Following the election of November 4, 1960, President-elect John F. Kennedy and his transition advisers focused among other things on questions involving the organization and administration of foreign policy, particularly proposals for modifying and streamlining the structure of the National Security Council apparatus as it had developed during the Eisenhower administration. Among principal transition advisers to the President-elect were Clark M. Clifford, a Washington attorney who had served as Special Counsel to President Truman, and Richard E. Neustadt, Professor of Public Law and Government at Columbia University. Clifford served as a channel of communication with the Eisenhower administration and maintained contact with General Wilton B. Persons, President Eisenhower's Assistant, from the time of their first meeting on November 14, 1960, through the weeks that followed. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pages 118-127, 209-210; and Bromley K. Smith, Organizational History of the National Security Council During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations (Washington: National Security Council, 1988), pages 5-14.

Several transition memoranda Neustadt prepared for President-elect Kennedy dealt with aspects of the organization and administration of foreign policy. These included "Staffing the President-Elect," October 30, 1960; "Conversation with Richard Bissell about a 'Personal Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief-Elect'," November 25, 1960; "The National Security Council: First Steps," December 8, 1960; "Next Steps in Staffing the White House and Executive Office," December 9, 1960; and "Introducing McGeorge Bundy to General Persons," January 3, 1961. Copies of these memoranda are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Richard E. Neustadt.

On December 6 President-elect Kennedy met with President Eisenhower at the White House. They discussed various subjects, including the organization and operation of the White House staff, the National Security Council, and the Pentagon. Eisenhower urged the President-elect to avoid any reorganization until "he himself could become well acquainted with the problem." The full text of Eisenhower's account of the meeting is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. It is printed in The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961, pages 712-716. See also Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, volume III, page 493.

During the transition period the President-elect was influenced by the findings and recommendations of the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations, chaired by Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington. Senator Jackson had begun hearings on the national security system in 1959, and Neustadt had become a consultant to the subcommittee. The subcommittee's initial recommendations, first released during the transition period on November 22, 1960, largely coincided with Kennedy's views on streamlining the National Security Council mechanism. See Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pages 209-210; Smith, Organizational History, pages 5-7. For the first published Jackson subcommittee hearings and reports from the 86th Congress, Second Session, and the 87th Congress, First Session, see Organizing for National Security: Inquiry of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate; vol. 1, Hearings; vol. 2, Studies and Background Material; and vol. 3, Staff Reports and Recommendations (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961).

On January 1, 1961, in announcing the appointment of McGeorge Bundy as his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Kennedy indicated that he had been impressed by the recommendations of the Jackson Subcommittee, and that these would provide a starting point for the task of reorganizing the operations of the National Security Council. The President-elect stated: "I intend to consolidate under Mr. Bundy's direction the present National Security Council secretariat, the staff and functions of the Operations Coordinating Board, and the continuing functions of a number of special projects staffs within the White House. I have asked Mr. Bundy to review with care existing staff organization and arrangements, and to simplify them wherever possible toward the end that we may have a single, small, but strongly organized staff unit to assist me in obtaining advice from, and coordinating operations of, the government agencies concerned with national security affairs."

"Mr. Bundy will serve as my personal assistant on these matters and as director of whatever staff we find is needed for the purpose. It will be part of his assignment to facilitate the work of the National Security Council as a body advisory to the President. I intend to seek advice from the members of the Council, both collectively and individually, and it is my hope to use the National Security Council and its machinery more flexibly than in the past. I have been much impressed with the constructive criticism contained in the recent staff report by Senator Jackson's Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. The Subcommittee's study provides a useful starting point for the work that Mr. Bundy will undertake in helping me to strengthen and to simplify the operations of the National Security Council." (Statement from the Press Office of Senator John F. Kennedy, Palm Beach, Florida, for release Sunday January 1, 1961; text in Henry M. Jackson, ed., The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level (New York: Praeger, 1965), pages 302-303.

Additional documentation on the reorganization of the National Security Council mechanism during the Kennedy administration is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VIII. On aspects of the organization and administration of foreign policy in the Kennedy administration generally, see also the following works by participants: George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: Norton, 1982); John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969); Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1967); Walt W. Rostow, View From the Seventh Floor (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Dean Rusk, as told to Richard Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: Norton, 1990); and Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).

2. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to the President's Assistant (Persons)/1/

Washington, January 16, 1961.

/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Presidential Transition Series. Confidential. Initialed by Persons. Another copy indicates that the memorandum was drafted by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Director of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State, and by Herter. (Ibid., Herter Papers)

SUBJECT
Transition Arrangements

In connection with our efforts to make the transition process a smooth one, I met personally on several occasions with Mr. Rusk, following the announcement on December 12 of his appointment, to discuss operations of the Department and to keep him currently informed on political problems, such as Cuba and Laos. These meetings took place on December 20, 1960, January 2, 3, 6, 7, 9 and 16, 1961.

Mr. Rusk designated Mr. George McGhee to serve as his representative to receive current briefings on the Lao situation. Pursuant to this designation, Mr. McGhee was briefed daily by our intelligence staff on Laos and was in regular contact with Mr. Merchant and our geographic bureau experts.

Both Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bowles were also briefed on State Department organization and procedures. They received unclassified briefing books on these subjects.

As soon as possible following their appointment and after ascertaining that security clearances had been obtained, we provided Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bowles with briefing books on policy matters. I enclose a list of the subjects covered in these books./2/ This list was previously furnished to you through Mr. Patterson./3/ The policy books covered current situations of interest around the world and did not include policy recommendations on any subjects.

/2/Not printed. The attached list of subjects, entitled "Index-Policy Briefing Book," indicates that the attachments were classified Top Secret and included the following major headings (with subheadings under each): I. Africa; II. American Republics; III-IV. Europe; V. Far East; VI. Near East and South Asia; VII. United Nations; VIII. Economic; IX. Mutual Security Program; X. Disarmament, Atomic Energy, and Outer Space; XI. Military Facilities System; XII. Legislative; XIII. Information; XIV. Cultural; XV. Consular and Security; XVI. Fisheries; and XVII. Visits.

/3/Presumably Bradley H. Patterson, Jr., Assistant to the Secretary to the Cabinet.

Although Mr. Rusk did not attend staff meetings in the Department following his appointment as Secretary-designate, he received daily summaries of State Department cable traffic. Particular cables relating to post-inaugural problems and events were provided to Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bowles on a selective basis. Likewise, briefing papers on matters which would be of concern to the new Administration after January 20 were forwarded to Mr. Rusk from time to time after specific approval from my office.

Following Mr. G. Mennen Williams' designation as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the new Administration, Mr. Williams was given a general briefing on African matters by officers in the Bureau of African Affairs and was introduced to personnel in that Bureau.

All of the new appointees, together with such staffs as they brought with them, were given temporary office space in the Department of State and were provided with all necessary and appropriate administrative services.

C.A.H.

3. Memorandum for Record/1/

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Presidential Transition Series. No classification marking. Drafted by President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Gordon Gray, who sent the memorandum to Persons under cover of a January 17 note indicating that his notes of conversations with Bundy "have been hastily drafted and their literary quality is greatly inferior to their accuracy." In a separate memorandum for record, dated January 12, Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary of the Operations Coordinating Board, described a 2-hour briefing he provided Bundy on January 11 concerning the Board's operations. (Ibid.)

Wednesday, January 11, 1961--10:20 to 12:50 a.m.

In this meeting I had my first conversation with Mr. McGeorge Bundy, who has been named by the President-elect to be his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, in connection with the transfer of responsibility of January 20, 1961. [Here follows brief discussion of personnel and procedural matters.]

I then told Mr. Bundy that General Persons, following a telephone call from Mr. Clark Clifford, had asked me to arrange for Mr. Bundy to talk with Mr. Lay, Mr. Harr and Mr. Bromley Smith. There ensued a discussion about Mr. Bundy's immediate commitments and it was ultimately agreed that he would talk with Mr. Smith on Thursday morning and Mr. Lay Thursday afternoon, inasmuch as Mr. Lay would be engaged in NSC business in the morning. Mr. Harr being out of town and the time of his return unknown to me, we made no plans for that conference.

Mr. Bundy indicated that beginning on Monday, January 16, he would be in Washington full time. I told him that I was prompted, with some hesitation to make a suggestion to him and that was that he might accompany me on Monday to the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk where I was to deliver a lecture. The purpose of the rather hesitant suggestion was not to involve him in the lecture business but to take advantage of the time afforded by the plane ride down and back for discussion. Mr. Bundy felt that in view of the fact that he would be in Washington all of next week, he could more profitably spend his time seeing other people in my absence. I took occasion at this point to say to him that I thought one of the more important functions of my office was to accept invitations to the various service colleges to lecture on the NSC and related matters, and I strongly urged him to seek to arrange his schedule so as to meet this worthwhile but also pleasant requirement during his incumbency.

I then tried to make it clear to Mr. Bundy that our instructions were to be of every possible assistance to our successors. I said that I hoped that I would not in any way appear to be "lecturing" him and certainly my aim was not to tell him how to organize his own affairs. My whole motivation was to give him my philosophy about the functions of the office; to point out mistakes that we had made; and to make suggestions for whatever value they might be to him.

Our discussion then covered a wide range of topics which I now set forth not necessarily in the order of their discussion:

1. I made clear to him my judgment that he should resist any tendency to have any other individual seek to insert himself between the President and the Special Assistant.

2. I expressed the view to him that rather than having two Special Assistants to the President operating generally in the same area (for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination) it would be better to have one man with an extremely competent deputy (or deputies). I explained to him that there had been no difficulties between Mr. Harr and myself but that I felt that his job was really less than a fulltime job and mine was more than a fulltime job and that much greater efficiency might have resulted had the structure been different. In any event, I suggested that if the job Mr. Harr has is retained, a better title should be found. I suggested also that if Mr. Bundy had such a deputy and if the decision were to retain the OCB the deputy could still be the Vice Chairman.

3. As to the Chairmanship of the OCB, I expressed my judgment as to the wisdom of the President's move in January in making the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs the chairman instead of retaining the State Department member as Chairman. I said I felt the change was an improvement both in theory and in practice for a variety of reasons, including the elimination of a situation in which a protagonist was also the "impartial chairman," and the more direct involvement of the President through his Special Assistant.

4. As to general procedures, I described for him the functioning of the NSC under President Eisenhower in considerable detail, including the conduct of meetings and types of papers going before the NSC. I also described in some detail the Planning Board process and the duties of the NSC staff.

5. I discussed briefly the relationships of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the office of the Staff Secretary to the President and suggested that that be pursued further in the 4 o'clock meeting with General Goodpaster and Mr. Dungan.

6. As to the internal security responsibilities of the Council, I described the responsibilities and the committee structure. Mr. Bundy had not been aware of this function of the Council.

7. In connection with the scope of Mr. Bundy's responsibilities, he had the impression that the President-elect would wish to look to him as his principal staff officer in all matters involving the national security and he asked what in my opinion this really involved beyond the NSC and its subordinate machinery and the CFEP. (He indicated that he expected to see Mr. Clarence Randall and I replied that I understood that General Persons was arranging for this appointment.) I indicated to Mr. Bundy that in my view the scope of such a responsibility would include not only an interest in and somehow a responsibility for the CFEP function, whether the CFEP were continued or eliminated. I also pointed out to him the situation with respect to the National Advisory Council indicating that the National Advisory Council was statutory and discussed with him some of the irritating difficulties that we had had in the past involving OCB and NAC responsibilities. I said further that he would have to interest himself in the international activities of the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce and other agencies. I said that he would have to have a personal relationship with Dr. Kistiakowsky's successor and if this were not possible on a personal basis it would have to be arranged structurally, because of the inter-relationship between the interests of the two offices. (Mr. Bundy indicated to me that he knew who Dr. Kistiakowsky's successor would be and they would have no problem.) I said there were certain elements also in the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization which would involve the interest of the Special Assistant. I expressed the hope to Mr. Bundy that the scope of his responsibilities would be as he had indicated subject always to one caveat which would run throughout everything I had to say to him. I wanted to make certain that he undertook those things he could physically do and that perhaps my notion of the job would be more than one man could handle. He acknowledged this difficulty and indicated his awareness that he would have to have some good assistants.

8. With respect to OCDM, I expressed my view that the whole complex needed a thorough-going reappraisal. In this connection he wished my view about continuing the Director of OCDM as a statutory member of the NSC. I pointed out to him the need for the integration of the resources point of view in the formulation of national policy. He wondered whether a President could not look to his Council of Economic Advisers for such a function. I pointed out to him that if he was thinking in terms of reducing the number of people in an NSC meeting the Chairman, CEA would be a body just as much as the Director of OCDM. He said he only wished to raise the question particularly since the Jackson Committee Staff Report had made the recommendation. I said this of course was something that the new President would have to decide. However, apart from this point, with a profession of some bias, I expressed my opinions about the Jackson Committee Staff Study pointing out the process of selective quotations, etc. I said that there were many things in the Jackson Committee Staff Study that I thought simply could not be supported.

9. Mr. Bundy wished to return again to the question of the Director of OCDM. He asked whether it would not be possible to appoint an Acting Director who could serve while a reappraisal was going on and who as Acting Director would not be a statutory member of the Council. I suggested to him that before such a decision was made two points ought to be considered: (1) The old Federal Statute which casts doubt upon the legality of acts of an acting head of a department after the expiration of thirty days and (2) the wording of the Reorganization Plan which created OCDM. I said it was my recollection although I could not be sure that that reorganization plan did not permit the flexibility he had in mind, if the Acting Director were the Deputy Director.

10. As to relationships with the President, Mr. Bundy asked me my view as to daily briefings of the President. I said that I felt of course that this was a Presidential decision. One possibility would be having the Director of Central Intelligence do it although this would, as a practical matter, be inconsistent with the practice of having the DCI brief the Council every week which I thought was a very useful device. I then said to him that I had made a note several months ago to discuss with my successor "Intelligence briefings in the Council. I believe that these should be crisper and should be conducted by more junior officers with a special briefing competence." I acknowledged to Mr. Bundy that this would cause serious personal problems and I was not sure I would advise him to tackle it. It was simply a question I left with him.

11. We discussed the question of attendance at Council meetings. I acknowledged that I thought the greatest vulnerability of the operation as it had been in recent times was the number of people who customarily attend meetings and that this was one of the most difficult problems he would face. I expressed the view that the attendance under President Eisenhower had not inhibited discussion but that the battle would constantly be fought. I explained to him the device of special meetings which the President may choose to use on occasion involving only statutory members and advisers and only one or two people with a special competence of the subject at hand.

12. Mr. Bundy wished to know how we prepared agenda for Council meetings. I explained to him that the President had largely left it up to the Special Assistant with a request for Presidential direction as necessary. I also explained to him the practices as to the conduct of the meetings and the development of the Records of Actions and their dissemination in considerable detail.

13. Mr. Bundy wondered whether he would need a lawyer on his personal staff. I suggested to him that I had been most adequately served by the lawyers on the White House Staff and that my guess would be that he need not make arrangements for legal services.

14. We discussed office space. I expressed the view to him that it would be desirable that he maintain his office in the White House itself in view of the kind of responsibilities that the President-elect will place upon him. I felt that he should be at the end of "the buzzer."

15. Mr. Bundy indicated that his present thinking was that he would not proceed in the same manner as General Cutler had proceeded in 1953. That is to say, he now sees no need for an urgent and massive review of all policy papers inherited by the new Administration. Mr. Bundy ventured the opinion that our policies are largely dictated by external events and that he didn't anticipate that there would be any significant policy shifts. He felt that his time and the time of the various elements of the NSC should be spent getting ahead with the immediate and pressing problems. I suggested to Mr. Bundy that at least he would wish to review the Basic National Security Policy paper.

Wednesday, January 11, 1961--4 o'clock

Mr. Bundy and I joined Mr. Dungan and General Goodpaster in the Conference Room of the White House where we had a discussion lasting about an hour involving the roles of the Staff Secretary and the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. General Goodpaster largely led the discussion describing the nature of his duties and the general responsibilities of the Special Assistant. He pointed out with great clarity the spectrum which at one end had the Staff Secretary functions and at the other end the work of the NSC. He then explained how in between there was a gray area in which the interest began to merge, overlap, and become confused. The ends of the spectrum were clear but the problem facing Mr. Bundy and Mr. Dungan was how to sort out their respective responsibilities in the gray area. It was agreed that such sorting out was the responsibility of the new people. The discussion was cordial and I think successful.

Wednesday, January 11, 1961--5 o'clock

Following our discussion with Mr. Dungan and General Goodpaster which ended at 5 o'clock, Mr. Bundy and I toured most of the first floor of the White House and then returned to my office where we talked for forty minutes. I said that I had wished to talk to him about the OCB and the burden of my discussion would be that he use his influence to avoid hasty decisions to abolish any of the machinery that had been established and evolved over the years. I confessed some personal bias for I said that I felt that my reaction to the suggestion that the OCB be abolished would be perhaps the same as his to the suggestion that now the College of Arts and Sciences at Harvard be abolished. In response Mr. Bundy laughed and replied that his immediate question would be, "What have I been doing for the last several years." I sought to describe the circumstances leading up to the creation of the old Psychological Strategy Board and pointed out its shortcomings. I said, however, that it had been an important first step leading to the establishment of the OCB, whose function and philosophy I described in some detail. I constantly reiterated that I was simply asking for avoidance of hasty decision and that the main point was that the functions assigned to the OCB were vital in Government and that it did not make sense to me to abolish the agency and then find it necessary to recreate it. This would be an unhappy waste of time and resources. I said even the suggestion that it might be abolished had an eroding effect on the structure especially in the lower echelons of the departments.

I said that I wished to reserve the minutia of procedures of operation for Mr. Bromley Smith's discussion with Mr. Bundy.

I then expressed the view that he might be alert to possible problems arising out of the appointment of Mr. Dillon as Secretary of the Treasury. I said that I thought this was a fine appointment. However, from Mr. Bundy's point of view there was a combination of factors to be considered. First, Mr. Dillon becomes the statutory Chairman of the National Advisory Council whose prerogative had been jealously guarded by the Treasury staff. Second, Mr. Dillon in his role as coordinator of mutual security had shown a disposition to be somewhat enamoured of his individual coordinating role. There had been occasions when the coordinating function of the administrator in the well-defined and somewhat narrow area of mutual security in the whole field of national and international security problems had come in conflict with the functions assigned to the OCB. I wondered whether Mr. Dillon would be eager to have a complete government-wide coordinating function. However, I simply pointed out these considerations for Mr. Bundy's reflection.

Finally, I repeated that my main notion was to avoid hasty decisions. The new Administration would of course want to make adjustments in the structure as best suited its requirements. Mr. Bundy assured me he came with no preconceived notions but expressed his gratitude for the warning flags I had put up.

[Here follow notes of a brief discussion of personnel and procedural matters on the afternoon of Thursday, January 12.]

Monday, January 16, 1961--3:45 to 4:45 p.m.

1. We discussed special clearances and Mr. Bundy said he would arrange for a briefing for January 17. I explained to Mr. Bundy the various reasons why I thought it important for him to be cleared now including the probable desirability of his controlling situation as far as the other White House Staff were concerned. In this connection I suggested to him that he would want to consider the question of whether he would like all of those who would regularly attend NSC meetings to have full clearances in order to avoid inadvertent disclosures which has happened in Council meetings on one or two occasions.

2. We discussed the desirability of the use of outside consultants and I explained to him some of the positive considerations including the occasional substantive contribution which can be made as well as the public relations aspects of the matter. In this connection I expressed my view about the reconstitution and elevation of the Science Advisory Committee in 1957 which had substantially eliminated the use of consultant groups which had been put together in the past such as the Technological Capabilities Panel, the Gaither Committee, etc. Mr. Bundy fully understood the problem and thought he would wish to make full use of the panels of the Science Advisory Committee. I pointed out to him that Dr. Kistiakowsky had more or less attended all NSC meetings and suggested that he would wish to consider whether he would want to extend the same privileges to Dr. Wiesner. I expressed views why this was desirable. Mr. Bundy felt that he wished to keep such people as the Science Adviser, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, etc. well informed but he thought that their presence would be more meaningful if they came on particular occasions. I said if he pursued this course then he would probably wish to think of some briefing device for these individuals similar to the one we use now for the Planning Board so that they could have the full flavor of Council meetings.

3. I suggested the need for some machinery for the identification of private citizens who wished to contribute their time and energy which might involve something like a central registry at which national security agencies would have access and to which they would make known their requirements. In this connection I described the frustration of Mr. Gene E. Bradley, Editor of the General Electric Defense Quarterly.

4. I pointed out to Mr. Bundy that both Ambassador Lodge and Ambassador Burgess have standing invitations to attend the NSC meetings whenever they are in Washington. President Eisenhower had made this arrangement in order to enhance their prestige with their colleagues. I informed Mr. Bundy that Mr. Burgess particularly had taken this quite seriously. In view of the President-elect's intention to keep the attendance very small in NSC meetings, I suggested he would want to consider what should be done with respect to the two new Ambassadors. Mr. Bundy felt this might constitute something of a problem.

5. I suggested that Mr. Bundy make certain that he or a designee of his arrange for continued participation in State-JCS meetings.

6. I described the procedures by which Mr. J. Edgar Hoover forwards reports to this office for the information of the President.

7. We again discussed the matter of "policy" vs. "operations." I expressed the view to Mr. Bundy that where there is not a very clear distinction, errors should be made on the side of including things in NSC meetings.

8. I pointed out to Mr. Bundy the real need for an improved meeting room for the Planning Board or whatever interagency groups he might use in staff support of the Council.

9. We discussed at quite considerable length, Mr. Bundy's notions about assuming the position of Executive Secretary. I pointed out to him some of the disabilities and ways in which he might overcome them. One was the administrative burden which I felt he could handle by delegation. Another was protecting his privileged position with the President, especially for Congressional purposes. I suggested to him that he could be both Executive Secretary and Special Assistant to the President. In the course of this conversation I urged him to be sympathetic with Mr. Lay's problems should he proceed with this plan. I said it was my view that it would be very unfair to ask Mr. Lay to take a cut in salary. Mr. Bundy expressed his understanding of the situation and assured me that in that respect Mr. Lay would be given the opportunity to find himself an equally good situation.

4. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, January 24, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Bundy Memoranda to the President, 1/61-2/61. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
The Use of the National Security Council

Everyone who has written or talked about the NSC agrees that it should be what the President wants it to be; this is right. So the following comments are entirely to stir your reactions. All we need for now is your decisions on opening steps-the Council can readily be shaped and reshaped to your taste as we learn from experience.

The Council has four elements: (1) its formal meetings under your chairmanship, (2) a Planning Board (of Assistant Secretaries), (3) an Operations Coordinating Board (of Under Secretaries), and (4) staff for the above. Numbers (2), (3), and (4) are, in my view, ripe for re-organization. They are too big, too formal, and too paperbound to do the immediate or the planning work you want. This reorganization will take a little while and its exact shape will depend, among other things, on what you do with (1) the Council itself.

My suggestion is that the Council can provide a regular and relatively formal place for free and frank discussion of whatever major issues of national security are ready for such treatment. I believe such discussion can do two things for you and one for your associates. For you it can (1) open a subject up so that you can see what its elements are and decide how you want it pursued; and (2) present the final arguments of those principally concerned when a policy proposal is ready for your decision. Both of these tasks can be performed in other ways; in emergency situations they must be. But the Council ought to be a good place for much of this work.

The special service the Council can render to your associates is a little subtler: it can give them confidence that they know what is cooking and what you want. The NSC, under Eisenhower, got too big; and we can and should cut back its attendance. But there remains a number of men whose self-confidence, as well as their ability to help you, can be strongly reinforced by participation in the work of the Council. Examples, quite different in their shape, are Vice President Johnson and Jerry Wiesner. So I think you will gain, at the start, by having reasonably regular meetings of NSC. The Eisenhower Administration used weekly meetings, but I suggest we begin with a fortnightly calendar, using special meetings of selected individuals as you may want them. Ken O'Donnell thinks Wednesday morning at 10:00 will be a good time.

Membership

The membership, by statute, includes:

1. President
2. Vice President
3. Secretary of State
4. Secretary of Defense
5. Director, OCDM

Two additional regular members, by standing invitation, going back to Truman, made a lot of trouble in the last Administration-in this one they will, I think, be valuable:

6. Secretary of the Treasury
7. Director of the Budget

The statutory "advisers", who have regularly attended in the past, are:

8. Director, CIA
9. Chairman, JCS (representing the Joint Chiefs as a group)

From the Presidential staff, customarily, there have been

10. The Science Adviser (nearly everything military is of major interest to him, and his separate counsel is important to you)
11. The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
12. Goodpaster (tending the door and handling urgent messages silently--a wise and good man)
13., 14.? And in this Administration, you may want to add Sorensen? or Dungan? or Rostow?

From the NSC staff

15.? The Executive Secretary (Lay), The Deputy Executive Secretary (Boggs)

(I'd drop the Deputy at once, and the Executive Secretary-ship should presently be merged with me.)

A number of additional people like the Chairman of AEC, the Under Secretary of State, the Director of ICA, the Director of USIA, and various White House staff men, were usually included by the last Administration. I'm against this (unless you want it) except where the agenda calls for it. But there will be squawks-I've already had pressure from USIA's Wilson, for example, and he has a relatively good case. What about him? Stevenson? Bowles?

Agenda

Traditionally, the meetings have begun with a briefing by the Director of CIA. This can be as short or as long as you want. I have the impression that occasionally in the past these briefings have been quite long, and my suggestion is that at the beginning you may want to give clear instructions that they be limited to fifteen minutes, except where you have a particular topic that you would like discussed at greater length.

Beyond that, the agenda is quite free. My own suggestions for the first meeting are two--they are not the most urgent, but in some ways they are the ones most fitted for the present Council discussion.

The first is that we should discuss ways and means of bringing defense policy and its budgetary meaning closer together. Both McNamara and Bell have made it clear to me that in their judgment this problem is at the heart of effective control of our military posture; both of them think it is ripe for attack. They would both gain strength from a brief discussion in your presence which might lead to a clear direction that they should attack this problem and bring explicit proposals for its long-range handling to the Council promptly.

The second agenda item is quite different: it is the billion dollar defense of freedom fund which Dean Rusk mentioned yesterday. I would include the wider problem of the dollar and foreign trade and foreign aid if it were not already being quite urgently and immediately discussed in preparation for your coming messages. As it is, I think this one has certain special value, partly because it is a separable and urgent item, and partly--to be frank--because I think it would be a dandy one for assignment to Rostow and me for preparation. Any such fund should be plainly and clearly in the President's hands for a whole lot of reasons, and the staff work should be done by your people. We can get a preliminary paper for discussion at the first NSC meeting if you want.

Urgent Reviews of Existing Policy

There are a number of existing policy papers which raise questions that should be promptly reviewed. I am scouting these papers myself (mainly through Walt) and I suggest we ask Rusk and McNamara also to state the ones that they find most in need of attention. A whole lot of these papers are fairly useless exercises, I think; these can be ignored for now. But some are important because they really do guide the executive branch and especially the Pentagon; these we must review and get right where they are wrong.

Organization of NSC and its Various Boards

While this is your business, and mine for you, the opinion of NSC members may be useful, and accordingly, we might put this on the agenda for the first meeting-but only if you should be ready. I'll make a preliminary sketch of what I think you ought to want when we talk Tuesday. In general, I agree with Dick Neustadt's remarkable analysis.

A Separate Subject: Briefing

There are a large number of activities and intelligence estimates you need to get caught up on, and this work will take longer than a short preamble to NSC meetings. But there is a problem deriving from the different habits of your predecessor. He used the military briefing process--charts and speeches--and I think the habit of quite long expositions is widespread. Moreover, everyone will want to keep you as long as you can stand it and maybe longer. On the other hand, you ought to listen to a lot of these men to get an estimate of them as men. Would you like me to coordinate a set of briefing meetings--military, CIA, AEC, and State? And if so, how much time do you want to spend?

5. Letter From President Kennedy to Vice President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 28, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, National Security Council Organization and Administration, 2/1/61-5/4/61. No classification marking.

Dear Mr. Vice President:

Recognizing the need for a Vice President who is fully informed and adequately prepared with respect to domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security of the United States, and recognizing also the need for a closer working relationship between the President and Vice President in this vital area, I would like you to preside over meetings of the National Security Council in my absence and to maintain close liaison with the Council and all other departments and agencies affected with a national security interest.

In addition, I am hereby requesting you to review policies relating to the national security, consulting with me in order that I might have the full benefit of your endeavors and your judgment.

You will need, in fulfillment of this assignment, pertinent information concerning the policies and operations of the departments and agencies concerned with national security policies, including the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

I will expect the departments and agencies concerned to cooperate fully with you in providing information in order for you to carry out the responsibilities outlined above.

Sincerely,/2/

/2/Printed from an unsigned copy.

6. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze)/1/

Washington, January 30, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1961, No. 475. Confidential. Also on January 30 Bundy sent a memorandum to President Kennedy on the subject of: "Policies previously approved in NSC which need review." The text is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, Document 7.

SUBJECT
A proposal for the NSC meeting of Wednesday, February 1, 1961

At the President's direction, the three of us have met and talked about the problem of identifying crisis problems and arranging for effective leadership in dealing with them here in Washington./2/ I think we are agreed on the following general position:

/2/In a separate January 30 memorandum, Bundy outlined for a luncheon discussion later that day with Merchant and Nitze the President's interest in the rapid identification and effective executive management of crises. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bundy Memoranda to the President, 1/61-2/61)

The identification of such problems should be the responsibility of all interested parts of the government. Insofar as such problems are in the first instance political, special responsibility rests with the Department of State, but there is every reason to expect alarm bells to be rung by someone in CIA or Defense whenever there is a strong conviction in either place that we need to act promptly. Such alarm bells can be rung in any one of a number of ways. In the most urgent cases the President himself will wish to be directly informed, but if there should be a regularly meeting group of senior officers of State, Defense, CIA and the President's office, such a committee might well be used for less urgent signals. And of course alarms may always be rung directly by a Secretary or to him. It did not seem to us that it was useful to establish a single tightly defined system here.

Where we do think that system is needed is in the assignment of responsibility once a problem has been identified and marked for concerted action. Since we agree that the President and his Cabinet officers will all want such problems identified before they get big and troublesome, if possible, we need a plan which will work for both small problems and big ones.

On the small ones, we believe it best that direct responsibility ordinarily be assigned to the Assistant Secretary of State of the region concerned. He may wish to make the matter his own urgent business, or he may wish to assign it to a deputy, but in either case he should have for this problem the same kind of authority and responsibility that we propose for a different individual in particularly urgent and large-scale problems. To this special arrangement I now turn.

Our proposal is that in the case of an unusually urgent, difficult, and complex problem, it will be desirable to center responsibility in a single full-time officer under the Secretary of State. This officer might or might not be the Assistant Secretary for the region, but in any case he should be free of other responsibilities while he is handling this one. He should be the Chairman of an executive committee of senior officers of immediately interested agencies, but this executive committee should not be one in which everything is decided by vote, and still less a place in which unanimous concurrence is required for any action. It should be an instrument of cooperation and coordination but the man in charge should be the chairman and his decisions should stand unless they are successfully challenged through appropriate channels to the Secretary of State or the President. This officer would have authority to coordinate all actions in the field, and he should be responsible for continuous reporting of his progress or lack of progress, his needs and his assessments to the President, the Secretary of State, and other agency heads. He should be provided with explicit and continuous direction on the policy of the United States by the President and the Secretary.

Our discussions showed that an individual holding this kind of responsibility will have to be kept in close touch not only with other departments but with the whole range of political problems which will relate to his immediate task. What we do in Laos, for example, is plainly and deeply interdependent with problems of relations to our allies and the Soviet Union. Thus no task force commander can be given the illusion that he is free to go his own course.

But it should be possible to arrange a framework of continuous guidance which gives him a kind of ability to act which no committee system can provide.

One particular device seemed to us a useful one in helping such task force commanders: it is that there should be regular weekly meetings of senior officers of State, Defense, CIA, and the President's staff, to keep in touch on day-to-day operating matters. Such a committee might be the one thing to keep from the old OCB and it might be a natural and easy place of regular review, short of the top level, of your departmental efforts in support of a task force commander's work.

We did not give detailed attention in our discussion to the problem of coordination in the field, but I think we would all agree that the Ambassador should be the senior responsible operating officer except in the most extraordinary circumstances.

McGeorge Bundy/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

7. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, January 31, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bundy Memoranda to the President, 1/61-2/61. No classification marking.

I think you may want to begin the meeting/2/ with some description of the way you want NSC to run: here are some possible points:

/2/Reference is to the initial Kennedy administration meeting of the National Security Council, scheduled for February 1. The Record of Actions taken at this 475th NSC meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, Document 8.

The Council is advisory: it does not decide. (This is self-evident, but it has been overlooked in a lot of NSC papers which report that "the Council approved," or "the Council agreed.") You will decide-sometimes at the meeting, and sometimes in private after hearing the discussion.

Members should feel free to comment on problems outside their "agency" interest. It's not good to have only State speak to "politics" and only Defense speak to "military matters." You want free and general advice from these men (or you don't want them there).

Formal meetings of the Council are only part of its business; you will be meeting with all its members in other ways, and not all decisions or actions will go through this one agency. And the NSC staff (your staff, really) will have other jobs than preparing for the meetings--but this problem can wait for Agenda Item 4, on NSC organization.

Comment on the agenda (attached, annex A):/3/ If you want, I can introduce each item with a line of comment-or, even better, you can do it yourself.

/3/None of the annexes is printed.

1. The briefing, for fifteen minutes, will be handled by Allen Dulles, who will have one assistant (Amory) present only for this part of the meeting. This will be a general briefing and will go on longer only if you encourage questions or ask them yourself.

2. Military Budgets and National Security Policy will be discussed by Bell and McNamara. Bell will go first, on the problem as it now is, and McNamara will continue on what he and Bell mean to do about it. The essential elements here are that they intend to pull the budget process and the military plan into one process of judgment, directly under the Secretary of Defense. This will be new. It is not the same as the basic question of national policy that will come up in 3, below; it is the practical question of carrying policy out effectively and at the right cost, and it is enormously important. It should be regularly discussed at the highest level, and this is a way of starting.

3. National Security Policies requiring Urgent Attention. I have discussed this in a separate memo which you have read. (Annex B) The basic policy paper (5906/1)/4/ is the one that needs to be replaced most urgently, and we need to say why, to the whole group, quite briefly. The essence of it is that this paper, with others which grow out of it, sets the basic policy on which military planning builds. This should be re-examined by any new administration, and there are particularly urgent reasons for doing it now.

/4/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. III, pp. 292-316. Documentation on the paper's revision is ibid., 1961-1963, volume VIII.

4. Organization and Procedures of the National Security Council. This is really your private business, but there is a lot of curiosity around the government, and in a formal way the problem ought to come before NSC before we act. The essence of it is that the organization should reflect your style and methods, not President Eisenhower's. The jobs it can do for you are two: one is to help in presenting issues of policy, and the other is to keep in close touch with operations that you personally want to keep on top of. Both of these things were done, in theory, by a large, formal, paper-producing staff for President Eisenhower. I'm sure you don't want that, and what you do want is what I need to ask you before the meeting. I have ideas, but I think it will be easier to talk about them than write.

5. A new item--on Effective Action in Crisis Areas. This you put on the agenda yourself (Annex C), and I have alerted all concerned that you will want names of task force leaders at the meeting.

McG. B./5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

8. Editorial Note

On February 18, 1961, President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10920 abolishing the Operations Coordinating Board. (26 Federal Register 1463) On February 19 the President issued a statement explaining how work formerly done by the OCB would be performed in other ways as part of the administration's program for strengthening the responsibility of individual departments. First, the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretaries for regional bureaus, in consultation with other departments and agencies, would be the usual means of coordinating efforts with respect to a country or area. Second, to the extent the OCB, as a descendant of the former Psychological Strategy Board, was concerned with the impact of American actions on foreign opinion and with the American "image" abroad, this work would be done by the President, the Department of State, and the U.S. Information Agency. Third, to the extent the OCB was responsible for ensuring action at the President's direction, this function would continue by direct White House communication with the responsible agencies. For text of the President's statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 104-105.

9. Memorandum From John Kenneth Galbraith to President Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, March 22, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of State--General, 3/6/61-3/31/61. No classification marking. Galbraith's appointment as Ambassador to India was announced on March 29.

SUBJECT
Fire Brigade Operations Abroad

I have been reflecting on a problem suggested by recent developments in Bolivia, Iran, Korea and prospectively in Jordan, Viet-Nam and elsewhere. This is the case of the country with a disintegrating economy which is the cause and consequence of a disintegrating government. The pattern is familiar. The budget is unbalanced, inflation is endemic. Stabilization efforts are creating industrial and social unrest-or would. American aid, though considerable, is insufficient-perhaps partially as a result of egregious misuse. Maladministration and corruption are general. Underneath is a nauseous social situation in which the landlords and politicians rape the poor with an energy which they apply to no other purpose. Without going into detail, I believe that foreign policy of the recent past including that on aid was peculiarly designed to nurture such developments.

We have also a certain uniformity in reaction when the position becomes dangerous. We send a high level mission. This is done partly because no one can think of anything else to do. But it also makes a measure of sense. It puts the immediate prestige of the United States behind essential social and economic reforms. It enables us to change past policy with grace. And the mission legitimizes the infusion of needed dollars hopefully with safeguards to insure less larcenous employment.

Since the situation is recurrent and widespread, and the remedy is much the same, I am persuaded that these operations should be arranged more thoughtfully than in the past. In the past, each has been an individual crisis: as in the case of the recent mission to Bolivia, an ad hoc group was hastily recruited and dispatched.

This is a sloppy and more than slightly dangerous procedure. We have here a rather intricate problem in economic and political diagnosis and therapy. Highly qualified economic knowledge is required of a very rare sort. There is no certainty that sufficiently talented and experienced people of requisite prestige can be assembled on short notice and there is a real chance that the wrong leader will do damage. It would be dubious policy for the Massachusetts General to recruit brain surgeons on a crisis basis whenever someone was brought in with a bad concussion.

Timing is also important. There are instances when conditions must get very bad before corrective action can be taken. But were this combination of economic and political therapy put on a more regular basis preventative action might more often be possible. Thus I am of the impression, based on intelligence from economists working there, that high level pressure on the Iranian government at the moment would avoid a larger outlay of money and a greater likelihood of disorder later on.

Accordingly I suggest that there be planning for these crises operations since, in fact, they will continue to be a normal aspect of our foreign policy. For the sake of being specific, I suggest that the President and the Secretary of State empanel a small group of men who would be properly qualified and permanently on call for emergency economic and political work abroad. The greatest consideration should be given to their selection for this is work of great subtlety and importance. Members should, with possible exceptions, be men already in the government. Their designation should not be publicized but the likelihood of such employment should be known to them. It should be recognized as an assignment of high distinction to take precedence on occasions of need over most regular activity. Some senior official, either in the Department of State or the White House, should be designated to keep in touch with the group. The members should be asked, within reason, to keep themselves informed on situations of potential concern and should have access to relevant cables and dispatches. They should, on occasion, be invited by the Secretary of State to meet for a review of situations of potential concern. Perhaps the group might be accorded some general designation such as "The President's Council on Economic and Political Policy."

Such men as Willard Wirtz of the Department of Labor, James Tobin of the Council of Economic Advisers, Edwin Martin of the Department of State, Arthur Schlesinger and Walt Rostow of the White House come to mind as combining the requisite economic and political sophistication but I cite them only by way of example.

10. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (McGhee) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, March 28, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Policy Planning, 2/11/61-5/61. Secret.

SUBJECT
Future Responsibility for Activities Handled Formerly by OCB Functional Working Groups

The Department of State has already taken steps to carry forward the activities of those former OCB Working Groups which dealt with specific geographic regions or countries. Those steps are consistent with the statement which was made by the President upon issuing the Executive Order of February 18, 1961 which abolished the OCB. In certain instances where it may appear desirable or necessary to reestablish interagency working groups in connection with those activities this will be done under the Department's leadership.

There were, in addition, twelve OCB Working Groups on subjects of a functional nature whose activities have as yet not been assigned as the continuing responsibility of any single department or agency.

Seven of those functional groups, each formerly chaired by a representative of the Department of State, concerned activities which were of primary concern to the Department and will continue to have significant foreign policy implications. They might well be dealt with in a manner similar to that which I understand has already been agreed to informally between yourself and Under Secretary Bowles for the activities of the former working groups on Antarctica and on Civil Aviation Policy Toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc, i.e., that the Department will assume leadership of the coordination and implementation of policies in those areas. Those seven groups were:

1. Working Group on Antarctica
2. Civil Aviation Policy Toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc
3. Cultural Presentations Committee
4. Ad Hoc Working Group on Foreign Disaster Relief Operations
5. Interdepartmental Escapee Committee, Escapees and Refugees
6. Working Group on Nuclear Energy Projects and Related Matters
7. Technical Panel on International Broadcasting

The activities of two of those functional groups, the one on Outer Space and the one on Security of Strategically Important Industrial Operations, appear not to require a specific assignment of responsibility for the future since the former is now the concern of the reactivated National Aeronautics and Space Council and the latter no longer requires special interdepartmental attention.

The three remaining former functional groups concerned subjects which are of principal interest to the other departments and agencies, i.e.:

1. The Exhibits Committee (USIA)
2. The Committee on People-to-People Program (USIA)
3. The Trade Fair Committee (Commerce)

The Department of State would be prepared, if you agree, to accept responsibility for the activities of the seven working groups enumerated in the third paragraph above and suggests that responsibility for the three working groups enumerated in the penultimate paragraph be assigned elsewhere as indicated.

George C. McGhee/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

11. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (McGhee)/1/

Washington, March 30, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Operations Coordinating Board, 1/27/61-7/27/61. Secret.

There follow several comments on the memorandum you sent me about the assignment of responsibility for activities formerly handled by OCB working groups./2/

/2/Document 10.

As you point out, the President clearly expressed in his February 18 statement his expectation that the Secretary of State would take the initiative for providing continuing coordination of U.S. actions with respect to a country or an area. Incidentally, I would appreciate receiving copies of completed papers which result from the work already begun by the State Department.

1. With respect to the functional assignments, the group that met with me on February 23 reached certain agreements that are in effect as far as I am concerned./3/

/3/No other record of this meeting has been found.

2. With respect to Antarctica, the group agreed that:

"d. The Department of Defense will continue to be responsible for the logistics of U.S. activities in the Antarctic. Mr. Bowles will tell us when decisions have been reached on the way the State Department will provide policy guidance and insure coordination of all U.S. activities in the area."

I conclude from your memorandum that the decisions referred to have been reached.

3. With respect to civil aviation, the group agreed that:

"e. The State Department will assume responsibility for whatever coordination and policy guidance is required in the field of civil aviation, subject to further discussion at a later date."

This should be read in the context of the President's recent National Security Action Memorandum 32, dated March 21, 1961./4/

/4/Entitled "US-USSR Commercial Air Transport Agreement." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 32)

4. With respect to trade fairs and exhibits, the group agreed that:

"a. USIA will assume responsibility for coordinating the planning and programming of all U.S. exhibits and trade fairs overseas."

This also covers the question of what is to be done with the Cultural Presentations and Trade Fairs committees, which were created by action of the Director of the U.S. Information Agency. As you undoubtedly know, the administration of these two parts of the President's Special International Program is now under study by the Bureau of the Budget.

5. The OCB had no continuing concern with or working group on Foreign Disaster Relief Operations. The OCB had been used as a vehicle whereby the several agencies of the U.S. Government having an interest in these matters had developed a modus operandi. As to the future, the group agreed on February 23 that:

"f. The State Department will assume responsibility for insuring that appropriate guidelines are developed to cover emergency relief in cases of natural disasters overseas."

6. The work with respect to escapees and refugees is principally the responsibility of the State Department but there is an important segment of this activity which is of major interest to CIA.

7. The OCB Working Group on Nuclear Energy Projects and Related Matters was a catch-all group to which a wide variety of assignments was referred. I do not see how the work of this group can be devolved to any one agency of the government. The major agencies with legislative responsibility, i.e., State, Defense, AEC, NASA, as well as the President's Science Advisor, would be expected to take the initiative on matters within their jurisdiction.

8. The Technical Panel on International Broadcasting has been completely inactive and, in my opinion, need not be reactivated by any department-at least in its old form. The Director of the U.S. Information Agency is responsible for initiating such interdepartmental actions as may be needed in this field.

9. I agree with the view expressed concerning work formerly done by the group on Strategically Important Industrial Operations. OCDM has noted the abolition of this group.

10. With respect to Outer Space, the group agreed that:

"c. As soon as the Space Council is organized and functioning, decisions will be sought on the assignment of activities formerly carried on by the OCB in this area."

In view of the above, it does not appear to me that additional assignments to the State Department are required at this time, but I would appreciate your reaction.

McGeorge Bundy/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

12. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, April 4, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bundy Memoranda to the President, 3/1/61-4/4/61. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Crisis Commanders in Washington

Over and over since January 20th we have talked of getting "task forces with individual responsible leaders" here in Washington for crisis situations. At the beginning, we thought we had task forces for Laos, the Congo and Cuba. We did get working groups with nobody in particular in charge, but we did not get clearly focused responsibility. The reason was that the Department of State was not quite ready, in each case, and this in turn was because of two factors: first, the senior State Department man was usually an Assistant Secretary with twelve other things on his mind, and second, these Assistant Secretaries, although men of good will, were not really prepared to take charge of the "military" and "intelligence" aspects--the Government was in the habit of "coordination" and out of the habit of the acceptance of individual executive leadership. Thus it has repeatedly been necessary to bring even small problems to you and still smaller ones to the White House staff, while more than once the ball has been dropped simply because no one person felt a continuing clear responsibility.

By contrast, in two areas where the crisis was less urgent, we have had effective leadership from the Department of State: one is the Latin American task force under Berle, and the other is the NATO task force under Acheson. In both cases, it is worth noting, your own staff have been energetically cued in to the working group-Goodwin with Berle, Rostow, Komer and I with Acheson. The Berle and Acheson groups were successful because Berle and Acheson took charge and had the stature to take charge.

We now very much need this kind of explicit assignment of authority in two particular areas: Viet-nam and Iran. The agreement upon this proposition is general throughout the government, but nothing is likely to happen unless you yourself, in agreement with the Secretary of State, designate individuals to do these two jobs. They should be in the State Department while they are in charge of the crisis, but they could come from anywhere in the government. Probably it would be best to begin with the State Department people. Walt and I suggest that Averell Harriman would be perfect for Iran, and perhaps George McGhee for Viet-nam. Averell is available, but George would have to be set free from his planning duties because Viet-nam is a long job. That would probably be a gain, because in all candor he is not a planner.

But the essential point is that the men involved should be sufficiently senior to take charge of the government as a whole, and to feel confident in acting directly for you and the Secretary. And they will have to be on these jobs full time.

McG. B./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

13. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, May 16, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bundy Memoranda to the President, 5/16-5/31/61. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
White House Organization

I'm giving this to Walt Rostow to give to you on the way back from Canada/2/ because it can wait till then and because I hope you'll be in a good mood. We need some help from you so that we can serve you better, and incidentally prevent stories like the one from Oslo about chaos in the White House.

/2/The President was in Canada May 16-18 for his first official visit outside the United States.

In the main that story and others like it are nonsense. Except for a brief period of disorder right after Cuba,/3/ the White House under your direction since January has been a center of energy--and controlled energy--which has revived the Executive Branch. Don't take my word for it-take the word of all the old-timers who now fear that because of Cuba we may turn back to cautious inactivity.

/3/Reference is to the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume X.

Cuba was a bad mistake. But it was not a disgrace and there were reasons for it. If we set our critics on the left and right against each other they would eat each other up, and we already know more about what went wrong and why than any of them. If the rules of the game allowed an explanation, we could give a good one--as you have been doing privately with great effect. Against our hopes and our responsibilities, Cuba is a nit-pick--it must not throw us off balance.

But we do have a problem of management; centrally it is a problem of your use of time and your use of staff. You have revived the government, which is an enormous gain, but in the process you have overstrained your own calendar, limited your chances for thought, and used your staff incompletely. You are altogether too valuable to go on this way; with a very modest change in your methods you can double your effectiveness and cut the strain on yourself in half. What follows is only one way of doing it--but it's worth some attention and represents, I think, a fair consensus of what a good many people would tell you--O'Donnell, Sorensen, Bell, R. Kennedy, Rusk, and Dungan.

First: you should set aside a real and regular time each day for national security discussion and action. This is not just a matter of intelligence briefing-though that is important and currently not well done by either Clifton or me (we can't get you to sit still, and we are not really professionals). It is at least as much a matter of taking time for reports of current action, review of problems awaiting solution, and planning of assignments that have a long-term meaning. The National Security Council, for example, really cannot work for you unless you authorize work schedules that do not get upset from day to day. Calling three meetings in five days is foolish-and putting them off for six weeks at a time is just as bad. Similarly, planning for a trip to Canada or a trip to Paris can be about three times as effective if you take part in it ahead of time, not just the morning before you leave. Or again, you cannot get what you need on a problem like test resumption if you don't take plenty of time to hear the arguments--and send back for more.

Truman and Eisenhower did their daily dozen in foreign affairs the first thing in the morning, and a couple of weeks ago you asked me to begin to meet you on this basis. I have succeeded in catching you on three mornings, for a total of about 8 minutes, and I conclude that this is not really how you like to begin the day. Moreover, 6 of the 8 minutes were given not to what I had for you but what you had for me from Marguerite Higgins, David Lawrence, Scotty Reston, and others. The newspapers are important, but not as an exercise in who leaked and why: against your powers and responsibilities, who the hell cares who told Maggie? But of course you must not stop reading the papers, and maybe another time of day would be better for daily business. After lunch? Tea? You name it. But you have to mean it, and it really has to be every day, with an equal alternate time when your schedule requires it.

The point about a regular meeting, at a reasonably fixed time, is that it can save you a lot of time and can redouble your influence-it can give your staff a coordinated sense of what you want and it can give everyone who needs it a time of day when they can reach you through an easy channel. It also gives you a way of keeping track of your own tremendous flow of ideas. Right now it is so hard to get to you with anything not urgent and immediate that about half of the papers and reports you personally ask for are never shown to you because by the time you are available you clearly have lost interest in them. If we put a little staff work on these and keep in close touch, we can be sure that all your questions are answered and that when you ask a big one the expert himself is brought in to recite.

Will you try it? Perhaps the best place for it would be the new Situation Room which we have just set up in the basement of the West Wing; the best time would be whatever you say. 9:30 without Maggie would be ideal--or even with Maggie--we could undertake to staff out all rough stones before you arrive. The operational business of action and plans would be my job, but I think we ought to have a professional for the intelligence briefing, and my personal suggestion is that you start with Bob Amory. He is really the Chief Intelligence Analyst of CIA, and before you decide they don't know their stuff you might try working with him--that part could be daily or three times a week, as you choose. Ted Clifton should be on hand with any business from the Joint Chiefs, and we could have anyone else you wanted.

Second--and much easier--if you can possibly manage it you must run closer to your schedule. When you start a big meeting half an hour late and let it go an hour overtime, you have not only disrupted the schedules of 30 men, but you have probably set 100 men under them to still greater trouble. This doesn't matter, except that it wastes executive energy, the most precious commodity you have brought to Washington. You should never forget that everyone who sees you at all is lucky--anyone who keeps you beyond the schedule is an imposition. The White House is a taut ship in terms of standards--but not in terms of schedules. By the same token--though it hurts to say it--you should close the back door to your office. Right now it is a great device for those of us who find it open--but it drives Ken O'Donnell crazy and it really makes it impossible for him or for anyone to protect you, so that recently you have had to take refuge from your own office in the little anteroom or in the garden. Possibly as a compromise you could let it be open only in the late afternoon and only for a specified list.

Third--there is the staffwork. Here we are making progress, but we need to be sure we are doing what you want; we can do much better for you than we have so far. For example: you deserve better protection from foreigners; you ought to get better briefing on their relevance; you should get more help on tough appointments like Assistant Secretary for Latin America (what's everyone's business is no one's business); and above all you are entitled to feel confident that (a) there is no part of government in the national security area that is not watched over closely by someone from you own staff, and (b) there is no major problem of policy that is not out where you can see it and give a proper stimulus to those who should be attacking it. Here the main duty is ours, and with your stimulus and leadership we'll do the job. If you'll agree to a daily meeting, I'll tell you how we can help you a whole lot more than we have yet succeeded in doing.

All this, if it is done right, will strengthen, not weaken, your Secretary of State, your Secretary of Defense, and your head of CIA. But most of all it should be useful to you.

McG. B./4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

14. Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the Professional Staff of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, June 19, 1961.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of State General, 6/17/61-6/20/61. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Operations Center of the Department of State

Attached is a description of the Operations Center recently established in the State Department under the direction of Mr. Achilles and Mr. Stutesman, his deputy. This is distributed as a matter of general information to the Staff, in view of the close working relationship that will be maintained between the National Security Council Staff and that of the Operations Center.

Charles E. Johnson/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment

OPERATIONS CENTER

In the Operations Center, with its interdepartmental staff, the Secretary has an instrument for following up government-wide action in the field of foreign affairs, for conducting informal interdepartmental reviews of emerging foreign policy problems, and for creating major interdepartmental Task Forces under his direction at an instant's notice.

I. Crises

S/O provides, on an around-the-clock basis, the secretariat, office and conference space and rapid communication facilities for the establishment and operation of as many as three major Task Forces at the same time.

Called into being by the Secretary, a Task Force gathers all pertinent facts bearing on a specific problem in the field of foreign affairs and prepares recommendations for action.  The membership is drawn at appropriate levels from the Department and other agencies of the Government.  The Chairman is usually the Assistant Secretary of the Geographic Bureau most directly concerned.

The Chairman and the substantive officers of the Task Force are given office space and officer and secretarial staff assistance in S/O.  Intelligence and operational data regarding the problem under study flow on a 24-hour duty basis directly into S/O from the State Department Telegraph Branch, the intelligence community through INR, from the Defense Department and from other agencies as required.

Task Forces should be disbanded as soon as possible after the functions for which they are established have been fulfilled, subject to reconstitution if and when needed.

II. Potential Crises

As an emerging or potential crisis is identified, the Secretary may place it under special watch in S/O.  In view of the fact that communications from the field, from other agencies and from the intelligence community are more rapid and complete to S/O than to a Geographic Bureau, it may be useful to detail an appropriate Geographic Bureau officer to S/O for the period of watch. This gives that substantive officer the full benefit of S/O facilities and removes him from the pressures of daily routine so that he can devote full time to the significant questions of the problem under study.

In effect, an interdepartmental Task Force in a minor key is thus established as the permanent Defense, CIA and USIA members of S/O work on an easy, continuing and informal basis with the Department officers concerned.  This group, studying all alert signals and reviewing existing policies, establishes a foundation of interdepartmental understanding upon which a major Task Force can be built at an instant's notice.

III. Follow Up

Basic responsibility for the implementation of policies requiring interdepartmental coordination rests with the appropriate Assistant Secretaries under the coordinating supervision of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs.  S/O assists the Deputy Under Secretary in the exercise of his responsibilities and follows up, at the Secretary's direction, any interdepartmental action in the field of foreign affairs whether it originated within the Department or in the National Security Council or in other inter-agency decision.

With a minimum of written reports and a maximum of informal consultation, S/O maintains a continuing review of programs and can identify at an early stage problems in the implementation of those programs which may require high level attention.  Formal interdepartmental committee meetings or "progress reports" are called for only when essential.

S/O thus serves the Secretary by keeping a continuing review of government-wide action on certain programs.  At the same time, S/O assists the Geographic Bureau desk officers by offering them a constant high level contact with Defense, CIA and USIA through the representatives of those agencies assigned to S/O.

IV. Watch

S/O has an officer (generally FSO-3 level), a clerk and a messenger-driver on duty at all times.

Other around-the-clock watch officers in the Department are: (1) the INR duty officer who monitors all intelligence reports; and (2) the Telegraph Branch Watch Officer who monitors all operational cables.  They are under instruction to alert the S/O duty officer the instant any significant message appears regarding any problem being dealt with by S/O.

Thus, the S/O duty officer is constantly in touch with all major developments on those problems and is prepared to take the necessary action to deal promptly with any question or problem which may arise. Some questions he may be able to answer on the basis of his own knowledge of S/O activities and the briefing he received before going on duty.  Other matters may require a search for information. In this connection, he is furnished with a daily revised list of telephone numbers where every S/O officer may be reached that evening or night.  He will take counsel with the S/S duty officer in the office during the day or at home at night if an operational problem outside S/O jurisdiction should arise.

15. Editorial Note

A White House memorandum of June 22, 1961, prepared for President Kennedy, was entitled "Current Organization of the White House and NSC For Dealing With International Matters." The memorandum summarized efforts to date, indicating that "The President's staff is at present about two-thirds of the way toward a sound and durable organization for his work in international affairs.  Since January a number of steps have been taken, and in the same period the President's concept of what he wants has developed somewhat.  There is still unfinished business." The memorandum is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VIII, Document 31.

16. Editorial Note

On September 4, 1961, McGeorge Bundy described the Kennedy administration's changes in and operation of the National Security Council in a letter to Senator Henry M. Jackson as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Policy Machinery of the Senate Committee on Government Operations.   For text, see Jackson, ed., National Security Council, pages 275-279.  In a subsequent letter to Jackson of January 28, 1965, Bundy stated: "In almost every particular, the principles and procedures set forth in the [September 4,] 1961 letter have governed the work of the Council under both President Kennedy and President Johnson." (Ibid., pages 279-280)

At the end of 1961, Bundy established a Standing Group of the National Security Council that was to meet weekly in the White House Situation Room to "organize and monitor the work of the National Security Council and to take up such other matters as may be presented to the group by its members." This NSC Standing Group was to meet 15 times between January and August 1962. Its chairman was the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and its members included the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.  The Executive Secretary of the NSC would participate, as would representatives of other agencies in accordance with particular agenda items.  After a lapse in meetings, Bundy revived the Standing Group in April 1963 under his chairmanship, first as the Plans and Operations Committee, then as the Standing Committee, and shortly as the NSC Standing Group, the original name. (Smith, Organizational History of the National Security Council, pages 51-53; see also Document 23)

President Kennedy, in his opening remarks at the 469th meeting of the National Security Council on January 18, 1962, described the role of the NSC with respect to Executive Branch departments and agencies.  The meeting summary noted that "The President referred to the Council's responsibility for integrating the work of the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, with the participation of the Treasury Department and other agencies when matters of interest to them were being considered.  He asked the members to cooperate in making the Council meetings useful, and ensuring that decisions arising out of the Council meetings were effectively carried out." See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VIII, Document 69.

17. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Bowles)/1/

Washington, October 31, 1961.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Administrative, 1961.  No classification marking.  A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates it was "Sent to all Cabinet heads (members)." In an October 31 covering note to Bundy, attached to another copy, Bowles wrote that the memorandum had been prepared for governmental departments and agencies to explain procedures for preparing papers to replace the former NSC and OCB regional and country papers.  Bowles recommended that the President rescind papers in the former NSC series as papers in the new series appeared.  Bowles would submit specific recommendations at the time papers were transmitted to the White House and sent for comment to interested agencies and departments. (Memorandum from Bowles to Bundy, "Preparation of Policy Guidelines Papers," October 31; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Department of State, General, 10/16/61-10/31/61)

Foreign Policy and Operations Guidelines

As you may recall, the President on February 19, 1961, abolished the Operations Coordinating Board and stated:

. . . we will center responsibility for much of the Board's work in the Secretary of State.  He expects to rely particularly on the Assistant Secretaries in charge of regional bureaus, and they in turn will consult closely with other departments and agencies.  This will be our ordinary rule for continuing coordination of our work in relation to a country or area.

Correspondingly it was agreed that country and regional policy papers formerly prepared by the NSC Planning Board would be prepared by the Department of State, though some of exceptional security importance might still be submitted to the NSC before dissemination.

Accordingly the Department of State has been developing a series of policy and operations Guidelines papers intended to replace both NSC and OCB country and regional papers.  Our aim is to make them as useful as possible in the coordinated guidance of the national foreign effort. They are still in the experimental stage, and your suggestions for improving their usefulness would be most welcome.

Our regional Assistant Secretaries are responsible for the preparation of these papers.  The procedure we have evolved so far includes consultation with other agencies at the working level while a paper is being drafted, referral to the field for comment by the chief or chiefs of mission concerned, after consultation with members of the country team, clearance at bureau level in the Department of State, referral to other agencies principally interested for formal comment; and (a) dissemination in final after any important differences have been resolved or (b) submission to the NSC if that is decided upon in a particular case. We plan to revise the papers once a year.

The first of these papers has reached the stage of referral for agency comment.  These papers will be addressed to your office for this purpose unless you prefer otherwise.  We would appreciate your helping us expedite the process.

Chester Bowles

18. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to the Assistant Secretaries of State/1/

Washington, July 2, 1962.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Planning, 1962. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Systematic Planning for Crises

As a result of several meetings on the anticipation of crises, I am requesting a new procedure to strengthen our performance in this area.

While the exact shape and date of a particular crisis is virtually unpredictable, we can endeavor to isolate and act briskly to exploit moments of transient opportunity, observe trends and situations that are likely to produce crises, and systematically think out ahead of time the critical dimensions of the problems these crises will create. In the light of such thought we may generate lines of action which could prevent, mitigate, or even turn such situations to our advantage. A great deal of work within the Department is already addressed to these objectives.

A successful program to meet these objectives will require the closest cooperation among those who illuminate the alternatives available to us, those who make decisions, and those who carry them out. I want to insure that a greater portion of the energies of the desk officers, who are so often absorbed in the day's immediate problems, are directed toward steps we should be taking now in order to improve our posture in the future. The purpose of this program is to provide a systematic means for strengthening the contribution of the Policy Planning Council to the operating bureaus in this respect. The operating bureaus retain full discretion and responsibility for the implementation of recommendations emanating from the informal working groups organized under this program.

I am therefore requesting Mr. Rostow to consult with each of you in order to undertake the following program:

1. Arrangements for consultation on a regular and systematic basis, between designated officers of the Policy Planning Council and the operating bureaus to select an initial list of problems for anticipatory planning on a priority basis and to establish a regular procedure for identifying situations of opportunity.

2. Establishment of small, informal working groups under the leadership of the Policy Planning Council, including representation from the responsible bureaus, and the intelligence and planning community, to develop specific plans and time tables for action on each designated priority problem.

3. Presentation of reports and recommendations of the working groups to the Assistant Secretary of the responsible bureau for his consideration and such action as he finds appropriate.

Dean Rusk

19. National Security Action Memorandum No. 173/1/

Washington, July 18, 1962.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 173. Confidential. Regarding the implementation of NSAM No. 173, see Document 20.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Chairman, Special Group (Counterinsurgency)

SUBJECT
Interdepartmental Field Visits

I feel that there is a need for accelerating our programs for underdeveloped countries and for effecting a closer tie between the County Team planning in these areas and the Washington departments which participate in these programs. It would seem to me that the technique of interdepartmental team visits used last fall in South Viet-Nam and early this year in certain Latin American countries could be broadened and applied to this requirement.

To this end, I would like to have organized a program of field visits by senior interdepartmental teams, under State Department chairmanship, to a number of selected countries, with particular attention to Latin America. These teams would consult with the Ambassador, his staff and local officials, would review the Country Team plans, and would form a judgment as to their adequacy, their consistency with United States objectives, and the reliability of the intelligence upon which they are based. Upon return to Washington, the teams would submit appropriate recommendations to me, through the Secretary of State, for strengthening United States activities in the countries visited which, when approved, would receive the same kind of intensive implementation as that being accorded the current South Viet-Nam program.

I would like the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) to initiate as a matter of urgency a program of visits of the kind outlined above.

John F. Kennedy

20. Editorial Note

In response to the President's request of July 18, 1962, in National Security Action Memorandum No. 173 (Document 19) for the initiation of a program of Interdepartmental Field Visits by specially constituted teams, Secretary Rusk met later that day with General Maxwell D. Taylor, the President's Military Representative, and William H. Orrick, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration. Rusk subsequently assigned Orrick responsibility for developing a program of Interdepartmental Field Visits. In early August, Rusk discussed the matter again with Taylor and with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, and Rusk approved a paper dated August 7, drafted by Orrick, for discussion by the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) at its August 9 meeting. These discussions are described in a memorandum from Orrick to Rusk, August 7. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 173)

The August 7 paper set forth the terms of reference and composition of the Interdepartmental Field teams. In consultation with the Ambassador in a given country and the members of his staff, as well as with local officials as appropriate, the teams would:

"(a) ascertain whether our country team plans are adequate to meet existing conditions, are consistent with our national interests and policy objectives, and are based upon reliable intelligence;

"(b) ascertain whether U.S. Government officials, under the leadership of the Ambassador, are pursuing the country team plans aggressively and effectively enough. For example, given the local situation, is there adequate contact with youth, labor, opposition and other outside-government groups as well as with Government circles;

"(c) ascertain whether the Ambassador is fulfilling his role as leader of the country team, is familiar with all country team programs, and is thoroughly aware of all policy directives from Washington to country team members;

"(d) ascertain the total image of the country team operation in the country under survey, including the standing of the Ambassador and the country team in the local community."

Each team was to submit a detailed report to the Secretary of State, who would then forward it to the President. Each team would be under State Department chairmanship and would not exceed in membership a total of four persons, excluding an Executive Assistant from the State Department. In addition to the Department of State, the Department of Defense, AID, USIA, CIA, and other agencies would be represented as appropriate to conditions in a given country. From time to time a public member might be added. Because of the immediate importance of relations with Latin America, it was recommended that the first team visit the Dominican Republic and Colombia as soon as possible, with a second team visiting Brazil and Argentina.

At a meeting later in August of the Special Group (CI) under the chairmanship of General Taylor, it was decided that the first team would visit Venezuela and Guatemala. (Letters from Rusk to John G. Bell, Ambassador to Guatemala, and from Rusk to C. Allan Stewart, Ambassador to Venezuela, both dated August 20; ibid.)

Under the provisions of NSAM No. 173, the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) approved the creation of a joint survey team, headed by General William H. Draper, Jr., to visit Brazil and submit appropriate recommendations. The report of the Survey Team on Brazil to President Kennedy, dated November 3, 1962, is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XII, Document 228.

An Interdepartmental Survey Group on Liberia and Tunisia was also formed by the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) under the authority of NSAM No. 173. The report of this group to President Kennedy was dated April 19, 1963; the portion on Tunisia is printed ibid., volume XXI, Document 184. Additional documentation on the Survey Group on Liberia and Tunisia is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM No. 173.

21. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone/1/

Washington, November 16, 1962.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Memoranda for the Record, 9/24/62-12/31/62. Secret. This memorandum is referred to in a November 16 memorandum from Bundy to President Kennedy entitled "The National Security Council and Supporting Staff Organization." In his memorandum Bundy, apparently in response to remarks by former President Eisenhower, reviewed the NSC organizational changes put into effect by the new administration. Bundy advised President Kennedy that the reorganized system had always had "rather more organization than General Eisenhower probably recognizes" and that "much of General Eisenhower's criticism may be directed against phenomena which were more characteristic of our first few months than of your present operations." For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, Document 108.

In discussions with General Eisenhower on a number of occasions during the past several months, he has raised the question of the adequacy of organization of the Executive Branch of the government as now constituted. Specifically General Eisenhower feels that

1. NSC meetings should be held regularly, at weekly intervals, and should be attended by designated members.

2. Benefit of such meetings is so that the President can hear the views of his principal advisors on all matters of interest expressed in the presence of one another, so that he, the President, will have the benefit of differing points of view on any particular problem expressed in the presence of one another and in his own presence.

3. Of particular importance in General Eisenhower's opinion is to have regular intelligence briefings at NSC meetings so that the President can benefit by conflicting evaluations or opinions of his principal advisors with respect to intelligence matters. Eisenhower feels very strongly that the circulation of intelligence reports fails to accomplish this specific objective.

4. The NSC, to function properly and adequately serve the President, must be supported by properly organized planning staffs. Eisenhower supports the concept that Operations Coordinating Board and the Planning Board have permanent, established organizations to prepare for NSC meetings and to insure decisions are properly carried out and he recognizes organizations of this type must be tailored to the desires of the President. In this connection Eisenhower feels that committees established for specific purposes are frequently not supported by staff and their work is not carefully coordinated with related problems which may be outside of the jurisdiction of the committee.

John A. McCone/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

22. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, November 16, 1962.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Planning, 1962. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Status of Systematic Planning for Crises

On July 2, 1962, you issued an instruction to the Assistant Secretaries concerning the establishment of a new procedure to strengthen our performance in the anticipation of crises.

Pursuant to that instruction the geographic bureaus submitted lists of problems requiring anticipatory planning. From these lists S/P and the operating bureaus have distilled an initial list of priority problems and work has been instituted on these. In reviewing the problem of anticipating crises with the bureaus, it was noted that there are all manner of crises with which the bureaus are daily concerned and which are subject to intensive planning efforts. The priority list as finally prepared was limited to those crises which were not already upon us and which it appeared would not become acute until a time period a little farther off in the future. The initial priority list which follows was chosen on a selective basis with the idea of starting off modestly with just a few topics and doing these well:

AF

Ghana Succession Problem:

This was one of the priority problems selected as falling within the purview of your July 2, 1962, instruction. Work was already in a well advanced stage in AF and S/P when a White House request for a paper on this subject was received. A paper was promptly furnished the White House on September 29, 1962.

Southwest Africa (UNGA action to enforce respect for the mandate):

The work developed on this subject in AF was sent to USUN in the form of staff studies, a position paper, and telegrams. Additional work must await the outcome of UNGA debate.

Angola (reassessment of Angolan Nationalist leadership):

A paper on this problem is in an advanced stage in AF.

EUR

Succession Problem in the Iberian Peninsula:

The first draft of a post-Franco paper has been completed and is currently being circulated in the Department for comment. A first draft on a post-Salazar paper is scheduled for January 1.

De Gaulle Succession Problem:

Work has commenced in EUR on this problem. A first draft is expected by January 1.

FE

Indonesian Economic Crisis:

Pursuant to your instruction work on this problem had already begun when a National Security Action Memorandum was received requesting a program of emergency aid to Indonesia. A paper on this subject was prepared in FE, in consultation with S/P and other agencies, and sent to the President in the form of a memorandum from you dated October 10, 1962. A study of the long-range aspects of this problem is continuing in FE and S/P.

Second Bandung Conference:

Preliminary steps have been taken by FE in the form of circular telegrams and airgrams to feel the world-wide pulse on this subject and quietly discourage participation in this conference. A circular telegram to FE posts containing general guidance on this subject is nearing completion.

NEA

Arms Control Problem (Israel vs. Arab States):

S/P, in consultation with NEA, has nearly completed a first draft of a paper on this subject.

ARA

Due to the chronic crisis condition of the area, Assistant Secretary Martin and I agreed that it might be better to subsume crisis planning under the Strategic Studies in Latin America. Mr. Martin and I have requested your approval of this procedure in a separate memorandum concerning the Strategic Country Studies.

23. Editorial Note

On January 18, 1963, the Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations chaired by Senator Henry M. Jackson issued a staff report entitled Administration of National Security: Basic Issues (Washington, 1963). The Senate had established the subcommittee in May 1962 as successor to the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. As the foreword to this report indicated, the subcommittee's purpose was to "review the administration of national security at home and in the field, and to make findings and recommendations for improvement where appropriate." The subcommittee was "concerned with the administration of national security--with getting good people into key foreign and defense posts and enabling them to do a job. It is not inquiring into the substance of policy." The report outlined basic issues on which the subcommittee would hold hearings during the present Congress. These issues included the President's problems in dealing with national security issues; dilemmas of administration; the President, the Secretary of State, and the problem of coordination; the Ambassador and the Country Team; Executive responsibility for administration; and communications.

In a memorandum to President Kennedy on April 2, Bundy referred to recent discussion of the need for strengthening interdepartmental planning and coordination of major national security issues. The Executive Committee of the NSC established during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 had been useful for major interdepartmental decisions, but was "not so good for lesser matters of coordination." Bundy proposed a new Standing Group of the NSC to be known as the Plans and Operations Committee. The Committee would be parallel to the NSC Executive Committee, but would not include the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, or Secretary of Defense. The new Standing Group would meet weekly with Bundy as chairman; it would review ongoing interdepartmental programs and future planning problems and would be "used for the occasional discursive review of drastic alternatives to existing policies." The text of Bundy's memorandum, entitled "A Standing Committee of the National Security Council," is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VIII, Document 131.

24. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President's Special Counsel (Sorensen)/1/

Washington, March 8, 1963.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bundy Chron File, March 1963. No classification marking.

SUBJECT
Decisions in the White House

It is a great advantage for you not to know how much academic nonsense is written about "the decision-making process," and it is probably not sensible for me to try to add to what you know so well about the real life here. Nevertheless the subject is interesting even outside the world of academic jargon, and the following points occur to me:

1. The modes of Presidential decision are enormously varied: there is the legislative method, the press conference reply, the individual appointed, the candidate encouraged, the interview granted and refused, the news that is made or prevented, the effort at persuasion included or omitted, the speech delivered, and perhaps as important as any group of these together, the ceaseless process by which, if an administration is lively, recommendations and proposals are ground forward for consideration. What I think many people forget is that the entire Presidential existence is in this sense a process of decision.

2. Most big decisions have lots of history. In the most notable single case, the missile crisis, it appears as if the decision were made between Tuesday and Sunday. But the fact is that very important antecedent decisions were made at the end of August and in early September, and incorporated in Presidential statements of major significance. Earlier still, in the speeches which followed the Bay of Pigs and in a consistent set of comments on Cuba for more than a year thereafter, the President had laid down a line of policy which was plainly inconsistent with a strategic missile base in Cuba. Equally clearly he had laid down a line of conduct developed out of his conviction that invasion of Cuba by the U.S. Armed Forces, in the absence of a major change in the situation, would not be in the national interest. Carefully construed, the decisions of October 1962 are an outgrowth of a line of policy developed by the President in many different modes over a long period of time. (And one may say, by contrast, of the Bay of Pigs, that it grew out of an early history which was not of the President's making and had to be grafted on to a point of view which was incompletely shaped in his own mind by the time decision became necessary-and in addition he was hampered by all the difficulties and unfamiliarities and failings of men who did not know him or their own roles as perhaps they have been learning to do since.) I think the steel case/2/ has quite a similar trail of preparation which was really governing in what was required of the President when the moment came, but you know much more about that than I.

/2/Reference is to President Kennedy's successful effort in April 1962 to persuade the steel industry to rescind steel price increases.

3. At least in my experience there is always a lot of discussion of the relative roles of the WH Staff and of Cabinet officers and their Departments and Agencies. You know as much about this as I do; my own belief is that our best course as staff officers is to make it clear that we are operating within the framework of the President's own immediate responsibilities and are not trying to replace or blockade those who have major operational, statutory, and advisory responsibilities of their own.

4. The President's use of all arms for information and comment is as striking as his very good record in using only responsible officers for final advice and decision. This is familiar to you--but not to everyone else.

5. The President's larger policies: an open door to Moscow, an open door to all underdog Americans, an open door to intelligence and hope, honor to bravery, equal sense of past and future, gallantry to beauty, and pride in politics--these are colors of a permanent palette--reflected in the small as well as the large decisions, drawn from in a hundred ways.

6. The President relies heavily on others for all sorts of follow-up, and intercommunication, and preparation and recommendation. He also delegates, massively but selectively. But he is still probably the most personal President of modern times--doing more himself. You know the millions of examples.

McG. B./3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

25. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/

Washington, April 12, 1963.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings General, 4/63-5/63. No classification marking. Another copy is ibid., Bundy Memoranda to the President, 3/63-4/63.

I have been very slow in sending this memorandum on long-range planning aspects, prepared in Walt Rostow's office and forwarded at the end of February by Dean Rusk./2/ The reason is that I just could not find a time when I thought you were likely to give it the attention they would like. But perhaps now you could have a quick look and agree to have a meeting with Walt and the Secretary and a very few others next week on these planning problems. My own guess is that what is needed for Walt is a real sense of your own interest and some sense on priorities, and beyond that we could probably organize the consideration of some of these long-range problems in the Standing Committee which you, Bobby and I have been discussing.

/2/Reference is to a February 28 memorandum from Rusk to the President, entitled "Critical Planning Tasks." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, BSNP 1963) The memorandum, drafted in the Policy Planning Council, described the status of 32 basic national planning tasks (see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, Documents 70 and 83), 8 strategic studies on individual countries, all in Latin America and Africa, and 13 political contingency plans. The memorandum recommended that the President "meet soon with a few of your key advisers to review the state of national security planning and, especially, to isolate those planning tasks you personally regard as critical." For additional background, see ibid., Document 126.

That Committee is now, incidentally, agreed around town and will begin operation next week. Its title will be "Standing Committee of the NSC" and we intend to have absolutely no publicity about it in order to avoid useless chatter about seizing the initiative from the State Department or restoring the OCB, or otherwise reorganizing ourselves in the spring of our discontent.

McG. B./3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

26. Editorial Note

On December 5, 1963, President Lyndon B. Johnson chaired the first National Security Council meeting of his administration. Because there was no Vice President, the President invited Representative Sam Rayburn of Texas to attend National Security Council meetings "from time to time as his schedule permitted." Rayburn was Johnson's successor in the event of the President's death in office. For an outline of remarks Bundy prepared for the President and the summary record of this 520th NSC meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VIII, Documents 149 and 150. See also Smith, Organizational History of the National Security Council, page 57.