Hyannis Port, August 5, 1961.

SUBJECT
U.S. Strategy in the 16th General Assembly

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to the President
Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State

The two discussions, one in the middle of the day and one late in the afternoon, were based on the background papers transmitted to the President by the Acting Secretary of State on Friday, August 4,/2/ and particularly on two of these:

1. U.S. Initiatives in the 16th General Assembly, and

2. Tab B: Predictable Major Issues in the 16th General Assembly of the United Nations.

The general plan of action proposed in these papers was to prepare now for a possible Presidential speech to the General Assembly during the General Debate. The theme of this speech, which would be echoed in many other statements made in the course of the Assembly, would be the United States interest in the building of international institutions. One subhead under this theme would be an outline of the new U.S. disarmament plan and other sub-heads might be the building of a more effective administrative and financial arrangement for a UN action in the peace-and-security field; a further specification of U.S. international space policy, following the statements made by the President in his Inaugural Address and in his policy statement of July 24;/3/ and an initiative in the field of economic development of the less-developed countries.

The President indicated that an opening initiative at the General Assembly in this general field was appropriate. He deferred a decision on whether he would himself come up to the Assembly during the first few days of the session; he agreed with the staff recommendation that we should do our planning in such a way as to avoid encouraging other Chiefs of Government and Chiefs of State to heighten by their presence the sense of excitement and the opportunities for direct policy conflicts. The staff work on the General Assembly initiatives will therefore proceed on the working assumption that either Secretary Rusk or Ambassador Stevenson will make the opening speech in the General Debate, with the possibility left open that the President might later decide to make it himself.

The President has designated Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., as the person on the White House staff to keep in touch with all the planning for the General Assembly.

In the following summary report, the Action Office is listed after the pertinent paragraph.

Disarmament

The presently contemplated procedure was outlined for the President:

1. Bilaterals (Ambassador Stevenson complained about their prolongation).

2. A section of the Presidential speech devoted to disarmament.

3. Follow-up speech by Secretary Rusk or Ambassador Stevenson.

4. Ambassador Stevenson thinks there should, in the meantime, be public reference to the U.S. interest in disarmament.

5. Negotiations transferred to the Disarmament Commission.

Possible "polemicists" to represent the United States in the Disarmament Commission were discussed, but no conclusion was reached.

On substance, the President questions whether the United States will really give power to a UN dominated by less-developed countries. Stage III is too subject to description as "World Government", Mr. Schlesinger thought.

Ambassador Stevenson thinks it is very important for the United States to be for disarmament in a very positive way. We must take the initiative on this and put the Soviets on the defensive.

Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Cleveland argued these two points of view are readily reconcilable: an attractive vision of Utopia must be featured, but it must not be confused with practical next steps or be regarded as related in some way to next year's Defense budget.

The President said he knew little about the background of previous disarmament negotiations; he wanted to get Ambassador Stevenson's views, and also the Pentagon's, on the McCloy draft of July 28, 1961./4/ He (a) stressed the importance of the "open society" theme, (b) thought we had a big advantage over the Soviets in any debate or negotiation because we can really take a tough inspection system, and (c) was interested in staff opinion that disarmament is a big issue in domestic politics of a good many other countries, but didn't think it was much of an issue here. Ambassador Stevenson demurred, based on the experience of using the disarmament issue as a major theme in political campaigns.

In a discussion of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a related matter, the United States agenda item and the probable Indian item were also touched on. Mr. Schlesinger suggested we take up Ambassador Thompson's proposal to make a big thing of banning "fall-out tests" (which are readily detectable) by a UNGA resolution-presumably after having beaten down an uninspected ban on underground tests as well.

Action: Ambassador Stevenson is to review the McCloy document, say what he thinks should be done in the UN on disarmament, and recommend the best tactics for doing it. The White House will also solicit Defense Department comments.

Action: USUN, D

Mr. Cleveland described the Peace and Security proposal, related it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper/5/ and the Congo operation. The President said it was all right to develop it as an initiative, with proper interdepartmental consultation.

Mr. Cleveland described this proposal, and indicated objections raised to it. The President raised the following questions: Can we follow through (analogy with President Eisenhower's Atoms-for-Peace and African projects)? On meteorological satellites, can we protect against the Soviets using the UN to criticize satellite picture-taking as high-level espionage? In general, can we protect military uses? The President said it was okay to develop the proposal in interdepartmental discussions by floating our paper.

Action: IO, S/AE

Mr. Cleveland described the general ideas of UNDA. Ambassador Stevenson stressed the importance, and indicated his acceptance of change from proposal for $1 billion of additive aid money. The President said to work up a proposal on this.

Action: S/B with IO and ICA.

Mr. Cleveland described the status of this item (including target dates). The President doesn't want to carry forward in this form, picking up and making good on an Eisenhower initiative. Ambassador Stevenson thought we should somehow challenge the Russians to join in the development of Africa through multilateral channels.

Mr. Cleveland suggested that we try to get out of the "Africa item" with a simple resolution declaring the development of Africa to be a good thing, and calling on all the nations to help. Also perhaps an exhortation to plan self-help and mutual help. Then we could develop the capacity of the Economic Commission for Europe to help in planning and pre-investment activities, using the strength of the Special Fund-UNDA for the purpose. We might then unilaterally earmark some money for projects receiving the UN's seal of approval through the participation in their development of the E.C.A. and, where they exist, the UN resident representatives in Africa.

Ambassador Stevenson indicated he would like to study the whole question of the Africa item further before making firm recommendations on how to handle it in the 16th General Assembly.

Action: USUN

Ascertain by intensive consultations (in New York and through diplomatic channels at government level around the world) what proposition can command a majority vote in the General Assembly.

Action: IO

Including an explicit arrangement with the French Africans as to their affirmative action on ChiRep if we are able to get Mauritania's membership application past the Soviet veto in the Security Council.

Action: USUN

Proposition to be floated will include two elements for a start:

a. the procedural proposition that ejecting the Chinese Nationalists or seating the Chicoms requires a two-thirds General Assembly vote as an "important" matter. (Watch out for pitfall of two-thirds requirement for acceptance of GRC credentials.)

b. the procedural step of establishing a committee of the Assembly to study Chinese representation in the context of proposals for enlarging the Councils. (Composition of such a committee would, of course, be highly important, and should reflect the relative strength in the General Assembly of the Peking recognizers (33) and the Taipei recognizers (49).)

Ambassador Stevenson gave his opinion that these propositions would not be sufficient, and that something like the successor state idea should not be in the picture.

The President said he realized the committee or any other means of postponement might only lead in time--next year, perhaps--to a Two-China proposal or even to Chicom admission in some form. But he wanted to avoid taking any major step along this road this year. He also was determined that the United States was not to be defeated on this issue in the United Nations. Based on discussions with Chen Chang this past week, the President fears that Chiang Kai-shek may be in what Mr. Schlesinger called a "gotterdammerung" mood, ready to pull the house down on himself--and on us in the process. Nevertheless, we had to keep on trying to persuade him that in the interest of protecting his UN seat (a national interest of the U.S. as well as of the GRC) some tactical adjustments would be required as we went along. One notable adjustment is the non-use of the GRC veto on the admission of Outer Mongolia.

The President wants to send a letter to Chiang this next week on this matter. Chiang's friends in this country, notably Roy Howard and Henry Luce, should also be enlisted in this effort of persuasion.

Action: FE

An item-by-item run-through of Tab B in the documentation ("Predictable Major Issues in the 16th General Assembly of the United Nations") produced these Presidential reactions that should be taken into account in preparing for the 16th General Assembly:

Security Council Election. The President asked whether anything needed to be done to get Guatemala to step aside in favor of a more widely acceptable LA candidate; he was informed that at present the danger of Cuba and Guatemala being the only candidates had been greatly reduced by the emergence of Venezuela with strong support from the LAs.

Committee Chairmanships. The President was informed that Roa (Cuba) was a candidate for Chairman of Committee Two (Economic Affairs), with the apparent support of Brazil and Mexico. He thought we should discuss the matter seriously with Mexico in view of Brazil's commitment, and our own, to sensible progress in international economic development.

Action: IO

Membership. While no decision was recommended at this stage on just how to vote when the Mongolia-Mauretania issue comes up in the Security Council, the President did not exclude the option of voting for the Mongolia application if we could be assured that as a consequence the French Africans would stand with us on Chinese representation.

Angola and Apartheid in South Africa. The President thought it served our purposes well to vote for criticisms of repressive policies, but thought the application of sanctions in such cases was unrealistic, improbable, and probably ineffective. The possibility was noted that another Congo-type operation might be required if Angola blows up in the near future.

The Congo. The President indicated his gratification at the turn of events in the Congo.

Algeria. We will presumably resist efforts to drag the Algerian issue back into the United Nations as long as there are any possibilities of achieving a settlement through direct French-FLN negotiations.

Tibet. Ambassador Stevenson expressed the opinion that the legal grounds for objection to China's action in taking over the administration of Tibet were relatively weak.

Korea. Ambassador Stevenson described the device used in the Resumed Session to frustrate the proposal that the North Koreans be heard by insisting they would then be bound by whatever action was taken by the UN. The President asked whether there was any thought of making South Korea a member of the UN, and was advised that to do so would spark an offsetting application from North Korea. To admit North Korea too would fly in the face of a long history of UN exhortations to bring about a unified Korea, and would also create a dangerous precedent for Germany and Berlin.

Vietnam. The President indicated his question on South Korea was provoked by considering whether South Vietnam could not be brought into the UN actions (some form of "presence" was mentioned in the discussion) that might help meet the actuality of large-scale indirect aggression in South Vietnam.

Hungary. During the day it developed that three of the President's sisters were planning a trip to Poland and Yugoslavia that might include a short visit to Hungary. In view of the present plans for a trip to Hungary by Frederick Boland of Ireland to try to clear up the "Hungarian item", and the involvement in the problem of the issue of religious prisoners, a question was raised about the inclusion of Hungary in the itinerary. A State Department opinion on the mater is requested./6/

Target Dates for Self-determination. The President expressed a lively interest in the Interior Department's plans for speeding up the development of United States dependencies and the U.S. Trust Territory in the Pacific. He was informed that State, Interior and Defense were considering together how best to bring the issue of self-determination to a head, and asked to be informed soon of the Departments' conclusions in this regard.

Berlin

In a discussion of the UN aspects of the Berlin problem, the President asked Ambassador Stevenson to give some thought to the idea that a UN-supervised referendum might be held in West Berlin--a suggestion which had been canvassed with the Secretary before he left for Paris. The first reaction of Ambassador Stevenson was that such a referendum might better be proposed for the whole of Berlin including the Eastern Zone. (Signal to this discussion is in Secto 18, August 7, 1961.)/7/

Action: GER, IO, and USUN.

The President gave Ambassador Stevenson his copy of the latest report on Berlin strategy by Mr. Dean Acheson,/8/ and asked him to study it and give the President his considered reaction.

Action: USUN

Mr. Cleveland said the Acheson memorandum reflected to some extent the suggestions in an IO memo which had been discussed in Ambassador Stevenson's absence with Ambassador Yost and other members of the USUN staff; however, the timing of "going to the UN" on Berlin is still subject to some discussion within the Department.

Washington, August 15, 1961.

Outer Mongolia and the Votes of African States in the
United Nations General Assembly

If Outer Mongolia is not admitted to the United Nations the African states could mobilize at least eleven votes (French African or Brazzaville group) or possibly as many as twenty votes (Monrovia group) against the Chinese Nationalists and, depending on the circumstances, against the United States. This group of votes could prove decisive on the Chinese representation issue and others of major importance to us.

The key issue for the French African states is whether Mauritania is admitted to the United Nations. African states generally, and the French African states in particular, have made it quite clear that their voting on Chinese representation and other issues would be affected by what happens to the application of Mauritania. Since the Soviet Union has declared that it will veto the application of Mauritania if Outer Mongolia is not admitted, the issue depends, in the eyes of the French Africans, on what happens in the case of Outer Mongolia. Their reaction will be almost equally adverse, so far as the GRC is concerned, whether Outer Mongolia's admission to the United Nations is blocked by a veto or by abstentions.

The evidence for this analysis, based on reports from many sources over several months is quite impressive. The more important reports are summarized below.

(1) In May, our Embassy at Dakar reported that the twelve states of the African-Malagasy union had taken advantage of the Monrovia conference to discuss the admission of Mauritania to the UN. These states reportedly agreed that if Mauritania's admission is blocked, whether by veto or abstentions, they would "retaliate by breaking relations with the Chinese Nationalists. In addition, the eleven states members of the UN would at the next regular session vote for expulsion of Nationalist China and the admission of Red China." These states expressed the hope that the United States would convince the Chinese Nationalists to abstain instead of using the veto (Dakar tel 783, May 24)./2/

(2) In June, Liberia, on behalf of the participants in the Monrovia Conference, circulated a letter to UN members stating that the group "looks with concern" on any attempt to prohibit the membership of Mauritania in the UN by exercise of the veto or by linking its admittance to other issues. The letter called on the Security Council, in the name of twenty independent African states, to approve the membership of Mauritania. (USUN tel 3324, June 14)/3/

(3) In July, USUN reported its belief that the French Africans will in fact carry out their threat to take reprisals against both the US and the GRC on issues important to us in the next GA and that they will do so "whether Soviet veto of Mauritania is engendered by GRC veto of Outer Mongolia or by defeat latter through abstentions organized by US. We therefore risk losing substantial bloc of votes not only on Chirep but on series of other issues of great importance to US if we do not proceed as planned with endorsement Outer Mongolia." (USUN tel 214 July 25)/4/

(4) On August 4, USUN reported that the Mauritanian representative (Lokman) said that Soviet representatives in New York are telling the French Africans they will veto all new membership applications if China goes through with its threat to veto Outer Mongolia. The Mauritanian representative said the French Africans had decided to retaliate at the 16th General Assembly by voting against China on the representation issue. (USUN tel 346, August 4)/5/

(5) President Senghor of Senegal told Attorney General Kennedy on August 6 that the Brazzaville states would work for the admission of Communist China to the UN if Nationalist China blocked the admission of Mauritania by vetoing the admission of Outer Mongolia. (Embassy Abidjan tel 95, August 8)/6/

(6) Our Embassy at Paris reported on August 14 a French official said that if the Chinese Nationalists use the veto and Mauritania was thereby excluded, the Chinese Nationalists "would of course be finished in Africa and at the UN so far as African support on the Chinese Communist issue is concerned." (Paris tel 805, August 14)/7/

In the last session of the General Assembly a key group of African states, including several French African states, demonstrated they are disposed, when they consider their interests are thwarted, to react sharply and negatively on matters of grave importance to the United States. A good example was the group's reaction to the US abstention on the Northern Cameroon plebiscite issue and our negative reaction to the concept of target dates for independence for colonial areas. When we did not take their side, these African states had no hesitation in voting against the US, or abstaining, at one vital point in consideration of the Cuban issue. (Defeat on April 21, 1961 of operative para I of draft resolution submitted by seven Latin American states at US request.)

Washington, August 15, 1961, 10:08 p.m.

117. You should seek appointment with President Chiang soonest and personally deliver following message from President Kennedy. You should point out Security Council consideration of Outer Mongolia and Mauritanian applications will probably take place during week of August 21.

"Dear Mr. President:

Now that Vice President Chen has returned to Taiwan I want to express my keen appreciation for your having sent so distinguished, able and trusted a representative to consult with me./2/ My associates and I profited greatly from his clear presentation of the views of your Government on matter of common concern.

As I am sure the Vice President has reported to you, our talks were marked by cordiality and frankness. While agreement was not reached on all points, the talks showed our agreement on fundamental objectives and demonstrated the vital importance both our countries attach to maintaining and strengthening our traditional friendship. In this regard I was particularly heartened by Vice President Chen's assurances that the GRC would never create any difficulties for the U.S. in its effort to meet the Communist challenge and that the overriding consideration motivating your Government in its relationship with the U.S. is its desire not to add to U.S. difficulties or see U.S. prestige suffer.

The joint communique issued by Vice President Chen and me following our discussions pointed out our mutual awareness of the world-wide nature of the Communist threat and of the belligerency and hostility displayed by the Communists in areas such as Berlin, Laos, Korea and Viet-Nam./3/ I am sure you will agree with me that the increasingly grave nature of the Communist challenge makes it imperative for all of us in the free world to maintain our solidarity and not allow the forces of Communism to divide and thereby undermine our joint strength.

In the international struggle between the free world and Communism, the United Nations is also a major battlefield. Whatever our appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the UN, we must recognize that it is a powerful force on a wide range of issues. The United States fully shares the strong views expressed by Vice President Chen on the importance to the GRC of not turning the UN battlefield over to the Communists. Moreover, as I explained to the Vice President, the prestige of the United States is deeply committed to preserving the GRC's membership in the UN and keeping the Peiping regime out. For ten successive years the United States has led the fight to prevent the entry of the Chinese Communists against increasingly serious opposition. Now, at what may well be a critical moment in this fight, we more than ever need to concert our efforts in this common cause.

In our discussion of the difficult problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations, Secretary Rusk and I outlined to the Vice President our proposed tactics to realize our common objective of preserving the GRC's position in the UN and keeping the Peiping regime out. I am gratified that the general outline of our proposed approach is acceptable to your Government. It remains, in the weeks before the opening of the next session of the General Assembly, for our staffs in Washington and Taipei and our Missions in New York to work together on a close basis to translate this general approach into detailed tactical plans to meet a wide range of possible parliamentary situations.

Our present tactical plan is, I am confident, the most promising that can be devised in the circumstances. I would not be frank with you, however, if I did not emphasize that there is a very grave danger we would not be able to muster majority support for it if your Government should invoke the veto to block Outer Mongolia's admission to the UN. Our most careful study of the situation clearly indicates that, if Mauritania is denied entry to the UN as a result of such action, most if not all of the French African states will, however illogically and unjustly, retaliate by voting against the GRC on the Chinese representation issue. In this eventuality we fear that despite our best efforts the GRC would be unseated and subsequently replaced by the Chinese Communists.

Vice President Chen's treatment of this subject and, more explicitly, your observations to Ambassador Drumright on July 1/4/ indicate that you are aware of these possible consequences of a veto of Outer Mongolia and are prepared to accept them rather than alter your position. The record on this issue, both in 1955 and in recent months, makes clear that you consider fundamental GRC interests to be involved.

I fully appreciate the importance of this matter to the GRC. I must stress, however, that the problem is not one that affects only the GRC. It involves no less deeply and inescapably the position and prestige of the U.S., especially at a time when the mounting Berlin crisis poses a mortal threat to the free world. The GRC may consider that in certain circumstances it would prefer to leave the UN rather than to yield on a point of major importance to it. But before taking an action that could lead to such a situation, I urge you, Mr. President, to consider carefully not only the GRC's interests but also those of the U.S. As I emphasized to Vice President Chen, it would be extremely inimical to U.S. interests if the Chinese Communists should gain admission to the UN. We would remain in the UN with a continuing heavy responsibility for leadership of its free world members. But our capabilities for exercising this leadership would be seriously impaired by defeat on the Chinese representation issue. My advisers warn, moreover, of the likelihood that French African wrath over a veto of Outer Mongolia will be felt during the next General Assembly session not only on the Chinese representation question but on various other issues important to the U.S. In this regard it is pertinent that the French Africans, and indeed many other states, will wrongly hold the U.S. responsible for such GRC action in view of the close relationship between our two countries.

In explaining, both publicly and in private talks with the U.S., why it feels obliged to prevent Outer Mongolia's admission to the UN, the GRC has advanced several cogent arguments which I would like now to consider. It has stated that, in the first place, this is a matter of basic principle, that you and we should not for the sake of expediency submit to Soviet blackmail tactics and acquiesce in what amounts to a violation of the UN Charter. The U.S. fully shares the GRC's repugnance for any action that allows the Soviets to get away with bare-faced blackmail. It also recognizes that there is a real question whether the Outer Mongolian regime possesses the qualifications for UN membership as provided in the Charter. Nonetheless, the cold, hard fact is that the French African states have accepted the Soviet linking of the Mauritanian and Outer Mongolian applications as a matter of practical power politics and have made the GRC and U.S. vote on the Outer Mongolian application the touchstone of their subsequent vote on Chinese representation. Our two countries are thus confronted with a situation in which we must choose the lesser of two evils. We must recognize that in order to attain our overriding objective of preventing admission of Communist China to the UN we will have to exercise tactical flexibility on the lesser consideration of Outer Mongolia's admission.

It has also been argued that admission of Outer Mongolia would seriously impair the UN's integrity and effectiveness and greatly enhance Communist prestige. No doubt admission would represent a tactical victory for the Soviets. But it seems to me inescapable that the adverse effects would be nothing compared to those that would flow from the GRC's departure from the UN and its replacement by the Chinese Communists, if GRC veto of Outer Mongolia should cause us to lose our voting majority on this larger issue. Moreover, once the GRC lost its seat, Outer Mongolia's admission could be expected to follow shortly in any case.

Finally, Vice President Chen and others have emphasized how difficult politically it would be for your Government to justify to the Chinese people and your representative bodies a reversal of your announced position on this issue. I am aware of the views expressed by the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang, by the five Yuans, and by your press and, as a practical politician, appreciate the problem that you face. Knowing, however, your long record as a statesman and the Chinese people's deep and abiding faith in your leadership, I am confident of your ability to explain to them the need for flexible tactics on the lesser issue of Outer Mongolia's admission to the UN in order to safeguard the GRC's international position and thereby to fulfill your national mission of thwarting the designs of the mainland Communist regime.

I also feel it necessary to emphasize the potential significance of the GRC's action on this issue in terms of its own security interests. GRC loss of its UN seat would impair the ability of the U.S. to muster support in the free world for military action in defense of the GRC should such action ever be required. U.S. support of the security of the GRC should not, moreover, be conceived of in purely military terms. Political, diplomatic and economic measures are also essential. Free world support for such measures may be extremely difficult to obtain in a situation in which the sympathies of a large part of the free world would probably have been lost, and the GRC's own juridical position undercut, by its attitude toward the UN. Its departure from the UN would inevitably lead to increasing isolation of the GRC as one country after another switched its recognition to Communist China. The problem of maintaining solid support for the GRC in the face of Chinese Communist pressures would become increasingly difficult. There would be a real danger of the U.S. itself becoming more and more isolated on this question. The GRC must not ignore the serious damage to its own security or that to U.S. interests which could result from its refusal, regardless of the cost, to maintain its UN position.

In your meeting with Ambassador Drumright on July 1 you stated that you would regard U.S. action to establish relations with Outer Mongolia and to support its admission to the UN as "incompatible with the consideration due a close ally." In this regard, you will recognize, I am sure, that our interests as well as yours are at stake. In the present instance the U.S., as I made clear to Vice President Chen, has deferred to the GRC's view and suspended our negotiations with Outer Mongolia for recognition. We are prepared to defer them indefinitely if the GRC will refrain from vetoing Outer Mongolia's application for UN membership.

Because the success of our efforts on the crucial Chinese representation issue is likely to be jeopardized if the Outer Mongolian application for UN membership fails, the U.S. considers it of the greatest importance that the GRC right of veto not be exercised. Assuming that the GRC agrees not to veto, the U.S. will abstain on the vote. While we cannot undertake to organize other abstentions, and recognize that Outer Mongolia will probably be admitted to the UN, we regard this as the minimum concession we both must make because of the larger issues involved.

For more than a decade the concerted action of the GRC and the U.S. has thwarted Communist divisive tactics on the Chinese representation issue. In the UN the position of the GRC has been maintained and the Chinese Communists have been excluded. At this crucial time for our two countries, and for the entire free world, in the struggle against the forces of international communism, it would be an unprecedented tragedy if we were now to find ourselves in disarray--and Communist stratagems to divide us were at last to succeed. We must, therefore, stand together--as we have in so many past dangers-so that victory may again be ours.

With great respect,

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy"

Rusk

Washington, August 24, 1961.

SUBJECT
China Representation and Outer Mongolia

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. George K. C. Yeh, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy
Mr. Walter P. McConaughy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Woodruff Wallner, Acting Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs
Miss Louise McNutt, Acting United Nations Adviser
Mr. Robert W. Rinden, Acting Director for Chinese Affairs

The Ambassador called at Mr. McConaughy's request.

Mr. McConaughy said that we wished to work closely with the GRC in some "politicking" with the French African states on China representation, but that for this to be successful the GRC would have to abstain on Outer Mongolia. We were hopeful that we could make some headway with the Africans on China representation not only at the forthcoming UNGA session but on other occasions. We would tell them that a concession to Soviet blackmail was involved and that we could not make such a concession every time.

The Ambassador said that he suspected that his government was having difficulty in making up its mind. No one can say how the African countries, especially the former French colonies, will vote on China representation even if the GRC refrained from vetoing Outer Mongolia. If there was a rough estimate on how the African states would vote, it would be helpful. If the GRC gave up something it would want something in return.

Mr. Wallner said that we want to be able to ask the African states: what is it worth to you to have Mauritania get in the United Nations as a result of GRC abstention? However, if we go to them now with this proposition and it turns out later that the GRC is not willing to abstain then the African states will be in an angry mood.

The Ambassador remarked that in his conversation August 22 at the White House with Mr. Bundy, the latter had stressed that President Kennedy's recent letter to President Chiang represented the President's views-as well, of course, as those of the State Department and the United States Government./2/

Mr. McConaughy said that we didn't want to take the slightest chance of there being any misunderstanding on this point and added that the President had gone over every word of the letter and had shared in drafting it. It represented the considered judgment of the President.

The Ambassador said that he had wired Taipei an account of his conversation with Mr. Bundy and so there should be no misunderstanding on this point.

The Ambassador said that, with respect to developing support in the United Nations for the important question (Article 18) tactic and also for a committee to study China representation, enlargement of ECOSOC, et cetera, his government had asked for his views on the committee and had inquired if the United States had full confidence regarding the composition of the committee. The committee's composition was very important, his authorities felt.

Mr. Wallner said that, as the terms of reference of the committee had not yet been determined, it was not possible now to say what the composition of the committee should be. The committee might look at China representation plus United Nations membership qualifications and the composition of the Councils. We were in the stage of testing this idea, for enlargement of Councils was a controversial question. It was appetizing to the Africans and Asians but unappetizing to the Latin Americans, who were over-represented and afraid of losing something.

The Ambassador observed that in 1960 nine African countries pledged, in writing, their support for the GRC but at the last minute they all reneged and only two of them had the courtesy to inform the GRC of their change in position.

Mr. Wallner said that last year the African states were inexperienced in the workings of the United Nations; this year he hoped they would be better organized and better mannered.

In reply to the Ambassador's query as to how Sierra Leone might be affected, Mr. Wallner said that it depends on what the Russians do. They might say that no one gets into the United Nations until Outer Mongolia does. The French might say that no one gets into the United Nations until Mauritania does. It is not clear what may happen. Mr. Wallner said that the Security Council meeting on membership may be held early next week, possibly on August 28, owing to British pressure on behalf of the Sierra Leone and Kuwait applications.

The Ambassador said that if the GRC should decide not to veto Outer Mongolia, we ought to get the British and the French to put as much pressure as they can on the African countries to go along with us on China representation.

Mr. Wallner said that the French might wish to be helpful but he didn't know how much influence they had. He noted that the French had used a great deal of whatever influence they might have in seeking support on the Bizerte issue.

On the Outer Mongolia issue, the Ambassador said that the GRC Cabinet had asked Foreign Minister Shen for an estimate of how much support at the United Nations the GRC would get if it did not refrain from a veto on Outer Mongolia.

Mr. Wallner said it was clear that the African votes would be lost if the GRC used its veto. All 14 votes of the Brazzaville group would be lost and, with the loss of the Monrovia group's votes, as many as 20 votes would be gone.

The Ambassador said that, in view of the unhappy experience of 1960, his Foreign Minister asked if the United States would be able to get a firmer pledge this year from the Africans.

Mr. Wallner thought we might have better luck this year, but there was always the possibility that the Africans might change their views.

Mr. McConaughy said that we must break out of this vicious circle, for we can't succeed in our efforts vis-a-vis the African states if we work on a hypothetical basis.

Mr. Wallner added that, if we could say to the African states that there is some flexibility in the GRC position, we would be in a horse-trading position.

The Ambassador replied that he and Ambassador T. F. Tsiang had both stressed to Taipei the need for some flexibility so that we could sound out the African states. He hoped within a few days to have a reply from Taipei.

Mr. Wallner said that as early as August 28 there may be a Security Council meeting on membership as the British are being pressed by Sierra Leone and Kuwait. There is not much time for us to probe the Africans' reaction. Unless we have a favorable reply very soon from Taipei, we may lose the chance to capitalize on the GRC's restraint on Outer Mongolia.

The Ambassador said that the decision was not being taken by President Chiang alone. There was strong opposition in some quarters in Taiwan to a GRC abstention on Outer Mongolia and the matter had been referred to the Executive Yuan (Cabinet). Other Yuans had also been consulted. In any event, the GRC was fully informed and a substantive reply to President Kennedy's letter might be expected in the next few days.

Washington, August 31, 1961, 8:36 p.m.

365. ChiRep--Outer Mongolia. FYI only: GRC has responded negatively to high level US effort persuade them not veto Outer Mongolia's admission UN./2/ Every indication is that Chinese will veto Outer Mongolia when SC meets, probably early September, and that Soviets will then veto Mauritanian application. Further complication is French threat to veto Sierra Leone and Kuwait if Mauritania not admitted.

In New York Stevenson told French representative Berard that most recent reports from Taipei indicate Chiang determined to veto Outer Mongolia. Berard said he certain that French Africans would retaliate by voting against West on Chirep issue, including "important question" proposal. If OM not vetoed and Mauritania admitted Berard believed all Brazza group except Senegal would go along with US on this question. Berard doubted that French Africans would support US on important question issue if US voted for OM rather than abstain in face GRC veto; but Berard said he would sound out French Africans on this point.

USUN reported yesterday that Lokman (Mauritania) says it now clear to Brazza group from public statements coming from Taiwan that China will veto OM membership, thereby bringing about Soviet veto Mauritania. Lokman says reaction Brazza group UN representatives has been to "unanimously recommend to the Govts. to decide at Tananarive Conference" (Sept 6-12) to retaliate Against China by voting against them on Chirep. USUN also reported French suggested Brazzaville group might consider alternative of not having Mauritanian application brought up at next SC meeting, in hope this will put group in better bargaining position.

Information this tel should be closely held. Total situation now being reviewed and further instructions will follow. End FYI.

Rusk

Washington, September 18, 1961.

SUBJECT
Situation Created by the Death of Hammarskjold/2/

1. There is no provision for an Acting Secretary-General nor has the Secretary-General ever formally designated anyone as "Acting" in his absence. There is no order of precedence among the Under Secretaries-General, of which there are 13. The nationalities of these 13 are: U.S.--3 (Cordier, Bunch, Vaughn), India--1 (Narasimhan), U.K.--1 (Hamilton), USSR--1 (Arkadev), France--1 (deSeynes), China--1 (Hoo), Yugoslavia--1 (Protitch), Brazil--1 (de Sa), Panama--1 (Huertamatte), New Zealand--1 (Turner), Greece--1 (Stavropoulos). (Tab A)/3/ There has been a general understanding since the San Francisco Conference in 1945 that no national of one of the permanent members of the Security Council should serve as Secretary-General.

2. In this situation, it is proposed that the General Assembly tomorrow postpone all business except for (a) the election of the President of the 16th Session and (b) the adoption of a resolution requesting Mr. Mongi Slim (Tunisia), who is expected then to be the Assembly's President, to undertake pending the appointment of Mr. Hammarskjold's successor, the functions of his Office. (Tab B)/4/ Such action is within the powers of the Assembly. This procedure was developed in consultation with the Secretary and Ambassador Stevenson. The British are in agreement and the resolution will be introduced by Ireland. Mr. Slim, of all those previously mentioned as possible successors to Mr. Hammarskjold when his term expires in 1963, is by far the most acceptable from the United States standpoint (Tab C).

3. It would obviously be impossible in fact for one man to perform all of the duties of Assembly President and also of Secretary-General. However, the Assembly's rules of procedure provide for the election of 13 vice presidents and that the President, whenever he is unable to preside, "shall appoint one of the Vice Presidents to take his place." So far as can be determined at this juncture before the elections are held Wednesday, the Vice Presidents will be: the five permanent members of the Security Council, Costa Rica, Mexico, Ghana, Niger, Cyprus, Netherlands, Greece, and an East European. Again, under the general understanding at the San Francisco Conference, it is unlikely that one of the five permanent members would be asked to serve.

On September 20, 1961, Mongi Slim of Tunisia was elected President of the 16th Session of the General Assembly by a vote of 96 to 0, with 1 abstention. For text of his address to the General Assembly after his election, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pages 124-126. The next day Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams sent a message to Slim that read: "Congratulations. The best man got the job. May God go with you every step of the way." (Telegram 638 to USUN, September 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960-63, 320/9-2161)

Washington, September 21, 1961.

SUBJECT
The Problem of a Successor to Secretary-General Hammarskjold

The optimum solution to the situation created by the death of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold would be the regular appointment, under Article 97 of the United Nations Charter, of a successor by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. This will not be possible since the USSR, which has a veto in the Council, has announced that it will agree to no one as Secretary-General, not even Mr. Arkadev, the principal Soviet official in the United Nations Secretariat.

At the other end of the spectrum of possibilities, it might develop that no affirmative action would be taken by either the Security Council or the General Assembly to provide for proper discharge of the Secretary-General's functions. In this situation, the United Nations Secretariat and the United Nations operations in the Congo as well as the United Nations Emergency Force would be without an effective directing head. In practical terms, if this did not lead to disintegration of the United Nations, it would produce a de facto troika arrangement.

Between these extremes lie other possibilities with varying degrees of acceptability. Our delegation in New York has been instructed to seek adoption of a General Assembly resolution which would invest a single competent individual with the functions of Secretary-General provisionally until a new Secretary-General is regularly appointed by the Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council. We are satisfied of the legal validity of this procedure within the United Nations constitutional structure. In this connection, it is reported that Ambassador Boland, of Ireland, and his neutral group have agreed on the following principles:

(1) A single individual should be named;

(2) He should be able to discharge on a provisional basis the functions of Secretary-General;

(3) The designation of the individual should be made promptly and by the General Assembly alone; and

(4) This should be done despite Soviet opposition.

Another and clearly less satisfactory possibility would be a General Assembly resolution inviting a named individual "to assume for the time being the direction of the Secretariat". This formula has been advanced by Ambassador Boland as an alternative. Such a formula would appear to omit from the individual's mandate the Charter functions of the Secretary-General other than his capacity as chief administrative officer and also the functions of the Secretary-General under a number of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions dealing with such important matters as the Congo. The formula would be improved to some extent by the addition, as proposed by our delegation in New York, of the words "with the functions set forth in Chapter XV of the Charter". The obvious ambiguities remaining if this kind of language were to be adopted would be ameliorated if Ambassador Boland and other delegates were to state, in explanation of the proposed resolution before the General Assembly, that it was designed to give the named individuals all the functions of the Secretary-General on an interim basis.

We have asked the United States Mission in New York to make as firm a stand as possible, in the complex and difficult tactical situation that prevails there, in favor of language which would invest the person who is provisionally appointed with all the functions and powers he needs--which is to say the functions and powers that Dag Hammarskjold had. We are in hourly touch with the negotiations as they proceed and will check in with you when they reach the point when a final judgment about the United States position can be formulated.

George W. Ball

Washington, October 6, 1961.

TO
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT
Follow-Up on the President's Speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, 1961/2/

It will be appreciated if arrangements are made to ensure that the actions being taken within the government to implement the President's speech are brought to the attention of all parts of the government affected thereby, and are currently reported to the White House. It is understood that certain steps along this line have already been initiated. However, the following specific list identifying the items in which the President is interested in having continuing follow-up is furnished you for your guidance in coordinating the interdepartmental aspects of and in reporting on these items.

ITEMS IN THE SPEECH FOR SPECIAL IMPLEMENTATION
AND REPORTING

1. "Selection of an outstanding civil servant to carry forward the responsibilities of Secretary General." (Page 2, paragraph 2)

2. "The prompt review and revision of the composition of United Nations bodies." (Page 2, paragraph 5)

3. Earmarking for all member nations "special peace-keeping units in their armed forces--to be on call of the United Nations--to be specially trained and quickly available--and with advance provision for financial and logistic support." (Page 5, paragraph 2-V)

4. Suggest "a series of steps to improve the United Nations' machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes--for on-the-spot fact-finding, mediation and adjudication--for extending the rule of international law." (Page 5, paragraph 3-V)

5. "Debate colonialism in full--and apply the principle of free choice and the practice of free plebiscites in every corner of the globe." (Page 7, paragraph 1)

1. A new statement of newly agreed principles for negotiation (relating to "general and complete disarmament"). (Page 3, paragraph 2)

2. "Challenge the Soviet Union, not to an arms race, but to a peace race--to advance together step by step, stage by stage, until general and complete disarmament has been achieved. We invite them now to go beyond agreement in principle to reach agreement on actual plans." (Page 3, paragraph 3)

3. "Program to be presented to this Assembly-for general and complete disarmament under effective international control." (Page 3, paragraph 4)

4. "I therefore propose, on the basis of this Plan, that disarmament negotiations resume promptly, and continue without interruption until an entire program for general and complete disarmament has not only been agreed but has been actually achieved." (Page 4, paragraph 3)

5. A "treaty assuring the end of nuclear tests of all kinds, in every environment, under workable controls. The United States and the United Kingdom have proposed such a treaty that is both reasonable, effective and ready for signature. We are still prepared to sign that treaty today." (Page 4, paragraph 1-IV)

"We shall urge proposals extending the United Nations Charter to the limits of man's exploration in the Universe, reserving outer space for peaceful use, prohibiting weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies, and opening the mysteries and benefits of space to every nation. We shall further propose cooperative efforts between all nations in weather prediction and eventually in weather control. We shall propose, finally, a global system of communications satellites linking the whole world in telegraph and telephone and radio and television." (Page 6, paragraph 1)

"Propose designating this decade of the 1960s as the United Nations Decade of Development. The United Nations' existing efforts in promoting economic growth can be expanded and coordinated. Regional surveys and training institutes can now pool the talents of many. New research, technical assistance and pilot projects can unlock the wealth of less developed lands and untapped waters. And development can become a cooperative and not a competitive enterprise-to enable all nations, however diverse in their systems and beliefs, to become in fact as well as in law free and equal nations." (Page 6, paragraph 3)

ITEMS ON WHICH FOLLOW-UP AND REPORTING WILL
CONTINUE THROUGH ESTABLISHED CHANNELS

McGeorge Bundy

Washington, October 18, 1961.

SUBJECT
Follow-up on Your Address to the United Nations General Assembly--United Nations Aspects

Your address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, 1961 contained several specific proposals for action by the General Assembly, action in which you indicated the intention of the United States to play a major role. A brief status report on each of these proposals is set forth below, with a reference to National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 101/2/ included in parentheses after the heading of each proposal. Wherever possible an estimate as to the timing of General Assembly action has been included. However, the General Assembly has not yet established a firm order of priority of consideration of items nor begun action on any of the substantive items on the agenda, making timing difficult to assess accurately at this time.

I. Successor for Secretary General Hammarskjold (Item A.1 of NSAM 101)

The United States has been holding intensive consultations with a "middle group" of United Nations delegates from key Latin American, African, Asian and European countries in an effort to work out an acceptable formula for appointing a single successor to Dag Hammarskjold who would have the full powers of the Secretary General under Chapter XV of the United Nations Charter. There has been tentative agreement with this group on a formula whereby the successor would select a group of Under Secretaries from the principal geographic regions to assist and advise him. The details of this formula, to which the Soviet reaction has thus far been negative, are still being discussed with the "middle group" in an effort to obtain firmer agreement and more precise definitions of the relationship between the Under Secretaries and the Secretary General. U Thant of Burma appears to enjoy the broadest support for the post of Secretary General.

II. Review and Revision of the Composition of United Nations Bodies (Item A.2 of NSAM 101)

In connection with the handling of the Chinese representation issue at the 16th General Assembly, the United States has been consulting widely on the desirability of establishing a committee of the General Assembly to examine not only the Chinese representation question but also the broader problems of criteria for UN membership and the composition of the Security Council and ECOSOC. Reactions to this proposal have been mixed. Our consultations are continuing.

III. Strengthening the Peace Keeping Capacity of the United Nations (Items A.3 and 4 of NSAM 101)

The Departments of State and Defense are studying specific means whereby the peace-keeping capability of the United Nations can be strengthened. Particular questions presently being studied are those relating to: (1), the use of United States military assistance funds for United Nations military training programs (2), the development of a United Nations military training center; and (3), the future policy and command control of United Nations forces.

The United States Delegation to the General Assembly will make a major speech as part of the First Committee debate on ways to strengthen the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations. Several delegations have responded favorably in their general debate statements to your proposal for ear-marking forces for possible use by the United Nations.

Our Delegation is presently consulting in New York with a number of key "friendly delegations" (including the United Kingdom) and the United Nations Secretariat with a view to determining both the specific resolutions which will be required and the feasibility of submitting these resolutions at this session of the General Assembly. The process of consultation will include the convening of an unofficial caucus of a number of delegations in early November for a series of informal discussions on the specific proposals which we will have developed by that time. Subsequent action will depend in large measure on the results of this caucus.

IV. Problem of Colonialism (Item A.5 of NSAM 101)

There are two items on the agenda of the Plenary dealing with colonialism, one proposed by the USSR on the implementation of last year's declaration on colonialism and one which carried over from the United States item on independence for Africa at the last session. Our Delegation in New York is negotiating with the United Kingdom and Australian delegations to develop a draft resolution which would be submitted under the Soviet Item. Our hope is that we can develop a resolution acceptable to us and the moderate Afro-Asians which would forestall the extreme resolution which the Soviets can be expected to introduce. We have received from the United Kingdom Delegation the text of a Nigerian draft resolution, moderate in tone and with a ten-year terminal target date for independence of African territories, which Nigerian Foreign Minister Wachuku hopes to introduce when the "United States Item" is considered. He also intends to request priority for the United States Item over the Soviet Item. The United Kingdom Delegation has received authorization to advise Wachuku it will vote for the operative paragraphs of his draft resolution, and we intend to take similar action. We cannot predict at this stage when the debates on colonialism will begin.

V. United States Disarmament Plan and the Problem of Nuclear Testing (Item B of NSAM 101)

1. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty--On September 28, 1961 the United States and the United Kingdom submitted to the General Assembly a resolution (Tab A) calling for the renewal of US-UK-USSR efforts to conclude at the earliest possible time a treaty on the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests in all environments under inspection, with control machinery adequate to ensure compliance with its terms./3/ The draft resolution sets forth the basis on which negotiations should be conducted, calls on the negotiating states to report to the Disarmament Commission by March 1, 1962, and calls on all states to adhere to the treaty once it is concluded. We hope that our item on nuclear testing will be discussed simultaneously with the Indian item on testing as the first item on the agenda of the First Committee, which should begin its work about October 16. We also hope that our resolution will be acted on before an Indian resolution, although this is doubtful in view of the strong emotional sentiment for an indefinite uncontrolled moratorium on all nuclear testing which we expect will be called for in the Indian resolution. Such an indefinite, uncontrolled moratorium is unacceptable to us. We expect that Ambassador Stevenson will soon make a statement reaffirming our readiness to negotiate a test ban treaty.

2. Disarmament--On September 25, 1961 our Delegation in New York, in conformity with the remarks made in your speech to the Assembly, had the United States Declaration on Disarmament circulated. This was done in order that the General Assembly might consider this document as a guide for the negotiation of a program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. As a practical matter it will not be possible to present this declaration as a resolution to be formally approved by the General Assembly. It will serve an extremely useful purpose in educating the Assembly regarding our position. Also, it will help to divert the Assembly's attention from Soviet sloganeering and to focus instead on the practical problems posed by a comprehensive disarmament program. We are considering presenting to the Assembly a resolution which would (1) refer to the agreement on general principles reached with the Soviet Union and (2) recommend that the Disarmament Commission appoint a subcommittee comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, Tunisia, UAR, UK, USSR, and the US, to undertake as a matter of urgency the negotiation of a disarmament agreement which would serve as a basis for world wide agreement among nations on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

VI. United States Program for Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Item C of NSAM 101)

We have developed and cleared with appropriate Agencies proposals for submission at the 16th General Assembly which embody the points you made regarding outer space. The point concerning prohibition of weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies is contained in the United States Declaration on Disarmament introduced at the General Assembly on September 25th. In addition, we are consulting with selected delegations at the United Nations to seek support for a resolution concerning the other points you made regarding outer space (Tab B)/4/ when the outer space item comes up for discussion in Committee I-probably not before the latter part of November. We plan to submit and seek maximum support for this resolution.

VII. United States Plan for United Nations Decade of Development/5/ (Item D of NSAM 101)

Subsequent to your speech, the Department has revised and cleared with appropriate Government agencies a detailed position paper on the United States initiative for strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to act in the fields of economic and social development (Tab C)./6/ Our representative made a major speech which was very well received on October 6 in Committee II in which he outlined our proposal for a UN Decade of Development. Consultations have been held at the General Assembly with friendly delegations and within the framework of the OECD in Paris and in London. Reactions have, on the whole, been positive.

Our present concept is that the Secretariat of the United Nations in cooperation with the Managing Director of the Special Fund (Paul Hoffman) would prepare and submit before the close of the present General Assembly detailed plans and recommendations for the organization and implementation of the UN Development Decade. Mr. Hoffman supports our proposals and stands prepared to act accordingly. We plan soon to introduce a resolution in Committee II embodying our objectives and assigning a particularly important role to the Special Fund.

Dean Rusk

New York, October 18, 1961, 10 p.m.

1251. SYG.

1. Stevenson met with Dean (UK), Berard (France), Nielsen (Norway), and Boland (Ireland) this morning to discuss further tactics. Conclusion of mtg was that in further conversation with Zorin Stevenson should take position we favored returning to appointment of single SYG without qualifications but that we were still willing to accept five if Sovs insisted.

It was also agreed we should stand solidly against any procedures which would have effect of tying SYG's hands and prejudicing future elections.

It was further agreed that, as last resort, seven Under Secretaries might be contemplated if all other issues were settled satisfactorily but that this was not time to discuss such possibility outside this restricted group. Dean said UK instructions allowed him to accept this. Berard said his did not but he seemed to think he might get such instructions if necessary.

2. Stevenson saw Zorin at Zorin's request following First Comite mtg in afternoon. Stevenson read to him from talking paper (pouched UNP) which took position agreed upon in morning mtg, laying stress on reverting to appointment of unencumbered SYG.

3. Zorin expressed regret we were going back to initial US position, stated he must think this serious development over and report results to govt. Although Zorin tried to sound threatening we got definite impression he was preparing to accept agreement with five Under Secretaries (including Western Europe), with SYG's statement to be made after election in GA only, with no reference to any such statement in SC or GA reses, but with some kind of "consensus" statement by Pres of GA after declaration of new SYG. Estimate of Europeans that USSR was becoming extremely anxious to settle issue quickly seemed borne out.

4. Zorin asked the fol questions, "so that he could report to gov accurately":

(A) Did we agree to temporary SYG being appointed through SC by agreement with USSR. Stevenson replied we were anxious to reach agreement with USSR and had been trying to do so for month. We did not agree that SC action on interim appointment was necessary but in effort to conciliate Sovs were willing to go there first;

(B) Did we agree that new SYG should make statement which should be coordinated among ourselves about intentions regarding his future work and that this declaration should be made after his appointment both in SC and GA; Stevenson replied that we agreed he should make declaration in GA after his election. Final wording of statement would have to be his;

(C) Did we agree that after SYG had made his declaration Preses of SC and GA would make statements that SYG's proposals were endorsed in some way by consensus of members? Stevenson replied we did not agree to statement in SC but only to statement in GA after his election. Idea of statement by presiding officer was new and his first reaction was that it was as objectionable as statement by SYG before his election because only reasonable interpretation was that body would have some right to endorse or reserve its position on SYG's statement. Zorin subsequently returned to same issue in context only of action by GA. He suggested GA Pres could express greeting to SYG and state that he took it there was a general approval by GA of SYG's statement; wording of this was something US and Sovs could agree to. Stevenson said US could not speak for what Pres of GA might do and Yost added we would be worried about any implication through such statement that GA approval was required. Zorin replied that no decision by GA was intended. Stevenson suggested that it might be all right for Pres of GA to welcome SYG and express "his" approval of SYG's intentions. Zorin suggested he add "and takes this to be general opinion of GA". Conversation broke off at this point by discussion of other problems and was not resumed.

(D) Zorin said he understood we objected to six or seven but were agreeable to four to which Western Europeans objected. Stevenson replied there was no agreement to four so there was no point discussing this issue. Zorin asked why we objected to EE but did not press us to add one.

(E) In attempt to pin down contents of declaration new SYG would make, Zorin then asked several questions about our attitude toward Sov version thereof. He asked whether we agreed to designation of "acting SYG." Stevenson said we preferred regular appointment but would accept this. Yost added our main point on declaration was related to "spirit of mutual understanding" in contrast to "basis," but we hardly thought it was worthwhile refining declaration until basic points of numbers of Under Secretaries and timing of declaration had been decided. We would not then have much trouble on language.

(F) Zorin asked whether we would object to SYG mentioning who Under Secretaries would be in his declaration. Stevenson said if this was satisfactory with candidate it would be satisfactory with us. Exact language was up to him. All we could do was suggest the number and that he consult in a spirit of mutual understanding and that we should make statement after his GA election.

(G) In summary, Stevenson repeated, we and others would prefer SYG appointment with full authority and without any specific mention of advisers. He thought both US and USSR understood U Thant intended to consult his principal Under Secretaries in a spirit of mutual understanding and that we knew his intentions. He also thought we could both trust him to carry out his understandings with us. This was therefore best course. On other hand, we could also agree to election of U Thant followed by statement in which he would indicate his intention to have selection of advisers who would come from the five principal geographical areas and with whom he would consult in a spirit of mutual understanding.

Stevenson

Washington, October 20, 1961.

RE
Appointment of successor to Secretary-General Hammarskjold

While it is difficult to judge from newspaper accounts the exact status of negotiations to appoint a successor to Secretary-General Hammarskjold, it seems to me that we may be approaching the moment when it is desirable to put some pressure on the Russians through the threat of action by the General Assembly. Herewith is one procedure in that connection, which may avoid some of the difficulties of too abrupt or final action. It has the advantages of putting pressure on the Soviet Union for a reasonable settlement without forcing the more timid neutrals to take a position in direct contravention to that of the Soviet Union.

Under Article 101(1) of the Charter the Assembly can make regulations with respect to the staff to be appointed by the Secretary-General. Pursuant to this Article, regulations approved in 1946 (which I believe are still in effect) provide that "there shall always be one Assistant Secretary-General designated by the Secretary-General to deputize for him when he is absent or unable to perform his duties. . . ." I understand that Mr. Hammarskjold made no such designation prior to his last trip to Africa. If this is correct, I believe that the General Assembly could designate one of the existing Under Secretaries to deputize for the deceased Secretary-General. There should be little doubt that it has the authority to make a quasi-ministerial designation in lieu of the Secretary-General's doing so. In fact, in view of the 1946 precedent where the General Assembly authorized the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission to carry out the duties of Secretary-General pending appointment of the Secretary-General, and the later action of the General Assembly extending Trygve Lie's term for three years upon the failure of the Security Council to agree on a successor, I have little doubt that it could designate a person who is now Under Secretary to act in this capacity. I am aware that there is disagreement among some members of the UN that the authority goes so far, although I understand this to be the United States position with respect to the powers of the General Assembly.

My suggestion is that, rather than requesting the General Assembly to deputize an existing member of the Secretariat or appoint a person to perform the duties of the Secretary-General, we now request the General Assembly merely to amend the existing regulation expressly to provide that upon the death of the Secretary-General, coupled with his failure to have deputized an Under Secretary, the General Assembly will act in his stead either by so deputizing or by naming a person to exercise the powers of the Secretary-General.

The introduction of a resolution framed in this way should strengthen the bargaining position of the United States in the current negotiations and would have the advantage of gaining support from all those who favor the power of the General Assembly generally but who might be opposed to any specific nominee or specific proposal or who hesitates to cross the Soviet Union directly.

If some countries question the legal authority of the General Assembly to take even this action, I should think this is one matter on which we could willingly accept the views of the International Court of Justice in an Advisory Opinion. The only difficulty I foresee here is one of delay. But even assuming some delay, the proposal would have the merit of positive action with the possibility of definitive resolution of a recurring problem. I have little doubt as to the conclusion which the court, as presently composed, would come to, but this judgment, of course, should be checked with those more familiar with the court than I.

In connection with the foregoing, I might add that press accounts of the current negotiations have generally not emphasized sufficiently the extent to which the position of the United States is consistent with the present provisions of the Charter, and the position of the Soviet Union is inconsistent with Articles 100 and 101 which proscribe the independence of the Secretariat from political guidance by countries. As you undoubtedly know, proposals similar to those now being put forward by Soviet Russia were put forward by Russia and by other countries at the time the Charter was being discussed in San Francisco and were rejected. Those familiar with the UN are undoubtedly aware of this, but it seems to me that some publicity to this effect might be desirable.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach/2/

Washington, October 25, 1961, 10:36 a.m.

1012. Re SYG.

1. Mission should see Zorin Wednesday/2/ and inform him that US cannot accept either four or seven Under Secretaries but remains prepared accept five from principal geographic regions. Furthermore US prepared to see addition East European among present 14 Under Secretaries though not among inner five.

2. At same time, Mission should seek clarify following points:

a) Is Zorin definitely prepared drop "to decide in agreement, or in other words" (which unacceptable to us) and accept reference to "in spirit of mutual understanding" only?

b) As indicated in Deptel 966/3/ Dept has reservations about any statement by GA President. If any statement to be made there must be agreement on text. US cannot accept any formulation that would tend undermine independence SYG and would want assurances from Slim his normal remarks on appointment new SYG would not in any way be phrased to imply GA consensus or endorsement of SYG's plans required.

c) US continues see difficulties from constitutional standpoint of any SC action in case appointment interim or acting SYG, since in our view this matter should be handled by GA exclusively. If USSR desires formal SC recommendation, US continues prefer he be named SYG. However if USSR considers interim nature of appointment overriding consideration, US prepared see SC members meet together informally without agenda and reach agreement on action in GA to present candidate.

We realize that such informal get together SC members may not fulfill what Soviets have in mind re SC meeting. If formal SC meeting is necessary then fuzzing formulation of agenda item, i.e., "to fill unexpired term of SYG caused by Hammarskjold's death" may help blur whether SC has been seized of permanent as against interim appointment and at least avoid SC taking jurisdiction over question of term of appointment. You authorized to discuss this also with USSR if they insist on formal SC meeting.

d) With respect five Under Secretaries, US believes SYG could avoid naming both areas and individuals in his statement of intentions, and believes naming individuals concerned highly preferable. We understand from Pederson-Sisco telecon Soviets indicated one or other acceptable.

3. In view current Soviet campaign with LAs and others to build support for seven Under Secretaries, Dept believes USUN should undertake active "corridor" campaign behalf our position in favor five Under Secretaries.

4. Further contingency instructions now under review but would prefer await word from you on developments next day or two as you pursue above line.

Rusk

Washington, October 25, 1961.

SUBJECT
Appointment of a Secretary General

1. After our talk yesterday on the problem of replacing Hammarskjold, we have analyzed the various avenues open to us. For the time being, the best course seemed to be a holding operation which essentially would have USUN restate our previous position, and an instruction in this sense was sent this morning. (A copy of the instruction is attached (Tab A))./2/

In view of the complexity of the problem, and since we did not give USUN the authority which they requested to acquiesce in the naming of seven Under Secretaries as special advisors to the new Secretary General, I would like in this memorandum to explain the major ingredients of the problem which set the framework for this instruction.

2. The points of disagreement with the USSR, or at least those points which require further classification, fall into the following major categories:

Zorin has stood fast on the Soviet position that there should be either four Under Secretaries (USSR, U.S., Afro-Asian and Latin American) or seven, adding one Western European, one Afro-Asian and one Eastern European to the foregoing. We oppose the first formula because it does not provide representation for Western Europe, one of the most important groups in the Assembly, and the latter because it gives a disproportionate amount of representation to the Communists in the "inner group" around the SYG. Moreover, by accepting the addition of an "Eastern European", there is a greater flavor of political representation--as opposed to geographic--than we would like to see. At the same time, this distinction is admittedly fuzzy, and most of our best friends have taken this aspect of the problem less seriously than we. (The UK Delegate in New York has contingency instructions that would permit him to agree to seven Under Secretaries, but not to four.)

Thus the main difference between us and the USSR has tended to focus more and more on the question of numbers. The most relevant recent cables are attached (Tab B)./3/

In our last meeting with the USSR, Zorin said the Secretary General should state he would have a group of principal advisers at the Under Secretary level with whom he would work in close collaboration and consultation in an effort "to decide in agreement, or in other words in a spirit of mutual understanding with them the important questions concerning discharging the functions imposed on the Secretary General by the Charter." We find the words "to decide in agreement" unacceptable, and USUN believes the Soviets will drop this phrase.

The Soviets have abandoned their demand that the new SYG should make a statement of his intentions in the Security Council or in the General Assembly before his election and have accepted our view that any statement must come after the GA election. However, they have added a new requirement that the GA President should make an approving statement after hearing the statement of the SYG referring "to general opinion of the General Assembly" in this connection. It is clearly the Soviet intent to seek by this approach to establish the principle that the SYG should organize his office and operate on the basis of a consensus of opinion in the General Assembly. I believe this demand should be resisted since it would derogate from the authority of the SYG as specified in the Charter.

The Soviets have consistently sought to designate the new appointee as "interim SYG" whereas we have always preferred that the qualification "interim" not be added to his title. However, we are both agreed that a satisfactory term for the new man would be until April 1963 when Hammarskjold's term was scheduled to expire. The Soviets would prefer to have the maximum amount of formal SC action taken in connection with the appointment of the new man, including the fixing of his term of office. That would seem to give the Council jurisdiction over the length of the appointee's term. In the holding cable we have just sent out, we suggested that if the USSR desires a formal recommendation by the Council, the individual should be named as "Secretary General" (not "interim SYG") and that if the USSR sticks on the interim nature of the appointment, the Security Council members should just meet informally, without an agenda, to reach agreement on the action to be taken in the Assembly.

3. Now that fairly extensive negotiations with the USSR have been held, with a definite narrowing of differences, there is increasing pressure among UN members for a solution based on US-Soviet agreement. This leads me to conclude that, whereas early in the game we might have proceeded in the General Assembly without Soviet agreement to name an interim SYG, we have now reached the point of no return as far as this possibility is concerned.

I frankly suspect that in the last analysis, if the Soviets agree to our other demands but stand fast on seven Under Secretaries, there will be irresistible sentiment in favor of this formula. However, since our agreement is important, I feel we should try to drive as hard a bargain as we can. Although a solution of the problem is indeed urgent, particularly because of the Congo situation, I believe we can afford the investment of two or three more days to try and get as many of these points ironed out as we can.

Washington, November 2, 1961.

SUBJECT
Attached Statement by U Thant

I am attaching for your information a copy of a statement which was given to Ambassador Stevenson on a confidential basis.

It is a statement which U Thant would make after he had been appointed Acting Secretary-General by the Assembly. You will note that the statement is a very good one from our point of view since no mention is made of either five or seven Under-Secretaries and it is clear that this is a matter for the Acting Secretary-General himself to decide.

I understand that copies of the attached letter have been given by U Thant to the UK, France, and USSR. The USSR apparently has been pressing U Thant to make changes in it, and in particular to include reference to seven Under-Secretaries, but U Thant has indicated that it is not subject to negotiation or change.

MH Manfull/2/

1. It is my intention to invite a limited number of persons who are at present Under Secretaries, or to be appointed as Under Secretaries, to act as my principal advisers on important questions pertaining to the performance of functions entrusted to the Secretary General by the UN Charter.

2. In extending this invitation, I am fully conscious of the importance of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity, and with due regard to the importance of as wide a geographic basis as possible, as laid down in Article 101 of the Charter. I intend to include among these advisers Dr. Ralph J. Bunche and Georgy Arkadev.

3. It is also my intention to work together with these parties in close cooperation and consultation in a spirit of mutual understanding. I am sure that they will seek to work with me in the same manner. Of course this whole arrangement is without prejudice to such future organizational changes as experience may reveal to be necessary./3/

Washington, November 11, 1961.

SUBJECT
Financing United Nations Peace and Security Operations

The financing of United Nations peace and security operations has become increasingly acute since the Congo operation began. The UN has unpaid bills of nearly $100 million, all reserves will be exhausted in a few months, and spending authority for Congo and UNEF (Emergency Force in Palestine) expires December 31, 1961.

Soviet bloc nations, France, Belgium, China, many Latin American countries, and others are seriously in arrears. Some do not have the revenues to pay, some argue on principle that the permanent Security Council members should pay the bill, others refuse to pay to show disapproval of the operations. (See Tab A for key financial facts.)/2/

Funding of these operations to date has been by a combination of assessed and voluntary contributions. The U.S. payments were 47.5% of the total this year. Because we paid more than our usual UN share (32.5%), 79 smaller nations least able to pay were given rebates up to 80%.

The cost of the Congo operation is running $10 million and UNEF about $1.7 million per month. This General Assembly must take action if current Congo and UNEF operations are to continue. (See Tab B for additional details of funding.)

It might well be advantageous from the United States point of view for UN forces to be placed in other world areas, especially where indirect aggression occurs. Financial uncertainty or haggling over costs and assessments could abort necessary action. We therefore propose to use the "honeymoon period" of the new Secretary General to persuade him to present a plan both to solve the immediate cash problem and to get a little ahead of the game on peace and security operations through 1963. This plan would include three major steps:

1. Finance the immediate need to June 30, 1962, by pushing through a special scale of contributions somewhat like the present one. Ambassador Stevenson believes this may be possible for this short period. To make another "every member canvass" work, the U.S. would have to pay about 50% of the bill. Smaller nations' contributions would have to be rebated by about 90%. But even this will not be popular with most other nations.

2. Submit to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion the question whether Member States are legally required to pay peace-and-security assessments that are already past due. We expect a favorable opinion. In that event the Latin Americans, France and even the Soviets might find it politically easier to back down and pay arrearages.

3. Undertake by negotiation to secure the agreement of 15 or 20 key States to a one-time UN Peace and Security Bond issue. $200 million would be required. With 25 year repayments at 2% interest, about $10 million would be required annually to pay principal and interest. We should press for repayment by all members as a part of the regular UN budget based on the regular assessment scale. The United States might have to buy $100 million of the bond issue.

(Tab C is a staff paper which supplies additional facts on the UN financial crisis and on this proposal.)

1. It could take care of the cash crisis for as much as two years. This would be a year longer than the UN has ever been able to look ahead.

2. It maintains principle of collective responsibility.

3. It brings the prospective annual repayment cost within capability of members.

4. It provides Secretary General with a new basis for collection of unpaid assessments.

5. It provides non-paying States with a "face-saving" device if they want to start paying again.

6. It avoids a U.S. contribution so large that propagandists could characterize Congo as a "U.S. operation."

7. It provides an initial approach and gives us time to work out more permanent arrangements. Our objective will be to devise an even longer range approach to financing UN peace and security efforts, perhaps by establishment of a special fund for this purpose.

1. Ambassador Stevenson and Ambassador Klutznick in New York are starting to discuss the whole UN financial problem with the new Secretary General to get him to act in a timely fashion.

2. Ambassador Stevenson would discuss this approach with a few friendly States. The Secretary General would discuss with the Soviets and other financially recalcitrant States.

3. The State Department will take soundings with Congressional leaders on the whole proposed strategy. If the proposal should go through at this session of the General Assembly, Congress would be asked rather early in its 1962 session to authorize purchase by the U.S. of $100 million of the UN bond issue. Other Member States would purchase the balance.

This whole range of ideas has been under review for several months. The Bureau of the Budget (Mr. Staats) and Treasury (Mr. Leddy) concur in the approach and in holding the exploratory discussions outlined above and spelled out in greater detail in Tab C. We all realize there are numerous problems associated with it, not the least of which is shortness of time; the General Assembly should really act before the end of the year. We are therefore asking Ambassador Stevenson to go ahead with consultations within this framework.

We believe the program has a fair chance of success. But our judgment on that will be better after we have had a chance to consult some of our European friends and some of the key members of Congress.

Dean Rusk/3/

Washington, December 20, 1961.

SUBJECT
Highlights of the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly

1. From the point of view of the United States interests, a United Nations General Assembly can be divided into two parts:

a. Constructive things we were trying to get done through the United Nations--notably by building up the UN executive.

b. Destructive moves and propagandistic debates in which our objective is to limit the damage to United States interests and UN executive functions.

2. The President's speech on September 25, 1961, proposed four major institution-building moves. On all of them there has been real progress:

a. A new Secretary-General has been appointed, and his Office has been maintained unimpaired.

b. Disarmament talks have been got under way again, with the important addition to the scenery of a major emphasis on building international peace-keeping machinery in parallel with the dismantling of war-making capacity.

c. At President Kennedy's suggestion, the UN has taken on a whole new function, to develop and supervise an international Outer Space program.

d. The UN Decade of Development has been proclaimed and some of the first contemplated steps--a UN-FAO Food for Peace Program and a 1962 Conference on Science and Technology for the Less Developed Areas-have been taken.

e. Financing the UN, which was not stressed in the President's speech but is essential to the development of its executive function, has also been advanced. By appropriation of adequate funds to carry the Organization through next June, plus a UN bond issue to raise the necessary cash to pay off its deficit, are both in prospect.

3. With the notable exceptions of the Goa affair and some of the nuclear issues, the destructive potential of this Assembly was not realized. For example:

a. The Chinese Communists were farther away from admission at the end of the Assembly than they were at its beginning.

b. In debating and developing resolutions on the emotional Colonialism issue, the prevailing sentiment in the Afro-Asian group was surprisingly moderate and, indeed, often was uninterested. The Colonialism debate was the least well-attended of any of the major items on the agenda. The thorny issue of "target dates" for independence, which the British and we thought would be our major difficulty in this field, was successfully by-passed altogether.

c. On the nuclear issues, the Soviets got their comeuppance on the 50 Megaton bomb, and we did well in the propaganda battle over the nuclear tests negotiations. However, we had great difficulty with some of the subsidiary issues of great interest to the smaller countries--notably the African nuclear free zone and the various proposals to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the present nuclear powers. This issue is the successor to colonialism in emotional content in the Assembly and deserves more systematic thought than the U.S. has given it. A Committee for this has now been organized, under the Chairmanship of William C. Foster.

4. Attached is a brief statement which you or the President might want to use as a comment on the ending of the General Assembly session tomorrow or the next day./2/

Washington, January 18, 1962.

SUBJECT
$200,000,000 Bond Issue

1. Origins of Bond Proposal. About mid-October Ambassador Stevenson and the Department became convinced that the financial crisis in the United Nations was prospectively so bad, and there was so little support for continuing the financing of the Middle East (UNEF) and Congo (UNOC) from special assessments, that a new means of financing these Peace and Security Operations was needed. United Nations unpaid obligations, including borrowing, were estimated to total about $110,000,000 by December 31. Unpaid assessments by that date (Soviet bloc, France, Belgium, and the smaller, less-developed nations) totaled about $80 million. Against this background, a plan had to be found on which a majority of members could agree which would prevent a financial stalemate and produce the cash necessary to continue these peace-keeping operations.

The United States conceived the idea of getting General Assembly backing (a) to secure an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice to put pressure on the recalcitrant nations to pay their arrearages and (b) to authorize the Secretary General to sell United Nations bonds. The outline of a plan was thrashed out in meetings between the State Department, the Treasury Department, and the Bureau of the Budget.

The UN bond issue was to finance the UNEF and UNOC operations for the eighteen months--July 1, 1962 to December 31, 1963. It was considered a gamble that even this could be agreed on, but it was hoped that this different plan utilizing U Thant's "honeymoon period" as Secretary General might work and provide the needed breathing space for these peace-keeping operations free from financial crisis. After Budget and Treasury clearances, I authorized Ambassador Stevenson to canvass the matter with the UN, my memorandum to you dated November 11, 1961/2/ explained fully the reasoning behind the proposal.

U Thant did in fact decide to make the UN's financial problem his first order of business. In a remarkable series of interviews with every delegation, concentrated in six successful evenings, the Secretary General became convinced that the plan might work.

(From the beginning it was recognized that to succeed, this had to be a U Thant initiative. We advised no one of the United States role. It was inevitable that some newspaper comment would trace the original idea back to Washington. But it would be a mistake for us to do other than attribute it to U Thant, who developed and refined the plan in consultation with the United States and other major contributors. If the U.S. origin were to show through too clearly, it might seriously prejudice U Thant's sale of bonds to some of the other governments.)

The first contacts with Congress on this matter were made after the Secretary General's proposals had been introduced into Committee Five but before the General Assembly had acted on them. About ten members of the House and Senate Foreign Affairs and Relations and of the Appropriations Committees, and their key Clerks, were reached in person or by telephone. Contacts included Congressmen Zablocki, Fascell, Judd and Rooney and Senators Fulbright, Saltonstall, and Wiley. We had, of course, informed members of Congress in our hearings last year that we were exploring ways and means to put UN finances on a sounder basis. Additionally, Congressman Burleson of Texas and Congresswoman Church of Illinois were members of the U.S. Delegation to the current session of the General Assembly and the proposal was discussed with them.

2. What happens if the bond issue does not pass Congress? The Assembly adopted the UN bond plan by an overwhelming majority, with our affirmative support and vote, and over Soviet objections. If Congress fails to take favorable action, the political repercussions at the United Nations would be serious. It is known at the UN that while this was a U Thant initiative, the United States was active in the development of the plan. Our standing in the UN will have been undermined and there would undoubtedly be a loss of confidence by U Thant in us, for this would constitute the Executive's inability to deliver on a proposal and move which we encouraged U Thant to make. It would tend to demoralize the UN leadership in connection with the Congo operation, and the potential ability of the UN to take on another Congo in the future would have been seriously weakened-both politically and financially.

In these circumstances, in order that we continue to achieve our objectives in connection with both the UNEF and Congo operations, we would have to seek other means to keep these peace and security operations going. One such probability would be to request a special General Assembly with a view to having it authorize new financing beyond June 30, 1962. This would be in the same form as in the past, namely a special scale of assessments. The cost would likely be to the United States more than 47% of the total which we have heretofore paid if the UNEF and Congo operations are to continue on their present basis. Another possibility would be a direct U.S. loan to the UN to tide it over until next fall at which time the Assembly would have to consider the whole question of financial solvency.

3. Size of Special UN Levies. The UN budget for peace-and-security operations in the Congo (UNOC) and the Middle East (UNEF), is running about $140 million per year. In 1961, UNEF cost about $19 million of which the U.S. paid $7.9 million. The actual amounts paid so far for 1961 for the Congo operation were $47.5 million for a $100 million budget for the first ten months of that year.

If financing of these operations were to be continued on the same basis, the 1962 U.S. costs would total for the Congo, $56.4 million and for the Middle East, $8.9 million.

4. Actions Being Taken by the Department with Congress. It is clear that we will have a difficult job in the Congress, particularly on the House side. We are canvassing carefully individual members of the Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees with a view to convincing them that it is in the national interest of the U.S. to support fully the UN bond issue. There have already been about twenty-five such individual discussions and there are many more to come. As a supplement and a corollary to these discussions with key Congressmen, the Department has prepared a detailed summary describing the purposes of the UN bond issue and giving both the political and financial reasons why it is in our national interest to participate. These summaries are being made available to members of Congress and their staffs. Over a period of the next few weeks we intend to broaden out our background discussions with individual members of Congress with a view to getting key members to come out publicly in favor of the proposal. Moreover, a number of Congressmen are receiving a good deal of correspondence from their respective constituents, and the Department is providing the necessary material to respond to such correspondence.

We have prepared a Presidential Message to Congress which will be forwarded to the White House this week. In capsule form, this message reiterates both the political and financial reasons for the UN bond proposal and emphasizes in particular that the peace-keeping operations of the UN--in the Middle East and in the Congo--are serving the national interest of the United States.

5. The Loss of Voting Privileges. The General Assembly voted to ask the International Court of Justice at The Hague for an advisory opinion to settle the question of whether past and future assessments for peace and security operations are mandatory obligations on governments under the UN Charter. U Thant has now transmitted the request to the International Court of Justice for the advisory opinion on debt payment. Presentations to the Court are scheduled to begin February 20. (The US will make a submission and oral agreements.) An opinion, which supports such assessments, would establish that such costs are to be considered as part of the regular expenses. This concept of collective responsibility for peace-and-security operations in the UN urgently needs to be reestablished. Armed with this opinion, the Secretary General, plus the concert of nations, may be able to persuade the recalcitrants to pay up.

6. Steps taken to get other nations to subscribe. The following steps have been taken to get other countries to fully subscribe the bond issue:

U Thant wrote a letter (January 5) to each member state urging them to buy bonds promptly./3/ He intends to follow this up with personal solicitations by himself and his staff.

President Eugene Black (IBRD) has written letters to the finance ministers in most nations of the world urging the purchase of bonds. In addition, Black is contacting the Germans and the Swiss to get them to buy bonds.

The Department has cabled our diplomatic posts and asked our Ambassadors to stress the importance the United States attaches to subscription of the full $200,000,000 promptly. In our recent conversations with the British we urged that they buy a generous share. Mr. Ball urged the Canadians last Friday to increase their Bond purchases over their announced intention to buy $6.24 million./4/ We will follow up with other nations on a selective basis.

The US Delegation announced, when it supported the bond issue proposal, that we have always stood ready to pay peace-and-security costs on a pay-as-you-go basis.

In summary, the technical case for the Bond Issue rests on three points: (a) the urgent need for cash by the United Nations; (b) the inability of smaller, less-developed nations to pay these heavy costs on a pay-as-you-go basis, and (c) the need for somewhat longer-range financing to remove the financial crisis from the difficult political problems of the Congo operation. The proposed Bond Issue would meet these requirements and reduce our United States contribution from 47-1/2 percent to 32 percent.

But essentially the case for our participation in the financing of the UN rests on broader political grounds. We cannot put a dollar sign on peace. For sixteen years the UN has served the national interest of the U.S. This has been particularly the case in its two principal peace-keeping operations--in the Middle East and in the Congo. Soviet opposition to UN peace-keeping operations attests to their effectiveness. A stronger executive capacity to act means a stronger UN to serve our interests-and the reality of the matter is that this cannot be accomplished without firm financing.

Dean Rusk/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.