Washington, undated.

PLAN FOR THE ACTIVATION OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

I. General

To accomplish the objectives for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as specified by the Secretary of Defense, this plan provides for the initiation of action in all areas which are clearly the responsibility of the Director, DIA. The plan is aimed at achieving:

a. The full integration of intelligence resources and functions assigned to the control of the Director, DIA, on a graduated basis;

b. Immediate assumption of planning, coordinating and management responsibilities of all Department of Defense intelligence activities within the purview of the Director, DIA, to achieve maximum economy and efficiency.

Full recognition is given to the necessity to avoid disruption or degradation of these vital intelligence efforts.

In order to preserve the continuity of operations throughout the consolidation process, the plan provides for the taking over and utilization of existing facilities, functions and resources of an individual military department and/or the Joint Staff, wherever feasible. Following this, related activities, resources and functions of the other departments and the Joint Staff are integrated into these facilities under the operational control of the Director, DIA. Initially, this will result in some imbalances in Service representation within DIA in each facility so utilized. This is considered necessary in the interests of continuity. However, the governing policy will be to achieve to the highest practicable degree, an optimum balance of personnel representation from the three military departments. This will be accomplished in accordance with DIA personnel policies aimed at the maintenance of the highest possible quality and security criteria.

As the DIA assumes full operational stature, the Director, DIA, will absorb many of the intelligence responsibilities now exercised by the intelligence chiefs of the military Services, as well as the responsibilities for substantive intelligence matters now exercised by the J-2, Joint Staff. Thus, the Director, DIA, will become the principal staff advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for substantive intelligence matters, and, acting through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for both substantive intelligence and managerial matters within his areas of assigned responsibility.

The DIA will be a balanced organization designed to support the major echelons of the military operational chain-of-command, the military departments, non-DOD agencies and international treaty organizations, in peace and war, without requiring major organizational readjustments after the onset of hostilities.

Coordination of all intelligence activities and responsibilities remaining with the military departments will be effected by the Director, DIA, supported by the operating elements of the DIA in their respective areas of responsibility, and by the headquarters staff. This arrangement will ensure the efficient allocation of intelligence resources and the effective management of all DOD intelligence efforts. The Military Intelligence Board (Annex A) will be established to advise and assist the Director, DIA, in the exercise of his responsibilities.

II. Organizational Structure

The DIA will arrive at a fully operational status through an evolutionary process. The plan provides for the rapid strengthening of DOD capabilities in the fields of collection, production and dissemination through the establishment of:

1. A Directorate for Acquisition (Annex C)

This Directorate, which will be charged with DIA functions and responsibilities in the fields of intelligence requirements and collection will be further sub-divided as follows:

a. The DIA Requirements Office which will establish the DOD Central Requirements Registry. This Office will also be charged with the examination and validation of all DOD intelligence requirements, the assignment of collection priorities, the designation of collection resources, and the restatement of requirements where necessary to ensure their responsiveness to the needs of all consumers of military intelligence.

b. The DIA Collection Management Office which will maintain a complete and current inventory of all collection resources to include their capabilities, limitations, equipments and operations. This Office will levy validated requirements on appropriate collection agencies and resources, monitor collection responses thereto, and evaluate collection efforts to determine reliability, efficiency and cost factors involved. In addition this Office will stimulate intelligence collection effort through creative planning and the exploitation of scientific and technological developments in their application to intelligence collection activities.

2. A Directorate for Processing which will be charged with the principal substantive intelligence functions and responsibilities of the DIA, and which will directly control and coordinate the production, estimating and current intelligence/indications elements of the DIA. This grouping is essential to the maintenance of a close and continuous interrelationship among these elements, as well as to provide for a similar working relationship with the estimates and production elements of the military Services. This will ensure the full utilization of Service production and estimates capabilities and the incorporation of their inputs into intelligence produced by the DIA. In order to accomplish its mission, the Directorate for Processing will be divided into the following elements:

a. The DIA Current Intelligence/Indications Center (Annex D)

This organization will provide for a single, integrated DOD Current Intelligence/Indications Center designed to meet the needs of the Secretary of Defense and his principal staff assistants, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, and the commanders of the unified and specified commands and their component commands. In addition, this Center will provide current intelligence/indications support to the President and other senior governmental officials and agencies on a 24-hour basis. It will maintain close working relationships with the production and estimates elements of the DIA and the Services.

b. DIA Estimates Office (Annex E) which will provide all DOD intelligence estimates and contributions to National Intelligence Estimates and the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), and which will assume the estimative responsibilities now charged to the J-2, Joint Staff.

c. The DIA Production Center (Annex F) which will, through a time-phased schedule, and in consonance with the concept provided herein, integrate DOD intelligence production as required to discharge the functions and responsibilities assigned to the Director, DIA.

The headquarters establishment of the DIA will provide adequate administrative support to the headquarters and supervision over the administration of the entire organization, and will assist the Director, DIA, in the exercise of his planning, programming, management and supervisory responsibilities for the overall DOD intelligence effort. This organizational structure will provide for maximum efficiency of operation with minimum requirement for revision during the evolutionary development of the DIA. The headquarters organization will provide the structure for all the elements which will be required in the headquarters when the DIA becomes fully operational.

1. Initially, the manning of the headquarters requires assignment of approximately 125 people, including both professional and administrative support personnel. This level of manning should be provided for as early as practicable after 1 October 1961, but in any event, no later than 31 October 1961.

2. During the period ending 1 July 1962, the headquarters complement will increase to a maximum of 250 personnel. This increase reflects the development of a full capability within the headquarters staff to discharge the responsibilities presently assigned.

The major elements of the staff will be responsible for management functions as follows:

1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Administration, will provide for headquarters administrative support and security and will be responsible for the initiation and conduct of an integrated personnel program for the career development of defense intelligence personnel. This office will manage the personnel activities of the headquarters, DIA, and will coordinate a Defense Intelligence Personnel Program for both civilian and military personnel. The Defense Intelligence Personnel Program will be initiated on 1 July 1962.

2. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Programs will initiate short and mid-range planning immediately upon activation. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, Policy and Programs will be responsible for the development of an aggressive program for the improvement of defense intelligence activities under the cognizance of the Director, DIA. Long range plans for defense intelligence operations and activities will be developed and will serve as the basis for evaluation and possible consolidation of the intelligence programs of the Services. In the development of long range plans and of programs, full cognizance will be taken of probable resource availability for future requirements based on scientific and technological forecasts.

3. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Support Systems will be responsible for the development of intelligence R&D requirements, for coordination of intelligence research and development, for liaison with all defense research, development and testing organizations having related interests or programs. He will also be responsible for the implementation of systems management in intelligence major project areas as directed. In addition, this office will be responsible for the integration of intelligence plans and programs for automation and automatic data processing to ensure that they complement each other and those of non-DOD intelligence agencies to the maximum extent practicable.

4. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Comptroller, will provide financial management and direction for obtaining effective utilization of Department of Defense intelligence resources. This office will review and evaluate budget estimates for all intelligence activities assigned or subject to review and coordination by the Director, DIA, and prepare and submit a consolidated budget for DOD intelligence activities together with recommendations pertaining thereto; and will participate in the administration of the consolidated budget. This office will conduct management engineering studies and review and analysis of programs to ensure maximum economy and efficiency. Statistical services, reports control and design, and other internal management services will be provided as directed.

5. The Inspector General will perform normal inspection functions within the internal DIA organization and for all agencies, installations and facilities assigned to the operational control of the Director, DIA. His inspection function will emphasize manner of performance, quality evaluation and operational readiness. In addition, he will perform such duties as relate to the monitoring, coordinating, and supervisory responsibilities of the Director, DIA, as the Director, DIA, requires.

Washington, November 28, 1961.

[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Central Intelligence Agency, General, 9/61-11/61. Top Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

Washington, December 9, 1961.

Please follow up on this:

1. CIA now provides certain support to private organizations of an educational or philanthropic nature.

2. These covert funds become the subject of common gossip, or knowledge, both here and abroad.

3. Covert funds draw suspicion upon the organizations concerned and, indeed, may bar them from entry into certain countries.

4. Covert funds scare away funds from other sources which do not wish to become involved with CIA-type activities or purposes.

5. In most cases, there is no need to conceal that funds are being provided by the U.S. Government. (See marked portions of attached.)/2/

6. Every effort should be made to move from covert to overt support in many of these cases. This might involve inter-agency transfers of funds from CIA to overt agencies such as AID or CU in the Department.

7. What can be done about this in connection with such organizations as (a) Asia Foundation, (b) African student activities and (c) possibly others?

Dean Rusk/3/

Washington, December 27, 1961.

SUBJECT
Discussion with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 2:45 P.M., 27 December 1961

[Here follows numbered paragraph 1 concerning an unidentified defector.]

2. McCone outlined in suitable detail the current thinking on changes in organization of the Agency,/2/ naming principally the reorganization of USIB; DCI as Chairman representing the President, not the Agency; DDCI as a member of USIB and the spokesman for the Agency; the FBI and NSA remaining as members; DIA to be the sole representative of the Department of Defense and members representing intelligence arms of Army, Navy, Air Force, JCS would drop off of the Board and the AEC member would be an ad hoc member to be called when matters of importance to AEC were up for consideration.

DCI would direct policy of the Agency and exercise extensive coordinating and supervising responsibility over the community. Arrangements would be made for the more thorough distribution of evaluated intelligence to interested government officials.

Deputy DCI would be the Chief Executive Officer of the Agency operating under policy guidance of the DCI. DDP would be divided into two divisions--one to cover conventional types of clandestine intelligence, the other scientific clandestine intelligence, each section to be headed by a Deputy Director. There would be some rearrangements of the functions of the DDI to insure proper dissemination of information estimates, etc., to USIB and the interested government agencies./3/

3. With respect to personnel, McCone advised that General Cabell had submitted his resignation effective January 31st and that he would soon propose a name, or list of names, to the President as the new DDCI. McCone generally advocated promotion from within for means of securing continuity and raising the morale of the Agency and stated he had found many men of very great competence in the Agency to choose from. Alternatively, McCone pointed out that in view of his personal circumstances, the President may wish to appoint a man of greater public recognition than anyone presently in the Agency and that if this was the case, McCone would have at least one name to propose (certain names were discussed). Mr. Kennedy generally favored promotion from within as he, too, realized there was an important morale factor within the Agency which must be given consideration.

McCone advised that he intended to discuss this and other matters with the President in Palm Beach on Wednesday, January 3rd.

4. McCone then expressed the view that he had observed that both in the Eisenhower administration and this administration intelligence which was disseminated was not "getting through" and being used for both short-term and long-term policy planning. He gave as examples Syria, Tshombe-Adoula meeting, the Laotian situation, etc. McCone said that he felt the basic purpose in establishing the Agency was to provide a facility for placing current, evaluated intelligence in the hands of policy-makers, including the President, but that this Agency's role had through the years been subordinated to operational activities. Mr. McCone said this had to be changed.

[Here follows paragraph 5 concerning General Edward G. Lansdale.]

John A. McCone/4/

Washington, January 7, 1962.

SUBJECT
Reorganization of the United States Intelligence Board

The Secretary of Defense and I have agreed that with the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the assignment thereto of the responsibility for the integration of defense intelligence resources and functions, a change in the composition of the United States Intelligence Board is desirable.

At the present time the United States Intelligence Board is composed of eleven representatives (the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman, six from the Department of Defense, one each from the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation). When I assumed the Chairmanship of the United States Intelligence Board I advised the Board that as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer I would represent you, and that the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence would become a member and represent the Central Intelligence Agency. The Board accepted this change.

Accordingly I recommend and the Secretary of Defense concurs that Defense representation be reduced to two (the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director, National Security Agency). I also recommend with the concurrence of the Atomic Energy Commission, that the Commission membership be on an ad hoc rather than a full-time basis since the Atomic Energy Commission participation is required only infrequently, when matters within its cognizance are discussed.

If these recommendations are approved, the reconstituted United States Intelligence Board would consist of: Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman; State Department, Defense Department, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation, members.

In limiting the regular membership of the United States Intelligence Board as recommended above, it would be our view that substantive dissents (including those of the military intelligence services) should continue to be reflected in estimates and other findings and decisions of the United States Intelligence Board.

This proposed reorganization of the United States Intelligence Board does not envisage limiting the composition of the United States Intelligence Board subcommittees to member agencies. The United States Intelligence Board subcommittee structure will be re-examined following your consideration of this memorandum to assure that membership includes representatives of all agencies with significant interests in the various intelligence fields.

John A. McCone/2/

Washington, January 7, 1962.

MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY
AND DCI ON SUNDAY, JANUARY 7, 5:30 to 7:15 p.m.,
AT THE WHITE HOUSE RESIDENCE

Note: Mr. Earman is to have this memorandum read by DDCI, DDP, and DDI, and appropriate actions taken immediately.

1. Agenda Item 2. McCone discussed the memorandum on the reorganization of USIB (copy attached)/2/ and advised the President that in view of JCS objections, which had been consistently stated for the past year, McCone now concluded that USIB would remain as is (except for DDCI's membership) for a few months allowing DIA to complete organization and assume responsibilities. McCone emphasized this did not change the ultimate conclusion that USIB should be organized in accordance with NSC and President Eisenhower's and President Kennedy's decisions. The President stated that Lemnitzer would like to meet with President protesting this decision. McCone suggests no further discussions for several months. The President agreed. Action: This matter will be held in abeyance; however, subject to be placed on agenda next USIB meeting for oral discussion by McCone and indication that NSC will ultimately be implemented./3/

2. McCone submitted proposed memorandum from the President to interested agencies concerning DCI responsibility. Copy attached. McCone also submitted SecState's letter advising President the letter was to be returned to Mr. Rusk./4/ (President read Rusk letter with obvious amusement.) The President read memorandum and approved subject to staff review and asked memorandum be submitted to Mr. McGeorge Bundy promptly. Note: Bundy requested memorandum on January 8th, however, when Rusk's letter returned to SecState he had requested memorandum be returned to him for review and either modification or submission of revised letter. This must be completed by January 9. Action: Mr. Earman should secure letter or revised memorandum from SecState on January 9, review again with Kirkpatrick and Coyne and Schuyler, to be sure memorandum conforms with recommendations of Killian Board and then submit memorandum to Mr. Bundy for immediate implementation./3/

[Here follow paragraphs 3-12, dealing with other subjects.]

John A. McCone5

Washington, January 8, 1962.

MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS
AT 11:00 O'CLOCK ON MONDAY, JANUARY 8, 1962

After a preliminary exchange of amenities, McCone stated that there were two problems.

(a) The reorganization of USIB.

General Lemnitzer gave a very articulate and persuasive argument as to why this should not be done. McCone responded by stating that it was a decision of the NSC, President Eisenhower and President Kennedy, and would ultimately be implemented. However, it was agreed, without changing the principle, that date of implementation would be postponed for a few months pending the completion of organization of DIA and permitting a few months for the operation of this agency. It was obvious that the Chiefs are very much opposed to removing the Service intelligence officers from the USIB, and probably will protest this move for reasons which have been expressed many times. The Chiefs have a unanimous paper on their position./2/

(b) Selection of a Deputy DCI.

The Chiefs made strong argument that this must be a military man and McCone agreed that he was perfectly willing to add a high level officer providing a man of great competence and experience was proposed. McCone explained the plan of reorganization of the office, the fact that Deputy DCI would have much greater responsibility than heretofore and therefore it would not be satisfactory to him to accept anyone except the most competent and experienced officer with some intelligence background, and great administrative ability and scientific knowledge. A list of candidates had been prepared by the Chiefs and submitted to Secretary McNamara for transmission to the DCI. They expected to receive this list today.

The Chiefs then invited occasional meetings with the DCI and this was agreed.

JAM

Washington, January 16, 1962.

In carrying out your newly assigned duties as Director of Central Intelligence it is my wish that you serve as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer, and as such that you undertake, as an integral part of your responsibility, the coordination and effective guidance of the total United States foreign intelligence effort. As the Government's principal intelligence officer, you will assure the proper coordination, correlation, and evaluation of intelligence from all sources and its prompt dissemination to me and to other recipients as appropriate. In fulfillment of these tasks I shall expect you to work closely with the heads of all departments and agencies having responsibilities in the foreign intelligence field.

In coordinating and guiding the total intelligence effort, you will serve as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, with a view to assuring the efficient and effective operation of the Board and its associated bodies. In this connection I note with approval that you have designated your deputy to serve as a member of the Board, thereby bringing to the Board's deliberations the relevant facts and judgments of the Central Intelligence Agency.

As directed by the President and the National Security Council, you will establish with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board the necessary policies and procedures to assure adequate coordination of foreign intelligence activities at all levels.

With the heads of the Departments and Agencies concerned you will maintain a continuing review of the programs and activities of all U.S. agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities with a view to assuring efficiency and effectiveness and to avoiding undesirable duplication.

As head of the Central Intelligence Agency, while you will continue to have over-all responsibility for the Agency, I shall expect you to delegate to your principal deputy, as you may deem necessary, so much of the direction of the detailed operation of the Agency as may be required to permit you to carry out your primary task as Director of Central Intelligence.

It is my wish that you keep me advised from time to time as to your progress in the implementation of this directive and as to any recommendations you may have which would facilitate the accomplishment of these objectives.

John F. Kennedy

Washington, April 7, 1962.

SUBJECT
Discussion with McGeorge Bundy

After briefly reviewing the organizational changes in CIA, including the series of appointments which have been made and the discussion of the selection of a Deputy for Intelligence Community affairs, I questioned Mr. Bundy concerning the procedure being followed by CIA to currently inform the President and the members of NSC on intelligence matters. I expressed concern because of my statutory responsibility to report to the NSC, pointing out that since the NSC seldom met, and when it did meet it was for the purpose of discussing specific problems, and it appeared to me that the regular NSC meetings were not practical. Therefore an alternate procedure must be developed.

Mr. Bundy stated as follows:

1. The morning briefings of himself, General Taylor, General Clifton and others are very satisfactory.

2. The President is generally informed on intelligence matters though he seems to get his information from a variety of sources and Mr. Bundy was not clear who all of them were.

3. At the moment it seemed impractical to count on regular NSC meetings as the President was not disposed to such arrangements.

4. He asked that I insist on meeting with the President not less than once a week for the purpose of making an intelligence report and that I keep a record of such discussions. He asked that I make a point of doing this and that I charge one of my assistants with arranging weekly meetings.

5. He asked whether a record existed of all prior meetings with the President and that I review my files and complete them.

6. Mr. Bundy observed that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense were well informed through their respective intelligence facilities and the "Check List" and he suggested that I arrange to brief the Vice President, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Office of Emergency Planning, at least every two weeks. Bundy thought this could be done by a briefing officer or by me personally if time permitted.

The arrangements as outlined in Item 4. above will be the responsibility of Mr. Earman and Item 6. above, the responsibility of Mr. Earman to arrange appointments. Mr. Sheldon to prepare the briefings. I would appreciate any comments DDCI may have on the above.

John A. McCone/2/

On July 23, 1962, Director of the National Reconnaissance Office Joseph V. Charyk sent a memorandum to NRO Program Directors and the Director of the NRO Staff setting forth the "Organization and Functions of the NRO." The memorandum established the basic organization of the NRO, described the functions of the elements, and outlined the concept and operation. After a discussion of the sensitivity of the NRO mission and the necessity for concealing the organization behind "plausible, overt" names, the memorandum described the responsibilities of the directors of the three elements: "Director, Program A being responsible for NRP satellite effort conducted by the NRO through utilization of Department of the Air Force resources, and the Director, Program B being responsible for NRP effort conducted by the NRO through utilization of Central Intelligence Agency resources. A Director, Program C is being established to be responsible for NRP effort conducted by the NRO through utilization of Naval Research Laboratory resources." The NRO Staff was responsible for assisting the Director, coordination and liaison with the U.S. Intelligence Board and the principal consumers of the intelligence collected, and overall management and monitoring of projects and staff. (National Reconnaissance Office, NRO Office of Policy Files) Charyk's memorandum, along with organization charts of the National Reconnaissance Office and the NRO Staff, is available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv), Electronic Briefing Book No. 35, "The NRO Declassified," Document 6.

Washington, August 1, 1962.

[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Central Intelligence Agency, General, 5/62-12/62. Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

Washington, August 23, 1962.

Dear Gordon:

Just a note to tell you how delighted I am that we will work together on the problem you and I have been discussing, immediately upon my return from a trip of great personal importance, which I am starting on today./2/

I have discussed our telephone conversation with General Carter and Walter Elder, and Walter will arrange appropriate office accommodations for you and secretarial service. Also, there are several recent studies and reports having to do with community coordination, which I feel it might be constructive for you to peruse.

I can appreciate, and feel it completely acceptable, that your work be done on a consultative basis under a consulting contract with a per diem remuneration, and in so doing would involve no official appointment, nor will it involve a resignation or a leave from your other activities, including the President's Board. Of course this will be with the full understanding that your work is being undertaken at my initiative, and involves my responsibility in fulfilling the President's directive to me, which was made after his review of a great number of recommendations of the President's Board./3/

To reiterate the objectives of this exercise, it is my feeling that the Deputy Director for Coordination is, and will be, a most important and effective post. However, if it is filled, as it has been in the past, without careful exploration of the manner in which the office is to function, and a thorough understanding with the secretaries of the departments involved, principally State and Defense, as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the effort will fail. However, I believe, as I have told you, because of your broad experience and the respect you command throughout government, you can approach the problem in a way that will command support of all involved rather than indifference, and from your effort there will evolve "terms of reference" for the office which will endure.

I feel this will be brought about best by seizing upon specific problems of an inter-service nature, dealing with them, resolving them, and by so doing establish a pattern which could apply to all future problems. In addition, Gordon, there is the question of selection of the man who will fill the job on a permanent basis. I am sure you will be of great assistance to me in this regard.

I will return on September 24th. You will have been back about ten days by then, and hence I believe the timing will be such that we can move forward aggressively.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely

John

Washington, September 26, 1962, 4:30 p.m.

1. The first part of the discussion concerned itself with the role of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) in respect to coordination and guidance. While Mr. Amory did not claim any responsibility for "policy" he nevertheless asserted a keen interest in "management." He indicated that BOB intended to be much more active with regard to the intelligence community in general than has been the case in the past. He referred to some reorganization which had taken place in the BOB which had made his office the focal point for foreign intelligence matters with the exception of certain military functions.

2. I asked whether he could speak on behalf of the BOB with respect to the role of the DCI in "coordination and guidance matters." Mr. Amory replied that he could speak not only for himself but could also repeat Mr. Bell's often asserted views. He said that they took very seriously the President's Directive to the DCI and supported it fully, including the aspect of a "Chief Intelligence Officer" for the Government.

3. Mr. Amory went on to say that in the last eight or nine months he and others in BOB had been very much concerned at the lack of movement in respect to coordination. He said he had felt that there had been a good deal of fanfare earlier this year about a more positive role for the DCI but that results had been disappointing. He acknowledged that the DCI had been faced with a number of things which had necessarily complicated and delayed certain actions. He expressed the hope that Mr. McCone as DCI would pursue a different approach than his predecessor in respect to devoting an excessive amount of his time to operating details of CIA. I reminded him of the delegations to General Carter.

4. I asked Mr. Amory whether if he or any others in the BOB at any time believed that the DCI was not performing his proper role, it would not be appropriate for such feeling to be communicated to the DCI. Mr. Amory agreed that this was a necessary course and indicated that this process exists largely through the staff. I then pressed him for specifics with respect to his allegation about lack of movement. He said that one example he had in mind was the failure to act in USIB with respect to the elimination of service members and the complete substitution therefor of the Director of DIA. He spoke in detail of postponements and indicated that his grapevine led him to believe that a new postponement was about to take place. He pointed out the budgetary implications in terms of personnel. He said that it was alleged that General Carroll could not properly represent Defense until he had sufficient competent personnel which would come from the services. On the other hand the services are not willing to give up personnel supporting them in their respective memberships on USIB. He left me with the impression that budget projections for 1964 did not reflect a firm decision to proceed with the personnel transfers.

5. I asked Mr. Amory whether he was concerned about the relationships between the DCI, the Secretary of Defense and Mr. Rubel with respect to NSA affairs. Mr. Amory adverted to the familiar conflict between departmental and national intelligence requirements and between military and other general requirements. [9 lines of source text not declassified]

6. I then asked him what he conceived to be the role of the DCI in respect to these matters including projections of large increases in NSA personnel and budget. He acknowledged that the DCI has no command function but asserted that it was a DCI responsibility to make certain of the proper allocation of resources. As to NSA, Mr. Amory believes that Mr. Rubel has made great strides from the management point of view. I pointed out to him that by Mr. Rubel's own statement, he was devoting no more than ten to fifteen percent of his own time to NSA matters which I felt was quite inadequate. Mr. Amory agreed that it was inadequate.

7. When I pressed Mr. Amory further about how he felt the DCI could exercise his responsibility in this area especially in the light of the fact that the DIA has no real relationship to NSA, he only could suggest a close working relationship between Mr. Rubel and his associates on the one hand and Mr. Cline, Mr. Sheldon and perhaps others on the other hand.

8. Mr. Amory indicated that in his area he was responsible for about eight billion dollars expended in the foreign field. He said that it was his view as well as the view of Mr. Bell, Mr. Sorensen, Professor Schlesinger and others of the New Frontier in the White House that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was an excessive proportion of this overseas expenditure. He said further that there was a determination that the proportionate amount spent on intelligence would have to be reduced. [3 lines of source text not declassified] In the discussion on this point he made several cost comparisons which reflected his impression that the intelligence effort was receiving a disproportionate allocation of resources. I pointed out to Mr. Amory that he was trying to equate things which could not be equated and that I questioned this approach.

9. I sought to bring the conversation back to specific roles. I posed as an example the possibility that the technical services of the army might be performing estimating and production chores which were in duplication of other efforts in the community. I asked Mr. Amory whether the budget process was not perhaps the best vehicle for detecting and eliminating such unnecessary duplication. He replied it was very difficult to identify people in the military with the size of the establishment and its budget and with only about 50 people in the BOB concerning themselves with the Defense Department.

10. In closing the conversation I again repeated that it would be only fair for him and his associates to report to the DCI any failures or omissions which they felt they had detected. I said I felt there had been enough general talk about failure of coordination and unless allegations in this regard were made on the basis of specific instances, general talk only complicated the problems of the DCI. Mr. Amory did not take issue with this point of view.

G.G.

Washington, November 17, 1962.

MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND
GENERAL EISENHOWER AND McCONE
AT McCONE'S RESIDENCE ON SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17th,
FROM 9:00 UNTIL 10:10 A.M.

[Here follow six paragraphs of discussion concerning the situation in Cuba and Western Europe, particularly Berlin. Portions dealing with the Cuban situation are printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XI, Document 189. A paragraph concerning Western Europe and Berlin is not printed.]

The meeting then turned to discussion of organization and Eisenhower reviewed at some length his concept of how the NSC must be supported by a Planning Board who are studying and reporting on the situation in each critical country or critical area and in addition the principals must meet frequently to discuss special acute situations. He recalled how studies were made by the Planning Board on all areas, that these served as broad guidelines for policy makers. In addition he recalled how he would meet with his principals on particularly acute situations such as Lebanon, Guatemala, Quemoy, Matsu, etc., and that these meetings would be held frequently, in some instances as often as once a day for several days, and that policies would develop from such meetings. The President seemed to concur that he should have more staff support; he expressed great pleasure at the functioning of the Executive Committee and the desire to have the Executive Committee established as a permanent organization, to meet once a week, to review special situations and to hear intelligence reports. There seemed to be no disagreement between the two men concerning the need for different type of organization than now exists. Eisenhower readily volunteered that any plan of organization must be tailored and must meet the particular desires of the man in charge and that a pattern acceptable to him may not necessarily meet President Kennedy's needs.

The meeting was cordial and constructive. Both President Kennedy and General Eisenhower expressed their appreciation to me and their desire to continue communication one with the other in about the same form and in the manner of this meeting.

John A. McCone/2/

[Here follows an added paragraph on Cuba, dated November 19, 1962.]

Washington, January 10, 1963.

SUBJECT
Meeting between DCI and Mr. Bundy in Bundy's office at 4:30 p. m. on January 10th

1. Mr. Bundy spoke of the concern regarding friction between CIA and Defense which apparently had been reported to him, and possibly to the President, by McNamara and Gilpatric. McCone responded that, in his opinion, the friction arose from two sources. One, DIA in establishing its areas of activities was giving substantial indication (at the working level) of a desire to duplicate rather than utilize CIA facilities. This tendency had been noted by General Carter and was a reason for many strong positions taken by General Carter in defense of this Agency. However, DCI noted that he believed all such controversies involving General Carter were, in the final analysis, amicably settled. Two, problems with Dr. Scoville, which to a certain extent were attributable to Scoville's personality. Underlying these arguments was the constant desire of Defense and Air Force to pre-empt entirely all reconnaissance. Bundy volunteered that this would not be acceptable because history had indicated that Air Force reconnaissance [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] would be placed on a lower priority to operational Air Force programs and this would be undesirable.

Action: Despite the pros and cons of the various arguments, it is essential that both CIA and Defense adopt policies and understanding which will avoid so far as possible controversy and jurisdictional disputes. DCI should discuss this whole subject very frankly with Secretary McNamara.

2. McCone stated to Bundy that he felt that he must have a stronger voice in reconnaissance than now exists or was contemplated in the defunct NRO arrangement./2/ He pointed out that the actions of SAC in connection with Cuba demonstrated the point that a military unit will, if left to its own devices, place operational requirements on a higher priority than intelligence-gathering during peace time. McCone stated and Bundy agreed that CIA and not SAC was responsible for both the U-2 and Discoverer, as well as Oxcart. I pointed out that Air Force efforts in satellite photography had failed completely and this was agreed to by Bundy. McCone stated that he would discuss this matter frankly with McNamara but that he would not continue to be responsible for intelligence unless he, and through him CIA, was the final authority on reconnaissance operations, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Overt operations during a war are in preparation for military action and should very logically be a military responsibility.

3. McCone outlined his views on the reorganization of USIB and the manner in which the national resources such as NRO, AFTAC and NSA should be handled by a full-time Assistant Secretary of Defense. The alternative would be a new Deputy Director of Intelligence to handle these particular operations; however this seemed impractical in view of the very large amount of support required in the Defense Department.

[Here follow paragraph 4 dealing with Cuba, paragraph 5 concerning Chinese Communist nuclear capabilities, and paragraph 6 briefly indicating that Cuba and the Chinese Communist nuclear threat were issues of high importance.]

John A. McCone/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

On February 4, 1963, James R. Killian, Jr., Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), sent President Kennedy a report based on the Board's survey of intelligence coverage, assessment, and reporting by U.S. intelligence agencies prior to the Cuban missile crisis in the fall of 1962. The report was based on PFIAB's review of intelligence on the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during the months preceding the President's report to the nation on October 22, 1962, on the Soviet establishment of offensive missile sites in Cuba. The February 4 PFIAB report was signed for the Board by Killian as Chairman, and included the names of the other Board members, William O. Baker, Clark Clifford, James Doolittle, Gordon Gray, Edwin H. Land, William L. Langer, Robert D. Murphy, and Frank Pace, Jr. Killian transmitted the report under cover of a shorter separate memorandum to President Kennedy, also dated February 4, 1963. The texts of the report and covering memorandum are in Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, and also printed in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pages 361-371. Documentation on the crisis is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XI.

The PFIAB report noted by way of introduction that the Board's review "sought to determine whether there were lessons to be learned from an objective appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. foreign intelligence experience as disclosed by the Cuba experience. We directed particular attention to those areas of the intelligence process which are concerned with such matters as (1) the acquisition of intelligence, (2) the analysis of intelligence, and (3) the production and dissemination of intelligence reports and estimates in support of national policy formulation and operational requirements."

The report discussed the U-2 reconnaissance overflights of Cuba from October 14, 1962, onward that provided photographic evidence the Soviet Union had begun to establish a strategic missile complex in Cuba. The report noted that "the definitive photographic evidence obtained as a result of the October 14 and subsequent overflights of Cuba were promptly processed and submitted to the President in time for decisive action before the Soviet MRBM and IRBM systems became fully operational. Beginning with the President's initial receipt of this crucial intelligence there was an effective performance on the part of the U.S. intelligence community in providing the President and his top policy advisers promptly with the coordinated intelligence necessary to enable our Government to respond effectively to the offensive missile threat in Cuba."

With respect to the period prior to October 14, 1962, the report concluded that "our foreign intelligence effort should have been more effective in (1) obtaining adequate and timely intelligence as to the nature and scope of the Soviet military build-up as it developed over a period of months, and (2) exploiting the available intelligence as a basis for estimating Soviet and Cuban plans and intentions."

On the subject of intelligence acquisition, the report found that "clandestine agent coverage within Cuba was inadequate," and that "full use was not made of aerial photographic surveillance, particularly during September and October when the influx of Soviet military personnel and armaments had reached major proportions." With respect to aerial photographic surveillance of Cuba, the report found that "the President granted authorization for all U-2 flights which were recommended to him by his policy advisers on the Special Group having responsibility for such matters." But until October 3, "it appears that there was a failure on the part of the intelligence community as a whole to propose to the Special Group U-2 reconnaissance missions on a scale commensurate with the nature and intensity of the Soviet activity in Cuba."

With respect to the issue of intelligence analysis, the report found a "need for improvement of the processes used in making national intelligence estimates and the processes used in making current intelligence analysis, and also in the techniques for relating these two functions." The report noted that "the President and policy-advisory officials were ill served by the Special National Intelligence Estimate issued by the intelligence community on September 19, on 'The Military Buildup in Cuba.'" This Estimate "pointed away from the likelihood of the establishment of Soviet nuclear missile systems in Cuba."

The report found that "in the analysis of intelligence indicators and in the production of current intelligence reports, the intelligence community failed to get across to key Government officials the most accurate possible picture of what the Soviets might be up to in Cuba, during the months preceding October 14." The report further stated: "We believe that the near-total intelligence surprise experienced by the United States with respect to the introduction and deployment of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba resulted in large part from a malfunction of the analytic process by which intelligence indicators are assessed and reported. This malfunction diminished the effectiveness of policy advisers, national intelligence estimators, and civilian and military officers having command responsibilities." The report continued: " We believe that the manner in which intelligence indicators were handled in the Cuba situation may well be the most serious flaw in our intelligence system, and one which, if uncorrected, could lead to the gravest consequences."

In its review of the intelligence reporting process, the Board found that "limitations which were placed on the publication and dissemination of reports and information concerning the situation in Cuba were either misinterpreted or misapplied. This inhibited the flow of significant data." With respect to the subject of emergency planning, the Board noted that the Cuban missile crisis "points up the need for advance planning to ensure that our human and material intelligence resources are sufficient, and are adequately organized, to meet the demands of an emergency such as that which confronted our Government in this instance."

On February 23, 1963, Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone sent a memorandum to President Kennedy commenting on the PFIAB report of February 4. McCone indicated that in appearances before the Board on November 7, December 9, and December 28, 1962, he had stated that "there was an understandable reluctance or timidity in programming U-2 overflights over Cuba after we had discovered the presence of surface-to-air missile installations. This caution was understandable not only because of the extremely severe criticism of 'U-2 incidents'" dating from the downing of a U-2 aircraft piloted by Francis Gary Powers over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960 (see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, volume X, Part 1), and the more recent loss of a Chinese Nationalist-piloted U-2 over Sakhalin on September 9, 1962 (see ibid., 1961-1963, volume XXII, Document 154).

McCone noted that "for two years the intelligence community had been surfeited with reports of 'missiles in Cuba,' all of which proved to be incorrect prior to those which we received on or about September 20." McCone stated: "I continue to feel that the intelligence community performed well. I have examined this performance personally and in depth, and incidentally with a critical eye. As you know, my own views differed from those of the community. I believe that the conclusions reached from my study made for the Board at your request reflect a more reasonable judgment of the performance of the intelligence community in the six months' period prior to the October crisis." McCone attached his conclusions, which read in full as follows:

"1. Although the intelligence community's inquiry into its actions during the Cuban crisis revealed certain areas where shortcomings existed and where improvements should be made in various areas of intelligence collection and processing, the intelligence community operated extensively and well in connection with Cuba. Every major weapons system introduced into Cuba by the Soviets was detected, identified, and reported (with respect to numbers, location and operational characteristics) before any one of these systems attained an operational capability.

"2. A relatively short period of time ensued between the introduction of strategic weapons into Cuba, particularly strategic missiles, and the commencement of the flow, although meager, of tangible reports of their presence; detection of their possible presence and targeting of the suspect areas of their location was accomplished in a compressed time frame; and the intelligence cycle did move with extraordinary rapidity through the stages of collection, analysis, targeting for verification, and positive identification.

"3. The very substantial effort directed toward Cuba was originated by an earlier concern with the situation in Cuba and the effort, already well under way, contributed to the detection and analysis of the Soviet build-up.

"4. Information was disseminated and used.

"5. Aerial photography was very effective and our best means of establishing hard intelligence.

"6. The procedures adopted in September delayed photographic intelligence, but this delay was not critical, because photography obtained prior to about 17 October would not have been sufficient to warrant action of a type which would require support from Western Hemisphere [or?] NATO allies.

"7. Agent reports helped materially; however, none giving significant information on offensive missiles reached the intelligence community or policy-makers until after mid-September. When received, they were used in directing aerial photography.

"8. Some restrictions were placed on dissemination of information, but there is no indication that these restrictions necessarily affected analytical work or actions of policy-makers.

"9. The 19 September estimate, while indicating the improbability that the Soviet Union would place MRBM's and IRBM's in Cuba, did state that 'this contingency must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy'; the estimators in preparing the 19 September estimate gave great weight to the philosophical argument concerning Soviet intentions and thus did not fully weigh the many indicators.

"10. The estimate of 19 October on probable Soviet reactions was correct."

The Report from McCone to Kennedy, February 28, 1963, is in the Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A; it is also printed in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pages 373-376.

On March 13, 1963, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone and Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric signed an agreement on the "Management of the National Reconnaissance Program," which designated the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent for the NRP. In order to carry out his responsibilities, the Secretary of Defense would "establish as a separate operating agency of the Department of Defense a National Reconnaissance Office under the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense." The agreement strengthened the authority of the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office who would report directly to the Secretary of Defense and would be responsible for the "management of all aspects of the NRP," including developing all projects for intelligence collection by "collection systems exclusive of normal peripheral operations, responding "directly and solely" to the requirements and priorities of the U.S. Intelligence Board, scheduling all overflight missions, processing initial imagery and producing and delivering intelligence to users, planning and conducting research and development of future NRP projects, and directing and managing all funds made available for the NRP. The NRO Director was also given authority to assign all project tasks to appropriate elements of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. (National Reconnaissance Office, NRO Office of Policy Files) The text of the agreement is available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv), Electronic Briefing Book No. 35, "The NRO Declassified," Document 7.

The agreement superseded the agreement of May 2, 1962; see footnote 2, Document 90. In March 1963 Brockway McMillan succeeded Joseph Charyk as Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.

On March 25, 1963, at 12:15 p.m., Director of Central Intelligence McCone met with President Kennedy and raised a number of issues. A memorandum of conversation prepared by Bundy, who was also present, includes the following item:

"The Director reported he was very dissatisfied with the reports of the Killian Board [i.e., the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, of which Killian was Chairman]. He felt that these reports and recommendations very often covered proposals or policy which he himself had earlier described to the Killian Board so that in a sense they provide a misleading record which might leak and be very damaging to the CIA. The President replied that he thought the Board's record of discretion was excellent, that any report would be filed with the answer of the Director or the affected agency, and that he thought that in this area the advice of an independent group of observers was invaluable. He thought it best that the Board should continue. He told the Director that Dr. Killian had asked for relief, and it was agreed that we should see what happens under new leadership before making any changes." (Memorandum of conversation with the President, March 25; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Bundy Memoranda to President, 3/63-4/63)

McCone's record of this conversation included the following: "The President advised McCone in confidence that Dr. Killian had submitted his resignation as Chairman of the Advisory Board for health reasons and this resignation would be accepted as soon as a replacement could be found. The President suggested, and Bundy later reaffirmed, that the recommendations should be answered by the DCI and he should feel free to point out in his answers that there are subjects upon which the Board made recommendations, which had been discussed with the Board, and the DCI in these discussions had indicated actions which the intelligence community, CIA and DCI had initiated." In a note, McCone wrote: "Bundy later asked DCI for recommendations. McCone suggested that when the change takes place, terms of reference for the Board should be reviewed and perhaps modified so that the Board could constructively assist the intelligence community and the entire intelligence portion of the Government as they had in the past, but would not assume quite as much operational responsibility as they had in the past." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1/1/63-3/31/63)

Washington, July 11, 1963.

SUBJECT
Discussion with Secretary McNamara, 11 July, 5:00 p. m.

1. The content of my letter of July 10th/2/ on the subject of the budget was discussed in considerable detail. It was agreed that I, as DCI, should have access to the Defense intelligence budgets. SecDef plans to prepare for all intelligence budgets by function, setting forth cost and manpower requirements similar to that of the CCP study. This will be true for NRO, which is now nearing completion, for General Carroll's DIA, and the classical Service intelligence operations, and for certain other particular activities. All of these are in preparation at the present time, and will be completed by Fall. The guidelines for the preparation of budgets have been established and there will be ample opportunity for review.

2. I confirmed that such a procedure would meet my needs, but that it was essential that I assure myself and the President that existing resources in all Agencies are being used to the maximum, that there is minimum duplication, that there are no visible gaps, and that the intelligence community is operating efficiently and effectively. McNamara agreed. I particularly raised the question of utilization of CIA resources and special skills. McNamara agreed that these should not be duplicated by DIA, but that DIA should make maximum utilization of such skills.

3. I raised the question of LeMay's desire to take over all aerial reconnaissance. McNamara indicated that this would not be advisable; he would not approve it; he had so told LeMay that as far as he was concerned this issue was dead. He said he thought NRO was operating more effectively now, and he hoped there would be a continual close-working arrangement between Fubini, McMillan and the CIA staff.

4. I raised the question of the control of detection and analysis of Soviet missile and space activity, referring particularly to Dr. Wheelon's plan for Mistic. McNamara asked that Dr. Wheelon review this organizational plan with Fubini, as McNamara felt the idea had great merit, although he was not familiar with the details.

5. McNamara had not been brought into the discussion of membership of GMAIC. He had no comment, except to say that he felt there were far too many people involved in all decision-making processes. He did not see why NASA necessarily had to be brought into the intelligence processes merely to make their facilities available, that the disciplines in NASA existed elsewhere, and in general he had some reservations about the plan merely because he thought that too many people were involved in all Government policy-making processes. He pointed out that the number of people who had injected themselves into the test ban discussions really had no right to a voice with respect to policy. I would expect McNamara would support Carroll's objection to NASA's membership on GMAIC.

6. Reference the supplying of NATO with information on Soviet capabilities as outlined in the 11 July memorandum of Elder's and the June 14th memorandum of USIB,/3/ McNamara could not recall how this question arose, and asked that we discuss it further later, with General Carroll, and if the issue still was unresolved, further discussion could take place.

7. [1 paragraph (12 lines of source text) not declassified]

Washington, October 21, 1963.

1. The National Security Act charges the Central Intelligence Agency with the responsibility to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and to provide appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government, using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities. The law further provides that departments and other agencies of government shall continue to correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence. Under existing Priority National Intelligence Objectives intelligence relating to threat of attack on the United States is considered the highest priority.

2. Hence, the proper handling of intelligence relating to Soviet missile and space firings is of the utmost importance. The analysis of all raw intelligence of Soviet activities and operations gathered from all sources and the reporting and dissemination of these analyses in a timely and comprehensive manner is a responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is my observation that CIA through its Office of Scientific Intelligence, and USIB through the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee are not satisfactorily organized for this task, despite the fact that the efforts of both organizations have produced a very considerable number of very valuable analyses and reports on Soviet missile and space activities through the years.

3. This memorandum therefore will confirm my previous instructions to you to create, within the resources of the Central Intelligence Agency an organization for the complete analysis of all data on Soviet missile and space firings. This organization should be established as a unit within the DD/S&T which in my opinion has the advanced technical capability required as a focal point for this effort. Naturally this Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center would not only be satisfactorily equipped with specialists of appropriate background and training, but will likewise utilize the best of our national capabilities, both private and governmental, in accomplishing the sophisticated technical analyses required to exploit on a timely basis the extensive collection activities now in being under the direction of various Services and agencies, most of which are being augmented.

4. The group you will establish within the DD/S&T under this directive should bring together all of the technical intelligence data for joint analysis, should work in close coordination with GMAIC and report its results to the USIB through GMAIC.

5. Likewise this analytical group should work closely with the agencies who now collect raw intelligence data and process and analyze their data independently.

6. It is assumed that the analytical group established under this directive through its study of all collection resources and the raw intelligence produced by them will develop judgments as to how our resources might be improved or more effectively directed. When and if such views are developed, I would appreciate them being brought to the attention of USIB immediately so that appropriate instructions can be issued for the implementation of such recommendations.

John A. McCone/2/

Washington, November 28, 1963.

SUBJECT
Discussion with President Johnson, 28 November 1963, 10:00 a.m.

[Here follows paragraph 1 concerning Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and developments in Vietnam.]

2. The President then stated that he had the greatest confidence in me personally. He recalled the background for our relationship through the years and also the fact that on several important issues which have come up since my assuming the position of DCI that he had forced me to express myself on policy and noted that he approved of the positions I took on various matters. He said that he felt my work in intelligence was of greatest importance, but he did not wish me to confine myself to this role. He said that he had observed that I had rather carefully avoided expressing myself on policy or suggesting courses of action and he suggested that it might be for interdepartmental reasons that I would wish to continue to do this in meetings (which he felt was a mistake), but nevertheless he invited and would welcome my coming to him from time to time with suggestions of courses of action on policy matters which, in my opinion, were wise even though they were not consistent with advice he was receiving from responsible people. He said he was not satisfied with the advice he was getting from many quarters and he noted that in issues such as nuclear testing, the disarmament test ban, discussions on Cuba and South Vietnam that he, McCloy and I had always been very close together, with Dillon for the most part conforming to our views, but more often than not these views differed in degree from those of a great many others who are in the Administration. In this context he did not mention Mr. Bundy, however, on other occasions he had expressed confidence in Bundy.

3. I received the definite impression from this discussion that the President would move rather rapidly on the role of advisers and some of his Cabinet members as he is not at all happy with a great many of them. I think the same might be expected of some of his ambassadors.

Washington, December 7, 1963.

SUBJECT
Discussion with the President on Saturday, December 7th, 12:00 for about one half hour

1. The President confirmed that he thought I should go to Saigon to meet McNamara, that he wished our new Chief of Station to be in place by that time, that he wished to meet the Chief of Station personally before he went to Saigon and again expressed apprehension over the situation in South Vietnam.

2. Reviewed with the President, modified, and apparently approved draft of a cable to Ambassador Lodge on the above subject.

3. I reviewed briefly my discussion with Robert Kennedy on Saturday morning, details of which are covered in another memorandum.

4. Reviewed my practice of briefing General Eisenhower. The President asked that I continue and he expressed the greatest of confidence in and friendship for General Eisenhower.

5. Discussed the organizational plan for the Alliance for Progress which was submitted in a memorandum last week. The President said that Robert Anderson flatly refused the President's personal appeal. He said he was turning towards placing Ambassador Thomas Mann as an Undersecretary of State for Latin American affairs, responsible not only for the Alliance for Progress but for all Latin American activities.

6. I told the President that I was dissatisfied with the "image" of the DCI. It has been created because Allen Dulles and also a number of men in the Administration had built up the operational side of the Agency and had not emphasized the activities of CIA and DCI which were first and carefully outlined in the law and were most important. I said the result of this had been that the DCI was now considered strictly a "cloak and dagger" operator and that this image had developed to a point that my contribution to him and to the Department was impaired, travel is difficult, visiting foreign countries is practically an impossibility all to the end neither the DCI nor the Agency were serving the President as effectively as they could in view of the vast resources of talent existing in CIA. In saying this I did not diminish the very great importance of the operational side as well as the technical side but indicated that our real contribution was to take all intelligence, including clandestine and technical intelligence, and meld it into a proper and thoughtful analysis estimate of any given situation. The President agreed and asked that I prepare a memorandum of a few paragraphs which he could use from time to time in talking with the press or in press conferences or even in speeches./2/

Washington, December 21, 1963.

SUBJECT
Proposed Reorganization of the United States Intelligence Board

In recent consultation with Secretary McNamara regarding measures which should be taken in the intelligence community to achieve your goal of good management and economical administration in government,/2/ we have concluded that the management of the foreign intelligence activities of the Department of Defense would be very greatly simplified if you would approve a reorganization of the United States Intelligence Board.

The Board, essentially in its present role of advising and assisting you as its Chairman in coordinating and guiding the total intelligence effort, was established in 1958 with the approval of the President under directives of the National Security Council. As approved by the President, the composition of the Intelligence Board currently consists of the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman; the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence Agency; the intelligence chiefs of the Department of State, Defense Intelligence Agency, Army, Navy, Air Force and National Security Agency; together with representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Since the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was created in 1961 to coordinate and supervise all intelligence functions in the Department of Defense (except those under the National Security Agency), it has been contemplated that the intelligence chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force would be removed from membership on the U.S. Intelligence Board at such time as the Director, DIA, has sufficient authority and resources to represent all the military services. Secretary McNamara and I believe that this change in membership on the Intelligence Board is now warranted in the interest of better management and more effective administration.

To put this reorganization into effect, I recommend that you approve the following membership on the United States Intelligence Board to become effective 1 January 1964:

Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, National Security Agency
A representative of the Atomic Energy Commission
A representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject to your approval of this recommendation, I will institute action to effect such changes in existing directives as are necessary to implement this reorganization.

John A. McCone/3/

LBJ Ranch, Texas, December 27, 1963.

SUBJECT
Discussions with President Johnson at the Johnson Ranch on Friday, December 27th

1. I arrived at the ranch by Jet Star from Seattle, arriving at midnight on Thursday, December 26th. I stayed in a guest room at President Johnson's residence. President Johnson and I ate breakfast alone the following morning and then with Pierre Salinger took a long walk. Following the discussion two memoranda were prepared by me for the President's subsequent use. Memorandum marked #1 was to be used by him in discussing our meeting later in the day when he met with a large number of the press. Memorandum #2 was for discussion with Secretary Rusk and others and for subsequent release to the press./2/

2. At breakfast the President immediately brought up his desire to "change the image of the DCI" from a cloak and dagger role to the role of an adviser to the President on world situations derived from intelligence sources which were of importance to the President in reaching policy decisions. For this reason he intended to call upon me for a great many activities which would be different from those of the past. As an example, he wished me to return to California to meet with President Eisenhower to discuss with him certain aspects of the world situation and also the particular actions which President Johnson [Eisenhower?] had taken in the interest of government economy.

3. I responded that this was very much in line with my thinking. I was willing to do anything that he desired. I then produced the Truman article and the Starnes article/3/ and explained to him that a statement of this type by President Truman would do great damage, that it would be used by many columnists who enjoyed criticizing CIA, that the Truman article and later editorials such as the Starnes article would undoubtedly be introduced into the Congressional Record by such critics of CIA as Senator Eugene McCarthy and would be used in an attempt to bring about legislation creating a joint committee on intelligence (Watchdog Committee). The President said that he had read the Truman article, that he thought it was a mistake and that he would do all that he could to arrest any such impressions concerning CIA's activities.

[Here follow paragraphs 4-15, dealing with various unrelated subjects, including Cyprus, Yemen, South Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Cuba.]

There are a number of items which I had intended to discuss with the President, but time ran out. They were:

1. The general scope of activity of CIA, most particularly in the areas of DDP. However, I am satisfied, after discussing the Truman article with the President, that he is in complete accord with our covert operations, including political action and paramilitary activities. However, he wishes to emphasize the correlating, estimating and reporting functions (i.e., DDI) in order to minimize the "cloak and dagger" aspects of CIA and the DCI.

2. I intended to suggest to the President that CIA be represented in his inter-departmental organization to examine foreign aid, or alternatively that we have an adviser or consultant sit with the committee. I would like the staff to give some consideration to this idea and give me their views upon my return. Frankly, I feel that our Stations have sources that can provide independent evaluations of certain aid programs and make suggestions which would be exceedingly valuable. However, there is some question as to whether we should become involved, either by direct participation or as consultants in this field.

[Here follow five additional paragraphs dealing with unrelated subjects.]