Washington, February 14, 1961.

SUBJECT
Closing Marginal Posts

The attached list (Tab A) of marginal posts includes the five least important in each geographic area, as ranked last summer by the Regional Bureaus. The combined staff and total annual cost of these 25 posts is 233 positions and $1,876,500. SCA reviewed the list and expressed opposition to closing eight of them because of their importance to consular work; simultaneously SCA suggested seven others which might be considered for closing.

There seems little doubt that the 32 posts listed are those of least importance to the United States in the conduct of diplomatic relations and consular work. During the past few months consideration has been given to closing some or all of these posts. ARA announced the closing of Colon, Panama, in August, but because of local pressures, now plans to keep the post open on a limited basis. EUR is planning to close Aruba this month. No other definite action toward additional closings has been taken.

The decision to close any post is, in the final analysis, a political one. Political factors to be considered are: the reaction of national and local governments to what they may interpret as a loss of prestige; the current status of relations which may at a given moment focus greater attention on a post closing than objectively it warrants; inter-city rivalries and jealousies within a county where the United States maintains several consulates; adverse public relations which may result from inconveniences to those receiving services from a post; pressures from United States citizens resident or travelling in a locality because they like to maintain a close and tangible contact with home. These, and similar factors, can be assessed properly only by the Regional Bureaus.

We should not overlook the importance of the human factor involved. The workload at such posts is somewhat routine and unchallenging. As a result the officers assigned tend to get in a rut and eventually lose their initiative. It seems to me that the human resources which can be recaptured and channeled into more urgent tasks are more important than the mere dollars involved.

I believe the need for review of marginal posts is urgent. You may wish to have Mr. Bowles take it up as a high priority, political item for discussion with the Assistant Secretaries involved.

That you ask Under Secretary Bowles to discuss the subject of closing marginal posts with the Assistant Secretaries of the Regional Bureaus and recommend the appropriate action./2/

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

List of Least Important Posts as Ranked by Regional Bureaus
(June, 1960)

ARA	American	Local	Total	Total Cost Annual Rate
Mexicali	3	2	5	$36,400
Antofagasta	2	3	5	29,000
Piedras Negras	2	3	5	26,800
Santos	1	3	4	17,600
Colon	2	2	4	25,000
	10	13	23	134,800

EUR
Aruba	4	5	9	74,100
Antwerp	7	19	26	149,700
Trieste	9	9	18	119,300
St. John	2	7	9	62,200
Basel	3	5	8	57,500
	25	45	70	462,800

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

List of Least Important Posts as Ranked by Regional Bureaus
(June, 1960)

NEA	American	Local	Total	Total Cost Annual Rate
Alexandria	4	8	12	103,400
Iskenderun	3	6	9	75,400
Aleppo	5	8	13	104,500
Isfahan	3	7	10	90,200
Haifa	3	7	10	80,000
	18	36	54	453,500
FE
Mandalay	3	6	9	50,900
Brisbane	4	3	7	35,600
Cebu	3	5	8	56,000
Hue	2	5	7	41,800
Adelaide	2	3	5	40,900
	14	22	36	225,200
AF
Kaduna	4	6	10	52,800
Lourenco Marques	4	9	13	71,500
Capetown	7	7	14	120,700
Port Elizabeth	2	3	5	40,300
Durban	3	5	8	53,900
	20	30	50	339,200

PER costs	--	--	--	261,000
Total	87	146	233	1,876,500

Note: SCA opposes the closing of the following posts listed above because of their importance in consular work: Mexicali, Piedras Negras, Aruba, Trieste, St. John, Haifa, Capetown, and Durban.

SCA suggests the following posts not listed above might be considered for closing: Cork, Edinburgh, Manchester or Liverpool, Turin, La Havre, Southampton, Vera Cruz.

Washington, February 25, 1961.

The more I see of the developing pattern of responsibility in the Department of State, the more I am inclined to share the view of Dean Rusk and Chester Bowles that the key job over there will be the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. This has not been so in the past, but in the pattern which is now developing this officer will necessarily be a point of responsible action and coordination for many of the things in which State must take the lead, and must also work in close cooperation with the Defense Department and CIA. The man who fills this job will have to be an active and decisive person, quite different from the ordinary foreign service type.

[Here follow four paragraphs concerning personnel options.]

McG. B./2/

Secretary of State Rusk, in a staff meeting on April 14, 1961, requested the Executive Secretary of the Department of State, Lucius D. Battle, to ask the Assistant Secretaries to submit brief papers on the long-range problems facing their respective bureaus. By May 5, nine bureaus had responded, and six others had not. (Note from Battle to Rusk, May 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960-63, 110.10/4-1961) The responses included a report from Deputy Under Secretary for Administration Roger W. Jones, dated April 22; from Assistant Secretary for Administration William J. Crockett, dated May 4; from Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Robert Tubby, dated May 5; from Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Foy D. Kohler, dated May 3; from Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Lewis Jones, dated April 19; from Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Wymberley DeR. Coerr, dated May 4; from Assistant Secretary for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams, dated May 4; and from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Roger Hilsman, dated May 3. Battle transmitted the reports to Rusk under cover of his May 5 note.

Washington, June 14, 1961.

SUBJECT
The Need to Improve the Administration of Foreign Policy

Our ability to create a more effective, more realistic, and more affirmative American foreign policy rests in large measure on the ability of the top echelon of the Department of State under the general direction of the President and in conjunction with other agencies to produce wise decisions.

It is equally dependent on greatly improved administrative State Department operations, reaching into every section and country desk in Washington and out to every overseas mission, that will assure that these decisions are carried out.

The following measures to achieve this greater effectiveness are either now being taken or are immediately contemplated.

At a recent meeting in my office, I asked each bureau head personally to review the operations of each country desk and other working components within his bureau.

These studies are now being completed, and with the help of Roger Jones, Bill Crockett and Herman Pollack, I am holding meetings with each bureau head to discuss whatever personnel changes and administrative changes are required to assure both the necessary experience and fresh perspective at all levels of each bureau.

We should avoid the appearance of a shake up, yet those who have been too long on a single assignment and who have become somewhat stale and fixed in their views should be switched to posts which will offer them a fresh challenge.

I am also making personal visits to each bureau. These visits include an hour or more of frank discussion with the thirty or forty top people dealing with the new administration's policies and specific problems which concern the particular bureau in carrying out these policies.

The letter from the President to all Ambassadors which went out two weeks ago establishes each Chief of Mission as responsible for the combined U.S. effort in the country to which he has been assigned and entrusts him with necessary working authority./2/ This action has had a most favorable reception.

To help assure a tactful and effective response to this letter, we are sending out a series of guidance letters to all mission chiefs. These letters will deal with the following subjects:

a. The broad role of the Ambassador as leader, coordinator, and administrator.

b. Methods of improving the reporting and policy guidance provided by each mission.

c. Techniques for establishing closer working relationships within the American official community.

d. Techniques for improving the impression created by American officials (and Americans generally) in each country.

e. Methods to insure closer contacts with the internal culture, institutions, and people.

The press of daily business makes it difficult for even the ablest of mission chiefs to give sufficient priority to programs which involve basic changes in working relations and habits.

To help assure the necessary thought and action, each Ambassador will be asked to write me a letter within one month of the receipt of these guidance memoranda outlining precisely what changes have occurred in his mission's operations as a result.

In this way we may persuade each Ambassador to focus personally on these fundamental operating questions. The response from each mission chief should also give us valuable insights into his understanding of his own mission. Further status reports will be asked for at periodic intervals.

As a second stage in the campaign to freshen up our operations abroad, I am planning to hold approximately nine regional Chiefs of Mission Conferences abroad between the end of July and the end of October.

These conferences, which will last for two or three days, will be somewhat larger than the usual Chiefs of Missions' Meetings. The Ambassador will be asked to bring with him his Administrative Officer, the AID Mission Director, the USIS Public Affairs Officer, and in some cases his Deputy.

I expect to take with me from Washington the appropriate Assistant Secretary for each region, Roger Jones, or one of his Deputies, and high level representatives from the new AID Agency and from USIA.

I shall personally attend each of these meetings. We will cover not only policy discussions but the practical problems involved in coordinating the activities of our various agencies abroad; personnel selection, training and management; improved reporting; and so forth.

I believe such meetings are essential to assure that the new emphasis and direction on foreign policy questions the President has approved carries through into action at all operating levels abroad.

We are now working on initial planning for the first three of these conferences. They have tentatively been scheduled for the period from July 25th through August 11th and will probably be held in Lagos, Beirut or Cairo and New Delhi. In September and October we will follow up with similar meetings in Latin America, East Asia and Europe.

We are also planning to lengthen the normal tour of duty at all posts to three years and in some cases longer. Although this will require legislation and considerable adjustment, it is essential if we are to develop knowledge of each country in greater depth, closer personal contacts and better language abilities.

I have also asked for a study of the reports now required of each Embassy and the extent to which the number, frequency and scope of these reports can be reduced. This is essential if we are to free our mission chiefs and their top associates for increased travel outside the national capital.

In 1958 studies were completed by the old Operations Coordinating Board dealing with the broad range of questions resulting from the total U.S. presence abroad, military and civilian. The objective was to persuade the agencies now operating overseas to tighten up administrative practices, personnel selection, attitudes, etc.

The OCB made a number of thoughtful recommendations. Some of these have been carried out in the intervening period. In other instances, however, there appears to have been little improvement.

In any event, the time has come to review this report in light of our present operations, to bring its recommendations up to date, and to establish the procedures that will assure that they are carried out.

Because of the large number of military personnel and dependents now overseas, the Pentagon has a particularly important role to play. In this regard I have discussed procedures with Ros Gilpatric, and a preliminary meeting has been set up with Herman Pollack and Bill Bundy. Procedures will then be agreed upon to explore all questions involving living areas, PX's, general attitudes, preliminary training, indoctrination, and so forth.

Each regional Assistant Secretary will be asked to follow through with the Pentagon and other agencies which are involved in his geographic area.

Roger Jones had an excellent meeting with Elmer Staats and some of the Budget Bureau people here on June 8th. A number of the problems involved in reaffirming State's responsibility for asserting primary authority in the overall field of U.S. international activities were discussed at length.

Elmer Staats and the Budget Bureau are taking a most constructive and helpful approach to all these questions. A special liaison man is being brought in to assure the necessary follow through between the Bureau and State.

Another area of our overseas operations which we should consider most carefully is the thousands of military personnel from foreign countries who are brought each year to the United States under the Military Assistance Program for training by the U.S. military in the use of new weapons and techniques. (Ed Murrow tells me that the total budget for this effort is half as large as that of the entire USIA.)

These many contacts provide a ready-made opportunity to create a better understanding of our country, its beliefs, and policies.

In cooperation with Defense we are planning to reexamine the handling of these foreign nationals who are exposed during their stay in this country. Together, we shall then work out a program that will improve their general understanding of the United States, its people and its policies.

I am asking Phil Coombs to coordinate this effort.

I am deeply impressed with the present aid program which has been prepared for Congress. In my opinion it deals most effectively with the objectives and requirements of foreign assistance.

However, as I read it, I was again conscious of the urgent need for a highly competent administrative operation to carry out the program. Criticisms of the past operations have often been overstated, but many are valid.

If we are going to get this program through Congress and if the program itself is to live up to the objectives set by the President, we must vastly improve the administrative set up and personnel.

Hank Labouisse and his staff are, of course, acutely conscious of this need. Yet, with their heavy load of Congressional contacts and day-to-day administrative problems, I cannot see how they can devote the necessary time to the immediate task of creating a new, highly competent organization with the necessary new faces.

I suggested to Hank Labouisse the possibility of bringing in (perhaps on a temporary basis) a high level administrator in public administration who would concentrate exclusively on the problem of personnel, organization, and assignments. I shall explore this possibility further.

In my opinion, it is also important to find more effective ways to use the talent in Labor, Agriculture, Hew and elsewhere in operations and planning overseas. It is essential that the State Department keep close control on policy questions. Yet, there are many highly expert people in these agencies with wide overseas experience whom we should learn how to use. At present many of them feel shut out.

I am having lunch with Orville Freeman today to discuss this question. I have already talked in general terms to Abe Ribicoff.

Cabinet members, themselves, with an interest in foreign affairs can play a most constructive role. It is our task to find an effective way to put their energies to work without disrupting or diffusing our normal operations.

This will give you an idea of the effort that is being made. Please give me any thoughts that may occur to you.

Washington, undated.

Summary of Major Improvements in State Department
Administrative Operations
January 20-July 20, 1961

(Source: Memorandum of July 20 from A--Mr. Crockett to O--Mr. Jones)/2/

1. Internal Organization Changes

a. Development of integrated regional approach to aid programs through new Agency for International Development (AID).

b. Enlargement of Disarmament Administration.

c. Establishment of Peace Corps.

d. Grouping of bureaus with politico-military-intelligence functions under Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs for day-to-day operations.

e. Elevation of head of cultural affairs programs to Assistant Secretary rank.

f. New emphasis in intelligence operations on studies of current and emerging problems.

g. Creation of Operations Center for emergency, inter-departmental action.

h. Strengthening long-range planning by consolidating the positions of Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council.

i. Expansion of Protocol Office activities.

j. Assignment to Director General of the Foreign Service of responsibility for adequate support for ambassadors.

k. Increase in Department support for the Export Expansion Program.

l. Setting up of an Office of Management to focus responsibility on management problems.

m. Abolishment of 109 inter- and intra departmental committees.

n. Improvement of internal communications through publication of the Department of State News Letter.

o. Beginning study on use of automation to expedite Departmental operations of various kinds.

2. Overseas Changes

a. Strengthening of concept of unified U.S. foreign affairs activities abroad under guidance of Ambassador.

b. Combining of previously separate post administrative services operations.

Washington, July 8, 1961.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

As you know from President Kennedy's recent letter to you, he is deeply interested in our operations, not only here in Washington but also abroad.

In order to strengthen our efforts here and to give improved support to our overseas operations, I have been taking a close look at the administrative structure of our Bureaus here in Washington, going over each Bureau in detail with its Assistant Secretary and our Administrative people.

We are also planning to hold a series of regional meetings of Chiefs of Missions throughout the world. The first of these meetings will be in Lagos, Nigeria, in late July, a second is scheduled for Nicosia, Cyprus, and the third for New Delhi. Additional meetings will be held later in Europe, Latin America and the Far East.

I plan to attend each of these meetings, and with me will be high officials from USIA, ICA, Defense and appropriate areas of the Department. It is my hope that you will be able to bring with you your chief advisers. You will shortly be receiving or may have already received specific details about these conferences.

In the meantime we thought it might be useful to send you some thoughts which we have put together here on various aspects of the problems we want to discuss in these conferences. The attached memoranda spell out in some detail the kinds of problems we feel you might profitably consider in advance of the meetings. They include suggestions and ideas which have proved useful in some of our Missions in achieving better integration of our activities and presenting a more positive impression to the people of the country in which we work.

Our purpose in sending them now is simply to elicit your reactions and suggestions. We will then discuss reactions from you and your colleagues in detail at our regional meetings. The memoranda will be the basis for much of our discussions.

Although the time is obviously very tight, I would appreciate getting at least some of your views before I leave Washington on July 24 for the first of these regional meetings. A preliminary reply by cable would be very helpful.

Let me add that these memoranda were written with considerable hesitation. The subjects touched upon are complex and often personal. We do not pretend to have all the answers. However, our embassy relations are so vital that I am sure you will agree that we must explore every practical way to improve our performance.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles/2/

Washington, July 8, 1961.

LEADERSHIP AND SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE AMBASSADOR

Before World War II the Ambassador's authority was seldom challenged by any other United States representative abroad. The limited responsibilities of the few representatives of other departments on his staff caused little difficulty.

After World War II this situation was dramatically changed by the United States new role of leadership and by the shrinking of the world through modern communications. Matters previously of domestic concern now impinged on foreign countries.

The immediate post-war years saw (1) the establishment abroad of numerous semiautonomous, strong special missions; (2) the retention and establishment of military bases and missions; and (3) the sending abroad of representatives by many Government departments and agencies.

The Ambassador during these years lacked the authority to supervise, direct or control these missions or representatives. By 1948 with the establishment of aid missions abroad largely independent of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, the Ambassador's authority had reached an all-time low.

The first important step to rectify this situation was the Clay Paper of February 1951, a memorandum of understanding between State, Defense, and ECA. It established the Country Team concept and was the first clear statement of the primary position of the Ambassador with regard to the personnel of other agencies.

From 1951 to 1961 the Ambassador's responsibility and authority were consolidated by a series of Executive Orders, Presidential letters and memoranda, and State Department instructions.

Key steps were Executive Order 10893 of November 8, 1960, the Presidential Memorandum of the same date, and the Department's Circular Airgram No. 4334 of November 14, 1960. The President's letter to all Ambassadors of May 29, 1961 was the most recent step in this development.

An able Ambassador is in a position greatly to improve the tone for all American officials in his country of assignment. If he has the necessary tact and skill, he can be of great help to the representatives of other U.S. Government departments and agencies in carrying out their missions. It is his task to create a satisfactory, easy working relationship with them and to encourage and support their activities in a way that will enable the Country Team to work more effectively in furthering our national objectives.

It is particularly important that an Ambassador make the representatives of other departments and agencies feel that they are an integral part of his official family. There are a number of ways by which this can be accomplished:

(1) by making sure that they are fully informed concerning overall American objectives in the country;

(2) by making sure that they are fully informed of the current and longer-term problems and obstacles in attaining these objectives and of the means best calculated, in the Ambassador's judgment, to overcome these difficulties;

(3) by having the Ambassador use his position socially and officially to assist them in accomplishing their specific missions;

(4) by having members of the Country Team regularly attend the Ambassador's staff meetings and members of the Embassy's Political, Economic, and Administrative Sections attend staff meetings held by the USIA, AID and other Country Team members;

(5) by including these Team members regularly in the small dinners or luncheons given for high-ranking officials;

(6) by providing helpful advice and guidance while remaining sensitive to the danger and undesirability of interfering in the minutiae of their operational responsibilities;

(7) by ensuring that the Ambassador is always available to members of the Country Team;

(8) by ensuring that each group understands the functions and activities of the others;

(9) by making sure that representatives of other departments and agencies know that the Ambassador will welcome their suggestions on any matter; and

(10) by encouraging close working relationships among all personnel interested in similar fields.

The President is the focal point in the United States Government where divergent interests are reconciled in the national interest.

The Ambassador, his personal representative, is best able to reconcile the divergent interests of the representatives of various departments and agencies in a foreign country. This is essential to prevent the export abroad of the perhaps inevitable bureaucratic conflicts of Washington.

An Ambassador and his Foreign Service staff do not and should not consider themselves as representing just the State Department. They represent and serve the entire United States Government.

The Ambassador is in a position to:

(1) ensure that all United States activities in a given country contribute to the achievement of United States foreign policy objectives;

(2) reconcile the special interests of the representatives of other Government departments and agencies with the national interest;

(3) coordinate all United States activities in a foreign country;

(4) identify in advance and forestall actions which in his judgment would adversely affect United States relations with the country concerned;

(5) ensure that all United States representatives fully understand United States objectives, speak with a common voice and are not played off one against the other by a foreign government; and

(6) provide advice, guidance, and leadership to assist the represent-atives of other departments and agencies in carrying out their responsibilities.

An imaginative, intelligent, and sympathetic exercise of leadership by an Ambassador should, in all but extremely rare instances, prevent situations from developing to a point where he must make a decision which will be appealed by the representative of another department or agency to higher authority in Washington.

The President's letter makes clear that the Ambassador's decision stands pending appeal, if any, to Washington. Similarly, circumstances which would make it necessary for him to request the departure of an individual should arise most infrequently.

When time is not an important factor, the Ambassador may wish to consult the Department by official-informal letter or "Eyes Only" telegram addressed to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration prior to making a final decision affecting the activities of personnel of another department or agency.

New regulations will be issued soon setting forth the procedures to be followed by an Ambassador in obtaining the departure of a member of the Foreign Service.

The representatives of other Departments and agencies are responsible for keeping the Ambassador fully informed of their views and activities.

This should be understood to include giving the Ambassador any information which they send to their departments and agencies, whether orally or through informal communications channels. This is particularly important if such information should reflect any disagreement with the Ambassador's views

The Ambassador is the leader, the coordinator, and the supervisor of all official United States representatives in the country to which he is accredited. As such, he bears the responsibility for success or failure in achieving United States foreign policy objectives in his country of assignment.

Washington, July 27, 1961.

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a memorandum on the organization of the Department of State which I promised you before leaving Washington./2/

In this memorandum I have tried to eliminate any references to my own emotions and commitments. However, I hope you will bear with me if I offer a few additional and highly personal comments on a situation that has been difficult for all of us.

When you asked me to accept the post of Under Secretary, I did so because I was convinced that a basic revitalization of the State Department both in Washington and in our overseas missions was long overdue and because I felt that I could help bring about the essential changes.

Much of my experience has been in administrative work. In the 1930's I organized a private business with more that a thousand employees. In the 1940's I reorganized a badly demoralized war-time agency with some 60,000 paid employees and 350,000 volunteers.

In India I reorganized not only our embassy but USIA and the foreign aid program which were then being greatly expanded and integrated into the embassy operation--exactly as we are doing with our overseas missions today.

In each case we brought in new people to head each bureau, men dedicated to the President's policies. And in each case there was a clear sense of purpose and high morale.

I do not make these comments as an expression of self-esteem. I do it simply because so much has been said about my alleged lack of interest in administration, and I would like to set the record straight.

The weak performance of some sections of the State Department has largely been due, in my opinion, to failure to introduce fresh faces where they are needed.

An additional weak point relates to the area of communications. Although no single individual possesses all the qualities desirable in the Secretary of State, I know of no one who possesses so high a percentage of them as Dean Rusk, nor anyone with whom I would prefer to work. For a variety of reasons, however, most of them the result of pressures, Dean, Adlai, and I have not worked together as closely as I believe we should.

Finally, I have been at fault in not maintaining close connections with the White House staff and you personally. My visit with you two weeks ago was the only direct exchange of views we have had since we had breakfast in your N Street home last November. If we had talked for no more than an hour a month, this situation would never have developed.

However, I was hesitant to take advantage of our former association or to infringe on the position which properly belongs to the Secretary, and so I held back.

As far as my own future is concerned, my strong preference is to continue where I am, with your support and that of Dean Rusk, so that we may bring about the changes in emphasis and direction which I believe to be needed in certain areas.

Once the right individuals have been selected and installed in the key bureaus where our principal difficulties lie, I would be in a position to divert a sizable amount of time to special policy problems in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Northeast Brazil, and elsewhere. I would also have time for more travel and for the essential task of explaining your policies in key nations abroad.

If you prefer to have someone else tackle these organizational problems, I will be glad to reshuffle various assignments with George Ball. This should also enable me to attend to special policy problems, overseas missions, and the achievement of a better understanding of your policies in the United States.

If neither solution seems advisable to you and Dean, I will find myself in a most difficult position. I am deeply dedicated to your aims in foreign policy, and I have prepared myself in depth for many years to serve the Department of State. Yet in view of the totally false and malicious attacks on me, most of them from people with an equal disdain for all liberal-minded Democrats, I do not see how I could accept a down-graded role from my present position of Under Secretary and still appear to retain your confidence.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chet Bowles

Washington, July 28, 1961.

Before leaving Washington, I promised to send you a memorandum with my views on the organizational needs of the Department of State. Such a report can be valuable to you only if it is frank. My frankness, however, should not be interpreted as a criticism, direct or indirect, of any individual.

Nor should it suggest any lack of respect for the career service. Within the ranks of the Foreign Service and the Department are many of the nation's most able, experienced, and dedicated specialists in foreign policy.

We have extraordinary assets, for instance, in such people as Bob Woodward, Tommy Thompson, Charlie Yost at the United Nations, Fred Reinhardt in Rome, Ellis Briggs in Athens, Tyler Thompson as Director General of the Foreign Service, Ed Martin in the Bureau of Economic Affairs, and many others.

Generally speaking, however, your approach to foreign affairs is inadequately understood by many of the able career officers of the Department who have attained senior rank in the last ten years. It is our task so to organize the various bureaus that the experience and skills of these men can be put to good use through a structure which assures you the kind of policies which you have been advocating for years. The key to such structure, in my opinion, lies in the appointment of bureau heads and deputies who clearly understand your foreign policy objectives, who believe these objectives are right, and who can work effectively as members of a team to achieve them.

Everyone knows that the performance of the Department of State in the first six months of the new Administration has been uneven.

In certain bureaus fresh ideas have begun to flow, morale is high, and there is a clear sense of purpose and direction. In others, there has been resistance to fresh thinking and a continuing attachment to the sterile assumptions and negative policies that we criticized so vigorously when we were out of office.

Let me emphasize that the difference to which I refer does not involve the efficiency of the bureaus' day-to-day operations, but rather their capacity to bring a fresh perspective to old situations, to sense the weakness or irrelevance of old positions, and to produce--or allow others to produce--the new policies which in some areas are so long overdue.

There are, I believe, two basic and interrelated reasons for the uneven performance of the bureaus: first, differences in leadership, and second, differences in the process of policy formation.

Where fresh blood that is keenly attuned to the New Frontier has been introduced, the performance by and large has been impressive. Where the outlook and personnel of the old Administration still prevail at the top of the bureau, we have been falling down.

Let me be specific.

In the up-graded and reorganized Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, headed by Phil Coombs and two able new assistants, Joe Slater and Max Isenbergh, the substantive improvement since January has been spectacular.

In Protocol we also see a new sense of direction and increased effectiveness under the leadership of Angie Duke. These qualities have already produced concrete results in the life of the African and Asian diplomatic community and elsewhere.

Abe Chayes in the Legal Adviser's office, with a reinvigorated staff, has introduced a much more affirmative approach to a vitally important and previously negative area of operations.

This pattern has been repeated in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research under Roger Hilsman and Tom Hughes, who are demonstrating how raw intelligence, thoughtfully interpreted, can provide a much more effective tool in our policy making.

At the same time, George McGhee, as Counselor, has transformed the Policy Planning Council from an ineffective and negative instrument into a respected producer of new ideas and perspective.

In the administrative section we see similar changes for the better. Here Roger Jones, with the help of two able career people, Bill Crockett and Herman Pollack (who in recent years had seen their ideas frustrated and bypassed), has vastly improved administrative procedures in regard to our operations in Washington and also in the field.

The Bureau of Public Affairs under Roger Tubby, ably assisted by Carl Rowan, has developed new techniques to further public understanding of foreign policy. For the first time, for instance, local newsmen and radio and television commentators from all over the United States have been invited to Washington for successful briefings in depth.

Under Adlai Stevenson, our operation at the United Nations has also substantially improved. Here the credit belongs not only to Ambassador Stevenson and his able assistants in New York but also to the vigorous support they have received from the reorganized Bureau of International Organization Affairs under the leadership of Harlan Cleveland and Dick Gardner.

We are also making substantial progress in improving the effectiveness of our overseas mission. A letter from you in late May expanded and redefined the role of our ambassadors. This was followed by more specific guidance papers which spelled out ways in which our overseas operations could be strengthened. The success of this effort has been dramatically demonstrated in the meeting which I am now attending in Lagos.

In addition, the overseas service term for career officers is being lengthened, language standards raised, and sixteen Foreign Service Officers of ministerial or ambassadorial rank who in the past Administration would now be heading embassies have been retired so that younger, abler officers could be promoted.

Even the most casual study of State Department operations will, I believe, underscore this central point: Wherever people who understand the Kennedy policies and believe in them have been brought in to head bureaus or to occupy top deputy posts, our performance has been greatly improved. Where we have failed to introduce such individuals, our performance has been less satisfactory.

Let us consider, for instance, the operations of the five geographic bureaus. At present each Assistant Secretary is supported by two Deputy Assistant Secretaries. This means that fifteen top officers are running the core of the Department under the office of the Secretary. Yet only four of these fifteen individuals are Kennedy-oriented men brought in from outside the Department. Two of the four are Assistant Secretaries and two are Deputy Assistant Secretaries.

In the Bureau of European Affairs, Inter-American Affairs, and Far Eastern Affairs, almost no fresh blood has been introduced.

All three of these bureaus are headed by individuals of great integrity and experience. Their staff are experienced, loyal, and efficient on day-to-day operations. But because top leadership in these bureaus in our first six months has been much less sensitive to your views and priorities, there has been a tendency to cling to outworn assumptions, to resist new approaches, and to gloss over setbacks.

The apathy towards the need for a review of old policies and for fresh approaches, which is evident in varying degrees in each of these three bureaus, is dramatized by a comparison with the Bureau of African Affairs under Soapy Williams, with his two able assistants, Wayne Fredericks, and John Abernethy.

Although the personnel in the African Bureau is younger and by and large less experienced, morale is probably higher there than in any other part of the State Department. Moreover, there is a clear understanding within the bureau of the principles which were laid down in your campaign, in The Strategy of Peace, and in the Democratic platform.

This brings me to a second and closely related point: Where we have Assistant Secretaries and Deputy Assistant Secretaries who understand and believe in your views on foreign policy, guidance is easily applied from the top. Communications are natural and uninhibited. Fresh ideas and criticism are welcome. There is an atmosphere of purpose and dedication.

Where a new Kennedy-oriented leadership has been lacking, such top-side guidance is resisted and policy tends to flow from the bottom up. The papers start from the country desks and then move gradually up through the various interested bureaus and levels of authority. Where disagreements arise, meetings are held, compromises are struck, and the papers then continue on their way.

When they finally reach the Secretary and the Under Secretary, the ideas are often fully crystallized, and the entire apparatus which is responsible for their development goes all out in their defense.

As a result, the top officers who are responsible for the final decisions have little knowledge of the compromises which have been built into these papers on their way up through the bureaucratic machinery; nor are they necessarily in tune with these compromises; nor are they adequately aware of the possible alternatives which for reasons good or bad may have been discarded.

By the day the paper is finally presented, time is likely to be short, pressures against changes are well developed not only in the State Department but throughout the government, and an NSC meeting may be just around the corner.

In these circumstances the Secretary and Under Secretary have no alternative but to accept the paper largely unchanged or send it back and start all over.

Such a procedure would be workable only if the lower and middle levels of the Department were infused with the foreign policy views which you outlined in your book and in your speeches. With due credit to the scores of able and dedicated professionals who hold these positions, such understanding is now the exception rather than the rule.

A single example will emphasize the essential point. Early last February it was clearly apparent that Berlin and Germany would erupt as a major issue during the spring. This called for an urgent review of our situation in that area, an assessment of the new forces, and the creation of a new position which would enable the new President to move from the negative posture of the previous Administration and seize the initiative with the Soviets and with world opinion generally.

Yet our efforts to stimulate this review were hampered by the convictions of many key professionals within the Bureau that our old position was adequate and that no further action was needed.

Let me say with the greatest emphasis that these remarks are not intended as a personal criticism of any individual. The Bureau of European Affairs which I have used to illustrate my point is, in my opinion, the best administered bureau of the Department.

However, like the Inter-American and Far Eastern Bureaus, it has clung to old positions and resisted fresh approaches because its principal architects of policy and operations have not been emotionally and intellectually attuned to your criticism of old Eisenhower positions and to the new approaches which you had consistently advocated.

Although this situation is difficult and frustrating, it is not, in my opinion, difficult to correct. A few new people properly placed and vigorously supported in a relatively brief period introduce new depth, understanding, and vigor into U.S. foreign policy where it is needed most. In cooperation with the Secretary, Adlai Stevenson, and me, they could enable us to reverse the present policy-making procedure which in certain key areas now operates largely from the bottom up rather than from clearly established guidelines at the top.

When an old policy seems to be losing its relevance or when an emergency situation arises, the first discussions, I believe, should involve the Secretary, Adlai Stevenson, and myself, and the Assistant Secretary for the geographic bureau, in addition perhaps to Harlan Cleveland, Abe Chayes, and, in some cases, George McGhee and George Ball.

From such a discussion, alternative approaches are almost certain to emerge. The further development of one of them could be assigned to the geographic bureau, another to the Policy Planning Council, and a third perhaps to some outside group headed by Harlan Cleveland or Abe Chayes.

But this procedure should go beyond emergencies. Right now, for instance, there is urgent need for policy review in all the geographic bureaus and particularly in Europe, the Far East, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. I believe that we need to create new NSC papers for at least a dozen geographic areas.

The guidelines of these papers should be outlined in advance by the Secretary, Stevenson, myself, and others who know what you want and would be in a position to contribute directly at the early stages of the full development process.

One final point which I have recently come to believe is of primary importance: The top officials of the Department can take control of policy formation only if they have able staff assistants with a "passion for anonymity" to help them.

These assistants should be in on the earliest policy discussions. They should then keep in close touch with the various task forces on a day-to-day basis so that they can inform the Secretary of progress on policy-making along the lines which have been agreed to.

Only in this way can the Secretary and Under Secretary be well and consistently aware that their ideas and your ideas are being developed as intended and also warned of emphasis change or deadlock or imperfections in the original proposals.

In no sense should this mechanism be viewed as a substitute for the Secretariat, which is an essential operation under the very able direction of Luke Battle, but rather as a supplementary operation which should also be directed by Luke. The Secretariat, as presently organized, lacks the personnel and authority to follow through on the policy-making process.

Most emphatically, I am not suggesting a reorganization but rather a revitalization of certain key bureaus of the Department. Although these bureaus are reasonably efficient in day-to-day operation, they are in large measure still emotionally tied to old policies which run counter to the commitments of the new Administration.

Instead of undermining the morale of the Department of State, the changes which I suggest will, I believe, give the Department a spirit and confidence which in some areas is now largely lacking.

In a memorandum to the President on July 28, 1961, Secretary of State Rusk set forth details for implementing a new system of foreign economic policy coordination. Rusk noted that the Council on Foreign Economic Policy had been abolished on March 12 and its functions transferred to the Secretary of State. In a letter to Congress of May 26 transmitting the foreign assistance bill, the President had indicated that he expected the Secretary of State to become the focal point of responsibility for coordination of foreign economic policy, and to choose appropriate mechanisms for carrying this out. Accordingly, Rusk now designated the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to assume responsibility, under Rusk's direction, for interagency consultation and coordination of foreign economic policy. Rusk's memorandum of July 28 to the President is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume IX, Document 4.

Washington, August 11, 1961.

SUBJECT
Mr. Bowles's Memorandum of July 28/2/

1. I agree with the essential argument of the Bowles memorandum--that the State Department would be more effective as an instrument of government if more top officials believed vigorously in the purposes and objectives of the Administration. Old Frontier people cannot carry out New Frontier policies. Or rather I agree with this argument so far as it goes, while at the same time wishing to emphasize that, in my judgment, it only covers a part of the problem. If Mr. Bowles's concentration on personnel suggests that he thinks bringing in more New Frontiersmen will solve all the troubles of the State Department, I do not agree with this. The appointment of more able Kennedy outsiders will help create the conditions for solution; but the problems are deeper and more obstinate than the Bowles memorandum suggests.

2. My few months at the White House have convinced me that the traditional tripartite division of the national government into executive, legislative and judicial branches is inadequate. With a strong President, there are really four branches of government: the executive, the legislative, the judiciary and the Presidency. A President who advances new ideas and policies may well encounter as much resistance in the executive branch as in the Congress or the Supreme Court. I was academically aware of this from my excursions into the Roosevelt era; but I know much more vividly today how acute and deep-rooted the problem is of mobilizing the executive branch behind new programs and purposes.

3. This problem may be especially acute in the State Department because of the 'non-political' and 'elite' character of the Foreign Service.

The typical Foreign Service officer is well above the average in decency, intelligence and devotion. However, the typical Foreign Service officer also tends to be somewhat emasculated so far as policy commitment is concerned. One reason for this is that Foreign Service training has the effect of divesting the professional officer of strong views on substantive policy. It almost seems as if the Foreign Service receives a group of spirited young Americans at the age of 25 and transforms them in the next twenty years into a collection of eunuchs (or possibly my protracted exposure to ARA has distorted my judgment).

Why this process of emasculation?

(a) Foreign Service traditions derive from the time when America's role in the world was passive and spectatorial; consequently Foreign Service officers still tend to be reporters rather than operators.

(b) Foreign Service officers are regularly shifted from one country to another and from one job to another. This lack of continuity--Iceland one year, Tanganyika the next--discourages them from developing a very intense interest in policy issues. (In any case, they are taught that their job is to carry out the policy, however idiotic they may personally consider the policy to be.)

(c) It is no coincidence that the areas where the problem of learning a difficult language compels continuity--the Russia Service and the China Service--are precisely the areas where the Foreign Service professionals have been least emasculated and most independent and outspoken. But it was precisely these areas which suffered most heavily in the Dulles period. Dulles's punitive action against the men in the Foreign Service who were most conspicuously free and strong individuals (Bohlen, Kennan, Davies, Service, Thayer, etc.) proved to the rest of the Foreign Service what a mistake it was ever to go out on a limb. The Department is still suffering from the hangover of the Dulles period.

(d) The system of promotions within the Foreign Service further discourages policy initiative, because it is hard to propose new policies without seeming to criticize present ones. Junior officers may well hesitate to challenge Assistant Secretaries with power over their next assignments or, indeed, over their future careers.

Obviously the Foreign Service cannot consist of a collection of freewheelers each pursuing his own foreign policy. But the factors listed above have exaggerated an inherent tendency toward caution to a dangerous point. And Foreign Service resistance to innovation is further reinforced-and often in a most unwholesome way--by the prevailing sense that the Foreign Service is an exclusive club which must jealously guard foreign policy from the meddling of naive and presumptuous amateurs.

4. How to overcome this built-in resistance to change? How to annex the State Department to the Kennedy Administration?

The answer begins, of course, with strong leadership at the top-of the sort which has enabled McNamara and Gilpatric to proceed so successfully in their reconquest of the Pentagon. Strong top leadership has been lacking in State.

It is also important, as Mr. Bowles suggests, to get able, Kennedy-oriented men in jobs of middle-level administrative responsibility. I believe that he is, in the main, right when he claims that the New Frontiersmen have done much more to revitalize our conduct of foreign affairs than the Foreign Service professionals. It is natural enough that this should be so. Men who were in tune with John Foster Dulles are not likely to come up with bold initiatives for the New Frontier. Probably too many such men are still in key jobs. In ARA, and no doubt elsewhere, some of the Foreign Service officers are out of sympathy with the Kennedy foreign policy. It would certainly help to get more men of the Ball-Cleveland-Coombs-Chayes-Williams order at the Assistant Secretarial level.

At the same time, there should be no crusade against Foreign Service officers. They have to do most of the work. Many of them will begin to adjust to the new dispensation. The best among them (Bohlen, Kennan, Thompson, Woodward, Gullion and others) enjoy the New Frontier and flourish in the new expansive atmosphere.

5. More important: new men are only part of the problem. The Bowles memorandum ignores a number of structural questions which increase the Department's inherent tendencies toward inaction and postponement. Making policy in the State Department is like negotiating a hopelessly intricate obstacle course. One may recognize the need for interminable clearance and concurrence while at the same time wonder whether these things are not sometimes erected into excuses for doing as little as possible. The Bowles memorandum also ignores fundamental, long-run questions, like that of the training and philosophy of the Foreign Service.

In short, we require more Kennedy-oriented men in State, especially, as Bowles suggests, in ARA, FE and European Affairs. Why not develop a general pattern for the geographic areas of insider/outsider teams, one as Assistant Secretary, the other as Deputy? But we also require a hard and skeptical reexamination of the policy-making process within the Department. (This reexamination might also be carried out by insider/outsider teams; it cannot be entrusted to the Foreign Service alone--or to the Council on Foreign Relations alone!)

6. In the end, let us face the fact, only one man can exert the leadership to do the job. That is the Secretary of State.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

On August 14, 1961, George C. McGhee, Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, circulated a draft paper entitled "Foreign Policy: Toward Clarity in Terms and Method," for discussion at a Policy Planning Council meeting to be held on August 17 at 9:15 a.m. (Memorandum from McGhee to Rusk, Bowles, Ball, Roger W. Jones, U. Alexis Johnson, Battle, Chayes, Hilsman, and the Assistant Secretaries of eight Bureaus of the Department of State; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Policy Planning 6/61-8/61)

The study was issued by the Policy Planning Council on September 11. (Ibid.) McGhee sent a copy to Bundy for his information on September 13, indicating in a covering note that the study had been discussed with the Secretary of State and the Bureau of the Budget. (Ibid.)

Washington, August 16, 1961.

I would appreciate it if you would prepare a memorandum on the present assignment of responsibility within the Department of State. We discussed this at breakfast this morning, but I think if we could get it down on paper all concerned on the White House staff, as well as the State Department, would have a better idea of how they should conduct their responsibilities.

Washington, August 18, 1961.

SUBJECT
Regional Operations Conferences in Lagos, Nicosia and New Delhi

As you know from my preliminary reports on the Lagos and Nicosia meetings, these three conferences were extremely valuable from a number of points of view.

Our purpose, as you will recall, was twofold: to carry the Kennedy foreign policy message more effectively to our field personnel and to underscore the President's recent letter re-emphasizing Ambassadorial responsibility for all phases of our overseas operations.

The agenda and the formula of interagency participation which we followed turned out to be generally sound, although we had to revise our schedule as we went along to allow more time for discussions of policy and less for operational matters.

We can make further improvements in the format of the meetings; one change should be to reduce slightly the overall number of people present since we were pressing the effective limit, particularly at Nicosia.

With these changes we can proceed with two meetings in Latin America in mid-October and one in the Far East in mid-November or early December with the assurance that they will be well worth the expenditure of time and funds.

Perhaps the major strength of these meetings was supplied by the interagency approach. The cross-fertilization of ideas among agencies produced some remarkable results.

The presence of the wives of the Mission Chiefs also proved to be an excellent idea. They were brought for the first time fully into the official family and made some real contributions to our discussions. We should include them in future conferences without reservation.

The region bureaus and the administrative bureau are hard at work trying to solve dozens and dozens of specific problems of policy, administration, and coordination raised in the meetings. I shall monitor their follow-up reports to make certain we get the maximum benefit out of the discussions.

There are, however, some overall conclusions both for our policy and for our techniques of operations which I would like to cite. These are areas which we should all be conscious of in the coming months, and where top level follow-up will be particularly important.

A. The principle of full ambassadorial responsibility outlined in the President's letter of late May met with unanimous enthusiasm at all our meetings. Other agency representatives from Washington and the field approached the principles with a great deal of good will and I am heartened by my conviction that we are enjoying the best inter-agency relationships with our Defense, USIA and ICA colleagues that Washington has seen for a long time.

Joint meetings of this type proved to be a tangible demonstration of the sort of mutual trust we so often talk about but have not always demonstrated in practice.

The Ambassadors all accepted our assurances eagerly but several went out of the way to stress the importance of full support from Washington when they exercise their overall executive responsibility in ticklish cases.

Fully integrated operations should be easiest to achieve in Africa where no large, well entrenched bureaucracies are already in existence but I feel confident the situation will be satisfactory in the Middle East and Asia as well.

B. There are three essential areas in which we must follow up carefully here to make sure our Ambassadors are able to carry out their increased responsibilities effectively.

1. In selecting future Ambassadors we must pay a great deal more attention to the breadth of their backgrounds, their sensitivity to political dynamics, and their degree of understanding of aid, defense and information programs: if they are to act as chief executives for these programs in the real sense their training must include some prior exposure to problems in these fields.

One of the Ambassador's most important responsibilities must be to fight the necessary battles with the other Washington agencies on behalf of his public affairs officer, his aid mission director, or his MAAG chief, just as he represents his State components to the regional bureau. Only if this sort of concrete support is demonstrated will our Ambassadors get the sort of wholehearted cooperation and loyalty from their other agency staff members.

This suggests that we should take a critical look at our present emphasis on specialization for younger Foreign Service officers. While the need for specialists is undoubtedly great, particularly language and area specialists, if Foreign Service officers are to be able realistically to aspire to ambassadorships they must at some stage in their careers get sufficiently exposed to other than traditional Department functions to fit them for the broad executive role we are assigning to our Ambassadors.

With this in mind, I intend to ask our personnel people to expand as rapidly as possible interchange of personnel between our Foreign Service, USIA and the aid program. Our exchange program with the Department of Defense, which is proving very successful, should also be stepped up accordingly.

2. While all agencies accept without reservation the new role of the Ambassador, there is some reluctance, particularly among the aid people, to include the Deputy Chief of Mission as the Ambassador's alter ego in that role. We are going to make clear to all our missions that the DCM no longer is to be considered merely the operating head of the traditional embassy sections, but that he must be the Ambassador's right hand and alter ego for executive direction of all agency programs.

We will also take steps to insure that our DCMs have sufficient rank, experience and ability to handle this sort of job satisfactorily.

We also were impressed that at large missions Ambassadors will need one or perhaps two personal staff assistants to assist them in coordination of all agency operations. Steps are being taken to provide for such positions wherever they are needed.

3. We must keep up the steady campaign initiated at these conferences to instill in all of our State personnel, and especially our administrative people, a philosophical acceptance of the "embassy family" concept. Bill Crockett is working vigorously at this in the administrative area and we must see that our regional bureaus absorb the spirit as rapidly as possible.

Only when our people really begin to think of their other agency colleagues as equals in the Embassy will we begin to achieve the real meaning of the President's letter. This will be slow in coming in some places. Our top people have the concept, but there are still many old wounds which must be closed and many bitter memories to be forgotten all over the world.

C. It was strikingly clear at all these conferences and particularly in Lagos that our administrative procedures are incredibly burdened with red tape.

Roger Jones and Bill Crockett are slashing it as rapidly as possible and are preaching to their own staffs the right doctrine. This is a doctrine of decentralizing Washington's administrative monopoly, reducing reports of all sorts, simplifying and clarifying regulations and relying on a test of common sense in their interpretation and, most important, trusting in the judgment of our Ambassadors and our administrative officers overseas.

One reaction common at all meetings was the desire for speed in making these major administrative changes, even if we make a few mistakes. I am asking Bill to move ahead with all possible dispatch, even at the risk of stepping on bureaucratic toes.

D. With a few exceptions we can be proud of our Ambassadors and their staffs in these areas. While it is unwise to conclude too much from brief observation in meetings, most of us from Washington came away with the impression that our personnel in Africa are an able and particularly dedicated group. Their morale is excellent in spite of the staggering administrative problems with which most of them are faced and they are well versed in the philosophy and policies of the Administration.

We had similar good impressions in New Delhi from our South Asian and Southeast Asian posts. I think we have about the right mixture in that area of career and noncareer Ambassadors. Man for man, that was the most impressive group of chiefs of mission with whom we met.

While several of our top career people, such as Ellis Briggs, Ray Hare, and Phil Bonsal, were outstanding at Nicosia, the group as a whole from North Africa and the Middle East were somewhat less impressive at that conference. However, I am convinced that the problem there is partly one of over-exposure to the area. Many Arab specialists have been concentrating too long without a change of scene on the immensely frustrating problems of that region.

I think this problem is another reason for taking a hard look at our current emphasis on specialization. While it is undoubtedly necessary to build a corps of well qualified specialists for language areas, such as the Arab world, we must make certain these officers serve frequently enough in other areas to bring fresh perspective and breadth of view to problems within their field of specialization. This concern may clash head-on with our current drive for longer tours of duty and fewer separate assignments in the course of an officer's career. I am asking our personnel people to suggest some ways in which we can accomplish both worthwhile objectives.

E. It is apparent that we have significant communications gaps between the Department and our field posts on policy. Meetings such as these short-cut many months of written communications and avoid cumulative misunderstanding.

In order to close this gap we must encourage more consultation in Washington by our top people from the field and more intra-regional travel, as well as periodic regional meetings. We found it was very helpful to have Ambassadors from two regional bureaus meeting together, as was the case in Nicosia and New Delhi.

Our bureau lines are often artificial and tend to make it more difficult to solve questions which affect a number of missions. Not only travel but our mechanical communications net must be greatly improved if we are to get maximum usefulness from our missions abroad. This will cost more money but it will be money very well spent.

F. While we all agree it is desirable to cut our staff where possible to eliminate waste and non-essential functions, we must be extremely careful to do so in ways which will really forward our policy objectives.

Our Foreign Service personnel abroad are working long hours and what fat there is overseas is more likely to be found in other agency programs. We must concentrate first on reducing unnecessary reporting requirements to free our people for more local travel and broader contact with people of their areas and then look at possible staff reductions.

I have instructed Phil Sprouse, of the Foreign Service Inspection Corps, to carry out an experimental inspection in Paris covering other agencies as well as State. If this is successful, we will set up joint inspection teams to allow us to look at the whole range of mission activities and make cuts where they are really meaningful.

G. I am increasingly led to believe from this trip that some redefinition of regional bureau lines is desirable. For example, the Arab states of North Africa share many common problems with those of the Near East and few with those of Africa south of the Sahara.

As another example, the problem of China weighs heavily in South Asia as well as Southeast and East Asia and it may be that closer organizational ties between our missions in South Asia and those to the east would assist us in evolving sound policies all around the Chinese periphery.

I intend to explore this problem in the coming weeks with the regional bureaus, Alex Johnson and George McGhee and will have some firm recommendations ready by October.

[Here follows section II, Policy, comprising 6 pages of discussion under the following headings: A. Berlin; B. Africa; C. Arab World; D. Communist China; E. India-Pakistan; F. AID; G. Nuclear Testing; H. Race Relations.]

Washington, September 6, 1961.

FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Administrator, General Services Administration

SUBJECT
Expediting Publication of "Foreign Relations"

The effectiveness of democracy as a form of government depends on an informed and intelligent citizenry. Nowhere is the making of choices more important than in foreign affairs; nowhere does government have a more imperative duty to make available as swiftly as possible all the facts required for intelligent decision.

As many of these facts as possible should be made public on a current basis. But, because of the inherent need for security in the current conduct of foreign affairs, it is obviously not possible to make full immediate disclosure of diplomatic papers. However, delay in such disclosure must be kept to a minimum.

It has long been a pride of our government that we have made the historical record of our diplomacy available more promptly than any other nation in the world. The Department of State has the responsibility within the Executive Branch for putting out this permanent record in the series "Foreign Relations of the United States." The discharge of this responsibility requires the active collaboration of all departments and agencies of our Government in the submission and clearance of papers necessary for the completeness of this record.

In recent years the publication of the "Foreign Relations" series has fallen farther and farther behind currency. The lag has now reached approximately twenty years. I regard this as unfortunate and undesirable. It is the policy of this Administration to unfold the historical record as fast and as fully as is consistent with national security and with friendly relations with foreign nations.

Accordingly I herewith request all departments, agencies and libraries of the Government to collaborate actively and fully with the Department of State in its efforts to prepare and publish the record of our diplomacy. In my view, any official should have a clear and precise case involving the national interest before seeking to withhold from publication documents or papers fifteen or more years old./2/

John F. Kennedy/3/

Washington, September 11, 1961.

PROPOSED STUDY OF ASPECTS OF STATE DEPARTMENT
STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS

Problem--Over the past few years it appears that there has developed in the Department of State an organizational proliferation and operational complexity that has increased points of interest and work clearance, established what may be duplicate or overlapping functions and reviews, extended the line of command between the desk officer and policy-decision-making, diluted the authority and effectiveness of regional Assistant Secretaries and resulted in functional bureaus organized internally on a geographic basis and geographic bureaus organized and staffed to perform a complete array of functional responsibilities.

Also, in its inter-agency relationships, careful consideration needs to be given to State's effectiveness in providing foreign policy guidance and leadership to other agencies of Government and in meeting the needs of agencies that have a direct interest in the conduct of overseas activities.

Study Proposed--It is recommended that a study be made of:

(1) bureau organizational structure;

(2) functional and geographic bureau responsibilities;

(3) effectiveness of existing decentralization of Departmental staff functions such as public affairs and administrative services;

(4) Department's inter-agency relationships; and

(5) related management aspects.

Its purpose would be (a) to develop proposals for internal simplification and stream-lining of structure including reduction in operational layering, increased delegations of authority, elimination of any functional overlapping and duplicating work reviews, and reductions in personnel and other costs, and (b) to examine existing inter-departmental relationships and recommend measures for their improvement.

Staff Resources--On a temporary consulting basis, the services of two or three former officers of State who are knowledgeable regarding its operational needs, and who have demonstrated a competence in management. To these will be added, on a highly selective basis, such numbers of existing officers as may be necessary, with the support of the Office of Management, to accomplish the task within approximately 30 days.

Report--The study group will prepare and submit to the Secretary a report on its findings and recommendations. If in the course of its work, the group identifies organizational or management problems requiring further attention, its report should so indicate and recommend a course of action.

Washington, September 28, 1961.

SUBJECT
Washington News

[Here follow paragraph 1, which deals with the appointment of John McCone as Director of Central Intelligence; paragraph 2, concerning the defense budget for fiscal year 1963; and paragraph 3, dealing with the management of foreign aid. Paragraphs 1 and 3 are printed as Documents 91 and 75, respectively.]

4. Chester Bowles and I smoked a peace pipe this week. He is still wholly unclear about his relation to the Secretary and to the Department. With a man who had time to keep a close eye on him, I am now convinced that he could be an effective deputy for certain kinds of work. He really does have a sharp eye for personnel, and he understands better than the Secretary the need for executive energy in the geographical bureaus and other Assistant Secretaryships. The trouble is that he is constantly wanting to make policy, without even knowing, really, that this is what he is doing. And his policy is not on all fours with your own, and still less with Mr. Rusk's. I recommended to him that he have a wholly frank and clear-cut discussion with the Secretary, but I am not hopeful of the result. Rusk finds it hard to use a Deputy, and Bowles finds it even harder to be a No. 2.

Yet when we turned to talk of empty embassies and how to fill them, Bowles made good sense, and I think his recommendations are well worth your attention. Unless you are planning to keep him in the deep freeze, I suggest that you invite him in for a talk on this specific subject.

[Here follow paragraphs 5 and 6 concerning Syria and Berlin, respectively.]

McG. B/2/

Washington, October 6, 1961.

SUBJECT
Equal Employment Opportunity

As you know, the Secretary, Mennen Williams, and I, as well as other newcomers in the Department of State have always had strong views on the question of civil rights. I among others have been critical of the slow pace with which the Department has recruited qualified Negroes for responsible positions. Until we took office, however, we did not know just how bad the situation was.

As of February 28, 1961, of 3732 Foreign Service officers, 17 were Negroes, of 1140 Foreign Service Reserve officers, 3 were Negroes; and of 3527 Foreign Service Staff employees, 38 were Negroes. (The figure of 38 in the Staff corps is on the low side. It was not feasible to canvass each overseas post to determine the number of Negro Staff corps employees.) In the Department, of 4570 Civil Service employees, 1064 were Negroes but less than fifteen percent of that number were higher than grade GS-5, and none higher than grade GS-13.

Soon after entering the Department last winter we started a real campaign to speed up action in this field. While there is a great deal more to do at least we have made a good start.

A number of regulatory controls have been instituted or revised; Assistant Secretary Williams has been named Employment Policy Officer for the Department of State and the executive director of each bureau has been designated as an associate employment policy officer, each of whom is responsible not only for the processing of formal complaints of discrimination but for promoting compliance with the concept of fair employment within his jurisdiction; an instruction has gone to the field directing that no discrimination is to be permitted in employee recreational activities at overseas posts; and the field inspection team has been instructed to observe for evidence of compliance with the nondiscrimination policy. Moreover, the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of minority group background served this year on the examining panel for FSO-8 candidates. However, to effect a change in the aforementioned statistics, action of a more remedial nature must be instituted. This is being done.

On August 16, the Department held a day-long conference with top Negro leaders and representatives of national agencies to discuss steps that might be undertaken to achieve a more representative officer and staff corps and to assure better recruitment and utilization of Negro civil service employees. Secretary Rusk told the conferees "we are determined to do everything that we can to insure that discrimination is not practiced in the State Department." They, in turn, made nine recommendations to the Department.

Following are the recommendations of the conference, each with brief commentary on Departmental action to date:

The conference of August 16 was the kick-off of such a campaign. Since that time, a communication has been sent to each participant asking that they send the names of any people they feel qualified for employment with the Department. In addition, application forms for the FSO-8 examination have been sent them with the request that they encourage Negro young people of their acquaintance to take the examination this year. The conferees were asked to talk up the fact that the Department is interested in finding qualified Negroes for service at home and abroad, and four of the conferees have been asked to serve on a liaison committee which is to meet periodically to assess the Department's progress. A meeting of this committee is planned for November.

The Department has this recommendation under consideration. When circumstances are appropriate, i.e. when suitable assignments occur for which we have qualified Negroes, the Department will not hesitate to make such appointments.

The paucity of Negro officers in the senior grades both in the officer corps and in the Civil Service makes it difficult for the Department to meet this recommendation. The Foreign Service officers used in the college visitation program are Class 4 or higher while Civil Service employees, when used are at least grade GS-14. There are no Negro Civil Service employees at this grade level in the Department, and of four Foreign Service officers Class 4 or higher, all are currently serving in assignments overseas. One Negro Reserve officer is teaming with a white officer for a special recruitment trip to five of the larger metropolitan areas which, hopefully, will provide both some additional candidates for the examination this year and lay a base on which to build a better recruitment program in these cities among the Negro population over the next few years. Plans are presently underway to assign a Negro employee to clerical recruitment activities.

The number of predominantly Negro colleges to be visited in the college relations program has been increased this year. Whereas seventeen were visited last year, that number has been increased to twenty-six this year, making a net gain of nine. Moreover, the officers participating in the recruitment program have been supplied with a copy of the summary of the conference on equal employment opportunity and time was allotted during the recent briefing session to inform them of the Department's efforts to increase the representativeness of the Service.

On or about November 1, three new Negro employees are to enter on duty. All are being appointed as Reserve officers in the middle grades. One is to be assigned to the Bureau of Economic Affairs, one to the Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs in the Leaders and Specialists Division, and the third to the Office of Personnel. It is anticipated that as more of the conference participants begin to supply names of qualified applicants, other appointments will be made.

Three steps are underway which should relieve the imbalance presently found in the distribution of Negro employees by grade. (1) The Office of Personnel is currently surveying job classifications in the Department to discover those in which there is a preponderance of Negroes. When this information is obtained efforts will be made to reduce the concentration. (2) A listing of Negro employees who have demonstrated potential for more responsible assignments is being prepared. This list of names will be judiciously used when vacancies occur for which these employees are qualified. (3) Every fourth promotion panel is being surveyed to determine the frequency with which Negroes appear on such panels. This will be continued over a six months period and a report will be prepared monthly detailing the type of panel, number of Negroes and the selection results. This activity in combination with the aggressive recruitment program underway should result in substantial change in Departmental employment within the next six months.

This effort is currently underway. Because of the highly specialized qualifications and skills of employees of these departments, it is not anticipated that many officers will be found possessing the broad background desirable for work in the Foreign Service. Neither does the Department have any assurance that any officers now employed by either of these agencies would be willing to forego their career status to accept employment with the Department of State. However, this effort will be pursued vigorously.

Dr. Kenneth Clark, one of the participants in the conference of August 16 and a Professor of Psychology at City College of New York has recently volunteered the services of a subcommittee of the Society for Psychological Study on Social Issues for the purpose of taking a hard look at the entrance examination to see if it places a handicap on applicants from culturally disadvantaged backgrounds. The Department has accepted this invitation and three officers of the Department will meet with the subcommittee this month.

Dr. Jerome Holland, also a conference participant and a college president, is being asked to chair a committee whose objective will be to look into the problem of the long term supply of Negro candidates for the entrance examination. This committee is to be asked to develop a prospectus for such a program.

Two Negro students out of twenty were included in the intern program this summer. If funds are available for this activity next summer, Negro students will continue to be included.

The Department is making every effort to find qualified Negro applicants for service overseas and in Washington. This program is of first priority and will continue to receive the personal attention of Mr. Herman Pollack, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel.

There are attached for your information copies of news articles on the conference of August 16./2/

Chester Bowles/3/

Washington, October 29, 1961.

SUBJECT
Delegation to International Conferences

I believe that our delegations to international conferences and meetings can be reduced in size and thereby be made more efficient and less costly. The critical test should be the minimum number and roles of persons required to accomplish the particular U.S. objective at the conference or meeting. Our delegations should be looked upon as negotiating delegations, not as policy makers. It is not necessary for every agency, or every portion of the Department, which has or claims an interest in the subject matter, to have representatives on delegations.

I have myself initiated the same policy with respect to my own visits abroad. In requesting you to give rigorous scrutiny to the makeup of U.S. delegations, I am also assuring you of my full support, especially during the period when people will have to adjust themselves to the requirements of this policy.

Dean Rusk/2/

On November 15, 1961, Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Commerce Hodges signed a "Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of State and the Department of Commerce on International Commercial Activities." The agreement began with the following statement of objective:

"The President has directed the Executive Agencies to place maximum emphasis on enlarging the foreign commerce of the United States in seeking to maintain an over-all balance in our international payments. He has charged the Department of Commerce with the leadership within the Government to insure that a vigorous effort be made to expand trade, travel, and investment and 'to provide energetic leadership to American industry in a drive to develop export markets.' He has called upon the Departments of State and Commerce to proceed jointly to increase commercial representation and facilities abroad. And he has made it clear that Chiefs of Mission shall oversee and coordinate all such activities abroad.

"To provide effective leadership, the Department of Commerce is assuming primary responsibility and direction for foreign trade promotion activities at home and abroad, giving due consideration to interests of other agencies.

"The Departments of State and Commerce agree that the President's directive can best be carried out abroad by a single overseas service. To fulfill their respective responsibilities, the two Departments undertake to establish new arrangements for the purpose of providing optimum commercial services within the frame-work of a unified Foreign Service.

"To this end the Department of State agrees to develop, with the full participation of the Department of Commerce, a Commercial Specialist Program within the Foreign Service."

The agreement provided an opportunity for Foreign Service officers to elect commercial work as a career specialty and permitted advancement within this specialty to the highest levels in the Foreign Service. Personnel would be augmented by an enlarged number of appointments from the Department of Commerce and the business community, who, along with Foreign Service career specialists, would provide the expertise needed to assist American business in meeting the increasing competition for world markets.

In order to attract economic and commercial talent, the two Departments would establish joint recruitment teams to visit educational institutions granting graduate and undergraduate degrees in business administration or foreign trade, and the Department of State would make special provision in its written Foreign Service examinations for candidates with background and interest in commercial activities. A department of commercial affairs would be established in the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State, chaired by a mutually acceptable nominee of the Department of Commerce. The chairman would develop a commercial training program and supervise its implementation and operation.

The Department of Commerce would normally initiate instructions to commercial specialists for carrying out their operational and reporting duties and responsibilities. Current instructions would be modified to provide increased emphasis on the promotion of trade, investment, and travel. Commercial specialists would be encouraged to travel more widely in their respective districts in order to develop market information which would be rapidly communicated to the American business community.

The Memorandum of Agreement, November 15, 1961, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Hodges, Luther. See also U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Weekly, April 21, 1962, page 1; Department of State Bulletin, April 30, 1962, pages 741-742. The text of the State-Commerce Agreement was transmitted to all posts in Circular Instruction CW-9672, June 4, 1962. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960-63, 120.201/6-462)

On November 26, 1961, the White House announced that Chester Bowles would become the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs, with particular emphasis on the problems of the new and developing countries. In this post, Bowles would "report directly to the President and Secretary of State on long-range planning and policy in this area, and on the improvement of our operation and representation in the countries involved. He will hold the rank of Ambassador, and also serve as an ex-officio member of the Policy Planning Council. He will continue to have an important role in explaining and promoting American foreign policy to key individuals and audiences both at home and abroad, and will from time to time undertake special missions for the President." (Memorandum of Understanding, November 27; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, State Department, General, 11/20/61-11/30/61) For President Kennedy's remarks concerning Bowles at his news conference of November 29, and his remarks at the swearing in of Bowles as the President's Special Representative on December 12, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 759 and 798.

Among other organizational changes in the Department of State, George Ball was to become Under Secretary of State; George McGhee would move from the Policy Planning Council to replace Ball as the second Under Secretary of State (but for Political rather than Economic Affairs); and W. Averell Harriman would become Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. Leaving the White House for the State Department, Walt Rostow would become Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council; Fred Dutton would become Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, and Richard Goodwin would become a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. On the State Department reorganization in the fall of 1961, see Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pages 442-445; memorandum from Jones to Rusk, December 1, in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960-63, 110.10/12-161; also Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Circular No. 44, Responsibilities of the Under Secretaries and Deputy Under Secretaries of State, December 15, 1961, in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, State Department, General, 12/61.

Washington, January 30, 1962.

SUBJECT
Duty Officers

You will recall that I mentioned to you several weeks ago the changes in the arrangements between the Executive Secretary's office and the Operations Center. I would like to confirm one or two points which I gather have caused some confusion.

We now have an integrated watch in the Department which is in the Operations Center. As part of this watch, the Reports Staff of the Executive Secretariat now functions on a 24-hour day rather than a 19 as previously constituted. The watch in the Operations Center is no longer a "sleeping" watch awakened as necessary but is now on a sit-up or stand-up basis on an 8-hour shift. This office can be reached on extension 4141-2.

Integrated into the watch is the duty officer in my own office who is here each night and over week-ends as long as needed. This is normally until about 11:00 p.m. on week nights and usually through the day Saturday and Sunday. When he leaves he turns over any pending problems to the Operations Center duty officer but remains on call at home in the event he is needed. For those matters involving the normal flow of paper, etc., you will probably wish to continue to talk with the duty officer in my office, extension 5381-2.

As I told you, the Operations Center follow-up unit and my follow-up unit have been merged but the nature and detail of follow-up will continue as previously. The follow-up unit is under Mr. Tom Rogers but Miss Moor on extension 6952 may be the most useful point of contact for your office.

I hope the foregoing is helpful. Please call me if there is any further information you feel is lacking.

N.A. Veliotes/2/

Washington, February 8, 1962.

SPECIFIC ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS DESIGNED
TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY AND FOSTER ECONOMY
OF OPERATIONS

1. Strengthening of Ambassadorial performance through President's letter of May 29, 1961, and designation of the Director General of the Foreign Service as the focal point for assuring that Ambassadors are adequately oriented, informed and supported.

2. Elimination of 99 administrative reports from overseas posts.

3. The number of committees having Departmental participation was reduced from 339 to 144.

4. Abolition of Correspondence Review function.

5. Curtailment of newspaper clipping service.

6. Consolidation of Operations Center with Secretariat.

7. Reduction of Administrative personnel by more than 125 persons.

8. Review of Department's appraisal, inspection, and audit activities to improve the Department's capacity to evaluate overall performance of the Department, including overseas posts.

9. Reorganization of The Bureau of Research and Intelligence with reduction of 230 in employment.

10. Decentralization of operating authority on administrative matters to geographic bureaus and to the field.

11. Plans formulated for the establishment of a consolidated administrative service center at Lagos for 20 African posts, with particular attention to supply and medical problems of these posts.

12. Department's directive regarding the use of tourist class accommodations for air travel in the U.S. and over the North Atlantic except under unusual circumstances. (Savings of about $300,000 on North Atlantic travel had to be used for other high priority items.)

13. Decision to hold personnel at 1962 level--no increase overall in 1963, but some redistribution in authorized Bureau strengths.

14. Simplification of procedures for handling and processing security reports from other agencies.

15. Reduction from 15 to 11 Foreign Buildings offices overseas.

16. Improvement of payroll and bond programs with less people. (Bonds are now issued currently instead of one month behind date of last deduction.)

17. Elimination of special group for Communist economic activities.

18. Elimination of special officer for East-West Exchanges.

19. Abolition of special position to review and advise on security appeals.

20. Sharp curtailment of overhead position in Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

21. Curtailment of unnecessary Departmental inspections.

22. Extension of Paris Regional Finance Center to serve African posts to cut down African staff buildup.