose force level objectives should be determined in consideration of the foregoing capabilities and should be keyed to military contingencies which have a reasonably high probability of occurrence, singly or simultaneously. Accordingly, based upon the basic military objectives, threat appraisal, strategic concept, and risk assessment, such contingencies govern the design of general purpose forces. Therefore, while maintaining essential deployments in areas not directly involved in the contingency situation, a US support, training, and rotation base, and the capability to conduct successful operations in other contingencies where force commitments are of a minor nature but where their timeliness may be crucial, general purpose forces are required to meet the following contingency situations:

a. Situation I--Without Mobilization: Conduct successful combat operations, either nuclear or nonnuclear, in any one major contingency outside the NATO area not involving direct engagement with the military forces of the USSR or the CPR (e.g., North Vietnam/Viet Cong aggression in Southeast Asia), while maintaining the capability for initial defense of NATO./3/

b. Situation II--With Mobilization: Meet the requirements of either of the following two situations:

(1) Situation II-A--Major Aggression Against NATO: Successfully conduct and terminate combat operations, in concert with allies, against a major attack by the Warsaw Pact nations, while maintaining a holding action/4/ against major CPR aggression in Asia.

(2) Situation II-B--Major Aggression in Asia: Successfully conduct and terminate combat operations, in concert with allies, against major aggression, not necessarily limited to one location, by the CPR in Asia, and provide forces for the initial defense of NATO.

86. (C) Airlift and sealift force level and pre-positioning objectives should be directed to a capability which will:

a. Provide mobility to meet a wide variety of contingencies through employment of forward-deployed forces together with rapid deployment of forces from the United States.

b. Meet the time-phased deployment requirements of the contingency situation and provide the required capability to support employment of combat forces.

87. (C) Analyses of strategic lift requirements and other factors affecting strategic mobility to derive airlift and sealift force level objectives should include consideration of the readiness of deployable units (Active and Reserve) and their location and posture relative to aerial and surface ports of embarkation; air and sea LOCs, including overflight, transit and access rights; the availability, likely condition, and capacity of air and sea ports in the objective area; operation of overseas terminals and provisions for reception, materiel handling and equipment processing; buildup of overseas logistical bases and their materiel inventories, including pre-positioned equipment and supplies; and the intratheater transportation systems. Intratheater transportation systems include all elements from theater mainland and offshore air and sea ports of entry to the using units during the deployment and employment phases of combat operations in a theater.

88. (C) In developing airlift and sealift force level objectives, the possible effects of hostile political or military action and sabotage on: lift vehicles; LOCs; overflight, transit, and staging rights; pre-positioned equipment and supplies; and facilities must be considered. Additional factors include the probable warning of hostile action, the nature of the attack, and the enemy and friendly forces already on the scene.

89. (C) Force level objectives for airlift and sealift forces will be derived from time-phased deployment lists developed from the framework of the strategy herein, with emphasis on the general purpose forces contingency situations outlined in paragraph 85, above.

90. (S) It is in the US interest to provide selected countries with military assistance, while recognizing that local forces are not always a substitute for US forces. National needs should be considered carefully in providing assistance and the level and type of aid set accordingly, recognizing that there are limits on the US ability to control its use. Most important, local forces should be assessed realistically and considered in conjunction with US resources in determining US strategy, preparing US military plans, and analyzing US force level objectives. Likewise, when determining the level and type of assistance to be provided in country and regional military aid programs, it is important to examine the role of local forces in US strategy and plans, together with political and economic factors affecting their use. In the underdeveloped countries, the military assistance program should also be designed to complement the civic and economic development of the country and to improve receiving, staging, and operating facilities that contribute to US strategic mobility requirements.

Washington, August 14, 1967.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT
Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 1967-FY 1968

The President has noted the request for nuclear weapons dispersal authorization for FY 1967 and FY 1968 as contained in the Department of Defense memorandum dated May 26, 1967,/2/ and as corrected by the DOD memorandum dated July 5, 1967 to the holders of the May 26 memorandum,/3/ and has taken the following actions in connection therewith:

1. The Department of Defense is authorized to:

a. Disperse nuclear weapons in the United States without limit.

b. Disperse nuclear weapons to areas outside the United States in the numbers indicated in the last column of Appendix A to the May 26 memorandum, as amended, with the provisos that: (1) the total in each area may be exceeded by 10% in the event of unforeseen contingencies, (2) weapons, for which dispersal in support of non-U.S. NATO forces is authorized for planning purposes only, may be dispersed in support of U.S. forces pending additional and specific dispersal authorizations on a case-by-case basis, and (3) the grand total of weapons outside the U.S. (areas under foreign sovereignty and areas under U.S. control other than U.S.) shall not exceed [number not declassified] nuclear weapons. Such dispersals will be subject to the yield restrictions specified in NSAM 143 and policy regarding permissive action link devices contained in NSAM 160./4/

c. Continue to disperse nuclear weapons and to provide nuclear weapon support to non-U.S. forces in accordance with the current dispersal authorizations which have been approved under NSAM 143 and which are tabulated in the column "Non-U.S. Forces--Authorized FY 1966" (Column C) of Appendix B to the May 26, 1967 Department of Defense memorandum.

2. The President has noted that the Department of Defense has concurred in a recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the dispersal authorization for the Pacific Theater be increased over the current dispersal authorization by approximately 5%. The President has accepted the recommendation of the Department of Defense in this matter. The President understands that the Pacific Theater requirements will be given further review during consideration of the next dispersal authorization request.

3. In connection with his action of the FY 1967-FY 1968 dispersals, the President has directed that in the future dispersal authorizations should be handled as follows:

a. A deployment plan will be submitted annually by the Secretary of Defense approximately in mid-November of each year concurrent with the nuclear weapon stockpile approval request.

b. Presidential authorization will establish levels in terms of (1) total overseas, (2) total by area, and (3) total by type of weapons (e.g., strategic offensive, tactical air, ASW) within each region. The Secretary of Defense will have authority to exceed control levels (2) and (3) by 10% to meet unforeseen contingencies.

c. The plan will contain actual deployment figures for the end of the previous fiscal year, deployments previously authorized, and proposed deployments for the same two fiscal year period as covered by the stockpile request.

d. Authorized deployments will be those planned as of the end of each fiscal year. The Secretary of Defense will have reasonable flexibility to manage and alter quantities during the course of the year to cover unavoidable peaks in deployment due to logistical factors. Plans for contingency deployments included in the Presidential authorization will be shown separately with adequate explanations.

e. The plan will include, on a highlight basis, the rationale for and major changes in the deployment plans.

4. The initial plan on the revised basis should be submitted by November 15, 1967 and should have the concurrence of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

W.W. Rostow

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DISPERSAL--BY COUNTRY/COMMAND

[table (11 columns and 29 rows) not declassified]

Washington, September 12, 1967, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT
ABM Deployment

PARTICIPANTS

Canada
Minister of National Defense Paul Hellyer
Elgin B. Armstrong, Deputy Minister of Defense
H. Basil Robinson, Deputy Under Secretary, External Affairs
Ambassador A. Edgar Ritchie
Air Marshal F.R. Sharp, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

United States
Secretary of Defense McNamara
Gen. J.P. McConnell, Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze
John S. Foster, Director, Defense Research and Engineering
Alain C. Enthoven, Asst. Secy. Defense, Systems Analysis
Lt. Gen. A.W. Betts, Chief of Army, R and D and Nike-X
George S. Springsteen, Deputy Asst. Secy., EUR

Secretary McNamara welcomed Minister Hellyer and referred to their previous conversations on the question of ABM's./2/ He wanted to continue those consultations because we are now on the point of announcing publicly the deployment of a light ABM system.

He noted that for some time the research and development on such a system had been going forward and had now developed to the point where decisions were possible. He said that we had continued to press the Soviets for discussions which might lead to some kind of agreement on limiting such deployment but that the Soviets were defensive about it. In response to Mr. Hellyer's question, Secretary McNamara said that he was certain such discussions would be taken at some time in the future. However, at the moment, he said, Viet-Nam stands in the way. He noted that Kosygin had been pressed very hard on this at the time of the Glassboro Summit and had given a more or less propagandistic reply. We shall, however, continue to press the Soviets and will press it again this week with them.

Secretary McNamara noted that our current budget had several hundred million dollars for the development of an ABM system. We have stated publicly that, depending on the outcome of talks with the Soviets, we might or might not use such funds to protect offensive weapons./3/

Secretary McNamara noted that the engineering development of an American ABM system had only recently progressed to the point where a production decision was possible.

He said, however, that today we have reached that point and expressed his satisfaction at the high quality of people and contractors working on the system. He said that the difference between today and the past is that we now have the Chinese threat and an engineering design which permits those in authority to make the decision to proceed with production.

He stressed that we had not yet made a final decision on this but believes we will announce such a deployment next week./4/

He said that the purpose of the system is to protect the American population against a Chinese attack in the mid-1970's and to provide some protection for our offensive weapons against Soviet attack.

Secretary McNamara then asked Mr. Foster to describe the system.

Mr. Foster said that two elements were involved--radars and missiles. [6 lines of source text not declassified] This radar is used to guide the interceptor to the impact point.

The interceptor is the Spartan which has a yield of [3 lines of source text not declassified].

Mr. Foster noted that the system we proposed to deploy would [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

He said that the eye of the system is the radar. To deny the enemy an opportunity to attack them, [3 lines of source text not declassified].

Mr. Foster stressed that the system is an area defense. There are only a few sites covering the whole country. He said, however, that the system does not provide coverage in depth for our strategic offensive weapons. Therefore, we have considered this problem and have decided to put Sprints in to protect a goodly number of our Minutemen.

The cost of the entire system, he said, is about five billion dollars.

Mr. McNamara said that we were proceeding to undertake consultations with our other allies./5/ He said that we would also be talking to the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] here and that our Embassy would be talking with the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He noted also that we would be talking in the North Atlantic Council tomorrow. He then asked if the Canadians had any questions.

[4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. McNamara said that all equipment would be in the United States.

Secretary McNamara stressed that this is a United States financed and oriented system and that we felt it provided an optimum degree of protection for the United States. One by-product, however, is some protection for Canada.

Secretary McNamara then read off the cities in Canada which would be protected--[2 lines of source text not declassified].

He reiterated that all of these would be protected and that this is a by-product of the U.S. system. He said that we could modify the U.S. system at extra cost to provide greater coverage for Canada. If Canada wants greater benefits, however, she must share in the cost and make an early decision. Mr. McNamara stressed that a Canadian decision by the end of this year would be necessary.

Dr. Armstrong asked Secretary McNamara what the cost might be. Secretary McNamara, before responding to the query, noted that Rand, on a recent study of the differences between cost estimates and actual costs on military contracts, found that the actual costs generally exceeded the estimates by 300 to 1,000 per cent. Hence the Canadians should be aware that the costs will be high. Current estimates for the American system are $4 to $5 billion. To increase the Canadian coverage would cost an additional $1 billion. This would give [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] coverage in Canada. It was stressed, however, that these are unescalated figures.

[1 paragraph (2-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary McNamara, again speaking of costs, said that we could reduce costs by reducing the coverage of the entire system. He said that we could achieve a 20 per cent reduction in costs by reducing coverage by 5 per cent. But this, of course, would raise political problems as part of the population would be left out of the coverage.

Mr. Hellyer said that there was no political problem in Canada now with regard to an ABM, because at the moment Canada is violently anti-ABM. But he noted this might change.

Minister Hellyer's comment led Secretary McNamara to talk about this attitude in the context of the development of neo-isolationism. He noted that this was caused by our view that our allies are standing back from what we regard to be joint responsibilities. He felt that an ABM deployment system could determine a country's inclusion or exclusion from world affairs. In the case of Canada, he cited particularly Asian affairs.

Minister Hellyer said that he agreed with Mr. McNamara on neo-isolationism but felt that the current attitude on such things in Canada at the moment was determined by Viet-Nam.

Secretary McNamara cited the reaction of our allies in connection with the Middle East. He said that they had just walked away from the situation. He cited all this to indicate that the ABM would have an influence, albeit minor, on all this.

Dr. Armstrong asked how coverage is determined.

Mr. Foster said that it was related to population density and that to cover Canada would not expose U.S. cities.

Secretary McNamara said that we need to know soon if the Canadians want to join because plants must be built from the ground up in order to supply the components of the system.

In response to a question by Minister Hellyer, Secretary McNamara said that the deployment of this system will not lead to the deployment of a Soviet-oriented system. He said that it is not intended to move toward a heavy system and stressed that deployment of this system is not the first step in the deployment of a larger system.

In support of this, Mr. Foster said the proposed system protects all of the United States but it does have some technical limitations. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Ambassador Ritchie asked if [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] were included.

Secretary McNamara said that [1 line of source text not declassified].

Basil Robinson asked what difficulties would ensue if Canada waited two or three years before joining.

Secretary McNamara said that there would be greater cost.

Dr. Armstrong asked, if Canada participated in the system, could some of the equipment be produced in Canada. Mr. McNamara said that we hadn't looked into this but he doubted it.

Minister Hellyer asked if there was an altitude limitation on explosions.

Mr. Foster replied in the affirmative.

Mr. McNamara said, [4 lines of source text not declassified].

Asked what the relationship of the system was to NORAD, Secretary McNamara said that it does not influence the NORAD agreement. Regarding command and control, it will be assigned to NORAD if the agreement were modified to have NORAD embrace the ABM's, or it could be assigned elsewhere.

Minister Hellyer noted that to put it in NORAD, or even to suggest putting it in NORAD at this time, would complicate consideration by the Canadians of renewal of the agreement.

When asked whether or not there was a strong possibility of the ABM's being related to NORAD, Secretary McNamara said that depended upon Canada.

He also noted, in response to Minister Hellyer's inquiry, that there was no overlap between the Air Defense System and the ABM's because they were independent systems.

When asked if there would be any savings from having the two systems thrown together, Mr. Foster said that he did not know of any such savings.

In response to Mr. Armstrong's query, Mr. Foster said that the ABM systems would operate against submarine missiles.

Mr. Hellyer asked why we had to protect missile farms. He said that he thought he remembered Mr. McNamara saying at the last consultations that these farms did not need protection.

Secretary McNamara said that there were two options available here. We could either expand the offensive system or defend the present offensive system. The U.S.S.R. is expanding their offensive system, so we must insure ourselves. We are buying insurance by the protection of the missile farms. Essentially, we are looking toward the time in the future when Soviets expand both their offensive and defensive systems beyond the present NIE threat limits.

Mr. Hellyer asked about the influence of the ABM system on the Air Defense System and the relationship envisaged. Secretary McNamara said that at this level they were unrelated. China has no air threat. He noted that other factors threatened the Air Defense System and not this one. We have problems in the Air Defense field which we want to discuss soon with the Canadians.

Mr. Hellyer asked how we prevent atomic bombs from being brought into American ports in boats.

Secretary McNamara said that we just have to depend primarily upon intelligence. He also noted, however, the degree of intimidation in such a situation would be limited in view of our ability to retaliate.

Minister Hellyer said that he wished to speak for a moment on the situation in Canada.

He said that he believed that Canada would be able to renew the NORAD agreement without inclusion of any reference to ABM's. If ABM's are introduced into the agreement, however, it would jeopardize approval of the agreement.

He said that the feeling against ABM's is so strong in Canada at the present time that there is an inclination, on the part of some members of the government, that when Canada renews the NORAD agreement, the government should issue a statement saying that it will not involve itself in a system at the present time.

Concluding, he said that at the moment there is "absolutely no chance" of Canadian involvement in the U.S. ABM system. His conclusion was that there was no more than one chance in a hundred of getting a decision for such participation.

Ambassador Ritchie asked Secretary McNamara when the announcement would be made. The Secretary replied on Monday./6/

Minister Hellyer noted that this announcement, plus having all the hardware in the United States, plus reassuring statements on fallout effects, would serve to clear the air in Canada and make for a much more rational discussion. Then the Canadians could talk of real plans and not hypothetical situations. He noted that the Canadians themselves had been doing some studies on the effect on Canada of the deployment of an American system. He had been discussing these with some Parliamentarians. He felt that the U.S. announcement would facilitate better understanding of the problem.

Secretary McNamara said that Minister Hellyer could publicly state that he had been consulted by the Americans about this deployment.

Mr. Hellyer also noted that, with regard to NORAD, the Canadian position will be officially given at the Permanent Joint Defense Board (PJDB) meeting next week. (Basil Robinson revealed after the meeting that the Cabinet was convening to discuss this issue this afternoon.)

At this point there was a brief discussion on the possibility of expanding the coverage of the U.S. deployed system by lowering the detonation ceiling from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The point made here was that while the ceiling is now at the higher level it could be lowered and increased coverage obtained, but other problems would ensue.

Dr. Armstrong asked if Defense Research Board experts could come down and talk to Mr. Foster about the ABM system.

Secretary McNamara said that he was delighted but that the classification on the system was exceedingly important and this must be given every consideration.

Dr. Armstrong asked what the system did in terms of preventing casualties.

Secretary McNamara reviewed the probable outlook for a Chinese ICBM deployment and said that our estimates were that without an ABM system, and in the event of a Chinese attack, we might suffer a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. With the ABM system he said this loss would be practically zero.

He did note, however, that if the Chinese force expands--its missiles rising from 75 to 100--we would have to expand our own system in order to keep the casualty figure down low.

Concerning the Soviets, Secretary McNamara said that we must be wary of regarding the system as giving much help against the Soviets except from the standpoint of defending our missile farms. He said that the Soviets, if they attack, would launch sufficient weapons to do considerable damage.

Dr. Armstrong asked if Secretary McNamara still would adhere to his philosophy that we could offset any Soviet ABM deployment.

Secretary McNamara replied in the affirmative. He said that we must exercise the offensive and take advantage of every technological development to be able to penetrate the Soviet system.

Mr. Hellyer asked if he could do anything further for Secretary McNamara. The Secretary replied in the negative and said that he was very glad to meet with the Canadians and that their officials would be welcome when they wished to come down here.

Mr. Hellyer said that he thought the announcement would come as no surprise and will definitely facilitate rational discussion.

Washington, September 14, 1967.

SUBJECT
Deterrence of Strategic Nuclear War, and Damage Limiting

I am concerned about our general approach to the problem of deterring strategic nuclear war, and I am also concerned about the relation of our damage limiting capability to deterrence and to planning for actual war fighting should deterrence fail.

In my view, deterrence will depend on a Soviet judgment not only of their own losses but also of relative US losses and surviving military capability. The political stakes and the nature of the Soviet leadership will also be important. In some future equivalent of the "Cuban missile crisis" 20% Soviet fatalities might not be enough, if US losses would be 80%. Soviet leaders might believe that the US would cease to exist while the USSR could successfully recover, using surviving nuclear forces to dominate the European industrial complex.

Our evaluation should consider possible surprise Soviet tactics as well as force capabilities: pin-down, FOBs, cruise missile submarines, medium bombers, and coordinated offensive/defensive operations. My feeling is that we have become too theoretical--that our calculations are too removed from the most likely patterns of admitted unlikely wars, and hence from the probable Soviet judgments which determine deterrence.

I believe we should consider a new criterion for deterrence. We should try to insure that Soviet losses would be at least as severe as US losses in any strategic war, and that the resultant surviving military balance would not be in favor of the Soviets. With regard to this latter point, I recognize that there are arguments both pro and con, but feel that it deserves our serious consideration.

Further, we should examine our forces in the light of how they would perform if a strategic exchange began, using various scenarios for its beginning. I suggest that under such circumstances the execution of the option to destroy Soviet population and industry would be our poorest choice. Rather, we would probably act to maintain the threat of such assured destruction while operating our forces to minimize Soviet potential for destruction on the US urban/industrial complex. A force planned for that purpose could well look very different from one aimed at preserving assured destruction in the face of a "Greater Than Expected" Threat.

Harold Brown

Secretary of Defense McNamara proposed to include an announcement of the Johnson administration's decision to deploy an ABM system in an upcoming address before the United Press International Editors and Publishers in San Francisco on September 18, 1967. For McNamara's early thoughts on the purposes of this speech, see Document 185.

In an August 8 memorandum to McNamara, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul Warnke advised that McNamara's speech should say only that he was leaning toward a THIN-X and a China-oriented ABM deployment, "but avoid making a firm commitment to proceed with a deployment," which, he felt, should wait until the President's budget message in January. He added that such a postponement would allow time for consultation with U.S. allies, "who are undoubtedly still relatively unfamiliar with the arguments favoring deployment of a THIN-X system, as opposed to a Soviet-oriented deployment." He went on to remind McNamara that he had promised Canadian Defense Minister Paul T. Hellyer that he would consult with him before any U.S. decision was made, and he outlined how the NATO allies as well as Japan and other Pacific allies could be consulted. At the least, he believed that if McNamara announced the ABM deployment in his September speech, the administration should first undertake urgent consultations with Canada and other U.S allies. On Warnke's memorandum, McNamara initialed the option recommending to the President that he make a firm commitment to deploy in his September address, and he added a note: "If a 'commitment' is to be made in the S.F. speech, remind me to 'consult' with Hellyer ahead of time." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, 471.94 ABM (Jul-Aug) 1967)

In an August 16 memorandum to McNamara, Warnke quoted as reclama a memorandum of conversation at the April 6 NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in which McNamara promised that the United States would not act unilaterally on ABMs without consulting its allies. In case McNamara still pressed for a full announcement in his San Francisco speech, Warnke offered four initiatives to prepare U.S. allies in advance for this eventuality. None of the "Approve" or "Disapprove" options following each initiative is checked. (Ibid.)

Meanwhile, on August 9 McNamara circulated a draft of his speech to key principals in the Johnson administration. In an August 16 memorandum to McNamara, Under Secretary of State Katzenbach commented that the draft was "a masterful job." He wondered, however, if McNamara had to be so specific regarding ABM deployment in the speech when "we are committed to consult further with our allies and in particular with the Nuclear Planning Group," which would not meet until September 28-29. He suggested that McNamara intimate in his address only that the administration was "moving in the direction of a thin deployment, stopping just short of announcing a final decision." Among a few other suggestions, he also warned against emphasizing the Chinese nuclear threat as a reason for the decision. "It might be better," Katzenbach cautioned, "to balance the protection of our offensive missiles with the protection against the Chinese threat." (Ibid.)

Under cover of an August 19 memorandum to President Johnson, McNamara forwarded the August 9 draft of his speech to the White House. In this memorandum McNamara quoted Katzenbach's suggestion to delay final announcement of the decision, but added, "I disagree. We are prepared now to make the decision and I believe we must make it. If we decide to go forward with the 'thin deployment' but fail to announce the decision, we are placing ammunition in the hands of our critics who will use it for partisan purposes." The President initialed the draft, presumably indicating his approval, but he also asked for comments on the draft from Joseph Califano. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of Defense, Vol. V, Aug. 1967 [2 of 2], Box 12) Califano generally endorsed its contents, but thought that there should be a statement in the speech or in an accompanying announcement of the budgetary impact of the ABM decision. He wanted to consult with Rostow before the speech was given on how to handle its impact domestically, "since all hell is likely to break loose from the liberals and the urbanists." (Memorandum from Califano to Rostow, August 27; ibid.)

When Adrian S. Fisher, Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, learned of McNamara's proposed San Francisco speech, he urged Secretaries Rusk and McNamara to delay the announcement of the ABM deployment, which would adversely affect the ongoing negotiations on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. His September 1 letter to Foster is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI, Document 204. He also submitted an ACDA paper, dated August 25, on the arms control considerations of a U.S. ABM deployment decision, attached to an August 28 memorandum to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and Walt Rostow. For text, see ibid., Document 202. In an August 31 memorandum, McNamara thanked Fisher for the paper and added that "my staff has been giving active consideration to the problems it discusses, and they will be in touch with your staff regarding them." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, 471.94 ABM (July-Aug) 1967)

In an August 28 handwritten letter to Rostow, Spurgeon Keeny agreed that the proposed light anti-Chinese solution was "probably the best solution" and that the draft speech effectively provided the strategic background and rationale for the ABM decision. Like Warnke, Katzenbach, and Fisher, however, he opposed an early announcement:

"I still think that the decision is premature, politically as well as technically, and that, if it is made this year, it should be as part of the regular budget cycle. A decision in mid-September will focus all attention on this issue in isolation from other military hardware decisions; and in its present form I am afraid it will meet strong objections from all sides. The anti-ABM forces will consider it a foot in the door, and the pro-ABM forces will consider it a grossly inadequate system which fails to protect the U.S. population against the Soviet threat. Technically, I think there are some unanswered questions as to how well and how long this system would actually deal with the early Chinese threat."

Realizing that McNamara was determined to make the full announcement, Keeny offered specific comments on parts of the draft speech. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of Defense, August 1967, Vol. V [2 of 2], Box 12)

Also on August 28, Keeny sent Rostow a memorandum warning against the "categorical statements" in the speech on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. He worried that if the administration later "had to back off from any of them, it will seriously undercut confidence in the Administration and our present strategic posture. Moreover, I am afraid these statements will antagonize rather than convince Congressional critics, and I am sure that they will complicate any possible discussion of the issue with the Soviets." He argued that McNamara should instead "emphasize not our strategic superiority but our very high level of confidence in the reliability of our deterrent under any circumstances." (Ibid., Country File, USSR, ABM Negotiations (II), Box 231) For text of an August 29 memorandum to Rostow, in which Keeny reiterated his arguments for postponing an announcement of the ABM decision until January, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI, Document 203.

Two days later, Keeny sent a memorandum to Rostow elaborating on the technical questions relating to the effectiveness of the proposed ABM deployment against even an early Chinese ICBM threat. To his memorandum he attached NIE 11-4-67 (Document 183), and the Montgomery Report Summary, an internal OSD study, dated August 10, 1967. The latter has not been found, but it warned among other things, according to Keeny's summary of it, "that the Chinese could include first-generation penetration aids on the same time-scale as our ABM deployment and a more sophisticated family of penetration aids a few years later at relatively small cost (10% of their ICBM program)." In conclusion, Keeny advised that "it would be wise to spend a few more months understanding this problem before we announce deployment of a specific system." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. 10) For Rostow's summary and assessment of NIE 11-4-67, see Document 187.

To a September 6 memorandum to McNamara, Warnke attached a suggested added paragraph to the speech, which indicated that despite the ABM decision the U.S. Government was still anxious to reach agreement with the Soviets on limiting offensive and defensive strategic arms. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, 471.94 ABM (Sep) 1967)

Meanwhile, the Johnson administration developed plans to notify U.S. allies in advance of the contents of McNamara's speech. Attached to a September 8 memorandum from Keeny to Rostow is a schedule, approved by an interdepartmental working group, for briefing European and Asian allies, the Soviet Union, other key Asian and Middle East countries, and U.S. posts abroad. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, ABM Negotiations (II), Box 231) For a memorandum of McNamara's conversation with Hellyer on September 12, see Document 190. For text of the statement to be delivered to the North Atlantic Council on September 14, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI, Document 210.

Internal memoranda and telegraphic instructions relating to the briefing of U.S. allies are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12. Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, expressed his concerns about the deployment decision and the announcement in telegram 896 from Moscow, September 2; text in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI, Document 207. Instructions to inform the Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee of the September 18 speech were sent in telegram 37260 to Geneva, September 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 18-6) The text of a letter from John A. Gronouski, Ambassador to Poland, to the Chinese Embassy in Poland, notifying the People's Republic of China of McNamara's impending announcement, was transmitted in telegram 38805 to Warsaw, September 16. (Ibid., DEF 12)

McNamara apparently incorporated into the final text of his speech several of the suggestions advanced by administration principals and his Department of Defense advisers. He included verbatim, for instance, the first sentence of Warnke's suggested draft paragraph attached to his August 16 memorandum. Text of McNamara's September 18 speech is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pages 16-25.

JCSM-520-67

Washington, September 23, 1967.

SUBJECT
Assurance Against the Unauthorized Use of US Nuclear Weapons (U)

1. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services have made repeated studies in depth in regard to devices, techniques, and procedures designed to assure positive control of nuclear weapons. In aggregate, the studies point to the conclusion that the principle of [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

2. (S) In response to a request by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 26 December 1963,/2/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff completed in 1964 a comprehensive review of all US nuclear weapon systems with the view of providing recommendations concerning any changes in procedures, controls, or weapon components that should be incorporated to provide a higher degree of assurance against their unauthorized use. This review included the views of the Services and the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

3. (TS) As a result of this review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, in JCSM-941-64, dated 9 November 1964,/3/ that:

[1 paragraph (8-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

4. (TS) In response to a proposed draft memorandum for the President on unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in JCSM-17-65, dated 9 January 1965,3 advised you that:

"In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize and support fully the requirement to assure the security of nuclear weapons against unauthorized use. [8 lines of source text not declassified]"

5. (TS) [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

6. (TS) [6 lines of source text not declassified]

7. (TS) In order better to determine future Air Force policy relative to PAL devices in general, the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, directed that a comprehensive study be accomplished. The completed study represents the position of the Air Force on PAL philosophy and PAL systems and was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review. The study reaffirms the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and concludes that present controls against the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons are sufficient and that additional restrictive devices are not required. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[4 paragraphs (21-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

8. (TS) [5 lines of source text not declassified] If, however, the national authority directs additional mechanical constraints, the PAL concept described by the Air Force could provide an improved, technically reliable system with significantly less operational degradation and lower costs than other proposed PAL devices and would eliminate costly retrofit of additional nuclear weapons. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

9. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

[5 paragraphs (16-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Harold K. Johnson
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff