JCSM-221-68 Washington, April 10, 1968.

SUBJECT
Worldwide US Military Posture (U)

1. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are increasingly concerned about the state of US worldwide military posture when measured against existing commitments and likely contingencies. This memorandum is intended to provide you with a current appraisal of the worldwide US military posture and to express concern about the limited capability of our military forces to respond rapidly to crisis situations.

2. (TS) Prior to the commitment of major forces to Southeast Asia in 1965, the major deployable general purpose forces based in CONUS, Hawaii, and Okinawa included 9-1/3 Army divisions, 2-8/9 Marine Corps division/wing teams, nonforward-deployed Navy forces, and approximately 48 Air Force tactical fighter squadrons. Meeting the requirements of the extended contingency in Southeast Asia has resulted in a reduction in the number of forces available to reinforce forces now deployed and for other contingencies as well as reduced combat readiness. At the present time, none of the CONUS-based land forces are deployable within existing tour/rotation policies and without extension of terms of service. After the approved deployments under Program 5 and Program 6 have been made, the only Air Force tactical fighter and reconnaissance units which will be available for immediate deployment are two F-100 tactical fighter squadrons and two reconnaissance squadrons ordered to active duty from the Air National Guard. Further, the deployment to Southeast Asia of the equivalent of 10-2/3 Army and Marine Corps division forces, one-half of the Marine aircraft squadrons, major surface and air forces of the Navy, and major tactical and strategic elements of the Air Force exceeds the force level which can be sustained by the existing active force structure under current tour/rotational policies. The Air Force must also sustain the forces deployed, for a yet-undetermined period of temporary duty, to northeast Asia in response to the USS Pueblo incident./2/

3. (TS) Shortages in personnel with the required skills, shortages in critical items of equipment, and the inability of units to attain the necessary training level are the primary reasons for the limited deployability of the forces remaining within the strategic reserve. In addition, the combat readiness of forces deployed in other forward areas has been lowered substantially since they have been required to contribute heavily in both personnel and equipment to support and sustain Southeast Asia deployments.

4. (TS) It is the decreased readiness of US military forces worldwide and the limited capability of the strategic reserve that most concern the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further, the risks associated with the current military posture and the possibility of communist-inspired diversionary contingencies erupting elsewhere increase as the commitment in Southeast Asia is prolonged and the active US military resources are further extended. Accordingly, the following assessment is provided:

a. Strategic. Though this appraisal is primarily concerned with general purpose forces, the principal threat to the United States is the large and rapidly improving strategic offensive forces of the USSR. Soviet policy is clearly aimed at improving the strategic position of the USSR relative, to the United States. It is noted that the current level of fighter/attack and B-52 sortie rates in the western Pacific and the additional deployments of aircraft to Korea have resulted in a SIOP degradation of about 250 alert weapons programmed against more than 200 targets.

b. Europe/Middle East/North Africa. The most likely pressure points for Soviet diversionary efforts are Europe, the Mediterranean, north Africa, and the Middle East. The NATO military posture, already weakened by France's nonparticipation, is being jeopardized further by proposed US, British, and Belgian troop reductions and redeployments. In addition to the Soviet capability to strike in Western Europe, particularly against the vulnerable Benelux line of communication (LOC), the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, together with Soviet aid to certain Arab States, provides added opportunity for the USSR to promote incidents in these areas. The United States must be able to respond to direct or indirect aggression in the Middle East and north Africa without significant drawdown on US forces in central Europe. The significance of the threat in these areas is increased by our limited capability to provide the forces required for the initial defense of the NATO area.

(1) Of the eight Army divisions committed to NATO, five are M-day divisions stationed in Europe. One of these, the 24th Infantry Division (Mech), is in the initial stages of redeploying from Germany (Reforger), wherein the division, less one brigade, will return to CONUS but remain under the operational command of USCINCEUR. Two of the three CONUS divisions normally committed to NATO by M+30 days, the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions, will require at least 12 weeks after mobilization to achieve a deployable status. The 5th Infantry Division (Mech), the third CONUS division normally committed to NATO by M+30 days, is currently preparing one brigade for deployment to Southeast Asia, and the division(-) will require a minimum of 12 weeks after mobilization to achieve a deployable status. Due to the reduced readiness of these three divisions, the United States has agreed to make two airborne divisions, the 82d and 101st, available to NATO by M+30 days. However, during the past 6 months, the 101st Airborne Division and one brigade of the 82d Airborne Division were deployed to Southeast Asia. The readiness of the 82d Airborne Division(-) was reduced in preparing this brigade for deployment, and the division(-) will require 8 weeks' training after receipt of replacements to achieve a deployable status. Provision of these replacements will not be completed until October 1968, unless there is a Reserve callup. Thus, there are no major Army combat forces ready to reinforce NATO on a timely basis without redeployment from Southeast Asia.

(2) Two Marine division/wing teams are committed to NATO to arrive in Europe by M+30 and M+60 days. However, only 1-3/9 currently are available without redeployment from Southeast Asia. These forces also provide a defense force for Guantanamo and amphibious ready forces in the Mediterranean and Caribbean and constitute the sustaining base for Marine Corps deployments to Southeast Asia.

(3) Navy commitments to NATO include 10 CVAs and seven CVSs by M+30 days. This represents two-thirds of the Navy's CVAs and seven of eight available CVSs. Navy ships are committed fully in sustaining worldwide deployments, and, thus, the reinforcement of NATO would require substantial redeployment from Southeast Asia. It is noted that 26 ships of the Atlantic Command have been placed in caretaker status or are operating with reduced manning because of personnel drawdowns to support Southeast Asia commitments.

(4) Twenty-one Air Force tactical fighter squadrons are now based in Europe and committed to NATO on M-day. Of those, four squadrons (Crested Cap) are programmed to become dual based in CY 1968 but will remain under the operational command of USCINCEUR. USCINCEUR plans call for an augmentation force of 37 tactical fighter squadrons by M+30 days. However, only six active squadrons (Air National Guard) are currently available in CONUS for deployment, of which two are approved for deployment to Southeast Asia under Program 5 and two are approved under Program 6. Therefore, the balance of USCINCEUR's air support requirements can be provided only by redeployment of forces from Southeast Asia or Korea and from the remaining 15 Air National Guard tactical fighter squadrons.

c. Southeast Asia

(1) In South Vietnam, the enemy has become increasingly aggressive throughout the country, with attacks against population centers and military installations. Elements of four North Vietnamese infantry divisions have been deployed in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone and Khe Sanh. The North Vietnamese Army has the capability of reinforcing the demilitarized zone/Khe Sanh area with between one and two additional division equivalents in possibly 30 days time. The North Vietnamese, with the aid of the USSR and Communist China, are rebuilding their Air Force and improving their air defense capability. Military and economic resources continue to reach the enemy through North Vietnamese ports, the Mekong-Bassac River system, and over the land routes from southern China.

(2) The North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao have achieved recent successes in Laos. It is possible that North Vietnam may seek to extend its control in order to protect its LOC into South Vietnam.

(3) In Thailand, the northeast region continues to be a center of insurgency, and the incident rate continues to rise. In recent months, a serious outbreak of insurgent incidents has been initiated by dissident tribesmen in north Thailand.

(4) In Burma, there is evidence of increased external communist assistance to the Karen and Shan dissidents and to the White Flag Communist Party. This, coupled with a deteriorating economic situation, indicates that the Burmese insurgency problem could assume serious proportions.

(5) Cambodia continues to be used as a sanctuary for North Vietnamese/Viet Cong forces and as a source of supplies, despite recent official US attempts to reach an agreement with Prince Sihanouk on denying the enemy this refuge.

(6) Communist China has the capability to launch and sustain a major invasion of Southeast Asia. In addition, the Chinese Peoples Republic could support an attack with a small number of nuclear weapons delivered by aircraft and could have a limited MRBM capability later this year. Chinese naval units have the capability to conduct limited submarine, torpedo boat, and surface-to-surface missile attacks.

d. Northeast Asia. It is still uncertain whether the marked increase over the past year in North Korean provocations, culminating in the attempted assault on the Blue House and the seizure of the USS Pueblo, was intended to divert US attention from Southeast Asia or to constitute the early phase of renewed communist aggression on the Korean Peninsula. It is prudent to recognize the first possibility and prepare for the second. For the past several years, US forces in Korea have been assigned a low priority in personnel and equipment modernization. Until a week after the seizure of the USS Pueblo, the Air Force had no tactical air support forces in Korea. There are now deployed in Korea, on a temporary basis, five tactical fighter squadrons and one augmented fighter interceptor squadron. Army forces deployed in Korea continue to be under recommended strength and, as a result, are at a reduced level of combat readiness.

e. Atlantic. The strategic significance of the Atlantic stems from NATO's reliance upon sea and air LOCs through that area for its economic survival and mutual support. The Soviet submarine fleet represents the principal threat to Free World shipping and to NATO naval forces. The Atlantic serves as a launch area from which the Soviets can conduct offensive nuclear warfare against the countries of the Western Hemisphere and Europe.

f. Latin America. The USSR, the Chinese Peoples Republic, and Cuba will continue to view Latin America as a prime target for subversion. This threat, as well as internal instabilities, should be met by development of an appropriate indigenous security capability and the encouragement of selected Latin American nations to provide trained and equipped units for use in OAS/UN peacekeeping missions. However, there is currently little assurance that Latin American countries would furnish units for peacekeeping purposes under circumstances considered essential principally to US national interest. Therefore, a capability still must be maintained for direct intervention--through the OAS, if possible, but unilaterally if necessary--to prevent establishment of another Castro-style communist government in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba continues to pose a threat to US security interests, and the US base at Guantanamo presents an opportunity for diversionary action by the communists.

5. (C) In addition to the external threats, there are domestic considerations that must be recognized. Many major cities in the United States are threatened with civil disturbances stemming from racial disorders and antidraft/anti-Vietnam movements. Forces from the Ready Reserve and CONUS-based Active Forces will be capable of coping with these threats. However, the simultaneous employment of Reserve forces, under State or Federal control, in a number of different cities, or the prolonged use of Active Forces in this role would reduce the capability to reinforce forces now deployed and to respond to other contingencies.

6. (S) The current steps to establish a workable basis for negotiation with North Vietnam are acknowledged. However, it is considered prudent that there be no relaxation of efforts to attain an improved military posture while awaiting results from those steps. Past experience provides ample evidence that negotiation with the communists is conducted best when backed by visible and credible force.

7. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that the strategic military options now available to the United States are seriously limited by the reduced combat readiness of military forces worldwide, other than those deployed to Southeast Asia, and by the limited size and reduced combat readiness of our present strategic reserve. Measures should be taken to improve the US military posture in order to:

a. Sustain and permit more effective use of forces already in Southeast Asia.

b. Provide and sustain the additional forces approved for deployment to Southeast Asia.

c. Restore and maintain NATO-deployed and -augmentation forces.

d. Restore and maintain other deployed forces.

e. Respond effectively to other contingencies.

f. Establish and maintain a high state of readiness in the Reserve component forces in order to augment Active Forces rapidly, when required.

8. (S) The level of forces necessary to achieve the required posture is set forth in JSOP 70-77./3/ The urgency in attaining these levels is emphasized, and the need to move ahead quickly on reequipping and modernizing our forces is of the utmost importance.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, April 18, 1968.

Walt:

At the recent meeting of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, several matters occurred to which I wish to call your attention.

The first is the attached memorandum to the President suggesting that he issue a statement with regard to the importance of the foreign intelligence effort./2/ The Board is taking inventory of its own resources and methods in the hope of providing better service to the President in the intelligence field and would appreciate the reinforcement afforded of such a statement by the President. Would you please forward it to the President?

As a result of the inventory mentioned above, the Board has reorganized its panels as indicated in an enclosure hereto./3/ The regional panels now coincide territorially with the interests of the IRG's and the regional Assistant Secretaries of State.

In considering how best to keep an eye on the covert activities of the CIA, the Board felt that it would be timely at our next meeting in June to review activities of the 303 Committee in keeping tabs on the Agency. We hope that you will be willing to attend and give us your impression of the effectiveness of the 303 controls. The meeting will be held on June 6-7 and I hope that you will be able to spend a little time with us on one of these days. I shall confirm this invitation later in writing.

You are well aware of the excellent work being done by NSA in intercepting and deciphering the low level infiltration and logistics traffic of the North Vietnamese. Unfortunately, a great deal of this traffic is not intercepted because of a lack of SIGINT aircraft with this primary mission. Pat Carter has been trying in vain to obtain a total of 15 aircraft for this purpose but, thus far, he has been frustrated, largely by the issue of operational control of aircraft on this kind of collection mission--shall that control be military or NSA? The issue is set forth in the attached letter which I hope you will be willing to dispatch to Clark Clifford./4/ In the past, the latter has always been sympathetic to the needs of NSA and I would expect him to react quickly to such a letter and cut the red tape which has thus far held back this much needed reinforcement in the SIGINT field.

I am sending these matters over in writing which normally I would have taken up with you in person because of your absence in Honolulu and my departure on a short trip which will last until April 25. I shall be back in my office on the following Friday./5/

M.D.T.

Washington, undated.

UNITED STATES POLICY ON INTERNAL DEFENSE
IN SELECTED FOREIGN COUNTRIES

I. Purpose and Authorities

This policy (short title "Foreign Internal Defense Policy") supersedes "United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy (USOIDP)" issued under cover of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 182 of August 24, 1962. It is consistent with NSAMs 182, 119, 124, 162, 173, 177, 283, and 341./2/ Its provisions govern the foreign internal defense policies, plans, programs, and operations of all U.S. government Departments and Agencies concerned. The appropriate Departments and Agencies should update statements of their roles and missions in support of this policy to replace those set forth in the superseded 1962 policy paper. The new statements should be submitted to the Senior Interdepartmental Group for approval. Departments and Agencies should also issue implementing directives as necessary.

II. Policy Considerations

Internal security situations in certain developing countries are a matter of concern for the United States. Because of location or economic resources, the need for U.S. military or other facilities and operating rights (such as transit rights), political alignments, or for other reasons, the United States must pay special attention to these countries and to the ability of their governments to maintain internal order. In certain circumstances, the United States may have to provide governments with assistance for internal defense purposes in order to help protect United States local and strategic interests which might be threatened by internal disorder or subversion. Subversion involves systematic efforts from internal or external sources to undermine or overthrow the established political and social order. Internal defense consists of the full range of action programs to maintain internal security, including, in addition to political and diplomatic activity and economic and military assistance, such specialized programs as civil police, psychological, paramilitary, and counterinsurgency operations; counterguerrilla activity, unconventional warfare, military civic actions, and public works.

In some developing countries, independence from significant influence or control by a foreign power may be a major U.S. security objective for political, military, or economic reasons. Such control or influence could result from communist subversion or from communist exploitation of local failure to maintain adequate internal security.

The United States must, therefore, be constantly alert to conditions of internal security in developing countries in order to identify situations where subversion, insurgency, or disorder endanger significant U.S. interests. In these cases, the United States must be prepared to assist governments in appropriate internal defense programs.

It is a part of our overall foreign policy that ultimately nations be able to develop according to their own traditions and that each be governed in accordance with the will of the majority of its citizens. We believe that governments should respond adequately to the aspirations of the people for political, economic, and social conditions appropriate to their environment, and should move toward the establishment of institutions which will provide some guarantees for the continuation of these conditions as governments change. The development of institutions responsive to local national patterns of behavior is more important, however, than progress toward an objective goal of representative democratic institutions as the United States has traditionally viewed them. In many cases, it is primarily the economic and technical aspects of modernization which are attractive goals in developing countries, and there is often great resistance to changes in political and social systems, no matter how important or appropriate these changes may seem to us.

The process of modernization in developing countries is often destabilizing in itself, and changes in political and social systems often are accomplished by revolutionary activity. While the United States would usually prefer basic changes in a society to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, the growth process is generally accompanied by unrest, upheaval, and violence. In U.S. policies toward foreign internal security situations, it is important to make a distinction between disorder and insurgency which may be a function of national growth and that which is a result of subversion.

Thus, the position which the United States should take with respect to the internal security situation in a foreign country is an integral, inseparable part of the overall U.S. policy toward the country and the region in which it is located. It cannot be formulated in isolation from other aspects of U.S. policy nor implemented as a separate program. The policy problem is to make judgments about the nature and speed of the process of national development and, where U.S. interests require it, to find ways to influence the process constructively.

The United States does not regard every situation of political instability or social disorder and violence as a foreign internal security problem threatening U.S. interests and requiring U.S. assistance for internal defense programs. In some cases, the forces making for instability and political upheaval may contribute, in the long run, to the achievement of objectives deserving of encouragement and support from the United States. In any case, it does not seem possible entirely to deprive people of the use of force for purposes of social change, and action which is too repressive may worsen the problem by forcing the pressures for alterations in institutions outside legal or acceptable channels and into subversive forms.

In countries where significant U.S. interests are not threatened by internal disorder or subversion, the United States should seek to avoid becoming involved in internal defense policies, plans, and operations of local governments. Even in these cases, however, it may be in the U.S. interest to provide internal defense equipment or training assistance appropriate to the situation and to U.S. objectives in the countries concerned.

Internal defense policy and programs for countries the United States may be prepared to assist will need to be determined on a case-by-case basis and carefully tailored to the specific and unique aspects of each situation. Important considerations which will affect the determination of the kind and nature of U.S. internal defense policy and programs for particular countries are: first, U.S. interests in the area; then the sources, kinds, and degree of threat to internal security; dangers from external exploitation; the possibility of local conflict broadening into larger-scale wars; the consequences of the internal security problem for overall development within the country; the will and ability of the local government to handle the situation with indigenous resources; the effect of U.S. programs on other programs within the country; the consequences of U.S. policies and programs on the U.S. position in other countries; the availability of external assistance from other nations or international organizations.

One of our primary concerns is to anticipate situations requiring U.S. foreign internal defense action far enough in advance, and to devise in cooperation with local governments, effective programs which will make unnecessary the engagement of U.S. combat troops. The long-term implications of use of U.S. military forces should be carefully studied in any consideration of such a step.

The process of change within a country is largely stimulated by local initiative, guided by national leaders, reliant on indigenous resources, and ultimately bears a national trademark. The role of internal defense is to permit the changes to take place in as orderly a manner as possible and without outside interference. The kind and amount of police and military action required to maintain internal security for each country are most likely also to be determined according to the character of the government and the people and the requirements for such force as seen by them. It is clear that the United States should persuade the countries concerned to do as much as they can for their own internal defense. We should realize, however, that many resource-poor countries are unable to attain their goals for political and economic modernization or their objectives of improved conditions of law and order without external help. Where U.S. interests warrant it and U.S. resources can be made available, the United States can provide such assistance or, in combination with other nations which share our common goals, see that it is provided.

The nature of the U.S. response toward foreign internal security situations may be a selection from or mix of the following policy options:

--non-involvement

--diplomatic persuasion, either bilateral or through regional groupings, and advice (including efforts to influence opposition groups or leaders where appropriate)

--special technical, economic, public information, civil security, police or military assistance to include operational assistance for internal defense programs and psychological operations

--assistance as a means of inducing policies designed to counter underlying causes of internal security problems

--boycott of a government through denial of normal diplomatic or economic relations

--use of military force to assist in restoring or maintaining internal order.

It will always be necessary for responsible U.S. officials both in Washington and in the field to make judgments, in individual country situations, concerning the character of U.S. action and the degree of U.S. assistance which may be desirable (from the U.S. point of view or the country's own standpoint) or tolerable or effective or available. Judgments of the appropriateness of political, military, economic, and psychological activities must be applied on a continuing basis as the situation in a country changes or develops.

Political development programs to provide for improved communication between the population at large and the central government can strengthen nations vulnerable to subversion and unrest. Encouragement of increasing popular involvement and wider participation in indigenous private and government institutions can induce people to seek desired social and economic opportunities and reforms through overt legal means rather than through subversion and violence. Such institutions as local development committees, regional councils, and rural production and marketing cooperatives may act as effective vehicles for participation in local and national development programs leading to the evolution of self-reliant societies resistant to subversion and insurgency. Legal development and public administration programs also may contribute to the achievement of this goal.

Effective police and public safety activities can play an important part in the prevention and handling of internal security problems. A capable and humane police force can be invaluable in coping with and controlling internal security situations at minimum cost with limited use of force and within the framework of civil law. It can be a factor in preventing dissension and dissatisfaction from growing outside the bounds of legitimate opposition and becoming subversion. In developing countries, U.S. police assistance programs can play an important role, not only in the preservation of public order, but in the building of indigenous civil security institutions which can keep pace with and assist in the nation's growth process. The effectiveness of public safety forces can be greatly enhanced if programs for their development are instituted in advance of potential crises. Such programs may be justified also to keep developing countries from obtaining police assistance from Communist or other countries hostile to the United States. Among the responsibilities which the indigenous security agencies can be brought to assume are the protection of broadening freedoms and the prevention of crime and terror which jeopardize the freedoms and interfere with national development. Public information programs can facilitate public acceptance of this role for the police.

The armed forces of a developing country can constitute the means for protection against internal insurrection beyond the capability of civilian police to control. The existence of loyal, appropriately trained, and effective military forces can represent an important deterrent against terrorism or guerrilla warfare and is an important element in internal defense planning. In addition, in many countries, the military establishment possesses equipment and skills representing a major national investment and resource. Frequently the United States can influence governments to use this resource in the nation building process without detracting from the capability of the military to perform its primary defense function.

Students, other youth groups, and labor are often prime target groups for local programs. The United States may be of assistance through these groups in promoting social progress in the developing society. Opportunities may also exist for influencing opposition leaders where Communist or other adverse influences seem likely to prove too disruptive.

Information activities, both person-to-person contact and mass media can play a significant part in the communication process by creating a favorable climate for change and self-help and providing facts and focus for political dialogue.

There may occasionally be opportunities for the resources of U.S. business firms and philanthropic foundations to be applied in support of U.S. objectives. Many private U.S. firms and foundations engage in programs to improve social and economic conditions in countries abroad and can usefully be encouraged to provide assistance and to adopt employment practices which will identify them with popular improvements and aspirations in support of U.S. goals.

Considerations affecting the level of U.S. assistance when provided, include the availability of U.S. and indigenous official and private resources, the financial and manpower impact of U.S. assistance on local governments, and opportunities to obtain assistance from third countries or international organizations.

The choice of U.S. programs and the determination of levels will also be influenced by the degree of identification with the local government we are willing to accept. In most cases, we will want to do everything possible to see that critical sectors of the local society understand the role that the United States is seeking to play. Psychological operations and information programs can assist in achieving this goal.

For the United States to act promptly and effectively when required by U.S. interests in connection with foreign internal defense problems, the responsible Departments and Agencies must be well informed about countries and regions where internal security problems exist or may arise. Intelligence and other information must be constantly available to allow policy makers and operators to anticipate contingencies. Planning, development, and coordination of programs and operations must take place in advance to ensure that necessary internal defense activities are provided for and will be supported from U.S. resources. The Senior Interdepartmental Group and the Interdepartmental Regional Groups, established by NSAM 341, March 2, 1966, are the mechanisms by which interdepartmental activities overseas are directed, coordinated, and supervised by the Secretary of State. Foreign internal defense activities explicitly fall within the scope of this NSAM. In the field, the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission, assisted by representatives of other agencies, has responsibility for plans and programs concerning foreign internal defense.

III. Courses of Action

To support this policy, the United States should, through the SIG-IRG mechanism established by NSAM 341 of March 2, 1966,

A. identify and establish priorities for countries in which an internal security situation represents a threat to significant U.S. interests and where U.S. internal defense assistance would be desirable and feasible; keep the list of such countries and their priorities under constant review;

B. develop a comprehensive plan to provide U.S. internal defense assistance to each country identified under A. above; the plan may be a separate internal defense plan or part of a more comprehensive country plan; in either case it should

1. be prepared, according to format, timing, and other guidelines established by the Senior Interdepartmental Group and the relevant Regional Interdepartmental Group,

2. be, under normal circumstances, the responsibility of the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in the country concerned,

3. integrate internal defense with other U.S. foreign affairs programs and activities,

4. take into account the capabilities of political advice, diplomatic persuasion, public information programs, public safety operations, civic action programs, other economic and military assistance, and psychological, counterinsurgency, countersubversive, unconventional warfare, and other appropriate operations to contribute to internal defense,

5. focus on improving the capabilities of the country itself--its leaders, its government, and its people--to strengthen its own internal security, using U.S. programs and resources in supporting roles,

6. discuss in detail the funds required for implementation and those available from existing resources, along with a recommendation as to sources of additional funds required, U.S. or local,

7. be coordinated interdepartmentally,

8. be subject to critical review, along with operations under it, and periodic updating.

C. provide for, in the plans referred to in B. above maximum possible emphasis on the development by each country concerned of its own capability to anticipate, prevent, and defeat subversion or insurgency; when external assistance is necessary, the United States should urge other resource-abundant nations to provide help and should, insofar as feasible, work through international and multilateral institutions;

D. prepare and coordinate interagency contingency studies for the possible use of U.S. military forces in situations where the U.S. national security interest is threatened by subversion, insurgency, or disorder in foreign countries;

E. maintain and strengthen intelligence and other reporting procedures where necessary to enable responsible U.S. officials to anticipate and to follow closely foreign internal defense situations of interest to the United States;

F. maintain and strengthen training programs where necessary to ensure that selected personnel may be able to carry out effectively all of the functions referred to above, both in the field and in Washington.

Washington, June 10, 1968.

TO
Executive Chairman, IRG/AF
Executive Chairman, IRG/ARA
Executive Chairman, IRG/EA
Executive Chairman, IRG/EUR
Executive Chairman, IRG/NEA
Chairman, Political-Military Group

SUBJECT
Implementation of U.S. Policy on Internal Defense in Selected Foreign Countries

In implementation of the "U.S. Policy on Internal Defense in Selected Foreign Countries", approved by the SIG on May 23, 1968, the following responsibilities are assigned to you:

1. Each IRG will provide the SIG by July 1 with names of countries within its area of responsibility where the internal security situation represents a threat to significant United States interests and where United States foreign internal defense assistance would be desirable and feasible under the criteria of the revised policy. The list should be supported by a brief explicit statement of the reasons for including each country.

Strict application of the revised criteria necessarily will reduce the number of countries worldwide that qualify for United States assistance in the field of internal defense. However, it is recognized that in some countries current programs will have to be continued (although phased down over time) even if not completely justifiable on the grounds of an internal security threat to significant United States interests. Valid reasons for such exceptions may be preservation of a special political or military relationship, supplementing economic development assistance, repayment for United States overseas base rights, or protection of other United States interests. Each IRG will be expected to distinguish clearly between those countries which fully qualify for foreign internal defense assistance under the revised policy, and those which the IRG believes should continue to receive such assistance for other reasons, submitting to the SIG only the names of those countries in the former category.

2. Upon approval by the SIG of a country's inclusion and its priority in the foreign internal defense action list, a comprehensive analysis of the internal defense situation in that country will be prepared under the supervision of the Chief of Diplomatic Mission for review and approval by the IRG. This analysis will include a detailed summary of host country, United States, third country, and international agency programs proposed to meet the internal threat.

This may take the form of a separate plan or be included in an overall foreign affairs planning document for the country concerned. In either case, internal defense considerations should be carefully related to and integrated with other political, economic, military, psychological, and informational aspects of United States policies and programs, and should focus on improving the capability of the country itself to strengthen its own internal security, using United States programs and resources in supporting roles. The country internal defense plan will be the basis for departmental and interdepartmental decisions on United States policies and programs concerning internal defense. Except as a new crisis may require, the plan should be submitted early enough in the budget cycle so that Washington guidance may be available to the field for use in the development of agency program documents. An outline showing the desired scope and a possible format for the internal defense section of a country plan or for a separate country internal defense plan is attached./2/

To avoid duplication of effort, each IRG should make maximum use of reports already submitted in the preparation of internal defense plans. For example, the internal security section of the Country Analysis and Strategy Papers (CASPs) submitted by Latin American posts in almost every case, following IRG review, will satisfy the requirement established by this directive.

3. Countries should be nominated for addition to or removal from the foreign internal defense action list by each IRG as individual circumstances warrant. The proposal by the IRG to place a country on the list should contain an explicit statement of the reasons therefor and for the priority recommended. The proposal to remove a country should indicate what change in circumstances has occurred. Each country on the list, and countries which the IRG feels are potential candidates for the list, should be re-examined no less often than annually as a basis for evaluating on-going programs and determining whether the status of the country has changed. Additions to, or deletions from, the foreign internal defense action list must have SIG concurrence.

4. The Political-Military Group, acting on behalf of the SIG, will be responsible for:

a. Recommending priorities among countries selected for United States action in the foreign internal defense field;

b. Exploring inter-regional and overall foreign policy implications of internal defense strategies and resource allocations recommended by the IRGs;

c. Reviewing interagency contingency studies involving the possible use of United States military forces in situations where the United States national security interest requires it;

d. Ensuring interdepartmental coordination of foreign internal defense research and development activities to make sure that United States resources are used most effectively to provide information, hardware, and techniques for application in the foreign internal defense field;

e. Reviewing, on the basis of the above, all internal defense country plans and related reporting; assisting the IRGs; bringing to the attention of the SIG additional options or alternative approaches in the light of overall United States resources, strategies, and commitments, and other matters requiring decision or consideration at that level; reporting at regular intervals to the SIG on foreign internal defense matters.

5. When carrying out its responsibilities under this directive, the Political-Military Group should include representatives from all Departments and Agencies holding membership in the SIG and IRGs.

SR IM 68-16
TCS-1939/68

Washington, June 10, 1968.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MOSCOW ABM SYSTEM

Within the past year the Soviets appear to have made further reductions in the construction of ballistic missile defenses at Moscow.

The early evidence suggested that the Moscow ABM system would have a force level of 128 launchers at 16 launch sites--four sites in each quadrant. In early 1964, construction in the southeast quadrant was abandoned, and the number of launch sites dropped to 12. Work has now apparently ceased on two more sites in the northeastern and two in the southwestern environs of Moscow. If construction is not resumed at these sites, the final force level for the completed system will be eight sites and a total complement of 64 launchers.

Partial system operational capability is probably near. All elements of the system are expected to be operational by mid-1970.

The cutbacks will not materially change the strategic role of the system, since even at originally indicated levels it could not have coped with a determined US attack. The Soviets may now feel a greater need for improved capabilities--for example, against penetration aids and multiple warheads--before filling in the Moscow system or extending ABM coverage into other parts of the Soviet Union. The cutbacks thus could represent a pause while improvements are being sought.

If so, the Soviets may now view arms limitations discussions with the US as a way of probing--at no penalty to themselves--the firmness of the United States' intent to carry out improvements presently programmed for its strategic forces. Although the Soviets have not formally responded to US initiatives for arms limiting talks, they have carefully kept alive the possibility that they will eventually do so.

Meanwhile, work on elements of the Moscow ABM system is progressing:

The forward early warning and tracking radars at Olenegorsk and Skrunda are now believed to be operational.

At Moscow, three of the present eight launch sites and the northwestern faces of the Dog House target acquisition and tracking radar are probably undergoing checkout for operational readiness later this year.

Recent ground clearing and associated activities at Skrunda and Moscow raise the possibility that deployment of new ABM-related radars is under way.

Completion of the launch sites still under construction will probably mark the end of deployment of the system in its current form. However, activity at the Sary Shagan missile test center indicates a continuing effort to improve ballistic missile defense systems. A better system, based on present technology and work currently under way at Sary Shagan, could be ready for deployment within a year or two but probably would not be widely deployed and operational much before 1973 or 1974.

Washington, June 11, 1968.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT
Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1969 and FY 1970

The President has noted the proposed Nuclear Weapons Deployment Ceiling Plan for FY 1969, along with projected deployment ceilings for FY 1970, contained in the Department of Defense memorandum dated March 19, 1968./2/ The President understands that the number of weapons shown reflect end-year ceilings with specific contingencies treated on a separate basis. The President also understands that actual deployments against these ceilings will be controlled by the Secretary of Defense, and he wishes to be advised as a matter of information of any significant changes in contemplated actual overseas deployments within these ceilings. In addition, the President will consider FY 1970 in next year's plan, which will deal with both FY 1970 and FY 1971. The President continues to be interested in Pacific Theatre requirements and will expect additional consideration of such requirements to be reflected in the next plan. The President has authorized the Department of Defense in FY 1969 to:

1. Deploy nuclear weapons to areas outside the United States as indicated in Appendices A and B, hereto, with the provisos that: (a) the FY 1969 end-year total authorized in each separate country/command area within each region (Appendix A) or the total by category of weapons within each region (Appendix B) may be exceeded by [number not declassified] in the event of unforeseen contingencies; however, the ceiling of [number not declassified] weapons in NATO Europe may not be exceeded; (b) the grand total of weapons outside the United States (areas under foreign sovereignty and areas under full U.S. control other than the U.S.) shall not exceed [number not declassified] weapons at end FY 1969; and (c) weapons to be deployed under the specific contingencies cited in Appendix C may be deployed under the noted conditions as additive to (a) and (b).

2. All weapons deployed to NATO Europe must have permissive action link devices installed. In addition, the President has noted that permissive action devices will be installed as soon as possible on weapons now at forward deployment sites [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] and further, that as a second priority, permissive action devices will be installed prior to deployment on weapons to be deployed to forward resupply positions at [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

3. Support non-U.S. forces in accordance with the units and numbers of warheads indicated in Appendix D hereto and the provisions below. The provisions of NSAM 197/3/ continue to apply; however, the procedure of case-by-case requests for authority to provide additional support of non-U.S. units pursuant to NSAM 143/4/ is hereby amended. Future requests for changes in support of non-U.S. forces will be reflected in the annual Nuclear Weapons Deployment Ceiling Plan and separate case-by-case requests will be submitted only to meet requirements which are not identified in annual deployment plans. The support authorized in Appendix D is subject to the following conditions:

(a) The Department of Defense memorandum requests authority to disperse weapons in support of non-U.S. NATO 155mm Howitzer units should this action prove desirable as a result of pertinent studies now underway. Prior to making firm commitments to NATO allies for specific support of 155mm Howitzer units, the Department of Defense should submit the proposed action for Presidential approval together with a current evaluation of the utility of such support.

(b) The yield restrictions of NSAM 143, as amended by NSAM 199,/5/ apply.

(c) The Programs of Cooperation remain essentially the same as those pertaining when each NSAM 197 action was approved.

(d) Custodial arrangements will be completed and units and facilities will be operational, to include U.S. unilateral communications to the U.S. custodial detachment, prior to deployment in support of non-U.S. units.

(e) Weapons may be deployed in support of U.S. forces pending compliance with (d) above.

The yield provisions of NSAM 199 are hereby amended to exempt the Mk 61 in support of U.S. forces from the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] limitation on land-based alert strike aircraft on station in NATO.

The next deployment ceiling plan should be submitted in mid-November 1968 in conjunction with the stockpile approval request.

W.W. Rostow

Authorized Ceilings on Nuclear Weapon Deployments
(Region and Country/Command Totals)
FY 1969

[table (4 columns and 32 rows of source text) not declassified]

Authorized Ceilings on Nuclear Weapon Deployments
by Category of Weapon--FY 1969

	Western Europe	Atlantic	Pacific
Strategic Offensive/1/	[*]	[*]	[*]
Strategic Defensive/2/	[*]	[*]	[*]
Tactical Offensive/3/	[*]	[*]	[*]
Tactical Defensive/4/	[*]	[*]	[*]
Fleet ASW and AAW	[*]	[*]	[*]
TOTAL	[*]	[*]	[*]

[*entry in table not declassified]

Contingency Deployments

		Quantity
Country/Command	Weapons	FY 1968	FY 1969	Conditions
[text not declassified]	Strategic Bombs	[*]	[*]	For support of US FB-111 forces if deployed
[text not declassified]	Strategic Missiles	[*]	[*]	For temporary off loading of [text not declassified] for maintenance purposes
[text not declassified]	Strategic Bombs and ASMs	[*]	[*]	For advance readiness or during brief periods for operational reasons
[text not declassified]	Fleet ASW & AAW	[*]	[*]	For wartime ASW operations
[text not declassified]	Fleet ASW & AAW	[*]	[*]	For wartime ASW operations
[text not declassified]	Fleet ASW & AAW	[*]	[*]	For wartime ASW operations
[text not declassified]	Artillery	[*]	[*]	For advanced readiness of Fleet Marines
	ADMs	[*]	[*]	For advanced readiness of Fleet Marines
[text not declassified]	Strategic Bombs and ASMs	[*]	[*]	[text not declassified]
[text not declassified]	Tactical Bombs	[*]	[*]	For temporary off loading of Navy Ships
	Fleet ASW & AAW	[*]	[*]	For temporary off loading of Navy Ships

[*entry in table not declassified]

Authorized Ceilings on Nuclear Weapons In Support
of Non-US Forces

[table (5 columns and 46 rows of source text) not declassified]

NIE 4-68

Washington, June 13, 1968.

THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION INTO THE US

The Problem

To assess the capabilities of foreign nations to introduce biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US, and to estimate the likelihood of such introduction over the next few years.

Conclusions

A. Virtually any industrial nation could produce biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) agents and introduce them clandestinely into the US in relatively small quantities. We do not believe, however, that any potential enemy would plan the clandestine use of BW or CW on a scale sufficient to achieve strategic military objectives. We do not rule out the use of BW or CW for sabotage and other special purposes for which they could be very effective. The relatively small quantities required for these purposes could be covertly produced in the US without great difficulty or risk of detection. Therefore we consider that their clandestine introduction would be unnecessary, and unlikely in view of the risks involved.

B. The Soviets could introduce nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US, and might consider doing so if they planned a deliberate surprise attack on the US. Considering the large numbers of strategic weapons now in their arsenal, however, the Soviets would see the contribution of a clandestine emplacement effort as marginal and would consider any advantages it offered as outweighed by the risks of jeopardizing surprise and of precipitating a US preemptive attack.

C. Because the Chinese have no other means of attacking the US with nuclear weapons, they might consider a clandestine emplacement effort with the object of deterring the US from attack on Communist China. Their capabilities to carry out such an effort, however, are much less than those of the USSR. Moreover, they could not be sure that the US would be deterred and they would have to consider that detection might result in, rather than stave off, a devastating US strike. For these reasons, we think it unlikely that Communist China will attempt to introduce nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US.

D. We have considered the possibility that a third country (e.g., Cuba) might assist the USSR or China in the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US. We consider this unlikely. We doubt that either the Soviets or the Chinese would seek to enlist the aid of another nation in such a sensitive undertaking. If they should, that nation's leaders would almost certainly react unfavorably to a proposal that could jeopardize their national survival merely to support Soviet or Chinese policy.

Discussion

1. In considering the clandestine introduction of weapons of mass destruction into the US, enemy leaders would have to weigh any possible advantages against the grave consequences which would follow from discovery. Despite all precautions there would always be risk of detection arising not only from specific US security measures, but also from the chance of US penetration of the clandestine apparatus, the defection of an agent, or sheer accident. The enemy leaders would almost certainly judge that use of this tactic would be regarded by the US as a warlike act, if not as a cause for war, and that it would precipitate an international political crisis of the first magnitude.

2. We believe, therefore, that the range of circumstances in which weapons of mass destruction might be clandestinely introduced into the US is quite narrow--that an enemy nation would consider this course only in the context of planning an attack on the US or of deterring the US from an attack on itself. Smaller stakes would not be worth the risk. Such weapons could not be brought in secretly in sufficient quantities to have a decisive effect on the outcome of a war. Any plans for their use, we believe, would envision the use of limited quantities to achieve results unattainable by other means.

3. Virtually any industrial nation could produce biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) agents and introduce them clandestinely into the US in relatively small quantities. Although small quantities of BW agents could be effective against large targets, the delayed action of such agents makes them unsuitable for use in situations requiring an immediate or precisely timed effect. Relatively large quantities of CW agents are required to obtain effective concentrations over extensive target areas, and it would be difficult to introduce them clandestinely in such quantities. Moreover, the effects of BW and CW agents cannot always be predicted accurately; adverse weather can limit or even prevent the effective use of BW and CW agents against some targets.

4. We do not rule out the use of BW and CW for sabotage and other special purposes for which they could be very effective. But because the relatively small quantities required for these purposes could be covertly produced in the US without great difficulty or risk of detection, we consider that their clandestine introduction would be unnecessary, and therefore unlikely in view of the risks involved. The following discussion, therefore, is limited to a consideration of the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons.

5. Only four foreign nations--the USSR, the UK, France, and Communist China--have developed and tested nuclear weapons. Beyond these, only India is likely to undertake a nuclear weapons program in the next several years; Israel and Sweden might do so. We can foresee no changes in the world situation so radical as to motivate the UK, France, or any of the potential nuclear powers to attempt to clandestinely introduce nuclear weapons into the US. For this reason, the balance of this discussion will be concerned only with the remaining nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and Communist China.

6. Both the USSR and Communist China can produce nuclear weapons which could be adapted for clandestine introduction into the US. [11 lines of source text not declassified]

7. Nuclear weapons with weights of up to 1,500-2,000 pounds could be brought across US borders by common means of transport without great difficulty. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] a Chinese weapon could yield [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The difficulties and risks of introducing higher yield or heavier weapons into the US, even in a disassembled state, are probably sufficiently great to seriously discourage such attempts. But higher yield weapons could be brought into US waters in merchant ships and detonated without removal from the ship. Such devices could also be carried in by fishing boats or similar small craft to which transfer had been made at sea.

8. Both the USSR and Communist China could make the physical arrangements necessary to bring nuclear weapons secretly into the US, but Soviet capabilities in this respect are much greater than Chinese. We believe that if either country undertook such a program, they would rely on their own agent organizations rather than on political sympathizers in the US. Soviet intelligence services have assigned a high priority to the development of espionage and sabotage capabilities in the US and presumably have formed an organization for the latter purpose. Should the Soviets undertake the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, they almost certainly would employ the highly trained and reliable agents of these services. They could also employ diplomatic personnel and could bring in weapons or weapon components under diplomatic cover. The large diplomatic establishments in Canada and Mexico could serve as bases for the operation.

9. There are no Chinese Communist diplomatic establishments in the US, Canada, or Mexico. The absence of such bases precludes the use of diplomatic pouches for the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons or their components and the use of secure diplomatic communications for planning and control of such an operation; it also makes more difficult the introduction and control of agents. Nevertheless, the Chinese could introduce agents under the guise of bona fide immigrants.

10. In considering Soviet and Chinese capabilities, we have also considered the possibility that a third country (e.g., Cuba) might assist the USSR or China in the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US. We consider this unlikely on two counts. We doubt that either the Soviets or the Chinese would seek to enlist the aid of another nation in such a sensitive undertaking. And if they should, that nation's leaders would almost certainly react unfavorably to a proposal that could jeopardize their national survival merely to support Soviet or Chinese policy.

11. If the Soviets or Communist Chinese have considered the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US, they have almost certainly been influenced by the same general considerations: the element of risk, the opportunities for clandestine introduction, and the results that could be achieved. The two countries, however, occupy vastly different strategic positions vis-a-vis the US. Thus, while we believe that neither would consider the use of this tactic except in the context of a possible general war, differing strategic considerations might lead the Soviets and the Chinese to see the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons in a somewhat different light.

12. The USSR. The Soviet leaders, like those of the US, must take account of the possibility of general war in their military planning. In such planning, the Soviets would consider the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US, if at all, only as a supplement to the main attack by their large strategic attack forces. Because they have already achieved an assured retaliatory capability, they would probably consider a clandestine emplacement effort as potentially useful only in support of a deliberate or preemptive Soviet attack and directed toward delaying or reducing a US retaliatory attack. Possible targets might include important government headquarters, key military command and control facilities, missile detection and tracking radars, and possibly some manned alert forces. The Soviets would recognize, however, that even if such an effort were successful, it could not prevent US retaliation or reduce it to an acceptable level.

13. In considering clandestine attack as a supplement to other weapons, the Soviets would have to weigh their ability to initiate such attack rapidly, with little preparation, and in close coordination with the main weight of attack. Thus, clandestinely introduced weapons would have to be in position at the time the attacks were launched. In the case of a preemptive attack, the circumstances would not allow sufficient time for the introduction and delivery of such weapons after a decision to preempt. To prepare for this contingency beforehand, the Soviets would have to accept the risk of maintaining weapons in the US for an indefinite period of time. These difficulties would not obtain if the USSR decided deliberately to initiate general war in a period of low tension; weapons could be introduced into the US a relatively short time before use. But the Soviets would have to consider the risk of jeopardizing the element of surprise on which this course of action relies, and that discovery might precipitate a US preemptive attack which would be disastrous for the USSR. For these reasons, we think it unlikely that the USSR will attempt to introduce nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US.

14. Communist China. The Chinese have no capability at present to attack the US with nuclear weapons. They probably have an ICBM system in the early stages of development, which could become operational several years from now. But they may fear that when it does the US antiballistic missile deployment will have rendered it largely ineffective. In these circumstances, they might see some advantages in clandestinely introducing and emplacing nuclear weapons in the US. Inasmuch as they could not deliver such an attack on a scale sufficient to achieve a decisive military objective, their object would presumably be to deter the US from a course of action that gravely threatened their national security. Consequently, the most likely targets would be population centers.

15. Clearly, the Chinese would also see grave disadvantages in such a move. So long as the US was unaware of their existence, the concealed weapons would have no effect upon its actions. Indeed, the risk of their discovery would be an ever-present, continuing danger to the Chinese themselves. Once the Chinese announced that nuclear weapons were emplaced in the US, the announcement would touch off an intensive search and extraordinary security measures. Moreover, the Chinese could not be sure that the US would in fact be deterred. On the one hand, the US might consider such an unverified announcement as a mere bluff. On the other it might take the clandestine introduction of such weapons as a casus belli and, having taken such action as it could to safeguard its population, launch a devastating nuclear attack on China. [3 lines of source text not declassified] It is conceivable that some Chinese regime might be willing to accept such risks of national destruction, but we think it unlikely.

Washington, June 27, 1968.

SUBJECT
Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 21 June 1968

The Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 21 June 1968, contained the following item:

a. Mr. Meyer called to the committee's attention the financial predicament of The Asia Foundation, [1 line of source text not declassified]. Mr. Rostow felt that the Board of Directors contained some movers and shakers and wondered if they had done all they could to raise money in the private sector. He also felt that both State and AID should be told of the relative high priority of this project and should not be allowed to treat it as a routine item.

b. Mr. Bohlen indicated that he would discuss the matter with William Bundy and a meeting at State had been scheduled on The Asia Foundation for Thursday, 27 June 1968./2/

c. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Since State and/or AID support may or may not constitute line items in their respective budgets, this is susceptible to congressional cuts. Thus, no one can accurately predict what, if any, federal monies will be allocated; this completes the vicious circle with potential Foundation support remaining in the wings until the picture is clearer.

d. If there were deep sighs for the good old days of straight covert funding, they were not audible due to the hum of the air conditioner in the White House Situation Room."

Washington, July 29, 1968.

SUBJECT
Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces (U)

We have reviewed our Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces for FY 70-74 and reached the following major conclusions:

1. Against the expected Soviet threat, our present strategic offensive forces provide a more than adequate Assured Destruction capability.

2. The program that we are recommending not only assures that we maintain our Assured Destruction capability, but provides timely and efficient options to meet the designed Greater-Than-Expected (GTE) Soviet threat to our deterrent throughout the FY 70-77 planning period.

3. Achieving a strategically significant Damage Limiting capability against the Soviet Union does not appear to be feasible with current technology and in relation to its cost and the other demands on our resources.

4. The Soviet program appears to reflect a similar conclusion about the feasibility of taking away our deterrent.

5. We will continue to maintain strategic "nuclear superiority" over the Soviets in terms of nuclear warheads. Based on our own experience, however, we doubt that this superiority can be converted into meaningful political power, particularly now that the Soviet Union also has a large and well-protected Assured Destruction capability.

6. We cannot depend on our nuclear forces alone to fulfill our nation's commitments and insure our national security; we must also maintain very strong nonnuclear forces.

7. Based on our view of U.S. security needs, and without considering the implications of possible arms control agreements that might result from discussions with the Soviets, we recommend:

a. Maintaining a land-based ICBM force of 1,000 Minuteman and a slowly decreasing number of Titan IIs.

b. Continuing development of Poseidon and maintaining the previous schedule for converting 31 Polaris submarines to the Poseidon configuration.

c. Maintaining the effectiveness of the programmed strategic bomber force--reaching 281 B-52s and 253 FB-111s in FY 72--by developing and, when needed, procuring advanced weapons and penetration devices as protection against possible advanced Soviet bomber defenses.

d. Continuing the previously approved Continental Air Defense Plan to introduce the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), give the F-106 interceptor the most modern fire control and missile system available, add Over-The-Horizon (OTH) radars for complete peacetime surveillance, and phase down the remaining interceptors and most of the ground-based radar and control systems.

e. Continuing the deployment of the Sentinel system but reorienting the program so that procurement funds for only one site need be obligated in FY 69.

Specific recommendations are discussed in Section V. Financial and force summaries follow.

Total Obligational Authority/a/
($ Millions)

	FY 69	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74/b/	Total FY 70-74
Strategic Offense
Previously Approved	8,340	8,598	6,607	5,817	4,867	4,533	30,422
SecDef Recommended		8,541	6,578	5,827	4,904	4,634	30,484
JCS Proposed		10,182	10,040	10,798	10,277	9,679	50,976
Strategic Defense
Previously Approved	3,609	4,528	4,684	3,713	3,770	2,861	19,556
SecDef Recommended		3,906	4,374	3,581	3,611	3,349	18,821
JCS Proposed		5,706	7,981	7,579	7,831	6,683	35,780
Totals
Previously Approved	11,949	13,126	11,291	9,530	8,637	7,394	49,978
SecDef Recommended		12,447	10,952	9,408	8,515	7,983	49,305
JCS Proposed		15,888	18,021	18,377	18,108	16,362	86,756

[Here follow 3 pages of additional tables.]

I. The General Nuclear War Problem

The main objective of our nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attacks on the United States. Our ability to strike back and destroy Soviet society makes a Soviet decision to strike the United States highly unlikely. By developing and deploying forces that are difficult to attack we can reduce even more the likelihood of such an attack. Unable to destroy most of our nuclear striking power, the Soviets would gain little by striking first.

Although the United States and the Soviet Union are strongly deterred from nuclear attacks on each other, a nuclear war anywhere in the world could lead to a war--and most likely a nuclear war--between the two countries. To avoid a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, we try to make all nuclear wars unlikely. This objective includes:

1. Maintaining control of our forces in a crisis.

2. Deterring nuclear attacks on or intimidation of allied or neutral countries.

3. Discouraging additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.

4. Emphasizing and maintaining the firebreak between conventional and nuclear weapons.

To deter a first-strike nuclear attack, both we and the Soviets maintain the ability to strike back and destroy the other's society. When they take steps to reduce the damage that we can inflict--for example, by deploying Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABMs)--we react to offset these steps. The Soviets would undoubtedly react in the same way to similar U.S. steps to limit significantly damage to ourselves.

Our analysis shows that the Soviets can protect their second strike capability against any threat we might pose. Since a second strike capability is vital to the Soviets, they will insure the survival of this capability. Convinced that the Soviets would counter a major U.S. attempt to take away their second strike capability, we see no effective way to implement, with present technology and within available resources, a major Damage Limiting program against them, although we are continuing development work that might eventually support such a program.

These considerations lead us to put primary reliance upon deterrence to keep the Soviet Union from attacking us. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on the other hand, we can buy an effective defense of CONUS as insurance against a failure of deterrence. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] allow us to develop an effective defense against her nuclear attack capability into the 1980s.

What if deterrence fails and a nuclear war with the Soviet Union occurs? If the war began with an all-out Soviet attack, including our cities, we would reply in kind. If the war started with less than an all-out attack, we would want to carry out plans for the controlled and deliberate use of our nuclear power to achieve the best possible outcome. The lack of such nuclear war plans is still a continuing weakness in our present posture.

II. Soviet and Chinese Strategic Forces

The following table shows the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of Soviet intercontinental forces.

Soviet Intercontinental Nuclear Forces

	1968	1970	1972
Ballistic Missile Launchers
Soft ICBMs	128-142	90-128	--
Hard ICBMs	720-782	859-1,026	1,020-1,251
FOBS	0-10	20-50	20-75
Mobile ICBMs (Non-add)	--	(0-25)	(0-100)
SLBMs	43-46	123-158	267-318
Total Launchers	891-980	1,092-1,362	1,307-1,644
Intercontinental Bombers	150-155	130-150	105-130

A new solid-fueled Soviet missile has been identified. Present intelligence estimates assume it is an ICBM, which will come into the Soviet inventory as a supplement to (rather than as a replacement for) the SS-11.

The Soviets have continued to test Fractional Orbit Ballistic Systems (FOBS). If we took no counter actions, these systems would be useful in an attempt to deny timely warning to our strategic bombers.

The Soviet Union is now making operational a new class of large, nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarines which carry 16 missiles with a range of about 1,000 nautical miles (nm). Intelligence estimates project that 10 to 13 of these boats will be in service by mid-1971, and 35 to 42 by 1976.

The Soviets are also engaged in a continuing effort to improve their strategic defenses. They have modified and improved the capabilities of the SA-2 air defense missile system; they are developing and producing a series of new interceptor aircraft; they are deploying the SA-5 air defense missile system; and they are in the advanced stages of constructing a ballistic missile defense system around Moscow. The intelligence community estimates that the Soviets have a formidable capability against medium to high-altitude air threats, a limited capability against low-altitude air threats, and probably little or no capability against ballistic missiles.

The SA-5 system is being deployed in all important areas of the Soviet Union. It has two to five firing sites per complex. Each site has six launchers [2 lines of source text not declassified]. In addition, the system may have some capability against ballistic missiles, although this now appears unlikely.

The ballistic missile defense system around Moscow with about 100 launchers may be fully operational by 1971. It is believed to be a long range, exoatmospheric system using large yield warheads.

We still have seen no evidence of Soviet development of a good low-altitude Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM). However, the new Foxbat interceptor is now estimated to have a "look-down, shoot-down" capability.

The Chinese were expected to begin operational deployment of a Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) with a fission warhead in 1967, but they did not do so. China also has under development a much larger and more complex missile system, possibly an ICBM. They were expected to complete a facility for large launchers late in 1967, but they did not. It appears that they are at least nine months behind the ICBM schedule that we previously estimated. However, this delay would still allow an initial operational ICBM deployment as early as 1972.

III. Assured Destruction

We deter a rational enemy from launching a first strike against us by maintaining a strong and secure ability to retaliate under any circumstances. We measure our second strike capability in terms of Assured Destruction--the ability to inflict unacceptable damage, calculated under extremely conservative assumptions, on the attacker, even after a surprise attack. Our ability to [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

However, our Assured Destruction capability does not indicate how we would use our forces in a nuclear war. We must design our forces to cope with many situations, including a war which neither side intended. We reduce the likelihood of such a war by keeping tight control over U.S. forces under all circumstances; by maintaining communications at all times with our forces, the governments of our allies, and, as appropriate, our enemies; and by having the options to choose an appropriate response. If we failed to deter nuclear war, we would want to be able to follow a policy of limiting our retaliatory strikes to the enemy's military targets and not attacking his cities if he refrained from attacking ours. In most situations we would have many missiles surviving to attack Soviet military targets, while withholding enough for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. For this task, missile accuracy is very worthwhile.

In measuring the capability of our forces, we cannot simply count total megatons or delivery systems, we must measure the amount of damage each side could do to the cities, population, industry, and military forces of the other. Factors such as accuracy, reliability, survivability, defense penetrability, and control are often much more important than warhead size in determining damage levels. The relative importance of these factors depends heavily on the attack objectives and the characteristics of the target system attacked. And, of course, the relative costs of additional weapons, yield (megatonnage), accuracy, survivability, reliability, and penetrability also affect how much of each of these factors should be bought to achieve any particular level of destructive capacity.

The next table illustrates the relative effectiveness of equal payloads of alternate warheads used against Soviet targets. It compares [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

[table (3 columns and 13 rows of source text) not declassified]

As the table shows, comparisons of missile launchers or megatons are not very meaningful. If a single input must be used as a measure, however, the best indicator of the relative capabilities of our forces is the number of weapons they can deliver. While the Soviet forces may exceed ours in megatons by 1972, the Soviets still cannot take away our Assured Destruction capability, largely because we will maintain a commanding lead in the number of weapons available and because our forces are relatively invulnerable to a Soviet first strike.

The following table compares the weapons, megatons, and megaton equivalents of the U.S. and Soviet forces.

U.S. and Soviet Intercontinental Nuclear Forces/a/

	1968		1970		1972
	U.S.	Soviet	U.S.	Soviet	U.S.	Soviet
Total Force Loadings
Weapons	[*]	1,200	[*]	1, 300-1,600	[*]	1,500-1,800
Megatons	[*]	6,000-6,400	[*]	6,400-8,300	[*]	6,000-8,900
1 MT Equivalents	[*]	2,300-2,400	[*]	2,500-3,100	[*]	2,500-3,300
Alert Force Loadings
Weapons	[*]	600-700	[*]	800-1,000	[*]	1,000-1,200
Megatons	[*]	3,700-4,000	[*]	4,200-5,700	[*]	4,400-6,600
1 MT Equivalents	[*]	1,300-1,400	[*]	1,500-1,900	[*]	1,700-2,300

[*entry in table not declassified]

Against the expected Soviet threat, our strategic forces can survive a well-executed Soviet surprise attack and carry out an effective second strike. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

How much damage these surviving weapons could cause depends on the effectiveness of Soviet defenses. Against the high NIE-estimated threat, the U.S. Assured Destruction capability would kill more than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the Soviet people in every year through 1977. This is far above the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] we believe is needed to deter a Soviet first strike.

While China may be able to threaten her neighbors and U.S. bases in Asia by 1970, she will not pose a threat to the U.S. second strike capability. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

The vital importance of our Assured Destruction capability to our national security requires us to be prepared to cope with Soviet strategic threats greater than those which the NIE projects. While unlikely, the Soviets might add a very extensive ABM defense or much improved anti-bomber defenses. They might improve their ICBM force by putting accurate Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) on the SS-9, or by replacing or improving the SS-11 with a new, more accurate ICBM. Conceivably, they might take all these actions. In order to test the adequacy of our forces under the worst conceivable conditions, we have designed what we call a "Greater-Than-Expected" threat. This threat includes all of the above offensive and defensive actions plus others which the Soviets might undertake in an effort to take away our Assured Destruction capability. The following table compares the 1977 balanced GTE threat, used in the following analyses, with the NIE threat.

	NIE Threat	GTE Threat
Offensive Missiles
Independently-targetable Missile Warheads On Line	1,500-2,200	7,000-9,100
Exoatmospheric Aim Points/a/	1,500-2,200	31,000
Air Defenses
Look-Down Fighters	300-400	600
Low-Altitude SAM Launchers	0-2,700	6,100
ABM Launchers
Area	400-2,000	2,400
Terminal/b/	100-1,300	6,100

Soviet programs required to support such an effort would be technically difficult, expensive, and, since we have clearly indicated we would respond, hold little hope of providing the Soviets with a net gain in effective first strike capability. Nevertheless, to insure that these threats remain unlikely, and to maintain our deterrent should they appear, we make sure that we have the options needed to counter them.

The Soviet Union, by replacing or improving the accuracy of its SS-11s and adding accurate MIRVs to its SS-9s, could destroy Minuteman missiles in their silos. Even if the Soviets could destroy all Minuteman missiles, however, they would not eliminate our Assured Destruction capability. Our remaining Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and alert bomber force can penetrate the NIE-estimated Soviet defenses and kill at [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Putting [number not declassified] Mk-3s on each Poseidon and increasing the bomber alert to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] against the greater-than-expected offensive threat through 1977.

Similarly, at least through 1976, a very extensive Soviet ABM system and air defense, without greater-than-expected ICBMs, would still let the U.S. programmed force maintain an Assured Destruction capability of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Our programmed force can cope with a greater-than-expected Soviet ABM system because we already have programmed ABM hedges--Poseidon plus MIRVs and penetration aids for Minuteman.

By putting [number not declassified] Mk-3s on each Poseidon missile and increasing the bomber alert rate, the U.S. programmed force can keep its Assured Destruction capability through FY 77, even if the Soviets deploy greater-than-expected, balanced missile and bomber defenses (without improving their offensive forces). We do not have to exercise these options now to meet this threat.

Only against a combined greater-than-expected Soviet ABM, air defense, and accurate ICBM force, costing the Soviets $20 to $30 billion above the high NIE, would we need major new additions to our retaliatory forces. The following table shows the effect of the combined greater-than-expected Soviet offensive and defensive threat on our Assured Destruction capability. It indicates the U.S. programmed force capability and the effects of developing and deploying Poseidon decoys, increasing the bomber alert rate to 60%, and buying advanced bomber penetration aids. The JCS-recommended inventories of [number not declassified] Unit Equipment (UE) Short Range Attack Missiles (SRAMs) and [number not declassified] UE Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoys (SCADs) are used.

[table (9 columns and 3 rows of source text) not declassified]

As the table shows, while the combined GTE threat would call for a more effective U.S. Assured Destruction capability for FY 74, we can maintain our Assured Destruction against this threat without buying any new missiles or bombers. We can do this by using technological advances that greatly increase the penetration capability of our Poseidon and bomber payloads.

We have, however, three main reasons for wanting additional options to maintain our Assured Destruction capability against the GTE threat. First, we do not want to rely primarily on alert bombers which depend on tactical warning for survival. Second, depending on how far ABM technology advances, we may not want to depend on decoys for missile penetration. Third, unless we protect our land-based missile force, the greater-than-expected Soviet offense could destroy it in its silos. In such a case, we should either protect Minuteman or phase it out, since a vulnerable missile force encourages--rather than deters--a first strike. We do not need to buy protection for our land-based missiles until we see the threat, since we can rely on bombers and Poseidon in the interim.

As discussed below, we propose to develop and maintain a number of options to allow us to keep our Assured Destruction capability against the GTE threat, even though this threat is not likely to appear. Since the threat is unlikely, we should select options with small initial costs. If later evidence does not rule out the threat, we can then develop these options fully. Because of uncertainties about the performance and cost of new systems, it is usually unwise to deploy them as replacements for proven, existing systems until a threat appears which cannot be economically met by improving the existing systems. Once an option has been developed, however, we examine it to see if it would be an economical replacement for part of the programmed force. In some cases, advances in technology permit us to save money by replacing an existing system with a new one, even though the new system does not provide more total effectiveness than the one it replaces.

Discussed below are the principal options which we have available to protect our Assured Destruction capability against the GTE threat.

1. Increase Warheads on Poseidon

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

2. Add Terminal Penetration Aids for Poseidon

We could develop terminal decoys for Poseidon. These decoys would aid in penetrating large ABM defenses if the threat to our land-based missile forces became severe. By initiating development in FY 70, we could equip all Poseidon with decoys by FY 75. The development costs would be $200 million in FY 70-73 and the procurement costs would be $250 million in FY 73-74.

3. Improve our Bomber Force

If Soviet air defenses improved, but their ABM capability did not, no increase in the size or expense of our strategic forces would be necessary. However, if the Soviet ABM threat became greater than the highest NIE, we might wish to respond by increasing the capability of our bomber force. Increasing the alert rate to 60% would cost about $190 million per year. By doing this, buying the JCS-recommended inventories of SRAM and SCAD, and putting penetration aids on Poseidon, we could maintain our Assured Destruction capability, as shown above.

Although we would not want to rely only on the bomber force, the next table shows the Assured Destruction capability of an improved bomber force used alone against the GTE threat. Against balanced terminal and area defenses, we could add a mixture of SRAMs, which are better against terminal defenses, and SCADs, which are better against area defenses. The SCADs could act as bomber decoys, carry nuclear warheads, or both. Contract Definition in FY 70 would lead to an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in FY 74. The 10-year systems cost of the improved bomber force considered below would be $2.1 to $2.6 billion more than that of the presently programmed force, excluding the cost of increasing the alert rate.

U.S. Assured Destruction Capability of Improved Bomber Force
Against the GTE Soviet Threat/a/

	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76	FY 77
SRAM (UE)	150	450	1,000	1,545	1,545	1,545	1,545	1,545
Cruise Missiles (UE)/b/	--	--	--	--	700	1,400	2,100	2,700
Bombers Alone in an Assured Destruction Scenario (Percent of Soviet Deaths)/c/	25%	25%	21%	15%	24%	24%	23%	22%

As the table shows, by buying and arming more SCADs than recommended by the JCS, we could maintain a substantial bombers-only Assured Destruction capability against the GTE threat through FY 77 simply by improving the programmed force. Thus, an Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) is not needed. We would deploy AMSA only if an AMSA force of equal effectiveness costs less than the improved programmed force. Such a force would require about 138 AMSAs and would cost $4.9 billion more than the improved programmed force in FY 69-78. Thus, we do not need to maintain an option to deploy AMSA by FY 77.

Considerations other than cost also make an AMSA force less attractive than improving the programmed force. First, developing AMSA requires a longer lead-time than deploying SRAMs and cruise missiles on the programmed force and thus imposes a substantial initial investment before we could determine that an increased Soviet threat has developed. Second, if we decide to proceed with AMSA now and the GTE threat does not appear, we will have spent $3 to $10 billion unnecessarily. Third, we do not yet know whether AMSA should be designed primarily as a penetrating aircraft or primarily to carry stand-off cruise missiles, nor do we know the value of supersonic speed and advanced avionics. Starting AMSA now, before we have resolved these issues, could force us to make costly changes later.

4. Improving Minuteman

We have a development program designed to test [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which could provide replacements for the present [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or accommodate additional Minuteman or a new ICBM. The complete development of each silo would cost $260 million and provide an IOC in FY 74. Procurement costs would be $4.5 million per silo and the deployment rate would be 200 missiles per year.

As a hedge against a heavy Soviet ABM system, we could replace all the Minuteman II by Minuteman III/MIRV at a cost of $2.2 billion over the present program. In addition, we could add penetration aids to all Minuteman III.

5. Defend Minuteman

A defense of the programmed Minuteman force could use the same components being developed for the Sentinel system: Sprint, Spartan, Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR), and Missile Site Radar (MSR). An option for a light defense of Minuteman is being maintained in the current Sentinel deployment plan. This light defense, although not increasing the number of Minuteman surviving a heavy Soviet attack, might show our determination to protect Minuteman and indicate that we would expand the defense if the threat grew larger. In a less than all-out attack on Minuteman (about 1,200 reliable, accurate re-entry vehicles), the light defense could save about 300 Minuteman missiles. The median defense would be an expansion of the light defense to defend more Minuteman and could be supplemented with additional Minuteman III in hard rock silos. The ABM defense and hard rock silos would insure enough Minuteman surviving against large MIRVs on the SS-9 to maintain, together with our other forces, our Assured Destruction capability. The heavy defense of Minuteman would maintain our Assured Destruction capability even against a Soviet small-MIRV threat. The table on the next page summarizes the three levels of defense.

Levels of Minuteman Defense

Defense	Sprints	Spartans	MSRs	Defense Investment Cost/a/ ($ Billions)	Level-Off Annual Operations Cost/a/ ($ Millions)
Light	320	120	4	$0.4	$ 30
Median (With Hard Rock Silos)	1,480	120	15	3.9/b/	310
Heavy	2,220	120	15	4.4	380

6. Add Poseidon Submarines

We could order more Poseidon submarines with missiles which requires a $290 million investment per ship and a four-year lead-time. By initiating procurement in FY 70 we could have 10 new Poseidon submarines by the end of FY 76 and 20 by the end of FY 77. With terminal penetration aids added to the whole Poseidon force, fewer new submarines would be needed.

7. New ICBM

Beginning Contract Definition in FY 70 would permit an IOC for a new ICBM in FY 76. We could deploy this new missile in new silos as part of a defended or undefended fixed land-based system. Conversely, we could deploy it as a land-mobile or ship-based system or base it in a new class of submarines called the Undersea Long-range Missile System (ULMS). Developing a new ICBM would require a $2 to $3 billion research and development program. The 10-year cost of buying 280 new ICBMs totals about $9 billion.

The next table compares the costs of these alternatives to the costs of other missile options designed to maintain our Assured Destruction capability against the GTE Soviet threat in 1977.

Costs of Various Missile Options To Protect the U.S. Assured Destruction Capability
Against the GTE Soviet Threat/a/

	$ Billions
	R&D	10-Year System Cost/b/
Defense of Minuteman	$0	$ 7
Threat A/c/	0	8
Threat B/d/
Additional Minuteman in Hard Rock Silos
Threat A	.3	12
Threat B	.3	10
New ICBM
Threat A	2.6	14
Threat B	2.6	12
20 Additional Poseidon Submarines	0	14
5 Additional Poseidon Submarines With Decoys on All Poseidon	.2	3
12 ULMS Submarines	2.0	13
3 ULMS Submarines With Decoys on All ULMS and Poseidon	2.2	5

We have many options to meet the GTE threat that do not require a major effort now. Adding five Poseidon boats and terminal decoys on all Poseidon is clearly the least expensive option. If we start a decoy development program now, the development time for the decoys would be about two and one-half years, and it would take another one and one-half years to deploy them on the programmed Poseidon force. We could then make a decision next year on adding more submarines and still meet the GTE threat.

The Soviets might deploy an improved ICBM force, alone or as part of a combined GTE threat, capable of destroying Minuteman. In some situations, a vulnerable Minuteman force might invite rather than deter an attack. In this case we could phase out Minuteman and rely on Poseidon for our Assured Destruction capability. However, it is desirable to maintain some land-based missiles as a hedge against unexpected threats to the Poseidon force, such as Soviet advances in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability.

To protect the land-based missile force, we can defend Minuteman with an ABM system at less cost than we can add hard rock silos for Minuteman. None of the new ICBMs has a clear cost advantage over defending Minuteman with an ABM system or putting Minuteman in hard rock silos until we need a much larger surviving payload to penetrate a Soviet ABM system that is much stronger than the one we envision as part of the GTE threat.

Not only is it cheaper to protect our land-based missile force with an ABM system alone (compared to a mix of ABM defense and hard rock silos), but it is much cheaper in the early years. However, we would not want to rely only on an ABM system. We are uncertain about the effectiveness of a heavy ABM defense against a heavy attack and the sensitivity of an ABM defense to larger numbers of smaller yield MIRVs and penetration aids. We would need lower levels of ABM defense and smaller numbers of hard rock silos if we deployed a combination of these two to hedge against a greater variation in threat. This suggests the following decision strategy: (1) maintain an option to proceed with an ABM defense of Minuteman (decision in CY 69, initial funding in FY 71) which could be expanded as the threat increased; (2) if the threat becomes more severe, stop expanding the ABM defense and plan on deploying 100 Minuteman IIIs in hard rock silos in FY 77; and (3) reduce near term costs for hard rock silo development to fit this schedule and to allow more time to find out how hard the silos actually prove to be.

A. Damage Limiting Against the Soviet Threat

Our ability to strike back and destroy Soviet society, even under conditions and assumptions favorable to the Soviets, makes any kind of nuclear war with the Soviets unlikely. Thus, we first buy forces to give us high confidence in our deterrent. As insurance in the unlikely event deterrence fails, we then consider adding forces that might reduce damage to our population and industry. Since we have offensive forces available for attacking military targets, the basic Damage Limiting issue is whether we should deploy Nike-X in defense of our cities.

A defensive system to save U.S. cities from a Soviet nuclear attack must attempt to keep ahead of the Soviet threat, including their reactions to our deployment. Such attempts are costly. In our analyses we use two stages in such a deployment./2/ The first, "Posture A," is an initial step recommended by the JCS. It represents an area defense of CONUS and a light defense of 25 cities. It would cost about $12 billion in investment and $900 million a year to operate. The second, "Posture B," is an attempt to keep ahead of the threat. It includes a higher density local defense of 52 cities. It would cost about $20 billion in investment and over $1.2 billion a year to operate. For Posture B we would also need improved air and civil defenses and ASW forces at an additional cost of $4 to $5 billion in investment. We believe the pursuit of effective defenses would eventually cost much more. Our commitment would be open-ended.

The United States can justify these costs only if they could limit significantly the ability of the Soviets to kill Americans. Our attempt to limit damage if our deterrent fails also operates to take away the Soviet deterrent. The following table shows what happens if the defense works and the Soviets do not react.

Deaths In an All-Out Strategic Nuclear Exchange in 1977,
Assuming No Soviet Reaction to a U.S. ABM System
(In Millions)

U.S. Program	Soviets Strike First, U.S. Retaliates		U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate		Soviet Assured Destruction Calculation
	U.S. Killed	Soviet Killed	U.S. Killed	Soviet Killed
No ABM	120	[*]	120	[*]	[*]
Sentinel	90	[*]	100	[*]	[*]
Posture A	40	[*]	40	[*]	[*]
Posture B	10	[*]	10	[*]	[*]

[*entry in table not declassified]

As the table shows, the Soviets lose their deterrent if they do not respond. They would be forced to react to increase their ability to strike back. The Soviets have the technological and economic capability to respond in many ways by: (1) adding MIRVs and penetration aids to their projected missile inventories; (2) adding a mobile ICBM, the SS-Z-2; (3) adding a new, higher payload, mobile missile; (4) deploying additional SLBMs; (5) defending all or a portion of their ICBM force; (6) launching all or a portion of their ICBM force on warning; (7) adding more bombers; or (8) some combinations of these responses. Against Posture A, the Soviets must respond with at least 100 new mobile ICBMs or an equivalent force in order to maintain their Assured Destruction capability; against Posture B, they must respond with at least 500 new mobile ICBMs or an equivalent force. These responses, while restoring their Assured Destruction capability, also restore their ability to kill Americans in a first strike. The table below shows what happens if the Soviets do respond.

Deaths In an All-Out Strategic Nuclear Exchange in 1977,
Assuming a Soviet Reaction to a U.S. ABM System
(In Millions)

U.S. Program	Soviets Strike First, U.S. Retaliates		U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate		Soviet Assured Destruction Calculation
	U.S. Killed	Soviet Killed	U.S. Killed	Soviet Killed
No ABM	120	[*]	120	[*]	[*]
Sentinel	100	[*]	100	[*]	[*]
Posture A	90	[*]	40	[*]	[*]
Posture B	90	[*]	90	[*]	[*]

[*entry in table not declassified]

As part of their response, the Soviets could add large numbers of offensive missiles, which would threaten our Assured Destruction capability. We, in turn, would have to react. Viewing each other's buildup in forces as an increased threat, each side would take counteracting steps, generating a costly arms race with no net gain in security for either side.

The above tables also show an important and paradoxical result regarding first strikes. The number of U.S. killed when the Soviet Union strikes first is less than or equal to the number of U.S. killed when the United States strikes first. The main reason for this is that there are two opposing effects in a strategic nuclear exchange. On the one hand, the country that strikes first can destroy a large number of the other's bombers and missiles on the ground, thereby limiting retaliatory damage to itself. On the other hand, the country that strikes second, facing an enemy that has partially disarmed himself, is likely to concentrate on attacking cities with its surviving force because there is little to be gained by firing back at empty missile silos and air bases. In the past, when neither side had a significant second strike force, the country that struck first could expect to achieve some strategic advantage. Now, however, the United States and the Soviet Union have reached a point where both have a large, hard-to-attack second strike force. Therefore, the country that now strikes first may destroy some of the other's weapons, but by freeing all of the enemy's remaining weapons to strike its own cities, it more than compensates for the enemy weapons it destroys and loses more than it gains. This result strengthens our belief that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union stands to benefit by striking first.

There has been evidence that the Chinese are devoting very substantial resources to the development of both nuclear warheads and missile delivery systems. Within a period of less than three years, they successfully detonated six nuclear devices. Last December, they detonated a seventh device, but this test was apparently a partial failure. These seven nuclear tests, together with their continuing work on surface-to-surface missiles, lead us to believe that they are moving ahead with the development of an ICBM. Indeed, if their program proceeds at its present pace (although there is some evidence it has been delayed) they could have a modest force of ICBMs by the mid-1970s.

The reasons for deploying an ABM system against the Chinese are: (1) it would prevent damage to the United States in a Chinese first strike; (2) it could increase the credibility of our commitments to defend Asian countries against Chinese nuclear intimidation or nuclear attack; and (3) it could lessen China's ability to drag the United States and the Soviet Union into a nuclear war. In addition, a defense against a light and unsophisticated Chinese threat would not deprive the Soviet Union of its Assured Destruction capability.

On the other hand, we already have a massive deterrent against a Chinese attack. A Chinese-oriented ABM system might enhance the prestige of the Chinese nuclear program and reduce confidence in the ability of our offensive forces to deter attacks on our allies. Further, it might suggest that we think the Chinese would act irrationally when many believe they would not. Leaving Asia and our Asian bases exposed, this system might suggest that the United States is retreating from Asia to a "Fortress America." Finally, it might keep Asian countries from adhering to a non-proliferation treaty by drawing attention to the threat and causing them to raise demands for their own defense, possibly as a step toward developing their own offensive nuclear capability.

On balance, however, we believe the advantages of a Chinese-oriented ABM system outweigh the disadvantages. Thus, deployment of the Sentinel system was initiated in September 1967.

We do not have to depend on deterrence alone to keep the Chinese from attacking us. The Sentinel system can be deployed at an investment cost of about $5 to $6 billion and should be highly effective against the kind of threat the Chinese may pose in the 1970s. The effectiveness of this deployment in reducing U.S. deaths from a Chinese attack in the 1970s is shown below.

[table (5 columns and 3 rows of source text) not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

Our analysis of the ABM system and its relationship to our strategic offensive forces leads us to conclude that:

1. The Soviets can substantially offset any Damage Limiting measures we might undertake, provided they are determined to maintain their deterrent against us. Thus, we should not deploy Nike-X to defend our cities against Soviet attacks.

2. We should deploy Sentinel, an effective defense of our cities against an unsophisticated Chinese ICBM attack. The nature of this decision makes the program sensitive to threat and cost. Since the Chinese appear to be behind in the ICBM development schedule by as much as one year over what we predicted last year, we can somewhat delay the Sentinel deployment schedule and thereby reduce FY 69-70 expenditures.

The estimated investment cost for the Sentinel program has increased by about $1 billion since the deployment decision was made. This has occurred while Sentinel is still in the planning stage and has not yet experienced the design changes and cost increases that normally result from testing a new system. By delaying the development schedule oriented to deployment of a prototype battery, we can provide time to analyze the reasons for rising costs and attempt to find ways to reduce costs.

3. An ABM defense of Minuteman is the cheapest option to insure the survivability of the Minuteman force. We should maintain the option for the defense of Minuteman using Sentinel components, while continuing the hard rock silo research and development program at a reduced level. A Sentinel delay now would still allow an ABM defense of Minuteman by FY 74.

Our current air defenses are costly to operate and relatively ineffective. Without a strong and effective missile defense, even a very effective air defense cannot save many lives. The Soviets could simply target cities with their missiles. In the 1970s the Soviets could kill 110 million Americans if we had no air defense system and 100 million if we had a perfect one.

However, there are other objectives of Continental Air Defense which must also be considered. These include: (1) defense against countries other than the Soviet Union, (2) defense against bomber attacks on those strategic forces that we withhold in a controlled nuclear war, (3) peacetime patrolling of our air space, (4) discouraging Soviet bomber aspirations, and (5) the use of continental air defense forces in missions outside the United States. We can achieve these objectives with a modern, more effective air defense force that costs less over the next 14 years than our present force. This modern force will consist of 200 improved F-106 fighters (the F-106X), 42 UE AWACS aircraft, and two OTH radars. It will use the Federal Aviation Agency National Air Space system for back-up command and control. The cost through FY 78 for the modern force is $12.3 billion compared with $11.7 billion for the current force. However, the lower operating costs of the modern force will result in substantial savings over the present force after FY 79.

The following table compares the relative performance of the current force, the modernized force, and an alternative force of 54 F-12s.

Number of Bombers Surviving an Area Bomber Defense

	Current Force	AWACS/F-106X	AWACS/F-12
10-Year Program Cost, FY 69-78 ($ Billions)	$ 11.7	$ 12.3	$ 13.7
Threat
Current Soviet Heavy Bombers (100 Aircraft)	84	26	37
Potential Threats
Current Soviet Heavy Bombers Plus Medium Bombers (100 Aircraft)	150	74	127
New ASM--600 nm Range (100 Aircraft)	100	62	53
New Supersonic Bomber (100 Aircraft)	90	70	60

Against the expected threat, the F-106X force is much more effective than the current force and somewhat more effective than the F-12 alternative. It is also more effective than the F-12 force against the medium bomber force or a heavy bomber force with advanced decoys or SRAMs, where numbers of interceptors are important.

The following table compares mixes of F-106Xs and F-12s:

Mixed Forces	10-Year System Cost($ Billions)	Enemy Bombers Surviving
		100 Subsonic	100 AMSA
Force with AWACS
198 F-106Xs	$ 9.9	26	70
198 F-106Xs/12 F-12s	11.0	8	53
108 F-106Xs/54 F-12s	13.6	5	30

Adding a small number of F-12s kills more bombers, but at an additional cost of $1 to $4 billion over 10 years. Furthermore, the total number of lives lost in a nuclear war is nearly the same with any of these alternatives.

Surveillance is presently the weakest part of our air defense system. Therefore, we should proceed with Engineering Development of AWACS (if the Overland Radar Technology program is successful) and with development of back-scatter OTH radars. We should also develop, and deploy on the F-106, advanced air-to-air missiles and an advanced fire control system. With these improvements to the F-106, there is little to be gained from the high performance characteristics of the F-12. Thus, we can avoid the additional $1.1 to $1.4 billion cost of an F-12 force and still meet our air defense objectives.

The same arguments about Damage Limiting also apply to our SAM programs. The Soviets could target SAM-defended cities with missiles and use their penetrating bombers on undefended cities, producing very nearly the same number of deaths. Costly systems such as SAM-D are not justified for CONUS defenses. Our other air defense objectives can be met with area air defense. In line with the perimeter defense concept in the F-106X/AWACS modernization plan, we can phase out 12 existing Nike-Hercules batteries in the interior of CONUS.

V. Specific Recommendations

The JCS have recommended strategic offensive and defensive forces that would cost $15.9 billion in FY 70 and $86.8 billion in the period FY 70-74. The program we are recommending will cost $12.4 billion in FY 70 and a total of $49.3 billion in FY 70-74. Specifically, we recommend:/3/

1. Deferring, until we have evidence of a good Soviet low-altitude SAM defense, the JCS recommendation to equip the B-52 and FB-111 force with 1,545 UE SRAM. This program would cost $137 million in FY 70 and $824 million in FY 70-77.

2. Disapproving the JCS recommendation for Contract Definition and full-scale development of the AMSA in FY 70. The 10-year cost of developing, procuring, and operating a force of 138 AMSAs would be $8.5 billion, including the costs of weapons and tankers.

3. Approving the JCS recommendation for Contract Definition of an advanced subsonic cruise missile, subject to favorable review of Concept Formulation. This program will require $30 million in FY 70 and $145 million in FY 70-74 for development. Deploying a force of 780 missiles would require a total of $361 million in FY 70-77.

4. Disapproving the JCS recommendation for Contract Definition of a new tanker based on the C-5. The present KC-135 fleet is satisfactory. The 10-year cost of developing, procuring, and operating a force of 210 C-5 tankers would be $5.5 billion.

5. Disapproving the JCS recommendation for full-scale development of an advanced airborne command post. The 10-year cost of developing, procuring, and operating a force of 14 command posts would be $1.2 billion.

6. Maintaining a force of 1,000 Minuteman missiles. Maintaining the IOC for Minuteman III at July 1970, resulting in 430 Minuteman II and 570 Minuteman III missiles by end-FY 74. Deferring procurement of terminal penetration aids for Minuteman III until we have evidence of Soviet low-altitude ballistic missile defenses.

7. Disapproving the JCS recommendation for full-scale development of the Mk-18 Re-entry Vehicle (RV). To complete this program would require $17 million in FY 70 and a total of $380 million in FY 70-74.

8. Disapproving the JCS recommendation for Contract Definition of the advanced ICBM system (WS-120A). This missile provides little improvement over Minuteman. The 10-year cost of developing, procuring, and operating a force of 280 missiles would be $9.1 billion.

9. Continuing Advanced Development of the ULMS, but deferring a decision on Contract Definition in FY 70 until completion of the ULMS Development Concept Paper.

10. Disapproving the JCS recommendation for Contract Definition on a Surface-ship-based Long-range Missile System (SLMS) in FY 70. This ship could not replace Poseidon and offers little advantage and many disadvantages, when compared to ULMS. The 10-year investment and operating costs for 10 ships would be $4.6 billion.

11. Disapproving the JCS recommendation for a prototype surface-ship-based intermediate range missile system (called the Ballistic Missile Ship). We do not need additional payload on the crash schedule that would justify this program. Construction of a prototype would cost $250 million, plus $75 million for five years of operation.

12. Continuing to plan for an average of [number not declassified] Mk-3 RVs per Poseidon missile. (The JCS recommend an initial load of [number not declassified] Mk-3s per missile, at an additional cost of $217 million in FY 70.) Procuring [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in FY 70, and a total of [number not declassified] in FY 70-74. Continuing development of Poseidon and, in FY 70, procuring 181 missiles and converting six Polaris submarines to the Poseidon configuration for a total investment of $1.3 billion in FY 70. Planning to build to a force of 31 Poseidon submarines by FY 76 for a total FY 70-74 investment of $3.9 billion.

13. Disapproving the JCS recommendation to provide a large-yield warhead for Poseidon. Development of such a warhead plus the modifications required for the Poseidon missile would cost $210 million.

14. Approving the JCS proposal to continue converting to Polaris A-3 missiles those remaining submarines not included in the Poseidon conversion program. This program requires no funds in FY 70.

15. Deferring decision on the JCS recommendation to deploy 12 additional communication relay (TACAMO) aircraft for command and control of the Polaris fleet. The JCS program would cost $48 million in FY 70 and $216 million in 10-year system costs. As an alternative for decision in October, we should consider adding new modulation techniques and satellite communications to the current force to greatly extend its capabilities.

16. Disapproving the JCS recommendation to deploy a ballistic missile defense of the United States against the Soviet threat. The JCS program would require $270 million in FY 70 in addition to the Sentinel program. The JCS-recommended objective for a Nike-X defense would cost $10 billion in 10 years above the cost of the Sentinel system.

17. Continuing the deployment of the Sentinel system, but reorienting the program so that procurement funds for only one site need be obligated in FY 69. This results in an FY 69 cost of $739 million and an FY 70 cost of $1.3 billion. The estimated total system investment cost is $5.5 billion, plus $986 million transferred from the Nike-X development program and $250 million in AEC costs.

18. Approving the JCS recommendation to preserve the option for a light defense of Minuteman using Sentinel radars plus additional Sprint missiles. For an IOC in FY 74, no additional funds are needed in FY 70.

19. Disapproving the JCS recommendation for Contract Definition on a ballistic missile defense ship (SABMIS) in FY 70. The research and development and 10-year investment and operating costs for eight ships would be $5.9 billion.

20. Disapproving Contract Definition for the Airborne Missile Intercept System (ABMIS), a concept for which there is no advanced development program.

21. Continuing implementation of the Continental Air Defense Plan, as recommended by the JCS. In FY 70, this action involves $37 million for development of the F-106X interceptor, $229 million for a full-scale development of AWACS, and $8.5 million for developing the back-scatter OTH radar. This air defense plan will cost $11.6 billion in FY 69-77 compared to $10.7 billion for the previously approved program.

22. Disapproving the JCS proposal to resume development of the F-12 interceptor. The 10-year cost of 10 F-12s, as recommended by the Air Force, would be $0.8 to $1.0 billion. The 54 UE F-12s in the JCS objective force would cost $3.4 billion.

23. Approving selected parts of the JCS recommendation to expedite a comprehensive improvement program (MOHEC) for Nike-Hercules, at a cost of $11.2 million in FY 76. The entire JCS plan would cost $35 million in FY 70 and a total of $375 million to complete.

24. Deferring decision on the JCS recommendation to deploy a surveillance satellite system (Program 949) in FY 70, and deferring until October a decision on continued development. This program would cost $114 million in FY 70 and $1.2 billion in 10-year system costs.

25. Disapproving the JCS recommendation to extend the approved military survival measures program from $38 million to $190 million over five years. In view of the present financial situation and our needs in Southeast Asia, deferring initiation of the approved program until FY 71.

26. Disapproving the JCS recommendation for a $150 to $200 million annual Civil Defense program. Approving instead an austere holding program at an FY 70 cost of $84 million.

27. Phasing out the B-58 force in the first quarter of FY 70, instead of at the end of FY 71 as previously planned, in order to save $55 million in FY 70 and $39 million in FY 71.