Washington, February 9, 1962.

There has been informal discussion with you of a meeting with policy officers of the Department down to the Desk level. This should include not only officers with responsibility for specific countries but also officers at comparable levels who have United Nations, economic, intelligence, administrative or other such responsibility. If you will set a time for the meeting, I shall call these officers together in the New Auditorium in the Department. I cannot think of any step which would be more useful from a morale standpoint and for increasing understanding of the spirit and objectives of the Administration./2/

You might wish to talk about American responsibilities in a revolutionary world and the new concepts of diplomacy which this demands, our relationships with the advanced nations of the West in meeting these responsibilities, our attitude toward the Sino-Soviet bloc, and our role in such organizations as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, etc.

Against this background, you could speak of the imaginativeness, forcefulness, and leadership which is expected of all officials of the Department. I think it would be useful to say that we expect Desk officers to make decisions and to exercise initiative and leadership in relations abroad and within the United States Government. For this they need a broad understanding of the philosophy and purposes of our foreign policy, and they must be expert without being parochial. These officers especially need to understand that this Administration recognizes the authority and responsibility of the Department in foreign affairs and has consciously given the duty of executive leadership to its Ambassadors and the Assistant Secretaries of State. This calls for a new consciousness on the part of Desk-level officers of the role of other agencies in foreign affairs, the closest relations with them, and a sensitivity to all factors--social, economic, political, military, commercial, administrative, intelligence and public information. It requires a broad knowledge of all the resources and mechanisms of the American Government.

Special mention might usefully be made of a need for taking into account problems of public relations and Congressional relations in making policy, although action in these problems will generally fall on the "political level" of the Administration.

Having said what is expected of them, there will be need for a word of assurance of support and confidence for these officers and for their colleagues in the Department and the Foreign Service. They would be glad to be assured again of the Administration's determination to defend them against political abuse and to promote careers on the basis of merit.

These officers will know of your own great interest in foreign affairs and welcome it. I doubt that any other President has come to know as many officers of the Department of State, of all ranks, as have you. A main impression which I think the meeting should leave is of your reliance on team effort between career and non-career officers to assist you in the creation and execution of policy and of our joint responsibility to keep you informed of facts and judgments about current developments.

Dean Rusk

Washington, March 22, 1962.

SUBJECT
Bureau of the Budget Report on State Department Organization for Foreign Economic Affairs

Attached is a preliminary analysis of the Report by the Bureau of the Budget Study Team on State Department Organization for Foreign Economic Affairs./2/ The analysis is intended to be no more than a starting point for intensive consideration of the aspects of the Report. Consideration will be most effective if undertaken with the active participation of the new Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, when he is named./3/

In particular his concepts of the total goals and purpose of E, of E's relationships to the regional bureaus and other parts of the Department, and of the internal organization of E may give new insights into the problem of how we may improve our organization for foreign economic activities.

The Department, it should be noted, has been active during the period since the Bureau of the Budget team completed its examination. The Secretary's reorganization of last December began establishment of a sound organizational pattern aimed at clarifying lines of authority and achieving more effective coordination of functional responsibilities. This constituted an important step upon which future changes should be predicated. We have also made some changes that anticipated the Budget Bureau's recommendations. For example, the Department has integrated in AID, economic development responsibilities previously assigned to E. More recently, the Under Secretary has directed that the Foreign Economic Advisory Staff be moved from his immediate office to E.

In addition, current steps to establish back-to-back space arrangements for related functions in the geographic bureaus for Latin American activities suggest directions in which the over-all structure of the Department may develop. Whether these arrangements are limited to physical location or eventually become organizational in nature, their intent is clearly to improve coordination in carrying out inter-related functions affecting the political, economic and other content of United States foreign affairs.

We are, thus, in the process of feeling our way along certain paths. Our readiness and ability to clarify the ultimate direction these paths will take, will in large measure determine the effectiveness of the use we make of this study.

On the morning of March 30, 1962, President Kennedy visited the Department of State for a scheduled off-the-record meeting with Department officials down to the level of desk officer. The meeting was held in the Department's new auditorium. In introducing the President, Secretary of State Rusk noted that "there has been no other President who could look around this room, in which are gathered the policy officers of the Department of State, and see as many officers whom he has known personally, and with whom he has worked intimately and directly on a great many complex and important questions in the conduct of our foreign relations, and that is deeply appreciated."

President Kennedy began his remarks by indicating his and the country's dependence on the experience and counsel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. "I know that those of you who work in the Foreign Service frequently feel beleaguered and surrounded, dealing not only with those who are our adversaries abroad, but also with those who are our most difficult friends, and here in the United States with those who fail to understand the complexities of foreign policy. I recognize, therefore, that you may sometimes get tired of reading magazine articles on what's wrong with the State Department. You may occasionally wonder whether the long work that you do, with your willingness to serve here and abroad, is fully understood by the people of this country. I'm sure it is not and I'm sure it never will be in its entirety. We have had such a long tradition of isolation that to be thrust suddenly upon the world scene as a leading power requires a change in thinking which is bound to cause serious misunderstandings among our people about those who conduct our foreign policy.

"In addition, our foreign relations are so complicated and so difficult and so sophisticated and so sensitive that it is impossible-except for those very few who live with these problems-to be fully aware of the subtle distinctions of policy. How could the average American be expected to understand the reasons why we help Yugoslavia and try to isolate Cuba, or why we recognize and carry on intensive dialogues with the Soviet Union and isolate China, or why we assist a dictatorship in Spain while we preach the doctrine of freedom and democracy in Latin America, why we insist as a matter of policy on a coalition government in Laos (even though coalition governments have not always had happy results, in our experience) while on the other hand we become more and more involved in sustaining the government of nearby Viet-Nam. These are all difficult and complicated and sensitive decisions upon which we may or may not be right, but which in any case require a good deal of understanding. So I do not think you should ever expect that they will be fully understood, and therefore you must carry on your struggle with a recognition that you are serving the interests of your country, and that it is the responsibility of those of us who hold public positions to attempt to explain those problems as best we can."

The President then referred to "a tendency in this country--this is particularly true of our press, and I think it's probably true also of our Foreign Service, from the cables that we read--to be overly sensitive to hostility abroad. . . . I do sometimes feel that as a country, as a people, as a service, as an executive, and as a Congress, we are too responsive to the pressures which those who are associated with us bring to bear upon us--pressures of disapproval which cause us to be constantly reexamining our own policies to see how we can bring them into line with one country after another. I think we probably should be tougher and try to pursue our own style with a little more vigor and direction."

The President referred to a statement once made by former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. "He said that the secret of the survival of the British Empire was that they never trusted the judgment of the man on the spot. I never understood that until recently, but I do think we have a tendency to oversympathize with the problems of the country to which we are accredited--those of us who may be serving abroad. . . . We want to be sure that we have very disinterested and hard-boiled judgment by the people who are there because we depend upon those people to give us guidance in our policy, but if what we get constantly represents not merely a report of the viewpoint of the other country, but an endorsement of that viewpoint, then those of you who sit at the desks and must make a judgment--and coordinate our policy with the desks of other countries and other regions--will find yourselves with an almost impossible job."

The President called for maintaining "the utmost discretion so that we can have a good deal of ease and fluidity in carrying on our negotiations abroad." Turning to another point, "if I have one real criticism, it is that I think we move too slowly. I know the difficulties of coordinating policy and making judgments on sensitive matters, but I do think we have to move with more speed . . . more vigor here. We depend completely on the Department. . . . You have to coordinate the policy within the Department and within the various agencies, but I do think that you should attempt in every way possible to speed your work up, and to make sure that committees and inter-departmental groups do not permit a smothering of your initiative on which so much depends."

The President referred to the important work of Ambassadors and Foreign Service officers on the spot at crucial moments. "It is a remarkable fact that the most interesting offices--the areas which place the greatest responsibility upon an Ambassador--are not the traditional ones of Western Europe, but Latin America, Africa, and Asia. These areas I think give the greatest opportunity to a Foreign Service officer to render direct and really unique service. . . . Thirty years ago it seemed that the great days of Ambassadors of the nineteenth [century] were over because of the cable. Now suddenly we have a new period where Ambassadors can play a most significant role."

President Kennedy then took questions from the floor on several subjects, including the possibility of increased communication with Communist China, the Department's relationships with Congress and with other agencies, and Presidential broadcasts on foreign policy to the American people. ("Draft for President's Revision," Transcript of the President's Remarks, prepared by Bundy; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of State, President's Talk to State Department, 3/30/62; an unedited draft transcript is ibid.)

A covering memorandum of April 4 from Bundy to Deputy Executive Secretary Brubeck transmitted Bundy's draft with the following comment:

"Here is a draft which I cleaned up over the week end for the President's consideration. His current feeling is that the paper should not have further circulation. If it is to be circulated, some of the informal comments will have to come out--and if they come out, what is left is a bit dull.

"On the other hand, I am sure he will be glad to know the Department's views on this matter. If, for example, the Department thinks that a summary, omitting the bracketed passages, would be useful to Ambassadors, I think the President might well be willing to have it circulated." A handwritten notation by Bundy reads: "This should not be copied or duplicated over there, in any way, without President's further consent--or circulated except to men you yourself choose." (Ibid.)

Washington, undated.

I offer the following observations for whatever they are worth, in connection with your questions about the Foreign Service:/2/

(1) There is not just one thing wrong with the State Department and Foreign Service, but many things.

(2) There is no sudden and drastic action that could taken to remedy these ills. Both organizations are the victims of many past mistakes, and particularly of erratic and misguided treatment on the part of a long succession of masters. A good professional organization is like a tree: you can affect its growth but only by long, patient and constant action. What the Foreign Service needs, in particular is fifteen years of consistent treatment along sound lines of personnel selection and advancement.

(3) The quality of the Foreign Service is today surprisingly good--much better than one would have a right to expect, in the light of the treatment the organization has received in recent years. The Department, too, contains hundreds of first rate men; but they are all embraced in a system too cumbersome to be fully manageable--in a machine so over-elaborate that the bulk of its energy is consumed by its own internal friction.

(4) So far as I know nobody inspects the Department of State. Our missions abroad (the civilian component, that is) are the objects of at least four inspection systems today. Whether it would be better if there were a single unified system, I do not know. The regular Foreign Service Inspection Corps is about to be taken over by an excellent man: Norris Haselton. I think he should be given support and a chance to show what he can do. It would be very inadvisable, in my opinion, to try to set up an inspection corps composed of, or headed by, outsiders who have had no experience in the Service. What is needed here are experienced competent, and conscientious Foreign Service Officers. One of the great troubles is that the Department does not like to assign its ablest officers for this work; when it does so, it leaves them there for too short a time, and yanks them out whenever it wants them for something else. The work of the Inspection Corps should be up-graded, the men should be kept in it for longer periods; arrangements should be made so that their home life would not be inordinately disrupted by this sort of work, as it now unfortunately tends to be.

(5) I do not profess to be an expert on the administrative problems of the Department. I feel fairly confident that there are far too many people and too many layers of authority. I suspect the Department needs a more rigid system of designation of respectability [responsibility?], with a view to getting away from the evils of the "clearance" system and committee rule. With fullest sympathy for the Secretary of State in the face of the demands made upon him for commitment of his personal time to travel and negotiation and attendance at conferences, I would submit that if the Department of State is to work more smoothly, it must have on duty at all times a full-time boss armed with authority to resolve promptly any and all questions within the competence of the institution.

(6) The Foreign Service officers with whom you meet on Thursday are by and large the victims, not the authors, of the inadequacies of the present system. Many of them are excellent and deeply devoted public servants. They will have heard something of your questions and anxieties about the Service. They will know that these are generally justified. Nevertheless, there will be some nervousness about your attitude toward them.

It seems to me that the best thing that you could do would be to indicate your awareness of the seriousness and recalcitrance of the administrative problems with which the Department and Foreign Service are beset; to remind them of the brevity of the time that has been available for the correction of these various evils or inadequacies by the present administration, and to assure them that this problem will have serious and continued attention of yourself and the Secretary of State. It could be pointed out that whereas there is a science of administration and management that has been worked out for mechanical processes such as the work of men at machines, where the relation of function to human effort can be statistically measured and defined, there is no such science for the work of bodies whose task in essentially analytical and advisory, such as the Department of State. The objective to be sought might well be defined, it seems to me, as the avoidance of the two extremes of (1) an apparatus so bloated and over-elaborate that it loses all the advantages of intimacy, flexibility and smartness of operation, and (2) such drastic and brutal curtailment as to involve injustice to those who are dropped and an inordinate burden on those who are retained. There must be a reasonable middle ground between these two extremes. The problem is to find it. The United States already has a Foreign Service second to none other in many respects. But it is spotty in quality, diffuse, inadequately coordinated, shaken by too many past changes of policy, uncertain as to what is expected of it and what can be expected. These deficiencies cannot be cured over night. But with time, patience, and imaginative insight they can be cured, and they will be.

George F. Kennan/3/

Washington, May 10, 1962.

Bill--

With regard to the Budget Bureau study of our organization for foreign economic affairs/2/--

1. We have already acted affirmatively on some matters which the study recommends. For example--

--we have abolished the Office of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, and have thus eliminated a basic premise on which some of the Budget Bureau's recommendations were formulated.

--we have integrated in AID the bulk of E's economic development functions.

--we have, in effect, transferred the Foreign Economic Advisory Staff to E. (The formal announcement will be made when Griffith Johnson has an opportunity to determine the reporting channel to him which he considers most useful.)

--we have arranged to include an economic option in future foreign service examinations.

2. Most of the other changes recommended for immediate adoption concern the internal organization of E. Griffith Johnson could not appropriately take actions along this line until he is sworn in. He must have time to familiarize himself with E before he can react usefully to the proposals. He has read the report and is considering it.

3. In addition, the study included certain recommendations "contingent upon other structural changes in the Department." As the study itself indicates these cannot be acted on immediately. They involve organizational choices which can be made only when AID is more settled and the alternative concepts of what a regional bureau should be are fully explored.

Ralph

Washington, May 25, 1962.

SUBJECT
Recommendations for Strengthening the Foreign Service

Some progress has been made in streamlining and modernizing our operational techniques of dealing with the problems of foreign policy. Two key obstacles stand in the way of further movement:

1. There is no single focal point in Washington comparable to the Ambassador abroad where full responsibility for all U.S. programs and operations in a given country is lodged. The result is often delay in decision making and diffusion of responsibility.

2. Although the antiquated Foreign Service personnel system is being gradually improved, much remains to be done if we are to make the Service a more effective instrument of Presidential policy.

Therefore I suggest the following actions:

1. That you and the Secretary agree on the need to give a higher priority to improving the effectiveness of the Department and the Foreign Service, and that the Secretary communicate this priority on your behalf to the Department.

2. That you seek legislation to establish five regional Under Secretaries of State with full legal authority to supervise all U.S. Government programs in their regions on your behalf and that of the Secretary.

3. That the individual selected to fill Roger Jones' position in the Department be given a mandate to carry out a series of specific changes in the Foreign Service personnel system within a maximum of six months. A few examples of the changes which I recommend are:

a. Grant "temporary rank" at higher grade for the duration of specific assignments, thus permitting a more flexible system of assignments for outstanding younger officers;

b. Speed up the promotion of outstanding young officers by eliminating any "time-in-grade" requirement for promotion and instructing Promotion Boards to use liberally their existing authority to make double promotions;

c. Detail one or two members of the White House staff to serve in rotation on promotion boards for the top FSO classes; also obtain the services of outstanding private citizens and representatives of other agencies to serve along with high caliber Foreign Service Officers on these promotion boards;

d. Increase the rate of "selection out" of marginal officers and obtain legislative authority to permit officers to retire after 20 years of service regardless of their age, with the Secretary's permission;

e. Reorganize the Foreign Service Institute as an expanded National Academy of Foreign Affairs to meet the training needs of all government agencies operating abroad;

f. Assign a far greater number of qualified FSO's to tours of duty with AID, Defense, USIA, and the Peace Corps, as well as a number of officers from those agencies to tours of duty with State;

g. Reorganize the Foreign Service Inspection Corps into inter-agency teams to evaluate the effectiveness of our total programs abroad;

h. Provide increased career incentives for cultural, administrative, economists and other types of specialists;

i. Reshape the Career Development program in the State Department to make certain that the top 25% of the FSO's are better trained for command positions.

[Here follow 12 pages of discussion.]

Washington, June 19, 1962.

I was concerned when I read a newspaper report on costs of Embassy residences. Of course, I believe that the residence of an American Ambassador should reflect credit on him and his country. On the other hand, I feel that excessive expenditures for such a residence will make us look ridiculous in the eyes of the people in the countries concerned.

Knowing the type of house that $300,000 will buy in the United States, it is difficult for me to see the need for Ambassadors' residences in that price range in such places as Senegal, Cyprus, and Seoul, unless there are unusual factors involved. I believe that Embassy residences should present an image of dignity and charm without being ostentatious or luxurious. Careful thought should be given, and possibly some re-examination of plans made, to assure that they reflect the proper impression of our Ambassadors and of our country.

Washington, August 27, 1962.

This is a personal observation on your memorandum of August 20 about the recruitment of junior Foreign Service officers./2/ It should not be taken as policy guidance.

The arguments submitted in behalf of an increased stress on graduate study or equivalent work experience have been used before. But I recall that about eight years ago we shifted emphasis from graduate studies to the "fresh B.A.". We must have had what we thought were good reasons at that time.

My guess is that this is one of those arguments which swings like a pendulum. Other instances: geographic versus functional organization, or college faculty arguments about letter or number grades.

I would not want to be quoted on this but there are one or two strong arguments in favor of recruiting younger people that I draw out of my experience. My impression is that graduate school experience tends to snuff out the "gleam in the eye" of many young people who finish college with a real spirit about making a contribution in some worthwhile undertaking. My guess is that, in graduate schools, they get closer to marriage and closer to jobs in this country; it might even be that in most graduate schools a "gleam in the eye" is a sign of naivete. Further, I have seen relatively few courses (and I have seen a great many) which give a highly intelligent young person much more than he could get out of reading some good books in a fraction of the time and cost. Finally, I am not very sure that what the professors say will be very relevant to the problems young people will encounter in the Foreign Service.

However, my only suggestion at this time is that you get somebody to dig out the policy consideration which threw the emphasis upon undergraduate work some years ago and then we can talk about it.

Incidentally, I do feel strongly that FSOs, after entering the Service, should be evaluated and promoted on the basis of work performed in the Service and the graduate degrees should bear no relevance after entry. The principal reason for this is that graduate degrees come a dime a dozen and high quality work comes from often unlikely places.

Dean Rusk/3/

Washington, December 19, 1962.

SUBJECT
"Personnel for the New Diplomacy"--Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel

Because of your deep interest in a foreign affairs staff which can meet our demanding international requirements now and in the foreseeable future, I think you will find the enclosed report highly significant./2/

"Personnel for the New Diplomacy" is the result of more than a year's work by the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, a group of knowledgeable private citizens whose chairman was Governor Herter. The Committee operated independently of the Department, financially and otherwise. It was sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The report and its recommendations have been studied by our experts who share my view that the report is impressive and that it will be extremely useful to us in upgrading the whole area of foreign affairs personnel. We welcome unqualifiedly the majority of the recommendations. Especially welcome is the proposal for a single foreign affairs personnel system instead of the dual foreign service and civil service systems with which we now work. Equally helpful are the recommendations directed to greater compatibility of personnel policies and practices between State, United States Information Agency, and Agency for International Development.

The Department is proceeding promptly to act on the report and in so doing to provide a coordinated approach with the other two agencies most concerned, the Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency.

Dean Rusk/3/

Washington, December 21, 1962.

Dear Mr. Bell:

I understand that the Department of Commerce has submitted to your Bureau for consideration a draft legislative proposal for the establishment of a separate foreign commercial service.

I have reviewed a copy of the draft proposal and am opposed to it or any similar action that would remove the commercial function overseas from the Foreign Service.

My objection is based on the following principal considerations:

1. The ultimate test--that of getting the job done most efficiently and effectively at our overseas posts--is best met by keeping economic and commercial work integrated; splitting these inter-related functions into separate services would only create problems and wasteful duplication.

2. Virtually all of our Ambassadors favor an integrated economic-commercial operation for both substantive and administrative reasons. Objection is predicated on knowledge of present circumstances and past unsatisfactory experience under a separate service.

3. The existing State-Commerce Agreement gives Commerce full participation and indeed a primary role in all commercial matters. The Agreement has been operative only eight months./2/ Given a reasonable chance, the Commercial Specialist Program can accomplish within a unified service all that a separate service could accomplish, without the inefficiencies and problems inherent in a new and parallel service abroad.

4. Appropriation history, including experience on 1963 budget proposals, strongly suggests that the overseas commercial program would fare no better if it were budgeted for under a separate service.

5. The Commerce proposal is incompatible with recommendations contained in the Herter Committee report on which we plan to move forward vigorously.

It would seem much more positive and fruitful to me for State, Commerce and the Bureau of the Budget to pull together to strengthen--not weaken--our total effort to attain our commercial goals within our foreign policy and balance of payments objectives. If the State-Commerce arrangements need revision for this purpose, I suggest that this be done within the framework of the Agreement.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Rusk/3/

Washington, January 25, 1963.

A Framework for Executive Operations in the State Department

This memorandum concerns itself with the organization of the operation of the Department of State at the level just under the Secretary and the Under Secretary. It proceeds from the premise that the two top men in the Department will necessarily be preoccupied with whatever are the most pressing and immediate diplomatic and political questions of each day--at the moment, for example, the Secretary is testifying on Cuba, and the Under Secretary is dealing with de Gaulle and Europe. Their Congressional, diplomatic, and expeditionary responsibilities make it certain that neither the Secretary nor the Under Secretary can be the day-to-day operating executive of the Department of State.

It is still clearer that neither of these two officers can take immediate responsibility for the Department's task of ensuring leadership and coordination of interdepartmental responsibilities both in Washington and in the field.

These executive responsibilities should be centered in the offices now described as the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, and the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

The Under Secretary for Political Affairs, as third-ranking officer in the Department, should have the responsibility for ensuring that the Department's business is getting done. This means that where problems are not being handled directly by the Secretary and Under Secretary, he should have senior responsibility himself. It means that when problems are or should be in the hands of his superiors, he should know about it and ensure that there are no loose ends. He should be available to make necessary policy decisions for Assistant Secretaries in all bureaus; he should be responsible for ensuring that all necessary machinery for interdepartmental coordination is established; he should be in the closest touch with the White House staff so as to ensure that the special interests and concerns of the President are being met; he should be responsible for meshing the administration of the Department with its operational needs. By the same token this officer should stay out of most external diplomatic efforts; he should avoid travel; he should not be responsible for Congressional testimony, wherever this can be avoided; he should, in short, be an operating executive officer for his two interchangeable senior commanders.

This is an enormous job, and the man who does it will need powerful help. In particular, he should have the direct support of the two Deputy Under Secretaries who now report directly to the Under Secretary. If this were done, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration should be responsible not only for the administration of the Department, but for ensuring that the operational responsibilities of the Department are met. This would imply supervisory concern for interdepartmental committees and task forces, to ensure that they are properly organized and manned, and effective in meeting their responsibilities. It would imply immediate responsibility for the connection of administration with operational needs. It would imply a general responsibility, on the organizational and operational side, for executing the desires of the three top officers; in that sense this officer should be thought of as Deputy Under Secretary for Operations.

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs would be responsible, as he is now, for such political judgments, and their execution, as, were delegated to him by his superiors. Where the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration would be expected to take policy guidance on his operational responsibilities from the Political Under Secretary, the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs must be an officer with a responsibility for substantial independent political judgment.

As an alternative, which in certain circumstances might be even more satisfactory, the responsibility for operations and executive follow-up might be assigned directly to an Under Secretary for Operations, who would then be the fourth ranking officer of the Department and who would add these responsibilities to those now held by the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. In such an arrangement this new Under Secretary would need to understand very clearly the importance of the closest cooperation with the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, as that officer is described above; it would be important to rank him after the Political Under Secretary and to put their two offices next to each other if possible.

Finally, it should be noted that the Political Under Secretary would be expected to maintain the most intimate and immediate day-to-day contact with the Administrator of AID, since a very large proportion of his work would involve effective coordination with that agency.

Washington, February 5, 1963.

Dear Dean:

As you know, we have submitted for consideration by State and the Budget Bureau legislation for a separate commercial service. I am advised that your Department is wholly opposed to the separation of the services,/2/ but I think it desirable to set before you the reasons why we think such a move is required.

First, so long as there is rotation among various functional assignments for Foreign Service Officers, the kind of competence and familiarity with problems, procedures, and people that is required in commercial work cannot be developed.

Second, the present institutional arrangements at foreign posts place the commercial officer under an economic officer who frequently has no appreciation of the requirements of the Department of Commerce and, worse, sometimes has an antipathy towards commercial work. I have actual illustrations from personal experience.

Third, the fact that commercial officers know who keep their personnel files and who acts on their promotion makes them cautious in initiating actions which would more actively represent American business overseas.

Fourth, the fact that funds for commercial work must compete not only with all other activities in State but also area by area (since each bureau in State I understand sets its own priorities) and the fact that changes in work assignments may be made at the posts without our notification, much less permission, means that we do not know what resources are in fact available to us and we cannot move quickly to meet changing commercial situations. For example, we have been unable even to get into the field to explain our present programs and needs and the working of the State-Commerce Agreement because of State's unwillingness to allocate funds for commercial officers conferences during calendar 1962.

Fifth, serious problems have arisen in London, Frankfurt, and Tokyo concerning the authority over the Trade Centers we have established there. The lack of preparation of many commercial officers for this type of work makes undesirable an arrangement whereby they are overseers or in authority over the Centers.

Sixth, partly for lack of funds in the FY 1963 budget but also for continued lack of interest within the State Department, there have been few personnel added who can make market and industrial analyses and do promotional work. Nor is there an adequate training and retraining program for existing officers and locals.

As you know, there are times when radical change is necessary and I believe that this is one of those times. The low standing of commercial work in the Foreign Service is too ingrained and the present personnel are too unfamiliar with the type of actions needed to permit an evolutionary process to succeed in the short time available.

While I recognize that such a move as we propose appears to run counter to the Herter report, there was recognition in the report that special conditions merit separate treatment. I would agree that in no event should the Ambassador's responsibility be reduced. He must of necessity control activities at his post.

I am sending copies of this letter to Kermit Gordon and Myer Feldman for their information and consideration.

Sincerely,

Luther

Washington, February 28, 1963.

With the press almost daily anticipating "another shake up in the State Department," I want to offer a few unsolicited comments as one of those cast here in the last shake up.

1. Tinkering with the Department in a few places will have negligible effect at best . . . and could even result in a worse, not better, situation.

If the White House wants to use one of the high positions here, as George McGhee's, to get sort of another special assistant to the President, as for global troubleshooting, that can be justified for its own sake. But it will not have any significant effect to strengthen the competence, creativeness or responsiveness of the State Department. Rather, another of the principal officials supposed to help give executive direction to this intricate organization will have been taken away much of the time for tasks elsewhere.

If the Department is largely to be written off during this Administration (and an arguable case can be made for that), then the top slots should be skimmed off; and the rest of the organization will drift off into limbo for the most part. But in that event the decision should deliberately be made that this place is to be recast as just a research and representational agency; and primary responsibility for conceiving and proposing policy in depth, as well as making final decisions on it, will be vested in the executive offices. I realize that much of the initiative for pulling together even the rough strands of policy has already had to be taken up by the White House; but the question presented by taking away another key Departmental official is whether the present level of executive prodding and coordination in the Department is to be allowed to drop even lower, and how much is the White House able and willing to take up the additional slack resulting from that.

Personally, I would guess that the world is too various, the international tempo too fast and the White House already too burdened with pressing domestic as well as foreign concerns to take on this more detailed function. But it seems to be an inescapable consequence of tinkering with a few appointments here without undertaking at the same time to strengthen the Department in a basic and comprehensive way.

2. State's troubles are principally institutional, not individual personalities; and the White House must accept a considerable part of the responsibility for these institutional difficulties getting worse, not better, in the last two years.

The key officials and the overwhelming bulk of the foreign service are dedicated, competent individuals. But the Department does not come close to adding up to the sum of its parts.

Some of the Department's difficulties obviously result from the incredibly complex and mercurial problems with which it works. But some of its deficiencies are also the historical and contemporary consequence of the foreign service, which is really quite a "remote society" from the rest of this country and most of the rough tough elements in the world, being allowed to direct, instead of being directed in, the political institution for which its members work. Even John Foster Dulles, who usually ignored the career service, left it independent of direction; and it ran the State Department while he ran Eisenhower.

The need for pioneering insights, vigorous executive initiative and incisive political skills in our foreign policy apparatus is not likely to be met in the present set up very often. Most career officials place too high an emphasis on job security to get caught outside the worn ruts that already exist here; they generally seek to protect themselves against changing tides in Washington and wherever else they are assigned in the world. They are forever mindful, for instance, (and understandably) of some in their ranks who expressed critical opinions of Chiang Kai Shek in the 1940s and paid a high personal and family price. The dilemma of having to report on the Batista-Castro "facts" of the 1950s is a more recent example that is cited.

The basic caution here is aggravated by the usual tendency toward conformity in a career service, the natural by-product, in fact, of almost any closed system. The domination of promotion boards and personnel channels by career people helps make the group even more inbred. Finally, even as to its strong points the system is intellectual, analytical, tentative--but not very creative, intuitive or politically perceptive. As one of the Department's best friends on the Hill, Hubert Humphrey, said recently in a moment of exasperation, "The goddam place is rational, maybe, iffy at best." In the same vein I sometimes wonder why everyone so uncritically takes the reports of career officers on the politics of the Congo, Laos or Italy when they obviously are so lacking in understanding about American politics, which exist in an environment whose assumptions and conditions they really must know far more about.

I believe the White House must accept a considerable share of responsibility for the present shortcomings of the Department. And that does not flow just from the overall responsibility for operation of the executive branch. The truth of the matter is that some of the key people in our Administration started out with a feeling the foreign service had to be made up to for what happened in the McCarthy and Dulles periods, as though even more recognition and free reign would somehow cause it to be more competent and responsive.

Far worse, merit appointments have increasingly been considered to be synonymous with career appointments--and the result, has been some senior foreign service mediocrities going up to the Senate for confirmation as Presidential appointees. Below that level, career officials have moved in mass into exempt positions that at least theoretically exist to allow changing Administrations flexibility and the opportunity for its own people to give direction in depth in a Department already 99% foreign service and civil service. Personnel offices have been left totally made up of career officials. The overall result, as several FSOs have told me, is that the Department is now even more in the grip of the foreign service than when Loy Henderson presided on the inside instead of in absentia from the Metropolitan Club.

Finally, practically every statement issued to Department personnel from the executive offices has been solicitous and reassuring of the foreign service even while the White House has privately been most frustrated over the quality of the work here. This is a strange and unfortunate contradiction for a supposedly tough and objective Administration. I urge that a little frank talk, direct and to the point, will be a healthy tonic with many career people more interested in just keeping, than compulsively trying to make something of, their jobs.

Personally, I have a great admiration for Secretary Rusk. He has to hold together and lead the disparate factors here. The White House, however, needs to provide the external executive influence to prevail over the inevitable internal institutional forces at work here.

In brief, instead of just railing against the State Department, I believe the White House needs to reassert itself here in major appointments, personnel channels and occasional commands.

3. Some constructive steps that should at least be considered are these:

a. Strengthen in Depth: Even while retaining the present conduct of foreign policy in the White House (and I would think a President in these times generally must be his own Secretary of State, as the press expresses this situation), I urge the Department be strengthened in depth internally and not just a few higher up changes be made, as the rumored Harriman shift.

b. Executive Officer: A high official should be designated to provide full-time, specific executive direction of the State Department under the supervision of the Secretary, who is already heavily occupied directly with the President, attending to his Congressional meetings and public and diplomatic obligations, and occasionally having to travel to conferences abroad. Ball is similarly preoccupied; and apparently McGhee's slot is going to be similarly used. Either one of those, or a special assistant to the Secretary, or another position, needs to be given real authority to prod the policy machinery to define problems promptly, pull together study groups early in developing situations, break substantive bottlenecks, and keep providing the Secretary and White House with timely recommendations.

Personally I strongly urge that the task not be assigned to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. Executive direction of the policy-making channels is needed--this is a substantive, creative, program-oriented task that should be kept separate from cut and dried administrative attitudes and channels. A second reason for not using the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration is that however frustrating the policy bureaus are here, they are historically and at present far more responsive than the administrative sector of the Department. The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration and Assistant Secretary Crockett, who is really quite effective in his present office, are needed full time to improve the administrative channels.

A third reason is that the Deputy Under Secretary's operation historically and now operates primarily through personnel offices dominated by career officials--in fact, it is the target of most of their lobbying. Increasing the authority of this office in the Department (as the Herter Committee recommends) will only tighten the hold of the institutional interests and influences that are the source of most of the Department's deficiencies.

For a "substantive executive officer" for the Department I suggest someone like Bill Bundy or Ken Hansen, assistant director of the Budget Bureau, as possibilities. International subsidiaries of large U.S. corporate structures should be able to yield other possibilities with executive competence and relevant general background.

c. Personnel Office: Competent new personnel should be pumped into the Department in depth. This can most effectively be achieved by placing an exempt person from the President's own staff in charge of the Department's personnel office. I suggest Dan Fenn for this appointment. Even if it is not Dan, I personally think that obtaining control of the personnel office with a competent, exempt individual completely identified with this Administration is the most important single step that can be taken to reinvigorate the Department over the long haul ahead.

d. Major Appointments: Whenever a career ambassador or other major nomination is proposed by the Department, someone on the White House staff (as Ralph Dungan) or in the Budget Bureau, should prepare for the President's consideration, along with the name proposed by the Department, at least one qualified outsider. This will assure that the stream of career recommendations from the Department is measured against specific competent individuals from private life--and that this Administration actually is encouraging merit appointments, not just career appointments.

e. Special Emissaries: Besides measuring career possibilities for ambassadorial slots against able individuals from private life, the same should be done with the major special assignments that come up from time to time, as recently with Merchant and Bunker. I find it difficult to reconcile the White House's frustration over the State Department with the persistence with which it turns so often to career diplomats that are almost stereotypes of everything for which State is pilloried. Personally I think the criticism is fairly sound--but it is evidently neglected when personnel appointments are made. Surely a country with the size and vigor of ours can turn up competent, experienced, vigorous, new-style representatives from public life, business, the bar and universities for missions abroad.

f. Schedule C: Far more exempt positions in the Department on Schedule C should be filled by genuinely qualified, noncareer individuals, not foreign service people who want the special pay and status but will not accept noncareer risks, responsibilities and attitudes. As a rule of thumb, after a six month grace period, no more than 10 to 15% of these exempt positions should be filled with career personnel.

g. Middle Level Positions: If, as mentioned in the press, Harriman is to be moved up in the Department (and he is really a breath of fresh air here: direct, tough, no-nonsense), I hope that the other assistant secretaryships will also be looked at with a critical eye and any strengthening done in one major move. I would hope that at least eventually several of the President's noncareer ambassadors who have proved themselves as really outstanding in the last two years might be brought back to invigorate the Department.

Washington, March 2, 1963.

Dear Luther:

Thank you for your comments in your letter of February 5 on the case for a separate commercial service./2/ My views were conveyed to David Bell by letter dated December 21./3/ I had instructed that a copy be sent to you simultaneously and I am sorry this was not done.

Without question, we both agree our goal is the most encompassing and adequate commercial service possible within the framework of our foreign policy. I still feel that the State-Commerce Agreement is the vehicle to accomplish this task. The problem, simply stated, is getting it into motion.

What I think we must do is give this Agreement the effort and application it warrants, in spite of the inherent difficulties. I understand that within the past month Assistant Secretaries Behrman and Crockett renewed their work on the Agreement. I have asked Assistant Secretary Crockett to make a determined effort to put its provisions into full operation and to attempt to resolve promptly problems arising in this connection. I hope you can give similar guidance in Commerce, and that we can move quickly in the proper direction.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dean/4/

Washington, March 6, 1963.

ORGANIZING FOR ACTION IN THE REGIONAL BUREAUS/2/

Successive attempts to meet complex country problems with complex organizational answers have relegated the country desk officer to a role bearing remote resemblance to his traditional purpose. What he does today-with a few notable exceptions-is serve as a contact point for overseas posts, prepare first drafts and initial recommendations, store information, and try to keep abreast of the activities of colleagues at his own level in other agencies. What he does not do is provide leadership in policy-formulation, coordination or decision-making.

Nor has the diminution of the country desk officer's role produced compensating improvements in the policy-making and action capacity of the regional bureaus. At the top the bureau structure is complicated and confusing; at the bottom it is rigid and wasteful of manpower resources. In between, a series of layers compound reviews. Responsibility for action--to be taken or consciously postponed--is so widely shared below the Assistant Secretary that accountability is uncertain.

The basic premise of the country officer has not become invalid by reason of being ignored. There is greater need than ever for expert, knowledgeable officers to be held responsible and accountable for achieving a unified approach to United States relations with other countries; to give clear foreign policy direction to other departments and agencies; to act promptly on matters which have not been reserved for decision at higher levels. What has changed is the nature of demands for country leadership, the level of ability country officers must bring to their tasks and the depth of support they must be given.

This report recommends measures to make possible a return to the original country officer concept--but in an environment which responds to today's needs. It proposes fundamental changes in existing bureau structure, and a new title for the country officer so that there may be no mistake as to the role he should play.

The country officer, if these recommendations are endorsed, will become a Principal Policy Officer/3/ whose value is acknowledged as comparable to that of a chief of mission. He will report directly to the Assistant Secretary and be authorized to act for the Assistant Secretary on matters concerning his assigned country or countries. His staff support will be organized to meet his needs rather than any predetermined pattern.

Above the Principal Policy Officer the action capacity of the regional bureau will be strengthened by providing the Assistant Secretary with an alter ego deputy and by confining all other officers to true staff roles.

These proposals are no more ambitious than the urgency of the problem warrants. Despite recognition of the Department's perennial shortage of senior officers combining substantive and executive skills, it is recommended that these proposals be fully implemented within a period of one year.

Summary of Recommendations

1. Concentrate the leadership and action responsibilities of the desk officer in a new position of Principal Policy Officer.

2. Locate the Principal Policy Officer immediately under the Assistant Secretary.

3. Assign to the Principal Policy Officer responsibility for one country or a group of countries depending on the nature and complexity of country problems.

4. Give to each Principal Policy Officer the freedom to organize and use staff to meet his needs as he sees them.

5. Initiate a one-year program for phasing into the Principal Policy Officer concept as rapidly as officers with demonstrated executive and leadership ability are available for such assignments.

6. Designate in each bureau one alter ego Deputy Assistant Secretary.

7. Restrict functional advisers, and all other officers outside the direct chain of command, to advisory and liaison roles and reduce the number of those at the bureau level as the Principal Policy Officer concept is phased into the bureau organizations.

[Here follows the remainder of the report.]

Washington, March 13, 1963.

SUBJECT
Division of Seventh Floor Responsibilities

Messrs. Ball, Harriman, and Alex Johnson met for lunch on March 13 to discuss this subject.

The following topics were covered:

1. Fish. After an extended discussion by Alex Johnson to the desirability of Governor Harriman taking over this problem, it was decided that the handling of this matter would be analyzed further. Governor Harriman and Mr. Johnson will talk about it and then talk further with the Secretary as to who should have primary responsibility for this activity.

2. Labor. It was agreed that Governor Harriman will take over the labor problem. (This will necessitate a change in the FAM Circular #44.)

3. Bill Jorden and Psychological Warfare. Mr. Johnson recounted at some length the background of the initiation of this operation, citing the interest of the Attorney General in this activity. It was agreed that a decision on the disposition of this activity would be deferred until Governor Harriman had had a chance to talk with Bill Jorden and acquaint himself further with the nature of this operation.

4. Timberlake and Soviet Counter Strategy. The historical background of this operation (first under Dillon, then Ball, and then transferred in part to INR) was recounted by Mr. Johnson. The Governor agreed that he would look at it further before making a final decision as to what to do with this operation. Both Messrs. Ball and Johnson, however, suggested that it should be liquidated.

5. Special Group-CI. Governor Harriman indicated that Mac Bundy had urged that he take over this particular activity. Mr. Johnson said that he would be glad to have the Governor undertake this operation. Before a final decision was reached, however, it was agreed that Messrs. Johnson and Harriman would talk about this between themselves and then with Mac Bundy.

6. Under Secretary's Committee on Foreign Economic Policy. While this was not a specific item for discussion, it was mentioned in connection with the examination of the problem with Bill Jorden and psychological warfare that Governor Harriman might broaden out this Committee to include other agencies and use it as a forum for acquainting them with the Department's operations and what they might do to assist the Department. Specific mention was made of including the Department of Justice on the Committee.

7. Outer Space. It was agreed that Alex Johnson would handle both the peaceful and the military aspects of Outer Space, but that Governor Harriman would represent the Secretary on the Vice President's Space Council. All matters relating to space would come to Governor Harriman through Mr. Johnson.

8. Science. There was very little discussion of this subject. It was agreed that the Science Office under Dr. Rollefson was a functional unit (much like the Legal Adviser's Office) and that it was not necessary to make it the particular responsibility of any one individual.

9. Disarmament. Mr. Johnson explained that his office did the staff work on this while the Under Secretary for Political Affairs sat on the Deputies Committee of the Committee of Principals. Mr. Johnson also stressed, however, that the Secretary looked primarily not to the Department, but to ACDA, for briefing on this particular subject. While it was suggested that Alex Johnson might take over this particular function it was agreed that Governor Harriman would take a look into it before a final decision on this subject is made.

10. Civil Aviation. Governor Harriman said that he understood that there was a problem here vis-a-vis Jeeb Halaby. He asked who handled it now in the Department. He was informed that Phil Trezise was the man who was on top of the aviation problem on a day-to-day basis. The Governor indicated that he would talk with Mr. Trezise about this matter in order to acquaint himself with it.

Washington, October 1, 1963.

Dear Kermit:

I would like to explore with you plans for implementing the Secretary's agreement to cooperate with the Bureau of the Budget in controlling the overseas activities of the U.S. government agencies. We have given this subject considerable thought during the past few weeks and have reached the following tentative conclusions which might serve as a basis for future discussion:

1. Need for a control mechanism--One of the most critical problems confronting us is the absence of an effective mechanism for controlling the activities of U.S. agencies conducted abroad. This gap is apparent both with respect to the approval of new activities and the systematic review of existing activities.

While it is true that we usually hear about the establishment of new offices overseas, there is no formal requirement for review and approval of the initiation of an activity or the establishment of an office. Our involvement ordinarily arises from such things as conferring diplomatic rank and privileges, furnishing office space, or arranging for passports and visas. This is not a satisfactory situation from a control standpoint because we seldom learn of a proposal until it is too far down the line for us to do much about it.

The situation in the case of the on-going activities is even more difficult. It is true the President's letter of May 29, 1961 to the Chiefs of Missions states that all agencies are expected to keep the Chief of Mission informed of their activities. The letter also indicates that the President has instructed all heads of departments and agencies of this responsibility. However, neither of these instructions has been fully implemented. The Ambassador's review of the activities of the major foreign affairs agencies takes the form of approving their annual programming and budget documents. Information concerning the activities of other agencies is much too sporadic and inconsistent to be useful for control purposes.

The situation in Washington is even more difficult. To my knowledge there is no instruction requiring agencies to keep the Department regularly informed of their overseas activities. The situation in the field is such that we see little profit in attempting to get the Ambassador to furnish us with this kind of information on a systematic basis.

Thus far, we have been considering merely the availability of pertinent data upon which to base a control mechanism. There is also the question of the authority for controlling the actions of other agencies. I am not sure that this authority exists short of the President-that is, I doubt if the Secretary could either prevent another agency head from undertaking an activity or control the level at which such an activity is to be carried on. Furthermore, my interpretation of the President's letter does not grant the Ambassador final authority to veto proposed activities or to set levels for existing activities.

All of this convinces us that meaningful control of overseas activities will necessitate either an elaboration of existing rules and regulations or the promulgation of new regulations. On balance, we favor the first alternative and believe that some elaboration of the President's legislative and budget procedures could best provide the necessary handles for controlling the overseas activities of the various departments and agencies.

2. Nature of State participation--We have experienced considerable difficulty in the past in determining the criteria by which we can judge the propriety of agencies' proposals for establishing programs and offices overseas. Attitudes within the Department vary from those like former Ambassador Briggs, who believe that overseas representation should be limited to employees of the State Department, to those who for purely parochial reasons actually join with other agencies in promoting requests for new offices and programs. We are now attempting to develop a consistent policy. One thing is clear-our ability to make meaningful judgments varies with the type and purpose of the program or project we are called upon to review. A case that recently came to our attention, and upon which I will communicate with you further in the near future, illustrates the point. In this case, our Ambassador to Lebanon reports that he was visited by representative of the Navy Department with a view to establishing a management group composed of three GS 18's, whose mission would be to investigate the capabilities of the Lebanese to conduct unspecified research for the Navy. Ambassador Meyer in his cable to us makes three points: (a) visiting Congressmen have been critical of the number of Americans in Lebanon; (b) the Congressmen have threatened to block construction of proposed new Embassy building until the number of Americans is substantially reduced; and (c) Meyer has no problem (other then a and b) with the activity proposed by the Navy. This is the kind of a case which is most difficult for us to resolve. First, it is apparent that additional U.S. presence is not inimical to our interests in Lebanon and may actually be advantageous in terms of US-Lebanese relations. Second, we have no expertise in evaluating the desirability of the research activities involved. Third, the type of activity is obviously beyond State's ability to perform. As a result, unless we adopt the Briggs' philosophy, which I personally believe to be completely untenable in today's world, or unless we are to hide behind the balance of payments argument, which I really think is more in your arena than ours, we have no basis for taking a position.

I could also cite other examples such as the authorization of a Secret Service employee in Paris to assist Interpol in investigating counterfeiting, and the celebrated case of the FAA European regional office, which I believe illustrate the same point--namely, the difficulty this Department has in making appropriate value judgments on programs that are essentially outside of the stream of foreign affairs.

We can, of course, make much more meaningful evaluations of the need for those activities which contribute directly to the achievement of our foreign policy objectives. But even here the relationships that have been established between the State Department and the various agencies charged with carrying out those programs--AID, CIA, USIA, the Department of Defense, ACDA, the Peace Corps--make it difficult for us to actually control the level or composition of annual operating programs.

3. Proposed budget circular on international activities--We have reviewed the October 16, 1961 draft circular/2/ in accordance with your request. With some minor reservations, I believe it would fill the need outlined in the foregoing paragraphs. I would be pleased to have members of my staff join in discussions with your people in an effort to resolve our reservations.

4. Actions in connection with the 1965 budget--We will be happy to participate in any way we can in reviewing agency estimates for overseas activities. The nature and scope of our participation will of course depend upon the information and data made available to us. If you believe, as I do, that the draft circular reflects the right approach in the long run, I would suggest that to the extent possible we use it as the basis for our effort this year. In any event, we would like to get information on any programs or activities that you would like us to comment on in sufficient time to permit our obtaining field comments.

Once again, let me emphasize the Secretary's interest and concern with the increasing complexity of U.S. operations abroad. I believe the course of action outlined above would go a long way toward resolving what up until now has been an exceedingly chaotic situation. I will be pleased to discuss this matter further with you or with members of your staff at your convenience.

Sincerely yours,

Bill/3/

Washington, November 5, 1963.

SUBJECT
Budget Bureau Study on "State Department Organization for Foreign Economic Affairs"

1. Attached is a copy of the study referred to Thursday by Ken Hansen. Also attached are analyses (Tab A)/2/ made by OM when the study was first received, and later when the Budget Bureau called Bill Brubeck on the status of action. Because AID is concerned in the larger area covered by the report, Dave Bell's transmittal letter (as Budget Bureau Director) may also be of interest (Tab B)./3/

2. The study had three focuses: internal E organization; general Department arrangements for strengthening economic expertise and distributing it throughout the regional bureaus; and the over-all organization of the Department (including AID) for foreign economic functions.

3. In the first two areas the Department has moved some distance, although we have not had occasion to make an evaluation in depth (nor do I recommend one immediately). By the time the report was released a number of lesser organizational rearrangements had been completed or agreed to and PER had begun to concentrate more on the need for economists. About six weeks later Griff Johnson became Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (Ed Martin had already moved from E when the report came out). Since then there has been a serious and, I understand, successful effort to bring into E some first-rate economic specialists.

4. No change has, however, been made in E's status within the Department by upgrading its head to Deputy Under Secretary. Neither have the larger organizational relationships between the AID Director, E and the rest of the Department been altered. When current developments in the AID program become somewhat clearer, we might well seek another reading from the Secretary or Mr. Ball on this. I should welcome an opportunity to discuss this with you.

Ralph S. Roberts

Washington, November 20, 1963.

Dear Senator Fulbright:

In my letter to you of June 26, 1963,/2/ I informed you that the Department was considering the closing of 14 consulates throughout the world and changing the status of five other posts.

The following posts have now been closed:

Salzburg, Austria
Santos, Brazil
Edmonton, Canada
Manchester, England
Le Havre, France
Cork, Ireland
Haifa, Israel
Venice, Italy
Penang, Malaysia
Basel, Switzerland
Cardiff, Wales
Sarajevo, Yugoslavia

The Consulate General at Geneva has been closed and the consular work transferred to Bern. Arrangements have been made for the United States Mission at Geneva to perform urgent diplomatic visa services. The consulates at Tangier, Morocco, and Yokohama, Japan, have been made branch offices of our Embassies in these two countries. These offices will continue to perform consular functions. The consulate at Mandalay, Burma, has been reduced in size and its functions limited to political reporting and protective services to American citizens in the area.

Because of the adverse reaction of the foreign governments and other factors, the Department reconsidered the plan to close the consulates at Windsor, Canada and Turin, Italy. These offices will remain open. The citizens of Piedras Negras, Mexico and Eagle Pass, Texas, requested the Department to reconsider the plan to close the consulate at Piedras Negras. This office will remain open for the indefinite future. Further study will be made of United States representation and the requirement for consular services in all of Mexico, including the border posts.

In the case of Basel, the municipal government and certain American business interests there objected strenuously to the closing of the consulate. The Department, therefore, has undertaken a new and detailed study of the situation to ascertain if there is in fact a commercial reason for maintaining the post.

The Department has concluded action resulting from the survey of consular establishments. No further actions are contemplated at this time. The Department will keep you informed of future developments affecting the status of our posts abroad in the normal manner.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick G. Dutton/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.