Washington, March 7, 1963.

Here are some additional USIA surveys from Western Europe.

You have already received the surveys entitled "Some Current Public Trends in Western Europe" and "West European Opinion Trends on U.S. and Soviet Strength". The ones enclosed differ in that the returns from Italy have been included./2/

Donald M. Wilson

CURRENT WEST EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION ON
SOME DISARMAMENT ISSUES

Trend in Support For General and Complete Disarmament

Support for whatever is understood by "general and complete" disarmament has increased in Western Europe over the past year and a half, and now ranges from a majority level in Great Britain to the order of 86 percent in Italy.

Table 1. "What are your feelings in general about disarmament? Are you for general and complete disarmament throughout the world, for some partial limitation on arms, or for no limitation on arms?"

	Great Britain		West Germany		France		Italy
	Jun/Jul '61	Feb '63	Jun/Jul '61	Feb. '63	Jun/Jul '61	Feb. '63	Jun/Jul '61	Feb. '63
No. of cases	(633)	(400)	(572)	(600)	(659)	(633)	(600)	(400)
General and complete disarmament	43%	57%	70%	72%	73%	80%	73%	86%
Some partial limitation	35	31	18	15	15	13	7	10
No limitation	13	6	4	3	3	2	3	*
Qualified answer	2	1	2	*	3	1	1	*
No opinion	7	5	6	10	6	4	16	4
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Asterisks indicate less than half of one per cent.

Would General and Complete Disarmament Require an
International Police Force?

The strongly predominant opinion among those in favor of general and complete disarmament is that such a state of affairs would require some sort of international organization with its own police force.

Table 2. "Do you think that general and complete disarmament would or would not require an international organization with its own policy force?"

Would require	45%	48%	52%	52%
Would not	6	9	12	14
No opinion	6	15	16	20
	57%	72%	80%	86%

Support For Nuclear Disarmament

On the more specific issue of nuclear disarmament support rises to overwhelming levels in the countries surveyed.

Table 3. "What about nuclear disarmament? Would you favor or not favor the abolition of nuclear weapons throughout the world?"

	Great Britain	West Germany	France	Italy
	Feb. '63	Feb. '63	Feb. '63	Feb. '63
No. of cases	(400)	(600)	(633)	(400)
Favor	70%	87%	94%	96%
Not favor	11	2	2	1
No opinion	19	11	4	3
	100%	100%	100%	100%

That sentiment in favor of the abolition of nuclear weapons is rather intense is suggested by returns available from three countries on whether or not nuclear weapons should be banned, if thereby the Western military forces were left weaker than communist forces. In France a majority, or near majority, is for a nuclear ban even if the West is left weaker as a consequence. Another 23 per cent are undecided rather than opposed.

In Great Britain and in Italy there appears to be more opposition than support for a nuclear ban that would leave the West militarily weaker than communist forces. But only minorities are explicitly opposed, which means that the majority in these countries are either for a nuclear ban under such circumstances or are undecided.

Table 4. "Assuming that banning nuclear weapons would leave the Western military forces weaker than the Communist forces, would you be for such a ban or against it?"

For ban	25%	Not available	52%	33%
Against ban if West left weaker	39	Not available	25	38
No opinion	36	Not available	23	29
	100%	Not available	100%	100%

Is Nuclear Disarmament Possible?

The widespread sentiment in favor of nuclear disarmament is not accompanied by equally general feeling that such a course is possible. While optimism holds an edge it does not attain a majority level in any of the countries surveyed, and except in France, is almost matched by the extent of pessimistic views.

Table 5. "Do you think it will be possible or not possible to abolish nuclear weapons throughout the world?"

	Great Britain	West Germany	France	Italy
	Feb. '63	Feb. '63	Feb. '63	Feb. '63
No. of cases	(400)	(600)	(633)	(400)
Possible	48%	47%	47%	46%
Not possible	41	43	32	38
No opinion	11	10	21	16
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Any pessimism, however, on the possibility of attaining nuclear disarmament would appear to be tempered by a widespread feeling that the countries of the world will get together before any general nuclear war on some way to avoid such a happening.

Table 6. "All things considered, do you believe that a general nuclear war is inevitable some time in the future, or do you believe that the countries of the world will get together in time on some way to avoid such a happening?"

Nuclear war inevitable	9%	11%	5%	5%
Will be avoided	74	72	85	82
No opinion	17	17	10	13
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Support For Verification in a Nuclear Test Ban

Despite the widespread desire for nuclear disarmament, evident in the preceding indications, the prevailing opinion in all four countries surveyed is that the U.S. should continue to insist upon adequate inspection as a part of any agreement to ban nuclear tests. The trend indication, where the same question has been employed, is that support for inspection has increased somewhat since earlier measurements in mid 1962.

The table below is somewhat complicated by the fact that an updated question version was substituted during the course of the study in time for the entire sampling in West Germany and Italy and part of the sampling in France. Results on the revised question, it will be noted, parallel indications from the earlier wording in indicating predominant support for inspection.

Table 7. "A main reason why there has been as yet no U.S.-Soviet agreement to ban nuclear tests is that the U.S. wants checking by international inspectors on each other's soil, and the Soviet Union opposes this because they say it will lead to spying.

"Should the U.S. enter an agreement with U.S.S.R. to stop testing without such inspection, or should the U.S. continue to insist upon such inspection as part of any agreement?"

	Great Britain		West Germany		France		Italy
	June '62	Feb, '63	June '62	Feb, '63	June '62	Feb, '63	June '62	Feb, '63
No. of cases	(647)	(400)	(620)	Not asked	(615)	(223)	(672)	Not asked
Should enter agreement	23%	20%	27%	Not asked	45%	12%	25%	Not asked
Should insist on inspection	54	67	51	Not asked	40	18	42	Not asked
No opinion	23	13	22	Not asked	15	5	33	Not asked
	100%	100%	100%		100%	35%	100%

"Now on this card we find two people expressing different views about banning nuclear tests. (CARD)

Mr. A. says: 'The U.S. should enter into an immediate agreement with the Soviet Union to ban nuclear testing even if the Soviets will not permit as much checking in both countries as the U.S. requests in order to verify that the agreement is kept.'

Mr. B. says: 'The U.S. should not enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union to ban nuclear tests unless the Soviets agree to as much checking in both countries as the U.S. feels necessary to verify that the agreement is kept.'

"Do you agree more with Mr. A or more with Mr. B?"

	Great Britain		West Germany		France		Italy
	June '62	Feb. '63	June '62	Feb. '63	June '62	Feb. '63	June '62	Feb. '63
No. of cases				(600)		(410)		(400)
Mr. A	Not asked	Not asked		30%	Not asked	16%	Not asked	26%
Mr. B	Not asked	Not asked		47	Not asked	38	Not asked	47
Qualified answer	Not asked	Not asked		1	Not asked	1	Not asked	2
No opinion	Not asked	Not asked		22	Not asked	10	Not asked	25
				100%		65%		100%

How Hard Are the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Working To
Reach a Disarmament Agreement?

Currently the majority feeling, except in France, is that the U.S. is working at least fairly hard to try to obtain an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on some degree of disarmament. In France opinions divide on this score, with as many as feel otherwise holding that the U.S. is not working very hard or not at all.

In contrast, in all four countries the viewpoint prevails that the Soviet Union is not working as hard as it might to achieve a disarmament agreement.

Since almost all in each of the countries surveyed favor at least partial arms limitation, these figures can be taken as approximate indications of comparative satisfaction with current U.S. and Soviet disarmament efforts.

Table 8. "In your opinion, how hard is the U.S. working to obtain an agreement with the Soviet Union on some degree of disarmament? Very hard, fairly hard, not very hard, or not at all?"

	Great Britain	West Germany	France	Italy
	Feb. '63	Feb. '63	Feb. '63	Feb. '63
No. of cases	(400)	(600)	(633)	(400)
Very hard	29%	29%	11%	33%
Fairly hard	34	33	28	34
Not very hard	22	20	27	11
Not at all	6	2	14	2
No opinion	9	16	20	20
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Not Favorable	35	40	-2	54

Table 9. "And how about the Soviet Union. In your opinion, how hard is the Soviet Union working to obtain an agreement with the U.S. on some degree of disarmament? Very hard, fairly hard, not very hard, or not at all?"

Very hard	8%	1%	6%	9%
Fairly hard	27	7	17	25
Not very hard	36	38	32	35
Not at all	14	36	24	9
No opinion	15	18	21	22
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net favorable	-15	-66	-33	-10

Support For Some Degree of Disarmament in Europe

Specific inquiries about disarmament thinking were concluded in the present survey by a query designed to illuminate the extent of general receptivity to proposals for disarmament in Europe. The results indicate a majority disposition in all four countries surveyed to be favorable toward an agreement between the Western Powers and the Soviet bloc providing for some degree of disarmament in Europe. This state of opinion tends to suggest, of course, that proposals for a nuclear free zone in Europe fall on fertile soil in the Western countries principally concerned.

Table 10. "Would you approve or disapprove of an agreement between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union and its European allies providing for some degree of disarmament in Europe?"

	Great Britain	West Germany	France	Italy
	Feb. '63	Feb. '63	Feb. '63	Feb. '63
No. of cases	(400)	(600)	(633)	(400)
Approve	64%	62%	72%	60%
Disapprove	9	18	7	14
No opinion	27	20	21	26
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Washington, April 23, 1963.

SUBJECT
The Bokaro Steel Plant

Construction of a steel plant at Bokaro either serves the U.S. national interest or it does not. My understanding is that it does, not only in narrow economic terms but also for political and propaganda purposes as well.

Therefore I strongly endorse Ambassador Galbraith's warning (New Delhi telegram 4009, April 17) that we not throw the baby out with the bath water by applying the Clay Report formula here./2/

All things being equal, we favor aid to private rather than public enterprise. But all things are not equal here.

Ambassador Galbraith has accurately described the consequences for us in India if we accept the Clay dictum. I want to warn of the consequences elsewhere.

We will fuel Communist propaganda fires in Asia, Africa and Latin America. We will undermine our posture of seeking a world of free choice as against a world of coercion. Worst of all, we will make mockery of the goal set for the U.S. by the President in his first State of the Union message--"a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others."

Edward R. Murrow/3/

Washington, May 9, 1963.

SUBJECT
Public Opinion in Italy Prior to the Elections

Two factors in Italian public opinion may have contributed to the Communist gain of about 1,000,000 votes in the recent national elections.

Before the election Italians increasingly regarded the Soviet Union as moderate and reasonable in its policies, according to a public opinion survey conducted for USIA in Italy.

In addition, there was a pre-election increase in the number of Italians who said it is possible to be a good Communist and a good Catholic at the same time, according to an independent survey by a Gallup affiliate.

Those two public opinion factors were present at a time when Italian esteem for the United States and its leadership was at a new high.

The USIA survey, made in February, 1963, did not find any rise in anti-American sentiment. On the contrary, a substantial number of trend indices showed the U.S. and its leadership has rarely ranked higher in Italy. General esteem for the U.S. continued to rise from its 1960 levels and in February reached a new peak.

Favorable reactions to "what the American Government has been doing in international affairs recently" moved in precisely the same way. The belief that the U.S. was doing all it should do to prevent war; confidence in American leadership of the West; belief in the credibility of American statements--all these were at the highest levels in three years. There was the feeling--shared by a new high of two out of three--that American and Italian basic interests were in harmony. Finally, Italian neutralism, predominant in 1960, fell to a minority position as it was overtaken by those who preferred their nation to side with the U.S. against the U.S.S.R.

Fewer Italians than in 1960 found any commonality of national interest with the Soviet Union: general esteem for the U.S.S.R. and the credibility of Russian statements remained as low as ever.

However, net favorable reaction to Soviet international actions showed a sharp increase, from a net figure of -10 in June, 1962, to a +14 in February, 1963. The reasons given for such favorable reactions were nearly all couched in terms of Russian "moderation" and "reasonableness" in the Cuban crisis. In terms of Soviet efforts to prevent war, the net index rose from -15 to +7 between June, 1962, and February, 1963.

Therefore, relative to its previous standing, the Soviet Union was quite favorably regarded in Italy at the time of the survey.

It is doubtful whether Italian voters' estimates of American and Soviet strength were involved in their voting behavior. On the eve of the elections, the U.S. was in a relatively strong and improved position. Militarily, the U.S. was, for the first time, given a slight edge by Italian public opinion in nuclear weapons and--more important--a substantial edge in total military strength. In economic strength the U.S. was seen ahead by huge majorities and in scientific development as no worse than even. Only in space did the Soviet lead continue to be substantial. Finally, in terms of the wave of the future, the U.S. was expected to be the eventual winner of a quarter-century of "peaceful competition"--a sharp increase from 1960.

Reactions to NATO were, if anything, complacent. Consciousness of the organization was low and among those aware of NATO's existence, the predominant view was that it was in a good enough condition, was strong enough, and that both Italy and the U.S. were contributing their share. Few appeared to favor either national or exclusively "European" nuclear forces. The predominant view was for reliance on American nuclear forces or some sort of all-NATO, jointly-controlled organization.

It was on the issue of nuclear war in general (not necessarily in a NATO framework) that Italians displayed the greatest sensitivity--a widespread emotion common to adherents of all political parties. Nearly nine out of ten opposed the tactical use of nuclear weapons against enemy soldiers attacking Western Europe with conventional weapons; a majority would still disapprove even if the alternative were being over-run. Two-thirds indicate they did not believe that nuclear warfare could be kept tactical and expressed the opinion that it would spread to attacks on cities. Three out of four saw no hope of personal survival of a nuclear war. On the optimistic side, by a slight margin, Italians felt that neither side would use nuclear weapons; and as many as two out of three were confident that the U.S. would not be rash in using nuclear weapons.

Closely linked to sensitivity to nuclear issues are Italian reactions to disarmament. In principle, nearly 100 per cent wanted world-wide disarmament--just about all desiring it to be "general and complete." A clear majority favored an agreement with the Soviet Union to provide some degree of disarmament on the European continent. There was also a predominant feeling that American nuclear bases near the Soviet Union should be dismantled--presumably in some instances meaning those in Italy as well as those in Turkey. About one in ten voluntarily mentioned Italian bases though they were not brought into the question.

The huge figure of 96 per cent favored abolition of nuclear weapons throughout the world; as many as one in three felt so strongly that they favored the idea even if it meant leaving the West weaker than the Communist forces. At the same time, only about half the population believed that such a ban was possible. Despite this reaction to nuclear weapons, the very high proportion of 82 per cent believed that, in fact, nuclear war would somehow be avoided and was not inevitable.

With the feeling in favor of nuclear disarmament went the desire to ban nuclear testing; but here the predominance of opinion took a skeptical view and considered that effective inspection--"as much checking in both countries as the U.S. feels necessary"--was a prerequisite.

On the whole issue of disarmament, two Italians out of three gave the U.S. credit for working to reach an agreement; but as many as one out of three--and most of these neither Communist nor left-wing socialist sympathizers--reacted favorably to Soviet efforts.

On current issues related to the Common Market, Italian opinion appeared to be lined up with the American position and against either the Soviet line or Gaullist nationalism. Two out of three wanted Britain in the organization, and substantial pluralities desired to see the Market extended to include various other nations. Proponents of "independence" from the U.S. were far outweighed by those wanting to work for an integrated Europe "in close partnership with the U.S."

A major outcome of the Cuban crisis, other than American gains, appears to have been an increase in the number of Italians attributing such qualities as "moderation" and "reasonableness" to the Soviet Government. As cited above, as many as 30 per cent reacted favorably to "what the Soviet Union has been doing in international affairs recently," compared to only 16 per cent reacting negatively. Most of this favorable group--comprising all segments of Italian political affiliation--went on to praise Soviet moderation and reasonableness in the Cuban crisis. When the question was asked directly in terms of Cuba, from 10 to 22 per cent of the parties ranging from the Center-left to the Liberals reported that their views of the Soviet Union had changed for the better. The reasons for this favorable change was nearly always given in terms of Soviet moderation and willingness to avoid war. Indeed, the proportion of those expressing improved opinions of the U.S.S.R. was just as high as the proportion expressing more favorable views of the U.S. Again, when the question was asked directly, public opinion was just as inclined to credit Soviet moderation as U.S. military strength for the outcome--an outcome which nearly all aware of the crisis felt had decreased the chance of nuclear war in the future.

Thus the gains of the U.S.--general acceptance of its need to act unilaterally and improvement of its already high general esteem and military image-to some degree appear to have been offset by the increased acceptance of the Soviet image as moderate and reasonable. The original Soviet provocation appears in the net to have been swallowed up by its subsequent behavior.

Although the P.C.I., like most local Communist parties, has of necessity stressed its independence, patriotism and indigenous quality, it has undoubtedly repelled a considerable number of possible sympathizers because of its connection with Moscow. Stressing its independence on the one hand, and on the other concentrating on improving the image of the Soviet Union so that the connection will be less damaging, have been permanent necessities for the P.C.I. Certain events of the past year and their reflection in Italian public opinion appear to have worked effectively for the Italian party's propagandists.

We have noted the favorable reactions of all segments of the Italian population--ranging from a tenth to a third and higher--to the Soviet posture of moderation in the field of international relations. Another reinforcement of this view can be noted in Italian reactions to the Sino-Soviet conflict-a conflict which to a considerable degree tends to put Soviet Communism into the position of being a reasonable, moderate, conservative, almost pacific force as compared with the Chinese extremists. This conflict appears to have had particular impact among the non-Communist forces in Italy. Thus P.C.I. adherents are most likely to deny that relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China are bad, while adherents of the other parties--no less on the right than on the left--predominantly hold that relations have deteriorated. Again, it is the non-Communists who are most hopeful that eventually the Soviet Union "will think of herself as a European state and seek friendship with the West in order to oppose Communist China." The P.C.I. sympathizers widely deny this possibility.

Such feelings on the part of large segments of the population provide a psychological atmosphere in which the Italian Communist party can operate effectively. The P.C.I. always has been among the most "reasonable" and "legal" in Europe.

The findings of an independent survey casts light on the effect of recent tentative contacts between the Kremlin and the Vatican. The study was made by the Gallup affiliate, DOXA, at about the same time as the USIA survey. It asked Italians: "Can you be, at the same time, a good Communist (enrolled in the P.C.I.) and a good Catholic?"

The results--only partially available--reveal that among right-wing socialists (P.S.D.I.) those answering "Yes, one can be a good Communist and a good Catholic at the same time" rose from 9 per cent in 1953 to 21 per cent in 1963; among Christian Democrats the rise was from 5 per cent to 16 per cent. For the nation as a whole, the "yes" response rose from 21 per cent to 23 per cent. In terms of the voting population, this 7 per cent switch would in itself amount to between two and two and a half million votes. It should also be noted that the question was posed in the extreme terms of being "enrolled in the P.C.I.". Merely voting on occasion for specific P.C.I. candidates, for any number of reasons, would be felt by many to be considerably lesser offense-particularly if the voting were rationalized as merely being a protest against the government or against the rise of 12 per cent last year in the cost of living.

A follow-up study of the elections is underway.

Donald M. Wilson/2/

Washington, July 9, 1963.

SUBJECT
Reactions to Your European Trip

Here is a summary of media reaction to your trip to Europe.

Western European media were almost unanimous that the visit was an overwhelming personal and psychological success but a limited political success.

You were widely viewed as projecting the image of a spirited and determined leader whose personal warmth and dynamism had previously been underestimated. The themes developed in your speeches most widely acclaimed were: Western unity, your categorical pledges to stand by our European allies, the promotion of peace, and your efforts to find better relations with the East. Comments on counteracting Gaullist policies and the quest for a multilateral nuclear force were divided and more critical. In only a few instances did commentators judge the trip an unqualified success.

Following the official welcome at Wahn Airport, the crescendo of popular and press acclaim rose rapidly. Even strongly Gaullist papers conceded that your reception by the Germans surpassed that of de Gaulle.

Prior to your visit, Die Welt of Hamburg had pictured you as "a political manager without passion, an engineer or a manufacturer of power." Subsequent to the Berlin visit, it wrote: "This was a Kennedy we had not seen before. His former coolness gave way to passion and to an unconditional personal commitment for this city."

A number of papers credited the visit with changing your views on Germany. The independent Kolner Stadt-Anzeiger said "if Kennedy ever had reservations vis-a-vis the Germans--and there are indications that this was the case--his Berlin visit has certainly lessened them."

Your statements on European unity drew support from Scandinavia to Italy, but were also widely interpreted as directed in part against de Gaulle. Many papers found a positive aspect in this approach, crediting you with "opening the way (to European integration) which de Gaulle has barred, (something) which no European politician has been able to do since the break in Brussels" (Berlinske Tidende, conservative, Copenhagen).

Several German papers appeared uneasy at the prospect of an ultimate choice between the U.S. and France, and tried to ride the fence. The Social-Democratic Neue Rhein Zeitung of Cologne wrote: "Kennedy will not hesitate to make political capital out of his new friendship with the Germans, but he also will not overtax this friendship to the disadvantage of our solidarity with France."

French papers were less outspoken on this issue. Le Figaro's comment that West Germany needed both American and French friendship and "could not choose between the two" was representative.

The Western European press was as one in praise of your renewed pledges to defend our allies, including some French papers. The anti-Gaullist Depeche du Midi of Toulouse, one of the most influential provincial papers, spoke of the "categoric manner" in which the U.S. assured the security of Europe and that its contribution was both "necessary and sufficient."

The Social-Democratic Neue Rhein Ruhr Zeitung of Essen summed up the views of many papers when it wrote "nobody in the White House, nobody in Germany had expected the President to identify himself so unreservedly and so courageously with the cause of Berlin and with the German cause as he did in his address at the Schoneberg city hall. Never before has a foreign statesman identified himself with the German cause in this form, on such a stage and so convincingly."

A sour note was sounded by the hyper-Gaullist Paris Presse which complained that your pronouncements in Berlin might have gone beyond assuring Europeans of U.S. determination to stand by its pledges and that "the U.S. President is now accountable for the enthusiasm he aroused."

Your statements on relations with the Iron Curtain countries were generally supported. The left-center Frankfurter Rundschau said, for example, "Mr. Kennedy's great peace offensive nourished our hopes for a rapprochement with the young progressive forces in the East."

In Europe generally, your visit to Ireland was seen as a "sentimental journey" and a "homecoming" without political implications. Within Ireland, no event in modern times has received such detailed press, photographic, and TV coverage. There is still no consensus about the political significance of the visit, but there has been speculation about Ireland's role in world events and relationships with NATO.

Papers of all political colorations welcomed you for what was described by the pro-Labor Daily Mirror as "a hustling working visit."

The majority of papers welcomed the decision to delay the multilateral force. The conservative Daily Telegraph said, "Mr. Macmillan convinced the President of the strength of British misgivings and the American plan . . . is unlikely to reemerge in its present form." Among the minority of papers still favoring the force, the conservative Daily Mail expressed the hope that mixed-crew surface fleet with Polaris missiles would ultimately be accepted "because the advantages are much greater than the objections."

Papers elsewhere construed the postponement of the multilateral force as a victory for Macmillan, particularly in France. Said the Gaullist mouthpiece La Nation: "Reality will prevail."

A number of papers interpreted the decision on the multilateral force as a move to improve chances for a nuclear test ban with the Soviets.

Italian editorialists were embarrassed by the relatively small crowds which greeted you in Rome, but following your appearance and speech in Naples papers from Socialist to Right supported your views with enthusiasm.

Conservative Corriere Della Sera wrote that de Gaulle's concept is designed to "isolate Europe," but that you, Segni, and Leone were agreed on the necessity of "European unity within the framework of the interdependence of Europe and the U.S."

Christian-Democratic Gazetta del Popolo said that your trip ended "with the solemn reaffirmation of a pledge of united effort . . . The special atmosphere created around this welcome American guest confirms the existence of the deep and vital roots of the Alliance, which the Italian people want as a guarantee and token of freedom, and which Italy now reaffirms, not only as a guarantee of security but as a new pledge and a hope of progress and peace."

Socialist Avanti gave heavy and generally friendly coverage to your visit, emphasizing the "peaceful" line. You have a "bag of ideas which deserve close consideration," Avanti commented.

A complete report on Western European reactions is attached.

Papers gave heavy coverage to the early part of the trip and to the audience with Pope Paul VI. Major dailies in Mexico, Peru, Argentina, and Chile had editorials supporting your objectives, particularly strengthening the Atlantic Alliance. The only non-communist negative reaction received was from La Prensa of Mexico City, which said that "not only North American . . . but also our own Mexican cities will be destroyed (in a third World War) and no one can dispose of our destiny so carelessly as the President of the United States seems to do." The editorial recommended a protest to the United Nations and censure by it of you.

African media gave the trip moderate coverage, but there was little editorial comment. Radio Accra and other stations reported favorably on your remarks in Bonn welcoming African unity efforts. But Radio Accra also reported a statement by Malcolm X criticizing you for talking of freedom in Europe while "millions of Afro-Americans are denied freedom in the United States." The Tunisian Neo-Destour daily L'Action spoke highly of your "courage, frankness, and determination in defining the new trends of (your) strategy" and of your decision-making capability, "a clear-cut end to the indecision of (your) predecessors."

There was extensive news coverage and limited editorial comment, except in India and Pakistan. Editorialists in these two countries dwelt heavily on the reference in the communique from Britain to military aid for India, the Indians largely favorably, the Pakistani critically.

Several papers in the Near East reported that your trip had failed to change de Gaulle's policy, and criticized you for not visiting France.

News coverage was moderate. Japanese commentators were inclined to agree that you had allayed German fears over West Berlin, and also interpreted the journey as an effort to form a unified base for negotiations with the Soviets. Comments in Viet-Nam were similar.

The Taipei press supported your efforts for Western unity, but, typically, called for a greater U.S. effort in Asia with the comment that "the root of the international communist evil is in Asia and not in Europe."

Soviet output on your trip was relatively mild in tone and low in volume, never exceeding more than two per cent of total radio comment. Among the propaganda themes were Western disunity, failure of the multilateral force, the alleged discrepancy between your American University and German speeches, and the opportunity your visit provided for "revanchist" leaders to fan "the slanderous campaign against East Germany." Moscow concluded that you were "evaded" in Italy, "approved only in principle" in Britain, and "warmly received" by the revanchists in Bonn.

Peking was harshly critical, picturing the tour as a "cunning diplomatic move with evil designs." A New China News Agency report of June 27 said you had made "five provocative and aggressive speeches . . . unscrupulously slandering the socialist system and expressing U.S. determination to . . . subvert the German Democratic Republic and other East European socialist countries." A Red Chinese labor official asked: "How can this satan incarnate be viewed as an envoy of the people?"

Cuban media interpreted the trip as an effort to gain approval for U.S. "aggressive policies" and adjudged it a complete failure.

Donald M. Wilson/2/

Washington, July 29, 1963.

I understand that you have expressed interest in United States participation in the 1963 Moscow International Film Festival and in the selection of the American film entry "The Great Escape."

"The Great Escape" was selected by the Hollywood Guilds Festival Committee, which is comprised of members appointed by the presidents of the Directors Guild of America, the Screen Actors Guild, the Screen Producers Guild and the Writers Guild of America. The need to increase and augment the prestige of the United States and of the American film art at international motion picture events was immediately apparent when I took over as Director of this Agency. It seemed obvious that a qualified body of experts of the motion picture industry itself, in cooperation with the government, was required to meet this objective effectively. Thus, this Festival Committee was formed at the instigation of George Stevens, Jr., Director of the Motion Picture Service of the Agency, and has made the selection of the official American film entries to all major festivals since the spring of 1962. Where political considerations obtain, as is the case with the Moscow Film Festival, the Committee consults with the government on the appropriateness of any motion picture as an official entry. Present members of the Committee are: Willis Goldbeck, Gene Kelly, Richard Widmark, John Houseman, Walter Mirisch, Ernest Lehman, Allen Rivkin, Joseph C. Youngerman, and Fred Zinnemann, Chairman.

The Committee considered a number of motion pictures in the process of selecting the official United States entry in the Moscow Film Festival, including the film "How the West Was Won." Almost up to the time of the Festival entry deadline, the Committee did not feel that it had found just the right film for this event. When "The Great Escape" was offered for consideration, however, Committee members were unanimous in selecting it as the official Festival entry.

Upon receipt of the Committee's nomination, the Agency made arrangements for review of the film by government officers in the Department of State and USIA. Those who saw the film felt that in addition to its technical and cinematographic excellence, it dramatically illustrated the precept that whatever the conditions, the human spirit will strive to remain free. They also noted, as did the Russians, that it gave counterpoint to the image of Nazi Germany military leadership set forth in present Communist propaganda.

Officials of the Soviet Embassy also saw the film. They thought the treatment given the Nazi prisoner of war camp and Nazi military leadership not understandable within Russian experience with the Nazis, but interposed no objection to the film's entry in the Moscow Festival.

The American Embassy at Moscow has since reported that the Soviet publications Pravda, Izvestiya and Trud praised "The Great Escape" for the performance of its cast (Steve McQueen received the award for best actor), and have otherwise acclaimed the excellence of the picture. They have been caused, however, to rise in the defense of their own anti-German propaganda.

Mr. Stevens was accredited as the Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Moscow Festival. He is expected to return to duty in the Agency very shortly, and I look forward to receiving his personal comments on the effectiveness of United States participation in the Festival. I shall, of course, be happy to report to you more fully the substance of his observations as well as to supply you with a copy of the written report of the Delegation.

Edward R. Murrow/2/

Washington, September 9, 1963.

SUBJECT
Discussion of U.S.-Russian Press Problems

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Pierre Salinger, The White House
Mr. Donald Wilson, USIA
Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, S/AL
Mr. Richard Davis, EUR
Mr. Robert Manning, P

Problems involving accreditation of American correspondents to USSR and Soviet correspondents to the United States were raised in the hope of achieving an agreed package proposal for presentation to the Soviet authorities.

Two types of problems are at issue:

1. Involving the desire of Novosti, the Soviet propaganda agency to be permitted to operate in Washington and the possible desire of USIA to establish more extensive operation in USSR.

2. The desire of the Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune to establish news bureaus in Moscow and the Soviet counter request for permission to open bureaus in Los Angeles and Chicago.

It was the sense of the meeting that the Novosti-USIA problem should be dealt with separately from that of bona-fide correspondents. Mr. Wilson agreed to discuss with his USIA colleagues the nature of possible USIA requests as quid pro quo for the granting of permission for Novosti to operate in this country. Ambassador Thompson had serious doubts that USIA would be able to get from the Russians permission to operate an open reading room or permission to engage in other activities of the sort that USIA pursues in other countries.

On the matter of the request of Los Angeles Times-Chicago Tribune, it was pointed out that the Russians have already been told that we would not open Los Angeles and Chicago to Soviet correspondents as quid pro quo for admission of these two American newspapers to Moscow. Instead the Russians were offered two more accreditations for correspondents in Washington in return for the Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune accreditations to Moscow. There has been no Soviet response to this proposal and it was the opinion of Mr. Thompson that there would be no such response until the Russians received our answer to their Novosti request.

As a means of breaking the deadlock and liberalizing news policies in both countries, Mr. Salinger suggested a package proposal along the following lines:

U.S. would admit two more Soviet correspondents to Washington or New York and would open Los Angeles and Chicago for the establishment of one bureau each representing Tass or some other bona-fide Soviet news operation. In return the Soviet Union would accredit two more correspondents to Moscow (Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune) and would open Leningrad and Kiev to one bureau each for some American news organization or newspaper.

It was agreed that Mr. Salinger would informally explore with the AP and UP whether each might be interested in establishing a bureau in Leningrad or Kiev.

The meeting agreed that the package proposal was a worthwhile proposition to put to Soviet authorities. It was also agreed to solicit the opinion and guidance of Ambassador Foy Kohler after his imminent return to Washington for consultation.

Informally there was a brief discussion of the advisability of a meeting between top Soviet authorities dealing with news matters and a group made up of Mr. Salinger, Mr. Manning and Mr. Murrow at some future date, both to discuss the bulk package proposal and perhaps also to take up other grievances and restrictions affecting the work of newsmen in the two countries.

Washington, September 18, 1963.

From all indications, Hungary has been adopting changes in the direction of moderation and pragmatism which reflect the interests of the Hungarian people. This tends to make Hungary at present more receptive to Western influence and opens up new opportunities for us. In the light of this development, I should like to suggest that this is a propitious time to modify our policy with regard to a cultural and informational program directed toward that country.

It is our belief that a careful advance in cultural and informational offerings now might further current policy objectives in Eastern Europe in general and in Hungary in particular. If Hungarians are as eager to receive manifestations of the Western world as they seem, such presentations, offered in measured doses, might well represent for them additional incentive to move even more rapidly away from the rigid positions of the past. It would naturally be well to proceed step by step, taking advantage of what appear to be major opportunities, but with watchful consideration for the reaction of articulate minority groups here at home.

We believe a telling program of cultural and informational activity could be directed at the following "target audiences" in Hungary: professional people, managers and technocrats, party and government officials, the intelligentsia, youth and student leaders--those who mold public opinion and influence policy and action. The welcome, but woefully meager, informal activities carried on to date through various private American organizations have been too restricted to touch them more than a little. Only activities of potentially greater impact can have much influence. Without much formalization--we are thinking neither of a publicized effort on our part nor of a cultural agreement with Hungary--we recommend such moves as sending one of our traveling exhibits; distributing at an appropriate time a simple Cultural Bulletin (similar to those we already disseminate in the Soviet Union, in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria); facilitating the visits of performing artists or athletes; encouraging representative American writers, artists or educators to include Hungary in their planned itineraries.

For reasons obviously its own, the Hungarian regime seems willing to accept such advances now. We propose therefore that we take advantage of the opportunities while they are offered, under the belief that once a start is made, Hungarian authorities will be under pressure to permit still more. If that is true, then perhaps cultural and information exchange itself will come to represent a bit of extra leverage for the attainment of other things we want from Hungary.

Edward R. Murrow/2/

Washington, September 25, 1963.

SUBJECT
Direction of Policy Concerning Hungary

I look forward to giving you an oral account of the meeting this afternoon in Secretary Harriman's office. Suffice it to say here that the memorandum over your signature had the full effect for which we hoped./2/

Net result was a three-point request from Secretary Harriman:

(1) that we get on with an expanded program in Eastern Europe in general and in Hungary in particular, since there would seem to be an entirely new situation developing as the result of the Tito-Khrushchev meeting, which Harriman believes will tempt other political leaders in Eastern Europe to demonstrate that they too can sell a few points to Chairman Nickie;

(2) that the Department send a letter to each of the East European posts asking whether they have any suggestions as to how fast and in what directions we might present a broadened program to people in their countries; and

(3) that USIA come up with any specific ideas for an expanded program in Hungary and in the other satellites in the months ahead.

Can't ask for much better than that. I have put Carl Sharek immediately to the task of drawing up specific suggestions for Hungary, together with a schedule covering the next couple of years. I shall submit it to you, if you agree, for transmittal to Secretary Harriman the same way we transmitted the original memorandum.

LSB

Washington, September 26, 1963.

SUBJECT
Selling Wheat to the USSR

As the press is fully informing us, the Russians are buying wheat. They will apparently get it where they can. Their purchases may or may not include us, depending upon whether we make up our minds to sell and how soon.

Without going into ramifications of the problem which are not of our direct responsibility, and strictly from the psychological viewpoint, IAS believes it would be in the interest of our foreign policy objectives to sell wheat, and other farm commodities, to the USSR and the Communist states of Eastern Europe in return for hard cash./2/

Here are the points in our reasoning:

1. Selling wheat to the Soviet Union is consonant with our policy to encourage in that country an improvement in a peaceful consumer economy satisfying the desires and aspirations of Soviet citizens for a better daily life.

2. Such sales would demonstrate that we are sincerely interested in trade of non-strategic and peaceful commodities as another step in the lessening of tensions.

3. A decision to sell would be tangible indication of humanitarian interest on the part of the American people, considerate of the welfare of the Russian people.

4. It would bear witness to the productive superiority of U.S. agriculture, demonstrating without any "embroidering" on our part who is outdistancing whom, in spite of Khrushchev's repeated braggadocio about "catching up and overtaking" us.

5. It would have a psychological impact on the Soviet people as they found themselves even to this extent dependent upon us, and it would condition them for further economic dependence, of one sort or another, in the future, should matters develop in that direction.

6. It would encourage Soviet authorities, and the Soviet people under them, to think still more often of positive relations with the U.S., and less often of any possibilities in the direction of Communist China. This might in its own way help their quarrel along a bit.

7. It would improve our surplus agricultural products situation, and along with that our balance of payments situation.

LSB

Washington, October 28, 1963.

SUBJECT
Some Changes in USIA since March, 1961

Since the appointment of Edward R. Murrow as Director, in March, 1961, a number of far-reaching changes have been effected in the policies, operations, procedures and output of the U.S. Information Agency. Inventoried below are some of the more significant of these changes. This listing is for the information of USIA employees who, engrossed in their own segment of the Agency operation, may like to know of changes and developments in other areas.

The role of the Director and his senior officers in the formulation of foreign policy has been greatly strengthened. No longer is USIA handed a policy and told to make the best of it. The Agency's counsel is now sought whenever national policies with foreign implications are being formulated. The Director participates actively in all meetings of the National Security Council and its executive committee. His key officers consult daily with their counterparts in the White House, the Department of State and other federal departments and agencies. President Kennedy's January 25, 1963 statement of mission for USIA charged the Agency with the responsibility for "advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs and official statements."/2/ That statement is very much an operational fact.

A revamping of functions has taken place in the Agency's Office of Policy to meet the problems and opportunities of the changing times. The country planning mechanism was overhauled to streamline and sharpen the functioning of USIS as an integral component of the overseas country teams. A media coordinator has been assigned to ensure that the many instruments of communication used by USIA are synchronized both in content and in timing. A long range planning officer has also been assigned to provide guidelines for other than immediate policy and media objectives to be reached in five to 10 years. A youth and student affairs officer plans and promotes activities and output directed to these critically important audiences. Another officer has been assigned to ensure the inclusion of overseas research findings in the Agency's policies and programming.

At overseas posts paper work has been subordinated to leg work. The volume of reporting from the field to headquarters has been reduced by about 20% to permit a corresponding increase of field officers' time in furthering programs and policies. Remaining reporting procedures have been simplified and streamlined.

Length of overseas tours, except in critical hardship posts, has been extended 50% from two to three years and a policy is followed whereby key officers often return to the same post for a second tour. This permits better use of officers who thus have greater time to develop contacts and know the problems.

Regional specialization for foreign service officers has been made the rule. No longer are officers assigned from one area to another throughout their careers, thus acquiring a smattering of expertise in one area only to be assigned away from it for the next tour. To the extent possible, they now spend the bulk of their overseas careers in a single cultural or ethnic region.

The diffusion of effort and output that characterized USIA during the first years of its existence is ended. No longer is the Agency's mission "to tell America's story abroad"; no longer does USIA scatter its fire indiscriminately to all segments of all populations. "Targeting", always an ideal, is now a reality. Audiences are carefully selected-together with the techniques of reaching them and the contents of the message-to achieve maximum influence leading to political action. All USIA media function in synchronization: if the theme is Free Choice, and the peg is Berlin, each medium devises a message best communicated through its instrument. The messages are carefully related each to the other and each supports the other. This results in a multiplied opinion impact.

A much greater awareness of the function of USIS has spread among senior U.S. operating officials in the 106 countries abroad where the Agency now has posts. Chiefs of mission now know that the public affairs officer and his staff have a dual responsibility: (1) to advise the mission on the psychological implications in the country of U.S. policies, plans and actions and (2) to serve as the information, cultural and psychological link between the mission and the people of the host country.

Since the spring of 1961 the Agency has increasingly emphasized operations in Africa and Latin America and because of these priorities has had to curtail somewhat its operations in Western Europe where normal communications with the U.S. are relatively full and open. The Agency has opened 12 new mission posts and eight branch posts in Africa in this period; 11 new branch posts in Latin America; two mission posts and one branch post in the Far East; one mission post and two branch posts in the Near East; in Western Europe, USIA closed four branch posts and opened one new one.

To assist the African area in its tasks of organizing many new posts, the Agency has conducted in Africa a series of training workshops for local employees. These have covered subjects such as office practices, maintenance and operation of motion picture projectors, the establishment and operation of a library, techniques of handling small exhibits, and the servicing of multilith presses.

The Agency has become increasingly effective in acting as a catalyst in producing the maximum favorable impression overseas out of the travels abroad of prominent American Government officials, and others. USIS posts thoroughly prepared for trips such as President Kennedy's to Latin America and Europe, Mrs. Kennedy's visit to India and Pakistan, and Vice President Johnson's travel to the Near East and Scandinavia. All the media in Washington did their advance work, too. During the trips, foreign service officers facilitated coverage by commercial media and also covered the events themselves. Films, special editions of magazines and pamphlets help to broaden, and make more lasting, the impact of such visits.

A Foreign Correspondents' Center was opened in New York City to help some 500 journalists who usually live in the U.S. to cover America and the United Nations. The Center arranged briefings by prominent American officials and others. It also facilitates visits outside New York. A documentation center is another service.

Greatly increased Agency-wide attention is being paid to key youth, student and labor groups abroad. For details see 20th Semi-Annual Report to Congress, pages 18-21 and 28-35.

In February, 1963 the short wave power of the Voice of America was doubled. A giant new transmitter complex--nearly five million watts, equal to the broadcast power of 96 of the top U.S. commercial radio stations--was completed at Greenville, North Carolina. This complex gives USIA a far better signal to Latin America, Europe and Africa.

Four highly versatile air-transportable transmitters have been constructed and put into operation. Three are near Monrovia. They provide an interim signal to Africa south of the Sahara until a large permanent transmitter complex of 1.6 million watts is completed in March, 1964. The fourth, on Marathon Key off Florida, beams medium wave broadcasts to Cuba.

Improvements in VOA's short wave broadcast service include: consolidation of Chinese-language casts by eliminating Amoy and Cantonese and concentrating on Mandarin, the principal language on the mainland and on Formosa; inauguration of Portuguese broadcasts to Brazil; increase of Spanish broadcasts to Latin America from one hour to nine hours daily; inauguration of dictation-speed newscasts in Spanish and Portuguese to facilitate wider diffusion by the printed word; considerable increase in the number of (stringer) correspondents reporting to VOA.

Other VOA construction advances: (1) the first of six new transmitters at Woofferton, England--increasing VOA power there fivefold to 1.25 million watts--goes on the air shortly; (2) relay facilities aboard Coast Guard Cutter, Courier, are being land-based on Island of Rhodes where the Near East Arabic services are being concentrated; (3) agreements for relay-transmitter installations were made with Greece and the Philippines; (4) relay facilities in the U.S., at Bethany, Ohio, and Delano and Dixon, California are being modernized; (5) new antennas have been built for RIAS, the Agency's station in West Berlin, with a resulting five-fold increase in power at night for broadcasts that blanket East Germany. Meanwhile, obsolescent relay transmitters at Brentwood, Long Island, Schenectady, New York, and Wayne, New Jersey, were retired from service.

The volume of VOA short wave broadcasting has increased nearly 30% since January, 1961: from 617'45" to 796'15" hours weekly.

The volume of placement on overseas medium wave transmitters of VOA-produced tapes has increased more than 150% since January, 1961: from 5,457 to 14,000 hours weekly. Some 5,500 radio stations in the free world, both commercial and government-owned, carry such VOA taped programs.

Twice the Voice of America has massed its transmitters to deliver to listeners behind the Iron Curtain an electronic Sunday punch consisting of vital information which Communist governments had been denying their people. The first: November 5, 1961, employing 52 transmitters, 4.3 million watts and 80 frequencies during an eight-hour period. It told the Russian people of world-wide revulsion because the Soviets had callously broken the atomic testing moratorium and resumed atmospheric tests. The second: October 25, 1962, employing the same strength and number of frequencies as the year previous, to broadcast the full story of the crisis confrontation over Cuba. In both cases, monitoring and the reports of correspondents in the USSR confirmed that, despite intensive jamming efforts, the broadcasts got through to an immense audience.

Sixty-seven films have been completed since March, 1961. Thirty-six of these are documentary, and 31 are major films on the visits of foreign dignitaries and other topical subjects. Among the more important films have been:

"United in Progress", two reels in color, based upon the participation of President Kennedy in the Costa Rican conference of Central American chiefs of state;

"A Philosopher's Journey", two reels in color, on the visit of the President of India to the United States, symbolizing the friendship between the two nations;

"Invitation to India" and "Invitation to Pakistan", both in color, depicted Mrs. Kennedy's visit in 1962 to those countries;

"The Farmer and I", two reels in color, shows the life and labor of an American farmer;

"China and the Far East", two reels, black and white, is one of a number of anti-Communist films;

"Escape to Freedom", three reels, black and white, shows the drama and the tragedy of the flight of refugees from Communist lands;

"School at Rincon Santo", "Evil Wind Out" and "Letter from Colombia" were produced to support the Alliance for Progress. Each is one reel, black and white.

"The Five Cities of June", three reels in color, depicts five significant events in June, 1963.

Since March, 1961 sixty-six films have been acquired from non-Agency sources at little or no cost. For its "packets" of films of specialized subjects, IMS acquired 1,173 prints, and 801 more prints are on loan for field use. It is estimated that acquisition activities during FY 1963 saved IMS $501,097. Sources for these films were several organizations, societies and associations, hospitals, doctors and institutions, trade unions, government agencies, foundations, museums and private industry. Among the more outstanding films acquired were: "Agriculture USA", "Project Telstar" and "The John Glenn Story."

The Agency is now placing special emphasis on one-reel documentaries because this type of picture is relatively easy to place in public theaters, whereas lengthy films are rarely accepted by theaters. Strong evidence of the success of this operation is the report from USIS Santiago. The report concerns "Horizons", the news magazine for Latin America. Recently USIA adopted the policy of issuing "Horizons" as two separate one-reel productions per month instead of a single two-reel production. USIS Santiago reported that 10 first run theaters accepted prints of the single reel version of "Horizons", whereas only five of these theaters would accept the two-reel issues. The audience for the two-reel version was 50,400, whereas the two 10-minute issues were placed in a total of 18 principal theaters in Santiago and were seen by 132,500.

With the cooperation of the American Science Film Association, USIA has sponsored, organized and coordinated American Science Film Forums in many countries. These traveling forums show selected American science films, accompanied by lectures, discussions and seminars under the leadership of outstanding American scientists. Their purpose is to emphasize U.S. pre-eminence in science; the relationship of science to human progress; and to demonstrate the application of films to research, education and the popularizing of scientific knowledge.

The U.S. Government and the American film industry participation in major international film festivals has been greatly strengthened. George Stevens served as Chairman of the American delegations to the festivals at Cannes and Venice in 1962; in 1963 he was chairman of the American delegations to the Moscow and Venice festivals and a member of the delegation to the Berlin festival. Because of the reluctance of the Motion Picture Association of America to select U.S. entertainment feature films for the 1962 Cannes film festival, the Hollywood Guilds Festival Committee was established upon the recommendation of USIA.

To fulfill its advisory function and to tailor output, USIA must know continuously and quickly what people abroad think about U.S. foreign policy actions and statements, along with their reaction to other major happenings. In recognition of this, reporting of such reactions has been expanded and speeded.

During the October 1962 Cuban crisis, for example, reports on global reaction were prepared twice a day, then daily, then intermittently as required. An over-all assessment of the situation was prepared later when there was time for adequate evaluation. Similar reports were issued on many subjects including the Sino-India border conflict and the Buddhist protests in South Viet-Nam.

Public opinion studies overseas have been enlarged in scope and depth to examine long-term values and aspirations as well as current views. In 1963 the Agency's Survey Research Division conducted its first world-wide public opinion study designed to measure attitudes on a global basis. Surveys also are used to study target groups that USIA is attempting to influence, to investigate channels and methods of communication and to examine the effectiveness of specific Agency programs. There has been a substantial increase in field commissioned research projects, including pre-testing of media materials and studies to determine the impact of particular programs. An effort is being made to study the attitudes of emerging peoples. This work has been expanded considerably in the past two years with an accumulation of invaluable information.

The Agency's research staff has stimulated applicable study by independent American scholars, foundations and universities. Survey findings now are being exchanged through information centers established at several universities.

A special projects research division was established in January, 1962 to cultivate fields of private research by offering suggestions, encouragement and limited financial backing. Additional resources have been utilized when research objectives converged with those of USIA and other government agencies. The values and aspirations of developing peoples, the clash of ideologies and political semantics have been the chief fields of exploration under this program. Research findings are being used to help tailor Agency information output.

Communist propaganda reporting and analysis now is handled on a daily basis. An early morning briefing from the overnight files informs key Agency officials on the latest Communist propaganda lines. Soviet and Cuba specialists prepare daily reports summarizing the foreign and domestic output from Moscow and Havana. Interviews with refugees and travelers from Communist countries have been utilized to probe public opinion in nations closed to us. By this method the Agency has acquired some indications of popular attitudes and communications habits in the Communist orbit.

The Agency's research library has introduced an automatic punch-card system of procurement, which reduced overtime and cut out hundreds of man hours spent annually in typing and filing. New equipment has speeded the transmission of materials between the library's several branches and has made file materials more readily available to operating services. Two new library branches were opened. One is the Foreign Correspondents' Center, a reference and circulating library near the United Nations headquarters in New York. The other is a limited collection selected for the particular benefit of Agency trainees.

During the past two years, American business and individuals have given the Agency a considerable volume of materials, otherwise unobtainable because of budget limitations, which were essential in overseas posts for initiating and welding a relationship with priority audience groups. Examples:

About half of all donated books are now carried overseas free by several major steamship lines; in the past two years some 800,000 books were shipped this way. At no charge, U.S. truckers are also moving impressive quantities of books and other materials from points of donation to the Agency's Brooklyn and Washington warehouses where they are screened and shipped.

Last Spring the U.S. Post Office Department agreed to give the Agency all books received in its 14 dead letter centers--100,000 to 150,000 annually. Most are new books, delivered by the Post Office to the USIA warehouse in Washington at no cost to the Agency. Some 150 wives of Agency officers have volunteered a half-day or more a week to sort and pack them. Supervised by a professional librarian, they so far have selected about 60,000 volumes for USIS use overseas. These include new high-quality reference works, texts, publications suitable for special presentations, as well as fine groups of American fiction, both hard and paper backed.

USIA's cooperative effort with American industry to inform U.S. businessmen stationed abroad on critical issues of American foreign policy now enters its third successful year. Over 8,000 such businessmen receive from their home office briefing material supplied by the Agency to 441 international companies. The most recent was on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; it reached recipients while international interest in the treaty was at its peak.

For the past year the Agency has operated an editorial exchange program with company and professional association publications that circulate overseas. USIA provides those publications with feature and policy materials for background, and which also suggest articles that will help to convey U.S. objectives to overseas readers. More than a million people are reached by the 67 American private publications now receiving such Agency material. In exchange, the Agency obtains, without cost, industrial and association material of value to Agency editors and writers. Additionally, a hundred exceptionally high quality publications, showing the achievements of American business, science and technology, are now received monthly or quarterly for distribution to USIS libraries.

The increasing need for sports equipment abroad led to the creation of an International Sports Kit Project in cooperation with the People-to-People Sports Committee. Begun in September 1962, the project resulted in requests for more than 12,700 Sports Kits from USIS posts in 86 countries. During the first year U.S. organizations and individuals donated 250 Sports Kits valued at $7,000 for distribution by USIS posts in 50 countries. Recent promotional efforts are expected to result in a significant increase in the giving of Sports Kits. Within a price range of from $12 to $64, the six kits provide equipment for boxing, baseball, softball, volleyball, soccer and basketball.

Emphasis in the donated books and magazine program has shifted from used to new material. Most of the 800,000 donated books shipped overseas by the Agency last year were new. In addition, the Book-of-the-Month Club has donated full subscriptions to 700 foreign libraries recommended by USIS posts. To avoid duplication and achieve greater effectiveness, a joint USIA-Peace Corps Donated Book Pool has been established to solicit book donations and to fill Peace Corps Volunteer and USIS book needs. While the magazine newsstand program continues at the 2,000,000 annual new magazine level, greater stress has been placed on technical and professional journals such as medical journals or the Scientific American.

Agency officers and executives of American companies with international operations have been meeting to delineate areas of mutual interest. These discussions, with over 150 companies, have served two purposes: first, to encourage these industries to identify their overseas activities with the economic and social development of the countries where they are operating, and second, to explore the possibilities of cooperation abroad between industry and Agency representatives. In this connection, USIS Public Affairs Officers are now visiting the home offices of companies with substantial operations in the countries where these officers are stationed.

Just over a year old, and now managed by a private non-profit corporation, the "Books USA" program allows Americans to purchase packets of 10 selected paperback books, at $4.00, for distribution abroad by USIS and the Peace Corps. This project, which requires no appropriated funds, takes advantage of the "at cost" basis on which many paperback publishers are prepared to make good books available, and it allows USIA control of distribution and presentation according to current target priorities.

Three automobiles, each towing a fully equipped travel trailer, have been made available to Agency foreign service officers for refamiliarization trips during their home leave in the United States. All costs, including gas, oil and insurance are borne by the Wally Byam Foundation. Twelve USIS officers and their families this year were able to benefit from this opportunity to reacquaint themselves with the grass roots life of the country for which they are spokesmen overseas on their next assignment.

The Agency has expanded the training program for junior officers to include the eight week, basic officers course at State's Foreign Service Institute. USIA officers thus receive essentially the same basic preparation as do junior diplomats. At the same time, USIA has the opportunity of indoctrinating future ambassadors in the role of the Agency. This is done through professional contributions to the curriculum and by the presence and actions of Agency junior officers participating in the courses.

The Agency has also increased its participation in the mid-career course from four or five officers a year to 20 or 25. With USIA assistance the course of instruction has been completely revised. Slightly over half of the Foreign Service Officers of this Agency are in grades R-5 and R-4. Training opportunities, other than language, for officers at this level are limited. For this reason USIA attaches great significance to the mid-career officers course and hopes to increase its participation in the future.

Substantial changes have been made in the training and placement of junior officers. In addition to the basic officers course, language training is heavily emphasized. Approximately 70% of the Agency's junior officer trainees now receive six months of language instruction before leaving for the field. Of these, 50% are trained in languages other than French, German and Spanish. Every junior officer now gets a basic course in the language of his training post; previously, European languages were stressed. A junior officer is now assigned to his training post or area for at least one tour of duty following his ten-month training period, unless there are overriding reasons to the contrary. This is completely contrary to previous policy. USIA has encouraged the Foreign Service Institute to develop a series of short courses (six months or less) in the so-called "hard" languages. Many USIA junior officers achieve phenomenal results from these intensive studies and, when followed by living in the country for three years, they develop a high degree of proficiency.

USIA has organized a number of special seminars and institutes for the domestic establishment of the Agency. These have covered such topics as youth and student affairs, international labor, U.S. efforts and accomplishments in space and the special seminar on problems of developing areas. Approximately 1,200 employees of the Agency have benefited from the program; for many it has been their first formal Agency training.

The USIA Intern Program for young graduates of university cinematography schools was inaugurated in October, 1962. Those selected, five in number, have done graduate work in films, have made films of their own and have worked closely with skilled professionals. They work for a year in the Agency on motion picture projects and receive special technical training and general instruction during those activities in preparation for assignment overseas. A new group of five interns will be inducted very soon.

During the past two and one-half years, the Press and Publications Service has developed new directions in both the nature of its output and its operational methods. In content, the major change has been in the emphasis on five major themes, which are the framework for the bulk of the service's output. The main effort has been to create Press and Publications material designed to emphasize the sources of strength on which U.S. foreign policy is based. Simultaneously, material not linked to America has been diminished.

Direction of IPS visual output has been concentrated in one operating branch with a direct line of responsibility to the director of IPS. Previously, it was diffused. A Run of Paper color service has been initiated to provide overseas publications with color separations on thematic subjects, which greatly reduces reproduction costs and increases use.

Picture service on chief-of-state visitors has been speeded. The old presentations albums that took a minimum of two months to produce have been replaced with prestige leather portfolios presented to the visitor before he leaves the United States to return home.

In graphics, the True Tales continuity strip is now being offered the field in jumbo size suitable for display and presentation. All regular cartoon continuity strips are now being produced in Spanish as well as English.

A series of cartoon-type booklets was devised to carry the Alliance for Progress and anti-Castro messages to the mass audience in Central and South America. Each booklet depicts actual happenings in color-drawing sequences. They have been extremely effective, making necessary large volume reprints. Twenty titles have been published. Nearly 20 million copies have been printed and distributed.

In order to improve the Agency's still picture output and keep abreast of technical developments, the Agency's photo laboratory was modernized. The lab's capacity for speedily turning out large quantities of copy negatives was greatly increased by the purchase of a continuous film processor. A Log-E-Tronics Unit, the first step toward electronic production of multiple prints was installed.

The IPS newsroom was reorganized as follows: Coverage, formerly the sole responsibility of a press coverage desk, was divided between the Washington desk and the telegraph desk. For the first time, a copy desk was created, to edit not only newsroom copy but also that of the features section and the visual materials branch. A news editor was added to supervise these desks. Several experienced newsmen were added to these desks (for example, a former associate editor of the Saturday Evening Post, an assistant city editor of the Louisville Times, a Sunday editor of the Corpus Christi Caller Times). An additional reporter has been assigned to the IPS UN Bureau. Coverage-in-depth, as opposed to straight top of the news coverage, has increased, with the production of a markedly greater number of backgrounders, situation pieces and interpretive stories.

The volume of IPS content has been tightened materially, but the Wireless Files have been expanded, largely in Africa. In March, 1961, 91 posts were equipped for direct Wireless File reception, of which only 18 were in Africa. In 1962, receiving equipment for 15 new African posts was put into operation and a separate African regional file was inaugurated. It started as a four-hour English transmission and now is six hours in English and French to 30 countries. Jamaica, British Guiana, Malaya, the Dominican Republic and Guayaquil also started getting the Wireless File. Altogether, 111 posts now receive it.

IPS pamphlet output has sharpened its political accent while reducing quantity which conforms with the Agency's role as the psychological arm of the Government in implementing foreign policy. Consequently, much of the material once presented as Americana is no longer used, except when it is essential as a means of suggesting a method for action in other countries. Examples of this closer keying to major current objectives were when the nuclear test ban treaty was under negotiation. IPS quickly issued a number of pamphlets in support; when Berlin was the hot issue, graphic pamphlets were produced. Heavier emphasis on graphics resulted in a picture pamphlet on Castro's betrayal of the Cuban people. Currently a comprehensive documentation of the Sino-Soviet split is being prepared.

In IPS mail features, science output has doubled, with space developments by far the biggest subject, but with increases also in subjects such as medicine, scientific applications in industry and similar subjects of great interest abroad, particularly in underdeveloped areas. Overseas rights have been acquired for material produced under domestic commercial contracts with the Astronauts. The volume of material on Civil Rights also has doubled in the past two years.

The number of IPS special packets, on such subjects as "The U.S. Trade Expansion Program", "Thirty Years of U.S. Social and Economic Progress", and "New Products and Processes in U.S. Industries", has increased sharply. Much more is being done to explain how the Democratic form of government assists and benefits its citizens. For example, a series called "How the U.S. Government Helps the People" has been running more than two years, and has developed more than 30 byliners by heads of various Federal Agencies outlining functions directly benefitting the citizen and the community. The effort to explain America within a mutual frame of reference is being carried out in the series, "Profile of an American", which has included a school teacher, doctor, farmer, steel worker and editor, among others.

In magazine reprints, a special service has been established to increase the number and variety of articles with intellectual appeal, for use in USIS-produced scholarly magazines. This in turn has led to servicing of more articles on public affairs by such government policy-makers as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Walt Whitman Rostow.

Special materials output by IPS has devoted increasing attention to the international effects of Communism. For example, an exhaustive series of articles was produced on Communist infiltration of free nations, covering most of the world's non-Communist nations. More is being done on the Communist economic offensive to show how trade and aid are used to promote purely political goals. The volume of background articles on the Sino-Soviet split has increased, and they point out that the dispute is primarily ideological and that the goals of world conquest remain unchanged.

The Africa Branch of IPS completed its second year of operation last month. It now serves 33 countries through 47 USIS posts. Thirty of them have radio telephone and telegraph equipment to receive the daily bilingual file. A small French staff provides French versions of both Wireless File and mail materials. From its beginning, the Branch has carried a heavy load in supplying copy on African visitors and other U.S. African firsts, and has played a leading role in telling a frank but constructive and continuous story of race relations in this country.

In September, 1963, secure teletype circuits were put into service between the State and Agency wire rooms and USIA assumed the responsibility for its own terminal processing. Reproduction workloads were sharply reduced and delivery times, both in and out, greatly improved.

A Regional Service Center was established in Mexico City in March, 1962. It was staffed with editorial specialists directing their efforts to selected audiences of labor, students, and self-help phases of the Alliance for Progress. Their end products are in the form most suitable for the transmitting media--finished printed material, lithographic negatives for local printed reproduction and manuscripts of material designed for placement in local magazines, newspapers, radio and television stations. Two other overseas Centers, at Beirut and Manila, sharpened their operations by increasing services while reducing costs. Services to using posts were increased and unit costs reduced. Meanwhile, a survey of press requirements for West Africa was made and the new posts were provided with minimum equipment for producing printed materials.

Exhibits prepared initially for showing in the USSR under US-USSR Cultural Exchange Agreements and later shown in other East European countries:

"Plastics USA" (5,000 sq. ft.): Shown for three weeks each in Kiev, Moscow and Tbilisi, between May and September, 1961, to audiences totalling 375,000 people. Exhibited in Rumania at Bucharest and Cluj; at Posnan (as part of an International Trade Fair) and Warsaw, Poland; and in Zagreb, Yugoslavia (again as part of an International Trade Fair)--between March and September of 1962--to an additional audience of 1,590,000.

"Transportation USA" (7,000 sq. ft.): Displayed in Volgograd and Kharkov between October 24 and December 27, 1961 to a total audience of 172,000. Shown again in Belgrade and Ljubljana between May and October of 1962, to an additional audience of 390,000.

"Medicine USA" (7,000 sq. ft.): Shown in Moscow, Kiev, and Leningrad for three weeks in each city, between March and July, 1962-to a total audience of 206,954. It was displayed in Zagreb and Belgrade in April and May to an additional 202,600 persons. This exhibit also formed the U.S. representation at Izmir (Turkey) International Fair in August, 1963, attracting there a quarter of a million visitors.

"Technical Books USA" (7,000 books and reference materials): Shown in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev between January 23 and June 11, 1963--three weeks in each city--to 140,423 visitors.

"U.S. Astronaut Orbits the Earth": This exhibit consisted of seven unmounted panels printed in color. Two thousand copies were prepared and shipped to posts all over the world well in advance of John Glenn's orbital flight. The posts made them ready for display as soon as word of Glenn's safe landing on February 20, 1962, was received, and many posts have continued to display them on appropriate occasions.

"Friendship Seven Mercury Capsule": in which John Glenn made his orbital flight. The capsule was made available by NASA, transported by the Air Force and toured under USIA auspices to 23 countries between April and August of 1962. Standing-in-line and attendance records were broken by the Friendship Seven all along the way.

"U.S. Progress in Space Sciences": A 30-panel free-standing exhibit with seven models. Eleven sets have been distributed to all areas. Among the places where this exhibit has been shown with success to date (usually in combination with other Agency-supplied exhibits and models) are Rome and Sao Paulo in international affairs, Tokyo and four cities in Portugal.

"Graphic Arts USA" opened in Alma Ata in early October and was an immediate smash hit.

Fiscal Year 1963 was the most productive year in the history of the Agency' s book publishing program. One thousand two hundred and two editions totalling 10,850,000 copies were published in 36 languages.

The Agency's Latin American Book Translation Program was expanded dramatically during the last two years, increasing from contracting of 64 editions in Spanish and Portuguese totalling 541,000 copies in fiscal year 1961 to contracting of 332 editions totalling over 3,500,000 copies in fiscal year 1963. To insure that these vastly increased quantities of books reach Latin American readers, a campaign to encourage vigorous commercial promotion and sale of these books has been developed throughout the area.

With the emergence of some 16 Sub-Saharan French-speaking colonies and dependencies into independence, low-priced American book translations into French became an important concern of the Agency. By July, 1963, over one million copies of more than a hundred titles were available in French to African readers at the equivalent of 20 cents a copy.

Since the spring of 1961, over a million copies of some 200 American textbooks have been translated into 18 languages and published and placed in schools and universities in 17 countries under the PL-480 Textbook Programs.

The Low-Priced Book Program in English has produced 3,085,921 paperbacks since March, 1961, and has sold 1,830,294. Reflecting improved distribution and promotion during the past two years, sales represented almost 50% of the total sold since the program began seven years ago.

The criteria by which the eligibility of informational materials for Informational Media Guaranty coverage is determined were substantially revised in September 1961. Eligibility is now limited to those materials which make a positive contribution in support of U. S. policy objectives and reflect favorably on the United States. The limited IMG resources are now allocated on a priority basis to assure that certain basic needs are met. For example, in fiscal year 1963, $350,000 in IMG contracts were issued for English-teaching materials. The bilateral agreement with Pakistan was amended to remove restrictions on the use of rupees acquired under the IMG program. A bilateral agreement was negotiated with the Republic of Guinea. Two new country programs were started (Korea and Afghanistan) and three other programs were phased out (Burma, Israel and the Philippines).

The Agency identified as of potential usefulness, and reviewed in relation to Agency objectives, over 10% of the books issued by the American publishing industry (18,000 titles published in 1961; 22,000 in 1962).

As a field service based on ICS book reviews, the Agency recommended about 3,000 titles a year to USIS posts for special consideration in ordering books. Blue Books have also been compiled and distributed to all USIS posts. These annuals combine, cumulate and list in an orderly fashion all the books recommended to USIS posts by various elements of ICS.

The Agency compiled and issued periodic subject bibliographies and special lists of books to assist USIS officers in obtaining useful materials. Of particular importance were book lists on modernization, labor, history, periodicals, a series entitled Focus U.S.A., and shorter lists on areas of particular Agency emphasis.

Books were selected to accompany the increasing quantity and range of Agency-sponsored exhibits. These varied from large book collections shown in Iron Curtain countries, to a model American book store for presentation in the Middle East, and to smaller book displays which accompany exhibits travelling throughout the Free World.

The Agency's American Studies Program came of age with the publication of "The United States of America, A Syllabus of American Studies." This "Syllabus", along with complementary material on the University of Pennsylvania certificate program, is helping to promote the growth of American Studies at many posts around the world. By September, 1963, 63 posts had requested 1,883 sets of the Syllabus for presentation to university libraries, education officials and professors.

"Restatement of Purposes and Technique of Agency's Cultural Packets" was published in July, 1961. In it the cultural operations division announced the continued production of ghost-written lectures on those aspects of American society, culture, history and government of interest to overseas audiences, and of importance to the Agency's over-all program.

Nineteen new information centers have been opened on the African continent for an area total of 54. Two additional regional librarians have been appointed: one for Dakar and former French West Africa, one for Brazzaville and former French Equatorial Africa. This brings the total number of librarians in Africa to six.

Collection of books in French have been increased considerably for French-speaking countries with the institution and growth of the "Nouveaux Horizons" series of low cost books in French for Africa. Over 100 titles in this series are now on USIS Library shelves in Africa.

The Agency has steadily increased its production of television programs to meet the immense need and interest overseas. In Fiscal Year 1963, slightly more than 113 hours of programs on film and tape were produced compared with 101 hours in 1962. In 1963, 22 new positions were added in the Television Service to improve the production, quality and capacity: 10 positions in production, six on the technical staff, four in programming, and two in administration. These additions, and the Agency acquiring its own production equipment, have resulted in quality programs at costs lower than commercial stations.

New TV studios, nearing completion, will permit USIA to more than double the volume of in-house productions. The new facilities will enable USIA to do language adaptations, dubbing, editing, original programming and transfer of programs from tape to kinescopes. They also will make it possible to record audio and video direct transmissions from any of the three networks via the leased circuits, to transmit audio and video to 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue for direct screening and produce programs in three scanning standards. The equipment can handle many technical jobs that formerly had to be done under contract.

Agency productions and acquisitions have been placed on more than 40 new stations world-wide since mid-1961.

A series of 13 programs, entitled "World Americana", was recently produced especially for the Japanese national television network. These programs described significant and interesting aspects of American life--leisure time, the American housewife, American youth, an American university and other subjects. Another targeted TV series, entitled "Personal Report", was inaugurated for Nigeria, using a Nigerian student in Washington as the commentator. This series projected selected aspects of the American scene to a Nigerian audience in terms comprehensible to them. Twelve programs have been produced to date. In 1962 a series entitled "Washington Reports" was started for Japan. This bi-weekly program features a Japanese correspondent reporting on various current events of interest to Japan. Still another series aimed for the Far East is "Washington Newsletter", a monthly series of reports to Thailand on events of interest in the United States.

In Fiscal 1963 a series of 13 half-hour Spanish-language programs, entitled "The Experts Answer", was inaugurated for Latin America. In this series, Latin American newspaper correspondents question an American expert in the fields of government, labor, industry, science and the performing arts. This series has been sent to 19 Latin American countries for placement.

A 15-minute weekly public affairs type of TV show in Spanish and Portuguese, "Panorama Panamericano", begun in 1961, has been improved and streamlined. Today it is carried in 19 Latin American countries.

Two special film programs on the Alliance for Progress were produced in Fiscal 1963. "Report from Colombia", commemorating the first anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, was sent to 17 Latin American countries; and "Report from Venezuela", on the subject of land reform, was distributed to 19 countries in Latin America for television and film showings. Recent films dealing with Castro have included "Focus: Cuba", "Cuba--A World Verdict", "The Lost Apple", "Castro and Cuba", among others, were produced and distributed world-wide for both TV and motion picture showings.

Television correspondents from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden, Holland and Italy are getting increased help from USIA in producing programs on the United States. Notable among these was a one-hour program produced in early 1961 by British Independent Television on the Kennedy administration, entitled "The New Americans". It featured interviews of top New Frontier officials and the President himself. The following year the same network returned to produce, with USIA assistance, a one-hour program on the United States entitled "State of the Union".

Other cooperative programs in which USIA has recently helped foreign television networks and stations include: two one-hour programs entitled "Science International" with the BBC; a program on the U.S. space effort entitled "Destination Moon"; a series to consist eventually of 13 programs on the United States by the French National television; six programs on the United States by Finnish television; a one-hour program on integration produced by Italian television; a series of 13 programs on science with Belgian television; a film documentary on the history of the American Negro by French National TV; a program on the space communities of Cape Canaveral and Houston by Italian TV; three shows on the U.S. space program for the new second German television network.

Another major achievement has been the Agency's "Let's Learn English" series which is or has been telecast in 37 countries to an audience of millions around the world. Because of the phenomenal popularity of the programs a second set called "Let's Speak English" has been produced and a third is planned for production in the near future.

"Science Reports", a television series comprising two 15-minute program segments per month and featuring achievements in science and technology in the U.S., is currently telecast in 52 countries around the world.

The first two volumes of a six-book English Teaching textbook series were produced under contract with the National Council of Teachers of English and the McGraw-Hill Publishing Company. A new English teaching quarterly, "The English Teaching Forum", is aimed at the overseas teacher of English. Articles include both linguistic theory and practical classroom problems.

Because of the limited number of professionally trained linguists available, the Agency has initiated a program whereby selected, outstanding teachers of English with broad Agency experience are sent to a university to undertake special studies in linguistics and the teaching of English as a foreign language. A professional training program has also been instituted for English teachers and binational center administrative personnel prior to departure for overseas posts.

The Agency has made significant progress in the more effective utilization of women officers. One woman has risen to the FSR-1 level, the highest career grade in USIA; another is the country public affairs officer for Chile; a third opened and operated a country program in Africa and is the only Agency officer to achieve a working proficiency in Swahili. Another woman has become the Agency's deputy budget officer; the editor-in-chief of "America Illustrated" is a woman, and three women officers have attained the GS-15 level.

Since the spring of 1961, the Agency has made strides in developing fuller utilization of minority personnel and in according them rank commensurate with their skills. Since that date, the number of Negro officers of GS-12 or higher rank in the domestic service, for example, has increased from one to seven. The number of Negro officers in the foreign service has about doubled from the 1960 figure of two dozen. Three country public affairs officers are Negroes. About 10% of all foreign service officers of rank equal to GS-12 or above are Negroes.

USIA officers are participating in Washington seminars on the "Problems of Developing Countries", examining techniques and materials that assist emergent countries to develop viable political structures resistant to Communist and other hostile attempts to subvert and weaken them. These seminars bring together some of the most skilled and experienced U.S. and foreign personalities in the field.

USIA officers also actively participate in both the Inter-Departmental Committee and the faculty responsible for the Country Team Seminar on Problems of Development and Internal Security. USIA normally enrolls 12 senior officers in each of the six sessions of this seminar and has one officer assigned full time to the faculty. USIA also has a liaison officer attached to the faculty of the Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg.

The quality and quantity of candidates for positions in the Agency's domestic and foreign services have increased sharply during the past 30 months.

General knowledgeability in the United States about USIA purposes and operations has also increased sharply; domestic press attention to the Agency, as one index, has increased in volume by some 2,000%, virtually all of it favorable.

Washington, October 1, 1963.

SUBJECT
Cliches That Should Be Discarded

As you know, we have led a rather long, and particularly successful, campaign against certain cliches that are no longer useful to American best interests. IAS dropped "Soviet Bloc" in its title, as more embarrassing than pertinent. VOA no longer refers to the "Communist bloc" or the "bloc countries." We think the trend is conducive to better listenership.

Current developments are leading others in the Government to thinking along the same general line. Yesterday morning Bill Tyler told me he had raised the question with Foy Kohler at the UNGA, specifically as concerns use of the term "satellites," with reference to Eastern European countries. Bill feels we are in no way advancing our objectives at this juncture by continuing to employ this designation, which he thinks must be galling to every true patriot in the area. I fully agree.

He asked me whether I would bring the matter to your attention, as a psychological factor of some importance. His hope would be that you might raise the point at an early NSC meeting, so that not only the Voice and other USIA media would stop using the pejorative term, but major speech writers, document drafters, and official reporters as well. He believes a decision at NSC level would get observance as would nothing else.

Matter of fact, State itself is one of the chief offenders--as witness the attached Airgram (CA-3272, September 23, 1963),/2/ which violates what we are opposing in just about every form.

Here are six expressions which we think it best to avoid, in our own interest, under current circumstances; they are more misleading than helpful:

Communist bloc Soviet bloc bloc countries	use instead Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Satellites Communist countries Communist-dominated countries	use instead Eastern Europe, or Eastern European countries

Continued use of such terms is not only psychologically unsound, in view of current goals--it also makes us look ignorant of the evolution we believe is taking place in that area of the world.

LSB

Washington, November 25, 1963.

SUBJECT
USIA Coverage of President Kennedy's Death and Your Assumption of the Presidency

USIA is using all media to describe your accession to the Presidency and to document the orderly transfer of power following President Kennedy's death.

Since 2:00 p.m. Friday, the Voice of America has been broadcasting a special program around the clock to all parts of the world. This coverage will continue through your address to a joint session of the Congress on Wednesday.

Our Wireless File, a teletype service to 108 posts in 101 countries, has carried full accounts, including biographies of you and the late President. News photos, including a 17-picture biography of you, were rushed out by air.

We are transmitting the text of a brief pamphlet on you to all posts for immediate translation and distribution.

Extensive newsreel coverage, for both theater and TV use, is being air-shipped daily.

A 15-minute TV biography of you is almost completed, and will be air-shipped to countries having TV by Tuesday.

A full half-hour TV documentary of your rise to the Presidency will be completed and shipped within 10 days.

Two motion picture documentaries in color, one featuring the life work of President Kennedy and the other on your life and assumption of the Presidency, are to be completed within 30 days.

A six panel photographic exhibit an your career is in preparation for shipment to all posts by air on Friday.

Donald M. Wilson/2/

Washington, December 20, 1963.

It is essential that we help maintain a high level of foreign confidence in the continuity of American Government and policy under President Johnson and in our nation as the leader of the Free World. The President already has done much to assure the world. He has reaffirmed in several ways and in the most specific manner possible his commitment to the continuation of President Kennedy's foreign policy--a policy which he helped shape and carry out.

For some time I have been considering the priorities for Agency output, first issued July 24, 1961./2/ They have not changed substantially, which reflects in still one more way the continuity of U.S. policy. There have been enough shifts in emphasis, however, to warrant a restatement of these priorities.

There has been and is some confusion as to what these priorities represent and what proportion of our output should be devoted to them. The Agency's function, stated by the President in a directive of January 25, 1963,/3/ is to "help achieve United States foreign policy objectives." There are, of course, differences among these objectives: some are world-wide in scope, others limited in geographic applicability; some are capable of achievement in a limited time, others will be with us for the foreseeable future. These goals are spelled out specifically in our Country Plans, which continue to be the basis of our operations in the field and support activities in Washington.

The diversity of our objectives around the world requires a wide variety of approaches, techniques, and activities. It also requires that we define our priorities, and co-ordinate our activities in support of them.

The attached priority subjects are those which I consider most urgent at the present time and which should be given full and persuasive treatment in all Media before other subjects are tackled.

The relative efforts in behalf of any of the five priorities will, as in the past, vary with the unfolding of events, the nature of the medium, and the situation in individual countries.

The responsibility for co-ordinating Media output on the priority and other subjects will continue to rest with the Assistant Deputy Director (Media Content).

E.R. Murrow

While providing a broad range of materials required to support a diversity of objectives in Country Plans, until further notice Agency media will focus attention on, and give priority to:

THE PURSUIT OF PEACE

The United States has no more urgent task than the pursuit of peace. In the words of President Johnson, "We will be unceasing in the search for peace; resourceful in our pursuit of areas of agreement even with those with whom we differ." We believe this search for an attainable and honorable peace should be based on a gradual evolution in human institutions and on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements (such as the limited nuclear test ban) leading to general and complete disarmament. The United States will continue to encourage the settlement of international issues by peaceful means rather than force.

STRENGTH AND RELIABILITY

The United States, matured and tested under the responsibilities of free world leadership, will maintain its strength in all fields to protect its own freedom and to aid in the defense of other free nations against threats to their independence and institutions. The United States can and will keep its commitments to its allies and to other countries.

FREE CHOICE

The United States believes in a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future, free to build and change their own systems so long as they do not threaten the freedom of others. We believe in the dignity of the individual, and will continue to help other nations in their efforts to modernize their societies, to resist coercion, and to construct and maintain free institutions.

RULE OF LAW

The fundamental commitment of the United States is to freedom of the individual, of the community, and of the nation under law. This commitment is the hallmark which distinguishes societies of free men from societies where rule is based on privilege and force. Historically, the rule of law was a commitment of the people of the United States to themselves; today it is the cornerstone of both our domestic and international policies. We will continue to work toward perfecting the rule of law at home and encourage its extension to and among all nations.

UNITED NATIONS

The United States will continue its full support of the United Nations, seeking in concert with other countries to strengthen the UN's peacekeeping machinery. It will also continue to support UN functions which assist all free nations, large and small, to maintain their independence and to move toward political, economic, and social justice.

[Here follow examples of talking points corresponding to these priorities.]