Washington, January 19, 1962.

SUBJECT
Conversation with U Thant

The attached somewhat bland memorandum from State will probably not tell you a great deal that you do not already know./2/

A couple of additional points:

1. West New Guinea. It is the view of Harriman and of the White House staff that we can most effectively stop an Indonesian invasion of West New Guinea by indicating to the Indonesians that they are going to get West New Guinea in the long run anyway, and that the one thing which would fatally prejudice their case would be an act of aggression. The logic of this view would be for you to suggest that U Thant point out to the Indonesians that military action is the one sure way of jeopardizing something which must otherwise fall into their waiting arms. I must add, though, that the Secretary of State seems to dissent from this proposed line of action.

2. US Attitudes toward UN. I think it is fair to say that there is an impending crisis of confidence in American attitudes toward the UN. The new apprehensions, which you yourself, of course, do not share, rise in great part from the flow of new small nations into the UN, from the expectation that this will continue for some time to come, and from the supposed consequence that the General Assembly will be dominated in the future by untried people from young and unsophisticated countries. The crisis has been foreshadowed in the tendency on the part of thoughtful pro-UN figures (Fulbright, McCloy) to propose the limiting of the US commitment to the UN as well as in the primitive "Get the UN out of the US and the US out of the UN" pitch of the John Birchers. Some of this will come to a head in the debate in the Congress over the bond issue.

You yourself have, of course, a steady confidence in the UN and in the purpose and capacity of the new nations to support the organization and live responsibly by the Charter. However, both the general situation and the bond issue debate suggest the need for moderate actions and tempers on the part of the new nations during the resumed session of the General Assembly. The most hopeful aspect, from the viewpoint of preserving US confidence in the UN, is the emergence of a reasoned and responsible group of statesmen from the new countries (among whom U Thant himself, of course, is a prominent figure).

3. UN Future. There is some speculation that U Thant finds the job burdensome, that he prefers to have more time for his own thought and work, and that he may therefore get out at the end of his present term. You might want to express sympathy for the sacrifices he has made in taking the job but add (if you are impressed by him) that he is playing a role of unique importance and that we hope that he plans to stay on. You might want to add that we are all interested in his long-term views about the future of the UN, and that you hope an opportunity will arise when you and he and Governor Stevenson can set aside present problems and try to figure out where the UN should be in, say, 1972 and 1987.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

Washington, February 7, 1962.

SUBJECT
Support for the UN Bond Issue

As you requested of Mr. Wallner on behalf of the President, here is an outline of State Department activities designed to arouse public support for the UN bond issue. They are designed to make use of existing private organizations to supplement the major effort going into Congressional testimony and constant liaison with key members of the Congress.

The United States Committee for the United Nations, under the Chairmanship of Robert Benjamin, is circulating material to 20,000 community leaders suggesting letters to Congress; offering supplies of the President's message/2/ and other materials to 136 member organizations; and planning spot announcements for local radio stations.

/2/For text of the President's message to Congress on January 30 transmitting a bill for the purchase of UN bonds, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 81-82.

The American Association for the United Nations has distributed copies of the President's message, an editorial by Norman Cousins, and a Fact Sheet to 10,000 small town dailies and weeklies; sent a similar packet to all AAUN chapters with suggestions for local campaigns of support; and sent a background piece on the Congo, tied to the bond issue, to both local chapters and the 10,000 newspapers. In response to a letter from the AAUN, former President Truman will hold a press conference in Kansas City, probably the week after next, to announce his support of UN bonds. Funds are being sought for newspaper ads.

A briefing session has been held in Washington for officials of twenty-three national organizations representing labor, professional, farm, veterans, womens', educational, church, and student constituencies. Some have started alerting their members through mailings, house organ articles and other means, and others are expected to do so. Some of these organizations are urging local chapter members to call on Congressmen home for Lincoln and Jackson Day events.

Regional briefing sessions, held by the Department of State in Chicago and Minneapolis last week, including a presentation of the case for the bond issue.

Copy for newspaper ads, hopefully to be sponsored by a group of businessmen, is under preparation. State will consult with Ralph Dungan re financing and sponsorship.

USUN is working with NGOs in New York and Ambassador Klutznick briefed a group of New York businessmen last week. Governor Stevenson's television program last Sunday was devoted to the bond issue.

Personal calls have been made on a number of organizations, including the Committee for Economic Development, the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, seeking support from the organizations, their executive committees, or their officers.

It is clear from efforts to date that the principal problem lies with the business community. It is indicative that in private sessions, the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce approved unanimously the UN bond issue, but the Government Operations Committee unanimously disapproved, thus throwing the issue to the Board of Directors, which meets in April.

You also asked about the possibility of an announcement of purchase of UN bonds by Germany during the course of Congressional hearings. The Secretary discussed this with the German Ambassador last Friday prior to his return to Bonn yesterday./3/ He strongly urged a maximum pledge to purchase UN bonds and a prompt public announcement in the interests of Germany, of the United Nations, and of the Administration's effort to secure Congressional authorization. An informal aide-memoire along these lines was presented to the German Ambassador./4/ Mr. Eugene Black previously urged the head of the Central Bank to support German subscription to the bonds. The Department will continue to press for favorable German action, but it is uncertain at this time what success we shall have. A complicating factor is Chancellor Adenauer's desire not to appear at cross purpose with General DeGaulle at this time.

MH Manfull/5/

Washington, March 8, 1962.

SUBJECT
Resumed Session of the 16th General Assembly

Time magazine recently described the 16th General Assembly as "the sensible 16th". In the assessment that I sent to you on December 20, I noted that real progress had been made at the first part of the session.

The resumed session, which with one exception was confined to colonial issues, did nothing to upset this favorable balance and in fact made it even more favorable. With solid Latin American support (except for Cuba itself), the Assembly refused, despite strenuous Soviet bloc efforts to the contrary, to take any action even of an anodyne nature on Cuba's charges against the United States. The greater moderation on colonial issues that had marked the first part of the session continued to prevail during the resumed session. Moderate resolutions on Angola and Ruanda Urundi were adopted by overwhelming majorities, and Soviet efforts on behalf of more extreme positions, particularly in the case of Ruanda Urundi, were not appreciated by the Afro-Asians. As we hoped, no resolution was adopted on British Guiana. Only in the case of Southern Rhodesia was action taken that we fear may aggravate rather than ameliorate the problem.

A more detailed account of the Assembly's action on the five items considered at its resumed session is attached./2/

Washington, March 23, 1962, 9:46 p.m.

2458. Subject: Definition of Aggression Committee. Refs: USUN 3009, 3115./2/ Dept adheres long established conviction that definition of aggression would not aid UN in maintaining peace and that further efforts arrive at definition be undesirable and unproductive. UN Charter contemplates determination of aggression be based on political evaluation by competent UN organ of all circumstances pertinent to incident in question, rather than automatic application or a priori formula. Pursuant this conception, San Francisco Conference specifically declined include definition of aggression in Charter.

Definition of aggression considered by GA at fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, eleventh, and twelfth sessions. Also considered by ILC at its third session, and by special committees appointed by GA in 1953 and 1956. Fact that these efforts did not result in agreement on definition indicates futility of further efforts. Dept. accordingly hopes Committee will adjourn without recommending further consideration definition by aggression in GA.

Pursuant GA res 1181(XII),/3/ committee composed of states members General Committee of most recent GA. Mission should consult with those delegations along foregoing lines in effort secure agreement committee should not recommend further consideration definition of aggression in GA.

In past, committee before adjourning fixed date for further meetings. If possible, Dept prefers omission this step. Instead, committee should adjourn with understanding it might meet in future at such time as majority its members deem fruitful. Thus necessity meetings at fixed intervals would be avoided.

Mission requested ascertain who will represent members in committee. FYI. Dept considers high level representation would lend undesirable importance to question, and does not contemplate high level US representation unless necessitated by representation other committee members. End FYI.

Ball

Washington, April 6, 1962.

SUBJECT
Chinese Representation, US-UK Differences Over

As you know, a problem has arisen with the British over the handling of the Chinese representation issue in subsidiary United Nations organs and specialized agencies. Ambassador Bruce and more recently the Secretary have discussed this question with Lord Home. The latter is said to have evinced a more flexible attitude than some of his subordinates who are taking a narrow legalistic line on Chinese representation that accords with the UK policy of admitting Red China to the United Nations. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Lord Home's views have prevailed. On the contrary, a telephone call to me from British Embassy Counselor R.J.D. Ledward on March 26, 1962, would seem to indicate that the working levels of the Foreign Office (particularly its Far Eastern Department) are still intent on forcing a showdown on the substance of Chinese representation similar to that which took place in the General Assembly in December 1961, in all those bodies which they consider "competent" to discuss and decide such issues.

According to Ledward's latest instructions the British now include in their category of "competent" bodies: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, the ECOSOC, the IAEA, the deliberative bodies of the ILO, FAO, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO, ICAO, the Board of Governors of the IBRD and the IMF and the Administrative Council and Plenipotentiary Conference of ITU. In discussing the matter with me on February 26, 1962, Ledward made it clear that if a "moratorium" proposal were introduced in any of these bodies, the United Kingdom delegation would be instructed to vote against it.

We strongly oppose reopening the debate on the substance of the Chinese representation issue in subsidiary United Nations organs and specialized agencies for reasons which are obvious. Since most of these bodies, however, are indeed "competent" in a strictly legal sense to debate and vote on the issue of Chinese representation, an "out of order" formula is not applicable and would not be honored. In order to avoid an open clash with the British therefore, it is essential that we obtain their agreement to or tolerance of some modification of our old "moratorium" formula.

In view of the conciliatory attitude displayed by Lord Home in his talks with Ambassador Bruce and the Secretary, the time appears to have come to resume our discussions with the British with a view toward developing a mutually acceptable formula whereby we can dispose of the Chinese representation issue in so-called "competent" lower United Nations bodies by procedural means. In particular we should press the British for consideration of the formula outlined in paragraph 5 of Department's telegram 4671 to London. (Tab A)/2/

To obtain agreement with the British on some such concrete formula has become a matter of urgency, for the Chinese representation issue is likely to arise in meetings of the following so-called "competent" United Nations bodies between now and the opening of the 17th General Assembly in September: ITU, 17th Session of the Administrative Council, May 5; WHO, 15th Assembly, May 8; Trusteeship Council, 29th Session, May 31; ILO Conference, 46th Session, June 6; ICAO, 14th Assembly, August 28. In addition the 7th General Conference of IAEA and the 12th General Conference of UNESCO are scheduled to meet concurrently with the 17th Session of the General Assembly in September/October and November of this year.

It was agreed between the Secretary and Lord Home in Geneva that the problems raised by the official British position on the admission of Red China to "competent associated UN organizations" should be discussed further "in Washington". I therefore suggest that at an early opportunity you call in the British Ambassador and discuss with him the specific formula for the handling of the Chinese representation issue in subsidiary United Nations bodies contained in paragraph 5 of Department's telegram 4671 to London, in the light of the recent general exchanges with Lord Home on this subject. You should invite his Government's reactions to this proposal and emphasize the desirability of obtaining early agreement on some such procedure in order to avoid unnecessary contretemps from arising between our Governments over this vexatious issue in the upcoming meetings of the agencies listed above.

Washington, April 19, 1962, 8:42 p.m.

5613. Assistant Secretary Cleveland invited UK Ambassador April 19 to discuss problem Chinese Representation in UN subsidiary organs. Cleveland recalled in conversation with Ambassador Bruce and Secretary, Lord Home had given impression he desired be helpful in connection this problem, saying it was not UK policy admit Chinese Communists to UN by back door. We agree with UK that legally a number of UN subsidiary bodies are competent determine own membership. However, given UN decision last fall and GA Resolution 396 (V)/2/ recommending that attitude adopted by General Assembly on membership be taken into account in other UN organs, we believe good case can be made for avoiding issue in subsidiary bodies. We anxious find formula which would avoid public display basic US-UK differences over substance Chinese Representation. With series of meetings of competent bodies scheduled begin next month, we consider it urgent that attempts be made reconcile our positions on this in near future. Cleveland stressed domestic problem which would be created in US if substantive differences with UK on this issue, which arouses such passions here, repeatedly exposed to public view in half-dozen upcoming meetings of subsidiary UN bodies. He pointed out only reason why this did not cause greater difficulties last fall was fact US position sustained by sizeable margin.

Cleveland then handed Ambassador two alternative versions procedural resolutions which we thought should serve as acceptable basis for approach to problem and said he hoped UK would find it possible accept one of these. Text follows:

I. a) a preambular paragraph recalling GA resolution 396 (V);

b) a preambular para recalling the action which the GA took at its 16th session on December 15, 1961;

c) possibly a preambular para declaring that any action at this time by the body in question to change the representation of China would be inconsistent with the above recommendations and decisions of the General Assembly;

d) an operative paragraph whereby the international body in question would decide not to consider at this session any proposal to change the representation of China.

II. a) a preambular paragraph recalling GA resolution 396 (V);

b) a preambular para recalling the action which the GA took at its 16th session on December 15, 1961;

c) an operative para whereby the international body in question would decide to refrain from taking action inconsistent with the above-mentioned recommendations and decisions of the GA.

Ambassador said UK has no desire whatever to see Chinese Communists seated in these bodies, but must act, and perhaps speak, in subsidiary bodies in manner consistent with position taken in GA. He recalled UK had voted against Resolution 396 (V). However, Cleveland pointed out this res had been adopted by overwhelming majority and did constitute clear recommendation to all governments by General Assembly. Ormsby-Gore said he did not know if UK would consider itself inhibited from voting for resolution containing reference to it. He thought this would be easier in any event if such reference contained in preambular paragraph rather than in operative paragraph reaffirming resolution. Ormsby-Gore stressed UK anxious not cause more trouble than necessary, but said correspondence between UK-UN and FonOff had not yet resulted in agreement as to how approach problem. He speculated possibly UK might decide simply remain silent when and if question arose and then abstain on resolution. He said however if either of foregoing formulae could be accepted by UK easiest combination for them would probably be (a), (b) and (d) of first alternative, omitting (c) in order avoid establishing general principles and limiting action in effect to year-by-year moratorium.

Rusk

A-273

New York, April 19, 1962.

SUBJECT
GA Voting

1. In resumed session GA several factors emerged on votes of importance to us which require close attention inasmuch as similar issues and similar voting problems can be anticipated in future. Specifically, successful outcome in blocking undesirable aspects of colonial issues having wide Afro-Asian and Communist support (e.g. mention of Comite of 17 in Angola res and call for Belgian troop withdrawal in Ruanda-Urundi) as well as on Cuban issue was achieved as result alignment in our support of: (a) Solid WE and LA backing. This included WE "moderates" such as Norway, Canada, Ireland, Austria and Sweden, whose support came with unusual ease this spring and WE states with grievances against us such as Portugal, South Africa and Belgium; it also included more difficult LAs such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Ecuador; (b) Backing by US allies in Asia (e.g. Pakistan, Thailand, Japan, China, Philippines, Iran) and by Malaya; (c) Abstention by French-African states and to some extent by friendliest Middle East countries (Cyprus, Lebanon and Jordan).

Chief factor assuring largest number these votes in UN appears to be our military and political alliances. Hard core of our supporters comes from NATO, OAS, CENTO and SEATO, and it is our mutual overall political and military commitments which seem to be primary factor in their voting on specific issues. Second important factor in maintaining our voting position in UN is developing shift of "moderate" Western countries toward support of our positions even in face of neutral opposition. Third important factor is fact French-Africans have so far been able maintain their moderate position. Our voting problem, as usual, is to continue to attract the "liberals" in this group while not losing the "conservatives".

2. While there was some voting improvement, as indicated above, there was also some deterioration. English-speaking Africans such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and sometimes Tanganyika tended to vote with Belgrade Group, if not for the most extreme proposals, nevertheless for proposals we opposed--for example for the Mongolian Resolution re Cuba in Plenary, and on second operative paragraph of Cuban Resolution in Committee--more often than they tended to abstain with French-Africans. Similarly Tunisia tended regularly to vote with this group, while a year ago it was more conservative. Saudi Arabia, which by any normal standards might be expected to be no more unhelpful than Lebanon and Jordan, continued to vote and take debate and corridor lines (primarily because of Shukairy and Baroody) similar to those of UAR and Iraq.

3. Both Boland (Ireland) and Algard (Norway) have asked us if we noted change in voting and attitude of "moderate" Europeans. They added this was deliberate policy on their part to help keep UN actions moderate and to combat "take it or leave it" tendency among some Afro-Asians when they have agreed on text of resolution among themselves. Boland told us he had himself witnessed decline of League due to disenchantment of major powers. Substantial European disenchantment with UN had already set in; radical Afro-Asians likely to produce even more of this; role of "moderates" in circumstances was to restrain radicals more than to press colonial powers (which was their main concern in last few years). Both Boland and Algard also said advance in US policy on colonial matters was key factor that made such attitude on their part possible. Because US policy helped keep pressures on our allies to come up-to-date on colonial matters, European moderates could keep pressures on Afro-Asian radicals not to go too fast. In particular they felt it was necessary to have something (especially from US) they could all be for rather than just to be against other proposals, and that we were now doing this.

4. Difficult to analyze exactly what we should do in light above voting situation. Suggest, however, we should give close attention to following:

a. Measures to assure continued and better support from liberal Europeans, LAs, and modern Afro-Asians

(1) We must maintain forward-looking policy on colonial questions. In particular we must examine issues before UN constantly with view to US initiatives or to actions we can support and which can be expected to block or dull more extreme proposals. Early planning by Department is vital if we are to achieve this. Such policy is also essential to assure support of more liberal pro-West elements not only in Africa and Asia but also in Latin America and Western Europe.

(2) We must make major effort keep as close as possible to French-speaking Africans. They now possess balance of votes in Assembly. Their votes can determine who is elected GA President; their votes can determine whether GRC or Communist China has majority in GA; their votes are essential to give us two-thirds majority on issues in which Casablanca-Belgrade powers are willing to vote in conjunction with Communists against our desires; their votes could be either psychologically helpful or damaging even on issues where they do not determine outcome. Inasmuch as we will constantly be seeking their support we must be prepared to give them something in return, for example to support them actively for membership on UN bodies and to support them on some of their resolutions and amendments even if we not entirely happy with them. Conversely we should be prepared to caution them against positions which are hopeless and which will make them look bad among Afro-Asians generally even if some of our friends (including the French) sometimes object. (At the same time it is probably not desirable to talk to other dels, especially French-Africans, about how much importance we attach to their role.)

b. Measures to attract further support among Afro-Asians

(1) We need to make effort to break-up voting alignment of Arabs. Arabs now tend to follow UAR line, which sometimes puts them against us and almost never with us. They vote en bloc more consistently than any other group in UN except Soviet bloc. We now sometimes pull Lebanon and Jordan from this group; however they are always uncomfortable because it isolates them from the other Arabs. If Saudi Arabia and Libya could be persuaded at govt level to shift their voting pattern more in direction of Lebanon and Jordan than in UAR direction we might be able produce better Arab voting balance by making it easier for all of them to split away from UAR-Iraq line more often. It would be helpful to our voting situation in UN, in other words, if Arabs could be split into a "Casablanca" group including UAR, Morocco, Yemen and Iraq, and another group of Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Libya (possibly together with Tunisia). Key to such development is to seek to shift basic instructions to dels from Saudi and Libyan Govts. Their basic instructions now seem to be to vote in harmony with Arab group or majority thereof. Most frequently this results either in UAR-Iraqi domination of group or in following their lead when Lebanon and Jordan differ. If their govts could be persuaded to instruct their dels instead to vote in harmony with Lebanon and Jordan (and possibly Tunisia) we might have real gain. This would have to be done in capitals and might not be successful.

(2) We should also begin systematic campaign of persuasion here and in capitals to get more frequent votes for our positions from "middle group" (Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Liberia) of English-speaking Africans. Dept may wish pay particular attention to this group in field approaches.

c. Measures to hold support of our allies

(1) We need to bring LAs into our GA and general UN planning on ground floor and insist Europeans consult with them on same basis. Once LA voting bloc cracks seriously here we will have profound voting problems. Their support more crucial than ever and we need to give them greater and earlier attention. (See USUN 3402 for specific recommendations.)

(2) While not modifying our policies on colonial questions we also should maintain in UN best possible general relations with Portugal, Union of South Africa, Belgium and Spain in order to assure them that our differences on specific issues do not reflect general relations and to assure their positive voting support to maximum extent on broad-range UN issues.

(3) We must give firm support to our allies in Afro-Asian world (Philippines, Thailand, Iran, Pakistan, in particular) especially when they seek elections to UN bodies. These are Afro-Asian countries whose votes we count on, and get, on questions crucial to us. In doing this they risk being "ostracized" by neutralists, especially on elections. If we allow them to be badly defeated in such elections they will react in other UN votes, moving toward the protective coloration of "abstention", and we will see further deterioration of voting support such as we have already seen in Ethiopia, Liberia, Tunisia, and to some extent Jordan. Where we are not prepared to support them, we should seek to persuade them not to run or to withdraw.

Stevenson

Washington, May 1, 1962.

SUBJECT
Keeping Abreast of the United Nations

The problem is to keep the President informed about impending UN problems so that he will know well in advance when the hard ones come along.

To do this effectively will probably require more in the way of direct USUN-White House communication than we have attempted in the past. Obviously neither of us wishes to bypass IO, but I am sure that Harlan will understand the President's desire for direct briefing. You will no doubt want to send Harlan copies of any reports that you may make directly to the President.

I would suggest the following procedure:

1) that every Monday you send the President a preview of the agonies of the week--either a short memorandum; or, if you prefer, tell them to me over the phone, and I will pass them on.

2) that, when a major issue of policy or strategy is under consideration, you plan to come to Washington and talk the matter out with the President or other interested officials.

3) that you prepare occasional memoranda on long-run problems of acute UN interest, like your recent memorandum on the Azores question (possible subjects: Communist pressure for increased representation in the Secretariat; the new stage of the China representation issue; etc.).

4) that, when you send memoranda requiring follow-up to the White House, you send me copies so that I can do something about them.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr./2/

Washington, May 2, 1962.

SUBJECT
Meeting between the President and Ambassador Stevenson, May 2

The President and the Ambassador discussed the following subjects:

1. The Azores. The President said that in the nature of things the two issues--Azores and Angola--cannot be separated because Portugal will not permit them to be separated. The Ambassador said that, since the Azores were important not only to American security but to NATO as a whole, he felt that more of an effort should be made to seek the cooperation of the NATO countries, as well as Brazil, in bringing pressure on Portugal. He reported that he had talked to Macmillan along these lines, that Macmillan had said that Britain would be glad to cooperate to this end, and that Sir Patrick Dean was ready to do anything he could.

The Acheson memorandum was discussed./2/ With regard to Acheson's recommendation that the US not participate in drafting any more resolutions on Angola, the Ambassador said that American participation was essential in order to moderate the resolution; without American participation, any resolution on Angola would be much more extreme. Acheson's recommendation that aid to Angolan nationalists be stopped was not discussed.

Action: Schlesinger to get a precise statement of Ambassador Stevenson's views as to how he recommends that we proceed.

2. Congo. The President explained why he thought the negotiations concerting US and UK policy toward the Congo should take place in London. The Ambassador agreed and indicated the USUN interest in the instructions to be sent to Ambassador Bruce. Action: the President said that State's instructions should be cleared with the Ambassador before they are sent.

3. Registration of Space Vehicles. The Ambassador explained the problem--i.e., the unwillingness in Washington to register temporary space vehicles (those which go up for a short time and then come down). The President said that he did not understand why they should not be registered, since it was not necessary to report the content of the vehicle. Action: the President said that he would personally check into the matter and let the Ambassador know.

4. Lake Tiberias. The Ambassador said that he thought it would be a great mistake to send the proposed Lake Tiberias note to the Israeli Government. While he felt that we would come out on the Israeli side on the question, he argued that the present draft would throw away valuable bargaining power, and that we should stipulate certain conditions before we accept the Israeli position. Action: the President asked that the Ambassador get together with Mike Feldman and see whether they could agree on anything.

Stevenson and Feldman subsequently agreed that it would be a mistake to send any note at this time. When the Israeli representative to the UN returns to New York in about two weeks, Feldman will go to New York and he and Stevenson will explore the matter together.

5. Kashmir. The Ambassador said that USUN planned to take no initiative in working on the resolution.

6. Chinese Representation. The Ambassador said that the Brazzaville group has indicated that it does not feel obligated to support the US position in the next General Assembly. The President said that in due course there should be a meeting on the Chirep issue.

7. UN Bonds. The President and the Ambassador agreed in expressing skepticism as to whether Francis Plimpton would be the most effective man to help on the Hill when the bond issue goes before the House. Action: Schlesinger to call Dutton and find out why Plimpton was chosen for this assignment and whether it might not be better to use somebody else.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr./3/

Washington, May 8, 1962, 7:22 p.m.

1687. Following mutually acceptable formula has been worked out ad referendum with British Embassy Counselor Ledward as procedural means to meet possible hostile proposals to unseat GRC representatives and seat ChiComs in subsidiary and associated UN bodies which British consider competent decide question of membership and representation:

Recalling the recommendation of the Fifth General Assembly of the United Nations on Dec 14, 1950, that "the attitude adopted by the General Assembly" regarding the representation of a Member State "should be taken into account in other organs of the United Nations and in the specialized agencies";

Recalling the action which the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations took on December 15, 1961 regarding the representation of China;

Decides to take no action on any proposal to change the representation of China at this Session.

FYI. Ledward expressed personal opinion that UK would be able vote for above formula in most so-called "competent" bodies provided UK could make oral statements expressing certain reservations. Ledward indicated, however, that for undisclosed reasons, in certain instances UK may abstain instead of vote for. End FYI.

For Geneva: US Del to WHO should advise British colleagues that if and when British cabinet approves above formula, US will use it instead of formula contained in US position paper should Chirep issue be raised in WHO Assembly in form proposal unseat GRC rep and seat ChiComs.

For London: Please press, as necessary for HMG confirmation this formula, which we hope will be forthcoming before issue arises in WHO Assembly. Geneva should be informed immediately of UK decision.

Ball

Washington, May 21, 1962.

Dear Harlan,

I feel that I owe you an apology for not giving you a reply sooner to the proposals which you put to me on April 19 about Chinese representation in subsidiary organisations of the United Nations./2/ The matter has, as you will know, been under discussion between the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State on two separate occasions and a revised formula was put to us on May 8./3/ This read as follows:--

[Here follows the text of the formula identical to the text in Document 204.]

The above would be on the understanding that:--

(a) some other delegation raised the question in the form of a Motion. I gather that you would not yourselves do so and as you know we ourselves could not undertake to table or sponsor such a resolution;

(b) we would be free to make a statement in clarification of our position on the lines taken by our delegate at the General Assembly.

I am now authorised to say that our delegations in "competent" bodies will be instructed in these circumstances to vote in favour of a resolution such as that given above. You will, I am sure, understand that this does not reflect any change in our basic attitude to Chinese representation as a whole and that my Government will wish to reconsider the position after the next General Assembly.

Yours sincerely

David Ormsby Gore

Washington, May 24, 1962.

SUBJECT
Present United States Efforts to Improve the Peacekeeping Capabilities of the UN

The development of UN's peacekeeping machinery is an integral part of the U.S. disarmament program. It is also an important objective in United States efforts to strengthen, over the near term, the peacekeeping ability of the United Nations.

In moving from the administration of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East (UNEF) to the administration of the UN force in the Congo (UNOC), the UN moved into an area of operational magnitude which placed major new strains on the organization. We have reviewed with the USUN, the Military Advisors Staff to the UN Secretary General, Ambassador Gullion and the Department of Defense the means through which the administration of the UN Congo operation would be improved. In particular we have looked at the need for strengthened command and policy control, for better logistic planning, and for officer training progress. We have also reviewed the Middle Eastern and Congo experience to see what it could tell us about more general moves for improving UN's military and policing capabilities.

Our conclusions are set forth in the attached paper (Tab A) entitled "The Development of the Military and Policing Capabilities of the United Nations"./2/ The paper was cleared throughout the Department of State, with ACDA, and with the Department of Defense, and was given to the British in February. The UK has informed us that they have requested their Imperial Defense College for a similar paper. We anticipate that these two papers will be taken up in bilateral talks with the British to be held probably during the last week in June or the first week in July. Most of the proposals would not require new General Assembly action. It might be advisable for implementation of some of the suggestions to await the election of a UN Secretary General at the 17th Assembly.

I would call your attention particularly to the following proposals:

In response to President Kennedy's address to the United Nations on September 25, 1961, Norway, Sweden and Denmark informed the Acting Secretary General that they had ear-marked forces and equipment for UN military operations, in line with an earlier request of Mr. Hammarskjold in May 1961.

Before his death Mr. Hammarskjold had approved a limited officer training program to be carried on in New York and in the field. The program was to be funded out of the current budgets of UNEF and UNOC. We understand that U Thant has now re-approved this training program. We expect it to be put into operation following the appointment of a UN Secretary General to a full five-year term at the 17th Session of the General Assembly.

The UN Secretary General's staff has begun an assessment of UN's experience in the Middle East and the Congo, with a view to manuals being prepared which could be used in an officer training program and in military colleges of member countries. (See proposal Tab A, page 6)

Our proposals recommend that the U.S., in cooperation with the UN Secretary General, explore the possibility of the UN establishing an officer training college--patterned in general on the NATO Defense College. Such an institution might be located at UN headquarters, or in a neutral country such as Sweden or Switzerland. It would be staffed in part by senior officers who have had field command and headquarters experience with the United Nations.

We are giving earnest attention to means of strengthening policy control over UN policing operations (See Tab A, page 8). One idea which is receiving special attention is that each UN field policing operation might be under the advisory or policy direction of a consortia composed of these countries contributing the principal military, logistic, and financial support to the particular operation. These considerations are, of course, closely related to the more general ones concerned with future patterns of financing UN's peacekeeping operations--beyond the bond issue.

UN's work in peaceful settlement is a second major area in which it is important for new moves to be made in strengthening United Nations capabilities. We are now preparing specific proposals for discussion with the British in the bilateral conversations to be held in the early summer. I attach a memorandum (Tab B), prepared in IO, making preliminary suggestions./3/ While the memo proposes certain specific measures which could be taken to strengthen UN's peaceful settlement facilities, it places an emphasis (and I think an appropriate one) on the necessity for creating both a new world-wide political interest in UN operations in this area and a new general political atmosphere. I will be very interested to have your reactions to the suggestions which the memo sets forth.

As we move forward on these short-term possibilities, and as ACDA moves forward in outlining the longer-term ones, it is important that we keep in close relationship. Our proposals need to reflect ACDA's long-term goals. I am sure you will want your projections to reflect the progress we are able to make over the near term.

In this respect, I think you will be interested in seeing a copy of a memo prepared recently by INR at our request, entitled "Soviet Attitudes Toward Development of Military and Policing Capabilities of the United Nations". It is a direct commentary on the basic paper from which Tab A (a sanitized version) was prepared for the US-UK talks.

Washington, June 5, 1962.

SUBJECT
Notes on Adlai Stevenson Visit, June 5

Ambassador Stevenson spent June 5 in staff discussions here in the Department, and had a visit with the President at the White House. The following notes will indicate the main questions discussed:

Six of the positions in the General Assembly Delegation are pretty well set: the five "regulars" at USUN (Stevenson, Plimpton, Yost, Klutznick, Bingham) and Marietta Tree. Three problems remain:

a. A man to handle disarmament; further consultation with Mr. Foster and Ambassador Dean will be necessary.

b. Appointment of a Negro member of the Delegation, staying as far as possible within the concept of a "fully professional" Delegation.

c. Senator Fulbright is considering whether Senators Gore and Carlson could be the two Senators this year; he is also considering whether they should be billed as Congressional advisers or as members of the Delegation as such.

Governor Stevenson will write to George Meany and Walter Reuther to ask whether they can serve as Senior Advisers. He will discuss with Mrs. Roosevelt whether she would like to be a Senior Adviser this year. Other people who would be shown in the Senior Adviser category would be Mrs. Gladys Tillott and Mrs. Jane Dick. The rotation among the three women commissioners appears to be satisfactory to the White House.

The President has asked Governor Stevenson to plan to make a one-hour presentation to the National Security Council some time on the UN considerations in national security policy. Governor Stevenson has asked us to develop an outline of such a presentation.

Governor Stevenson talked to U Thant, who had been in touch with the Indonesians but has not been asked by the Indonesians to confirm the Dutch acceptance of satisfactory ground rules for the resumption of negotiations. (A cable is going out to Djakarta to get the Indonesians to ask U Thant if they need more assurance than the United States has already given them.) U Thant is clear that there should be a brief further period of discussion between the Netherlands and Indonesia under Ambassador Bunker's auspices. Once an agenda is agreed on, U Thant will designate somebody to sit in on the last stage on behalf of the UN Secretariat.

Governor Stevenson had a most interesting farewell discussion with Berard, who is being assigned as French Ambassador to Rome. The memorandum of conversation is being sent to you separately./2/ I told Governor Stevenson what I knew of your first discussion with Ambassador Alphand. Governor Stevenson thought it might be useful to discuss relations with France directly with President de Gaulle; an opportunity for this might be the invitation to visit de Gaulle which he believes may be forthcoming when he (Governor Stevenson) is in Europe this summer for the ECOSOC meeting.

Governor Stevenson had a very brief opportunity to bring the President up-to-date on the status of the Kashmir question in the Security Council, and the prospects for Ruanda-Urundi in the General Assembly.

There is an urgent need to decide how far we will be going to oppose inscription of a Southern Rhodesia item on the agenda of the resumed General Assembly. The matter will probably come up at the General Committee on Friday morning, June 8th. The Department will await USUN's assessment of the voting situation, before trying to decide whether to campaign against inscription by making representations at government level to key members of the General Committee. On this subject, the President particularly asked whether we were planning to support the British, and Governor Stevenson said we were. If we decide not to oppose inscription, on the ground that we would lose on it, and thereby lose influence in the subsequent resolution, we may want to inform the President of the revised thinking on this subject.

Governor Stevenson is developing a memorandum for the President in connection with his visit to Mexico. We have made available to Governor Stevenson a copy of the present draft of the "scope paper", and will receive his draft for the President in due course.

Governor Stevenson expressed to the President his concern, and ours, about the delay in the consideration by the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the UN loan legislation. Fred Dutton will follow up with Larry O'Brien to see whether more steam can be generated for earlier House consideration of the matter. The danger is that if the loan legislation is not passed reasonably soon, some of the opponents or lukewarm supporters will begin to suggest that the whole question be reconsidered in the upcoming General Assembly rather than acted on by the Congress at this time.

We discussed with Governor Stevenson the varying proposals for the financing of the peace and security operations of the UN. It does not appear that, with as many unknowns as are still in the picture, we can now settle on a definitive answer to the question, "after the bond issue what?" However, we will need a line of policy and conversation for use in the Congressional hearings and consultations with other governments; this can be framed in terms of alternatives. A paper along these lines will be developed in IO after taking into account New York's 3897 of June 4.

USUN has developed a memorandum on the Soviet attempt to enlarge its representation in the Secretariat, a copy of which will be sent to you separately. We are actively discussing this question here, as it appears to be the next major Soviet attack on the UN executive establishment after the failure of the Troika proposal. A draft letter answering questions from Senator Eastland on this subject was checked out with Governor Stevenson, and discussed by him with some of the White House staff. We are all agreed that there is no reason to be protective of the UN in this matter; the best way to protect the international civil service concept is to campaign publicly for it now and during the General Assembly. Frank discussion of the matter with interested members of Congress would fit in with this strategy.

A considerable part of Governor Stevenson's session with the President was devoted to a discussion of policy towards Israel, on the basis of a draft letter to Prime Minister Ben Gurion, which had been drafted by Mike Feldman. Governor Stevenson is not clear that any letter is required. If there is a letter he believes it should:

a. Applaud Ambassador Harmon's declaration to Governor Stevenson that Israel now intended to stop using the retaliatory raid as an instrument of policy;

b. Express the hope that Israel will cooperate closely with the UN peacekeeping machinery in the area; and

c. Look forward to completion of the project for diverting Jordan waters and express the U.S. understanding that Israel will act within the limitations of the Johnston Plan.

We discussed how best to develop the UN's peacekeeping capability, on the basis of the line of policy set forth in the planning paper, agreed with the Department of Defense and ACDA, entitled "The Development of the Military and Policing Capabilities of the UN". We emphasized that no legislative action by the UN was contemplated at this stage, but a number of useful steps could be taken by informal action within the UN Secretariat. While U Thant is unlikely to move vigorously on this front prior to his own election to a full five-year term as Secretary General, Governor Stevenson thought it would be useful to have a session with U Thant and some of his chief advisers, for which he would want me to come to New York and at which we could indicate the kinds of steps that might reasonably be taken to plan for a more proficient discharge of the peacekeeping assignments laid on the UN Secretariat from time to time by the Security Council or the General Assembly.

Washington, June 11, 1962.

SUBJECT
Tour d'Horizon

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Georgi M. Kornienko--Counselor USSR
Mr. Joseph J. Sisco--Director UNP

At Mr. Kornienko's request I had lunch with him today at the Hay-Adams. The following principal points emerged during our luncheon conversation.

1. Ruanda-Urundi. Mr. Kornienko took the initiative in raising the question of General Assembly consideration of Ruanda-Urundi. He was particularly interested in the question of the continuing presence of Belgian troops. I indicated that our objective is to support independence of Ruanda and Burundi on July 1 under conditions which would give reasonable assurance that stability will be maintained. After Mr. Kornienko stressed the need to assure that Belgian presence was not an indefinite one, I pointed out to him that it was important that the USSR distinguish between symbolism and reality on this matter. I said that I understood why for propaganda reasons the Soviet Union might wish to stress in the Assembly the need for early Belgian withdrawal. However, I pointed out that the USSR has an interest in not creating conditions which might bring about another Congo-like situation in the heart of Africa. Mr. Kornienko said there was no need for a direct confrontation between the US and USSR on Ruanda-Urundi.

2. 17th GA. Mr. Kornienko indicated an interest in how we viewed the coming 17th General Assembly. He was particularly interested in knowing whether the US intended to make any formal proposal looking towards the establishment of a UN Peace Force or the strengthening of the UN peace-keeping machinery. I limited myself to indicating that these matters were under consideration and that no definite decisions had been taken. I did reiterate our continuing interest in strengthening the peaceful settlement procedures of the UN as indicated in a number of speeches given recently by Ambassador Stevenson and Department spokesmen.

3. SYG. In response to my statement that the question of the election of a Secretary-General would arise this fall, Mr. Kornienko said that "Mr. Thant had not fulfilled the hopes they had regarding him." Mr. Kornienko cited in particular Thant's failure to meet regularly with his "cabinet of under-secretaries." Mr. Kornienko affirmed that one of the purposes of receiving Thant in Moscow in August is to give Mr. Khrushchev the opportunity to have a personal look at the Acting Secretary-General.

4. UN Financing. I pointed out that a key issue this fall will be the question of UN financing. Assuming a favorable Court decision indicating that peace-keeping expenses would be mandatory obligations on the part of the members of the UN, I asked Mr. Kornienko what the USSR position would be. Mr. Kornienko was non-committal, saying that the USSR would not wish to indicate in advance what peace-keeping operations it would support. He indicated USSR willingness to support peace-keeping operations decided upon by the UN "in accordance with the Charter." He expressed dissatisfaction with the UN operation in the Congo. He held out very little hope that the Russians would support putting UN finances on a more firm footing.

5. Disarmament. I asked whether he felt that disarmament would be considered at the fall session. Mr. Kornienko said historically the USSR has always felt that the Assembly should consider disarmament each year. However, he indicated that whether they would favor a discussion at the Assembly would depend on whether any progress was being made in Geneva. I asked whether this would not also depend on whether or not the USSR had resumed testing by that time. Mr. Kornienko smiled and said "Yes it would" and that if they resumed testing by that time they would be less anxious for a discussion in the Assembly, but that we would be more favorable to such a debate.

6. Hungary. Mr. Kornienko expressed the hope that we would not once again press the Hungarian issue at the GA this fall since it was only an irritant to US-USSR relations. I pointed out that Hungary, after so many years, had yet to fulfill any of the objectives of the innumerable UN resolutions adopted on this matter and that its complete disregard of the UN resolutions made it difficult for this question to be removed from the agenda.

7. Laos. Mr. Kornienko had received, as we had, the report of the provisional agreement on the new Laotian Government under Souvanna Phouma. He limited himself to saying that the USSR was cooperating with the US to achieve a neutral Laos. He also contended, though mildly, that Communist China shares these objectives.

8. Geneva Conference. Mr. Kornienko said that the American press had made much too much of the Soviet reversal on the war propaganda resolution. He said it was just a case of second thoughts on their part. He then went on to say that it would have been foolish for an agreement to have been achieved on this matter between the US and USSR while "the US was putting troops into Thailand." He said the climate was not propitious for such an agreement.

9. Walter Lippmann. I asked Mr. Kornienko if he had any observations regarding the Lippmann telecast last week and Lippmann's writings that the balance of force had changed in favor of the West over the past year and a half. Mr. Kornienko did not understand on what basis Lippmann was making this evaluation. He said such an evaluation could be dangerous if it led the American people to think that the US has overwhelming strength and therefore could take greater risks in its diplomatic dealings with the USSR. I indicated to Mr. Kornienko that we realize that this was no time for rash action on the part of any of the principal powers. I expressed the hope that the USSR would avoid incautious action in Berlin. Mr. Kornienko said he wished to stress that the USSR cannot "put on ice" the Berlin question indefinitely. The situation is risky and dangerous, and that while the matter can be kept on ice for a while, the dangers and risks increase if the situation continues. He reaffirmed the desirability of continuing the talks.

10. Stevenson-Zorin Talks. The luncheon concluded with Mr. Kornienko commenting "as a personal suggestion" the desirability of Stevenson and Zorin having full discussions before the opening of the 17th General Assembly so that some of the key items could be discussed beforehand.

Joseph J. Sisco/2/

New York, June 21, 1962, 7 p.m.

4078. Statements by SYG UN to Advisory Comite on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ).

U Thant made fol statements to ACABQ in closed mtg today.

1. At next GA he intends propose increase in working capital fund to $40-$45 million.

2. UN will have explore new sources of revenue to help finance peace-keeping operations. (However, Turner and Vaughn/UN informed ACABQ they saw no prospects increasing UN income substantially from sources other than governmental contributions. By substantially they meant in excess of $1 million.)

3. He informed by number of govts they withholding decision purchase UN bonds until after affirmative opinion of ICJ.

4. He intends review ONUC financial situation and future of ONUC operation with Congo Advisory Comite in July and decide then what recommendations make to SC re future of ONUC operation. He believes cost of ONUC operation can be substantially reduced in second half 1962.

5. He has made clear to all parties interested in Ruanda-Urundi, including sponsors of Afro-Asian res, that any UN mil personnel going to R-U would have their activities limited to advice, instruction, and observation. Accordingly, he anticipated that UN expenses in connection with R-U would not be sizeable.

6. In response to question of Sokirkin (USSR), he stated he had no present intention submitting report to 17th GA on recommendations of Comite of 8 (Comite of Experts on review of activities and organization of Secretariat).

7. Said UN will not incur any cost in connection with controversy between Indonesia and Netherlands re New Guinea since two govts concerned had indicated they would share all costs.

Plimpton

Washington, June 22, 1962.

SUBJECT
The NSC Meeting on the UN

Dear Adlai:

You have in New York two excellent pieces of briefing material, both of which are in Dick Pederson's hands. One is a series of talking points drafted here as a result of your request to me. A clean copy of this draft is attached. The other is an excellent outline drafted by Dick Pederson, entitled "U.S. Policy as Seen from New York"./2/

In this letter I am making some additional suggestions, that have to do with the kind of presentation which would, it seems to me, best serve the purpose of the NSC meeting itself.

1. First, as to the general theme. The most important impression for you to leave on your audience Tuesday,/3/ it seems to me, is that you think of the UN as an instrument of U.S. policy.

It is a complicated instrument, of course, because it is also an instrument of the foreign policy of 103 other countries. But we are not without resources and skill to get our way where it matters.

It is also a limited instrument: if we want to defend Europe, the UN is largely irrelevant and NATO is essential. If we want to relate ourselves to the less-developed countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the UN is essential and NATO is irrelevant.

It is an important instrument, not only because it generates a great deal of the world's political noise, but because it now has the capacity to act: The UN system spends $502.3 million a year, $311.5 million of which is U.S. contributions to various programs and projects. The UN employs 33,494 civilians and has 22,600 troops in the field. It has successfully intervened in eight peacekeeping situations (Greece, Indonesia, Kashmir, Korea, Suez Crisis, Lebanon, Laos, and the Congo), and has operated as the "third man" in a very large number of international disputes (current examples: Ellsworth Bunker on West New Guinea, Joseph Johnson on Palestine Refugees).

2. It is essential to make a clear distinction between what is symbolic and what is real in the UN. The General Assembly session we are just winding up contains one excellent example of each. The General Assembly has been (a) deciding the future of Ruanda-Urundi, making important executive decisions that will really affect the lives of five million Rwandans and Burundis; and it has also been (b) holding a big public protest rally on the situation in Southern Rhodesia, for which the GA has no responsibility. It is notable that the delegates are a good deal soberer on Rwanda-Urundi than they are on Southern Rhodesia.

On this point, you might use an analogy: There is a difference, in Congress, between a joint resolution on freeing the captive nations of Europe, and an executive decision to move the Marines into Eastern Europe during the Hungary revolt-which was carefully not done by the administration and not recommended to the Congress.

Throughout the field of UN affairs, it is essential to keep clearly in mind this distinction between what is talk and what is action. The newspapers do not make this distinction, most of the time--witness recent commentaries by Tom Hamilton in The Times and Roscoe Drummond in the Herald-Tribune. But most of the UN delegates make this distinction pretty clearly and it behooves responsible Americans to be clear about it.

3. I would strongly recommend that the classified nature of this discussion be exploited by regular use of incidents to illustrate general points. What I mean is that you should tell stories and name names that could not be told and named in public to help bring your points to life. Examples of the kind of thing I have in mind are:

--reference to some African or Asian who performed as a demigod but sobered up when given the chairmanship of a committee or some other responsible task (Miss Brooks? Or hasn't she sobered up enough to be a good example?)

--or perhaps of the embarrassment caused to other delegations from new countries when one of their members behaves irresponsibly (Jaja Wachuku?).

--an actual incident supporting the point that the eight neutralists at Geneva have been educated and impressed by our performance at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. (We will try to provide one.)

--perhaps a story or two to make the point that we have some pretty good pipelines into other delegations and into international caucuses--i.e., that we have a reasonably good intelligence system in New York.

--perhaps the now-it-can-be-told story about the behind-the-scenes negotiations leading to the election of U Thant. (I have in mind here the thought that in the National Security Council you are in a position to blow our horn on some quiet diplomatic victories which we cannot claim out loud.)

--perhaps a reference to the frustrations inherent in the business due to the fact that we frequently cannot take credit for what we've done because we have to exercise leadership without appearing to lead, much less to dominate.

4. It is entirely clear that no great power, and probably no minor power either, is going to violate what it regards as its own security interests to bow to majority of the UN or even to the principles of its Charter. Khrushchev has said this in so many words. We have not, but only because we have had no need to. The differences between the U. S. and Soviet performances in the United Nations reflect the fact that UN stands for a kind of world diametrically opposed to the Soviet vision of a Communist one-world; that the U.S. normally can agree with the majority of the members and the Soviet Union normally cannot agree with the majority; and that the Charter of the UN is an accurate projection of our own basic documents on the international plane and is anathema to the Soviet Union.

5. The UN is a politico-parliamentary mechanism which operates according to procedures which are familiar to us and unfamiliar to the Soviet Union, which partly accounts for why we do as well there as we do. Personally, I am much less impressed with the Russians now than I was when I took over this job a year and a half ago. In diplomatic maneuvering they seem to me to be rigid and often clumsy; sometimes they seem not to do their homework adequately, and often they operate against their own long-range interests (as in boycotting the Security Council in 1950 and boycotting the operation--thereby excluding themselves from any influence in it or over it--in the Congo).

6. Building the UN is the world's toughest, most complex, most delicate, most advanced task of institution building in the world. It is only seized of disputes after other forums and tactics have been exhausted. But the stake is no less than a future system of world order in which the U.S. can find long-term security in the post-colonial age of atoms and outer space. In a small way, we are learning some of the essential operational lessons that would make it possible to organize a world order if we can ever get anywhere in the disarmament negotiations.

Warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Harlan Cleveland/4/

Washington, June 26, 1962, 10:30 a.m.

Ambassador Stevenson read the attached paper, as marked./2/

In response to a request by the President, Ambassador Stevenson discussed in general the major issues which will arise in the 17th General Assembly of the UN, which begins September 19th. He predicted a long and different session which would deal with some 90 issues. Among the problems which will have to be faced are:

a. The Latin American caucus is breaking up. We can no longer count on their voting as a body. Dissidents are Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia and Chile. The major cause of the breakup is differences over Cuba.

b. The African vote is increasing in strength, but the problem which this creates is not much worse than we faced last year.

c. The colonial issue will become more difficult this year because the areas under discussion now are the white settler areas involving the UK and Portugal.

The President complimented Ambassador Stevenson on his presentation and suggested that a transcript of his remarks be circulated to the Council members. He asked Ambassador Stevenson to discuss the problems of Chinese Representation.

Ambassador Stevenson replied that if the Chinese Communists continue the strident tone of their public statements, and if Sino-Soviet differences remain the same, the representation issue will be less difficult this year than last. He said that Chiang's invasion statements were laughed at in New York and asked how we could control such statements in order to avoid the embarrassment which they cause us. In his view, the Chinese Communist buildup was provoked in part by the fear of invasion, but it might be related to local unrest on the mainland. He predicted that a Soviet resolution on Chinese representation would be soundly defeated, but he anticipated serious trouble for us if the Russians asked only for the admission of the Chinese Communists and not for the expulsion of the Chinese Nationalists.

In response to the President's question as to how he should answer press queries with respect to our policy toward Quemoy and Matsu, Ambassador Stevenson said any answer would be difficult prior to the receipt of a report from Ambassador Kirk. He wondered whether Chiang was losing control of his government, and he felt that we should make clear that the U.S. would not support an invasion of the mainland. He admitted that he would like to say we are leaving the islands, but he fully recognizes that we cannot so state. He felt that all that could be said was that the U.S. supports its treaty commitment to defend Formosa, and that this commitment does not involve support of a mainland invasion.

The President commented on the number of troublesome problems which are dealt with in the UN. He expressed his desire to be certain that the White House is closely coordinated with the UN Mission in New York and asked whether the White House was receiving adequate intelligence material from the UN Mission.

Ambassador Stevenson said the Mission was filing thousands of words of intelligence daily to Washington. There is nothing wrong with the reporting, but he believed that if there were more officers assigned to the Mission, it would be possible to do more interpretive reporting, which he felt would be of great value to Washington. He indicated that the Mission's relations with the Department of Defense were satisfactory and cited the long service of Admiral Wellborn on the UN Military Staff Committee. His link on disarmament matters is William Foster. He felt that the tie to State Department could be improved. He acknowledged that there were some inadequacies in information furnished and he promised to pay more attention to improving this situation. He felt that more information to the White House could be provided and he felt that direct reporting could be handled by summaries of Mission actions.

In response to a question by Mr. Bundy about the debate on outer space in the UN, Ambassador Stevenson predicted that there will be a sizeable amount of emotional discussion of ways of avoiding the use of outer space for military purposes. He said we now lead in the use of space for peaceful purposes, but we are criticized for proposing high altitude nuclear tests. He referred to public statements indicating that we are moving toward the military use of outer space and suggested that such statements should be related to the President's speech last fall.

Mr. Bundy said we did have a military program in space, but this is a peaceful program. He said that many people think that any military program is a violation of the principles stated by the President in his speech. He said we need to do a considerable amount of educational work in order to make clear that military uses of outer space were peaceful uses and not a contradiction of the President's policy.

Ambassador Stevenson agreed and suggested that a group be formed to undertake this educational work. He suggested that we make our views clear to the British.

Mr. Cleveland said there was considerable confusion on this subject. He noted that we do not say that space was to be reserved for peaceful uses only. He then said many had not accepted the analogy of outer space being the same as the use of the high seas by military ships on peaceful missions.

Mr. Bundy referred to the questions of weapons of mass destruction in outer space and the problem of inspecting outer space.

Ambassador Stevenson said that we did not contemplate the use of force in space, but we must continue to discuss the weapons problem in outer space in the Geneva disarmament talks. He hoped that it would be possible to keep this subject from being discussed by the General Assembly.

Mr. Foster said we could keep the actual negotiations on the subject in Geneva, even though the Geneva talks were recessed, but we could not prevent speeches from being made at the UN.

Ambassador Stevenson resumed his discussion of General Assembly problems:

a. Nuclear testing, ban-the-bomb resolutions, and efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

b. Colonialism.

c. Denuclearized shots. (The President's view was that if the countries in a proposed zone agree to denuclearization, we cannot vote against their action.)

d. Palestine. (The work of Joseph Johnson on the refugee problem would be helpful this session.)

e. Election of a Secretary General. (U Thant may accept again. His views may be clearer after he visits Moscow in July.)

f. Integrity of the UN Secretariat. (Soviet attacks will continue. The Africans are trying to use population figures as the criteria for representation on commissions in UN business.)

g. Long-term UN financing. (The importance of the bond issue is clear.)

h. The decade of development.

i. World trade. (The Common Market is viewed with concern by some UN members, as was expressed in the conference of 30 non-aligned states in Cairo. The USSR proposal for a world trade conference may also be troublesome.)

j. Cold war items. (These items are becoming unpopular and the question arises as to whether we should continue to press them. The main one, Hungary, is difficult because we do not know how to abandon the issue. The effort last year to resolve the problem by having the Secretary General visit Hungary at the time the Hungarians granted amnesty to their political prisoners did not work out. The Tibet issue is one that we are not pushing. The Korea issue is ours, but we may attempt to keep it out of discussion this session.)

k. Finance problems. (U Thant is deeply concerned about the immediate financial situation. He is cutting costs of the military in the Congo, but he fears that if the Congo situation is not resolved promptly, military units will be withdrawn and some states now committed to buy UN bonds will not fulfill their pledges.)

There followed a discussion of current plans to bring agreement in the Congo. The President made clear his view that we must move in concert with the British and the Belgians and that the U.S. should make no commitment to use force in the Congo until there had been further discussion of any such proposal at the White House.

The President concluded the meeting by again expressing his appreciation to Ambassador Stevenson. He mentioned again that the closest possible liaison should be maintained among State, Defense, the White House and the UN Mission in New York.

Washington, July 3, 1962.

SUBJECT
Intimations of Soviet Desire for Bilateral Discussion of 17th General Assembly

I found the memorandum of conversation between Joe Sisco and the Soviet Counselor of Embassy of June 11 interesting indeed./2/ However, considering the general Soviet tactic at this time of suggesting quiet talks with the U.S. on a number of different issues, I am not surprised by the "personal suggestion" of Kornienko that a Stevenson-Zorin discussion would be desirable.

As a quick reaction it is my feeling that: (1) We not take the initiative in proposing such talks but respond should Zorin or some other responsible Soviet official repeat Kornienko's "personal suggestion." (2) Considering the number of issues in which both the USSR and the U.S. have an active interest at the time, I can understand that there are some possible agenda items which the USSR might wish to treat with caution for its own reasons. Thus, a convergence of interests between us is possible at least in a limited sense. Over-all, however, my judgment is substantially the same as that which you expressed in your letter of June 25 to Ambassador Stevenson: i.e., "While this probably would not be productive of very much agreement, it might be a useful exercise."/3/

Assuming that the Secretary does go to Geneva for the purpose of signing the Laotian agreements approximately the third week of July, and if there is indeed a serious Soviet intent to arrange a discussion of General Assembly matters, Gromyko would have an opportunity to suggest it at that time. In any event, the actual discussions, if they develop, probably should be centered in New York where Ambassador Stevenson and his staff have the details at their fingertips.

I would assume that, should such talks take place, appropriate steps would be taken to keep our allies fully informed.

Washington, July 20, 1962.

SUBJECT
U Thant Visit to Washington

While talking with U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations, in April Assistant Secretary Cleveland expressed the hope that he would come to Washington for a visit during the summer. Subsequently U Thant indicated to Governor Stevenson that he would like to come to Washington but would expect a formal invitation from Governor Stevenson.

I believe it would be desirable for you to receive him in Washington for a brief visit early in September before the General Assembly opens for the following reasons:

1. U Thant has already visited several European capitals, including London, Dublin, Oslo and Paris, this summer and plans to visit Moscow, Warsaw, Prague and Vienna from August 24 through September 4, 1962. A visit to Washington would be an appropriate and desirable conclusion to his tours of major European capitals.

2. A Thant visit would permit a useful exchange of views with him both on his European trips and on the forthcoming session of his General Assembly.

3. No Secretary General of the United Nations has visited the White House since May, 1953 (Hammarskjold)./2/

Receiving U Thant would demonstrate your continued personal interest in the United Nations as well as your satisfaction with the role he has played as Acting Secretary General. U Thant may be elected this fall to the full five year term of Secretary General of the United Nations which begins in April, 1963, although he has not yet admitted that he is even a contender for that position. From our point of view, Thant has done a good job so far and it would be difficult to find a better man who could be elected Secretary General at this juncture of world affairs.

I therefore recommend that you issue an invitation for U Thant to visit Washington, preferably on September 10 or 11, 1962. I also recommend that you host a small luncheon for Thant during his visit to Washington and that you agree to meet with him for about one hour beginning at 4:00 p.m. on the day of his visit.

George W. Ball/3/

Washington, July 26, 1962.

SUBJECT
The Candidacy of Sir Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) for President of the Seventeenth General Assembly

There are two announced candidates for President of the Seventeenth General Assembly--Sir Zafrulla Khan and Dr. G. P. Malalasekera, Representatives, respectively, of Pakistan and Ceylon to the United Nations. This year is generally recognized as an "Asian year" since the last Assembly President from this area was Prince Wan of Thailand in 1956. The Zafrulla candidacy appears to have attracted substantial support and has the quiet endorsement of the Secretary General. So far as we are aware, the Malalasekera candidacy is supported only by the Soviet bloc and India.

Malalasekera formally announced his candidacy on May 3. At that time both Zafrulla and Okasaki, the Japanese United Nations Representative, had indicated their interest in the presidency to our Mission in New York and had been told that either would be acceptable to us. Okasaki, in fact, informed our United Nations Mission that he was a candidate on April 26 but he has never circulated a formal announcement, as is customary. We avoided taking any position in favor of one against the other in view of our close relations with both Pakistan and Japan. The situation was made more delicate by the fact that Zafrulla (and the Pakistan Government) have held us primarily responsible for Zafrulla's failure to be reelected to the International Court of Justice last year, when we supported the Japanese candidate and not Zafrulla. Okasaki made it clear that he did not wish to enter into an open contest with Zafrulla and has not pressed his candidacy since Zafrulla formally announced his candidacy on May 11.

We have so far given no formal commitment of support to Zafrulla, not wishing to do so until the Security Council's consideration of Kashmir had been concluded and the Indian aid issue was out of the way. However, this has been a matter of timing rather than of substance. Malalasekera would not make an acceptable General Assembly President, not only because of his Government's radical neutrality but because he, personally, is widely regarded as both incompetent and unreliable. It appears very unlikely that Okasaki would advance his candidacy so long as Zafrulla is a candidate and, in any event, our United Nations Mission believes it is too late for him to make an effective campaign.

Our Embassy in New Delhi is concerned that open United States support of Zafrulla's candidacy may exacerbate United States-Indian relations because of current Indian-Pakistan tensions, Zafrulla's role in the Kashmir debate in the Security Council, and the possibility that the Kashmir issue will be brought to the General Assembly. We believe it highly unlikely that Pakistan would bring Kashmir to the General Assembly. However, were we to have any indication that Pakistan might do so, we would indicate our opposition. The Pakistan United Nations Delegation has recommended to Karachi against this and believes the Government will accept its recommendation. We agree with this estimate on the basis of the clear self interest of both Pakistan, and Zafrulla personally, in not having this issue raised at the Seventeenth General Assembly.

We have authorized our United Nations Mission to give a formal commitment of support to Zafrulla next week after having made clear to him our views of the handling of the Chinese representation issue at the Seventeenth General Assembly. Pakistan did not support us on this issue at the Sixteenth General Assembly and current Pakistan-Chinese Communist exchanges are not reassuring. However, we would expect Zafrulla as a reputable jurist to be an impartial presiding officer and we believe our position on the handling of the Chinese representation issue at the Seventeenth Session to be well founded from the legal standpoint. We are not in a position to exact a quid pro quo from him since Malalasekera provides no alternative. We should, however, make completely clear to Zafrulla our unshakeable determination not to be defeated on this issue.

We do not propose to seek assurances from him with respect to Kashmir since we believe it most unlikely Pakistan would seriously consider raising this issue at the forthcoming session and we do not wish to waste our bargaining power. We do, however, intend to point out that an active United States campaign on behalf of Zafrulla might well prove counterproductive by provoking an organized Indian campaign against him. We will of course, as is our usual custom, make known our support of him when asked and in the course of our normal pre-Assembly consultations. Since the vote is by secret ballot, without nominations or discussion, it is not our custom to make any public announcement of how the United States will vote.

C. K. Johnson/2/

Washington, August 10, 1962, 7:14 p.m.

227. Subject: Acceptance by 17th UNGA of ICJ Advisory Opinion on UN Expenses. Embassy should approach FonOff at highest appropriate level with objective of assuring its support of acceptance by 17th UNGA of ICJ Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the UN. The following points may be useful in your presentation.

1. ICJ Advisory Opinion of 20 July authoritatively resolves in the affirmative legal question of whether UN assessments for Congo and UNEF are "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17(2) of the Charter. Consequence is that all Members are legally bound to pay outstanding UNEF and ONUC assessments. ICJ decision by vote 9-5. Two of dissents were not on substance decision, but on ability of Court to deal with question; accordingly, decision actually 9-3 with 2 "abstentions."

2. While there have been differences of view among some UN Members on binding character of UNEF and ONUC assessments, USG trusts addressee Govt unites with it in adherence to rule of law in world affairs and importance of strengthening role of law in UN.

3. Just as in a contentious case, so in advisory opinion ICJ has declared the law. As report of 6th Committee UNGA noted, "the authoritative nature of the advisory opinion should be taken for granted" (A/1101, p. 200).

4. UNGA has unfailingly accepted or acted upon all past advisory opinions (nine). 17th UNGA inevitably will be confronted with question of action in respect to Expenses opinion, which already appears as item on provisional agenda. USG assumes 17th UNGA will accept Expenses opinion, by resolution noting or approving it. USG attaches highest importance to such acceptance. While it trusts opinion will be accepted as matter of course, USG prepared if necessary to exert its most earnest efforts to insure acceptance. Failure to accept Court's opinion would gravely damage prestige and potential of international law, standing of ICJ, integrity of UN, and responsibility of UN membership.

5. Accordingly, USG hopes addressee Govt will support acceptance of Expenses opinion by 17th UNGA, and would appreciate assurance to that effect.

6. Action by UNGA in accordance with Expenses opinion has great importance for US public opinion. President and Dept have publicly committed USG to acceptance and enforcement by UN of Expenses opinion.

7. FYI. In connection with enforcement, US Congress and public much concerned with large amount arrears on Congo and UNEF accounts. Prompt payment of all or part of arrears would have significant and immediate effect on reversing growing dissatisfaction here with UN Members considered by Congressional and public opinion to be "financially irresponsible." This would also facilitate US purchase $100 million bonds from UN. End FYI.

If opportunity arises and in your judgment raising question will not prejudice objective of securing support for acceptance of Court's opinion, you may suggest that some prompt payment on addressee Govt's arrears would be highly desirable.

Seek opportunity to state that payment by addressee Govt of its arrears now would mitigate UN financial crisis and, in view of its influential position in UN, assist effort of SYG to collect other arrears, facilitate US purchase of UN bonds, and constitute important and concrete support of ICJ opinion. To maximize effect on other Members thereby promoting fiscal responsibility so urgently needed if UN is to survive as important force for world order, public announcement by Govt that payment is being made in response to Court opinion highly desirable. Announcement might state that Court has "settled any question of mandatory character of expenses" for UNEF and Congo which is occasion for Govt making these payments.

Seek opportunity to state, if in your judgment raising question not prejudicial to US interests, that payment by addressee Govt of its arrears now would, in view of its influential position, assist effort of SYG to collect other arrears, mitigate UN financial crisis, facilitate US purchase of UN bonds, and constitute important and concrete support of ICJ opinion. To maximize effect on other members thereby promoting fiscal responsibility so urgently needed if UN is to survive as important force for world order, public announcement by Govt that payment is being made in response to Court opinion highly desirable. Announcement might state that Court has "settled any question of mandatory character of expenses" for UNEF and Congo which is occasion for Govt making these payments.

8. For La Paz, Guatemala and Asuncion: Foregoing should be correlated with Embassy's action pursuant to Depttel sent to La Paz 60, Guatemala 15 and Asuncion 20./2/

9. For WE posts and Canberra, Ottawa and Wellington: Stavropoulos (UN Legal Under Secretary) and Dept for tactical reasons disposed to seek allocation of item on ICJ opinion directly to Plenary rather than Fifth Committee or other GA Committee. Inquire view FonOff.

10. Report reactions, rpt info USUN.

11. For French Speaking Posts: French text this cable follows./3/

Rusk