New York, February 2, 1961, 2 p.m.

2078. Subject: 16th GA Presidency. Plimsoll (Australia) asked us whether we would like to see Slim (Tunisia) as next GA Pres. He said Slim just returned from Tunis with indication he be FonMin and with Govt Tunisia approval his candidacy.

Plimsoll reported several conversations with U Thant (Burma) who said to be Slim supporter. Thant wrote Ali Sastroamidjojo (Indonesia) (who is planning become serious ASAF candidate) seeking to discourage him from running. Thant claimed according to Plimsoll, he was urging others to write Ali in same sense. Thant said he had found surprising number Asians whom he would have expected be Ali supporters to feel Indonesia not right country to provide next GA Pres, that it should be African. In fact only UAR and Morocco seemed opposed to Slim, and are hoping urge Sudan FonMin to run.

Plimsoll said Thant leaving for Burma early next week and suggested if USG favored Slim it be important get word to Thant before he leaves. Opportunity act on Deptel 1346/2/ not yet presented itself. Hope be able do so during SC mtg Thurs morning.

Stevenson

New York, February 2, 1961, 6 p.m.

2084. 16th GA Presidency. Deptel 1346./2/ Stevenson met with Slim (Tunisia) during translation in SC this morning. He told him of high regard in which US holds him and his talents and expressed hope that these would be at service GA as presiding officer 16th Session which will mark moment of great crises and need for UN. This would be tribute both personally, to his country, and to continent of Africa. Stevenson added hope that Slim might make announcement his candidacy as early as possible and appropriate.

Slim replied by expressing gratitude for confidence shown and indicated his definite intention to run. He said his candidacy would be on behalf of all of Africa and for that reason he intended announce it as soon as he had been able ascertain backing of Africans was available. He therefore felt it not possible make announcement before resumed session commenced, at which time he would actively pursue his goal.

In response to Stevenson's question Slim said he felt confident he would be able obtain support from all of Africans. He mentioned having heard of possibility Ali (Indonesia) had been considering running, but he thought it doubtful Asia would be entitled to consideration for Presidency when Africans had for so long been denied it. We noted report that several Asians seeking discourage Ali from running which would confirm his feeling about candidacy of African state being entitled consideration this year.

Stevenson

New York, February 8, 1961, 8 p.m.

2131. Resumed 15th GA. Yesterday Korean observer Liem urgently queried USUN concerning rumor heard from Afghan and Japan Dels to effect resumed session would only consider those items which were absolutely necessary, as result of which items such as Korean one would not be taken up. We assured Koreans so far USUN concerned we not aware any intention not to take up various important items such as disarmament, Congo, Korea, and others at resumed session.

Today we learned from other quarters this rumor gaining some credence. At lunch today Schurmann (Netherlands) spoke favorably of it to Yost. Matsch (Austria) sought sound us out as to whether US support proposal of this kind. Plaja (Italy) called on us to inquire as to possibilities in this regard. Jha (India) said he liked idea avoiding discussion disarmament now.

Subject also came up in US-UK discussion Congo this afternoon. UKDel had done study on items remaining for consideration at resumed session which were musts from British point of view. Copy this list being sent separately. Basically it refers to Comite 4 and 5 items, Congo, TC composition and ECOSOC items in plenary and raises problem of disarmament.

In discussion with UK it was agreed everything hinges upon whether agreement with Soviets possible and desirable, whereby disarmament could be shelved until 16th regular session. Would seem be highly undesirable to shorten resumed session only to pave way for special session on disarmament as Khrushchev has demanded.

This afternoon we asked GA Pres Boland (Ireland) whether he aware current status pressure on this subject. He unaware this precise rumor, but recalled at time Soviet release RB-47 fliers,/2/ question of Soviets dropping U-2 item and obtaining deletion Hungary and Tibet bruited. Unofficial suggestions to this effect from Eastern European countries were then made to him but no formal approach made.

Stevenson

Washington, February 27, 1961.

SUBJECT
Candidacy of Ali Sastroamidjojo for Presidency of the 16th General Assembly

PARTICPANTS
Mr. Nugroho, Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Indonesian Embassy
FE:SPA--Mr. James D. Bell
FE:SPA--Mr. Robert S. Lindquist

Mr. Nugroho presented a Note in which the Government of Indonesia proposes Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo as candidate for the presidency of the 16th General Assembly The Note states that the support of the United States would be deeply appreciated./2/

Mr. Nugroho said that Ali's candidacy is partially an outgrowth of a previous Indonesian withdrawal in favor of Mexico in connection with the Disarmament Commission, and what he believes to have to have been at that time an understanding that this future candidacy of Dr. Ali's would receive certain Latin American support. He said also that the backing of the Arab states for Ali's candidacy may be affected by Mongi Slim's possible candidacy but nevertheless Indonesia is seeking Arab support. Mr. Nugroho believes that substantial Afro-Asian support can be lined up for Ali.

Washington, March 20, 1961.

SUBJECT
Presidency of the 16th General Assembly

The Tunisian Foreign Secretary has written you announcing the candidacy of Ambassador Mongi Slim for President of the 16th General Assembly and expressing the hope that his candidacy will have our support (Tab C)./2/

You will recall that Ambassador Stevenson, on your authorization (Tab D), spoke to Slim on February 2 to encourage him to put forward his candidacy (Tab E). According to the attached uncleared memorandum of conversation, the President on February 6 assured him of "U.S. backing" (Tab F).

The only other announced candidate is Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia (Tab G). While there are no indications that his candidacy has so far received any widespread support, his election would be in the interest neither of the orderly conduct of the Assembly's business nor the attainment of United States objectives at the session.

Against this background, a prompt commitment to support Slim's candidacy appears desirable. The last five Assembly Presidents have been from the Far East, the Commonwealth, the Middle East, Latin America and Western Europe, respectively. Only Africa and Eastern Europe among the geographic regions have never held the Presidency. If the Slim candidacy gains widespread support early, this should serve to discourage the Soviet bloc from putting forward a candidate and might persuade Sastroamidjojo to withdraw. At the same time, it is recognized that any United States campaign on behalf of the Slim candidacy is likely to prove counterproductive.

That you sign the attached letter to the Tunisian Foreign Secretary (Tab A) and approve the attached instruction to USUN (Tab B).

Washington, April 6, 1961, 6:48 p.m.

269. Zorin announced in Political Committee April 5 USSR would not press U-2, RB-47 complaint against US and suggested states concerned take steps clear agenda of Hungary and Tibet. Yost welcomed Zorin's statement re U-2 and RB-47 case but observed Hungary and Tibet not in same category. Later, spokesman USDel informed press US not prepared drop Hungary and Tibet.

Rusk

Washington, April 12, 1961.

SUBJECT
United States Position on "Package" Membership Proposal Including Mauritania and Outer Mongolia

The Brazzaville Group, who are the sponsors of the draft resolution before the General Assembly on the admission of Mauritania to the UN, have accepted the Soviet amendments to their resolution to include, and give priority in the resolution to, Outer Mongolia, and have requested that the U.S. agree to this "package" in order that another Soviet veto of Mauritania in the Security Council may be avoided. The French, who have agreed to support the Group on this matter, have informed us that the admission of Mauritania constitutes the "number one objective" of the Group under the instructions given them by their respective chiefs of state, and the Group have made clear that they will insist upon consideration of this matter at the resumed session. In this situation, the draft resolution with the Soviet amendments is practically certain of adoption despite strong Moroccan opposition to the admission of Mauritania and regardless of the U.S. position. A somewhat similar resolution, strongly and actively opposed by the U.S., was defeated in 1957, when the Assembly composition was much more favorable, by a vote of only 33 to 37 with 10 abstentions./2/ There is general agreement that the U.S. should vote against the Soviet amendments and abstain on the resolution as a whole if the amendments are adopted.

The pending draft resolution with the Soviet amendments would do no more than find Mauritania and Outer Mongolia qualified for UN membership and endorse their admission, with a request to the Security Council that it take note of this finding. In view of our recent decision to undertake negotiations looking toward recognition of Outer Mongolia, it would obviously be highly preferable if Security Council consideration of this request could be deferred until just before the 16th General Assembly. However, if the resolution is adopted by the Assembly, an African request for immediate Security Council consideration of this matter is likely so that the Assembly can act to admit Mauritania ( and Outer Mongolia) before it adjourns, and is practically certain when the Security Council acts on Sierre Leone's application following its independence on April 27. Ceylon is President of the Council in April and is most unlikely to resist an African request for an immediate Council meeting. While Chile is Security Council President in May, pressure from Sierre Leone for early consideration of its application, which the UK would almost have to support, would make postponement for any length of time extremely difficult.

There are two courses open: (1) the U.S. could abstain or join China in voting against the admission of Outer Mongolia in the Security Council and attempt to organize a sufficient number of negative votes and abstentions so that the negative votes of U.S. and China do not constitute a veto, as the U.S. did in 1957 and last December; or (2) the U.S. could abstain as it did on the package proposal including Outer Mongolia in 1955, which was vetoed by the Chinese, and try to persuade the Chinese also to forego use of their veto. (If the GRC were to agree, this course would result in admission of both Outer Mongolia and Mauritania.)

Arguments in favor of the first course are:

1) It would put the U.S. in a much better bargaining position in its negotiations on the recognition of Outer Mongolia;

2) It would permit us to approach the Chinese in the broader context of our negotiations on the Chinese representation issue, in which we contemplate urging that both the U.S. and the GRC agree to forego use of their veto on membership;

3) It would not risk a Chinese veto of the "package" proposal, with the serious damage to the over-all position of the GRC in the UN that would result from such a veto, and particularly among the Africans;

4) It would not have the implications for the GRC's status that adoption of a more flexible position on the Outer Mongolia question by the U.S. (and the GRC) at this particular juncture would have;

5) It would avoid a "back to the wall" reaction from the GRC just when we are trying to negotiate the representation issue;

6) It could give us a strong bargaining point with the Africans in obtaining their support of whatever handling is decided on with respect to the Chinese representation at the 16th General Assembly.

Arguments against the first course are:

1) It would almost certainly result in a Soviet veto of Mauritania for which the Africans would blame us;

2) The U.S. rejection of their approach would be strongly resented by the Africans, particularly as we could not explain our basic dilemma to them, and would be seriously prejudicial to our efforts to make them more responsive to U.S. influence;

3) It would probably result in such a reaction against the GRC as to reduce its support among African states, although the reaction would probably be less severe than in the event of a GRC veto under the second alternative;

4) It is far from certain that we could organize the necessary number of negative votes and abstentions in the Security Council to avoid the U.S. and Chinese veto which would be the "kiss of death" for the GRC in the UN. (There are five certain votes on the Council in favor of the "package": USSR, France, UAR, Ceylon, Liberia; whether in the face of French-African agreement on the "package" and GA endorsement of it, the UK, Turkey, Chile and/or Ecuador could be persuaded to abstain is far from certain.) If we were to vote against, and this were also to be a veto, this would be contrary to established U.S. policy.

5) It is questionable whether the active U.S. opposition to acceptance of the "package," which would be required not only in the Security Council but also in the GA to assure a substantial number of at least abstentions on the resolution there, is consistent with the decision to open negotiations on the recognition of Outer Mongolia, since we would not be in a position to explain that our opposition is essentially tactical and temporary.

The second course, which is that reflected in the attached telegram,/3/ avoids, in my opinion, these disadvantages and has the following advantages:

1) It would result in the admission of Mauritania;

2) It would go far to meet the request of the Brazzaville Group;

3) It would not be too unpalatable to Morocco;

4) It would undoubtedly be warmly received by the great majority of UN members;

5) It would avoid a complete reversal of our previous position on Outer Mongolia pending the outcome of the projected negotiations;

6) If the GRC agrees to forego the use of the veto, this course would avoid focussing the resentment of the Africans on the GRC at this critical time. It is, however, by no means certain the GRC would agree, whatever pressure exerted, to join us in an abstention. Its veto in 1955 came despite U.S. representations at the highest levels urging that it forego use of its veto in its own self-interest. If the GRC were to veto, the consequences in terms of loss of African support for its position in the U.N. would be extremely serious.

The disadvantages in this course are the obverse of the advantages in the first course and relate exclusively to our policies with respect to the GRC and Outer Mongolia.

We have been informed by USUN that Ambassador Stevenson has agreed to meet with the Brazzaville Group before the end of the week to give them our answer and there is a possibility that the Africans may raise their draft resolution at the next plenary, scheduled for April 13.

Washington, April 14, 1961, 10:30 p.m.

1583. I. Following is US position re admission Mauritania and Outer Mongolia to UN:

1. We should urge the Africans to insist that the "package" be split, pointing out that in our opinion Mauritania will get such an overwhelming vote in the General Assembly that it will be most difficult for the USSR to veto its application in the Security Council if the Africans maintain pressure on them. The Africans must realize that it is with the USSR not the US that the ultimate decision on the admission of Mauritania lies. It is the Soviet Union that has vetoed Mauritania.

2. We support the admission of Mauritania now as we have in the past and hope splitting the package will lead to its admission.

3. We will be prepared to support and even co-sponsor the admission of Outer Mongolia when we have had an opportunity to determine whether it in fact has the attributes of an independent state. The new administration has been reviewing this question with a view to initiating conversations at an early date.

4. If asked as to the meaning of this statement you should indicate that:

(a) we are beginning discussions with our friends immediately; and

(b) our review will include the question of the willingness and ability of Outer Mongolia to send and receive diplomatic missions and carry on normal diplomatic, consular, commercial and cultural relations with other countries.

5. The Chinese, UK and French Delegations should also be informed of our position immediately.

II. In light above Dept believes USGADel should, if tactical situation GA remains unchanged:

1. vote against Soviet amendments;

2. vote for 11-power draft if not amended;

3. if Soviet amendments adopted, arrange for para-by-para vote on amended resolution and vote against first Soviet preambular paragraph and first Soviet operative paragraph; vote for paragraphs remaining as they originally appeared in 11-power draft; and abstain on third operative paragraph as amended and on resolution as whole.

4. make explanatory statement along lines I (points 1-4) above.

Should also be pointed out Soviet efforts make admission one applicant contingent on admission another contrary UN Charter under 1948 advisory opinion ICJ. However, since US does not wish appear oppose admission Mauritania or disposed thwart will majority UN members on membership issue, it will abstain on 11-power draft resolution if Soviet amendments carried. For same reasons, US will endeavor prevent linking of admission Mauritania and Outer Mongolia in SC, will continue support admission Mauritania but cannot at this time support admission of Outer Mongolia.

III. USGADel should immediately consult with Chinese Del pointing out question admission Mauritania and Outer Mongolia could be raised SC before resumed session adjourns on basis GA action and in any event likely be raised when Sierra Leone application considered shortly after its independence on April 27. Our view best way prevent favorable SC action on Outer Mongolian application at this time is to organize sufficient number abstentions so that recommendation its admission fails to receive necessary seven votes, and we intend proceed accordingly. We would therefore urge Chinese Del obtain authorization Taipei join us in abstaining on "package" proposal in GA and SC since negative vote by GRC would only serve alienate such support as GRC now enjoys among new African members, particularly Brazzaville Group.

IV. USGADel should also urgently seek agreement other SC members likely be responsive our approach this matter (particularly UK, Turkey, Chile and Ecuador) to abstain in both GA and SC vote on "package" proposal.

Rusk

Washington, April 21, 1961, 12:06 a.m.

2090. Re urtel 2944./2/ Confirming telecons today, Mission authorized agree GA recess on schedule April 21.

While we very much wanted complete debate on Korea, Hungary and Tibet, we recognize that extending session would likely encounter strong opposition. We doubt seriously we could muster two-thirds majority to reconsider earlier decision to adjourn April 21 and moreover it is clear that extending session would open the gates to numerous pressures to prolong session indefinitely. Moreover, in context atmosphere engendered by Cuban and UNRWA debates in particular, we think drawing session out unlikely be productive from our viewpoint even if we could do so. As far as African item is concerned, as long as Africans themselves are not distressed by failing conclude consideration this item, and particularly since they have insisted in injecting unacceptable elements on target dates into res on our item, we prepared see this wind up without res.

Main additional action Dept eager to see taken not covered by urtel is Political Committee decision on seating North Korean representatives. We believe North Korean response to Committee's condition on seating their representatives clearly unsatisfactory and that it would be desirable, especially from viewpoint domestic ROK problems, to have Committee take decision that North Korean response is unacceptable and they are not to be seated. This also confirms Department's position you should seek "no decision" on Hungarian credentials.

Rusk

Washington, May 2, 1961.

SUBJECT
Toward a Strategy for the United States in the United Nations

Now that the Resumed Session of the United Nations General Assembly has adjourned, it is none too early to be planning for the General Assembly session in the fall, and more generally for the future of the United Nations. In this memorandum I will suggest a widespread program of consultation with governments on UN matters.

I

Before coming to recommendations on procedure, I think it would be useful to set forth some facts of life about the UN.

1. As we all know, the growing importance of the UN combined with rigid application of the one country-one vote principle, makes for increasing difficulty in mobilizing a two-thirds majority in the Assembly for sensible and moderate programs and policies. The presence of "swirling majorities" in the Assembly in turn tends to raise the emotional temperature of the atmosphere in debates in the smaller councils, notably in the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council, but to some extent in the Economic and Social Council as well.

2. However, the Resumed Session did demonstrate that it remains possible, even in a General Assembly of 99 members with 25 African states in attendance, to keep action (as differentiated from talk) under control. Despite our well-publicized difficulties in New York during the last few weeks, there was literally no (repeat no) action item which was able to get a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly over our active opposition. The Arab bloc could not sell its proposal for Alien Property Custodian in Palestine. The Mexican resolution on Cuba fell far short of a two-thirds vote. The provisions in the Indian resolution calling for Belgian withdrawal from the Congo within 21 days and the threat of sanctions were not approved. Even the demand for economic sanctions against the Union of South Africa because of its apartheid policy was not accepted.

3. On the other hand, a two-thirds vote was put together, with much sweat and sleeplessness, for acceptable resolutions on (a) the Cuban situation, (b) financing the Congo operation, (c) reaffirming the UN role in the Congo, (d) exhortations to the Portuguese on Angola and to the Belgians on Ruanda Urundi, (e) approving and implementing the plebiscite to split the Cameroun trust territory, (f) a Credentials Committee report recommending that the Assembly take "no decision" on Hungarian credentials, and (g) several non-controversial items, including the US-USSR resolution deferring General Assembly discussion of disarmament.

4. Thus in the actual event, the less constructive proposals were defeated and the most necessary actions taken. It must of course be recognized that the absence of economic and social items on the agenda of the Resumed Session, the decision to defer the disarmament debate, and the deadline set for adjournment contributed to this result. The Assembly did not consider certain questions on which we have the greatest difficulty mustering either a blocking third or a two-thirds majority. While no agreement was reached on a "bob-tailed" session, this was in fact what we got.

5. The picture is by no means of swirling majorities under the leadership of the Soviet Union defeating the US at every turn. The US is not-yet at least-being defeated at every turn; and the swirling majorities are far from being subject to Soviet leadership. Indeed, the Soviets do not operate in such a way as to exercise the leadership they could in this forum, since they take a relatively extreme position on nearly every issue, often change their positions suddenly in the later stages of debate, and have not yet learned to use their financial influence in the UN. (They could jeopardize the Congo operation far more by participating in its financing and then threatening to withdraw than by boycotting the agreed assessment from the outset.)

6. In the midst of all these stirring parliamentary events, highly significant executive operations are going on outside of the Assembly debates. The UN Emergency Force continues to sit on the Gaza Strip. The mediation machinery in the Middle East survives the April 20 Israeli parade in Jerusalem. By far the most important of all, the UN executive has been building its Congo force back up to nearly 20,000 again, in spite of earlier defections. Also during this period, the UN is managing a sufficient show of firmness to convince the central Congolese Government that the best way to get rid of the UN in the long run is to cooperate with it in the short run. At the same time, unnoticed and unsung, the UN Congo staff is conducting in the technical, economic and financial fields one of the world's largest civilian advisory operations.

7. In spite of all the talk about the devastating effects of the Soviet attack on the Secretary General, that estimable executive clearly won the 1960-61 round in what will doubtless be a continuing fight. Khrushchev came in like a lion with his proposal last fall for a tripartite Secretary General; Gromyko ascertained in March that in its present form this proposal was strictly no sale; and Zorin was duly instructed to go out like a lamb.

The predicted timidity of the Secretariat, as a result of the Soviet attack, has materialized among subordinates to some extent, but is not much in evidence in the Secretary General's office. Mr. Hammarskjold is currently working out a new "UN presence" in connection with the difficulties between Cambodia and South Vietnam. And some of the countries most concerned with avoiding trouble in West New Guinea are, in consultation with Mr. Hammarskjold, putting together a proposal for a new UN operation--a trusteeship over that disputed territory.

II

These are lessons that can be derived from past experience. If we look now to the future of the United Nations, some additional facts of life are discernible.

8. There is hardly a major subject in international politics which does not have a United Nations angle, presently or prospectively. To put the same thought another way, nearly every major matter handled by every Foreign Office in the world had to be handled both in bilateral diplomatic channels and in the multilateral channels of international organization.

9. Every United Nations matter (thus, by the definition I have just suggested, nearly every major matter of foreign policy) is sooner or later subjected to the full glare of international publicity. The United Nations has become a world news center rivaling and, on some subjects, upstaging the traditional news centers of London and Washington.

10. The United Nations and other international organizations are developing and can much further develop a capacity to take executive action on behalf of the world community as a whole. The unnoticed lesson of the events of the past few weeks is the great potential importance to our national interest of these international operations. The Kennedy Administration inherited three prime trouble spots: the Congo, Laos, and Cuba. It is not without meaning that of these three, we have had to move backwards or sideways on Cuba and Laos, where either no international field operation has been developed (Cuba) or the UN operation was inadequate for the task (Laos). In the Congo the presence of a field operation maintained by an international organization has enabled us to move forward (by fits and starts, to be sure) precisely because the world community can "intervene in the name of non-intervention" while a single nation, however powerful, cannot. The development of the United Nations operational capability should now be a central target of American foreign policy.

11. It will be important, as we go along, not to confuse actions and operations with the rhetoric and symbolism of public debates. We have to be able to operate at the level of symbolism as well as the level of reality; but in order to do so successfully it is important not to confuse the one with the other. At the symbolic level, for example, we can assume that the imprecision of resolutions and the extremism of rhetorical hyperbole will continue to increase as the square of the membership in the General Assembly--and can afford to be a good deal more relaxed about it if we have learned to apply our dignity and our power effectively in support of UN operations.

12. For the new nations and their even newer representatives, the discussions in the General Assembly and the smaller United Nations Councils and Commissions, including the regional commissions and the Specialized Agencies, have a very important role to play as a global training ground for responsibility. The development of voting blocs in the Assembly is deplored by some people; yet they are not only inevitable in so large a body but also potentially a force for more responsible actions by individual delegates. During the Cuban debate, the Nigerian delegate proposed to amend the Latin American resolution in an unfriendly way; he was brought to his senses by a Latin American threat to prevent a two-thirds majority for a resolution on the Cameroun issue that was favorable to the Nigerian point of view. The immersion of excitable diplomats in practical politics of this kind has its educational value.

As we work through the final years of the colonial era, for example, the primary problems facing the new nations will not be those associated with generating opposition to the "colonialists" or speeding the day of self-determination for their non-self-governing brothers. The primary problem for the leaders of these nations--in different ways in Africa, Asia and Latin America--is how to govern their own societies effectively and by the consent, whether or not expressed in traditional forms, of their own people. The task of institution building for social and economic development; the invention of appropriate forms of public communication and political leadership; the recruitment and training of internal security forces at once politically loyal and militarily effective; the reconciliation of a mystique of nationalism with the hard facts of international interdependence--these are the big items on the agenda for the national leaders of the less-developed parts of the world. It will be important for us, and for others of the "more developed nations", to find ways of making sure that these leaders and their successors are continually reminded of the obligations of public responsibility, which are not only (in the words of the Charter) "to promote social progress and better standards of life" but to do so "in larger freedom," protecting "fundamental human rights" and "the dignity and worth of the human person", and "to practice tolerance and live in peace with one another as good neighbors."

III

If the United Nations is to be made more effectively operational, if the symbolic debates are to be used to put pressure on the newer and more revolutionary governments as well as on the older and more democratic ones, if the United Nations is to fulfill its mission as a training ground for public responsibility, then there will have to be some changes made in the way we have traditionally operated in the United Nations. Most of them are obvious from this rehearsal of "the facts of life"; and some are already contemplated or under way in New York.

For example:

1. The United States Mission in New York, taken as a whole, needs to be on a day to day first-name relationship with about 600 key individuals in 98 national delegations. The subject matter of this relationship cannot and should not be limited to tactics on particular issues that may arise in the United Nations; it should instead be a process of continual consultation across the whole range of shared concerns about foreign policy. This requirement raises important problems about recruitment of staff, and the assignment of political officers from the Department at peak periods; it also makes the question of quarters allowances and representational funds in New York an important matter of United States foreign policy.

2. The requirements of the situation argue for a strong United States delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, with a minimum number of delegates (preferably none) who are there for show rather than for hard diplomatic work. The delegation should be of the highest professional caliber.

3. We also require urgently a modernization of our communications system with New York. When quick instructions are required in New York, we are having to send them over an ordinary, open telephone line. We are looking into ways to assure instantaneous and secure transmission to New York so that the long telegraphic delays are avoided as well as open telephone calls.

4. The planning of our work in the Department and in New York should provide for careful advance preparation through diplomatic channels (and on some issues in the public prints as well) on each item of each General Assembly agenda--and major items in the Councils, too.

5. The United States Embassy in each UN country needs to be generally familiar with United States thinking on the United Nations angles to all major questions of foreign policy--not only those which happen to be of concern in that particular country or region. Thus the United States Ambassador in Baghdad should be briefed on any change in thinking on Korea; the United States Ambassador to Japan should know what we intend to do about the African item; the United States Ambassador in Buenos Aires should be brought up to date on the Palestine Refugee problem; and so on around the circle.

6. We should arrange full and frequent discussions between responsible officers of the Department and of USUN with the Foreign Office people in key countries, particularly those officials who formulate instructions to their delegates in New York. This can partly be done by embassies on the basis of instructions from the Department; but there is much that can be accomplished in informal views across the whole range of United Nations affairs. You and I have already discussed plans for visits on my part to some of the European capitals for this purpose; later it may be useful to cover key bases in other parts of the world.

We surely have the courage and leadership to organize to do this job right not only in New York but in Washington and in every diplomatic post overseas. Whether the Congressional support for a first-rate effort will be forthcoming cannot be predicted; but the Congress has normally responded when the full weight of Presidential leadership has been publicly placed behind a major foreign policy push. In agreement with Ambassador Stevenson, I will shortly be making further detailed proposals to improve our technique and our capacity for effective "parliamentary diplomacy".

Beyond repairing the repairable deficiencies in technique, our preparations need to cover a detailed assessment of the situation surrounding each item now or likely to be on the agenda of the XVI session of the General Assembly, now scheduled to begin September 19, 1961, at the United Nations in New York. Here again detailed analyses and recommendations are in preparation at USUN and in the Department. They will be presented for your review as they are ready, in an effort to avoid the last-minute pile-up of United Nations policy questions and to emphasize the strategic rather than the merely tactical issues involved.

There are, however, three overriding questions on which it is necessary to develop a general sense of direction, as they affect nearly all the more specific items on the United Nations agenda. These three questions are:

--The financing and management of an operational United Nations
--The Secretary-General and "tripartitism"
--The issue of Chinese Communist representation in the United Nations.

IV

Financing and Management of Operations

I have referred earlier to the symbolism which the UN represents-a parliament of peoples from the nations of the world replete with rhetoric and resolutions which at times appear to counter the aims of American foreign policy-and to the need for making a distinction between undisciplined parliamentarianism and the responsibility of executive operations. I venture to predict that the coming months will require, perhaps more so than in previous years, serious deliberations by this Government whether or not to use the UN as an "executive agent" in areas experiencing political, economic or social upheaval. If it should be determined that the UN will be so employed then we must do some rethinking about its managerial capacity.

Because of the one country-one vote principle the political debates which may rage around the UN presence in troubled areas of the world are inevitable. Inevitably, criticism will be heaped upon whatever agent--be it this Government, a consortium of countries or the UN--is employed to maintain peace and security. But this principle and criticism should not be allowed to throttle the tools required for the task.

Peace and security is a responsibility of every nation, but our foreign aid effort is testimony to the fact that every nation does not have the wherewithal to meet the cost of attaining these goals. These nations are also members of the UN. And here, many countries are finding it impossible to meet the costs of UN peace and security operations based on the prevailing assessment scale.

To continue this system will pit against each new proposal for an operating function three groups of delegates--those, like the Soviets, who are opposed to the development of operating functions at all; those who think that the particular operation proposed might adversely affect their national interest; and those who believe the proposed operation will be too expensive for their treasuries.

The last category of countries is able to meet less costly obligations such as those supporting the UN Special Fund, the Expanded Technical Assistance Program and certain refugee activities. They are in fact, willing to delegate action to the governing bodies directing such activities. Thus, it appears to us that these precedents might be applied to emergency operations. To be sure, such operations have political implications far greater than UN technical assistance or refugee relief, and the General Assembly would continue to remain the forum for the airing of views on these questions.

But a large share of the financing burden of peace and security operations must inevitably fall on UN members with a capacity to pay. If there are a number of such operations, the burden probably will fall on the same members. The membership as a whole is probably willing to contribute moderate amounts annually toward peace and security (say $18-20 million), but some other provision has to be made for the bulk of the expense of an operation such as the Congo.

We are considering presently a number of alternative means of financing, including a plan which would provide for loans to a UN emergency fund with initial capital to come from the capital exporting countries and with repayments to be made by all UN members over a number of years. Any such arrangement should, following a determination that emergency action must be taken, be accompanied by a delegation of authority from the General Assembly to a consortium of nations making the major contributions to the operation both in cash and in kind. This consortium would then support and advise the United Nations executive in carrying out the operation. As long as the one member-one vote principle prevails, it is unlikely that the Assembly would be willing to delegate outright the political control of such an operation to a consortium group. It might, however, be willing to give such a group, in recognition of its contribution, a greater voice, perhaps in an advisory capacity, in the management of the operation. Without such a delegation of authority it is doubtful that continuing financial support of the major contributing powers could be expected and maintained.

In the absence of some such arrangement it is feared that the peace and security efforts of the UN will take on a quixotic character whose weakness adds to the strategy of the Sino Soviet Bloc, receives the derision of a de Gaulle, and causes erosion of United States support.

The Secretary General and "Tripartitism"

Another major question of strategy arises from the Soviet attack on both the Office of Secretary General and on the Secretary General personally. Dag Hammarskjold's present term of office expires in the spring of 1963. The question of what happens after that will be on the agenda of the 17th General Assembly, convening in September 1962 since Article 97 of the Charter provides that the Secretary General shall be appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. This question will therefore presumably be under active consideration during the summer of 1962, hardly a year from now.

The first General Assembly, in its appointment of the first Secretary General, followed the recommendation of the United Nations Preparatory Commission that he be appointed for a five-year term. (The Commission also recommended that the Security General be eligible for reappointment for a further five years.) When in 1950 Trygve Lie's term was about to expire, the Security Council, meeting in closed session, was unable to reach a recommendation because of lack of unanimity among the permanent members. (The USSR vetoed the reappointment of Lie because of his strong support of the United Nations action in Korea and the United States let it be known that it was prepared to veto anyone other than Lie.) The General Assembly then adopted by a show of hands vote of 46 to 6 (Soviet bloc), with 8 abstentions, a resolution in which the Assembly simply "decides that the present Secretary General shall be continued in office for a period of three years." The legality of the action was challenged by the Soviet bloc and certain other members. It was justified on the grounds that the Assembly having set the term of office could extend it and that it was essential to insure the uninterrupted exercise of the functions vested by the Charter in the Office of Secretary General.

Trygve Lie, whom the USSR refused to recognize as Secretary General after the extension of his term, submitted his resignation in November 1952. In April 1953, acting on the recommendation of the Security Council, the General Assembly appointed Dag Hammarskjold and decided that "the terms of appointment of the second Secretary General shall be the same as those of the first Secretary General" (i.e., a five-year term). In 1957, Hammarskjold was reappointed by unanimous vote in both the Council and the Assembly, later deciding the "terms of appointment . . . . during his second term of office shall be the same as during his first term."

Khrushchev, in his address to the General Assembly on September 23, 1960, proposed replacement of the Secretary General by a "collective, effective body of the United Nations comprising three persons, each of whom would represent a certain group of states" (i.e., "colonialist," "socialist", and "neutralist"). This proposal followed the forced withdrawal of Soviet bloc personnel from the Congo and endorsement of the Secretary General's role there by the Fourth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly after a Soviet veto in the Security Council. Khrushchev enlarged upon his proposal in the Assembly on October 3, stating not only that "we" do not and cannot trust Mr. Hammarskjold but also that "any other Secretary General will also fail objectively to represent the interests of the three different groups of states." Soviet spokesmen subsequently explicitly extended this tripartite concept beyond the Office of the Secretary General to include the Secretariat, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council and its functional commissions and have raised it in other international meetings, such as the current Nuclear Test Ban talks and the recent Conference on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities.

On February 14, 1961, the USSR issued an official statement on the situation in the Congo, denouncing the Secretary General and declaring that "the Soviet Government will not maintain any relations with Hammarskjold and will not recognize him as an official of the United Nations." The Soviet bloc has since refused to have any official communication with the Secretary General. The response among the UN membership generally has, however, been so negative that the USSR did not really make an issue of the Secretary General at the resumed General Assembly. A Guinean proposal to delete in the Congo resolution a request to the Secretary General to take executive action was defeated 83 to 11, with 5 abstentions. While the USSR will undoubtedly continue to press its tripartite proposal and to attack Hammarskjold personally, the focus of this attack so far as the Office of the Secretary General is concerned is likely to shift to the Under Secretary level, where it has a better chance of obtaining some Afro-Asian support.

Unless there is a change in the Soviet attitude toward Hammarskjold, his reappointment is probably not feasible. Should the USSR decide to push its triumvirate proposal, the Soviet veto would probably preclude agreement on any successor and in any event, great-power agreement on a successor sympathetic to the West is highly unlikely. In these circumstances there appear to be five alternatives:

1) Persuade Hammarskjold to allow himself to be "continued" in office by Assembly action as Lie was. Since Hammarskjold is already being given the "silent treatment" by the USSR, he may be hard to convince but it might be done if he believed the future of the United Nations was at stake.

2) Persuade the General Assembly to designate some other Secretariat official as Acting Secretary General pending great-power agreement on a successor. This would require planning, since it was tacitly agreed at the San Francisco conference that the Secretary General would not be a national of one of the five permanent members of the Security Council and all the Under Secretaries General are great-power nationals. It is also unlikely that an Acting Secretary General from one of the great powers would be acceptable to the General Assembly.

3) As the price for the USSR's abandoning its "triumvirate" proposal, agree to some "neutral" acceptable to the USSR. However competent such an individual, this would inevitably mean a downgrading of the Secretary General's role in the Organization. He could not be expected to act without a Soviet blessing and the USSR would undoubtedly withhold its blessing if there were any chance his actions could thwart Soviet designs.

4) Accept a "neutral" as Secretary General with administrative responsibility for the Secretariat and for the conduct of UN sessions but place the responsibility for UN operations in the hands of semi-autonomous individuals or committees. This solution raises a serious question of how such an individual or group would be designated, since 1) the Charter vests the power of appointment in the Secretary General, 2) a neutral Secretary General could not be counted on to designate either an individual susceptible to Western influence or a group in which the Western influence would predominate, and 3) the composition of any committee designated by some other UN organ, given the present membership of the UN, is much more likely to approach the Soviet tripartite concept than to be Western in its orientation. Similarly an individual appointed by a UN organ is much more likely to be "neutral" than Western in sympathies. Moreover, unless there is one strong head of the Secretariat, it is not likely to be administered effectively; various organs and sub organs operating more or less autonomously are likely to result in more disparate, uncoordinated action within the UN system.

5) Accept the Soviet tripartite concept at Under Secretary level in exchange for Soviet acceptance of a Western-oriented Secretary General. This alternative probably would appeal to some Afro-Asians but is almost certain to hamstring the Secretary General and to be reflected throughout the Secretariat, thus undermining the Organization's capacity for executive and operational action.

Chinese Representation

The many opportunities to develop the United Nations as an executive operation depend for their fulfillment on our not allowing the United Nations to be blown apart on the issue of Chinese Communist representation. For ten years now this issue has been an ubiquitous element of discord in the United Nations and almost all other important international bodies. While the Chinese Communist behavior has been abominable, the United States rightly or wrongly bears a large measure of the onus for failure to solve the Chinese representation question. This attitude is to be found not only among those who are opposed to the moratorium resolution, but also among those who support it at our request. It has limited the exploitation of the full powers of the United Nations and has inhibited the orderly development of some important activities and programs.

The China issue has debilitated the vigor of the United Nations and frustrated its natural development and evolution as its membership increased and the scope of its responsibilities and programs expanded in number, depth and type. The Communist bloc has utilized this issue not only to provoke acrimonious debate but to cynically exploit it as an excuse to prevent the adoption of action desired by the majority. Solutions to such problems as the enlargement of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, and consideration of such problems as Charter review have been frustrated by the Soviet bloc on the excuse that China is not properly represented.

This problem, like an unhealing wound, has required considerable effort to maintain the position of the Republic of China. The United States has had to spend an inordinate amount of effort and good will to insure that the composition of the United Nations Councils, Credentials and other committees and subordinate bodies and the instructions given to them were consistent with its position on this question. Pressure and hard bargaining have also been necessary to insure that resolutions, invitations, treaties, conventions and other diplomatic documents were drafted with the view to preventing the Chinese Communists from being included. Many (including some of our friends in the United Nations) believe that disarmament agreement would be facilitated if the United States would alter its position on the question of Chinese representation.

United States objectives and interests in the United Nations require that the onus for the continuing failure to resolve the issue be shifted to the Communists. This means new tactics must be evolved that permit the United States to remain faithful to its commitments to the Republic of China; that assure the continuing membership of the GRC in the United Nations; that GRC can accept (or at least not oppose); that the majority of the United Nations finds reasonable, and that keep the Chinese Communists out of the United Nations as long as they persist in defying the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Consultations

As we develop and refine our policies on various issues of concern in a United Nations context, we will want to carry on a more intensive program of consultation with other countries. This program of augmented consultation that I am suggesting would provide for a stepped-up exchange of views on four levels.

1. The Department: General. IO and interested geographic bureaus will continue to discuss with representatives of foreign governments in Washington the continuing problems of the United Nations. It is important that these consultations take place early in the consideration before policy has hardened. Many nations maintain ambassadors in Washington who double in brass as United Nations Representatives. Similarly most of the embassies on Washington have at least one person responsible for keeping current with the Department on United Nations matters. It is important that we give these traditional diplomatic exchanges a new dynamism by keeping the flow of information meaningful, mutual and current. Furthermore, it is desirable that consultations be frequent across the board and not confined to the more aggressive of our allies.

2. The Department: IO. I believe it is particularly desirable at this time to send people from IO to consult with policy making officials concerned with United Nations affairs in various world capitals. We need to do more in the way of exploratory exchanges rather than converting people to "our" firmly determined policy. In our redoubled efforts to reach the uncommitted countries, particularly in Africa, as well as to strengthen the ties that exist with our allies, it would be helpful to have policy making officials in various countries consult directly with officers in IO who have an intimate knowledge of the particular problem. I hope to do some of this on the trip that I will take this summer along the lines that I have already discussed with you. It is no reflection on the hard-working Foreign Service generalist not to expect him to know in detail the involvements of United Nations problems as complicated as the Congo problem, Palestine Refugees, etc. But by the same token it is important that the Foreign Office of a small African country which has to instruct its delegation on these matters should understand them clearly. Furthermore, on such field trips our IO officers can contribute to a fuller understanding of UN matters by our own Foreign Service Officers.

3. USUN. Our Permanent Mission to the United Nations maintains daily contact with the representatives of ninety-nine countries. This daily contact becomes much more intensive during the General Assembly. It is important that these foreign United Nations Representatives not feel that our contact with them is motivated solely by a desire to obtain information or support. Much can be done between General Assemblies in developing a fuller understanding of United States policy, but this has to be a part of skillful diplomacy involving the creating of a firmly based rapport. The staff in New York is being strengthened so that our liaison will be more continuous, regular and effective. We are also seeking housing allowance so that able Foreign Service Officers can afford to serve in New York.

The need for this rapport is complicated further by the fact that during voting periods in the various committees of the United Nations, our permanent staff buttressed by Departmental support often has to move with great speed. An additional facet of this consultation at the United Nations would be the exploration of pre-General Assembly conferences with groups of our allies and provision of educational trips throughout the United States at our expense for newer UN delegations at various levels to increase their understanding of the United States.

4. U.S. Foreign Service--the Capitals. On numerous occasions it is necessary "to go to the capitals" to enlist support for the United States position on a particular issue. When this happens U.S. policy implementation is dependent on the skill of our Foreign Service. No matter how skillful our Foreign Service is, if the particular officer does not understand, for example, the involvement of the concept of a property custodian in the complex welter of the Palestine Refugee problem, he can be of only limited help if this is the issue that is being decided. This means that we must improve our continuing flow of current information to the field, possibly by a special reports officer for field dissemination or by circulating more widely in the field the unclassified daily summary which comes to the Department from USUN. Trips to the field by USUN officers should be encouraged as should a more regular UN briefing for all political officers en-route from Washington to the field. IO has attempted in previous years to implement the field's understanding by circular airgrams to the field detailing our preliminary thinking on U.S. policy on the various items to be considered by the General Assembly--these circulars are sent out a month or so before each General Assembly.

You would not expect such a memo as this to contain pat answers to all (or any) questions pending in the United Nations. It is instead an attempt to inventory the strategic questions to which we have to address ourselves between now and September, all the while dealing from day to day with the tactical crises of the moment. With your permission and encouragement, I would like to make this memorandum (and any first reactions which you and the Under Secretary may have at this stage) the basis for some intensive discussions with Ambassador Stevenson and his associates in New York, and with my colleagues in other Bureaus of the Department here in Washington. I would moreover propose to use this memorandum to generate some correspondence with a number of our Ambassadors abroad, on United States strategy in the United Nations.

Washington, June 1, 1961.

SUBJECT
Secretary's Policy Planning Meeting this morning Concerning the United Nations

The Secretary was not present. Mr. Bowles took the chair and requested Harlan Cleveland to kick off. Harlan mentioned some of the lessons we had learned from UN affairs in recent years and expressed the opinion that it was probably a good thing that the originally envisioned "peace force" in being under UN auspices had not materialized. He believed that in conditions as varying as Korea, Lebanon and the Congo no permanent force could be tailored to handle such a broad spectrum of demands on it. At the same time, the conscience of the world community would no longer accept military intervention on the part of individual nations. For the most part the days when the flag could be run up and one's forces cross borders have passed. The communists found this out ten years ago in Korea. The British and French found it out five years ago at Suez. We found it out a few weeks ago (Cuba), except that we did not run up the flag. He felt that across the spectrum of matters in which the UN was engaged, its greatest service could be at the intervention end of the spectrum and that bilateral arrangements would for the foreseeable future cluster more at the aid end of this spectrum. In between are a great many activities to be handled, partly by the UN and partly through other means.

One of his most interesting points was made in connection with our passing quite rapidly at this time out of the colonial era. He thought that once attention of the underprivileged nations could be directed from major attention to the colonial issue, it was most likely to settle next upon human rights issues. He said that in other areas of UN activity we have to a considerable extent passed beyond the purely forum stage and become operational--with varying degrees of success. He believed that willy nilly the UN was going to have to become operational in the human rights area. He believed that it would be in the United States interest to be in the vanguard of the inevitable on this count and that we should plan forthrightly accordingly. (I hope we can encourage him and perhaps S/P to come forth with some tangible planning on this.) We tend to forget how near we are to the post-colonial period, and we must plan how to lead the Afro-Asians in matters of their next major attention so that trends will be more in accordance with United States interests and traditional beliefs.

He also spoke of the difficult problem of financing operational matters in the UN. He said we had to find a means of avoiding situations whereby every action is dependent upon everyone's willingness to pay. He pointed out that in instances where the communists do not approve of action they will not support it financially. In the present stage of French disenchantment with the UN they, too, are unlikely to be willing to support many of its activities consonant with their ability to do so. The poorer nations are unable to do so. The combination of all of these is equivalent to more than a blocking third in the UN. He did not offer a solution to this one.

George McGhee said he was struck by the pessimism shown at Oslo with regard to the future of the UN. He said if we should be faced at some point with a choice between our NATO alliance or our support of the UN, it would be an exceedingly difficult choice for us. While not supporting the Portuguese view of their own colonial problem, he said they at least serve to flag some coming dangers. In their words we had for some time been "appeasing" the new nations of the world by handing over colonies. When they are all gone they will surely turn to other matters related to privileges of the "have" nations and the self-appointedly "superior" races. At this time they will use their growing influence in this world body to turn to such problems as Berlin, oil monopolies and military bases.

George said that while the problem of overt aggression may be in general solved now, the problem of indirect aggression certainly was not. Harlan Cleveland said that there was some promise even in this regard, however, in the Congo lesson in recent developments.

Mr. Bowles said that he thought the discussion so far had been overly pessimistic. He said a decade ago the communists had six revolutions going on in Asia and the only one they won was the Indo-China one, where Asians were fighting the white man. The British of course were associated with the suppression of the Malayan rebellion, but the point is that because of their history of preparing their colonies for independence and then in fact granting that independence, they were believed by the Malayans. This was certainly not true with respect to the French. He continued by saying that we have a number of advantages over the Soviets:

1) We do not want to take over the world, and the world does not want to be taken over.

2) We can use the tremendous forces associated with nationalism if we have the courage and intelligence to do so.

3) With all the predicted dangers inherent in the UN of a rapidly changing character, it is still likely to continue to be more in our interest than in that of the communists (Khrushchev can take small comfort from what he got out of the last session of the UN).

4) We must recognize that both the United States and the Soviets will become less powerful percentage wise in the world which is so rapidly evolving. This will definitely be bad for the Soviets but it need not be so bad for us considering the sort of world we not only can live with but would like to help bring about.

5) The days when we ran the UN are over, but this is not necessarily bad unless we indicate that we consider it to be so.

He said in general he was optimistic about the UN of the future. For one thing, he had always felt that if you couldn't solve a certain problem, it was often helpful to attempt to get the problem hopelessly confused. He said we were pretty good at that and the UN could help us in it.

Allan Evans feared that the "have nots" would, as they turn from the colonial issue, enter an era of "soaking the rich" and that we were likely to become more acutely conscious as time went on that we whites were the distinct minority in the world. He wondered whether the UN, in so far as it must lend itself to be a vehicle for the underprivileged and pigmented to get back at the privileged and white, was in our over-all interest after all. Several expressed opinions that it definitely was, provided we acted maturely ourselves. In this part of the discussion it was pointed out that even though the UN acted as a catalyst in the formation of blocs, without the UN powerful forces at work in the contemporary world would doubtless form regional associations which might give even more trouble if they were not part of a global council.

Harlan Cleveland advanced the interesting thesis that regional approach to security, while seeming to make all the sense in the world and did to a limited extent, was not proving to be what we had expected of it. Somehow nations are much readier to contribute forces to the solution of problems far from their boundaries than they are near home. India, for instance, has contributed a brigade in Africa but we would be fortunate indeed to get a couple of companies from India in any action which might eventuate with respect to Laos, even though the fate of Laos is of more immediate concern to India. We, too, in recent years with a notable exception or two have not felt free to engage our forces in Latin America. It seems that today security is best served by considerable cross-breeding.

One member (whom I did not know) expressed the view that while attempting to understand the rather widespread disillusionment with the UN characteristic of our European friends, we must resolutely carry on with our own belief in the UN despite their attempts to deflect us. Time, he felt, would prove that such a course would in the long run be very much in the interest of our European friends as well as in ours and that of the whole world community.

Considerable discussion was held concerning the mechanics of keeping our officers in the field adequately educated with regard to UN matters in other than their immediate areas so that they could in turn educate their hosts and solicit views from them. The opinion was expressed that we would do well to do more soliciting and less arm-twisting.

The meeting ended with the observation that perhaps the best advertisement of the virtues of the UN with regard to our interests lay in the fact that the Soviets did not like the UN and were doing everything in their power to make it ineffective.

New York, June 1, 1961, 7 p.m.

3227. 16th GA. We have reviewed political items before 16th GA on which decisions are needed. Fol are, in our opinion, most important:

1. Elections and slates: (A) LA candidate not yet in field for SC; we working on this with Argentina and propose raise question with Betancourt in Caracas; (B) we have had no response from Dept re desirability active campaign for Philippines in SC; (C) no word yet received from Canada or whether it interested in Comite I.

2. Disarmament: Must await decisions on nuclear testing (see USUN 3200/2/ for our comments) and results of disarmament discussions.

3. Hungary: Since Dept prefers Boland not approach Hungarians in New York (Deptel 2358-USUN 18419)/3/ we are awaiting Dept's decision re alternative initiative.

4. Korea: Coup in Korea creates exceedingly difficult situation for us in GA, both on seating of del and on substance of issue. Having put invitations to dels at 15th GA on basis acceptance UN competence it important new ROK govt again explicitly accept UN competence. Also appears necessary to us that we have new policy on Korean issue for this fall. We felt this before coup, which makes it even more imperative. Present policy created restlessness even among 16 and if, as is likely, neutrals such as India seek raise new elements there will be considerable support, probably including French Africans. We not certain what elements would be best or feasible in new approach, but if be able offer some kind of conf or meeting on our terms good vote might be expected. Possibility of avoiding Korean item entirely at 16th GA should also be considered. We note Seoul's 1686/4/ comments ROK probably would not wish have issue come up this year. In light fact 15th GA referred issue to 16th session and it therefore on provisional agenda, this may not be easy course. However, if ROK requested further postponement of issue it might be possible.

5. African item: We believe it might be best if African item could be referred to Second Comite with view to avoiding more readily question of target dates, which will be one of first items in Comite IV. Suggest we be authorized explore this with selected African dels. Also believe postponement item gives opportunity for modifications in economic portion of draft res and suggest Dept examine it with view to making res more meaningful. If African dels not willing refer item to Comite II believe we must be at least as forthcoming on concept target dates as we were finally prepared to be at 15th GA and that we should tell UK this soon.

6. "Troika" Secretary General: Consideration by Assembly of top-level structure of Secretariat will be required as result report of comite of eight experts to review Secretariat's organization. Sov drive for three-headed SYG will undoubtedly collapse of its own weight, but will produce counter proposals which may be even more difficult. One such proposal put forward last year by Nehru and Nkrumah and supported by certain members of expert comite will undoubtedly be for three Deputy SYGs--one from Sov Bloc, one Western, and one "neutral." Suggest we be instructed tell SYG we as much opposed to "troika" at deputy level as at SYG level and to ascertain his views. We will withhold recommendations until we have studied report of comite of experts and have had SYG's reaction to it.

7. Mauritania: What we do on Mauritania and Outer Mongolia in SC will vitally affect our relations with French-speaking Africans for entire GA. Approach being made Moscow per Deptel 2088 will materially assist us in this connection. If approach results in establishment of relations and admission of Outer Mongolia to UN, we should be authorized discuss this with French African states before public announcement is made in order to parley this change into maximum support from them on other issues in GA such as ChiRep, Korea and disarmament. If Outer Mongolian reply is not negative we should also be authorized discuss it with French Africans before public knowledge so that we can shift much blame as possible to USSR if Mauritania again vetoed. Suggest also Dept now request British delay application of Sierra Leone in SC until situation with Outer Mongolia clarified.

8. South Africa: Our observations re policy on South Africa conveyed in USUN 3102./5/ Dept's comments requested.

9. UNRWA: We see little alternative to extending UNRWA for another period. Given other problems we likely to face it would be politically dangerous to alienate Arabs to point which termination UNRWA would cause; we believe it highly important decision on UNRWA be made in light entire GA picture. Key issue likely revolve around length of UNRWA extension. Property rights custodian and/or repatriation also likely be raised by Arabs as major political contention. If material progress made through PCC Special Rep or otherwise on repatriation-resettlement issue, we may find it possible make policy advance over simple UNRWA continuation, i.e., generate some movement toward repatriation and resettlement.

10. Budget: Finding solution of critical cash problem of UN and financing of ONUC and UNEF will certainly be of crucial importance to future of UN. In our view, best approach probably is through establishment of peace and security fund; our preliminary thoughts re one possible solution pouched OIA/Westfall. In effort reduce magnitude of problem, suggest Dept review need for continuation UNEF at present level. As Dept undoubtedly aware, Secretariat giving serious consideration possibility reducing magnitude and, accordingly, cost of ONUC operation by end 1961.

11. Angola: Momentum of this item grows steadily and at 16th GA Angola could easily become one of two or three major issues. We will therefore need have worked out our policy objectives and next steps to be taken well before GA. In fact by then we may already have given definitive shape to our position under pressure of SC meetings. Assuming Portuguese fail take effective reform measures policy decisions will be (A) whether West should try deal with Angola problem primarily outside UN, with the UN action held to minimum; (B) if primarily in UN, what kind of practical arrangements can be set up to provide effective but orderly steps toward self-determination on basis which will get GA support. Present Portuguese policy certain to produce continued pressures for even stronger UN reses.

12. Procedures: We have discussed with UKDel desirability initiating steps to improve UN procedure. Campbell (UK) tells us there some hesitation about this in UKDel but he believes they will soon start consultations with other Commonwealth members on cosponsorship of item. If they get balanced cosponsorship they probably will go ahead but otherwise are not likely put item on this fall.

13. Outer space: Whether or not Sovs participate in work of outer space comite this summer, this field will be ripe by time of GA for US initiative designed reduce Sov prestige and put US efforts and objectives in favorable light before world public opinion. USUN developing ideas which we will forward.

14. Tibet: So far as we know decision has not yet been reached whether or not US will encourage Malaya, Thailand, and possibly Ireland, to resume their initiative for inscription this item at 16th GA. If Hungarian item dropped, subsequent dropping of Tibet item would seem equate it in eyes of many Afro-Asians as "cold war" item which had been maintained purely at US insistence. We therefore suggest prompt consultations with Malaya and Thailand to see if, without US prodding, they plan request inscription. (GA decision at end 15th session unclear about what done with Hungary and Tibet items but presumption is they were not transferred to 16th GA.)

15. Future of TC: Unless it clear early in GA future we wish TC have, debate likely be disorganized with decision contrary US interests. With departure from Council Belgium 1962, TC again be out-of-balance with but nine members and influence on GA be considerably diminished. Choices before us seem be (A) do nothing and allow influence TC wither; (B) amend Charter to provide larger membership; (C) provide for elected or appointed members of subcomite of Council under Rule 66 of procedures (Australian proposal), or find other means strengthen TC. We believe (C) offers most promise finding some satisfactory solution, pending conditions favorable to Charter amendment.

16. Comite on Info, renewal and terms: All-out effort will be made extend comite life indefinitely until all territories self-governing, and to revise terms reference enable hearing petitioners, full discussion of political development, including target dates for individual territories, and, generally, give to Comite on Info powers provided TC. UK has said it would not participate in comite on this basis. In any event question essentially one of competence (i.e., whether GA competent dictate to member states in absence specific provision Charter) and ties in with issue of target dates.

17. Southwest Africa: GA will have decide what is next step take to bring about change in South African policies. Comite SWA will by then have reported unable enter SWA despite terms GA res. It possible we will be faced with res which could seek revoke mandate and impose UN trusteeship or one which would request imposition sanctions against Union. Both discussed 15th GA without res and probable both will be proposed formally. Main problem for US is find something positive to support rather than simple opposition to extremist res.

18. Initiatives in UN: This GA, like last year's, most likely be negative in nature from US point of view. Chief points of our concern likely be ChiRep, "troika" proposal, budget, Council elections. On other items we will be making little, if any real progress, and on East-West items we will continue be in weak position. (Nature disarmament discussion unpredictable now.) We and UKDel believe we must do something to overcome this negative appearance of GA (which may continue into future also), and must look for initiatives.

(A) If we can make proposal for billion dollar economic program (USUN 3152)/6/ this would provide dramatic initiative this fall.

(B) We also suggest proposals for African program be firmed up to point where we can make concrete offers of support for large-scale new African project, perhaps willingness put large amount into African development banks if established. African item now suffers from lack firmness of our part either (1) on what we wish see done or (2) on what we willing put into it. With advances on these positions, which we could put forward as response to African sentiment at 15th GA, we could again capture initiative and African imagination on this item.

(C) We should also make most in UN of program to use surplus food to assist food-deficient peoples through UN system.

(D) Another initiative which we believe US could take, and on which we should seek cosponsorship of other friendly dels, is something on concept of "open world." Low key but substantial and extended efforts to propagate this concept both in UN and elsewhere would in our opinion be of substantial benefit to Western world. It represents what we stand for as contrasted to what Sovs stand for. Phrase "open world" is succinct and descriptive enough to capture world imagination as earlier concept such as "Iron Curtain" and we should be able put sufficient substance into basis US (and Western) national policy on such issues to make it something Russians will ultimately have to come to terms with. Current Russian hesitation on inspection systems, which is becoming better known to world opinion, will make them more vulnerable to sustained program on our part to promote this concept.

Stevenson

Washington, June 30, 1961.

Dear Harlan:

In the interstices of Adlai Stevenson's reporting to the authorities, the Congress and the press on his South American tour, we got a certain amount of IO business done with him. I am enclosing for your information (Tab A) a copy of his notes on his meeting with the President June 26./2/ We are following up on these various aspects, and I shall confine the rest of this letter to Chinese Representation.

After we received your report from Ottawa removing hopes of the Canadians' carrying the ball for us on the successor state business, we wrote a memorandum to the Secretary (Tab B) urging him to ask the President to initiate congressional consultations and to authorize us to start our diplomatic campaign. Alex Johnson threw some cold water on this but passed it along with the suggestion that perhaps the Australians, after all, might be a good stalking horse. Three days later on the basis of some other reports from the field, we reiterated the urgency of getting a decision on our recommendations (Tab C).

As far as I know, the Secretary didn't act on these memoranda. He did, however, answer questions on the general subject in executive session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Tab D). (This testimony, I am told too emphatically to believe, will not be published and is being held very close.) He also discussed the alternatives in rather frank terms with the Japanese Foreign Minister. Freddie Kuh got wind of this from a member of Ikeda's Delegation and wrote a story in the Sun Times implying that we had decided in favor of the successor state approach. Three days later, on June 24, Bill Jorden re-wrote Kuh's story from Mt. Olympus, and it appeared in the same issue of the Times that announced his (Jorden's) appointment as a member of the Policy Planning Staff. I enclose the clipping as Tab E. To this Linc White merely stated that our policy remained in favor of keeping Taipei in the UN and Peiping out of the UN and that no decision had been made as to our parliamentary tactics at the GA. We have stuck to this story pretty much and it is now our official line, although the Secretary did embroider a bit on it in Chicago this week (Tab F).

Adlai Stevenson's return on June 22 marked renewal of our activities here to get things off dead center. He talked to both the Secretary and the President and thought he had general agreement to proceed. Just before he left for New York, the Secretary summoned Chet Bowles, Alex Johnson, Walter McConaughy and me, and laid down the rule that it was too dangerous for us, at least, until after the aid bill was passed, to proclaim that our policy was to keep Peiping out of the UN and at the same time peddle, like a Parisian postcard dealer, a resolution which in fact invited them to become members as the successor state approach does. He rejected our arguments against the dangers of waiting until September. In fact he has given me quite a hard time in discussions of this subject both in staff meetings and in private meetings. Tab G contains Pete Thacher's uncleared and unofficial summary of the June 27 meeting.

I informed Adlai Stevenson of this decision just before he left for New York, and Chet Bowles also talked to him about it, and AES was quite disturbed. IO and USUN are rather like field generals who ask for four divisions and ammunition for a forty-eight-hour barrage prior to the assault, and are told by Headquarters that they can have two divisions and a twenty-four-hour barrage, but are damned-well expected to achieve their objectives anyway. Headquarters in this case is moved by other considerations, i.e. the administration is faced with two parliamentary situations. One, right here and now on Capitol Hill relating to the aid bill, and another, in New York in September. The immediate one is now dominant, and there is well-justified fear that if we talk too much the joint resolution on China may well be strengthened and tacked on as an amendment to the aid bill.

I need not review for you all the counter-arguments that AES and we have made. I just do not believe that we can maintain the freeze on public debate of the question until September. On the other hand, we certainly must be careful not to provoke such a debate by our own actions, and we shall be sending you a telegram to this effect as guidance in your discussions at the Quai and before the NATO Council. The purpose of what may seem an unusually dull letter with a great many enclosures is to give you as full background as possible on developments here and to urge you to play Chi Rep in very low key in your NAC meeting. I think they have borne out the very wise conclusion which you and Doc Matthews came to in Vienna and which you mentioned to me on the telephone.

If I may burden you with one more angle, I enclose as Tab H, Harry Luce's reply to the President. This provoked the latter to ask AES to see Cabot Lodge in New York. The conversation has taken place, and we understand informally that Lodge remained unimpressed, although we have not yet seen a record of the conversation. We hear that Lodge recommended that the moratorium be pursued, and that he believes it can be won if the US is willing to make a public statement that we will be in favor of admission of Red China at such time as it changes its attitude and policy. In this connection please see paragraph two of New York's 3456,/3/ which I am pouching to Paris for your attention.

Sincerely yours,

Woodie

P.S. As if you didn't have enough to read, I enclose the text of AES's remarks on his South American trip before the National Press Club./4/

Washington, July 13, 1961.

The President has more than once mentioned his concern over general planning for the UN session this fall. He is eager to have time to look at the major issues ahead of time, in the hope that we may have a well worked out U.S. position on as many as possible, always recognizing that in a forum of this sort unexpected and urgent questions are sure to arise.

While many of the questions at issue have interdepartmental ramifications, the orchestration of a UN session is peculiarly a task for the Department of State. May I therefore ask if you will make recommendations to the President with respect to the ways and means of working out our basic UN position? One thing which I venture to suggest is that you and the President and Ambassador Stevenson may wish to have a long and careful discussion of these matters at some stage which follows after preliminary planning and analysis, but before the hardening of expert positions.

McGeorge Bundy/2/

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
United States Strategy at the Sixteenth General Assembly

I.

On September 19, 1961, nearly every major issue of American foreign policy will be before the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations.

This would be largely true even if we did not want it that way. It is all the more true because we have deliberately decided, on some very important matters, that the United Nations must be the central forum in which to pursue our objectives.

Our philosophy is well expressed in statements by the President and the Secretary of State: it is to protect and develop the "world of free choice and free cooperation", and undermine and subvert by freedom's contagion "the world of coercion."

II.

United States strategy at the Sixteenth General Assembly derives from these three imperatives about the United Nations:

1. The United Nations is the only loom on which the western world and the Southern Hemisphere can "weave the fabric of common interests" so wide and so strong that it can some day contain--and then suffocate--the East-West struggle.

2. The Soviet Union wants a United Nations with a capacity limited to debate; the majority outside the communist bloc wants a United Nations able to act. Common interests are woven together through actions, not words.

3. If the United Nations is to build its capacity to act, there is no substitute for United States leadership.

Our strategy at the General Assembly is thus to exercise United States leadership with the objective of expanding the United Nations' capacity to act in ways that will bind together the non-communist world; contain the communists if they want to play, and get along nicely without them if they don't; and prove to the last dogmatist the proposition that "those who would not be coerced" will not, in fact, be coerced.

This is an objective which would be embraced by every member outside the Soviet bloc. It is not just the symbolic stuff of which ringing preambles are made; it is an objective pursued in actions-actions by operational international organizations. Provided the leadership is there, the fundamental condition is favorable and the objective realistic--because the United Nations Charter and the constitutions of other major international organizations are vivid expressions of the philosophy of "free choice and free cooperation." Thus a willingness to lead is a prior decision--transcending by far the importance of the specific initiatives selected on which that leadership makes itself known.

"Leadership" of course does not usually--or even often--mean the insistent noisiness of the pitch man. What is involved is something more subtle and more effective: an activist attitude and a sense of direction, a willingness to be caught in the middle, because the middle is where power has to be exercised.

III.

The General Assembly increasingly mirrors the international climate; reflects the total policies of nations, particularly of the United States and the USSR; and provides the institutional framework within which the members pursue their respective national interests on the greatest issues of the times.

That the Sixteenth Session will meet in a climate of crisis hardly makes it unique. In 1950 it was Korea; in 1956 it was Suez and Hungary; in 1958 it was Lebanon; and last year it was the Congo. But if tension is not new to the United Nations it is likely to be unusually high this year. For Berlin, whether or not it is formally on the agenda, will provide a principal backdrop for the Assembly.

Along with this impending threat to peace and security will be the lack of progress toward resumption of disarmament negotiations and the impasse at Geneva on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. Great pressure may be expected from the smaller powers, and particularly from the uncommitted, for reinvigorated efforts on these matters. We ourselves have already decided the United Nations is the best educational forum in which to state our case and build international support for it.

There will be strong pressure at least for full debate on Chinese representation. This and related items will be used by the Communists to attack our entire position in the Far East, the SEATO alliance, the off-shore islands, and our policy in Korea and in Laos. They will press these issues because on them they find members of the Atlantic community dangerously at odds with each other. With the exception of Tibet, we are defending, not pressing forward in East Asia.

As in several past Assemblies, there will be "colonialism" in its various guises, including the questions of Angola, Algeria, New Guinea and target dates will be a predominant problem. As in the case of China policy, the "colonialism" issue lends itself to exploitation by the USSR because the free world can sometimes be split apart on questions about which political leaders feel strongly.

There will be a number of issues relating to the needs of the less developed areas for economic and technical aid; the dominant theme will again be the demand for a capital fund directly under United Nations auspices. One way of turning this recurrent demand toward a useful and flexible system, and also achieving a better relationship between our bilateral aid and our multilateral contributions, is outlined in one of the proposed Presidential initiatives in Tab A./2/

There will finally be the crisis of the United Nations itself--epitomized by the facts that success is not yet assured in the Congo; that the office of the Secretary General is sustained but not yet secure against "Troika;" that ways must be found to put United Nations finances on a more stable basis; that the Councils and the United Nations Secretariat must soon reflect the changed composition of the Organization. Overhanging the whole Assembly will be a question not yet on the agenda: what to do next year to prepare for the end of Mr. Hammarskjold's term as Secretary-General in April 1963.

IV.

Beyond the issues of global concern are the nasty, embarrassing regional conflicts-each embarrassing to a special group of countries of which the United States is (because of its power not its wisdom) nearly always a member. Most of these issues are now outside of Europe, though the Alto Adige dispute is troublesome. The "German question", including Berlin, is regional in geography but global in its inter-action on all other issues.

The China problem will be doubly difficult in the United Nations this year. West New Guinea is a regional conflict for which both the Dutch and Indonesians see some advantage in throwing into the United Nations--with very different ends in view. Farther north in the Pacific area, Okinawa could become an ugly symbol and the development of the United States trust territory has suddenly come to critical notice as, near the end of the colonial era, the United States is revealed to everybody's surprise as among the last of the colonial powers.

On the Asian continent, the Laotian civil war is already deeply penetrated by major-nation power on both sides; the United Nations "presence" there is on vacation but it could still become at a later stage the middleman in the process of building in Laos something resembling a national government. There is a United Nations political presence in Cambodia too--with a refugee hat on. The actuality of indirect aggression in South Vietnam may require a more direct application of the "conscience of the world community" before we get through.

The United Nations has been "seized of" Kashmir, that stickiest leftover of the partition of British India, for more than a decade. We may be due for another seizure on that front this year. On the other side of Pakistan, the Afghans are showing signs of pressing again the ancient claim of nationhood for "Pushtoonistan."

In the Middle East, the temporary calm has been maintained partly by the presence of the United Nations--a sometime political representative in Amman, the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, a massive relief program for a million Palestine refugees, and a 5,000-man United Nations Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip. But the storm is gathering, sparked by Egyptian and Iraqi ambitions, the prickly defensiveness of Israel, and the endless running sore of the Palestine refugees. The United Nations relief agency for the refugees is up in this year's Assembly for abolition or continuation; in the resulting debate the refugees may be almost forgotten in the political clamor.

In North Africa, the Bizerte affair will still be on everybody's mind--and still on the United Nations' agenda, at least through the involvement of the Secretary General as mediator. Bizerte, in turn, may bring Algeria back into the United Nations, as a sign that hopes for a bilateral settlement are slimmer than ever. These two cases, plus the French boycott of UNEF and the Congo operation, raise a special problem for the West: how to use the United Nations effectively in situations where France has to be involved, if DeGaulle maintains his simple policy: "Je n'aime pas l'ONU."

South of the Sahara, the opera bouffe of Congolese politics and the difficulty of maintaining under United Nations auspices a large and complex nation-building operation will continue to interact; the Congo may once again be a major issue in the Assembly. Angola, apartheid in South Africa, and the status of Southwest Africa will doubtless be debated again in an atmosphere enflamed by the colonial reluctance of the Portuguese and the continued intransigence of the South African nationalists. The issue of "target dates" for independence will be with us again; on this one, the British and we are concerting a new line. And just under the surface, the Secretary General is extending his capacity to act a political adviser and technical consultant to new nations on a wide range of matters on their agenda of nationhood: in Togo a Special Representative of the United Nations regularly commutes from Geneva to talk to Olympio; in Somalia an informal political adviser operates from a base as resident representative of the Technical Assistance Board; in Tanganyika, the Secretary General has just completed arrangements with Nyerere to provide a similar service. The independence of Ruanda-Urundi is being arranged now by a United Nations Commission set up at the Fifteenth Assembly; some continuing United Nations concern for internal security and governmental institution-building is inevitable after the formal grant of independence, scheduled for next year. (Soon, perhaps--hopefully not too soon--the role of the United Nations in the internal development of new nations will be defined further in General Assembly debate. Meanwhile the United Nations crops up in many parts of the newly-developing world, because there is so often no bilateral alternative.)

In Latin America the United Nations presence has been less apparent, and from the United States point of view less useful, than in other parts of the world. Where international cooperation turns out to be feasible, the inter-American system has been used; debates in the United Nations, notably in the last couple of years on Cuba, have symbolized holes in the inter-American system. But with the penetration of Soviet power into the Hemisphere, an unnoticed rule of international politics may once again be evident: when it comes to tackling substantial security problems, the weaker nations are least courageous in applying their power to nearby situations, most courageous in applying it far away. To deal with Cuba, we may eventually need a vehicle (the United Nations?) with which to apply collective power from outside as well as inside the Hemisphere.

V.

Mr. Khrushchev said on July 10 that the Soviet Union would not accept any decisions of the United Nations which the Soviets consider contrary to their interests and that he would use force to oppose such decisions if necessary. This new law in unilateralism would indicate that the general Soviet posture will be one of bellicosity rather than accommodation in the Sixteenth General Assembly.

The Soviets are likely to have three principal objectives: (a) to project an image of the Soviet Union in favor of disarmament and to place the onus on the United States for failure to achieve progress in this crucial field; (b) to exploit the colonial question by every means, using as a basis the Soviet declaration of last year supporting the immediate independence of all colonies; and (c) to press its "Troika" concept across the board in a stepped-up effort to paralyze the Secretariat and to insure against any United Nations action anywhere except on Soviet terms. In this connection it is not unlikely that the Soviet Union will pursue its proposal to move United Nations Headquarters out of this country. A more detailed exposition of expected Soviet positions in the United Nations General Assembly is contained in the attached report (Tab C)./3/ A similar report received by the State Department a year ago proved to be an impressively accurate forecast of Soviet policy in the United Nations during the Fifteenth General Assembly.

Judging from past experience, the reaction of many of the uncommitted countries of Asia and Africa to the Soviet-created tension will be to urge the West to compromise. At the same time, the United States is in a good position on the test ban issue and should develop the wit to acquire the initiative on general disarmament; the Soviet attack on the United Nations itself is extremely unpopular; and the colonial issue is about to burn itself out. Thus if the United States, both inside and outside the United Nations, takes specific constructive initiatives and generally displays speed, flexibility and self-confidence, Soviet hostility in the United Nations can mightily assist in "weaving the fabric of common interests" between the western world and the southern hemisphere which "by reaching beyond the cold war, may determine its outcome."

VI.

There is a truism regarding the 100-nation United Nations which is as significant today as it was in the 51, 60 and 82-nation Organization: there is no substitute for United States leadership. We can still mobilize required majorities, and we can prevent adoption of unacceptable proposals; but to do so we have to keep everlastingly at it. The luxury of sitting out every second dance is not for the leaders. The United States is still the number one power in the United Nations when it wants to be. Too often in past years, it hasn't wanted to be enough to be fully effective.

In more specific terms our aims at the coming Assembly should be:

(a) to adopt a posture of evident reason and firmness on political and security issues, such as Berlin and disarmament, which affect our vital interests;

(b) to press for the further strengthening of the executive capacity of the United Nations;

(c) to mobilize the moderate elements in the Assembly on colonial and other issues to deflect the initiatives of the Soviet bloc and other extremists;

(d) to offset the defensive United States position on certain issues by taking constructive initiatives of our own including a Western disarmament plan, a new U.N. program for outer space, a program for the development of the United Nations capacity to act for peace and security, and a United Nations Development Authority;

(e) to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities on issues where this is possible, such as the test cessation talks, the Congo, U.N. financing, Tibet, Hungary, Soviet unwillingness to cooperate in the United Nations Outer Space Committee, and the enlargement of the Councils;

(f) to dramatize in speeches throughout the Assembly committees the advantages of open society versus closed society;

(g) To lay firmer groundwork for retention of the one Secretary General principle, to promote discreetly the idea of extending Dag Hammarskjold for another term and to bolster support for retaining the United Nations in the United States; and

(h) to press for more orderly procedures in the Assembly as a means of expediting constructive business and of recovering from the shambles made of such procedures by Khrushchev's shoe pounding and other efforts to degrade an Assembly that must operate in a civilized manner if it is to serve effectively as a school for political responsibility.

VII.

To carry out the strategy outlined in this memorandum, the United States effort at the United Nations needs to have certain special characteristics.

First, the President should be represented by a fully professional Delegation. On present plans, previously discussed in Washington by Ambassador Stevenson, the members of the Delegation will substantially meet this test; in future Assemblies the criterion of experience might be given even more weight than has, in the nature of things, been possible this year. Assignment of the delegates will also be important; for example, the strongest possible delegate should be assigned to the Fifth Committee which will deal with both the financing of the United Nations and with the politically explosive question of reorganizing the Secretariat.

Second, we should assign at least two key officers, the best tacticians we have, to deal full time with the Chinese representation question.

Third, we must step up our liaison activities during the Assembly; we made some progress at the Resumed Session in this regard. Parties and receptions must be systematically covered. African delegates must be helped with their housing problems and protected from discriminatory practices. Liaison officers from the Department's regional Bureaus who are assigned to the Delegation must remain full time; there should be no "split terms". Moreover, liaison officers should be sought who have had previous experience with the Delegation.

Fourth, the United States should engage its full prestige only on issues which are really important to us. We can distinguish in resolutions between the less essential symbolism of language and reality of substance. We will have to temper our sense of legal exactitude with a politician's feel for useful ambiguity.

Fifth, we should be procedurally alert, to counter or at least protest strongly and consistently any unparliamentary practices within all seven committees of the Assembly and its plenary body. The Delegation was too lax on this during the first part of the Fifteenth Session. We must apply a firm hand on this if the Assembly is to be restored as a properly functioning parliamentary body. Unparliamentary behavior serves Soviet interests in the General Assembly.

Sixth, we should lead and encourage the "fire brigade" group of moderates (Norway, Canada, Tunisia, Japan, Argentina) to develop proposals before the Soviets do, to move first and effectively and therefore channel constructively the action of the Assembly; otherwise the extremists take over and we are confronted with issues that force us to choose between holding our nose and holding our allies.

VIII.

There will be about eighty items on the agenda of the Sixteenth General Assembly. Of these, about twenty are key to us or confront us with particularly delicate decisions.

The three principal initiatives we have in mind, on which Presidential decisions would be required, are detailed in Tab A; the United States position on disarmament, which is in effect a fourth initiative, will presumably have been unveiled a few weeks before the General Assembly in the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Commentaries on the main predictable items are contained in Tab B./4/

Washington, July 28, 1961.

SUBJECT
When Not to Use the U.N.

At lunch on Tuesday you asked if I thought there were any problems which should not be taken to U.N. You were called to the telephone before there was an opportunity for more than a general reply. It was a good question and deserves a more complete answer./2/

There are obviously certain situations in which it is clearly in the United States interest that a problem be taken to the Security Council or the General Assembly. There are other situations in which a country, or group of countries, decides to take a question to the U.N.--and where such a move is either clearly in the U.S. interest or where it would be against our interest to oppose it with sufficient strength to defeat it.

I hope it will not surprise you if I agree that there are situations, in which it is so clear that a question could be handled better outside the U.N. that the U.S. should firmly chart that course! There are many good illustrations in the last category, of which the Antarctica Treaty and the bulk of our economic aid are two.

I don't know that it would be useful to attempt any definitive guidelines. But one can project four general types of situations in which it would be in the U.S. interest to take a question to the U.N.

a. If a crisis arose in which it was urgent that one or more U.N. members be reminded emphatically (and publicly) of their obligations under the U.N. Charter--and it appeared that sufficient support was available to do this.

b. If a crisis had arisen, or was impending, in which it appeared that a U.N. observer, policing or military operation was both a desirable and a possible way forward. In this respect we should not underestimate the extent to which certain types of U.N. field operations serve as a "school for political responsibility" for the newer countries that provide contingents. This has been the case in the Congo.

c. If the U.S. needed to muster international support for a particular political or economic approach to a question and was convinced this could be done most effectively through the U.N. Operating through a large number of bilateral channels can sometimes be equally (or more) cumbersome.

d. If an operational program was being projected in which there was a genuine need of cooperation from a majority of the U.N. membership.

All of this raises the question as to whether once U.N. gets in on something, it ever gets out. There are some good examples:

1. In 1946 the U.N. Security Council was instrumental in getting the Soviet troops out of northern Iran.

2. During the period 1947 to 1949 the U.N. got a Dutch-Indonesian cease-fire in Indonesia, and carried through to a political settlement.

3. Between 1946-1949, a U.N. commission helped bring guerrilla activity in Northern Greece to a close.

4. In 1958 during the Lebanon crisis the U.N. went into Lebanon with a 640 member Observer Group. The operation was terminated successfully in December of that year.

We could use some more examples of U.N. getting out of a situation with the problem having been "solved". (We are working right now on a device for dropping the Hungary item.) But in some of the places where U.N. is conducting a holding, or containment, operation (UNEF in the Middle East) it is costing the U.S. much less, financially and politically, than would be the case in any program which the U.S. could maintain by itself or in combination with its formal allies.

Even with the natural "deformation professionelle" of my present job, I would not hold that the UN should get into everything; indeed, I have frequently written nasty things about people whose one preoccupation in foreign policy discussions is to complain that "the U.N. is being bypassed."

What I would say is this:

(a) In every major diplomatic problem these days, including every so-called "country problem", there is a bilateral aspect and a multilateral aspect. We should therefore be tooled up to handle, on each issue, both the bilateral diplomatic operations and the multilateral diplomatic operations. On Cuba the UN aspects were not in the advance planning at all; but on Berlin, Laos, disarmament, and of course the Congo, the UN angle has been thoroughly explored well ahead of time. Sometimes contingency planning on the U.N. aspects turns out to be a dry hole; it has been so far on Laos. But it's always a potential gusher--and on occasion it gushes very suddenly, as it did in the current case of Bizerte.

(b) Because there is potentially a UN angle to every major subject, we have a serious problem of rationing the load we place on the Organization. Up to a point, loading more onto the U.N. helps enhance its capacity to act. Beyond that point, overloading can be dangerous if it makes the machinery creak too badly or exposes the U.N. executive to too many different kinds of political attack at one time.

Geneva, August 4, 1961.

I--INTRODUCTION

The 32nd Session of the Economic and Social Council was the first summer session attended by a United States delegation under the Kennedy Administration. It is appropriate under these circumstances to analyze the internal arrangements as well as the agenda and relationships within the Council itself. The character of the participation by the United States reflected a change of approach in two principal respects:

First, an effort was made to induce high-level attendance from our government. This was achieved by the presence of the Chief of the Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Mr. Harlan Cleveland, and one of the members of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, Mr. Kermit Gordon. More will be said about their contributions elsewhere in this report.

Secondly, an attempt was made to include certain representatives on Commissions in attendance during portions of the session of the Council. Since our Representative on the Human Rights Commission, Mrs. Marietta P. Tree and our Representative on the Social Commission, Mrs. Jane W. Dick, were both scheduled to be in Europe in any event, we imposed upon them to join the Delegation during the anticipated periods when items which they had handled before their Commissions respectively were in Committee or Plenary.

We believe this practice has substantial merit for the future. It undoubtedly added to the quality of the United States representation and interventions. It also afforded important personalities an opportunity to get some of the flavor of the ECOSOC forums. This two-way transference should provide a precedent for the future. It certainly enhanced the US performance at the 32nd Session.

As a newcomer to the summer session, and to Geneva in that connection, it is difficult to evaluate the relative significance of this session. By and large the atmosphere was calm. The initiatives were very few, and most of them arose from proposals previously or currently undertaken by the United States. A key member of the Secretariat openly stated that unless the US undertook something the Council remained passive. A noticeable tendency not to expand or to enter new areas prevailed among friends and foes. This may be due in some measure to a watchful, waiting attitude with regard to the UN organization altogether.

At the 32nd Session the United States Delegation urged throughout the importance of a balanced concept of economic and social development. This began with an extraordinary speech by Ambassador Stevenson on the World Economic Situation, and the point was made time and time again that the end of all economic work is social betterment. This view was expressed in some detail by Kermit Gordon in his speech on commodity problems. Here he emphasized that the basic test in approaching the solution of price problems was to determine whether or not that solution provided some relief for the problems of the many in the commodity producing countries. Assistant Secretary Cleveland called upon the Technical Assistance Committee to find ways to strengthen its work in the less developed countries, making the point that the search for the many for a better life demanded a better use of our resources. Needless to say, this same theme was expressed in the United States Representative's speech on the World Social Situation as well as in submitting the volunteer personnel proposal to the Technical Assistance Committee.

A similar tone was struck by the Deputy Representative in the analysis of the problems of coordination. Throughout, the United States kept pounding away on the theme that we faced a new day and a new challenge, as well as a new opportunity. In the World Social Situation speech it was suggested that perhaps a general debate on the world economic situation and the world social situation should be combined, and the two reports should be coordinated.

In this report only certain selected items will be discussed, including certain administrative and procedural questions. The general report will reflect in greater detail all other developments.

II--Economic

The economic phase of the 32nd Session was literally in low gear. Ambassador Stevenson's opening address on the World Economic Situation was followed by a number of speeches that concentrated primarily on domestic economic situations rather than the global scene. When the Economic Committee went into session there was no general economic debate either. The net result was that the world-wide economic situation came in for limited attention.

Most of the items that were discussed excited very little attention or difference of opinion. We have already commented on the discussions on international commodity problems. This was the kind of problem which, of course, brought out some spirited discussion since there were vital national interests involved.

When the US initiated the discussion on the use of food surpluses there was surprisingly little interest in pursuing the subject to a conclusion. Actually, we were unable to secure sponsors for a resolution which was ultimately adopted with some changes. There was reluctance on the part of some member states to get involved in the possibility of being required to contribute any cash to a $100 million fund. The whole concept of surplus food as a means for economic development, which seems so exciting to some of us, found a few followers, but no great enthusiasm.

[Here follow Sections III-XVI.]

XVII--CONCLUSION

The most common complaint heard on all sides at Geneva concerned the decline in stature of ECOSOC itself. There is a great danger that when enough people begin to believe something it can accelerate that something into becoming a reality. The real trouble is not in the meetings of ECOSOC, even though they seem to labor so painfully to produce so little. The very character of the work and the nature of an international conference makes this somewhat inevitable. But, even producing bricks instead of houses can be a satisfying experience if the direction is right and the plan is clear. It is doubtless the lack of direction and the absence of a real over-all plan with regard to ECOSOC that constitutes the greatest present peril.

In this connection there are at least two deficiencies that must be cured. One is the size of ECOSOC. I realize all of the problems about expansion, but until this happens there will continue to exist a large body of opinion that considers ECOSOC unrepresentative and ineffectual.

Secondly, the major powers, or even the major power, our own, must put more trust in the multilateral economic and social programs. There is a sense of drifting in the absence of such an evidence of progress. The Soviet has no interest in this multilateral process. Our immediate friends are distressed about trusting it or paying for it. Therefore, unless and until we demonstrate a greater belief in multilateral economic and social programs, ECOSOC must decline.

This meeting demonstrated a great interest in improving the coordinating processes through ECOSOC. There is a certain amount of maturing in the Council's attitude toward these problems. The United States has played a very important role in bringing this about. But, coordination in and of itself is hardly a stimulating goal. What is worse, interest in coordination can only be related to the intensity and importance of substantive programs that need coordination. Consequently, our government is destined by events to reach a virtually unilateral conclusion that may determine the character and stature of ECOSOC. This is an awesome responsibility viewed against its potential.

Philip M. Klutznick/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.