Washington, undated.

THE "PRESTIGE POLLS" ISSUE

The mission of the U. S. Information Agency is to inform and influence peoples abroad.

If we are ignorant of public opinion abroad, we have to shoot in the dark.

With these two facts in mind, the Office of Research and Analysis has sought to refine the assessments of popular opinions and attitudes.

We know that an accurate measure of the opinions of a people cannot be obtained by diplomatic reporting, press analysis, or other traditional research methods. These methods measure opinions of special groups and measure the opinions subjectively.

Public opinion polls or surveys can, however, measure objectively the opinions of a whole population.

This is not to say that we need only the public opinion polls. Although increasingly precise, survey data cannot be taken as the last word but must be weighed along with all other types of evidence to produce a comprehensive assessment.

As our reports concerning world public opinion measurements grew more comprehensive and more incisive, the demand for more and more pointed reports followed. Since those reports were expected to remain within the executive family of the government in order to help guide government programs, we had no trepidation about calling the shots as we saw them. Objective analysis, we felt, provided the only justification for the exercise.

Unfortunately, these reports got caught in the domestic political line of fire. Now there is some thought that to avoid future difficulties, we might discontinue these surveys. Several factors discount this easy solution.

1) Our difficulties highlight a major governmental problem, the "security" system. At the root of this problem is the difficulty of deciding, under heavy pressure, precisely which facts and conclusions can be made public or must be kept within the governmental family. Once a decision is made that a report is a security matter, it should remain secure. If it doesn't remain secure, this is the fault of the security system.

2) Public opinion surveys conducted by USIA are an essential part of the intelligence-gathering mechanism of the U.S. Government. All government intelligence estimates, including public opinion assessments, have to be made on the assumption that the resultant product is for government guidance rather than for public print. If USIA surveys were taken out of this intelligence complex and released to the public, the picture would be incomplete and could be distorted.

3) The USIA survey mechanism has been made available by former Director Allen to other departments and agencies of the government to collect facts of particular interest to them. Through arrangements with the Bureau of the Budget, other users can reimburse the Agency. This arrangement means that more comprehensive surveys can be run with proportionately less cost to the cooperating agencies. The first such survey is being made in seven countries in Latin America and it will provide data for a specific National Intelligence Estimate on the situation in that crucial area.

4) President Kennedy has committed himself to fully and frankly inform the American people. He has implied not that a particular report or series of reports must be automatically released or discontinued but he and his authorized spokesmen will, after considering all the evidence, report to the people through public pronouncements.

A more comprehensive research program is possible now for several reasons. Research techniques have improved considerably in recent years. Coincident with this development the Agency has established a survey research mechanism which extends to all parts of the world. Moreover, this mechanism has gained enough experience to move ahead with confidence.

A comprehensive research program cannot confirm or revolutionize the information program in a single year. A build-up is necessary. In three years, however, a comprehensive research program could go a long way toward guiding, supplying, and evaluating the information program.

This program can enable us to know more about the basic aspirations of the people we are trying to reach. It can give us concrete indicators of the current climate of opinion. With this basic knowledge, it can determine the target "influentials" we have to work through and it can tell us the most effective communications channels to use. Finally the program of the future will provide more facts, objective facts, for evaluation of Agency programs and products.

Most USIA surveys are omnibus surveys. In addition to public opinion questions, they include questions on communications habits (how they learn and from what media), on reaction to specific USIA programs and products, and other incidental information.

The new frontiers around the world are immense. Rather than reduce any intelligence-gathering mechanism, we should seize and exploit all techniques for learning more, particularly in the field of human relations.

USIA has proved the survey technique. It should be brought to full flower.

Washington, February 2, 1961.

SUBJECT
Your Draft Memorandum on "Overseas Opinion Studies"

Yours was a noble and much appreciated effort to defend our public opinion studies./2/ Unfortunately, everybody in this office who has had to deal with these problems for several years feels that neither of your alternatives is the answer to our difficulties.

We have striven for several years to classify our reports as low as possible and have succeeded in producing more and more unclassified reports, particularly in connection with Communist propaganda. But it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to try to "sanitize" many of the most essential reports we produce. Trying to keep two sets of books creates more problems than it solves.

We have also carefully considered the possibility of releasing only the figures in public opinion polls. But this also creates more problems than it solves. The bare figures can lead to gross misinterpretation and if we try to produce even a few brief paragraphs of interpretation, we are still releasing an official governmental interpretation.

I think we have to maintain the position that our public opinion estimates are in the same category as all of the other intelligence estimates of the intelligence community, and that the administration, to fulfill its commitment to fully and frankly inform the American people, should utilize the information it gets from all intelligence data--not just the necessarily fragmentary and ephemeral insights of a particular poll, useful as it may be--to inform the people through public preannouncements. I don't think the administration can ever give in completely to the "right to know" crusade of the Fourth Estate which implies that all governmental documents should be subject to public scrutiny.

This IRI stand does not mean that this public opinion data can never be published. Following the precedent established by the State Department in its publication of the historic record of our foreign relations, we can make this material available after its sensitivity ends, and after the interest centers on the data itself rather than its relation to some other issue. We can also release certain data to certain research organizations for unattributed use, and it might also be used on appropriate occasions in testimony before Congressional committees.

For a fuller exposition of our views on the subject, I call to your attention the memorandum and the attachment, the "Prestige Polls" issue, which I sent to Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson and to you yesterday.

Also there are several inaccuracies in your memorandum. For example, the first sentence is an overstatement. Given funds we could in fact make surveys in almost all countries around the world, outside the Curtain, except in a few countries where the political situation is in turmoil. In the last paragraph the third survey that you mentioned is a 7-nation study in Latin America rather than a 16-nation study. However, the number was limited to 7 only because of the fund limitation.

Washington, February 7, 1961.

We propose to discontinue the use of foreign public opinion polls as such because (1) we do not want to give the impression abroad or at home that U.S. foreign policy is determined on a "popularity" basis, and (2) we question their value in view of the time lag between taking the polls and using them as a basis for action.

USIA's need is for political intelligence, based primarily on CIA reports and field interviews with political, business, labor, educational and other opinion leaders and only secondarily on public opinion sampling. To protect our sources, and assure their continuing usefulness, these Preoccupation Analyses would be classified and not made public.

Edward R. Murrow/2/

Approved/3/
Disapproved

Washington, March 3, 1961.

MEMORANDUM TO
USIA--Mr. Edward R. Murrow
P--Mr. Roger W. Tubby
CU--Mr. Philip M. Coombs
C--Mr. George C. McGhee

I have already spoken with Roger Tubby and with Ed Murrow at the Thursday Luncheon/2/ of the crying need to improve public understanding of the US abroad. It seems to me we must review quickly the question of how we wish to portray ourselves, our society, our policies, and the motivations behind our major programs and consider how to correct many existing impressions abroad of American life and purpose. New techniques and procedures should be devised for improving our public relations efforts covering not only what we say but how we say it. The Thursday Luncheon was in agreement as to the importance of going ahead with this project with Ed Murrow taking the lead./3/ I would appreciate it, therefore, if you together would give it your early attention and keep me informed.

CB

Washington, undated.

Dear Ed,

This is to confirm our several conversations regarding the role of USIA and its relationship to me and the State Department.

1. Organizationally, there is no change. USIA as presently constituted remains an independent agency, reporting directly to me. I have charged the State Department with the responsibility of providing policy guidance to you and other agencies dealing in foreign affairs.

2. The State Department will continue to direct the Exchange-of-Persons and Cultural Presentations programs. Overseas, USIA will continue to operate these programs under the direction of the Chief of Mission. On matters dealing with these programs your Public Affairs Officers and their Cultural Affairs staffs should report directly to the State Department through State channels. You and Assistant Secretary Coombs, and your respective staffs, must work together closely and harmoniously so this joint enterprise may have maximum effectiveness.

3. I consider you one of my principal advisors, with a special concern and competence in assessing the psychological factors dealing with foreign affairs./2/ As such, I want you to participate when appropriate in the development of foreign policies and programs.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy/3/

Washington, April 22, 1961.

If USIA is to have maximum effectiveness as the psychological instrument of U.S. foreign policy, our media output must be more responsive to policy direction and emphasis, and faster and more flexible than heretofore. This requires the closest coordination of all media efforts. I have asked IOP to undertake this responsibility and have appointed Mr. Edgar D. Brooke, a senior Career Foreign Service Officer, as Director of Media Content. He reports directly to the Deputy Director of Policy and Plans.

Specifically, our purposes are:

1. To define the themes which media should convey and the subjects they should cover in their world-wide output, and to establish priorities among them.

2. To synthesize Area requirements for media output to best meet overall field needs.

3. To organize detailed programming of media efforts on behalf of priority themes to assure desired emphasis and appropriate division of responsibility.

4. To assure policy control of media output through continuing review.

1. Themes and Subjects

a. IOP, in consultation with the Areas, shall develop a definitive list of themes to be conveyed and subjects to be covered in world-wide output, and shall recommend to the Director which themes and subjects should be given priority.

b. IOP, working with the Areas and IRI, shall keep abreast of U.S. policy developments, field needs, and attitudes of key audiences, and shall revise the Agency's themes, subjects and priorities accordingly.

c. IOP shall provide the media with these approved lists of priority themes and subjects, and policy guidance on their handling.

2. Planning and Programming

a. The media shall periodically provide IOP with their plans for production and acquisition of major items for world-wide use. ("Major items" shall be defined by IOP in consultation with the media.) IOP shall continuously review these plans to assure conformity with current national policy and Agency priorities.

b. IOP shall organize joint planning by the media to assure that world-wide output supports priority themes and that there is appropriate division of responsibility among the media for each theme.

3. Policy Control

a. In production of major items, the media shall provide drafts, scripts, or rough-cuts to IOP for policy review in time to permit changes if necessary.

b. IOP shall spot-check other output to assure conformity with policy.

4. Applicability

a. These procedures shall apply primarily to media output intended for more than one Area. Present procedures for servicing individual posts and for guidance covering output for a single geographic area are not altered by this memorandum.

b. The present fast news guidance procedures are not altered by this memorandum.

There is no intention to interpose a barrier between media chiefs and my deputies and myself. Rather, we seek to insure that all media are used with maximum effectiveness and that they are consistently and immediately responsive to policy decisions by the Government and program decisions of this Agency.

In this effort I ask your unstinting cooperation.

Edward R. Murrow

Washington, undated.

AREAS OF CONFLICT

1. In programming, the principal problem caused by the existence of several U.S. broadcasting stations each with a different mission is that overseas listeners cannot always be certain to which they are listening. There have been many reports in recent years, from our embassies, refugees, and other sources, that many listeners in the USSR and the satellites frequently are unable to distinguish between VOA and RFE-RL. All three are known to be U.S.-supported so it is understandable that these listeners often do not attempt to make a distinction. The credibility--or lack thereof--of one U.S. radio tends to rub off on the others. This is also true, but to a lesser extent, with respect to VOA and VUNC broadcasts to Korea and the Chinese mainland. AFRTS broadcasts also are confused in some countries with VOA English transmissions. It can be argued, of course, that it is desirable to have more than one U.S. radio available to listeners, each designed for a different segment of the audience.

2. In the case of AFRTS there is a possibility that the relatively large-scale use of frequencies and filling of the airwaves with a foreign language causes people to resent the presence of U.S. troops. Such broadcasting undoubtedly makes the presence of the troops more visible to a larger section of the population. This can be both good and bad. These issues are somewhat similar to those raised by the ostentatiousness of PX's.

3. Frequency Usage. Frequencies for international broadcasting are becoming an increasingly more difficult resource to obtain. Particularly in the high frequency spectrum, the outlook is very bleak because of the fact that the total amount of useful spectrum space is decreasing considerably while at the same time new broadcasting services are increasing. VOA could use part of the spectrum space now used by RFE and RL. From the standpoint of delivering a U.S. message to the world, their use of these frequencies is inefficient since their targets are limited to only a few countries. Their use of the frequencies makes them unusable by others over a much wider geographical area; in addition since RFE and RL are always jammed even neighboring frequencies are interfered with.

The operation of AFRTS stations overseas also adds to the frequency problem. In Germany for example, AFN uses several powerful 100 KW transmitters on several desirable medium wave frequencies. These frequencies would be very valuable to VOA, for example, which has only one mediumwave frequency for its relay station in Munich. The German stations also would like very much to have use of one or more of these frequencies and may some day demand them back. Possibly we would be better off by arranging for VOA to have one of these frequencies and the Germans the rest . . . before we are forced to give them all back. U.S. willingness to give up one or more of these frequencies now night even be used as the "Quid" for extending or enlarging our VOA agreement with the German government.

The use of frequencies for AFRTS, particularly those with high power, becomes increasingly difficult to justify to international conferences working on frequency availability.

4. Interference. Because of the band crowding which is greatly increased by the large RFE and RL use of frequencies, there is considerably less than desirable separation between stations. Because of this, RFE and RL cause interference to VOA transmissions. VOA could utilize the same number of transmitters and frequencies without this detrimental effect because it has a much wider target area and could therefore plan the frequency usage so as not to cause itself this interference.

5. Jamming. RFE and RL attract a great deal of jamming, much of which spills over and jams VOA programs which are not otherwise jammed. Permanent jammers can be set up efficiently on RFE and RL frequencies to cover their limited target area. VOA usage of a frequency to widely separated areas makes the problem of jamming much more difficult since many more jammers are required to work on a given number of transmitters and frequencies.

Every time we bring up the subject of Communist jamming (either at the International Telecommunications Union, the United Nations or directly with the Russians), they counter-challenge by accusing the United States of broadcasting "evil propaganda broadcasts." While we have always pointed out that the Voice of America broadcasts do not fall into the category they describe, they immediately make reference to the broadcasts of RL and RFE. We claim to have no control over the broadcasts of RFE and RL, but this is not believed by many countries of the world. Up until now, our attempts to condemn Communist jamming have always ended in a stalemate. We attack the Russians for jamming us and they counter-attack by claiming that we are directing broadcasts of an inflammatory nature to them (and the broadcasts they usually refer to are RL and RFE).

In 1950 the UNGA condemned both sides by stating that both jamming and inflammatory propaganda broadcasts should cease. It is very difficult for us to take a strong position against jamming on the one hand and defend the broadcasts of RL and RFE on the other.

6. International Conferences. The existence of RFE and RL are becoming more embarrassing to handle at international conferences concerning broadcasting and telecommunications regulation. It is obvious to a great many of the members of these conferences that these two radio operations are U.S. government supported, and yet explanation of the need for these operations is very difficult for anyone to give. In conferences dealing with the problems of frequency shortage, interference, attempts to find useful spectrum for the new and developing countries, etc., explanation of these operations, which use such big chunks of the bands, is difficult, and results in weakening the U.S. position, since it leaves the impression of something in which the U.S. is deeply involved but is not willing to admit or explain.

7. Host Agreements. Another way in which RFE and RL cause some difficulty to VOA is in the matter of agreements with host governments. RFE and RL are able to make agreements of a type which would not be permitted for VOA, because they do not have the same restrictions on expenditures or other terms. This makes it difficult for VOA to obtain satisfactory agreements wherever the host is familiar with the RFE or RL arrangements.

8. AFRTS Use of VOA Facilities. VOA provides AFRTS with transmission facilities for the broadcast of AFRTS programs from the U.S. to overseas locations and, in one instance, for relay of the programs abroad. The service to AFRTS amounts to 79:45 transmitter hours daily--or 9% of VOA transmitter usage--and is absorbed in the VOA budget with no reimbursement from AFRTS.

If prorated as a part of the overall VOA network costs, the value of the AFRTS transmissions would be approximately $386,000 annually. However, the savings to VOA if the AFRTS utilization of our facilities should be terminated would be only about $85,000. Obviously separate AFRTS transmitting facilities would be more expensive.

In addition to the daily AFRTS schedule, VOA facilities are furnished to AFRTS on an ad hoc basis for the coverage of special events, mainly sports. We comply with AFRTS requests for facilities on such occasions whenever it is possible to do so without serious harm to our own operations.

Since our facilities do not now provide the flexibility we require for our own purposes, the carrying of AFRTS affects our program decisions, limiting the diversity of our programs.

It should be mentioned that VOA and AFRTS work together to some extent in the program area. The degree of cooperation varies from area to area, depending upon the need and the personnel involved.

Washington, June 8, 1961.

SUBJECT
An Effective Countertheme to "Peaceful Coexistence"

In the period since early 1956 the Soviets have transformed the concept and phrase, "peaceful coexistence," into a useful political tool by assiduous and continuous propagation at all levels of the government and party apparatus. They have gained abroad a substantial measure of acceptance of this concept as a legitimate objective, not only of their foreign policy but of other countries. It appears as such in repeated joint communiqués of the Soviet Union and other countries and all too frequently in the speeches and conversations of leading political figures, particularly but not exclusively, from the uncommitted countries.

We have attempted to combat it by pointing out both the hypocrisy and true meaning of its major tenets and by indicating that it is nothing more than a Soviet rationalization for using every measure of struggle against the free world except nuclear warfare. Toward this end we have made occasional public speeches and have instructed our posts abroad to disseminate our views of it. This has been manifestly inadequate. In the field of propaganda one simply can not beat something with nothing.

We have needed a single, simple countertheme if we are to do the job. After a long study of the possible alternatives, we have concluded that "peaceful world community" is the most effective phrase we can find. Although this phrase seems to embody the essence of our basic foreign objectives, we recognize that neither it nor any other single phrase will magically accomplish our purposes. If, however, we devote the same degree of attention and effort to it that the Soviets give to "peaceful coexistence," we should be able to invest it with meaningful content, achieve an increasing measure of understanding of the difference between our and the Soviet concept and have some success in associating other countries with our view. "Peaceful world community" also helps us in our efforts to emphasize that "general and complete disarmament" is not an end in itself but an important component of a larger aim. John McCloy quite independently used the exact phrase for that purpose in his conversation with Gromyko. USIA is instructing all its media to employ the term whenever it is appropriate.

If you approve of this phrase and of its employment in the manner indicated, we will give some thought as to how it can be most auspiciously launched.

Dean Rusk

Edward R. Murrow

Washington, June 19, 1961.

SUBJECT
The Rusk-Murrow Memorandum on "An Effective Countertheme to 'Peaceful Coexistence'"

The attached memorandum for the President from Dean Rusk and Ed Murrow proposes that we attempt to combat the Soviet propaganda emphasis on "peaceful coexistence" by developing the countertheme of "peaceful world community."/2/ USIA has apparently already instructed its people to employ the term whenever it is appropriate./3/ I am not convinced by this memorandum; and, before it is taken up with the President, I would welcome your views on the matter.

Obviously a new propaganda phrase is not going to solve our problems. In any case, I doubt whether this phrase is the right one for the simple reason that it does not do what it is supposed to do--that is, it does not establish an "understanding of the difference between our and the Soviet concept." The heart of that difference, I would have thought, lies in the question of human dignity and freedom--and this is not immediately suggested by the proposed phrase. If one were to ask Khrushchev whether he was against a "peaceful world community," he would of course reply--and truthfully in his terms--that this is exactly what he is working day and night to bring about. "Peaceful world community" and "peaceful coexistence" do not constitute a meaningful antithesis.

I am informed also by Roger Tubby and Philip Stern of State that the phrase "peaceful world community" presents tricky problems in translation. In many languages, it will come out, when translated, very close to "peaceful coexistence." In Russian, I understand, the words for "peaceful" and "world" are identical, which would make our proposed slogan very clumsy indeed (mirnoye mirnoye obschchestvo). Also "community" is hard to render; in many languages, it will come out as "village" or, if transliterated, will be hard to distinguish from "communism."

I share the Tubby-Stern view that "world of free choice" would be a preferable phrase. "World of free choice" suggests an immediate antithesis: the pluralistic world vs. the monolithic world. The phrase implies human dignity, political freedom, self help, cultural independence, etc. It should strike a particularly responsive chord in the underdeveloped world where nations and individuals probably care much more at the moment about freedom for national self-assertion than about a peaceful world community. Since free choice is one thing the Communists can't bear and always eradicate at the first opportunity, Khrushchev would be much harder put to claim that he too wanted a world of free choice. Moreover, the phrase apparently presents no very serious translation problems.

Let me quote from Dean Rusk's eloquent statement on May 31 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "We seek, above all, a world of free choice in which a great diversity of nations, each faithful to its own traditions and its own genius, will learn to respect the ground rules of human survival. We do not wish to make the world over in our own image-and we will not accept that the world be made over in the image of any society or dogmatic creed. Against the world of coercion, we affirm the world of choice. We believe that the revolution of human liberty will never come to an end."/4/ This seems to me to be the main point.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

Washington, June 24, 1961.

SUBJECT
The Nuclear Test Ban Issue

At your request my colleagues and I have undertaken careful study of the impact of the nuclear test ban issue. We have drawn on suggestions by the Disarmament Administration, Ambassador Galbraith and Mr. Chayes.

We believe this issue is a key, conceivably the key, to our Cold War posture in the coming year. Unless we persuade our allies and the uncommitted nations of the rightness of our course in this respect, we stand in grave danger of losing their support on other issues, notably Berlin.

Whether we decide to resume testing or not, world opinion must be persuaded that:

1. The United States has done everything in its power to obtain a treaty banning nuclear testing.

2. The Soviet Union does not want a test-ban treaty and thus has not negotiated in good faith.

3. If and when the United States resumes testing, it is because the irreducible minimum security needs of the free world including the neutrals require it.

To achieve these psychological objectives, it is essential we begin now on a massive, three-phase information effort. Abroad, this is a highly emotional issue. As Ambassador Galbraith said in his memorandum to the President: "A resumption of testing would cause us the gravest difficulties in Asia, Africa and elsewhere . . . The issue between ourselves and the Soviets at Geneva are abstract and poorly understood . . . If we are the first to test that will be the one noticeable and noticed thing. Those who are unfriendly to us will have a field day on an issue where they can arouse a great deal of popular passion."

Our task, then, is to meet this emotional issue with the patient repetition of reasonable arguments cast in emotional terms. We have six months--the time it will take the military to prepare significant weapons tests. Specifically we propose:

1. Ambassador Dean returns to Geneva. If he does not, our stated willingness to go the "last mile" to obtain a treaty will not be credible in the eyes of the world.

2. The President makes a major "peace" speech in which he reviews U.S. and free world efforts toward disarmament since 1945, making the test-ban treaty the symbol of these efforts. He calls on the Soviets to put the world's fears at rest.

3. A few hours before the President delivers this address, our Ambassadors call on the heads of government to whom they are accredited and give them copies of his message. Our Chiefs of Mission use the occasion to brief the foreign leaders on the US-UK draft treaty, and our position in general, in greater detail than the President does in his speech.

4. Dean flies from Geneva to certain "neutral" capitals (e.g., Delhi, Cairo, Djakarta) to assist in briefing foreign leaders. Certain U.S. scientists are employed to brief their counterparts abroad.

5. USIA undertakes a massive information campaign to stimulate interest in and support for our position among world opinion leaders. Themes: U.S. determination to reach agreement, contrasted with Soviet intransigeance--e.g. insistence on Troika and refusal to accept reasonable inspection. Importance of test-ban treaty as first step toward disarmament; without the former, the latter is unobtainable. If peace is to be preserved, the Soviets must give up some of their irrational secrecy which is unworthy of a modern nation. What are they hiding, secret nuclear tests?

6. CIA covertly: (a) Launches a signature campaign by indigenous groups appealing to the Soviets to sign the US-UK draft treaty; (b) plants rumors in the foreign press that earthquakes, TNT explosions, etc., in the USSR may actually be secret nuclear tests.

7. Get one or more neutral nations to introduce a resolution at next autumn's U.N. General Assembly session calling on the atomic powers to sign a workable test-ban treaty with adequate controls. Stevenson and staff tirelessly press our case in the corridors.

1. If the President determines that free world security absolutely requires resumption of testing should we fail to obtain a treaty from the Soviets (and this is a big if), preparations should be as secret and low-key as possible so as not to hurt the credibility of our agreement-seeking posture. There should not be a White House announcement; when the story leaks, the AEC confirms we are making contingency preparations pending a decision.

2. If our information campaign, our pressure on world leaders and efforts at the U.N. fail to budge the Soviets, the President and Mr. Macmillan make a final, solemn public plea to Khrushchev. Again, our Ambassadors in the field personally brief heads of government on this appeal.

3. USIA obtains widest possible dissemination and discussion of the Kennedy-Macmillan appeal. Themes: Free world security and survival requires either an effective test ban or resumption of testing. The Soviets may now be testing in secret. The Chinese may be behind Soviet intransigeance.

1. If Khrushchev remains adamant, the President and Macmillan simultaneously announce their decision to resume testing, emphasizing that it is being done solely because free world security absolutely requires it. The history of our efforts is reviewed. The two leaders make it clear that we will not test in the atmosphere, and thus there will be no fallout.

2. The President and Macmillan write personal letters to all heads of government, for delivery by our Ambassadors just before the US-UK announcement, disclosing their decision and repeating the reasons for it.

3. The President, Mr. Rusk and Ambassador Stevenson-in carefully-spaced statements to keep our position before the public over a period of weeks-restate that position. USIA obtains widest possible dissemination of these statements.

4. Foreign correspondents and observers, including Soviets, are invited to witness the tests so that the public may be reassured about our no-fallout safety precautions. Worldwide scientific opinion is mobilized in support of this contention.

5. Shortly after weapons tests (but only after, because security is the only valid reason for resuming testing), we carry out tests for peaceful uses of nuclear power--AEC's "Project Plowshare." USIA gives widest possible dissemination to this project which seeks to utilize atomic power for digging harbors, generating electricity, extracting oil, etc.

6. After our first tests, the President reaffirms the U.S. desire for a test-ban treaty and invites the Soviets to resume negotiations.

Edward R. Murrow/2/

Washington, July 14, 1961.

MEMORANDUM FOR
Secretary of State
Director, U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT
An Effective Countertheme to "Peaceful Coexistence"

The President completely endorses the effort to combat the Soviet propaganda trap contained in the phrase "peaceful coexistence" by the use of symbolic language that expresses our view of the nature of the conflict in which we are engaged. The statements by the Secretary of State before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and, more recently, at the Press Club,/2/ have provided the language we need to do the job. He has expressed the conflict as being between the "world of free choice and free cooperation" and "the world of coercion."

The President has requested that immediate steps be taken to give this formulation the widespread currency and usage that would make it an effective countertheme to the Soviet formula. It is requested that the facilities available to the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency be employed in this effort./3/ This request is also being passed along to the appropriate members of the White House Staff for action.

McGeorge Bundy/4/

Washington, July 19, 1961.

Please get the word around the Agency that we are to drop from our lexicon the words "under-developed countries," "undeveloped countries," "backward countries," and any similar terms.

As substitutes, IRI reports that the words which translate the best in all languages and are positive in their connotations are "developing countries" and "modernizing countries."

"Emerging countries" is not considered to be good,/2/ and the use of "new" before "developing" and "modernizing" is confusing in translation in most languages.

When your shop has time, I would like to have an updated "Guidance on Preferred Terminology" prepared which would propose positive words to be used as substitutes for such terms as "East-West," "Cold War," "pro-West," "pro-American country" and many others which are misleading, inaccurate and not in our best interests. All new suggestions should be checked out for a worldwide translatability.

Edward R. Murrow/3/

Washington, July 24,1961.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Director, U.S. Information Agency
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Policy Guidance and Preemption of U.S. Government-Controlled Broadcasting

After consultation with the heads of Departments and agencies concerned, the President has approved the following:

1. The Department of State shall provide foreign policy guidance to all international radio broadcasting and television stations controlled by U.S. Government agencies. This includes stations of the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service and the Voice of the United Nations Command in Korea, operated by the Department of Defense, and those stations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] influenced or financed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. This guidance shall be relayed through the U.S. Information Agency, which will provide supplemental information policy guidance as required. The Director, U.S. Information Agency shall establish appropriate procedures for conveying guidance.

3. The Director, U.S. Information Agency is authorized to preempt time on any of these radio and television stations for special programs when he deems it to be in the national interest. The Director, U.S. Information Agency shall establish appropriate procedures for arranging for such special programs.

4. Every effort shall be made to avoid public awareness of the relationship between the various ostensibly non-governmental broadcasting stations and the U.S. Government.

McGeorge Bundy/2/

Washington, July 24, 1961.

SUBJECT
Special Program Emphasis

Until further notice, Washington media and field posts will focus attention on, and give special emphasis to, persuading our audiences that:

1. Despite Soviet intransigeance, the United States is doing everything in its power to obtain a treaty banning nuclear testing, the first, vital step toward general disarmament. (Test Ban)

2. Soviet efforts to abrogate their agreements and deprive West Berliners of their freedom threaten the security and freedom of people everywhere. Under no circumstances, therefore, will the U.S. abandon Free Berlin. (Berlin)

3. An effective United Nations which has sufficient authority to act in crisis situations is indispensable to the security of small nations. Knowing this, the Soviets are seeking to paralyze the U.N. Secretariat with an unworkable "troika" arrangement. (United Nations)

4. The Sino-Soviet Bloc, despite lip-service support to emerging nationalism, is implacably opposed to independent nationalist movements and genuine neutrality. Man's best hope is in "a world of free choice" such as sought by the U.S., not a "world of coercion" as favored by the Communists. (Free Choice)

5. Modernization of newly-developing nations can best be achieved through democratic, pragmatic political and economic development consistent with the traditions, character and aspirations of a people. (Modernization)

These areas of emphasis are not intended to supplant all other Agency output. We simply are seeking to focus adequate media and field attention for a period of time on subjects currently of overriding importance. I have been specifically charged by the President with the task of undertaking major efforts on items (1) and (2).

The duration of these efforts will vary. There cannot be universal and equal emphasis, either by all media or in all countries. I will expect IOP (in the person of Mr. Brooke, Director of Media Content), working with the Area offices and the media, to develop appropriate emphasis and application of these efforts in the various countries in which we operate, along the lines set forth in my memorandum to the Staff of April 22./2/ IOP will provide detailed policy guidances to the media and to the field in support of these efforts.

I ask your full cooperation and support.

Washington, August 31, 1961.

SUBJECT
Considerations Regarding Nuclear Testing

1. What is now to be tested is not so much nuclear devices as the will of free men to remain free.

2. Those who today urge you to resume testing immediately will tomorrow contend that the decision to do so was merely another belated reaction to Soviet action.

3. What is required is time. We can within weeks achieve the position of the last best hope of freedom, sanity and survival. This can be done not only by the exposure of Soviet duplicity, but also by playing heavily upon the fears of hazards to health and future generations.

4. No further public statements should be made during the Belgrade Conference. Our people there should be instructed to say quietly that our arsenal is adequate to any demands that may be made upon it and that the President is considering the advisability of giving Khrushchev one final chance to draw back.

5. There should be no indication of consultation with our allies lest this be interpreted as a sign of vacillation or indecision.

6. Steps should be taken to bring the question before the U. N. General Assembly, where in the course of a roaring debate the Russians can be hoist on a troicka of their own making, Berlin, colonialism and nuclear testing.

7. I have heard no arguments from the military or scientific community to indicate a delay of a few weeks in the resumption of testing would endanger the national security. This time, if properly employed, can be used to isolate the Communist Bloc, frighten the satellites and the uncommitted, pretty well destroy the Ban the Bomb movement in Britain, and might even induce sanity into the SANE nuclear policy group in this country.

8. During this interval, special effort should be made to arrange for an Administration spokesman to appear on television and radio, not to make statements of policy but rather to explain why precipitate action is unnecessary and unwise and why this country should not, by the immediate imitation of Soviet tactics, throw away this opportunity to consolidate its leadership of the non-communist world.

Edward R. Murrow/2/

Washington, October 30, 1961.

[Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA Files: FRC 68 A 1415, FOIA/Classified Folder. Confidential. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

Washington, November 1, 1961.

Ambassador Tuthill, our permanent representative to the OECD, has come up with a proposal which I believe will have great impact not only among the Western European countries but more particularly in the uncommitted countries of the world. It is an idea which I believe will interest the President.

As you know, the OECD will hold its first meeting on the Ministerial level in Paris on November 16-17. This will give Western European nations the opportunity to review the economic success they have achieved over the last 12 years as a result of the cooperative efforts symbolized by the OEEC, the Marshall Plan, the Common Market, Steel and Coal Community, the European Payments Union, etc. In summarizing these achievements, it can be shown that the economic vitality of the West is far greater under our capitalistic system than any like achievements which can be boasted by the Soviet bloc.

The second part of this proposal, which I find even more important, is that the representatives of the OECD nations would outline a vigorous economic plan for the future. They should set goals for the next five or ten years not only for their own countries but also for the aid in the development and economic progress of the less favored nations of the world./2/ Details of this plan are contained in the telegram from Ambassador Tuthill which I attach to this memorandum./3/

The time is short for obtaining the approval of all the nations involved in this plan but I think it can be done if Ambassador Tuthill is given the go ahead signal right away. He has in his hands in Paris all the necessary elements. USIA would of course be prepared to bring this story to all parts of the world as soon as the Ministerial conference had approved the plan.

Edward R. Murrow

Washington, December 5, 1961.

1. Izvestia moved your interview/2/ to the last two pages in the second of its two editions. (The first edition is primarily for street sales; subscribers get the second, which is believed to be the larger in circulation.) Khrushchev's Novosibirsk speech of November 26 on agriculture occupied practically all of pages one, two and three in the second edition.

The interview may have been read by as many as 40 million people. On a story of this great interest, Izvestia is credited with up to ten readers per copy, or roughly one out of every five citizens of the USSR.

Our experts do not believe the "debate" character of the exchange, widely commented on here, detracted from the intense interest with which readers searched your words for clues to the question of war or peace.

You may now wish to consider doing the same thing from time to time for other countries such as Poland where the American view does not get through adequately.

2. Outside the Communist Bloc, editorial comment on your Izvestia interview was largely favorable, with most editorials stressing the significance of an uncensored presentation of U.S. policies. Some European media credited the Soviets with a sincere effort to present the U.S. view. A number of Near and Far East papers strongly approved both the granting of the interview and the content; Asahi of Japan suggested an exchange of such interviews with Communist China. Three French papers, however, expressed concern over the development of bi-lateral relationships. A Cuban radio commentator charged you with lies, hypocrisy and a variety of other evils.

3. A tough Pravda editorial and a TASS dispatch on December 1 may signal intensification of the Soviet propaganda drive to keep Austria out of the Common Market. Pravda said flatly that Austrian participation would violate neutrality, and TASS equated the Market with NATO. Preliminary Austrian reaction was firm and cool, with officials taking the position that Austria must be the judge of its own neutrality.

4. The construction of our new shortwave transmitting complex near Greenville, N.C., is proceeding well, with all phases on schedule. I inspected the work last week, and was well satisfied with both the design and progress in construction. The Greenville facility will give us a capacity of 4,800 kilowatts, on eighteen transmitters, as compared with a present east-coast capacity of 1,385 kilowatts. It will provide a greatly improved signal to Africa, the Middle East, South America and Europe for direct shortwave, relay and emergency communications. The entire installation will be operational at the end of 1962.

5. More than half the British public (52 per cent) supports admission of Communist China to the United Nations, according to a Gallup survey made available to USIA. Another Gallup survey showed 42 per cent of the British people favoring representation of both Communist China and Nationalist China, 11 per cent opposed to both, 9 per cent for Nationalist China only, 9 per cent for Red China only, and 29 per cent without an opinion.

6. The Scandinavian press continues uneasy over Soviet pressures on Finland, after temporary relief over what appeared to be a solution. The conviction now is widespread throughout Scandinavia and Western Europe generally that this is only the first in a series of moves aimed at Finland.

7. Communist Bloc distribution of books and periodicals in Africa has increased markedly in 1961, according to a year-end USIA research report./3/ The countries well-penetrated include Cameroun, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Somali Republic and Zanzibar.

8. I am leaving for Paris Thursday evening for three days of discussions with my British, French and German opposite numbers in the continuing effort to harmonize our activities. I expect to be back on December 13, after a brief stop in London.

Edward R. Murrow/4/

At a Director's staff meeting in January 1962, Acting USIA Director Wilson corroborated press reports that Murrow was in Paris "with Pierre Salinger for a meeting with the Soviet press officer Karmalov concerning exchanges in television and other communications media with the USSR." (Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA Files: FRC 88 A 18, 1/1, Director's Staff Meetings/61) Henry Loomis, USIA's "media head" for broadcasting, had broached the idea of a television exchange at a USIA Director's staff meeting on March 6, 1961. He then reported that the "Soviets at last have indicated their willingness to proceed with the radio-TV exchanges provided for in the US-USSR exchange agreement." The Soviets wished to send a team to the United States in order to develop arrangements for the exchange, and Loomis felt it best for the United States to do likewise to "prevent being short-changed." (Ibid.) The exchange agreement for 1960-1961 was signed in Moscow on November 21, 1959, and entered into force on January 1, 1960. (10 UST 1934)

On February 20, 1962, Charles Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, sent a telegram on behalf of Secretary Rusk to George F. Kennan, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, expressing President Kennedy's request for Kennan's input on the Kennedy-Khrushchev television exchange, for which draft texts were supposed to be exchanged on March 8. (Telegram 878 to Belgrade, February 20; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Files, USSR, TV Exchange, 3/8/62, Box 190) Kennan responded on February 23 that the exchange's "main target will be the Soviet people" and that the President should not consider this a suitable occasion for direct personal sole-mizing [sic] with Khrushchev" but use it "to correct by skillful indirection certain impressions Soviet propagandists have endeavored to build up: namely, that we are militaristic, wedded to Cold War, averse to peaceful coexistence, animated by imperialistic designs on others and uninterested in any constructive collaborative trend on international life." (Telegram 3991 from Paris, February 23; ibid.)

In a February 21 memorandum to his brother Ted at the White House, Tom Sorensen indicated that the President would "have the same advantages in his TV appearance with Khrushchev that he had in the Nixon debates: obvious sincerity, obvious ability, obvious youth and vigor." The memorandum continued: "Questions and comments directed to Russian-speaking guides at our recent exhibits in the USSR provide a useful insight into the Soviet public's concerns and misconceptions about the U.S. and its policies. Based on this experience and the advice of our demonologists, we recommend that the President emphasize" the U.S. desire for peace, its stance on Berlin and disarmament and nuclear testing, and the "welfare base of [its] free enterprise (or mixed economy) system." (Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA Files: FRC 68 A 4933, Government Agencies, White House/62)

On the same day, Ambassador Thompson sent a telegram to Secretary Rusk, indicating that as a result of his understanding from Salinger that "Cold War themes are barred," he felt that the "target should be average Soviet citizen" for which the "problem uppermost. . . is peace. . . . Therefore suggest plus for disarmament might be one of the main themes." (Telegram 2255 from Moscow, February 21; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Files, USSR, TV Exchange 3/8/62, Box 190)

In the wake of President Kennedy's announcement of the resumption of nuclear testing on March 2, the Soviets cancelled their plans to proceed with the exchange. In response to McGeorge Bundy's inquiry as to whether the cancellation represented any personal slight by Khrushchev against the President, Charles Bohlen wrote on March 9, one day after the planned exchange: "The Soviets undoubtedly feel it would be quite incompatible at a time when Soviet propaganda was denouncing the President's speech as 'aggressive' or 'atomic blackmail' to have" the exchange. He continued that no affront could have been meant by Khrushchev in his cancellation of the event since the event was at no point official and, therefore, nothing was ever publicly retracted; the only public knowledge of the event was in the United States as a result of leaks. Bohlen also pointed to Khrushchev's desire to "bring about a Summit in Geneva," a goal not consonant with "rebuff[ing] the President." Because of these factors, Bohlen viewed the Soviets' cancellation not as petty but "quite sensible." (Ibid.)

Hans Tuch, a USIA specialist in Soviet affairs, reported to Murrow on February 27, 1963, nearly a year later, that at the conclusion of the 1962-1963 U.S.-USSR Exchange Agreement's mid-term discussions, the USIA "expressed complete dissatisfaction with Soviet performance but received no particular encouragement that they will do better." (Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA Files: FRC 72 A 5121, Field-Soviet Bloc/63) The exchange agreement was signed in Washington on March 8, 1962, and entered into force the same day. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pages 726-740.

Washington, April 24, 1962.

SUBJECT
Attribution of USIA Media Materials

Receptivity to USIA media output is nearly always greater when the output is not attributed to the Agency or the U. S. Government. I have therefore instructed our field posts not to carry USIA attribution on pamphlets, motion pictures, television shows and other media products (but excluding periodicals) except when local custom or law dictates otherwise. This rule henceforth shall also apply to media materials produced in Washington.

The posts were asked to consider attribution to credible local groups when appropriate and feasible. In Washington, you should consider attribution to appropriate U. S. groups, when feasible and useful, in the production of media materials.

An exception to this rule would be those instances when we want to make it clear that we are presenting the official viewpoint of the U. S. Government.

We must continue to distinguish between "unattributed" and "unattributable." Our materials may be "unattributed" but never "unattributable." We are willing to acknowledge, if questioned, the origin of any Agency product. My point is that we should not publicize, emphasize or otherwise call attention to the USIA-origin of our output except when necessary. Our job is not to advertise the Agency or any element thereof but to influence foreign public attitudes in furtherance of U. S. objectives.

This directive supersedes all previous instructions and guidances on this subject.

Edward R. Murrow

Washington, May 15, 1962.

SUBJECT
Psychological-Political Program

The purpose of our meeting on May 23/2/ is to provide you with a status report on the psychological-political program which you helped launch as a member of the President's ad hoc committee on this problem. I have asked Mr. William J. Jorden of my office to report to us on what is being done and what is planned in this area. He has been assigned primary responsibility for developing, coordinating and conducting programs in the psychological-political field.

He will discuss the organizational forms he has developed to carry out this function. He will also describe programs now underway or soon to be launched. Among others, these will include:

1) The positive "image" of the United States--the effort to explain to our own people and to the rest of the world what we are for, and why; to counter the impression that we know better what we oppose than what we favor; to correct the distorted image of America that has developed in many parts of the world as a result of misinformation and Communist propaganda.

2) The failures of the Soviet bloc--to expose for all to see the weaknesses and failures of the communist system; to counter the "wave of the future" propaganda line; to reveal the flaws of communist theory and Soviet practice.

A number of sub-themes fall in this broad category:

a) The Sino-Soviet split--to expose the facts of increasing dissension within the Bloc; to stimulate broad discussion of the theoretical and practical problems that bedevil the Bloc and divide Moscow and Peking; the strike at the fiction of "monolithic unity" in the Communist world.

b) Bloc agriculture--to reveal in detail the story of the huge and continuing failure of the communist system to produce enough food for its people; to destroy the fiction that collectivization provides the best pattern for less developed countries in facing their agricultural problems.

Countering short-range moves by the Communists, such as:

a) The Helsinki Youth Festival
b) The Accra Peace Assembly
c) The Moscow Conference on Peace and Disarmament

3) Future developments which we can begin now to counter or minimize, such as:

a) achievement of a nuclear capability by the Chinese Communists
b) claims or demonstrations of an anti-missile or anti-satellite capability by the Soviets

4) Promoting the flow of information to our posts abroad and, through them, to our friends and other governments and individuals.

5) Extending the breadth and depth of our contacts abroad with non-governmental groups and individuals--intellectuals, youth, labor unions, political oppositionists, etc.

Any ideas or suggestion you may have on these or other possible activities in the psychological-political field will be welcome.

George C. McGhee

Washington, July 11, 1962.

Dear Ed:

In a memorandum dated June 23 the President directed that a procedure be developed to guarantee coordination of economic and military aid agreements with foreign policy objectives before announcement of major aid actions./2/ Attached for your information, along with a copy of the President's directive, is a copy of my reply dated July 11 describing steps being taken to ensure the necessary coordination./3/

I would appreciate your cooperation and assistance in seeing that the actions of our respective departments and agencies fully meet the requirements which the President has set forth. Compliance with the President's wishes will require close cooperation between appropriate members of your staff and Assistant Secretaries of the geographic bureaus of the Department of State to whom I have assigned full responsibility in this important area. I propose therefore that members of your staff who are responsible for actions of this character which have foreign policy implications consult, when and as appropriate, with the Assistant Secretaries of this department in order to effect coordination.

If you have further thoughts on this problem, I would be glad to hear from you or to discuss it with you./4/

Sincerely,

Dean

Washington, August 15, 1962.

SUBJECT
Operation of the New Soviet Branch

The Director called media directors and others concerned to discuss with them his concept of how the new IAB should function./2/

He stated that it should become the best body of expertise on Soviet affairs in this town. It should perform useful coordination between our own branches within and other elements outside the Agency. It should as well examine what we are doing and not doing./3/

As an example, there are African students studying in Russia that call at our Embassy. They are a receptive target for information, and could be particularly useful in their travels to other European capitals and returning home. ERM suggested that if a plan could be devised in about a week specifying what to do and how much it would cost he could probably obtain money for it. But to do so he would need specifics.

Each Director was advised to stir up his own people and to get going with ideas on subjects and projects.

From his luncheon with the Russian Ambassador, ERM said the one subject that seemed most on Dobrynin's mind was American publicity about anti-Semitism in Russia. With this as a lead perhaps we could do an Ameryka magazine article on Jews in the United States or a VOA series on Jews in Latin America. This was the kind of idea ERM had in mind.

Loomis mentioned a need for personnel trained in VOA languages of broadcast. He suggested establishing a personnel plan so that language speakers could have an Agency-wide career. General concurrence.

The Director mentioned to Schmidt that he would like to see personnel with Russian background posted to Latin America, the Far East, etc. Schmidt replied it was already being done to some extent.

There was general concurrence on a need to look at personnel policies for people with language capabilities so as to attract them, develop them, and keep them.

Loomis suggested that Problems of Communism, now written for a free world audience and one of the Agency's best products, might be done in another edition aimed at Communist audiences.

Chinese relationships regarding Russia might also be exploited much more in media output.

ERM stressed the need to attempt the unorthodox. He mentioned his Dobrynin conversation in which the Ambassador said that Ameryka and USSR need more self-criticism. Murrow said he immediately offered to swap editors for one issue. Dobrynin was noncommittal. The Director commented that the idea may be good or bad but it was unorthodox and he wanted to encourage more such unorthodoxy.

It was suggested that if the bureaucracy could be relaxed to obtain funds we could have a person or persons travel for long periods of time in Bloc countries, writing articles, cutting tapes, etc. To continue this for a long period we would, however, need an overcomplement of language speakers.

Paid vacations in Russian resort areas were mentioned. An officer on salary would spend time in resorts such as Sochi and in doing so contact a wide range of Russians.

Tom Tuch's interest rose.

Russian tourists coming to the United States could be contacted and be interviewed. They are more official than tourists of other nations, and hence worth the effort of contact.

It was suggested that we could investigate Russian society, observe how well they are developing, and speculate what they might develop into. This entails telling them things about themselves which they do not know.

The necessity of cooperation with other Western European nations was mentioned.

Loomis described the dual mission of Project Larry in Liberia: we are to be both the Voice of America and the Voice of Africa. He observed that we might extend a similar mission to our Bloc broadcasts: become both the Voice of America and the Voice of Communism. This would entail relating matters such as what goes on in other Communist parties, who controls Cuba, who is on top in African Communism, etc. The Russian people have only one source of information; this would seek to give them an alternative.

The need for government coordination on visiting dignitaries was mentioned. When Udall goes to Russia with Robert Frost, or Newton Minow is approached for a television exchange with Russia, they should seek a briefing first either at USIA or State.

It was suggested that Dobrynin himself might be induced to do a VOA report to his people.

Murrow closed the meeting by observing that in a week or three he would like to see some plans and "unorthodoxy".

Robert Mayer Evans/4/

Washington, August 22, 1962.

SUBJECT
Youth Programs and Problems in 92 Countries

To tackle our problems with youth abroad, we felt it was necessary to know what is specifically "bugging them" on the country-by-country basis; what, if anything, USIA is doing about it; and what more, if anything, we can do about it.

We now have returns on a questionnaire designed to give the answers from 92 countries (out of the 101 where USIA operates), which are summarized in the attached report./2/ The findings confirm some of our previous conclusions, but also gave us some surprises. Example (on page 2): Intellectual restrictions imposed by the government do not seem to be a major source of frustration among youth, as many of us had previously believed.

The world-wide conclusions give some valuable information. We are using it and the individual country returns to recast our programs to meet insofar as possible the specific needs now identified. I shall give you some specifics in a few weeks.

Edward R. Murrow/3/

Washington, September 26, 1962.

REFERENCE
Your Memorandum of August 9, 1962/2/

We appreciate the opportunity to re-do the statement of the mission of the U.S. Information Agency. Our proposed restatement, a substitute for NSC 165/1-10/24/53, is attached./3/

I agree it would be desirable if the President issued it, rather than making it a National Security Council document.

We do not think it necessary for part of the statement to be unclassified, as was the case in 1953./4/ We no longer need a statement to hang on the wall; rather we desire a realistic, meaningful definition of the Agency's mission for internal use within the Government.

Edward R. Murrow

Washington, November 30, 1962.

Dear Arthur:

Don Wilson is out of the country, and I am replying to your letter of November 16 on Defense Department accreditation of USIA representatives./2/

I am surprised at your equation of USIA representatives with commercial news media correspondents, particularly since you well understand the use of news and public affairs as "weapons" of diplomacy and power. It would be more accurate to equate our representatives with uniformed and civilian staff of the Defense Department who work with the commercial media people.

USIA representatives are government officials, not "correspondents" as the meaning is applied to representatives of the Washington Post or CBS. We are not in the news business as such, but in the business of furthering U.S. objectives through information activities abroad. The importance of our activities in supporting the national interest was re-emphasized in the Cuban affair.

We seek Defense Department accreditation and authorization for travel on military carriers only when successful carrying out of our mission requires us to do so. I hope, therefore, that you will not treat us "on the same basis as a non-government newsmen" but on the basis of our common desire to further the government's interests. This to me means taking care of our needs (along with yours) first, not last.

Sincerely,

Edward R. Murrow/3/

Washington, December 5, 1962.

Dear Ed:

Your letter of November 30,/2/ has delivered me into the "hands of your enemies," friendly ones that is, in my shop.

They have argued from the outset exactly as you do, that USIA representatives are not "correspondents" in the sense that representatives of the Washington Post or CBS are, to use your own examples. They agree wholeheartedly with you, and always have, that USIA men are not in the news business but are in the business, as you say, "of furthering United States objectives through information activities abroad."

Under these standards they are not entitled to the accreditation, which you had wanted them to have. As you well know, accreditation intended for commercial newsmen cannot be extended to government employees except in the lenient formula I devised for your people.

If you want me to rule that USIA representatives are not to be equated with the non-government news media representatives for the purpose of accreditation that will make you a hero among my staff. It will confirm their conviction I was wrong all along and they will happily dis-accredit USIA men.

What I have been trying to do is make life easier for the USIA reporters with whom I have worked abroad and for whom I have great admiration. Because of that, I have insisted they be accredited, a policy I will change if you desire.

Ever sincerely,

Arthur

Washington, December 19, 1962.

SUBJECT
President's "Year-Ender" Briefing

We understand that the President again this year will brief selected correspondents on a background basis, covering events of the past 12 months. Following is a run-down of USIA's year for the President's possible use:

In 1962, the U.S. Information Agency made significant contributions in support of U.S. policies in the Cuban crisis, on the U.S. resumption of nuclear testing, the Berlin issue, and the challenge of space.

U.S. policies and actions in the Cuban affair, and the evidence on which they were based, were more thoroughly documented for foreign audiences everywhere in the world than any other issue in peacetime history.

This was accomplished by the heaviest possible use of all media and concentration by our posts abroad on local placement and face-to-face persuasion. It included round-the-clock broadcasting in Spanish to Cuba and Latin America, the first use of commercial U.S. stations to supplement our own transmitters, and the first tactical employment of a USIA air-transportable 50-kilowatt transmitter. We massed 52 transmitters to penetrate Soviet jamming and successfully tell the people facts on Cuba which they got from their own media much later or not at all.

The success of the Cuban campaign was due in large measure to our direct participation in the NSC Executive Committee.

USIA generated wide understanding of and support for our need to resume nuclear testing, and opposition abroad was surprisingly mild when the new tests were announced.

Continuing intense coverage of space events and the world exhibition tour of the Glenn capsule did much to improve our position in the space race.

We continued to develop support for our position on Berlin, one of five priority issues of U.S. foreign policy. The others, which we gave heavy, all-media emphasis throughout the year are a world of free choice vs. a world of coercion, a strong United Nations executive, safeguarded disarmament, and modernization of developing nations as a means of evolution in freedom.

There were these other important developments during the year:

USIA's basic build-up in Africa and Latin America was nearly completed. In Africa we now have posts in 33 of the 35 independent countries, including a substantial program in Algeria. In Latin America we increased our missions from 35 to 45 major cities, and we now have 29 student affairs officers and nine labor information officers at work there.

The first half of the 4,500-kilowatt Greenville, North Carolina, shortwave transmitter complex went on the air.

USIA films had such a marked increase in quality that popular and Congressional demand caused us to make two of them (on Mrs. Kennedy's trip to India and Pakistan) available for showing to the American people.

The number of people being taught English by USIA in classrooms reached a quarter of a million. "Let's Learn English," a series of 130 television teaching films, has been placed in 33 countries on 55 stations with an audience of 80 million. Audience response is typified in Austria, where 10,000 copies of the textbook were sold out the day after the series began, and in Japan where 60,000 copies of the final examination were distributed.

About 430 U.S. corporations are distributing USIA materials on important foreign policy issues to their 8,000 representatives abroad, almost all of them Americans, on a continuing basis.

For the first time in history, USIA has enjoyed a consistently good domestic press.

Among our remaining problems:

We have not yet succeeded in finally negotiating rights for broadcasting sites in the Eastern or Western Mediterranean, the Philippines, and Thailand--but are hopeful of success.

We have not been able to mount a fully adequate book program in Latin America because of the loss of an anticipated supplemental appropriation, although our book translation and publishing program there is double what it was a year ago.

Edward R. Murrow/2/

Washington, January 25, 1963.

The mission of the United States Information Agency is to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives by (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations, and (b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs and official statements.

The influencing of attitudes is to be carried out by overt use of the various techniques of communication--personal contact, radio broadcasting, libraries, book publication and distribution, press, motion pictures, television, exhibits, English-language instruction, and others. In so doing, the Agency shall be guided by the following:

1. Individual country programs should specifically and directly support country and regional objectives determined by the President and set forth in official policy pronouncements, both classified and unclassified.

2. Agency activities should (a) encourage constructive public support abroad for the goal of a "peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others;" (b) identify the United States as a strong, democratic, dynamic nation qualified for its leadership of world efforts toward this goal, and (c) unmask and counter hostile attempts to distort or frustrate the objectives and policies of the United States. These activities should emphasize the ways in which United States policies harmonize with those of other peoples and governments, and those aspects of American life and culture which facilitate sympathetic understanding of United States policies.

The advisory function is to be carried out at various levels in Washington, and within the Country Team at United States diplomatic missions abroad. While the Director of the United States Information Agency shall take the initiative in offering counsel when he deems it advisable, the various departments and agencies should seek such counsel when considering policies and programs which may substantially affect or be affected by foreign opinion. Consultation with the United States Information Agency is essential when programs affecting communications media in other countries are contemplated.

United States Information Agency staffs abroad, acting under the supervision of the Chiefs of Mission, are responsible for the conduct of overt public information, public relations and cultural activities--i.e. those activities intended to inform or influence foreign public opinion-for agencies of the United States Government except for Commands of the Department of Defense./2/

Where considered advisable, and except for direct international broadcasts by the Voice of America, the United States Information Agency is authorized to communicate with other peoples without attribution to the United States Government on matters for which attribution could be assured by the Government if necessary. The United States Information Agency shall, when appropriate, coordinate such activities with the Central Intelligence Agency./3/

John Kennedy/4/

Washington, February 5, 1963.

Until such time as the Administration shall have formulated new policies in regard to the problems created by de Gaulle's current actions and attitudes toward the Common Market and the Atlantic Alliance, USIA plans to operate from the following position as suggested by Ambassador Bohlen's telegram 3098 of February 3,/2/ namely:

a) To move steadily ahead with the promoting of the Atlantic Alliance, the establishment of a NATO nuclear force, and the reduction of trade barriers, without attempting to push France into any of these projects, but also without closing the door to her participation in whatever degree she desires;

b) To exploit French fears of being isolated by offering our friends knowledge of programs which they will find more in their long-term interest than French proposals;

c) To support the efforts of European countries to consolidate their strength through the Common Market; and

d) To refrain from harsh or discourteous attitudes toward France and maintain toward her a position of persuasive dignity. The French though sometimes volatile in the extreme are basically a people to whom logic has great appeal.

Edward R. Murrow/3/

Washington, February 28, 1963.

SUBJECT
USIA Policies on Handling of Public Opinion Poll Data

Effective immediately, we will observe the following policies with respect to the handling of foreign public opinion polls sponsored by this Agency.

1. Foreign public opinion polls bearing the classification "Confidential" and the contracts under which such polls were taken will, upon request by the Chairman of the appropriate Committees or Subcommittees of the Congress, be made available to the requesting Chairman and the ranking Minority Member of such Committees or Subcommittees. This availability will be made with the understanding that the material furnished will not appear in the records of the Committees or Subcommittees nor in any way be made public.

2. Polls bearing the classification "Confidential" will be declassified automatically two years after their completion unless at that time the interests of national security require them to remain classified. The declassified polls will be available upon request of Members of Congress or the press.

3. Polls bearing the designation "Official Use Only" will, upon request by the Chairman of the appropriate Committees or Subcommittees of the Congress, be made available to the Members of such Committees or Subcommittees. This availability will be made with the understanding that the material furnished will not appear in the records of the Committees or Subcommittees nor in any way be made public. One year from the completion of these polls, they will be available upon request of Members of Congress or the press.

4. Poll results will be declassified at monthly intervals upon authorization of the Director, and will be made available to the Congress and the press according to the above formula on request.

5. Since USIA lacks authority to disseminate classified material originating in other agencies of Government, documents in which such classified material is integrated with our polls will not be made available. The polls contained in such documents will be isolated from the other classified material and treated in accordance with points 1-4 above.

1. Thirty days before the scheduled declassification of "Confidential" poll data, the Deputy Director (Policy and Plans) and the Director of the Information Research Service (IRS) shall recommend to the Director of the Agency what portion of the data if any shall remain classified in the interests of national security, as per A. 2. above. The decision to retain security classification on any poll data shall be made by the Director or, in his absence, the Acting Director.

2. Normally, security classification will be retained only when one or more of the following circumstances prevail: (a) Release of poll results would embarrass the host country, and such embarrassment would be detrimental to U.S. relations with that country; (b) release of poll results would identify and embarrass the polling organization, making it difficult or impossible for it or other local polling organizations to conduct further surveys for USIA; (c) release of poll results would embarrass a third country, and such embarrassment would be detrimental to that country's relations with the U.S. or its relations with the country in which the poll was taken.

3. Poll results involving the popularity of the United States or that of any U.S. political figure shall not, in the absence of circumstances listed in paragraph B. 2., be construed as involving national security and therefore will be declassified as per the formula in section A. above.

IRS shall submit to the Office of Policy (IOP) for prior policy clearance all questions to be included in polls financed or sponsored, in whole or part, by the Agency.

Edward R. Murrow