Washington, August 9, 1968.

In the course of the Board's continuing appraisal of the adequacy of our Government's intelligence coverage of Soviet plans and actions affecting U.S. national security, we have had discussions of the desirability of reinstituting a periodic examination of the relative strategic strength of the United States and the USSR. We have noted that the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council which had been charged with this work was inactivated in 1963 and that no other agency in the government has been given the responsibility for continuing an interdepartmental analysis of this matter./2/ Meanwhile, from the intelligence point of view, we see the increasing need for reliable information on the status of Soviet advanced strategic military capabilities, and on related Soviet research and development efforts.

Based on discussions with former members of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, our conclusion is that the former evaluation procedure would hardly be adequate to cope with the current problem which is now far more complex than the one which confronted us in the past. These complexities arise from the growing sophistication of strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems, the many unknown factors with regard to the performance of these new weapons and the sensitivity of the kind of study which we have in mind.

The kind of analysis we envision would call for an evaluation of the composition, reliability, effectiveness and vulnerability of the strategic offensive and defensive forces of both sides, to include their command and control systems. It would also call for a close study of the urban-industrial structure of both nations in order to assess the probable effects of strategic attacks on urban-industrial targets. These analyses should be based upon the best available information and foreign intelligence. A by-product of the kind of new study we are discussing would be to focus attention on the gaps in the intelligence data and to accelerate measures to collect the missing pieces.

After the development of the best possible understanding of the likely performance of the opposing strategic forces, it should then be possible to construct one or more scenarios for war game purposes in order to measure the interactions of these forces in nuclear war. The results would then permit our best military and scientific minds to draw pertinent conclusions as to the relative strength of our forces and the considerations which should influence future decisions and actions in the strategic field.

The agencies interested in such a study and with a contribution to make to it include the White House, State, Defense, JCS, CIA, Justice and AEC. Since the study would draw heavily upon the scientific community, the President's Science Advisory Committee should be included as a participant.

Taking into account this breadth of governmental interest, the question arises as to the best way of organizing it. The old Net Evaluation Group did not have adequate scientific support to carry on a study of the scope which we are proposing. Furthermore, it reported through a committee chaired by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to the National Security Council. Under present conditions, the Board believes that the proposed study could best be done under the Secretary of Defense acting as executive agent for the President.

It is the recommendation of your Board that the Secretary of Defense be directed to prepare proposed terms of reference whereby he would undertake the net evaluation studies in collaboration with the appropriate other government agencies, along the lines suggested above.

Maxwell D. Taylor

Washington, August 16, 1968.

[Source: Washington National Records Center, Central Policy File: FRC 383 86 A 5, Folder 3015. Top Secret; Noforn. 5 pages of source text not declassified.]

JCSM-520-68

Washington, August 26, 1968.

SUBJECT
Draft Presidential Memorandum on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces (U)

1. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the "for comment" draft Presidential memorandum (DPM) on strategic offensive and defensive forces./2/ The tentative recommendations in the DPM could lead to the conclusion that, rather than improving our military capabilities, we are compromising US strategy to accommodate to the Soviet improved posture. The Soviet technical ability and national purpose are demonstrated by their capability to develop and deploy a ballistic missile defense, a new nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles, and the new Foxbat interceptor, while continuing to expand their hardened ICBM force and developing a new ICBM and the fractional orbit bombardment system. The development of these Soviet capabilities without corresponding improvements in US strategic force capabilities continues the shift of the strategic balance away from the United States.

2. (TS) The implications of the rationale and the tentative recommendations in the DPM are that the United States has neither the capacity nor intent to acquire the strategic force capabilities, to include damage limiting, required to pursue effectively a complete military strategy. While the principal military objective of the United States with regard to strategic nuclear warfare is to deter an attack upon the United States, our deterrent could fail for a number of reasons. Important among these are miscalculation of intent or resolve, underestimation of military capabilities, or commission of an irrational act. Should deterrence fail, the principal objective is to terminate hostilities under conditions of relative advantage while limiting damage to the United States and minimizing damage to US and allied interests. This latter objective is considered to be as important as deterring nuclear war since, if deterrence fails, we must ensure the continued existence of the nation by safeguarding the survival of our essential political, military, and economic structure.

3. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned about the views in the DPM relative to the general approach to deterring strategic nuclear war and the relationship of damage-limiting capability to deterrence. While they concur that deterrence of a rational enemy is dependent on our maintaining a strong and secure ability to retaliate under any circumstances, they also believe that a Soviet decision to initiate hostilities will be influenced not only by their own expected losses but also by US losses and the relative surviving military capabilities. It is difficult to quantify the level of fatalities that will deter the Soviets. The Soviets may not consider their fatalities as the only influencing factor or think of them in terms of a quantitative threshold. If they sustain 20 percent fatalities as compared to 80 percent for the United States, for example, they might not be deterred from initiating an attack against the United States. Our judgments of what may deter the Soviets must not be based on calculations limited to a narrow set of hypotheses or which are too far removed from the most likely pattern of admittedly unlikely wars. Further, such judgments should include evaluations of possible Soviet attacks utilizing improved tactics and force capabilities, including pindown, the fractional orbit bombardment system, cruise missile submarines, and medium bombers.

4. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur with the allegation that nuclear war plans for the controlled and deliberate use of nuclear weapons do not exist. Planning for strategic nuclear war must consider a range of options dependent upon the circumstances of war initiation and the objectives of the attack. [13 lines of source text not declassified] The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that further improvements in command and control capabilities will provide additional flexibility for the controlled and deliberate use of nuclear weapons.

5. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are cognizant of the fiscal and political restraints related to certain of their recommendations. However, they conclude that the choice is not one of degree within an acceptable level of risk but rather whether or not the United States will possess the strategic capability necessary to support its national policies effectively. Based on the DPM's specific recommendations and the rationale as related to strategies, objectives, and force employment concepts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that the United States may not, if the present trend continues, possess the strategic capability to support effectively its national policy in the mid-range period.

6. (TS) The existence of US strategic superiority for the past two decades has deterred a global war and permitted flexibility in international affairs. As the relative strategic position of the United States is challenged--and the increasing Soviet capabilities most certainly reflect a challenge--two principal dangers are identifiable: first, that an increasing confidence in their strength will lead the Soviets to high-risk courses, and, second, the possibility that such courses will escalate into strategic nuclear war. Unless the presently programmed strategic force levels of the United States are improved, erosion of our relative strategic position will continue. Concomitantly, flexibility in pursuit of national goals will be constrained by our inability to deal from a position of strength. As this erosion continues, the margin for error in the conduct of international affairs will be reduced, and the risks attendant to each decision will increase at an accelerated rate. The alternative to acceptance of the risks associated with the erosion of our strategic position is to insure that the Soviets have no doubt of the US determination and capability to deter a deliberate enemy decision to attack and, should such deterrence fail, to insure that the United States and its allies emerge with relative advantage irrespective of the circumstances of initiation, response, and termination. To accomplish this, we must continue a vigorous program of research and development; increase survivable missile throw weight; deploy an effective ballistic missile defense against the Soviet threat; continue modernization of forces, including development of a replacement strategic bomber aircraft; and continue to improve strategic command, communications, and warning systems.

7. (TS) In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm that the force level objectives stated in JSOP 70-77/3/ constitute strengths essential for the maintenance of an effective strategic nuclear posture during the mid-range time period. Accordingly, they believe that, despite the financial constraints anticipated in FY 1970, we should proceed with strategic offensive and defensive programs necessary to maintain and improve our strategic posture in pace with the threat and within an acceptable margin of risk. Therefore, they recommend that the foregoing rationale and the comments and recommendations contained in the Appendix hereto/4/ be used as a basis for your decision on strategic offensive and defensive forces.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, September 3, 1968, 1911Z.

CAP 82362. Herewith Clark Clifford's letter to me/2/ commenting on General Taylor's suggestion that we reestablish something like the former Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC./3/ As you see, Sec. Clifford and Gen. Wheeler believe that present staff work within the Department of Defense fully covers the work formerly done by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee and, therefore, they do not believe a new study is required.

I will make Sec. Clifford's letter available to Gen. Taylor.

"In response to your request that we look into Max Taylor's suggestion for a resumption of the sort of study last conducted by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC in 1963, I have had my staff review existing studies to determine whether a new NES-type effort would be worthwhile.

Needless to say, the NES studies were initiated in the 1950's at a time when our strategic capabilities were far less than they are today and more significantly for purposes of a new study, we lacked the analytical capability to assess relative U.S. and Soviet performance in various scenarios. General Wheeler and I find that existing current material fully covers the ground of the Net Evaluation studies.

Our intelligence in regard to Soviet capabilities has vastly improved, as reflected in periodical NIEs on Soviet strategic offensive and defensive systems, updated versions of both of which will be forthcoming shortly (NIEs 11-8 and 11-3)./4/ Each year the Joint War Games Agency writes a Soviet objectives plan (RISOP) which they game against our SIOP. These results give us a very detailed evaluation of our near-term capabilities against the Soviets and their capabilities against us. When dealing with capabilities over the next ten years, the DOD strategic force and effectiveness tables, last revised on August 7, 1968,/5/ consider relative strengths in a number of different strategic situations, and we have the capability of readily preparing additional tables for any particular scenario not covered. The forthcoming DPM on U.S. strategic and defensive systems also covers much of the same ground./6/

In the light of the availability of this material General Wheeler and I are convinced that it would not be desirable to proceed with a new net evaluation study."

Washington, September 20, 1968.

Dear Max:

Thank you for sending me a copy of the memorandum you propose to send to the President in regard to the FIAB proposal for a new Net Evaluation Study./2/ In general you have done justice in presenting my views, although there are many more evaluations going on than I mentioned in my letter to Walt Rostow/3/ or than you mention in your memorandum to the President.

I would like to emphasize, however, that while I believe a new administration might wish to have a hand in initiating as far-reaching a study as you propose, my main point is that existing studies and existing coordinating mechanisms for bringing information to bear on the problem are adequate to do the job.

This is not to say that there are no intelligence gaps, or that we intend to rest on the merits of studies we have already completed. I am convinced, however, that our current efforts are able to identify--and take steps to fill--any gaps in our intelligence, our research and development, and our analysis.

I believe that our current efforts have the interdepartmental inputs that you feel would be the main benefit of your proposed study. What is lacking most in our current efforts is the relaxed, long-range view that could best be supplied by studies at IDA, Rand, etc. I have been promoting such studies and would appreciate your help in focusing such studies on the pertinent issues.

I have enclosed brief descriptions of a few of the more important continuing efforts that we are making to evaluate the relative strategic strength of the United States and the USSR. I would be glad to provide briefings on any of these efforts to you personally or to the FIAB.

Sincerely,
Clark

Major DoD Efforts to Evaluate the Relative Strategic
Strength of the United States and USSR

Political-military war games are conducted and analyzed by the Joint War Games Agency (JWGA). These (non-computer) games explore major international issues, problems, and questions bearing upon our national security. The White House, the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, the USIA, the AID, the ACDA, and the Military Services provide participants for these war games. These games address broad political, economic, psychological, and technological considerations as well as military strategy. The JWGA usually conducts at least four of these games each year. They provide an excellent vehicle for obtaining inter-departmental inputs for an examination for the relative strategic strength of the U.S. and USSR. Two games, played in 1967, studied the effect that anti-ballistic missile defenses might have on a strategic exchange between the U.S. and the USSR.

The Red Integrated Strategic Operational Plan (RISOP) is developed by the JCS and the Services. It is our Soviet equivalent of the U.S. Strategic Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). In developing this plan the Red Planning Board tries to maximize the effectiveness of the Red forces and exploit known or expected weaknesses of the U.S. strategic posture or forces. The RISOP is approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then war gamed against the SIOP. The war gaming effort involves computer facilities in Omaha, the National Military Command System Support Center in Washington, and the Navy computer facility at NAVCOSSAC. Two independent war games are conducted, one in Omaha by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff and the other in Washington by the JWGA. The results are briefed to the JCS and to appropriate CINCs. Applicable portions of the plans are provided to the Office of Civil Defense.

The Post-Nuclear Attack Study (PONAST) is being conducted in the JCS Special Studies Group. It was initiated about two and one half years ago and is now nearing completion. PONAST considers two general war scenarios, which include strategic and theater nuclear forces, in order to examine possible follow-on military and non-military operations in the post-SIOP period of the war. The Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) and the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) have been active participants. Some twenty-seven other agencies were called upon for various contributions, through the auspices of OEP. The Department of State and the Defense Intelligence Agency have played major roles. The study will identify problems that probably will confront national civilian and military leaders during the successive stages of a general war, and will assess capabilities to cope with such problems.

A feeling for the depth and scope of the study can be gained from the fact that it took more than 4,000 hours of computing time on our most modern computers. Except that it does not specifically focus attention on gaps in intelligence data, it is exactly the kind of analysis that appears to be envisioned by the FIAB in that it evaluates the composition, reliability, effectiveness, and vulnerability of the strategic offensive and defensive forces of both sides, including their command and control systems. It also closely studies the urban-industrial structures of both nations in order to assess the probable effects of strategic attack on urban-industrial targets, as well as the capability of the nations to recover from these attacks. This study was based on the best available intelligence information since the RISOP-SIOP war games, appropriately expanded, were used as the basis for the study.

The Strategic Forces DPM presents the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense on the strategic offensive and defensive force structures for the next five years, as well as the rationale behind these recommendations. An essential part of this rationale is calculations of the ability of our strategic forces to accomplish their major objective--deterrence of nuclear war.

To do this the DPM first calculates the capability of our programmed forces against a combination of the upper-range of the National Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP) projections for each element of the Soviet strategic forces. Excursions then are made to study cases where we lose major components of our forces, to make sure that our capability is not vulnerable to an unforeseen technological breakthrough. If these calculations show that our capability is not sufficient, the DPM recommends developing and deploying enough forces to make it sufficient.

Next, the DPM tests our programmed forces against a threat specifically designed to take away our deterrent capability. It then examines force options which will restore our capability to an acceptable level against this threat. It also examines the lead-times necessary for development of these options and recommends actions which will insure that we can maintain our capability even against this greater-than-expected threat.

Finally, the DPM next examines our capability to limit damage to the United States in the event that a nuclear war occurs. In this situation the DPM examines likely scenarios instead of the limiting ones used to examine our deterrent capability. It also takes into account possible Soviet reaction to the deployment of a U.S. damage limiting force.

The DPM is sent out for comment to the Services and the JCS. In addition, comments on appropriate parts of the DPM are usually solicited from the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Secretary of Defense considers these comments in writing the Record of Decision version of the DPM. The recommendations in the Record of Decision DPM then form the basis for the budget submitted to Congress.

The DoD Strategic Force and Effectiveness Tables (SF&ET) contain calculations, for each of the next ten years, of the capability of the U.S. to sustain a first strike by the high NIPP threat and retaliate. Fourteen different scenarios are considered, most of which test the effect of unforeseen vulnerability of a major portion of our forces. The tables also contain calculations, for each of the next ten years, of the retaliatory capability of 14 combinations of strategic force options against a greater-than-expected threat. In addition, they contain calculations of our damage limiting capability with different levels of U.S. ABM defenses in five different scenarios against six different Soviet reactions to our deployment of ABM systems. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

The SF&ET also contain a detailed listing of the U.S. forces and options, the Soviet threat (from the NIPP), and greater-than-expected Soviet threats designed to take away our deterrent capability or our damage limiting capability. The characteristics of these forces are listed in detail.

These tables form a point of departure for all calculations within DoD of the capabilities of our strategic forces. They are coordinated with the Services and the JCS and comments on the greater-than-expected threat have been obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Secretary of Defense requested the Secretary of the Air Force to study sub-SIOP nuclear options (NU-OPTS) involving limited nuclear exchanges between the U.S. and the USSR. A pilot study has been completed which indicates that the U.S. and USSR can conduct coercive warfare with strategic weapons, at relative high levels, with each side retaining its capability throughout the exchange to deter an all-out city attack. The Air Staff, SAC, ADC, USAFE, and the Rand Corporation are now investigating the strategic and operational considerations associated with limited nuclear operations, with emphasis on target selection criteria, required damage expectancies, attack levels, types of delivery systems, and the command and control, reconnaissance, intelligence, and communications elements which will be necessary to conduct strategic operations at lower levels of controlled response. These elements are being analyzed both for the U.S. and the USSR. The purpose of this study is to develop a logic for the conduct of strategic war, at levels less than SIOP, in order to provide the President with additional options for the limited use of our strategic forces.

The composite views of the intelligence community on Soviet military posture and capability are found in four major National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs): NIE 11-3, Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defense Forces; NIE 11-4, Main Issues of Soviet Military Policy; NIE 11-8, Soviet Strategic Attack Forces; and NIE 11-14, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces./4/ These estimates are produced yearly and, when necessary, updated during the year. Special NIEs are produced when urgent situations require them. Such a special estimate was issued recently to assess our capability to unilaterally detect changes in Soviet strategic offensive and defensive force structures./5/ The U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) produces these estimates. This Board consists of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, the AEC, and the NSA. (Normally the Department of Justice abstains from the above NIEs since the subject is outside their jurisdiction.)

The National Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP) is prepared annually by the USIB to serve as a supplement to the NIEs on Soviet programs and capabilities. It is much more detailed than the NIEs. The added detail is principally a quantification and projection over a ten-year period of the broad trends and capabilities indicated in the NIEs. Its purpose is to: (a) include in a single document the quantitative data on all major aspects of Soviet military forces, (b) to present the quantitative data by mid-years for a ten-year period, (c) to organize the data into mission-oriented categories, and (d) to indicate ranges of uncertainty associated with each projection.

Washington, September 24, 1968.

Dear Clark:

Your letter of 20 September/2/ will be most helpful to your old colleagues of the FIAB in dealing with the intelligence aspects of its central theme. Although aware of some of them, I found the tabulation of DOD efforts in the field most impressive and would like to take advantage of your offer of a briefing on some of them.

With regard to the use of IDA, Rand, etc. for studies in this field, speaking under my IDA hat I can assure you of IDA's readiness to work on any aspect of these problems which are within its competence.

Sincerely,

Maxwell D. Taylor/3/

NIE 11-8-68
TCS 582-68

Washington, October 3, 1968.

SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES

The Problem

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic attack forces through mid-1970 and to estimate general trends in those forces over the next 10 years.

Conclusions

A. The primary objectives of Soviet strategic policy have been to achieve a more formidable deterrent and to narrow and eventually to overcome the US lead in capabilities for intercontinental attack. Toward this end the Soviets have built strategic forces, both offensive and defensive, which provide a large assured destruction capability and important damage-limiting capabilities as well. While they have only begun to narrow the gap in submarine-launched ballistic missiles and remain inferior in heavy bombers, the Soviets will shortly overcome the US lead in numbers of ICBM launchers. Current programs will bring further improvements in the USSR's strategic position, already the most favorable of the postwar period. But the Soviets face in the future a strategic situation changed and complicated by projected improvements in US forces--Poseidon, Minuteman III, and the antiballistic missile system--that threaten to erode their relative position.

B. In deciding upon the future size and composition of their strategic forces the Soviets are almost certainly exploring a number of alternatives. They are evidently interested in strategic arms control as an option that could conserve economic resources and protect their improved strategic position. In the absence of an arms control agreement, we believe that they will continue the arms competition with the US, seeking to maintain and if possible improve their relative strategic position. In any case, they will probably give increased attention to qualitative improvements, particularly those designed to enhance survivability and capacity to penetrate defenses.

C. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The great improvement in the USSR's strategic position results primarily from the rapid and extensive ICBM deployment of the past few years. The Soviet ICBM force now has about 900 operational launchers and our evidence on construction activity indicates that it will surpass the US force in numbers by 1970. The Soviets have begun deployment of a small solid-propellant ICBM, they probably are developing a new large liquid-propellant system, and they probably will develop a mobile ICBM system. In addition, they are flight-testing multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs).

D. We believe that for the period of this estimate the Soviet force goal will lie somewhere between 1,100 and 1,500 ICBM launchers./2/ If it lies near the low side, the Soviet ICBM force would probably peak at a higher level until older launchers were phased out. Such a force would probably embody considerable qualitative improvements including better accuracy, more sophisticated reentry vehicles such as MRVs and multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and possibly penetration aids. A force toward the higher side of our estimate would also include qualitative improvements, and it would rely in part upon larger numbers to attain improved capabilities.

E. Space Weapons. At the time of our last estimate the Soviets were conducting extensive flight tests which we believed related to development of a fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS). Developments since that time have lowered our confidence that we understand the intended purpose of the system under test; the Soviets may be trying to develop a FOBS, a depressed trajectory intercontinental ballistic missile, or perhaps a dual system which could perform both missions. Until our evidence is more conclusive, we are unable to make a confident estimate as to the type of system being developed, when it could reach initial operational capability (IOC), or how it may be deployed. We continue to believe it unlikely that the Soviets will develop a multiple orbit bombardment system.

F. Medium-Range Ballistic Missile/Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM/IRBM). There has been little change in the size of the MRBM/IRBM force, which still stands at about 700 launchers. We estimate that new MRBMs and IRBMs will supersede present systems within the next 10 years. The Soviets will continue to maintain massive strategic forces against Eurasia, but the introduction of improved missiles may result in some decrease in numbers. We believe that the Soviets are developing and will deploy, in both a fixed and a mobile configuration, a new solid-propellant MRBM (designated SS-14) of about 1,500 n.m. range which could reach IOC in a year or two. We estimate that they will also develop a solid-propellant IRBM with a range of about 3,000-3,500 n.m., and that it will reach IOC in 1970-1971. It will probably be deployed in both fixed and mobile launchers and with its extended range will provide more flexible coverage of Eurasian targets.

G. Submarine-Launched Missiles. The Soviets have clearly embarked upon a high priority program to improve and expand their ballistic missile submarine force. Six, possibly 7, of the 16-tube Y-class submarines have now come down the ways and there is evidence suggesting that the production of this class will be stepped up soon. We believe that the Soviets are building toward a ballistic missile submarine force that will confront the US with a threat roughly comparable to that which the Polaris force presents the USSR. They could reach that position by the mid-1970's, when they will probably have some 65-80 ballistic missile submarines, of which 35-50 will be Y-class types.

H. Long-Range Aviation. Attrition and retirement of older models will gradually reduce the Soviet heavy bomber force. The medium-bomber force will probably also decline as Badgers are phased out, but at a slower rate than we estimated last year. The introduction of a new air-to-surface missile into the Badger force suggests that the Soviets intend to extend the useful life of some of those aircraft for a few more years. We still believe that the Soviets are unlikely to introduce a follow-on heavy bomber; they may introduce a follow-on medium if the Blinder does not satisfy their future requirements./3/

Discussion

1. The most important issues of Soviet military policy concern the strategic balance between the US and the USSR. The goals of Soviet strategic weapons programs were set at a time when the US enjoyed such a superiority in intercontinental delivery systems as to put the USSR at a political and psychological disadvantage. The aim of Soviet strategic policy, therefore, has been to achieve a more formidable deterrent and to narrow and eventually to overcome the US lead. Toward this end, the Soviets have built strategic forces, both offensive and defensive, which provide a large assured destruction capability and important damage-limiting capabilities as well, and they have substantially reduced the US lead in numbers of intercontinental delivery vehicles.

2. The great improvement in the USSR's strategic position results from the buildup of Soviet strategic forces begun by Khrushchev several years ago. The new leaders have made some decisions as to the size and composition of their strategic forces, but they have generally followed the strategic policies and programs that they inherited. In the future, however, they face a strategic situation significantly changed from that which led to present Soviet policies. Projected improvements in US strategic forces--Poseidon, Minuteman III, and the antiballistic missile (ABM) system--threaten to erode their relative position. Now the Soviet leaders are confronted with the necessity for new decisions on the future size and composition of their strategic forces. Other military requirements and the growing needs of the general economy are among the factors which the leaders must consider in making these decisions.

3. Under the collective leadership, military expenditures have continued to rise, primarily as the result of the continuing development and large-scale deployment of strategic weapons, which account for about half of the total military expenditures. The requirements of these programs for scarce high-quality resources of the sort needed to sustain economic growth have aggravated the impact of defense spending on the economy. Now, events in the Far East and in Europe have posed new military requirements which probably will result in a substantial increase in the strength of Soviet theater forces. Thus the perennial problem of resource allocation promises to sharpen. Economic considerations almost certainly were among the principal reasons for the Soviet decision to discuss arms control with the US.

4. Nevertheless, the economic considerations contributing to the Soviet decision are probably no more compelling than the strategic considerations. Considering US plans for improvements in its strategic forces, the Soviets probably recognize that a considerable sustained effort would be necessary to maintain the relative position they have now achieved. They may also be concerned lest the end of the Vietnam War enable the US to divert additional resources to its strategic forces. Finally, they may reason that further increments to their strategic forces would have little effect on the relationship between the US and the USSR so long as the US maintained its large, second-strike assured destruction capability. If these arguments were to prevail in the USSR, the Soviets would probably seek an agreement that preserved their present strategic relationship with the US.

5. It is too early to assess the full implications of the Czech crisis for Soviet policy toward arms control. The Soviets still have the same basic economic and military incentives; indeed, it is possible that the new military requirements generated by the Czech crisis have added to those incentives. Moreover, the present Soviet line seems to be that the Czech crisis is an internal Communist Bloc affair that should have no effect on the USSR's relations with the US. It is possible, therefore, that the Soviets will seek to proceed with arms control talks. At a minimum, however, the Czech crisis has delayed the opening of talks with the US and has dampened the prospects of any real progress toward strategic arms control in the near term.

6. In any case, the Soviet leaders cannot base their strategic planning on the possibility of strategic arms control and will almost certainly explore other alternatives. At a minimum, they might consider a policy of deterrence aimed only at maintaining a large assured destruction capability. Or they might consider a try for strategic superiority of such an order that it could be translated into significant political gain. We consider it highly unlikely that the Soviets will select either of these courses of action. The first, that of unilateral deescalation, would involve a decision to sacrifice the hard-won gains of recent years. The second would involve economic sacrifices that are probably unacceptable to the present leadership and would almost certainly provoke a strong US reaction. We believe, therefore, that in the absence of a strategic arms control agreement, the USSR will continue the arms competition with the US with the object of maintaining and if possible improving its relative strategic position.

7. For several years, the Soviets have given the highest priority to the effort to overcome the US lead in numbers of intercontinental delivery vehicles, particularly in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). By 1970, the Soviets will probably surpass the US force in numbers of ICBM launchers but they will remain inferior in submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. To maintain an assured destruction capability in the strategic situation that is emerging, qualitative improvements, particularly those related to survivability and capacity to penetrate defenses, become more important. There will undoubtedly be pressures for a continuing enlargement of the ICBM force, and it may continue to grow. But having attained rough numerical parity with the US in ICBMs, the Soviets will probably give increased attention to other options designed to enhance the survivability and effectiveness of their strategic attack forces.

[Here follow Parts II-VII, an annex, and seven tables (pages 6-41).]

Washington, October 8, 1968.

Dear Clark,

I thought that you would like to know that during our Board meeting of October 3-4,/2/ we reconsidered our recent recommendation to the President/3/ that there be established within the Executive Branch an interagency mechanism for the preparation of comparative evaluations of the strategic military offensive and defensive capabilities of the United States and the USSR.

In the course of our discussions, we had the benefit of your views and comments as set forth in recent communications to Walt Rostow and me./4/ Your frank expression of views on the subject was appreciated by all members of the Board.

Upon further consideration of the matter it was the Board's conclusion that, rather than pursue this subject in the form of a further recommendation to the President at this time, the matter should be included in a final Board report to the President toward the close of this year, in a section devoted to the identification of intelligence problems of continuing concern.

On behalf of the Board I express thanks for the help which you provided to us in our deliberations on this question.

Sincerely,

Maxwell D. Taylor/5/

Washington, October 14, 1968, 1:40 p.m.

NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH

Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford	Walt Rostow
Secretary of State Dean Rusk	George Christian
General Earle Wheeler	Tom Johnson
Admiral Thomas Moorer
General Leonard Chapman	Joining the Meeting:
General John McConnell	Senator Richard Russell
General Bruce Palmer	General William Westmoreland
Bromley Smith

Secretary Clifford: There have been instructions issued on authority to release nuclear weapons [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

The project's code-name is "Furtherance."

We recommend three major changes:

[3 paragraphs (8 lines of source text) not declassified]

We all recommend this.

Walt Rostow: We think it is an essential change. This was dangerous. We recommend going forward.

General Wheeler: All the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commanders have been consulted. We recommend approval.

General McConnell: I concur, Sir.

General Chapman: I concur.

Admiral Moorer: I concur.

I-25100/68

Washington, October 23, 1968.

SUBJECT
Chemical and Biological Warfare Policy (CM-3676-68)

Reference is made to your memorandum on the above subject, dated 25 September 1968,/2/ requesting that the Department of State be queried on when their position on the DOD draft NSAM/3/ would be available and to a memorandum of 1 October 1968, from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning and Arms Control, ISA, to the Director, Joint Staff, in which the Director was informed that DOD had requested that the State Department convene the Political-Military Group to discuss State's position on the subject./4/

A meeting of the Political-Military Group was held at the Department of State on 16 October 1968.5 Each principal designated a representative to participate in a Working Group to resolve differences now existing between State and the DOD draft NSAM. The Working Group has representatives from State, ACDA, ISA, and J-5 of the Joint Staff. Mr. Keeny of the Executive Office of the President has been invited to attend. The first meeting of the Working Group was held Tuesday, 22 October 1968 at the State Department./5/

Paul H. Nitze

NIE 11-3-68

Washington, October 31, 1968.

SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES

The Problem

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic air and missile defense forces through mid-1970, and general trends in these forces through 1978./2/

Conclusions

A. Throughout the postwar period the USSR has devoted a major effort to strategic defense. This effort can be attributed primarily to the size and diversity of US strategic attack forces, although for the future the Soviets must consider the threat posed by third countries, particularly China.

B. We believe that the competition for resources in the USSR is likely to intensify, not only between civilian and military programs, but also within the military establishment. These pressures may exercise a restraining influence on the strategic defense effort, but are unlikely to reduce it below present levels. The trend for the longer term will depend heavily upon Soviet decisions concerning antiballistic missile (ABM) deployment and the related question of strategic arms control.

C. The Soviets have built a formidable system of air defenses, deployed in depth, which would be very effective against subsonic and low-supersonic aircraft attempting to penetrate at medium and high altitudes. The system is less effective against higher performance aircraft and standoff weapons; it has virtually no capability against low-altitude penetration below about 1,000 feet except in a few, limited areas. The Soviets recognize these shortcomings and are deploying new interceptors, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and radars in an effort to overcome them.

D. At present, the major effort is directed to counter the threat posed by high-performance aircraft and standoff weapons. Deployment of the SA-5 long-range SAM system is the largest single defensive weapon program now underway. This system represents a considerable improvement over older systems in terms of range, velocity, and firepower. It is being deployed as a barrier defense around the European USSR and for point defense of selected targets. We estimate that there are some 60 SA-5 complexes, and that nearly half are operational; we believe that some 100 complexes will be operational by 1973. The Soviets have also been testing an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) that will probably enter service soon. This system, deployed in coastal areas and used with long-range interceptors, could greatly extend the area in which incoming aircraft could be engaged.

E. The Soviets are also attempting to strengthen their air defenses against low-altitude attack, but their efforts of the past year have resulted in minor improvements rather than in any fundamental solution to the problem. They have deployed all-weather interceptors with improved capabilities for low-altitude attack, and they will probably introduce more advanced SAMs and interceptors better suited for low-altitude defense. The primary limitation on low-altitude defense, however, is surveillance and control. Deployment of new radars has improved tracking capabilities in limited areas down to altitudes of 500 feet and even below, but we expect little advance in ground-based continuous tracking capability at low altitudes during the period of this estimate.

F. The Moscow ABM system (ABM-1), under deployment since 1962, has probably achieved some operational capability. Its deployment has apparently been cut back substantially from the originally planned level; the elements still under construction will probably be operational in 1970. We believe that the Soviets plan additional deployment of an improved ABM system at Moscow. ABM development continues, but we cannot determine whether it involves an improved version of the Moscow system or a substantially improved, second-generation ABM system, although we consider the latter more likely. We still do not believe that there is any deployment of ABM defenses outside the Moscow area. We believe that the SA-5 long-range SAM system is unlikely to have a present ABM capability, although the state of available evidence does not permit us to exclude this possibility, and we consider it unlikely that it will be modified for an ABM role./3/

G. Deployment of ABM defenses beyond Moscow will probably await the availability of a second-generation system. If such a system is now under development, it could reach an initial operational capability in the 1973-1975 period; like the Moscow system, it will probably be designed for long range, exoatmospheric intercept. The extent of future deployment will depend heavily upon economic as well as technical considerations. Deployment of a national defense system on a scale sufficient to cope with the full US missile threat does not appear to be a feasible course of action for the USSR within the period of this estimate. We believe that the Soviets will decide upon a program that would provide some defense for the most important target areas in the USSR. Some part of this defense would probably be deployed against Communist China and other third country threats.

H. We have no evidence of a Soviet antisatellite weapons program nor of Soviet development of hardware specifically for this purpose. It would be technically possible, however, for the Soviets now to have a limited antisatellite capability. With existing radars and missiles armed with nuclear warheads, they could almost certainly destroy or neutralize current US satellites up to about 2,000 n.m. during an early phase of their mission. With terminal homing in the interceptor missile, they may even be able to neutralize satellites using a nonnuclear warhead. Soviet technical capabilities are such that they could develop and deploy during the next 10 years any of several types of antisatellite systems if they chose to do so. We believe, however, that the Soviets would realize that any use of antisatellite systems in peacetime would expose their own satellites to attack, and consider it unlikely that they would do so except in retaliation.

Discussion

1. Soviet strategic defense forces have gone through several stages of development since World War II. Through the mid-1950's the Soviets attempted to counter the large US strategic bomber force in being with large numbers of air surveillance radars and interceptor aircraft, reinforced at Moscow with large numbers of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). As the US force obtained higher performance intercontinental bombers, the Soviets in the late 1950's developed and deployed Mach 2 interceptors and extended SAM defenses throughout the country. When the US, in the face of this extensive defense, began practicing low-altitude penetration tactics, the Soviets began in the early 1960's deploying the Firebar interceptor and the SA-3, both possessing better capabilities for low-altitude intercept than earlier systems. The US deployment of a standoff capability with air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), was followed by Soviet development and the current deployment of the Fiddler interceptor and the SA-5 system, which have greater ranges than earlier systems.

2. In their efforts to have a defense in being against an immediate threat, the Soviets have generally deployed a system quite early in the development cycle, using available technology, rather than wait for the development of more advanced but unproven techniques. These systems have then generally been modified and improved during the period of deployment. In some cases, however, deployment has been canceled early in the program either because the system proved relatively ineffective or because a better one was in the offing. When an improved system has been deployed, older ones are not rapidly retired or replaced. The Soviets tend to have extensive defenses deployed in depth, usually with considerable redundancy. This redundancy may give the defenses as a whole a greater capability than analysis of each weapon system alone would indicate. On the other hand, some elements of the defenses are always somewhat out of date, and do not represent the most effective Soviet counter to new US systems or concepts of operation.

3. Soviet military planners probably see the US strategic threat in the mid-1970's as consisting of three major forces: bombers and ASMs, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). They are aware that the threat will become more sophisticated and formidable with the incorporation of improvements--new aircraft, ASMs, aerodynamic and ballistic penetration aids, and multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The weight of a US attack could be increased by the strategic forces of Britain and France; the Soviets probably view the British forces as simply adding to the Polaris threat, but French intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) deployment will pose a threat from a new quarter.

4. The Soviets probably believe that the massive air defense forces they have built and are building will provide an effective counter to the medium and high-altitude bomber threat, although they realize the problem of low-altitude defense is not yet satisfactorily solved. The most critical requirement of Soviet strategic defense, and the one most difficult to meet despite more than a decade of effort, however, is defense against ballistic missiles. The nature and extent of antiballistic missile (ABM) deployment is almost certainly one of the major questions of Soviet military policy.

5. For the period of this estimate, the US and its allies will continue to pose the principal strategic threat to the USSR, but Soviet military planners must also be concerned with the emerging strategic capabilities of a hostile China. The substantial military buildup along the Chinese border over the past few years has consisted primarily of theater forces. The strengthening of air defenses has been modest in comparison, and at a deliberate pace that in the Soviet view probably matches Chinese offensive capabilities. The Soviets almost certainly believe that their great superiority in offensive strategic weapons will enable them to cope with any threat that might materialize in the foreseeable future, and they hope for a political change in China that would remove this possibility. For the longer term, however, Moscow must consider the problem of ABM defenses against a new threat from the south.

6. Soviet decisions as to how best to meet the strategic threat of the mid-1970's will be affected not only by the Soviet view of the threat and the pace of technological development, but also by the constraints of economics. The present Soviet leadership has shown a general disposition to accommodate military programs, and military expenditures have continued to rise. Moreover, within the military establishment strategic defense has long enjoyed a favored position. We estimate that the Soviet strategic defense effort is larger, both in absolute terms and as a share of the total military budget, than that of the US. Developments of the past year, however, have strengthened the demands of competing claimants, both civilian and military. The Soviet leaders have shown rising concern over the adverse effects of military spending upon economic growth; we believe that this was a major consideration in their decision to discuss strategic arms control with the US. Now the Czech crisis has raised new requirements for theater forces in Europe which, together with the continuing buildup on the Chinese border, will probably bring a significant increase in Soviet theater forces. Thus, we believe that competition is likely to intensify, not only between civilian and military programs, but also within the military establishment.

7. Current pressures may exercise a restraining influence on the strategic defense effort, but are unlikely to reduce it. For the near term, at least, expenditures for strategic defense will probably be maintained at their present high level, while military expenditures as a whole continue to rise. The trend for the longer term will depend heavily upon Soviet decisions concerning ABM deployment--potentially the most costly single military program on the horizon--and the related question of strategic arms control. If the Soviets embark upon any sizable new program of ABM deployment within the next few years, expenditures for strategic defense will increase and by the middle 1970's are likely to exceed those for strategic attack by a substantial margin.

[Here follow Parts II-V and three tables (pages 6-29).]

Washington, November 25, 1968.

SUBJECT
Review of U.S. Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities

This report supplements previous submissions which have been made to the President on the subject by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Because this is the Board's final report to you, it undertakes to account for the highlights of the Board's operations since its establishment on May 4, 1961. It also includes our current views respecting selected, long-term, intelligence-related problems which we deem worthy of continuing attention.

The Board was established by Executive Order 10938, dated May 4, 1961 (Attachment A)/2/ immediately following the Bay of Pigs episode and the Order was reconfirmed by you at the beginning of your Administration./3/

The charter of the Board directed that it (a) conduct a continuing, independent review and assessment of all functions of the Central Intelligence Agency and of other departments and agencies having responsibilities in the fields of foreign intelligence and covert activities, and (b) advise the President periodically with respect to the objectives and conduct of those activities required in the interest of foreign policy, national defense and security.

When you became President you reaffirmed the need for the Board, continued its terms of reference, reappointed the personnel who then comprised the Board, and thereafter made additional appointments to the Board. On occasion you have reemphasized the role and mission of the Board in directives to your principal advisors (Attachment B, dated October 19, 1965, and Attachment C, dated May 1, 1968)./4/

In accordance with the provisions of the Executive Order, the membership of the Board has been drawn from qualified individuals outside of Government. The individuals appointed to serve successively as Chairmen of the Board have been Dr. James R. Killian, from May 1961 to April 1963; Mr. Clark M. Clifford, from April 1963 to February 1968; and General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, (Ret.), from February 1968 to the present. Present membership of the Board is listed in Attachment D./5/ The Executive Secretary of the Board, Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, by reason of consecutive Presidential Appointments has been associated continuously with this and earlier Presidential Boards since 1956. The Board has found his services to be invaluable.

The heightening of world tensions and the spread of Communist aggression in recent years has resulted in a substantial increase in the size, cost, complexity and importance of the national intelligence effort. [4 lines of source text not declassified] About [number not declassified] personnel, civilian and military, are engaged in some aspect of intelligence activities in which many departments and agencies take part. Most of the money and manpower resources devoted to foreign intelligence activities are allocated to intelligence-related elements of the Department of Defense, including the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Unified and Specified Commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; the Cryptologic Agencies of the Military Services; and the National Security Agency. [7 lines of source text not declassified] The remaining costs, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are allocated to other units of the Department of Defense and to the intelligence components of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

The magnitude of this effort is a reflection of the steadily increasing volume of intelligence collection requirements levied upon the system. A substantial portion of our intelligence resources is allocated to the top-priority acquisition of data concerning the strategic military capabilities (offensive and defensive) of the Soviet Union and Communist China. The war in Vietnam has added greatly to the burden of our intelligence agencies. The need to know more about economic, political and military developments in newly-emerging nations has added further to the intelligence workload. If, in the aftermath of the Vietnam war, there should be a trend to review and possibly to revise U.S. commitments abroad, there will be a corresponding requirement for intelligence to serve as a basis for such judgments.

In the course of meeting national intelligence needs, it has become necessary to develop advanced and elaborate facilities for the collection and analysis of information in great volume. These facilities include photographic reconnaissance aircraft and satellite systems [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. A portion of the U.S. intelligence effort is concerned with espionage and counterespionage activities, including penetrations abroad of foreign governmental regimes, military organizations, political groups, and the development of intelligence resources among the diplomatic corps abroad. There are also overt collection sources such as the observations of hundreds of U.S. diplomats and Military Attaches; voluminous information is acquired daily from foreign broadcasts, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and other sources, adding to the heavy burdens of analysis placed upon the U.S. intelligence system.

All of these activities produce information essential for the preparation of estimates of enemy capabilities and intentions, and provide the intelligence base required for the formulation of U.S. foreign policy and for defense and budgetary planning. For the indefinite future, we foresee the continuing demand for an ever-improving intelligence system to meet critical needs of the decision-makers in the fields of foreign policy and national security.

The Board is the only organization of the Executive Branch having the responsibility for maintaining a continuing scrutiny of the complex but indispensable U.S. foreign intelligence effort, an effort which is large, expensive and widely-dispersed. The complexity of the effort and magnitude of the resources involved are such that the Board's concerns include proper utilization of the powers and authorities of the departments and agencies engaged in intelligence and associated activities. In the discharge of its functions the Board has conducted intermittent reviews of all significant intelligence activities of the several agencies engaged therein, including those of the Central Intelligence Agency; the Departments of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Service Cryptologic Agencies; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Unified and Specified Commands; the AEC; and the foreign intelligence aspects of the operations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (particularly counterintelligence). The Board has received the generous cooperation of the senior officials and subordinates of these departments and agencies.

The review function of the Board has not only served to keep it fully informed, but has also had the beneficial effect of causing the component agencies of the intelligence community to test and examine on a continuing basis the performance of their respective roles and responsibilities.

The Board has carried out its review responsibilities through the following means:

1. Meetings of the Full Board. The Board has held two-day meetings on alternate months. During your Administration the full Board held meetings totaling 52 days and during President Kennedy's tenure meetings of the full Board totaled 39 days. At these meetings the Board has: (a) received extensive briefings from representatives of the intelligence community on significant current intelligence developments and problems; (b) reviewed and acted upon reports of the Board's Panels and reports of on-the-scene reviews made by representatives of the Board; (c) held discussions on matters of mutual interest with the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of the member agencies of the community; (d) met with high-level consumers of the intelligence community's products to obtain their views on problem areas requiring remedial attention; (e) reviewed implementation by the intelligence community of earlier Board recommendations; and (f) prepared reports to the President.

2. Board Panels. Designated Panels of the Board (composed of selected members and the Executive Secretary) have been responsible for keeping the full Board informed with respect to significant actions, problems, gaps, overlaps and deficiencies in specified areas of the overall foreign intelligence effort. Certain of the Panels have investigated the conduct and interrelationships of intelligence operations in various geographic areas of the world. Others have examined the scientific and technological aspects of intelligence operations. Still others have dealt with the organizational and management aspects of the intelligence community as a whole and of the component elements of the community such as the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. One of the Panels has been concerned exclusively with counterintelligence problems and with the improvement of means to counter the attempts of foreign espionage services to penetrate our Government.

3. On-the-Scene Reviews. The Board has attached great importance to its on-the-scene reviews in the U.S. and abroad. It has been a long standing practice for individual Board members, together with the Executive Secretary, to make first-hand examinations of our intelligence operations in various regions of the world. Overseas these reviews have included consultations with U.S. Ambassadors, Chiefs of the Political and Economic Sections of our Embassies, our CIA Station Chiefs, our Defense Attaches and others as appropriate. Through personal observations, briefings and discussions Board representatives have been able to obtain a vivid picture of our intelligence activities, of the operational environment in which they are conducted, and of the special problems faced by our intelligence personnel in the field. At the same time we believe that these on-the-scene reviews, known to have been made on behalf of the President, have served to stimulate morale and job performance among the representatives of the intelligence agencies.

Recent overseas reviews conducted by the Board have included surveys of U.S. intelligence activities in Southeast Asia, the Far East, Western Europe, the Middle East and Latin America. In some of these areas, where critical U.S. intelligence interests were involved, repeated on-the-scene surveys were made by representatives of the Board. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

4. Review of Reports. The Board has required the submission of periodic and special reports by the various military and civilian intelligence agencies. These reports include annual submissions by each agency of the intelligence community, accounting to the Board in great detail with regard to all major aspects of their respective operations. This reporting procedure keeps the Board informed concerning significant intelligence programs, successes, problems, gaps and deficiencies, and at the same time compels the agencies periodically to take stock of the progress made in meeting their responsibilities.

5. Review of Major Intelligence Publications. The Board has maintained a continuing review of major intelligence publications which are produced on a daily, weekly, monthly, or "spot" basis by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of State and by the U.S. intelligence community collectively. These publications include current intelligence reports and appraisals of significant day-to-day developments, National Intelligence Estimates, Special National Intelligence Estimates, and the intelligence results of satellite and aircraft reconnaissance missions.

6. Discussions with the Principal Intelligence Consumers. In the course of its reviews and studies the Board has found it essential to consult from time to time with high-level users of intelligence including the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, JCS, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the heads of the various intelligence agencies, as a means of determining whether their critical intelligence requirements are being met adequately.

7. Special Studies. From time to time the Board has conducted special studies, at the request of the President, in regard to intelligence-related matters of particular national security interests. The subjects covered in these studies have included such matters as the following.

a. The performance of U.S. intelligence agencies in providing advance information on the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961.

b. The intelligence community's performance respecting the introduction of Soviet strategic missiles into Cuba in 1962.

c. The Soviet penetration in the 1961-1963 period of highly sensitive elements of the National Security Agency, prompting improved counterintelligence measures relating to personnel security investigations, clearances and to the safeguarding of sensitive intelligence data.

d. The intelligence coverage of the Gulf of Tonkin incident involving U.S. Naval forces in September 1964.

e. The quality, timeliness and handling of intelligence bearing on the enemy military offensive in South Vietnam during the Tet holidays in January 1968.

f. The intelligence aspects of the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty in June 1967, and the North Korean capture of the U.S. Signals Intelligence vessel, Pueblo, in January 1968.

g. The system for the control of military intelligence/combat aircraft operating over North Vietnam and the Tonkin Gulf, with a view to minimizing navigational errors and unintentional intrusions over the Chicom border.

h. The intelligence community's coverage of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

i. Measures to strengthen the intelligence community's capability for providing the President and other top officials with timely, interagency evaluations on developing crisis situations.

j. The scope and effectiveness of the intelligence community's special programs to keep abreast of Soviet and Chinese Communist scientific and technological developments, particularly in the strategic weapons field.

Throughout its tenure the Board has found it most helpful to have had meetings with the President to discuss major aspects of the foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert operations of our Government. Since its establishment in 1961, the full Board was privileged to have had 12 such meetings.

In keeping with its charter, the Board has reported its findings and recommendations directly to the President at frequent intervals. Following the submission of its reports, and after notification of actions directed thereon by the President, the Board has made a point to follow up on the implementation of its recommendations by the departments and agencies concerned.

From May 1961 to the present time, the Board has submitted a total of 41 reports to the President containing over 200 specific recommendations.

We believe that Presidential actions on Board recommendations, and the continuing support given by the Board to innovations and improvements in the agencies' intelligence programs, have made an important contribution to the noteworthy progress which has been made in various areas of the total intelligence effort. Some of the significant areas of progress to which we refer are listed below:

1. Reorganization of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). The USIB, established by National Security Council Directive, is the principal vehicle employed by the Director of Central Intelligence in the coordination of the total intelligence effort. Consistent with various Board recommendations, actions taken with a view to improving that coordination have included a reduction in the number of military agencies represented on the USIB, and realignment of the USIB's basic structure and methods of operation.

2. Internal Reorganization of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The establishment within the CIA of a Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology (on a coordinate level with the Deputy Directorates of Intelligence and Clandestine Operations) was undertaken in 1963, consistent with recommendations which the Board had made with a view to assuring maximum exploitation of science and technology in the furtherance of major intelligence programs and projects. As a result, progress has already been noted in special research and developmental areas concerned with intelligence applications of the natural sciences, behavioral research, and advanced photographic and other sensors.

3. Establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Since the establishment of the DIA in 1961 with the endorsement of the Board, that Agency has undertaken improvements in several segments of the Defense Department's intelligence activities, including a reduction in the dispersion of effort in intelligence areas of interest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. Establishment of the Defense Attache System. The dissolution of the three separate Service Attache Systems and the authorization in 1964 of a single Defense Attache System under DIA's centralized management and control have resulted in more efficient use of attache resources, better handling of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] requirements levied by the Department of Defense and the Military Services, and improved [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

5. [17-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

6. Strengthening of the National Signals Intelligence Program. Close and continuing attention by the Board, and its close collaboration with the Director of the National Security Agency, have led to substantial improvement in the management and conduct by the National Security Agency of the intercept and analysis of foreign communications and electronic intelligence. This large, complex and costly activity is targeted against the [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] of selected foreign nations. The program continues to provide unique data of major interest to U.S. policy officials, both civilian and military, including insights into the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] capabilities of a number of target countries. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

7. [12 lines of source text not declassified]

8. Attacking the Information-Handling Problem. In response to a series of reports and recommendations by the Board, combined action has been initiated by the member agencies of the intelligence community toward the planning, development and ultimate establishment of a computer-assisted, community-wide system for the management, storage and retrieval of the vast quantity of intelligence information which is collected, processed, analyzed and reported by these agencies on a continuing basis.

9. Improved Intelligence Collection Effort in the Vietnam War. Based on repeated on-the-scene reviews made by the Board in the Vietnam theater and on resulting recommendations to the President, there has been over the past three years an expanded and improved effort on the part of the entire intelligence community with respect to intelligence collection efforts in the Vietnam theater, with increased emphasis upon Signals Intelligence capabilities, clandestine agent operations, interrogation of prisoners of war and returnees, and processing and analysis of captured enemy documents.

10. Measures to Improve Personnel Security Screening Procedures and the Handling of Particularly Sensitive Information. As an outgrowth of Board recommendations, the intelligence community has put into effect uniform personnel security standards governing the screening of personnel for access to sensitive compartmented information. These uniform standards have resulted in stringent personnel security clearance criteria and enlarged requirements for background investigations leading to the issuance of security clearances.

11. [9-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Although gratifying advances have been made in our national intelligence effort (a few important examples of which are cited above) there remain a number of problem areas which we suggest should receive continuing attention. For the purpose of this report, we give only a bare summary to identify them as matters deserving priority attention for the future, noting that they are documented in greater detail in the files of the Board.

1. Current Intelligence Support to the President. As the Board's recent review of the performance of the intelligence community at the time of the Tet offensive has again emphasized, there is still an unresolved problem of meeting the President's day-to-day--sometimes hour-to-hour--requirements for intelligence without excessive resort to spot reports by-passing the responsible evaluation process of the intelligence apparatus. The problem consists of two parts--first, how to keep the Director of Central Intelligence continuously aware of the changing intelligence interests and needs of the President, and second, how to respond thereto with minimum delay. Whatever procedure is developed to meet this need, it is essential that the Director of Central Intelligence should continue to have a close rapport with the President and be, in every sense, his principal intelligence officer.

A possible means of meeting the need of the President for timely, evaluated spot intelligence would be for the DCI to assign a senior intelligence officer to the White House to work alongside the Special Assistant to the President for NSC Affairs for the purpose of anticipating Presidential intelligence needs and expediting the process by which the intelligence community satisfies them. This process could include a small group of analysts working directly under the DCI for the specific purpose of satisfying White House requirements with quick access to all the resources of the intelligence community.

2. Early Warning Capabilities. We shall probably never be satisfied with our early warning capabilities for crisis situations in spite of the continued efforts of the Director of Central Intelligence and the United States Intelligence Board to improve early warning procedures. In view of the transcendent requirement for timely warning of foreign actions related to our national defense and security, this subject is deserving of priority attention on a continuing basis.

3. Comparative Evaluations of Military Capabilities. The Board believes that national security interests would benefit from the establishment of an interagency mechanism (representing civilian and military departments and agencies) for making periodic, comparative evaluations of the military offensive and defensive capabilities of the U.S. and the USSR. It is important that this be an interdepartmental effort involving as participants all appropriate elements of the Executive Branch. We envisage that from time to time this body would evaluate the composition, reliability, effectiveness and vulnerability of the offensive and defensive forces of both sides, thus providing an informed basis for national policy decisions. An anticipated by-product of such studies would be the identification of significant gaps in the intelligence community's coverage of the USSR.

4. Science and Technology. In spite of progress made in linking scientific and technological resources with intelligence activities, the Board believes that an even greater effort should be made to ensure that the substantial and innovative resources of the nation's scientific and technologic community are brought to bear upon critical intelligence problems, including the development and application of concepts for long-term, sophisticated systems for the collection and timely communication of critically-needed intelligence. This coupling of the intelligence community with key elements of the scientific and technological community has proved to be extremely rewarding in the case of the National Signals Intelligence Program and of the National Reconnaissance Program.

5. Signals Intelligence. Continued efforts by the Secretary of Defense are needed to assure the most effective possible management, organization and conduct of the U.S. Signals Intelligence effort as an essentially national resource, having as its primary mission the satisfaction of critical national (as distinguished from departmental) intelligence needs.

6. Communication of Signals Intelligence. In order that the National Security Agency may carry out its mission, it is imperative that it manage and control all [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Signals Intelligence material [2 lines of source text not declassified]. This requires continued administration by the National Security Agency of facilities for the communication of such material and messages.

7. National Security Agency Direction. In the past, the National Security Agency has been handicapped by the too frequent rotation of its directorship. The Board is convinced that in order to achieve increased management effectiveness of this highly important intelligence activity, longer tours of duty should be established for the directorship. Consideration should also be given to the alternative of a military or civilian appointee to this position.

8. Information-Handling. Although a beginning has been made toward improved management and handling of the great volume of intelligence information, there is need for continued stimulus, at highest Governmental levels, to energize and integrate the efforts being made by elements of our intelligence community to exploit automated procedures, machine aids and computers for the collection, processing, analysis, communication and reporting of intelligence information.

9. Espionage. In general, the Board regards the results of U.S. espionage efforts as inadequate and urges an intensification of efforts to obtain significant intelligence on priority targets through clandestine agent collection operations. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

10. Counterespionage. Because of the unrelenting efforts of foreign intelligence services to subvert military and civilian personnel of our Government and to acquire access to our classified information, the intelligence community must be on the alert constantly to detect and defend against such operations on the part of foreign powers. It is essential that this effort include the positive clandestine collection of intelligence both at home and abroad with respect to these hostile operations. The Board considers that there is a most critical gap in this counterespionage coverage resulting from the absence of policy authorization for the use of audiosurveillance devices against the espionage activities of foreign agents operating within the U.S.

11. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

12. Validation of Intelligence Requirements. There is an unsatisfied need for more effective methods for the screening of intelligence collection requirements with the objective of assuring that assignments of collection tasks take into account national intelligence needs, objectives and priorities; the collection resources which would have to be utilized; and the expected value of the intelligence information which would be obtained. Improved methods could result in a substantial reduction in the vast workload and great costs entailed in trying to meet the countless requirements which are continually levied and which tend to bog down our foreign intelligence apparatus.

13. Covert Operations. We believe that the 303 Committee should lend greater emphasis to periodic review of all approved covert programs in order to evaluate progress being made, and in appropriate instances, cancel unproductive projects.

14. Defense Intelligence Agency. This Board endorsed the concept of Defense Intelligence Agency as announced by the Secretary of Defense just prior to his establishment of the DIA in a directive issued in August 1961. As indicated previously in this report we believe that the DIA shows promise of achieving the principal objectives for which it was created. To insure that the full realization of this promise is not unduly delayed, it is of first importance that the DIA receive the real and continuing cooperation of each of the military departments, and be provided as soon as possible with all necessary means in the way of proper space, advanced equipment and qualified personnel needed for the accomplishment of its critical mission.

15. Increased Policy Guidance by the National Security Council. It is the opinion of the Board that a number of the major problems confronting the intelligence community stem from inadequacies in the policy guidance and coordination which is provided to the intelligence community. We believe that the prosecution of the national intelligence effort would be materially enhanced if stronger policy direction and guidance were made available by the National Security Council. As a first step in that direction we suggest an early review, and up-dating where appropriate, of the National Security Council Intelligence Directives and related directives which govern the responsibilities and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the conduct of the total U.S. foreign intelligence and covert action effort. These directives have not been reviewed for several years, and we consider it essential that they be reexamined by the NSC at an early date, with a view to effecting such revisions as are necessary to assist the intelligence agencies in the improved performance of their respective missions, and to lend increased support of the President and the NSC to the Director of Central Intelligence in discharging more effectively his responsibility for coordination of the U.S. intelligence effort as a whole.

16. Retention of Overseas Intelligence Facilities. The Board is aware of the review that is being conducted of the future need for the overseas bases and installations which are presently maintained in support of our foreign policy. Among those which may be considered for elimination there undoubtedly will be some having important intelligence functions which, in the interest of the national security, must continue to be performed. The Board urges that intelligence requirements receive careful consideration before making decisions to eliminate bases having important intelligence missions which cannot otherwise be performed.

We have directed attention in this report to selected topics which we believe should continue to receive priority attention by Government officials having responsibility for the management and implementation of the national intelligence program. There are other aspects of the intelligence effort which have been the subject of Board studies, reports and specific recommendations, and are in our opinion appropriate for periodic reexamination and follow-up action.

In closing, we would like to reiterate our feeling of the increasing importance of the national intelligence effort to our security. It is a field of great complexity requiring the services of thousands of dedicated professionals of ability, training and experience who should receive the firm and continuing support of senior officials of Government. It is of the utmost importance to attract and retain these valuable specialists and instill in them an esprit de corps based on a feeling of the importance of their work and the esteem in which it is held by the nation. The Board has noted in recent times an unhappy tendency in Congress, the press and elsewhere to denigrate intelligence in the public eye and to undermine public confidence in our intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA. This dangerous trend is in part fomented by foreign and domestic enemies of our national security. The Board expresses the hope that in the future the senior spokesmen of Government will continue to give serious thought to the need, in the national interest, to reverse this trend and to give voice to the importance and quality of the work being done by the intelligence community.

For the Board,
Maxwell D. Taylor

During 1968 the Joint Chiefs of Staff proceeded to develop a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1971-1978 (JSOP FY 71-78). The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded Volume I, Strategy (65 pages), under cover of a July 6, 1968, memorandum (SM-456-68) to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the regional Commanders in Chief, and the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command. This memorandum noted that Volume I was to be used in the development of military recommendations for the preparation of Volume II, Analyses and Force Tabulations; Volume III, Free World Forces; and appropriate Annexes. (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 72 A 1499, 381 JSOP 71-78 1968 Volume I-Strategy) Volumes II and III and the annexes have not been found. Under cover of a December 5 memorandum to Secretary of Defense Clifford (JCSM-713-68), the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted Volume I with the recommendation that the military strategy in Volume I "be used as the basis for the development of DOD policy on major strategic issues and in analyses leading to development of the Five-Year Defense Program." (Ibid.)

CM-3811-68

Washington, December 19, 1968.

SUBJECT
FY 1970 Defense Budget Discussion with the President (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to my memorandum, dated 26 November 1968,/2/ which contained information on the forthcoming FY 1970 defense budget discussion with the President./3/

2. (U) A copy of the statement that I plan to give and the illustrative examples to be discussed by each Service Chief are attached for your information.

3. (C) Since information concerning many budgetary and force level decisions is not available at this time, it may be necessary to revise the illustrative examples prior to meeting with the President. I shall appreciate an opportunity to discuss with you the time and place for our meeting with the President.

4. (U) Without enclosures, this memorandum is Confidential.

Earle G. Wheeler

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN, JCS ON
FY 1970 DEFENSE BUDGET

Mr. President, recognizing the financial constraints under which the FY 70 budget is being developed, the JCS decided against addressing individual issues as has been the custom in the past. Instead, we propose to discuss the general posture of our armed forces with emphasis on the impact of FY 70 budget decisions on present and future military capabilities. I will provide a brief assessment and each Service Chief will provide illustrative examples highlighting his key areas of concerns.

The JCS are fully aware of the wide variety of demands on our nation's resources and the hard decisions which must be taken in allocating these resources. The war in Southeast Asia, coupled with the dangerous situation in Northeast Asia, and the unstable and uncertain environments in the Middle East and Europe, challenge our capability for adequate and timely response to other contingencies which might arise.

The Soviet threat continues to expand in size and improve in quality. There is no indication that it is leveling off nor is there any sign of self-imposed limitations based upon achievement of a particular force capability. We expect an increase in Soviet land and sea-based missiles, an increased deployment of anti-ballistic missiles, an improvement in air defense, and an overall improvement of their general purpose forces.

Despite US progress in certain areas, rapid increases in USSR capabilities have eroded our once clearly superior strategic position.

The Soviet missile force is growing in size. Our strategic force is undergoing qualitative improvements, such as Poseidon and Minuteman III, which will increase our force effectiveness; however, it is programmed to remain static in numbers. While our bomber force is being reduced, the loss in numbers is partially offset by the introduction of a short-range attack missile and a new decoy missile. Our capability to defend the continental US against the bomber threat will be reduced by force reductions programmed for FY 70. The lack of an effective ballistic missile defense is also cause for concern, although the planned Sentinel deployment represents a significant first step in this direction.

The JCS are concerned with the decreased readiness of our general purpose forces and their capability to respond to possible worldwide contingencies. Our fighting forces in Vietnam are the best equipped and supported in history; however, the higher priorities given Southeast Asia, together with manpower and funding limitations, have resulted in constraints on personnel and materiel in other areas of the world. The resulting personnel turbulence, curtailment of training, and diversions of logistic assets to meet unprogrammed requirements magnify the deficiencies in our current military posture.

In this regard, the plan for the improvement and modernization of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces is receiving priority attention and support. The JCS note, however, that it will require diversions of service equipment programmed and procured for US forces. An uncompensated diversion of materiel from US forces will have an adverse effect upon the readiness of general purpose forces not directly committed to the conflict in Southeast Asia.

The JCS consider that US strategic force levels, when compared with the growing Soviet strategic capabilities, represent a declining trend in the US strategic position vis-a-vis the USSR. Additionally, we believe that the existing conventional capability of our general purpose forces provides only a limited choice of options at the present time outside Southeast Asia. It does not provide the capability to reinforce NATO adequately in a timely manner, nor of simultaneously providing a response to other than minor contingencies elsewhere.

Risks associated with the capabilities of our programmed forces can be reduced by short-term actions such as: (1) improving the readiness of deployed forces, (2) modernizing current forces, (3) retaining forces scheduled for phase down, and (4) providing adequate logistic support.

Deferral of such actions is generating an accumulation of unfunded requirements which reduce current force capabilities and will have an adverse impact on force capabilities in the future.

In amplification of these judgments, and to provide further insight into these matters, each Service Chief is prepared to discuss his areas of concern, with illustrative examples.

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES

Army--Low manning levels in Korea and Europe, and STRAF structure and manning level problems.

Navy--Shortages of personnel, and budget constraints related to capability and staying power of naval forces.

Air Force--Reductions in Strategic Bomber and Air Defense Forces.

Marine Corps--Degradation of amphibious assault capability.

Washington, December 19, 1968.

CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS AND DECISIONS
AT THE 48th SIG MEETING ON DECEMBER 19, 1968

PRESENT
The Under Secretary of State, Chairman
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Taylor, for the Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Poats for the Administrator, Agency for International Development
Mr. Akers for the Director, United States Information Agency
The Under Secretary of Treasury
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
SIG Staff Director

SSDSG--Ambassador McClintock
SSDSG--General McDonald
DOD--Dr. Halperin
DOD--General Orwat
DOD--General Ginsburgh
BOB--Mr. Clark
NASA--Mr. Morris
NASA--Mr. Radius
State--Ambassador Leonhart
State--Mr. Farley
State--Dr. Ruser

Mr. Katzenbach regretted that General Wood, Director of the Study,/2/ was unable to attend. He would try to meet with General Wood later on to obtain his personal views and conclusions.

Mr. Katzenbach said he recognized that SIG members had not had a great deal of time to review the study. But, inasmuch as the SIG had commissioned this work, he felt the SIG should discuss next steps. Also, any preliminary comments SIG members might have would be helpful in the follow-on.

He personally found the report a very valuable, interesting document. He had no doubt that it would have a significant influence on policy making. It was encyclopedic in its survey of our overseas installations and facilities. Even if this were all, it would have considerable value to the new Administration.

Mr. Katzenbach noted the separate treatment on overseas intelligence facilities. He would like to discuss this volume with General Wood in a more restricted forum.

The Ambassador said he would like to pay tribute to General Wood's role in the project. General Wood had provided intellectual leadership and teamwork. The Study clearly had his personal imprint.

The Study was the first effort in some 10 years to review all of our overseas installations and facilities. It differed in several respects from the earlier Nash report:/3/

First, it examined our overseas base requirements on the basis of alternative strategies and options, whereas the earlier study has simply projected current doctrine;

Secondly, it covered intelligence facilities, as well as other functional and regional requirements;

Thirdly, it considered in some depth a series of special technical problems associated with our installations, including their balance of payments and budgetary cost, the relationship with military and economic assistance programs, the implications of disarmament and arms control, and the impact of the accelerated advance of science and technology.

In preparing the Study, Ambassador McClintock said, the Group had examined United States security interests and commitments, and prospective trends in the world environment during the 1970s. In addition, it had prepared a comprehensive tabulation of all our installations and facilities country-by-country.

The United States now had overseas about the same number of people as it had ten years ago. These numbers, however, included troops deployed in Viet-Nam. Excluding Viet-Nam, personnel had been cut by half. These reductions were not concentrated in any one place but ranged from Korea and North Africa and Western Europe.

The Study fell into two parts--our overseas facilities as related to global requirements and the facilities needed essentially for the support of regional policies.

In the first category, the Group had considered the requirements for strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems, ASW, intelligence, early warning systems, and for research and scientific activities such as NASA tracking stations and the atomic energy detecting system.

As regards the treatment of regional policies and strategies, the Ambassador noted the alternative approaches discussed in the summary of the report, namely, the choice, for purposes of analysis, of assuming alternative base structures and examining their strategic implications, or of specifying alternative strategies and developing base systems to support them. The Group had chosen the latter course.

This was a basic point of methodology. It involved eight essential steps.

--First, specify the military deployment requirements to support a particular regional strategy.

--Second, determine which of these deployment patterns would require changes in the base structure.

--Third, lay out the available base structure.

--Fourth, assess the probability that the existing base facilities would not be retainable for political reasons.

--Fifth, evaluate the vulnerability of the facilities to enemy attack.

--Sixth, assess the extent to which available bases would support various regional strategies.

--Seventh, highlight the specific changes from the present base structure required to support various regional strategies.

--Eighth, estimate the cost of these changes.

Ambassador McClintock said the key chapter in the Study was Chapter 5, entitled "Policy-Strategy Alternatives and Base Structures for the 1970s", which reviewed in some detail the base structures required for support of each regional strategy. Each base and base complex had been costed out in terms of its initial investment cost and the annual balance of payments drain or savings.

Generally speaking, these cost estimates were fairly rough. In the case of the Pacific region, however, the various regional strategies had been subjected to a much more detailed costing by a special sub-group (Vol. VII).

The Study Group had been much encouraged because the results of this detailed costing were about the same as the rough estimates made by the Study Group itself.

This was the first time that major strategies for a world region had been subjected to this kind of systematic analysis.

Ambassador McClintock stressed that the Study Group had set forth certain broad alternatives only. They evidently had not been able to consider all the variations. One of the first tasks was to pinpoint which of these strategies should be analyzed in greater depth--a task for the new Administration.

Ambassador McClintock then proceeded to review the results of the regional analyses.

As regards Europe, the Study outlined five alternative strategies. The major constraint was that of geography. Unlike Asia, there was no realistic off-shore, over the horizon, deployment possibility. United States forces must be deployed in an area allowing only limited defense in depth--or they must be deployed 3,000 miles away in the United States.

The two key strategies were those of the NATO DPM--alternative 2A--and of forward defense with early selective use of nuclear weapons--alternative 3. The latter would result in an annual $250 million balance of payments saving. The other strategies--alternatives 4 and 5--which assumed a thinning out--or removal--of the United States presence--envisaged a European (conventional and tactical nuclear) build-up to compensate for the withdrawal of the United States forces. They would permit an annual balance of payments saving of up to $1.25 billion (alternative 5).

Turning to the Pacific, Ambassador McClintock noted that the problem here had been to formulate alternative policies in a post Viet-Nam environment. One important conclusion was that withdrawal of forces from the mainland of Asia must not be equated with a budgetary saving because of the cost of moving United States forces to alternate locations and the cost of new installations in these locations. In fact, some of the withdrawal strategies were extremely expensive, e.g., redeployment of United States forces to Hawaii and the Pacific Trust Territories.

For each alternative, it was assumed that United States forces available for various contingencies were those of existing DPMs.

Another important point was the trade-off between military assistance and United States forces deployments. For example, alternative 4 assumed forward defense on the mainland by indigenous forces only. This strategy involved an annual balance of payments saving of about $600 million. But, to be fully implemented, it would entail an estimated investment cost of $5-$10 billion over, say, a ten year period to modernize indigenous forces.

A third conclusion was the critical importance of the Pacific Trust Territories. The United States did not now possess clear title to these territories. There was some danger that the Japanese would become so popular with the islanders that a plebiscite would return the islands to the Japanese.

Mr. Katzenbach noted that the problem was one of Congressional attitudes. There was unanimity within the Executive Branch on the need to do more in these Territories. He felt some progress had been made this past year in increasing Congressional awareness of the importance of this problem.

As regards the Western Hemisphere, Ambassador McClintock said the Study had considered three, progressively more interventionist, strategies. The conclusion was that we were able to handle virtually any contingency from our facilities in Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone. This pointed up a general lesson, viz. that the United States has a great deal of valuable territory suitable for support of various overseas strategies (e.g., Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, Hawaii and Guam, and our possessions in the Caribbean).

The other point to make was related to the importance of control over the Atlantic Narrows in the event of conventional war. In this connection, our access and overflight rights in Brazil were of considerable value.

Turning to the Near East, the main contingency, although it was not used as the basic situation, was that of an Arab-Israeli confrontation leading to United States involvement.

The main conclusion for this region was this: the DPM envisaged a maximal United States deployment of three divisions and 19 tactical air squadrons in support of Iran. The analysis has shown that such a deployment would not be feasible without additional access rights in Liberia, Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia.

In the Indian Ocean area, all the alternatives pointed to the importance of Diego Garcia as a supply base and staging area. Even the Indian leadership, as it became more alarmed at Soviet activities, seemed to find such a facility less and less objectionable. For example, the possible deployment of Poseidon-armed nuclear subs would be much easier to handle from this island base.

Ambassador McClintock then summarized some general conclusions.

General Wood had objected to firm policy/strategy recommendations but had concurred in setting forth a series of findings. Some of these were:

--First, the value of our security talks with Japan and Australia. In this connection, the question arose whether similar security talks at an appropriate level might perhaps be desirable with the Philippines.

--Second, the desirability that Ambassadors and unified commanders be asked for periodic assessment of the capabilities of their facilities, so that the Executive Branch has a better, more up-to-date understanding of what these facilities are capable of and how they can support functional or regional requirements.

--Third, the importance of economic and military assistance as a way to preserve access and staging rights and build up local forces in lieu of United States deployments.

--Fourth, the fact that research and development can be useful in reducing requirements in host countries. This had to be qualified in the sense that scientists and engineers were not sensitive to the need to avoid proliferation of our overseas bases and facilities.

--Fifth, the fact that withdrawal of United States forces from forward positions may increase, rather than decrease, budget costs because of the expense of relocating troops and facilities.

--Sixth, the point that certain base systems, such as those in the Western Hemisphere, can support multiple strategies and are not tied to any specific regional strategy.

--Seventh, the continued importance of certain naval base facilities in Western Europe and the Mediterranean.

--Eighth, the fact that reversion of Okinawa is inevitable. We would be better off trying to make the best possible deal rather than waiting until reversion is forced upon us. On the other hand, there was no reason to give up more than administrative responsibility [1 line of source text not declassified].

--Ninth, the desirability of taking another close look at the possible uses of Sattahip and Singapore in support of United States deployments, the latter through commercial arrangements using the facilities left behind by the British.

--Tenth, the fact that staging and overflight rights in Africa and Latin America cannot be secured except on an ad hoc basis. We would have to be reconciled to this situation over the foreseeable future.

In conclusion, Ambassador McClintock said he would like to emphasize that preparation of this Study was a massive worldwide effort. The Group had enjoyed excellent cooperation from the Unified Commands, notably General Lemnitzer and CINCPAC, as well as the various Ambassadors.

Mr. Barr/4/ wondered about the costs of strategies that envisaged withdrawal of our forces from forward positions. He felt that a distinction should be made between budgetary and foreign exchange costs. Ambassador McClintock agreed that redeployment of our forces to the dollar area, while costly in budgetary terms, would yield sizable foreign exchange savings. Budgetary costs and IBOP savings for each alternative are contained in the Study.

Mr. Eugene Rostow said that he found our staging rights in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area quite unsatisfactory. As of now, our forces would be severely handicapped if they had to enter the Gulf. A United States presence in this area was important in view of the rivalry between the Shah and the Arabs and the importance of the oil supplies.

Mr. Bohlen asked about the status of Diego Garcia. Mr. Nitze said that he had authorized a construction survey and that construction funds had been included in the FY 70 Defense budget. The cost of the planned installation was estimated at $26 million. The diplomatic side of this problem had been solved.

General McDonald said he wanted to elaborate on the Study's cost estimates. These all assumed constant force levels. The costs and savings shown resulted from different deployment patterns exclusively. In this respect, the Study differed from others which usually included savings resulting from changes in force structure.

Mr. Poats suggested that the funding of base rentals be examined on a world-wide basis. In the case of Spanish facilities, this was a problem in FY 70. If it was decided to put the Spanish MAP into the Defense budget, the question arose whether this principle should not also be followed for other military assistance programs, which in effect represent a rental payment.

The SIG then discussed next steps for review and disposition of the Study.

Mr. Katzenbach observed that, in his view, this was a matter for the next Administration. The SIG should, however, make interim arrangements to permit some follow-on work to go forward until the new Administration could decide on its own arrangements.

In addition, he felt it was very important not to foreclose any of the new Administration's options by premature disclosures. The Study contained extremely sensitive information. He saw some danger that bits and pieces would leak out, conveying a totally erroneous impression.

Accordingly, he would like to propose:

--First, recipients personally take responsibility to restrict distribution of the document in their own departments. As regards the State Department, those with a need to know, essentially the Assistant Secretaries, had copies. No further distribution was contemplated.

--Second, there would be no distribution beyond that already made between now and January 20. In particular, he did not believe there should be an overseas distribution until the new Administration has an opportunity to review the document and the arrangements.

--Third, as and when field comment is required, he questioned whether the whole report should be distributed. It might be preferable to limit distribution to pertinent portions of the report, i.e. a "sanitized" version containing all those sections pertinent to the addressee.

General Wheeler said he would like the JCS to study the various strategies contained in the paper. He would like the Chief to begin thinking about alternative regional strategies in these terms. He felt the Study contained important material for the next Administration's policy making.

Mr. Katzenbach said he had no particular difficulty with an internal JCS distribution on a need-to-know basis. In some respect, the JCS staff was perhaps more familiar with handling this kind of document. This also applied to the intelligence community.

Mr. Barr said he would like Treasury to review the foreign exchange cost estimates. What was important about these estimates was not only the overall balance of payments cost of the various strategies, but also where the balance of payments drain was occurring--whether it involved, e.g., Japan, Germany or the franc area.

Mr. Barr agreed that it was unlikely Treasury would be able to do much work on this problem before January 20 and that only part of the information was actually needed for review purposes.

Mr. Katzenbach emphasized that he did not advocate a rewriting of the Study. The Study was there to use. Rather, he was proposing that pertinent portions be excerpted from the complete report for further follow-on work on a need-to-know basis.

The SIG then discussed the Study Group's proposal to cost and additional strategies in greater detail--similar to the costing in Volume VII on West Pac. Mr. Katzenbach observed that the Study Group would require policy guidance on which of the various alternatives were worthy of further analysis. This guidance would have to come from the new Administration.

Another problem, Mr. Katzenbach said, was that the SIG did not know how the new Administration wanted to organize the national security process and, therefore, how to dispose of a study of this kind. (A similar problem existed with respect to a number of other SIG projects.) He would like to entrust to the Political-Military Group responsibility for further work, including:

1. Coordination of the interdepartmental review; and,

2. The preparation of appropriate recommendations.

He thought it better that the SIG assign responsibilities which the new Administration then could approve or modify as it saw fit. He did not feel that these arrangements would preempt the new Administration's options. The Political-Military Group would not be able to do more than begin the review of this massive study between now and January 20.

Mr. Katzenbach said the proposal was to include intelligence facilities under these arrangements, with the understanding that the Political-Military Group would redelegate the intelligence part to a more restricted sub-group.

The intelligence facilities were of course a separate system. But, as the report recognized, there was a relationship between these facilities and other installations. There was need for a central point where conclusions about these various systems could be put together.

Admiral Taylor agreed that further work was needed on the intelligence parts of the Study. He found composition of the Political-Military Group somewhat amorphous. The membership appeared to vary from problem to problem. He would designate Major Gen. John M. Reynolds as the Agency's representative for this purpose. Also, the intelligence chapter should be taken up in a special sub-group of the PMG.

As regards the IRGs, Mr. Katzenbach suggested that the PMG try to identify specific issues on which it would like to have the IRGs' views and recommendations. (The IRGs would, of course, be free to comment on other pertinent aspects of the Study.)

The suggestion was made that the PMG might want to use a few of the more experienced cost analysts of the Study Group for its follow-on work.

Before adjourning, the SIG briefly took up three additional matters:

--Mr. Katzenbach said he would like to include in the SIG directive/5/ some substantive guidance on the focus of the follow-on work in the Political-Military Group;

--Mr. Katzenbach proposed a revision in the stand-by press guidance;

--The Group agreed that there was no need for Congressional briefings at this time inasmuch as the Study was a technical report rather than a decision document.

Arthur A. Hartman
Staff Director

Washington, undated.

SIG DIRECTIVE

At its 48th meeting on December 19, 1968, the Senior Interdepartmental Group received a report on the results of the overseas base study undertaken by the joint State/Defense Study Group./2/

The SIG agreed that the Political-Military Group should be charged with responsibility for:

a) coordination of the interdepartmental review of the Study;

b) the preparation of appropriate recommendations to the SIG.

To this end, the five IRGs are requested to review appropriate sections of the Study and submit their conclusions and recommendations to the Political-Military Group. Taking these views and recommendations into account, the Political-Military Group is requested to submit its recommendations on further action to the SIG by March 1, 1969.

These should, to the extent feasible, include recommendations regarding (1) working assumptions on the strategies which should guide future base planning; (2) bases in which significant changes could be made in the near future (two years); (3) bases in which significant changes could be foreseen in the 1970s; (4) bases in which no significant changes can be foreseen; and (5) any steps that should be taken to improve the examination of future base problems in the United States Government.

A special sub-group with appropriate membership shall be established to review the intelligence chapter and submit appropriate recommendations.

Additionally, it is understood that the PMG may ask the State/Defense Study Group to reconstitute the special sub-group that prepared Annex J to cost out additional alternative base structures for strategies in various regions.

To ensure a systematic unified review of the Study's findings, the SIG noted the desirability that the Political-Military Group be free to pose specific issues for the IRGs to consider. Review of the Study by the IRGs would not, however, be restricted to these specific issues; rather the IRGs should be free to comment on any other points pertinent to their jurisdiction. The Political-Military Group's final report should discuss remaining differences on conclusions and recommendations between the IRGs and the Political-Military Group.

The SIG also agreed that the Study not be distributed further at this time pending:

a) a review of the arrangements for disposition of the Study by the new Administration; and,

b) some progress by the Political-Military Group in defining facts and issues requiring review by the IRGs, the constituent agencies, and the field.

In this connection, SIG members are requested to take responsibility for the handling of this sensitive document within their respective agencies. No field distribution is contemplated pending additional guidance from the new Administration. The SIG Staff Director should be consulted on such limited additional distributions as may be necessary in the several agencies to commence review of the report.

The SIG also agreed that, as a general principle, access to the document in the agencies should be restricted to a need-to-know basis. Furthermore, access by staffs should be limited to those portions of the Study actually required for review purposes.

The SIG also considered the question of Congressional briefings and consultations. It noted that the existence of the Study had received considerable attention in the press, and that Congressional inquiries might be expected from time to time. The SIG agreed that it would be premature to brief members of the Congress on the contents of the report inasmuch as:

a) evaluation of the Study is still under way; and,

b) the Study is a technical document, setting forth basic data for policy options, rather than a document advocating specific lines of action.

Approved guidance for handling press inquiries is attached.

PRESS GUIDANCE

In the event recipients are queried by the press or others about the base study, the following guidance is provided. (Recipients may also draw upon earlier guidance provided in State 211289 (African posts only), 211290, and 261970.)/3/

The long-range study on the overseas bases has been completed. It is one of a number of classified studies undertaken by the joint State/Defense Study Group. The results have been submitted to the SIG on 19 December and contain no specific recommendations, but are simply designed to aid those who will face future policy decisions. It would not be appropriate to discuss the content of the report or to release it.

CM-3943-68 Washington, December 26, 1968.

SUBJECT
FY '70 Budget Discussion

1. This memorandum responds to our telecon on the evening of 24 December./2/

2. The JCS decided that, in view of the complexity of the FY '70 budget problem and the numerous hard decisions which had to be made, it would be profitable to focus our discussion with the President/3/ on the impact of FY '70 budget decisions on our present and future military capabilities. As you will recognize, this is a departure from the past practice of having each Chief in effect reclama the decisions made in certain specific programs.

3. Accordingly, I will lead off for the JCS by discussing the Soviet threat, our capabilities in the strategic area relative to the Soviets, the capabilities of our general purpose forces, and the trends seen by us. Thereafter, the other Chiefs in turn will illustrate our concerns by addressing one or two specific items in their particular areas of professional interest. We propose the following sequence and subjects:

a. Gen Palmer--Low manning levels in Europe and Korea, and Strategic Army Force structure and manning level problems;

b. Adm Moorer--Shortages of personnel, and budget constraints related to capability and staying power of naval forces;

c. Gen McConnell--Reductions in strategic bomber and air defense forces;

d. Gen Chapman--Degradation of amphibious assault capability.

4. We will, of course, be prepared to discuss other subjects as desired by the President; for example, questions raised by him at lunch-eon on Tuesday/4/ regarding Sentinel, ammunition procurement, the F-14, etc.

Earle G. Wheeler