Washington, November 24, 1967.

Dear Bob:

Thank you for sending me the first installment of your memoranda to the President on the FY 69-73 Defense program under cover of your letter of October 28./2/

I note that the Strategic Forces memorandum is to be revised this month and understand it will include a new program for North American air defense and some other revisions of the October 4 draft./3/ I would like to defer comment until I receive the newer version. I would, however, like to make a few comments on some of the other memoranda.

In your ASW memorandum2 the analysis supporting the retirement of the ASW carriers and the transfer of their mission to aircraft operating from land bases abroad argues that insurance against the loss of a few bases, such as the Azores, is not a sufficient case for maintaining and modernizing the carrier forces since there will be other bases available. I am less sanguine than you are about the prospects five years hence of being able to use all of the primary or secondary ASW bases you cite, and I think we may have to face more than the loss of just a few bases over the next five years. Thus I think it could be a mistake to plan any long term increase in our dependence on foreign bases for a major function such as ASW.

As you know a joint State-Defense base study is to get underway in January. It should throw some light on the likely availability of ASW bases. A final decision on the carriers might if possible be deferred until the study's findings are available and can be assessed by our staffs.

The theatre nuclear forces memorandum argues that our stockpile of nuclear warheads in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is more than adequate, particularly in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]./4/ It is not clear, however, what specific reductions are planned and on what sort of schedule. I would like to be kept informed of the major changes you have in mind since our allies are often extremely sensitive to adjustments in levels of nuclear weapons support.

I am in full agreement with your air and sea lift objectives,/5/ but I can foresee that your renewed request for FDL funding may well run into the same difficulties in Congress that it did last year. To the extent that the objections of Senator Russell and others to the FDL rest on its foreign policy implications, the State Department would be prepared to lend a hand in defense of the ship program, if this would be useful to you. It is my feeling that the argument for the program will be most effective if it emphasizes our need for these ships to support our normal overseas deployments and long standing commitments, rather than the great advantages they offer for meeting a broader range of contingencies.

There are two memoranda, NATO Strategy and Research and Development, that were not in the group you sent. I will defer comment, therefore on your recommendations on European forces issues until I receive them.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dean

Washington, December 1, 1967.

SUBJECT
Defense Department Budget for FY 69 (U)

My review of the Department of Defense military program and financial budget for the next fiscal year has proceeded to the point where I can present certain conclusions to you. Preliminary estimates indicate that the military forces (Tab A)/2/ and procurement programs which I recommend for your approval will require new obligational authority for Military Functions, Military Assistance, and Civil Defense of $79-82 billion for FY 69. These amounts and previous budgets and appropriations are summarized in the following table:

	New Obligational Authority ($ Billions)/c/
	FY 1967	FY 1968	FY 1969/a/
DOD Normal Budget	$50.3	$50.1	$54-57
Southeast Asia	22.4	23.3	25
Total NOA Required	$72.7	$73.4	$79-82

This will result in the following estimated expenditures and share of Gross National Product:

	Expenditures	% GNP/b/
FY 1967	$68.5	9.0%
FY 1968	73.9	9.1%
FY 1969	77-78	8.9-9.0%

The FY 69 Budget was prepared on the basis of two key assumptions:

1. Provision was made for deployments to Southeast Asia, comprising 525,000 men in South Vietnam and 46,700 in Thailand, 3,608 helicopters, 1,572 fixed-wing non-attack aircraft, 1,074 attack aircraft, and 707 ships and boats by June 30, 1969.

2. Provision was made for combat consumption for all items through FY 69 reorder lead time, enabling continuation of the war indefinitely at the currently planned activity levels, barring unforeseen contingencies, without an FY 69 Supplemental.

The Military Forces supported by this budget are summarized in the tables available for your review. Although I have reduced the budgets proposed by the Services for FY 69 by approximately $16-19 billion, my recommended force structure is based on requirements for national security and has not been limited by arbitrary or predetermined budget ceilings. In my review of the Service proposals, I attempted, as last year, to eliminate all non-essential, marginal, and postponable programs with the objective of minimizing the costs of supporting the required forces.

In developing the program and reviewing the budget proposals, I have had the continuing counsel and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff./3/ The points of difference between my recommendations and those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are set forth in the attachment at Tab B./4/ It should not be necessary for you to study the attachment in detail--of the differences with the Chiefs, I believe they will wish to discuss with you only three issues affecting the FY 69 budget.

1. Advanced Strategic Bomber (AMSA): The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend Contract Definition and, subject to favorable review, beginning full-scale development of a new strategic bomber in FY 69, at an FY 69 cost of $40 million. Their plan would aim at an Initial Operational Capability in FY 76. Mr. Nitze and I recommend continuing development of advanced aircraft technology and bomber penetration aids, at an FY 69 cost of $25 million. We recommend against beginning full-scale development of a new bomber in FY 69 because we do not believe an Initial Operational Capability in FY 76 is needed. Development, deployment, and five years of operation of a force of 150 AMSAs would cost about $7.3 billion.

2. Modernization of the Fourth (Reserve) Marine Air Wing: The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend buying 15 A-6As and 8 RF-4Js at a cost of about $92 million in FY 69 to provide more modern aircraft for Marine Air Wings. This would free A-6As and RF-4Bs for assignment to the reserves. This is in addition to the 358 Navy/Marine Corps Fighter, Attack, and Reconnaissance aircraft I recommend buying in FY 69 at a cost of $1,485 million. For FY 69, they also recommend procurement of 25 CH-46 helicopters for the reserves at a cost of about $50 million, in addition to 130 helicopters I recommend buying for the Marines in FY 69 at a cost of about $180 million. (Procurement of all new aircraft for the Fourth Marine Air Wing would add about $1 billion to my recommended plan over the next five years.) Mr. Nitze and I recommend against this procurement because, without it, we are greatly increasing the total tactical airpower and helicopter lift capability of all of our forces, including the Marine Corps, and because we believe the total inventory of Marine aircraft is adequate. Moreover, our general policy is not to buy new aircraft for reserve air forces. Under our recommended plan, from 1961 to 1971, the destruction capability of the Marine fighter and attack forces will increase more than fourfold and the helicopter troop lift capability will increase more than tenfold.

3. Development of New Tactical Fighter (F-X/VFAX): Both the Air Force and the Navy want to develop a new fighter to replace the F-4. They believe it is needed to counter the latest Soviet fighters. They recommend that we plan to proceed with "Contract Definition" in FY 69 leading to an Initial Operational Capability in 1975. The FY 69 cost of their latest proposal is estimated at about $104 million. Mr. Nitze and I agree that a new fighter ought to be developed for the mid to late 1970's, and we recommend including $60 million in the FY 69 R&D budget for this purpose. This will permit an IOC in 1976.

Dr. Foster, the Director of Research and Engineering, has informed me that a properly defined and substantiated joint-Service plan for F-X/VFAX has not yet been developed. Several important issues have not yet been resolved including the extent to which the two Service versions can be common, the size of the crew, and the extent to which all-weather air-to-ground electronics should be included. The recommended $60 million will support an extensive experimental effort in avionics and propulsion to help resolve these issues and to reduce program risks, permitting start of full-scale development in FY 70.

In addition although the JCS do not recommend FY 69 budget action on a Soviet-oriented ABM system, they want to repeat their view that ultimately the U.S. should deploy such an ABM system to protect U.S. population centers against heavy Soviet attacks./5/

The recommended program has been discussed with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology. They are in agreement with my recommendations with two exceptions. Dr. Hornig is concerned about the apparent decrease in the level of R&D on tactical weapons, and what he considers an inadequate rate of application of new technology to Vietnam. However, he will not be in a position to make specific counterproposals until our R&D budget estimates are more firm. Mr. Schultze believes the FY 69 RDT&E total obligational authority should not exceed $7.45 billion. Our tentative proposal for FY 69 is $7.4-7.7 billion.

Robert S. McNamara

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
AND RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WITH FY 69 BUDGET IMPLICATIONS/6/

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended maintaining a Minuteman force of [3 lines of source text not declassified] for each Minuteman II. The JCS concurred in the Minuteman force level, but recommended that MK-17s be deployed for Minuteman II and later for Minuteman III. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendations. Subsequently, the Secretary of the Air Force recommended slipping the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of the MK-17 one year to January, 1970, and retaining MK-11s for Minuteman II in the interim. The Secretary of Defense later recommended canceling MK-17 development and slipping Minuteman III an additional six months.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing the previously approved program of buying area penetration aids for all Minuteman missiles and terminal penetration aids for Minuteman III. He also approved deploying an improved version of Minuteman II penetration aids at a cost of $35 million in FY 69. The JCS concurred.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended that no additional Titan II missiles be bought and the Titan force be phased down as missiles were fired in Follow-on-Tests. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended procuring 11 additional Titan II missiles to maintain the force at 54 missiles with a test rate of 6 per year. The JCS recommended retaining the Titan force at 54 UE missiles until a new large throw-weight ICBM is available as a replacement. The Secretary of Defense then recommended maintaining the Titan force at 54 UE missiles by buying 5 missiles in FY 69 (for $11.3 million) and 4 missiles in FY 70 and reducing the test rate to 4 per year.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended developing a stellar-inertial guidance system for the Poseidon force and deploying an average of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He recommended against developing an option [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] by end FY 72. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred in the development of a stellar-inertial guidance system, but recommended retaining the option [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The JCS recommended planning on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] missile. The Secretary of the Navy proposed to initially procure [1 line of source text not declassified] by 1975 if a review in 1969 does not indicate that higher loading is necessary. The Secretary of Defense then reaffirmed his recommendation to deploy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] throughout the entire period.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended against deploying area and terminal penetration aids for Polaris A-3 at a cost of $200 million in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy agreed to defer the deployment, but recommended retaining the option to deploy these penetration aids at a cost of $9 million in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense agreed to retain this option.

6. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing Advanced Development of an Advanced ICBM, but recommended against starting Contract Definition in FY 69. The JCS recommended completion of Contract Definition in FY 69, and dependent upon favorable review, full-scale development of the missile element of the Advanced ICBM (WS-120A), with the objective of an IOC in FY 73. They also recommended delaying a decision on expenditures unique to a specific deployment mode until study results are available. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended beginning Contract Definition in FY 69 at a cost of $79 million. Subsequently the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force agreed to develop [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that are capable of accepting either Minuteman III or the WS-120A missile; the program would support a deployment date of Minuteman in such silos in FY 72 and an Advanced ICBM IOC in FY 74. Of the $207 million total hard silos R&D program, the Secretary of Defense will authorize $40 million in FY 69. This includes $38 million R&D money for the dual-capable silo and $2 million for site surveys. An additional $10 million was authorized for advanced ICBM technology.

7. The Secretary of Defense recommended against procuring a prototype Ballistic Missile Ship (BMS) in FY 69. The JCS recommended Concept Formulation and, dependent upon favorable review, construction of one prototype BMS to be available for tests and training in FY 71. This would require $120 million in FY 69 funds. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

8. The Secretary of Defense recommended retaining the current basing program for the bomber force and deferring a decision on equipping B-52 G/H bombers with SRAMs until there is evidence that the Soviets have a good low-altitude terminal defense. He also decided not to reduce further the number of Hound Dog missiles in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Air Force concurred in the bomber force basing program. The JCS recommended equipping the B-52 G/Hs with SRAMs, beginning in FY 70. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended modification of B-52 G/Hs beginning in FY 69 at a cost of $68 million and additional SRAM procurement beginning in FY 70. The Secretary of Defense subsequently decided to modify 30 UE B-52s for SRAM in FY 69, at a cost of approximately $45 million, with no increase in the total number of SRAMs to be procured, but retaining an option to buy more in FY 70.

9. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing development of advanced aircraft technology and bomber penetration aids, but recommended against beginning Contract Definition for the Advanced Manned Strategic Bomber (AMSA) in FY 69. The JCS recommended completion of AMSA Contract Definition in FY 69, and subject to favorable review, full-scale development to preserve an IOC of FY 76. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended Contract Definition in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendations.

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended a Chinese-oriented, system (tentatively with the option of providing for the defense of Minuteman with Sprint missiles following the initial Spartan installation) at an investment cost (including AEC costs) of $4.1 billion in FY 69-73. The Secretary of the Army concurred, but also recommended deploying Nike-X to protect U.S. cities against a Soviet attack. The JCS accepted the proposed light Nike-X deployment as a first step, and concurred in the FY 69 part of the plan, but also recommended deploying Nike-X at the "Posture A" level (at about $10 billion) to protect U.S. cities against a Soviet attack. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation. (The investment cost of his recommended plan is now estimated at about $5 billion, including AEC costs.)

2. The JCS recommended production now for deployment of 12 UE F-12 interceptors in FY 72, and initiating Contract Definition now for an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) for an IOC in FY 73. The JCS recommended against phasing down of our air defense without modernizing the force. The Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense later agreed on a new continental air defense plan including deployment of Over-the-Horizon radars; full-scale development of prototype AWACS with a procurement decision based on flight tests; and development and deployment of an improved F-106X aircraft. The plan also includes provisions for augmenting the defense with Tactical Air Command, Navy, and Marine Corps forces in time of emergency, and selective phase-downs of current Century interceptors and portions of the SAGE/BUIC system. An F-12 development program is under review.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing feasibility studies on the sea-based ABM system. The JCS recommended speeding up feasibility and Concept Formulation studies on both the sea-based and airborne missile intercept systems. The Secretary of the Navy recommended acceleration of the sea-based missile intercept system. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing the approved program for military survival measures (fallout protection for military personnel) at a cost of $47 million in FY 68-73. The JCS recommended a larger program at a cost of $191 million. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended phasing out 18 Mace in Europe and 36 Mace [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Air Force recommended against the phaseout. The Secretary of Defense affirmed the Mace phase-out in Europe, but deferred the Mace phase-out in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] until FY 70.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended phasing out one Pershing battalion now in CONUS in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Army recommended against the phase-out. The Secretary of Defense then recommended deferring phase-out until FY 70.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended against developing a MIRV missile for Pershing. The JCS (less the Air Force Chief of Staff) and the Secretary of the Army recommended development and deployment of Pershing MIRV at a cost of $43 million in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended reducing the tactical nuclear bomb stockpile [number not declassified]. The JCS and the Secretary of the Air Force recommended increasing the tactical nuclear bomb stockpile to [number not declassified]. The Secretary of the Navy contended that [number not declassified] tactical nuclear bombs would be insufficient. The Secretary of Defense then recommended a stockpile of [number not declassified] tactical nuclear bombs in FY 69 and [number not declassified] bombs in FY 70 and thereafter.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended phasing down the tactical Nike Hercules nuclear warhead stockpile to [number not declassified] warheads per U.S. and allied battery. The JCS recommended retaining [number not declassified] warheads per U.S. battery and [number not declassified] warheads per allied battery. The Secretary of the Amy recommended deferring decision pending further study. The Secretary of Defense then agreed to defer decision.

6. The JCS recommended the following tactical nuclear warhead stockpiles, compared to the program recommended by the Secretary of Defense:

[list (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

These recommendations are now under review.

1. The JCS recommended the following total FY 69 Army force structure compared to that recommended by the Secretary of Defense:

	JCS	SecDef
Active Division Equivalents	21-2/3	19-2/3
Active ISIs	21-2/3	19-2/3
Active SSIs	17-1/3	12
Reserve Division Equivalents	9	8
Reserve ISIs	9	8
Reserve SSIs	13-1/3	15-2/3
Division Force Equipment Sets	30-2/3	27-2/3 (less 2/3 of an SSI set)

The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendations.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended a total FY 69 Marine Corps force structure of 5 division forces (4 active, 1 reserve) with an active manpower strength of 298,000. The JCS concurred with the number of division forces, but recommended an active manpower strength of 330,000. The Secretary of the Navy concurred with the number of division forces, but recommended an active manpower strength of 322,000. The Secretary of Defense will review total manpower strength in connection with specific requirements.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended procuring 540 UH-1D helicopters in FY 69. The Secretary of the Army recommended procuring 744 UH-1Ds. Total UH-1D procurement requirements are now under review.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended reducing the previously approved FY 69 CH-47 procurement from 60 to 26. The Secretary of the Army recommended retaining the currently approved program to procure 60 CH-47s in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense then recommended procuring 48 CH-47s in FY 69 and long lead-time components for 36 CH-47s in FY 70. The Secretary of the Army then concurred.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended procuring the new TOW and Dragon anti-tank missiles only for active Army armored and mechanized divisions. The JCS, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring these missiles for all active and reserve Army and Marine Corps division forces. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

6. The Secretary of Defense recommended reducing the previously approved procurement program for M60 Shillelagh tanks because of technical difficulties in Shillelagh. The JCS recommended procurement not be reduced. This recommendation is now under review.

7. The Secretary of Defense recommended changing the mix of Vulcan and Chaparral units and reducing the number of fire units per battalion from 64 to 48. The JCS and the Secretary of the Army recommended no decision be made until completion of a new Army study. The Secretary of Defense then agreed to consider the change in mix to be tentative, pending the results of Army tests and studies next year. (The FY 69 procurement of Vulcan and Chaparral may not be sensitive to the mix decision.)

8. The Secretary of Defense recommended deactivating 8 Hercules batteries in Europe in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Army recommended deferring deactivation because of slippage in the Vulcan/Chaparral force. The Secretary of Defense agreed to defer deactivation until FY 70.

9. The Secretary of Defense recommended reducing the number of Hawk batteries from 83 to 79. The Secretary of the Army concurred. The JCS recommended retaining the previously approved program of 83 batteries. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

10. The Secretary of Defense recommended gradually eliminating all 40mm automatic weapons units from the Army reserve components as Vulcan phases into the active Army. The JCS recommended all 56 40mm reserve units be maintained and modernized with 20mm Vulcan. The Secretary of the Army recommended phasing down the number of reserve units to 40 batteries for which equipment is available, and then phasing down to 16 batteries as Vulcan is deployed in the active Army. The Secretary of Defense agreed to the Secretary of the Army's alternative.

11. The Secretary of Defense recommended changing the mix of Marine Corps assault transport helicopters in the three active wings from 360 CH-46s and 72 CH-53s to 252 CH-46s and 144 CH-53s. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred in this change provided three new light transport helicopter squadrons were approved. The Secretary of Defense then reaffirmed the change in the CH-46/CH-53 mix and recommended creating three temporary light transport helicopter squadrons using existing UH-1E assets in FY 68 and FY 69.

12. The Secretary of Defense deferred decision on procuring the AH-1G as a replacement for the UH-1E in Marine Corps light observation squadrons (VMOs). The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring 55 AH-1Gs to provide 12 of these aircraft for each of the three active VMOs. The Secretary of Defense then recommended procuring 38 AH-1Gs to provide 12 aircraft for each of the two VMOs deployed to Southeast Asia.

13. The Secretary of Defense recommended that no new CH-46 helicopters be procured to complete the modernization of the 4th (Reserve) Marine Air Wing. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended that new CH-46s be procured to replace UH-34s in the Reserve Wing. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

14. The Secretary of Defense made no recommendation on any type of crane helicopter for the Marine Corps. The JCS recommended developing and procuring 15 CH-54B crane helicopters for the active Marine Air Wings at a cost of $48 million in FY 69. The Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring 5 for $15 million. The Secretary of Defense then decided not to budget in FY 69 for development or procurement of CH-54Bs.

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing the previously approved undersea surveillance system (SOSUS) program in FY 69 at a cost of $73 million. The JCS supported a Navy proposal to expand the SOSUS system to include four rather than two mid-Pacific arrays, to install a new long-range cable in the Philippine Sea System, and to approve an installation in the eastern Atlantic area. The FY 69 cost of this proposal is $120 million. The Navy proposal is now under review.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended disapproving development of a new carrier-based ASW aircraft (VSX). The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended continuing VSX development. The Secretary of Defense deferred final decision pending further review. Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense approved development of the VSX as part of a plan for 5 CVS carriers and 4 air groups after the war in Southeast Asia, an Authorized Active Inventory (AAI) of 135 VSX aircraft, and a land-based patrol aircraft force of 24 P-3 squadrons when the VSX is phased in. The Secretary of Defense also recommended reducing the end FY 69 force by 2 CVS air groups to bring the number of air groups into balance with the available carriers.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended continuing Contract Definition of a new class of ASW escort, the DX, but deferring construction of the first of these ships to FY 70. The JCS supported the Navy proposal for constructing 9 DXs in FY 69. The Secretary of the Navy later recommended constructing 5 DXs in FY 69 at a cost of $252 million. The Secretary of Defense then agreed to the Secretary of the Navy's recommendation.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended procuring 3 nuclear attack submarines (SSN) in FY 69 at a cost of $254 million. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring 5 SSNs at an estimated cost of $423 million in FY 69. The Secretary of the Navy later recommended procuring 3 SSNs in FY 69 and procuring long lead-time items for FY 70 SSNs at a cost of $284 million in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense then recommended procuring 2 SSNs in FY 69 and procuring long lead-time items for 2 FY 70 SSNs, at a FY 69 cost of $178 million.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended procuring 40 P-3C land-based patrol aircraft in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred in the number to be procured. Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense recommended a reduced P-3C buy in FY 69 as part of the new airborne ASW plan. The exact number of P-3Cs to be procured is under review.

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended a FY 69 amphibious assault shipbuilding program of 2 amphibious assault ships (LHA) and 7 tank landing ships (LST). The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred. The Secretary of the Navy later withdrew his recommendation on LST construction. The Secretary of the Navy's recommendation is now under review.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended deferring the construction of one amphibious flagship (AGC) from FY 69 to FY 70. The Secretary of the Navy concurred, but the JCS recommended the AGC not be deferred. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended deferring Contract Definition of the landing force support ship (LFS) from FY 69 to FY 70 and not constructing an LFS in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended Contract Definition not be deferred. The JCS also recommended FY 69 procurement of one LFS. The Secretary of Defense then approved the JCS/Navy recommendation regarding Contract Definition, but reaffirmed his recommendation against constructing an LFS in FY 69.

4. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended a force level of 6 CA/CAGs plus 2 battleships for Southeast Asia. The Secretary of Defense then recommended a force of 4 CA/CAGs plus one battleship for Southeast Asia.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended rehabilitating 10 minesweepers (MSO) in FY 69, but recommended against constructing any new MSOs in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred with the recommendation to rehabilitate 10 MSOs, but recommended constructing 5 new MSOs in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendations.

6. The Secretary of Defense recommended deferring one mine counter-measures support ship (MCS) and one special minesweeper (MSS) from FY 69 to FY 70. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred.

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended an underway replenishment force of 81 ships (including a 10 ship Southeast Asia augmentation) in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended a force of 87 ships (including a 12 ship Southeast Asia augmentation) in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense then recommended an underway replenishment force of 83 ships (including a 12 ship Southeast Asia augmentation) in FY 69.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended deferring FY 69 procurement of replenishment helicopters. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring 18 UH-46s at a cost of $28 million in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended deferring the FY 69 procurement of 8 patrol craft (PC) to FY 70. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended constructing 3 replenishment fleet oilers (AOR), 5 salvage tugs (ATS), and one destroyer tender (AD) in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred.

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended a 15 CVA force (augmented by Intrepid during the war in Southeast Asia). The JCS (less the Chairman and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force) and the Secretary of the Navy recommended 17 CVAs (including Intrepid until replaced by a new CVA) for the duration of the war in Southeast Asia. The Chairman recommended 16 CVAs but did not address the Intrepid issue, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force recommended 16 CVAs (including Intrepid until replaced by a new CVA). The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended constructing one new CVAN in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended a force of 1,004 Navy fighter/attack aircraft in FY 69. The JCS recommended a force of 1,192 Navy fighter/attack aircraft in FY 69. The Secretary of the Navy recommended a force of 1,060 Navy fighter/attack aircraft. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended a force of 70 Navy reconnaissance aircraft in FY 69. The JCS recommended a force of 71 aircraft. The Secretary of the Navy recommended a force of 87 aircraft. The Secretary of Defense then recommended a force of 82 Navy reconnaissance aircraft.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended a total of 203 aircraft of other types (airborne early warning, utility, electronic countermeasures, tankers, and helicopters) in Navy combat units in FY 69. The JCS recommended a total of 226 aircraft. The Secretary of the Navy recommended a total of 194 aircraft The Secretary of Defense then recommended a total of 190 of these aircraft.

6. The Secretary of Defense recommended a force of 417 Marine Corps fighter/attack aircraft and 27 Marine Corps reconnaissance aircraft for FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy concurred.

7. The Secretary of Defense recommended a total of 55 aircraft of other types (electronic countermeasures and tactical air control) in Marine Corps combat units in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended a total of 63 of these aircraft. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation. Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense concurred with the JCS/Navy recommendation.

8. The Secretary of Defense recommended a total of 315 aircraft (fighter/attack, reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, and tactical air control) in Navy and Marine Corps reserve combat units in FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended a total of 353 of these aircraft. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

9. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring the following tactical aircraft in FY 69 compared to that recommended by the Secretary of Defense:

	JCS	SecNavy	SecDef
A-6A	113	124	36
A-6D	48	24
A-7A/B	375
A-7E		240	214
F-4J	112	150	36
F-111B	42	42	30
RA-5C	57	24	24
RF-4B/J	30	24	10
EA-6B	31	19	8
E-2A/B	9	9
TC-4Cs	18
TOTAL	835	656	358

The Secretary of Defense's recommendations may be revised to reflect the latest Southeast Asia attrition estimates.

I. Air Force Tactical Air Forces/8/

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended a total of 1,777 fighter/attack aircraft for FY 69. The Secretary of the Air Force concurred. The JCS recommended a total of 1,807 aircraft. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation. The Secretary of the Air Force later recommended reducing the FY 69 force to 1,771 aircraft.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended a tactical reconnaissance force of 360 aircraft for FY 69. The JCS and the Secretary of the Air Force concurred.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended a Special Air Warfare force of 354 aircraft for FY 69. The JCS recommended a total of 420 aircraft. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended a total of 390 aircraft to include 36 UH-1 helicopters. The Secretary of Defense then recommended a FY 69 force level of 396 aircraft and a FY 69 buy of 37 UH-1s.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended a total of 391 other aircraft (night warfare, electronic warfare, and tactical air control) in Air Force combat units for FY 69. The JCS recommended a total of 427 aircraft. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended a total of 505 aircraft. The Secretary of Defense then recommended a total of 455 aircraft and the Secretary of the Air Force concurred.

5. The JCS and the Secretary of the Air Force recommended procuring the following tactical aircraft in 69 compared to that recommended by the Secretary of Defense:

	JCS	SecAF	SecDef
A-7D	135	220	220
AX	22
F-4E	150	113	113
F-5A/B	49
F-111A	181	181	181
RF-4C	59	51	51
RF-111	45
A-37	81	50	50
UH-1F	60	37	37
OV-10	30
Utility Transports	52
TOTAL	864	652	652

The Secretary of Defense's recommendations may be revised to reflect the latest Southeast Asia attrition estimates.

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended procuring 27 C-5As in FY 69 at a cost of $548 million. The JCS concurred.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended procuring 4 Fast Deployment Logistics (FDL) ships in FY 69 at a cost of $187 million. The JCS concurred.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended that the Forward Floating Depot (FFD) program be cancelled. The JCS and the Secretary of the Army recommended that the FFD program be continued. The Secretary of Defense then concurred.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended procuring 2 small tanker ships in FY 69 at a cost of $21 million. The JCS concurred.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended no additional C-130 procurement in FY 69. The JCS did not comment on C-130 procurement in FY 69. However, the JCS supported force level of C-130 aircraft would require procuring about 27 C-130s in FY 68-69. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended procuring 25 C-130s in FY 68 at $60 million, and 28 in FY 69 at $70 million. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation. The Secretary of the Air Force later recommended buying 27 C-130Es at $10 million in FY 68, $40 million in FY 69, and $30 million in FY 70. The Secretary of Defense again reaffirmed his recommendation.

6. The Secretary of Defense recommended no additional procurement of C-2A (COD) aircraft in FY 69. The JCS did not comment on C-2A procurement. The Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring 18 C-2As at a cost of $56.8 million in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

7. The Secretary of Defense recommended no additional procurement of KC-130 aircraft for the Marine Air Wings. The JCS did not comment on KC-130 procurement in FY 69. However, the JCS-supported KC-130 force structure would require procuring about 24 KC-130s in FY 69. The Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring 24 KC-130Hs at a cost of $83 million in FY 69. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

8. The Secretary of Defense recommended against procuring Tactical Support Transport aircraft for the Marine Air Wings and that 26 C-47/54/117s be deleted from the force structure in FY 69. The JCS did not comment on procurement, but recommended that the 26 C-47/54/117s be retained through FY 69. The Secretary of the Navy recommended $31.2 million in FY 69 for the procurement of 12 Tactical Support Transport aircraft. The Secretary of Defense then recommended retaining the 26 aircraft through end FY 69 and then phasing them out without replacement.

9. The Secretary of Defense recommended phasing out all 336 C-119s from the reserves in FY 69. The JCS did not comment on this recommendation. The Secretary of the Air Force recommended retaining 160 C-119s in the reserves through FY 69. The Secretary of Defense then concurred with the Secretary of the Air Force's recommendation.

10. The Secretary of Defense recommended that 20 Navy C-118s be deleted from the airlift force structure in FY 69. The JCS concurred, but recognized a need for some Navy Tactical Support Airlift. The Secretary of the Navy recommended a plan (the FY 69 part of) which would phase 10 Navy C-118s into the reserves to replace 13 C-54s. The Secretary of Defense then recommended phasing 14 Navy C-118s into the reserves in FY 69 to replace 20 C-54s.

1. The Secretary of Defense recommended a procurement objective of 90 days of combat support for U.S. forces committed to NATO. The Secretary of the Air Force concurred. The JCS recommended 180 days of combat support for these forces. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

2. The Secretary of Defense recommended a 135 day pipeline for forces in the Indefinite Combat category. The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended a 180 day pipeline. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

3. The Secretary of Defense recommended the ASW forces be supported at 90 days plus shipfill for the full force (equivalent to 135 days of combat for deployed forces plus shipfill for the full force). The JCS and the Secretary of the Navy recommended support at 180 days for the deployed forces plus shipfill for the full force. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

4. The Secretary of Defense recommended equipment stocks for forces in the Indefinite Combat category through the first 180 days after war starts. The Secretary of the Navy recommended D to P plus a 180 day pipeline. The JCS recognized that provision must be made for replacement of attrition of equipment (including aircraft) beyond 180 days; however, a specific recommendation was withheld pending further analysis by the JCS. The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation that more equipment would be bought only when it can be shown that its lack would keep these forces from being able to fight indefinitely.

5. The Secretary of Defense recommended 90 days of logistics support for two armored Army Reserve division force equivalents. The JCS recommended that these forces be given logistics support to enable them to fight indefinitely (D to P). The Secretary of Defense reaffirmed his recommendation.

The JCS recommended procuring one nuclear frigate (DLGN) and two guided missile destroyers (DDGs) in FY 69. The Secretary of the Navy recommended procuring two nuclear frigates and modernizing two conventional frigates (DLGs). The Secretary of Defense recommended constructing three nuclear guided missile destroyers (DXGNs) in FY 69, one using FY 68 funds. The Secretary of the Navy tentatively concurred with the recommendation pending further review.

REMAINING SIGNIFICANT FY 69 BUDGET DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A. Strategic Retaliatory Forces	JCS	SecDef
1. Procurement of MK-17s for Minuteman II	Yes	No
2. Deploy MK-17s on Minuteman III	Yes	No
3. Procurement of Titan II missiles		5
4. Option to deploy MK-17s on Poseidon by end FY 72	Yes	No
5. Average number of MK-3s per Poseidon missile	[*]	[*]
6. R&D on Advanced ICBM	$75 million	$11 million
7. Prototype Ballistic Missile Ship	$120 million	$0
8. R&D on AMSA	$65 million	$25 million
B. Continental Air and Missile Defense
1. Anti-Soviet Nike-X deployment	Yes	No
2. Introduce AWACS; phase down SAGE/BUIC; modernize F-106 and reduce total number of interceptors; continue R&D on F-12	Yes, but use F-12 in lieu of F-106X, and delay phasedown	Yes
3. R&D on sea-based and airborne ABM systems	$20 million	$1 million
4. Military survival measures program	$30 million	$10 million
C. Theater Nuclear Forces
1. Phase out of 18 Mace in Europe	No	Yes
2. Pershing MIRV	$43 million	$0
3. Tactical nuclear bomb stockpile	[*]	[*]
4. Tactical Nike Hercules nuclear warhead inventory	[*]	Under Review
5. FY 69 tactical nuclear warhead inventory	[*]	Under Review
D. Army and Marine Corps Land Forces
1. Army active division equivalents	21-2/3	19-2/3
2. Army reserve division equivalents	9	8
3. Army division force sets of equipment	30-2/3	27-2/3
4. Marine Corps FY 69 active end strength	330,000	Under Review
5. UH-ID helicopter procurement	744	Under Review
6. CH-47 helicopter procurement	60	48
7. TOW and Dragon procurement	All active and reserve Army and Marine divisions	Active Army armored and mechanized divisions
8. Reduction in M60 Shillelegh procurement	No	Under Review
9. Force objective for Hawk batteries	83	79
10. Army reserve 40mm automatic weapons units	56	40
11. Complete modernization of4th (Reserve) Marine Air Wing	Yes	No
12. CH-54B crane helicopters for active Marine Air Wings	15	0
E. Navy Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces
1. SOSUS program	$120 million	Under Review
2. DX procurement	9	5
3. SSN procurement	5	2
F. Navy Amphibious Assault, Fire Support, and Mine Countermeasures Forces
1. AGC procurement	1	0
2. LFS procurement	1	0
3. CA/CAG force level	6	4
4. Battleship force level (Southeast Asia)	2	1
5. MSO procurement	5	0
G. Naval Replenishment and Support Forces
1. Underway replenishment ship force level	87	83
2. UH-46 replenishment helicopter procurement	18	0
H. Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces
1. Attack carrier force	16	15
2. Navy fighter/attack aircraft force level	1,192	1,004
3. Recommended aircraft procurement	835	358
4. VFAX and E-2B development	Accelerate Development	Under Review
I. Air Force Tactical Air Forces
1. Fighter/attack aircraft force level	1,807	1,777
2. Special Air Warfare force level	420	354
3. Electronic Warfare force level	137	75
4. Recommended aircraft procurement	864	615
5. F-X and A-X development	$128 million	$60 million
J. Airlift and Sealift Forces
1. C-130 procurement	Yes	No
2. KC-130 procurement	Yes	No
K. Logistics Guidance
1. Support of U.S. NATO-oriented forces	180 days	90 days
2. Pipeline for forces in Indefinite Combat category	180 days	135 days
3. ASW support	180 days plus shipfill	90 days plus shipfill
4. Logistics support for two Army reserve armored division force equivalents	D to P	90 days
L. Major Fleet Escorts
1. DLGN procurement	1	0
2. DXGN procurement	0	2
3. DDG procurement	2	0

[*entry in table not declassified]

Washington, December 4, 1967, 12:23-1:35 p.m.

NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH
Secretary McNamara
Undersecretary Nitze
General Wheeler
General McConnell
General Johnson
General Greene
Admiral Moorer

Secretary McNamara said this is the annual meeting with the President to review budgetary issues which the JCS feels are important enough to discuss with the President.

General Wheeler said the Joint Chiefs of Staff had two very long and productive sessions with Secretary McNamara concerning U.S. strategic forces and general purpose forces./2/ He said there are only four issues which will be brought to the President's attention, and one has no impact on the FY'69 budget.

General Wheeler said this has been the most far-reaching and most extensive exchange of views the JCS has had in the four years he has participated. He said that budget decisions are still being considered, so it does not necessarily mean that additional questions will not be brought to the President's attention in the future. He said the questions before them today concern force modification and force structure. This does not affect Southeast Asia operations.

General McConnell said there is disagreement on whether we should have a new advanced strategic bomber in 1976. He says the JCS believe we should have one and Secretary McNamara does not believe we should have one.

Secretary McNamara said he believed General McConnell presented the issue well. He said by 1976 we would have 465 bombers including B-52s and FB-111s. In 1976 there will be 1542 missile launches "on line," and 8,190 separately targetable bombs or warheads.

The National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) are that our forces could adequately destroy Soviet capabilities as currently programmed./3/ If the Soviets go beyond NIE estimates, we go to what is called "greater than expected" threats. Even in the event that the "greater than expected" threat develops, we still have means of coping with this situation. These include adding the Spring Defense to the Minuteman system; the addition of hardened silos for the Minuteman missile; adding 150 more Minuteman missiles; and the addition of newer missiles to the B-52 bomber.

General McConnell did say that it is better to have these new bombers than to have to modify the system were the "greater than expected" threat to develop.

The President asked how much this would cost. General McConnell said it would range up to 7-1/2 billion dollars for 150 aircraft, but the amount asked for in FY'69 was only $40 million for contract definition.

Secretary McNamara said he would recommend only about $25 million and that this would delay the bomber program about a year. Under his plan, the current force would be modified and the $7-1/2 billion investment would not be necessary.

General McConnell said it was his judgment that the bomber is superior in "sure destruction" of cities than is the missile. He recommended going to the contract definition on the bomber immediately.

Secretary McNamara said he felt that the threat is not realistic. If it does not develop we will not need the bomber. "I say we stand a good chance of not having to spend the $7 billion. We are talking about 1976. We do not know what the Soviets will do between then and now."

General Johnson said there is some difference of opinion about the assumptions built into this which leads to the figures given in the NIE estimate.

General McConnell said the newest B-52 will be fourteen years old in 1976. "I believe we will need a new bomber by then."

Secretary McNamara said he did not think a new bomber would be necessary.

General Wheeler said the next issue was the modernization of the Fourth Military Air Wing. He said this is a reserve wing.

General Greene said that a later type aircraft is needed in this wing. He said, for example, they have no planes in this wing which can fly in storms or at night and there are no photo reconnaissance aircraft. He also said there is a shortage of helicopters in this wing and that more were needed.

General Greene said that about 23 fixed wing aircraft and 25 choppers would be required to bring this wing up to par with the other wings. The budget request for FY'69 would be $130.1 million and the projected cost for the total project would be $631 million. Secretary McNamara said he did not believe that it was necessary. Secretary Nitze agreed with Secretary McNamara.

General Greene said it was a matter of what the President wanted this wing to be capable of doing in the event it were to be needed in actions independent of Vietnam. "If they are going to operate independently they are not able to do the job with the current equipment."

Secretary McNamara said the wing was ready to go if necessary.

General Greene said the wing has only thirty choppers.

Secretary McNamara asked how many choppers did it have three years ago?

General Greene said there were none three years ago.

Secretary McNamara said that was just the point--there has been significant modernization in the wing during the last three years and that choppers could be reallocated in the event this wing were to be activated for duty.

The President asked if the Defense Department was doing all it could to get choppers to Vietnam.

Secretary McNamara said that indeed there was every priority given to putting more choppers into Vietnam. He said there now was a problem of parts, and there may be a need to shift the tension from choppers to parts. He said, in fact, that there were more choppers than could be used well.

General Johnson said there are 140 choppers per month coming into Vietnam.

Secretary McNamara said there was chopper pilot problems now. He said the need is for more roads in Vietnam so that much of the travel which is now by chopper can be handled on roads. In fact, he said that much of the movement could be handled more efficiently on roads rather than by chopper.

Secretary McNamara said Ambassador Komer and Ambassador Bunker asked for $65 million in road money but that he could only give $40 million.

General Greene said that if we have another crisis somewhere else in the world we would not have this Marine wing equipment well enough to sustain itself.

Secretary McNamara asked for more time to study this problem. He said it was his impression that the wing was not able to sustain itself.

Admiral Moorer said there is a need for a new tactical fighter. He said the F-4 is being used as a first line fighter. There is a need for a general purpose fighter for both services. He said that the services were asking for $100 million for contract definition and that there is no dispute for a need for a fighter. The dispute is over the amount.

Secretary McNamara said Admiral Moorer stated the case well. There is a need for a modern fighter. He said the difference between the JCS and the Secretary is over $60 million versus $100 million.

Secretary McNamara said we will go as fast with money as decisions can be made, but that he would be inclined to leave the budget figure at $60 million.

General McConnell said that the $100 million figure would permit them to overcome any differences in design or contract definition.

Admiral Moorer said that the Secretary had agreed to make up any difference out of funds, were more than $60 million required, so that was satisfactory to him.

General Johnson said that the JCS expected questioning on the differences between their position and that of the Secretary of Defense on the need for ABM defenses. He said the JCS still favors a heavy defense while the Secretary favors a thin defense.

Secretary McNamara said the arguments are well known. The Joint Chiefs are saying they haven't seen anything to change their views and I certainly have not seen anything to change mine.

The President urged that the JCS and the Secretary try to reconcile their differences before testifying. He pointed out the bad results which came out of the Stennis hearings this past session./4/ "These differences permit them to propagandize that we have deep divisions between the civilian and military leadership. I certainly have seen no evidence of that while I have been here. I think you all are superior and stable and dependable.

"However, you must take into account not only what you say but the effects of what you say. You must keep in mind the relation between the military committees of Congress and the Chief Executive. Some committee chairmen think they should run the strategy of the war rather than the President. I base this on all my years in the Congress. We do want the understanding of the committees, but it does not strengthen our system to air our differences.

"I am pleased and proud of your performance, your competence, and your dedication.

"All of you know that you are welcome to visit me anytime you want. You do not have to go through Marvin Watson. You can call my secretary and slip in through the side door if you have some personal problem or some complaint. There is nobody that stands between you and me if the issue is serious enough to bring it up.

"All of you should know that at any meeting where you are not represented Secretary McNamara has presented your view often better than his own. I remember several situations in which the Secretary presented his position and then presented the position of the Joint Chiefs and I went with your recommendation.

"We are going into a very difficult period ahead. We are going to have a new Secretary of Defense./5/ Most people do not realize how much our wife means to us until she leaves us. Then you learn how difficult it is to do your own cooking. It is the same way with the Secretary. We are going to have to learn to work these things out. It will require all you can--particularly since this is going to be an election year and we are facing some serious financial problems.

"It appears we are not getting a tax bill. Interest rates are rising. We have a potential deficit of $25-$35 billion depending on which assumptions you consider. Our revenues are down. Our expenditures are up.

"I am going to cut $4 billion. $2 billion of that will come from Defense. Even after that $4 billion cut we will still have $1-1/2 billion more than what we went in with on the budget in January.

"So I ask you to return to your departments and sharpen up your lead pencils. Take your lowest priority items and see what you can do to forgo everything except the pay increases and the men and materiel necessary."

Washington, December 16, 1967, 9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

As the attached minutes of yesterday's 303 meeting indicate, we now have firm agreement, including Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, on how to proceed with respect to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

Your decision is required over the weekend because the deadline for informing the organizations in New York is, apparently, December 18.

Under the proposal we would:/2/

--Provide [number not declassified] million in a lump sum payment ("surge funding") to cover the two radios at present levels of activity down to the end of fiscal 1969.

Under existing New York law the two organizations would not have to file with the New York Attorney General their revenues until December 1968.

--Inform the two radios that it is the intent of the U.S. Government to find in the year ahead an alternative way to keep them in business. For your information, the two major options are: the overt creation by the Congress of a special public corporation for this purpose, or an arrangement via USIA.

With respect to questions at the end of the year about the implementation of the Katzenbach report,/3/ we agreed that, if asked, we would say that no exceptions were made to the recommendation of the Katzenbach committee; and, in certain cases, funds were provided to permit organizations to adjust to a new status; but we would make no breakdown as to what organizations were supported or what amounts had been given in surge funding.

--Inform the Radio organizations in New York that they were to maintain tight security about the method of financing through fiscal 1969; and we would request them to end the solicitation of small private donations via radio and television--a method which is in the process of ending in any case. Solicitation of funds from large corporations which are aware of government financing would continue.

Walt

Proposal approved/4/
Disapproved
See me

SUBJECT
Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 15 December 1967

PRESENT
Mr. Rostow, Mr. Katzenbach, Mr. Nitze, and Mr. Helms.
Admiral R.L. Taylor and Mr. William Trueheart were present for all items.
Mr. Charles Schultze, Mr. Hugh Tovar, and Mr. John Richards were present for Items 1 and 2.

a. The meeting began with a resume of the meetings and steps which began on 5 May 1967,/6/ resulting in today's confrontation.

b. Mr. Rostow began by asking where State stood. Mr. Katzenbach replied promptly, "Behind Mr. Schultze's recommendation for surge funding."/7/ [This may be summarized as follows: surge funding both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty before December 31, 1967, at the FY-68 funding levels (no modernization) so that both can continue operation until July 30, 1969. This would give us another year to decide what to do with both RFE and RL. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]]/8/

c. But what happens afterwards? Mr. Katzenbach alluded to special legislation towards a public communications authority or other overt or even possibly covert funding. The point was made that it would be less difficult to reconstitute covert funding after the election than it would be now.

d. Mr. Nitze interposed that the Secretary of Defense thought an announced exception to the Katzenbach formula would be the least difficult solution.

e. Mr. Helms said, o.k., if we accept surge funding, was the thrust toward continuation?

f. Mr. Rostow said yes and at least the staff work on the options had been performed (an allusion to the exhaustive Trueheart report),/9/ and one of the rejected paths, that of the public broadcasting authority or British Council approach, could be reopened in view of the new time available, i.e. one year, to resolve the problem.

g. Mr. Katzenbach agreed, but said we are face to face with the public relations aspect. He was in favor of a simple statement to the effect that with the terminations, certain funds had been provided, but there should certainly be no specific breakdown as to what organizations were supported or what amounts had been given.

h. Mr. Schultze provided an outline along the following: While it is not our policy to identify organizations, specific contributions had been made to various valuable institutions until such time as adequate legislation or new ways of funding from the private sector have been discovered.

i. Mr. Katzenbach elaborated that the Department had the choice, as the deadline neared, of waiting for questions or planting the question in advance.

j. The question was raised as to the timing of the two radios filing appropriate statements with the Internal Revenue Service. Mr. Schultze observed that the surge-funding figure would only appear in the 1968 declaration in early 1969. The inference here was that the main objective was to smoothly sail past the election date in the fall of 1968.

k. The point was made that the directors of the radios should be informed that their statements, preferably brief (left to their proven judgment in the past), should indicate they intend to continue.

l. [7 lines of source text not declassified]

m. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

n. On the question of fund raising, Mr. Katzenbach felt that witting corporate contributors presented no problems but that radio solicitation for individual donors should be stopped at once. It was agreed that the radios would be so instructed.

o. It was agreed that the statement for Mr. McCloskey should be drafted by Mr. Trueheart for submission to Mr. Katzenbach and general agreement by the principals.

Mr. Rostow noted that we had ridden right into the middle of December and had a legal obligation to have covered all covert efforts which might possibly be construed to come under the aegis of the Katzenbach Committee rulings. He asked where we now stand. Mr. Tovar noted that every effort had been made to cover the field; he could assure the chairman that every major project and expenditure in this field had been examined, that there might be bits and pieces and marginal efforts which had not yet been prepared for screening. Mr. Rostow implied that in the marginal field there might be some potential cliff hangers, and Mr. Helms directed that a list of these be prepared promptly for Mr. Rostow so that he would know what could be expected on forthcoming agendas in the grey area. Mr. Tovar noted that the review of the marginal projects was a continuous year-round process and was not limited to a specific search scheduled to end 31 December.

[Here follows Item 3.]

Peter Jessup

Washington, December 18, 1967.

Dear Bob:

Your prompt and responsive reply of December 1/2/ to my letter of November 24/3/ concerning the DPMs on General Purpose Forces was greatly appreciated. In my earlier letter I said I would defer until later comment on the DPMs dealing with Strategic Forces and NATO. I have now completed my review of these latter memoranda.

I have no specific suggestions for changes in this year's force decisions. I do have some thoughts on the effect of our foreign relations of projected future trends in our strategic force posture and what we say about this posture. I believe it would be more useful, however, to comment on these in terms of a study which my staff recently completed rather than on the DPMs themselves.

Several months ago I requested an assessment of the foreign policy implications of recent and projected changes in US and Soviet military forces, with particular emphasis on the strategic forces. I enclose a copy of that study./4/ I would very much appreciate your comments on it.

It is clear that many of the issues raised in this study require further examination. However, I do think the study highlights the importance of what we say about our strategic posture because of the way in which these statements may be interpreted both by the Soviets and our allies. In particular I think we should try to lead discussions away from such oversimplified concepts as "superiority" or "parity."

I am sure you agree that it is important that we carefully coordinate the statements which we make to Congress on this score as we have done in past years. To this end I have asked Phil Farley to be in touch with your staff on the posture statement and to focus particularly this year on the strategic forces portion of that statement as well as the review of the international situation.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk/5/

SUMMARY OF STATE PAPERS ON CHANGING US-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

The central theme of the studies is that the US Government should take a fresh look at the political and military implications of the growing strategic parity and changing US-Soviet strategic relationships. The State papers suggest that this can be done through: 1) SIG arrangement for contingency planning on where and how the Soviets would be most likely to intervene in local conflicts, and 2) joint State-Defense development of rationale for US strategic forces, focusing on the rhetoric of deterrence and the major asymmetry in US-Soviet strategies and postures between offense and defensive oriented systems.

The substantive points of the studies fall into three categories: 1) strategic nuclear relations, 2) problems created by increased Soviet strategic mobility and 3) NATO.

On strategic nuclear relations, intelligence estimates point to increased Soviet capability to damage the US in a nuclear exchange, and, over the next decade, the expectation that continued Soviet expansion of their strategic forces may lead to their surpassing the US in some categories of strategic strength. While perceptions of these matters are probably more significant than the "actual" balance, these trends, State tentatively concludes, do not now or in the next five years seem to jeopardize the US deterrent. The problems will not likely be deterrence, but a) increased US domestic controversy, b) uncertainties and pressures leading to "worst case" assumptions in budget planning, c) complications on non-proliferation given obvious vulnerability of US to nuclear attack, and d) greater Soviet inclination to intervene in third areas.

It is this last problem coupled with gradually increasing Soviet strategic mobility that may be of more immediate concern. Evidence of extensive worldwide naval activity, expansion and modernization of airlift-sealift capabilities, allowing for distant but limited operations may tempt the USSR to be more responsive to requests from governments and factions for military support.

On the NATO part, the Soviets have maintained superiority in Central Europe and have modernized their forces (including tactical nuclear weapons). But with US realization that we were not far behind conventionally, the consensus is that a Soviet attack on Western Europe is unlikely. The problem, however, is that the over-all US-Soviet strategic relationship may cause our allies to be more deferential to Soviet political pressures, leading to a further European questioning of the reliability of US commitments.

JCSM-3-68

Washington, January 2, 1968.

SUBJECT
Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons to the United States (C)

1. (S) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 13 November 1967, subject as above,/2/ which identifies certain security problems for the United States arising from the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities, particularly those of Communist China, and the possible clandestine introduction of such weapons into the United States.

2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in considering the reference, note that in a statement of national policy contained in National Security Council 6022/1, dated 18 January 1961, entitled "U.S. Policy on Continental Defense,"/3/ the primary responsibility for implementing policy guidance concerning the internal security of the United States is assigned to the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS). The Internal Security Section of NSC 6022/1 stipulates, in paragraph 28, that the ICIS, in coordination with the IIC, shall "provide adequate deterrents to the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons."

3. (C) National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) Nr. 161, dated 9 June 1962, subject: "U.S. Internal Security Programs,"/4/ transferred the supervision of the IIC and the ICIS from the National Security Council to the Attorney General of the United States and directed that the ICIS effect coordination in all phases of the internal security field except in those certain functions assigned to the IIC. The ICIS is composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, and Justice. Other Government agencies participate as ad hoc members of the ICIS when matters involving the responsibilities of such agencies are under consideration.

4. (TS) Within the structure of the ICIS and the IIC, a Joint ICIS-IIC Committee on Countermeasures, referred to as Committee "B", has been responsible, since its inception in 1953, for considering ways and means of safeguarding against the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons. This committee, composed of representatives of the Bureau of Customs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Departments of Defense and the Army, and the Atomic Energy Commission, periodically submits studies concerning this subject to the Chairmen of the ICIS and the IIC. The most recent study prepared by Committee "B" on this subject is a "Reappraisal of the Threat of Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons," dated 27 June 1963./5/ In conjunction with the preparation of this reappraisal, the committee first generated a requirement for a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on this subject. This resulted in the publication by the Director of Central Intelligence, in coordination with the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), of NIE 11-7-63, dated 13 March 1963, subject: "The Clandestine Introduction of Weapons of Mass Destruction into the US."/6/

5. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a comprehensive review of this matter is required at this time, since neither NIE 11-7-63 nor the 1963 ICIS study deals with the Chinese communist nuclear threat or many of the other cited problems. In view of the authority and responsibilities vested in the ICIS and the IIC by the NSC policy statement and White House memorandum previously cited, a reassessment of the complete threat should be initiated and conducted at the ICIS and the IIC level. The DOD representative to the ICIS (Director for Security Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)) could most logically introduce these issues and request a reassessment. The USIB should consider the other relevant problems raised in the reference and submit an up-to-date estimate. In this respect, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are requesting that the USIB update NIE 11-7-63./7/

6. (U) Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff share your concern over this matter and as nuclear proliferation becomes an increasing problem, they propose that, as a second phase of the study effort, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would review the findings of the ICIS and the IIC in the context of the issues cited in the reference. This review, to be conducted in coordination with your staff, would provide the basis for a report to you on the military aspects of the problem and possible further action by the Department of Defense to contribute to a concerted national effort to contain the threat.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, January 15, 1968.

SUBJECT
Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces (U)

I have reviewed our Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces for FY 69-73. The tables on pages 3 and 4 summarize our force goals./2/ For the FY 69 budget, I recommend that we:

1. Maintain a force of 1,000 Minuteman missiles. Plan on a Minuteman II force of 500 missiles in FY 69, but replace Minuteman Is and IIs used in follow-on-tests (FOTs) with Minuteman IIIs/MK-12s, leading to a force of 520 Minuteman IIIs by end-FY 73. Delay the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of Minuteman III from December, 1969 to July, 1970. Cancel the MK-17 re-entry vehicle program for a saving of $309 million in FY 69-73. Develop an option to deploy Minuteman III in very hard silos or supplement the present Minuteman deployment at a cost of $40 million in FY 69 and a total cost of $212 million in FY 69-73. Continue the previously approved programs for buying area penetration aids for all Minuteman missiles, and terminal penetration aids for Minuteman III. Minuteman II penetration aids may not be effective against certain types of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs). Therefore, deploy an improved version of the Minuteman II penetration aids at a cost of $22 million in FY 69 and a total cost of $44 million in FY 69-73. With all the above changes, the Minuteman force will cost $147 million less in FY 69-73 than the previously programmed Minuteman force.

2. Maintain the JCS-recommended Titan force structure by buying four missiles in FY 69 for $12.6 million and five in FY 70 for $13.6 million and reducing the FOT rate to four per year./3/

3. Continue development of Poseidon, and procure 47 missiles in FY 69 at a total FY 69 investment cost of $329 million. Plan on an IOC of November, 1970, based on a sixteen month re-order lead time (the same as Polaris re-order lead time). Build up to a force of 384 on-line Poseidon by FY 75, for a total FY 69-73 investment cost of $4,998 million. [1 line of source text not declassified] and plan on a force of 31 Poseidon submarines carrying an average of [number not declassified] MK-3s per deployed missile. Procure 167 MK-3s in FY 69, 1,387 in FY 70, and a total of 3,781 in FY 69-73. Against expected threats, this Poseidon force will have the same effectiveness as the previously programmed force with [number not declassified] MK-3s per missile, but will cost $84 million less in FY 69 and $394 million less in FY 69-73.

4. Defer indefinitely the JCS recommendation to deploy area and terminal penetration aids for Polaris A-3 at a cost of $200 million in FY 69 and a total cost of $220 million in FY 69-73.

5. Disapprove the JCS recommendation to start Contract Definition of an Advanced ICBM at a cost of $79 million in FY 69. Instead, continue Advanced Development at a cost of $10 million in FY 69. Development, deployment, and operation of the JCS-recommended force of 350 Advanced ICBMs would cost from $7 to $10 billion in FY 69-75, depending on the basing.

6. Disapprove the JCS recommendation to procure a prototype Ballistic Missile Ship for $120 million in FY 69. Ten-year costs of ten Ballistic Missile Ships would be about $1.6 billion.

7. Approve the Air Force recommendation not to reduce the current base program for the bomber force. Defer, until we have evidence of a good Soviet low-altitude terminal defense, the JCS recommendation to equip the B-52 G/H bomber force with 1,020 Unit Equipment (UE) Short-Range Attack Missiles (SRAM) beginning in FY 70. Additional SRAMs for B-52s would cost $68 million in FY 69 and a total of $251 million in FY 69-73. As a special force for suppressing anti-bomber defenses, modify thirty UE B-52s to carry some of the previously approved SRAMs at a FY 69 cost of $54 million and a total cost of $56 million in FY 69-73.

8. Disapprove the JCS recommendation for Contract Definition and full-scale development of the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) in FY 69. Development, deployment, and five-year operating costs for 150 AMSA would be $7.3 billion. Approve instead further development of aircraft technology, as well as a program to develop bomber penetration aids.

9. Approve procurement of Sentinel, a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] area ABM system which also provides an option for the defense of Minuteman. The total Sentinel system investment cost will be $4.9 billion in FY 69-73.

10. Continue feasibility studies on the sea-based ABM system (SABMIS).

11. Disapprove the JCS recommendation to deploy a Nike-X defense of U.S. cities against attack by the USSR. (Not a FY 69 issue; the JCS consider the FY 69 budget for Sentinel an adequate first step toward the defense they recommend.)

12. Disapprove the JCS recommendation to produce and deploy twelve UE F-12 interceptors for continental air defense at a FY 69-73 cost of $800 million. Approve instead the Air Force recommended plan for a modernized continental air defense force that includes: (a) development and deployment of 198 improved F-106X aircraft; (b) if the Overland Radar Technology program is successful, engineering development of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) on a schedule that permits a system demonstration before substantial production funds must be committed; (c) development of the Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar, addressing production release in September, 1970; (d) examining the possibility of augmenting our air defense force during periods of high tension with at least 300 fighters from Tactical Air Command (TAC), Navy, and Marine Corps training units plus carrier-based aircraft as available; and (e) selective phase-down of the current Century interceptor force and portions of the SAGE/BUIC system, the National Air Space Surveillance System, and Nike-Hercules radars.

13. Extend the civil defense program at a FY 69 cost of $77.6 million.

14. Disapprove the JCS recommendation for $191 million for military survival measures. Continue instead the approved program at a cost of $47 million for FY 68-73.

15. Approve a JCS recommendation to accelerate Program 440L OTH warning system against Fractional Orbit Bombardment Systems (FOBS) at a FY 69 cost of $39.3 million. Disapprove a JCS recommendation to accelerate Program 949, a satellite warning system for the same purpose.

I. The General Nuclear War Problem

The main objective of our nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attacks on the U.S. Our ability to strike back and destroy Soviet society makes a Soviet decision to strike the U.S. highly unlikely. By choosing to develop and deploy harder-to-attack forces, we can reduce even more the likelihood of such an attack. Unable to destroy most of our nuclear striking power, the Soviets would gain little by striking first.

Although the U.S. and the USSR are strongly deterred from nuclear attacks on each other, a nuclear war anywhere in the world could lead to a war--and most likely a nuclear war--between the two countries. Thus to avoid a nuclear war with the USSR, we try to make all nuclear wars unlikely. This objective includes:

1. Reducing any possible loss of control of forces in a crisis.

2. Deterring nuclear attacks or intimidation of allied or neutral countries.

3. Discouraging additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.

4. Emphasizing and maintaining the firebreak between conventional and nuclear weapons.

Like us, to deter a first-strike nuclear attack, the Soviets maintain the ability to strike back and destroy our society. When they take steps to reduce the damage that we can inflict (e.g., by deploying ABMs), we react to offset these steps. I believe that the Soviets would react in the same way to similar U.S. steps to limit damage to ourselves.

Our analysis shows that the Soviets can protect their second strike capability against any threat we might pose. Since a second strike capability is vital to the USSR, I believe they will insure the survival of this capability. Convinced that the Soviets would counter a major U.S. attempt to take away their second strike capability, we have chosen not to start a major Damage Limiting program against the USSR.

These considerations lead us to depend upon deterrence to keep the USSR from attacking us. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] conversely, we can buy an effective defense of CONUS as insurance against a failure of deterrence. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] allow us to develop an effective defense against her nuclear attack capability into the 1980s.

What if deterrence fails and a nuclear war with the USSR occurs? If the war began with an all-out Soviet attack, including our cities, we would reply in kind. If the war started with less than an all-out attack, we would want to carry out plans for the controlled and deliberate use of our nuclear power to get the best possible outcome. The lack of such nuclear war plans is one of the main weaknesses in our posture today.

II. Soviet and Chinese Strategic Forces

The following table compares U.S. and Soviet intercontinental forces in terms of total megatons, launchers, and bombers.

U.S. vs. Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces/a/

	1968		1970		1972
	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR
Ballistic Missile Launchers
Soft ICBMs	--	128-142	--	90-128	--	--
Hard ICBMs	1054	720-782	1054	859-1026	1054	1020-1251
FOBS	--	0-10	--	20-50	--	20-75
Mobile ICBMs (non-add)	--	--	--	(0-25)	--	(0-100)
SLBMs	656	43-46	656	123-158	656	267-318
Total Launchers	1710	891-980	1710	1092-1362	1710	1307-1644
Intercontinental Bombers	646	150-155	558	130-150	534	105-130
Total Force Loadings
Weapons	[*]	1115-1199	[*]	1276-1566	[*]	1409-1760
[text not declassified]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]
[text not declassified]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]
Alert Force Loadings
Weapons	[*]	610-672	[*]	765-949	[*]	954-1211
[text not declassified]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]
[text not declassified]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]

[*entry in table not declassified]

Numbers of missile launchers and bombers are a poor measure of the relative capabilities of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces; total megatons are worse. Yet these measures are frequently used in drawing comparisons between U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities. The important question is not total megatons or numbers of delivery systems, but whether our forces can effectively carry out their missions--Assured Destruction and attacks on Soviet forces to limit damage. Factors such as accuracy, reliability, survivability, and control are decisive in evaluating the effectiveness of our forces. Our missiles appear to be more reliable than Soviet missiles; they are more than twice as accurate. In 1972, programmed U.S. missile forces could destroy some 700 hardened targets. The expected Soviet ICBM force could destroy only some 300 such targets.

We are buying large numbers of smaller, accurate weapons because they better meet our strategic objectives--even while reducing total U.S. megatons. The following table compares the number of targets destroyed by [number not declassified] of the MK-3 warheads programmed for Poseidon, with a [3 lines of source text declassified] as many targets.

Effectiveness of Alternative, Equal-Weight Payloads/a/

	[text not declassified] Weapons	[text not declassified] Weapons
Number of airfields	8.3	0.83
Number of hard silos/b/	1.7	0.83
Number of small cities (100,000)	2.9	0.83
Number of medium cities (500,000)	0.6	0.83
Number of large cities (2,000,000)	0.5	0.5
Number of defensive interceptors needed to counter/c/	11.0	1.1
Total megatons	0.5	10.0

Such calculations have convinced me and the Services of the superiority of Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) over single, large megaton weapons for attacking cities or military targets, defended or otherwise. Therefore, the best way to increase the effectiveness of our forces is by putting MIRVs on Minuteman and Poseidon.

During 1964-65, the USSR maintained small silo (SS-11) ICBM construction starts at the rate of about 150 launchers per year. It doubled this rate during the first half of 1966, then returned to the original rate. The SS-9 ICBM deployment appears to have stopped except for filling out groups already under construction.

A new solid-fueled Soviet missile has been identified. Present intelligence estimates assume it is an ICBM, which will come into the Soviet inventory as a supplement to (rather than a replacement for) the SS-11.

The Soviets have continued to test Fractional Orbit Ballistic Systems (FOBS), which would be useful in an attempt to deny warning to our strategic bombers, if we took no counter actions.

A recent re-evaluation of the present Soviet submarine force indicates about 20% fewer operational Soviet ballistic missile submarines than previous intelligence estimates. The USSR is, however, now making operational a new class of large, nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarines to carry sixteen 1,000 to 2,000 nautical mile (NM) missiles. Intelligence estimates project ten to thirteen of these ships in service by mid-1971 and 35 to 42 by 1976. Diesel-powered Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) submarines no longer are estimated to be part of the Soviet threat to the U.S.

The Soviets also appear to be pursuing two advanced defensive programs: (1) a long-range anti-ICBM system around Moscow with about 100 launchers, and (2) a system across European USSR (the Tallinn system or SA-5) with about 3,000 reloadable launchers, [1 line of source text not declassified]. We expect both systems to become partially operational this year. There are conflicting intelligence evaluations of the Tallinn system. While it appears to be designed for air defense, the system could have some capabilities against ballistic missiles. The NIE estimates the system is designed entirely for air defense, while a dissenting view emphasizes a dual air defense/ABM role. Since last year, the dissenting view has lost ground as we discovered that the defensive missile is much too slow to intercept missiles successfully, and the engagement radars have little capability when operating independently against ballistic missiles.

We still have seen no evidence of Soviet development of a good low-altitude Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM). However, the Foxbat Interceptor is now estimated to have a limited "look-down, shoot-down" capability.

The Chinese were expected to begin operational deployment of a Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) with a fission warhead in 1967, but did not do so. China also has under development a much larger and more complex missile system, possibly an ICBM. They were expected to complete a large facility for large launchers late in 1967, but did not do this either. It appears that they are about six months behind the ICBM schedule that we had previously estimated, which would still allow an initial operational ICBM deployment in the early 1970s.

III. Assured Destruction

We deter a rational enemy from launching a first strike against us by maintaining a strong and secure ability to retaliate under any circumstances. We measure our second strike ability in terms of Assured Destruction--the capability to inflict unacceptable damage, calculated under extremely conservative assumptions, on the USSR, even after sustaining a surprise Soviet first strike. I believe that our ability to kill from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the Soviet people, including at least [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the people and industry in their large cities, is enough to deter the USSR from launching a first strike against the U.S., even in extreme situations.

However, our Assured Destruction capability does not indicate how we would use our forces in a nuclear war. We must design our forces to cope with many situations, including a war which neither side intended. We reduce the likelihood of such a war by keeping tight control over U.S. forces under all circumstances; by maintaining communications at all times with our forces, the governments of our Allies, and, as appropriate, our enemies; and by retaining options in selecting appropriate responses. If we failed to deter nuclear war, we would want to be able to follow a policy of limiting our retaliatory strikes to the enemy's military targets and not attacking his cities if he refrained from attacking ours. In most situations we would have many missiles surviving to attack Soviet military targets, while withholding enough for [1 line of source text not declassified].

Against the expected Soviet threat, our strategic forces can survive a well-executed Soviet surprise attack and carry out an effective second strike. Even after a surprise Soviet first strike with the strongest Soviet forces in our NIE, we could launch more than 4,300 weapons, with a yield of more than 1,800 megatons, against the USSR in 1976.

How much damage the surviving weapons could cause depends on the effectiveness of Soviet defenses. The next table shows that even against high NIE-estimated threat, the U.S. Assured Destruction capability is much greater than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which I believe is needed for deterrence against a Soviet first strike.

Capabilities of U.S. Programmed Force for Assured Destruction
(Percent of Soviet Population Killed)

	FY 69	FY 72	FY 76
Against High NIE Threat	[*]	[*]	[*]
Against Low NIE Threat	[*]	[*]	[*]

[*entry in table not declassified]

If we could be sure that Soviet forces would stay within the range of the NIE—both in quality and numbers—we could consider smaller strategic forces.

While China may be able to threaten her neighbors and U.S. bases in Asia by 1972, she will not pose a threat to the U.S. second strike capability. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 line of source text not declassified] The recommended strategic forces are sufficient to inflict this destruction on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] while still maintaining our Assured Destruction capability against the Soviet Union.

The vital importance of our Assured Destruction capability to our national security requires us to be prepared to cope with Soviet strategic threats greater than those which the NIE projects. While unlikely, the Soviets might add a very extensive ABM defense or much improved anti-bomber defenses. They might improve their IBM force by putting accurate MIRVs on the SS-9, and by replacing or improving the SS-11 with a new, accurate ICBM. Conceivably, they might take all these actions.

The following table compares the 1976 balanced greater-than-expected threat, used in the following analyses, with the high NIE threat.

	High NIE	Greater-Than-Expected
Independently-targetable missile warheads on-line	2100	5500
Air Defenses
Look-down fighters/a/	200	400
Low-altitude SAM Launchers	2700	4200
ABM Launchers
Area	1700	1700
Terminal/b/	1025	7125

Programs required to support such an effort should prove technically difficult, expensive, and, since we have clearly indicated we would respond, hold little hope of providing the Soviets with a net gain in effective first strike capability. Nevertheless, to ensure that these threats remain unlikely, and to maintain our deterrent should they appear, we make sure that we have available the options needed to counter them.

If the USSR replaces or improves the accuracy of its SS-11s and adds accurate MIRVs to its SS-9s, it could destroy Minuteman missiles in their silos. Even if the Soviets could destroy all Minuteman missiles, they would not eliminate our Assured Destruction capability. Our remaining SLBMs and alert bomber force can penetrate the NIE-estimated Soviet defenses and kill at least [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Similarly, at least through 1976, a very extensive Soviet ABM system and air defense, without greater-than-expected ICBMs, would still let the U.S. programmed force maintain an Assured Destruction capability [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Our programmed force can cope with a greater-than-expected ABM because we already have programmed ABM hedges--Poseidon plus MIRVs and penetration aids for Minuteman.

The next table shows that the U.S. programmed force can keep its Assured Destruction capability through FY 75 by putting [number not declassified] MK-3s on each Poseidon missile, even if the Soviets deploy greater-than-expected balanced missile and bomber defenses. Short-Range Attack Missiles (SRAMs), SRAM decoys, and an air-to-air missile to protect the bombers against advanced interceptors would keep our Assured Destruction capability against this threat [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

U.S. Assured Destruction Against Greater-Than-Expected Balanced Defenses
(Percent of Soviet Population Killed)

	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76
U.S. Programmed Force	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]/a/
U.S. Programmed Force plus [number not declassified] MK-3s on Poseidon	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]

[*entry in table not declassified]

Only against a combined greater-than-expected Soviet ABM, air defense, and accurate ICBM force, costing the Soviets $20 to $30 billion above the high NIE, would our retaliatory forces need major new additions. Because of high cost and little return, the Soviets probably will not attempt to attain such a posture. Moreover, because of uncertainties about performance and cost, we should not deploy new systems as replacements for existing systems until a threat appears which cannot be economically met by improving the existing systems. We should develop new systems only as options which would restore our Assured Destruction capability should the greater-than-expected threat occur, realizing that it is not likely to occur. Thus, we should select options with small initial costs. If the threat actually materializes, we can, by later investment, develop these options fully. (No augmentation is needed for FY 69-72. Hence, I am recommending against the deployment of the JCS-proposed Antelope penetration aids for Polaris A-3s, which improve their capability against ABM only in that time period.)

The following table shows the effect of the combined greater-than-expected Soviet offensive and defensive threat on our Assured Destruction capability. It indicates the U.S. programmed force capability and the effects of buying SRAMs, SRAM decoys, an advanced bomber decoy, and an air-to-air missile to protect bombers against an advanced interceptor.

U.S. Assured Destruction Against Greater-Than-Expected Soviet Balanced Offenses and Defenses
(Percent of Soviet Population Killed)

	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76
Programmed Force	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]/a/	[*]/a/	[*]/a/	[*]/a/
+ bomber options	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]/a/	[*]/a/
+ bomber options, [text not declassified] and either[text not declassified]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]

[*entry in table not declassified]

This table shows that even if the bomber defense missile works, the greater-than-expected threat would call for a more effective U.S. Assured Destruction capability by FY 76. In addition, for Assured Destruction we do not want to rely primarily upon bombers which depend upon tactical warning for survival. Therefore, our alternative is to provide our missile forces with added protection. The degree of this protection depends upon how much and for how long we are willing to rely on bombers in the interim. ([number not declassified] MK-3s on Poseidon and [number not declassified] Minuteman defended or in [number not declassified] psi silos, when added to the above bomber options, result in [number not declassified] Soviet fatalities in 1976.) In any event, we should not take steps--such as reducing the number of bomber bases--that lessen our confidence in the bombers' survival.

1. Increased Warheads on Poseidon

We are providing the production base so that by FY 74 we could put up to [number not declassified] MK-3s on each Poseidon missile as a hedge against a heavy Soviet ABM or an increased threat to Minuteman.

2. Improve Our Bomber Force

Against improved terminal bomber defenses we can put SRAMs on B-52s in addition to the SRAMs on FB-111s. By initiating procurement in FY 70, the B-52s could be equipped with SRAMs by FY 72.

If Soviet air defenses improved, but their ABM did not, no increase in the size or expense of our strategic forces would be called for. However, for the cost of the present B-52 program we could improve our effectiveness by putting SRAMs on 195 B-52s and phasing out the other sixty.

If Soviet air defenses improved as part of a balanced Damage Limiting program, SRAMs plus penetration aids for the whole bomber force would prove worthwhile and would total about $2.7 billion in ten-year systems costs above the present program.

3. Improvements to Minuteman Missiles

As a hedge against a heavy Soviet ABM system we could replace all the Minuteman II by Minuteman III/MIRV at a cost of $1.9 billion over the present program. As a hedge against the failure of our penetration aids, at a cost of $6.2 billion we could convert to 1,000 Minuteman III missiles and buy [number not declassified] MK-18 MIRVs for each missile. We could have an all MK-18 Minuteman III force by FY 76. We could develop super-hard [numbers not declassified] psi silos for Minuteman as possible replacements for the present [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or provide for additional Minuteman IIIs as an alternative to a new ICBM (item #6 below) if we should want more payload. This would cost about $200 million in research and development ($40 million in FY 69) for an IOC in FY 73. Procurement costs would be $5 million per silo, 150 of which could be built per year.

4. Defense of Minuteman

Deployment of the light defense of Minuteman, shown below, might dissuade the Soviets from developing and deploying systems which otherwise could destroy Minuteman. In any event, it would provide a useful defense of Minuteman against the expected Soviet ICBM force without accurate MIRVs and furnish a base for developing a stronger defense against a Soviet force equipped with MIRVs. The median defense of Minuteman would protect against less sophisticated MIRVs on the SS-9s (about six per SS-9). Finally, the heavy defense of Minuteman would guard against the very sophisticated counterforce threat (eighteen accurate MIRVs per SS-9) assumed in the greater-than-expected threat for 1975 and 1976. The following table summarizes these three defenses.

Levels of Minuteman Defense

	Sprints	Spartans	Investment Cost/a/ ($ Millions)	Annual Costs ($ Millions)
Light Defense of Minuteman	264	120	$400	$10
Median Defense of Minuteman	1050	200	1400	40
Heavy Defense of Minuteman	1700	200	3600	160

5. More Poseidon Submarines

We could order more Poseidon submarines, which require a $280 million investment per ship and a four-year lead time. By initiating procurement in FY 70 we could have ten new Poseidon submarines by the end of FY 75 and twenty by the end of FY 76. The more Poseidon missiles we have the less we would have to rely upon Minuteman.

If we chose to deploy additional Poseidon instead of defending or hardening Minuteman, and if Soviet ICBM accuracy improved markedly (to about [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]). In this case, we should phase it out. Thus, choosing Poseidon might result in upsetting the balance of our forces. It would be undesirable to be without a land-based missile force as part of our offensive posture because we would become potentially more sensitive to unexpected Soviet advances in anti-submarine warfare.

6. New ICBM

Contract Definition begun in January 1968 would permit an IOC by FY 75. We could deploy this new missile in new silos as part of a defended or undefended fixed land-based system. Conversely, we could deploy it as a land-mobile or ship-based system or base it in a new class of submarines. In order to develop a new ICBM, we would require a $2 to $3 billion research and development program. The ten-year cost of buying a new ICBM totals some $11 to $20 billion.

The following table compares the costs of these alternatives against the greater-than-expected Soviet threat. The costs shown are over and above the cost of presently programmed forces. All options provide an Assured Destruction capability of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] against the greater-than-expected Soviet threat in 1976.

Costs of Various Missile Options To Protect Assured Destruction
Against Greater-Than-Expected Threat
($ Billions)

	R&D	Program Costs (FY 68-76)
Defense of Minuteman
Median--Against large-MIRV threat/a/	$0.5	$2.0
Heavy--Against small-MIRV threat/b/	0.5	4.3
16 Additional Poseidon Submarines and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on all Poseidon	0.0	6.6
[number not declassified] Additional Minuteman in super-hard silos	0.2	6.1
New ICBM
Land-based	2.5	8
Sea-based	2.5	8

If the Soviets do not react by developing and deploying these MIRVs, we can defend Minuteman at less cost than we could procure Poseidons. If they develop a small MIRV threat, the cost of Minuteman defense would about equal the cost of acquiring Poseidons. Super-hard silos for Minuteman are not competitive with a light Minuteman defense, but they offer an alternative to heavier Minuteman defenses against the small-MIRV threat. A posture combining defense (calling for small-MIRVs) and super-hard silos (calling for very high yield warheads) would be very difficult to attack. None of the new ICBMs enjoys a clear cost advantage over defending Minuteman, putting Minuteman in super-hard silos, or acquiring Poseidons until the Soviet ABM becomes much stronger than the greater-than-expected threat./4/

If we choose to buy more Poseidon, we would have to order them in FY 70 and FY 71, before we could see the extent of the Soviet threat. If we develop super-hard silos, we would not have to decide to deploy them until FY 73.

A defense of Minuteman can be bought in stages and is likely to hold down the total cost of hedging our Assured Destruction capability. To deploy the heavy defense of Minuteman by FY 76, we would have to decide on the light defense by FY 70, the median defense by FY 71, and the heavy defense by FY 73. Other hedges, such as more Poseidon submarines or the Ballistic Missile Surface Ship, are unnecessary. Super-hard silos can be built in response to the threat and they are competitive with the defense of Minuteman. The choice between super-hard silos and defense of Minuteman depends on the direction the Soviet threat takes. To preserve the option to go either way, we should develop them both.

Recent studies have reviewed the value of a mixed ballistic missile/bomber force against reasonable projections of Soviet defenses into the 1970s. They show the bombers add some measure of assurance against greater-than-expected Soviet threats and induce the USSR to divert resources to their anti-bomber defenses. A mixed offensive force enjoys certain advantages against terminal defenses. By attacking some cities with missiles only, and others with bombers only, we force the Soviets to use more resources to protect all defended cities with both bomber and missile defenses. In order to accomplish this objective, however, we do not need large bomber forces.

The previous section discussed the hedges to our programmed strategic offensive forces, especially to their missile components. Since we intend to keep the missile force well-hedged, the issue is whether we also want to hedge our bomber force with an AMSA.

Is an AMSA a good hedge? It is not. Against the NIE range of threats our programmed forces are adequate. Since the strategic forces are already well-hedged, we can keep an Assured Destruction capability against greater-than-expected threats without the AMSA.

To counter a Soviet greater-than-expected threat, under most circumstances, including the most probable ones, U.S. offensive forces equipped with AMSA cost more than forces with equivalent effectiveness but without the advanced bomber.

What does AMSA cost as a hedge? To answer this question we must compare the cost of bomber forces needed to cope with various levels of Soviet threat. The following two tables make this comparison.

Costs of Alternative FB-111/B-52 Forces
($ Billions)

Bomber Force	Program Costs (FY 68-82)/a/
A. 210 FB-111s	$ 7.2
B. 210 FB-111s and 255 B-52s without SRAMs	12.4
C. 210 FB-111s and 255 B-52s with 18 SRAMs per B-52	15.3

Force B represents the programmed force and would cope with the higher range of the NIE-projected Soviet strategic forces. It would also let us expand to meet a greater-than-expected Soviet threat. Force A, costing $5.2 billion less, would be appropriate for the lower range of NIE threats. Force C adds SRAMs to the B-52s, providing the expansion needed to meet the greater-than-expected threat. This option would cost $2.9 billion more than Force B.

The next table compares the cost of hedging against the greater-than-expected threat.

Costs of Alternative Strong Bomber Forces of Equal Effectiveness
($ Billions)

Bomber Force	Program Costs (FY 68-82)
C. 210 FB-111s and 255 B-52s with 18 SRAMs per B-52	$15.3
D. 210 FB-111s and 68 AMSAs	15.3
E. 138 AMSAs	16.6

Both Force D and E are about equal in effectiveness to the programmed force plus SRAMs against the greater-than-expected threat, provided B-52 penetration aids work. Force D represents the smallest AMSA force which we can use as a hedge. It costs $2.9 billion more than the programmed forces. The all-AMSA Force E costs considerably more than either Force A or C, $9.4 and $1.3 billion respectively.

Considerations other than costs make the Force D option less attractive than Force C. First, developing AMSA requires a longer lead time than deploying SRAMs on B-52s, and imposes a substantial initial investment before we could determine that an increased Soviet threat has occurred. Conversely, since the SRAM option has a shorter lead time, we can delay the decision to deploy this missile until the increased threat begins to appear. Secondly, if we decide to proceed with AMSA now and the greater-than-expected threat does not appear, we will have wasted $3 to $10 billion.

In sum, to achieve equal effectiveness, AMSA contributes only marginally at great cost. Thus, Engineering Development is not called for now. However, we should proceed with Advanced Development to provide aircraft technology and to keep open the option of replacing the B-52s.

IV. Strategic Defense

Our Assured Destruction capability makes any kind of nuclear war with the Soviets unlikely. Therefore, we first buy enough forces to give us high confidence in our deterrent. As insurance in the unlikely event deterrence fails, we then consider adding forces that might reduce damage to our population and industry. Damage Limiting forces, unlike those for Assured Destruction, cannot and need not work perfectly under all conditions. They should insure against the more probable risks, such as wars growing out of a deep crisis, or threats posed by the growth of Chinese nuclear forces. The basic Damage Limiting question is whether we should deploy Nike-X in defense of our cities.

A defensive system to save U.S. cities from a Soviet nuclear attack must attempt to keep ahead of the Soviet threat, including their reactions to our deployment. In this analysis we use two stages in such a deployment. The first, "Posture A", represents a light defense of cities. It has an area defense of the entire CONUS, providing overlapping coverage of key targets. It has a relatively low-density Sprint defense of 25 cities. It is estimated that initially it would cost about $9 billion in investment and $600 million a year to operate. The second, "Posture B", is a heavier defense with a higher density Sprint defense of 52 cities. It is estimated that initially it would cost $18 billion and $1.1 billion a year to operate. Because of probable Soviet reaction, with Posture B we would also need improved air and civil defense and ASW forces at a cost of $4 to $5 billion in investment. Moreover, experience convinces me that the pursuit of effective defenses would eventually lead us to spend about $40 billion.

[1 paragraph (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

U.S. Killed In All-Out Strategic Exchange in 1976
Assumes No Soviet Reaction to U.S. ABM
(In Millions)

U.S. Programs	Soviets Strike First		U.S. Strikes First Soviets Retaliate
	U.S. Fatalities	Soviet Fat.	U.S. Fatalities	Soviet Fat./b/
Approved Program (Sentinel)	100	[*]	90	[*]
Posture A/a/	40	[*]	10	[*]
Posture B	20	[*]	Less than 10	[*]

[*entry in table not declassified]

This table shows that if the Soviets do not respond, they lose their deterrent. They would be forced to react to increase the ability of their forces to survive and strike back. They could do so in several different ways: (1) by stepping up deployment of SS-9s and SS-11s now in production; (2) by defending their present missile force; (3) by adding MIRVs, chaff, or other penetration aids to their missiles; (4) by deploying a new, large ICBM (either mobile or defended); or (5) by deploying a new submarine-launched missile like our Poseidon. They have the technical capability to do any of these things by the mid-1970s.

If the Soviets choose to respond to our ABM with MIRVs, penetration aids, and missiles which would survive a U.S. attack (MIRVs and penetration aids against Sentinel plus 100 missiles against Posture A and 550 against Posture B), they would regain their Assured Destruction (second strike) capability. A larger Soviet response could raise probable U.S. fatalities still higher.

U.S. Killed In All-Out Strategic Exchange In 1976
Assuming Soviets Respond To U.S. ABM
(In Millions)

U.S. Programs	Soviets Strike First		U.S. Strikes First Soviets Retaliate
	U.S. Fatalities	Soviet Fat.	U.S. Fatalities	Soviet Fat.
Approved Program (Sentinel)	120	[*]	110	[*]
Posture A	110	[*]	90	[*]
Posture B	100	[*]	90	[*]

[*entry in table not declassified]

As part of their response, the Soviets could add large numbers of offensive missiles that would threaten our Assured Destruction capability. We, in turn, would have to react. Viewing each other's buildup in forces as an increased threat, each side would undertake counteracting steps, thereby increasing the costs to both with no gain in security. Therefore, I believe deploying the Nike-X system to protect American cities would be neither wise nor effective.

A light U.S. ABM system would protect against a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] ICBM attack. By protecting the U.S. against such a threat, it probably would enhance our ability to deter [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] nuclear intimidation of other [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] countries. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The area defense of CONUS would give us a realistic Damage Limiting capability against [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for the mid-1970s, as shown in the next table.

U.S. Fatalities In a Small-Scale Attack/a/
(In Millions)

	[heading not declassified]			[heading not declassified]
Number of ICBMs	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]
No Defense	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]	[*]
Light ABM	[*]	[*]/b/	[*]/b/	[*]	[*]	[*]

[*entry in table not declassified]

Civil Defense provides low cost insurance for our people in the unlikely event of a nuclear attack. As a by-product it has also proven to be a significant aid in natural disasters. This program should be pursued. More effort is needed to identify useful shelters in home basements. This can fill a large part of the current shelter deficit at a very low cost--about $0.45 per space added.

The number of lives which would be saved by air defense if the Soviets were to attack the U.S. depends on our ballistic missile defense. With only a light missile defense, even a very strong air defense could not save many lives. The Soviets could simply target cities with their missiles. A Soviet first strike, with missiles only, could kill 120 million people; their bombers could then add less than ten million fatalities even if we had no air defense at all. A force of either 200 improved F-106 interceptors with AWACS (ten-year cost $9.9 billion) or 54 F-12s with AWACS (ten-year cost $11.6 billion) would reduce these fatalities by less than five to eight million.

However, there are other objectives of continental air defense which must also be considered. These include defense against countries other than the Soviet Union, defense against bomber attacks on those strategic forces that we withhold in a controlled nuclear war, peacetime patrolling of our air space, discouraging Soviet bomber aspirations, and the use of continental air defense forces in missions outside the U.S. We can achieve these objectives with a modern, more effective air defense force that costs less over the next twelve years than our present force. This modern force will consist of 200 improved F-106 fighters (the F-106X), 42 AWACS, two OTH radars, and the Federal Aviation Agency National Air Space system for back-up command and control. The cost through 1979 for the modern force is $13.7 billion compared with $13.9 billion for the current force. However, the lower operating costs of the modern force will result in substantial savings over the present force after FY 79.

Surveillance is presently the weakest part of our air defense system. Therefore, we should proceed with engineering development of AWACS (if the Overland Radar Technology program is successful) and with development of back-scatter OTH radars. We should also develop, and deploy on the F-106, advanced air-to-air missiles and an advanced fire control system. With these improvements to the F-106, there is little to be gained from the high performance characteristics of the F-12. Thus, we can avoid the additional $1.7 billion cost of an F-12 force and still meet our air defense objectives.

Washington, March 11, 1968.

SUBJECT
FY 1969-70 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

Submitted herewith for your approval is the proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile for the end of FY 1970 and certain related adjustments to the FY 1969 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile approved on 10 June 1967./2/ The Requirements stated herein are based on the forces detailed in the Five Year Defense Program submitted to you separately./3/

The stockpile which you approved on 10 June 1967 authorized a total of [number not declassified] nuclear warheads/4/ for FY 1969. Reappraisal, in the light of the proposed force levels and the continuing review of nuclear weapons requirements, indicates that the FY 1969 stockpile should now be adjusted to a total of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] warheads. The detailed composition of the initially approved FY 1969 stockpile is shown in Column 1 of Inclosure 1;/5/ the proposed adjusted FY 1969 stockpile is shown in Column 2. The proposed adjustments result principally from the impact of adjustments in force modernization programs for Minuteman, Polaris-Poseidon and tactical missiles, reappraisal of requirements for air-to-air missiles and from reprogramming [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] bomb production during FY 1968, FY 1969 and FY 1970 due to technical difficulties. The reprogramming has caused a reduction of [number not declassified] in the number of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] bombs approved by you on 10 June 1967, for inclusion in the FY 1968 stockpile. This reduction has been offset by the retention of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] tactical bombs previously scheduled for retirement during FY 1968, pending delivery to stockpile of those bombs which are now programmed for FY 1969.

The proposed FY 1970 operational stockpile, submitted for your consideration, consists of [number not declassified] nuclear warheads. This objective is to be achieved during FY 1970 by the production of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This is a net reduction of [number not declassified] warheads from the adjusted stockpile recommended for end FY 1969.

The production proposed for FY 1970 represents the continuing program to improve our nuclear weapons posture by modernizing existing weapons (Minuteman II), and by providing new warheads in support of new capabilities (Poseidon, Minuteman III, FB-111) to be introduced concurrently with the phase-out of older systems. The proposed reductions include some obsolescent weapons in excess of present requirements (Davy Crockett tactical missiles and Lulu depth charges); those warheads being replaced during modernization actions (Minuteman and Polaris); and other weapons whose programmed inventory can no longer be operationally justified (strategic bombs and surface-to-air missiles). The detailed composition of the FY 1970 stockpile is shown in Column 4 of Inclosure 1. The incremental changes in warhead quantities required during FY 1970 to achieve the proposed stockpile are shown in Column 3 of Inclosure 1, with appropriate footnotes where necessary to identify the nature of the change. Associated with the proposed operational stockpile, and shown as Inclosure 2, are non-nuclear components which provide different operational capabilities for the same warhead and/or are required in excess of a one-for-one ratio with basic assemblies.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the nuclear weapons stockpile through FY 1970. While it does not fully reflect all of their earlier recommendations, they accept the adjusted FY 1969 and proposed FY 1970 stockpile figures as reflected herein./6/

In addition to the operational stockpile (Inclosure 1), warheads required for the quality assurance and reliability testing programs are shown in Inclosure 3. These additional warheads are needed to offset reductions in operational capability during stockpile sampling programs, joint firing test programs, and foreseeable major retrofit actions requiring temporary and permanent withdrawals from the operational stockpile. For strategic missiles we provide warheads to offset temporary and permanent withdrawals. For other systems we allow a decrease in the operational stockpile for permanent withdrawals for testing, unless this can be offset by delayed retirements or, in the case of warheads still in production, by additional production. Withdrawals for non-destructive testing, limited to a small percentage of the warheads concerned, are permitted to temporarily decrease the operational stockpile. Additionally, warheads for systems being phased down are also retained where economies may be realized thereby, mainly by reducing the requirements for rebuild of warheads subsequent to future planned quality assurance tests. Finally, warheads are provided in this category when dictated by unusual circumstances such as foreseeable major retrofit programs or in cases involving severe logistics problems.

The Atomic Energy Commission will also be required to produce those nuclear warhead parts intended for transfer to the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] pursuant to the terms of the agreement for cooperation. These parts are considered annually in a separate action by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense.

The proposed FY 1970 stockpile is within the presently projected availability of special nuclear and by-product materials, and the number of weapons recommended to be produced in FY 1970 is within the planned capability of the Atomic Energy Commission weapons fabrication system. An Atomic Energy Commission summary of special nuclear and by-product materials required by the nuclear weapons program for FY 1969 and FY 1970 is shown in Inclosure 4.

The preliminary Atomic Energy Commission estimate of the weapons production and surveillance operations costs proposed for FY 1970 is approximately, $332 million which excludes the cost of special nuclear materials, equipment and plant amortization. The FY 1970 $332 million estimate may need to be revised when the FY 1971 stockpile composition is firm. The above data for production and surveillance costs exclude costs of Weapon Tests (including development of supplemental test sites) and Research and Development, which are estimated to be approximately $575 million for FY 1970. The above figures are Atomic Energy Commission estimates and do not include additional expenses incurred by the Department of Defense.

In accordance with your directions, as conveyed by Mr. Rostow in his memorandum of 10 February 1967,/7/ the Atomic Energy Commission has been transferring to the Department of Defense finished nuclear warheads and components as they are produced and certified by the Atomic Energy Commission, subject to the production and retirement provisions of the currently applicable stockpile composition directive of the President. Such transfers for FY 1969 and 1970 will, therefore, be made in accordance with the stockpile composition recommendations of this memorandum if approved.

The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission accordingly recommend that you:

1. Approve the stockpile of [number not declassified] nuclear warheads for end FY 1970 tabulated in Column 4 of Inclosure 1.

2. Approve the revised stockpile of [number not declassified] nuclear warheads for end FY 1969 tabulated in Column 2 of Inclosure 1.

3. Approve the quantities of warheads required for quality assurance and reliability testing tabulated in Columns 2 and 4 of Inclosure 3.

4. Direct the production and retirement of those quantities of nuclear warheads and nuclear warhead parts necessary to achieve and maintain the above stockpiles; as well as the production of the additional nuclear warhead parts necessary for transfer to the United Kingdom pursuant to the agreement for cooperation.

5. Authorize the Atomic Energy Commission in coordination with the Department of Defense to initiate production of such long-lead time nuclear warhead parts as may be necessary to prepare for FY 1971 production of warheads required by the approved Five Year Defense Program.

6. Authorize the Atomic Energy Commission, in coordination with the Department of Defense, to make such changes in the FY 1969 and FY 1970 stockpiles as may be necessary because of changes in Atomic Energy Commission production/retirement capability, material availabilities or quality assurance requirements.

7. Authorize the Department of Defense, in coordination with the Atomic Energy Commission, to make such changes in the FY 1969 and FY 1970 stockpiles as may be required because of adjusted delivery assets or changes in military requirements.

Any changes indicative of a major shift in defense policy or Atomic Energy Commission production capability will be submitted for your specific approval. A draft implementing directive is submitted here-with for your consideration (Inclosure 5)./8/

Paul H. Nitze
Glenn T. Seaborg/9/