Washington, August 16, 1962.

SUBJECT
The Seventeenth General Assembly

You have called a meeting for 4:00 p.m., on Tuesday, August 21, to consider United States strategy at the 17th Session of the General Assembly. I am attaching a strategy paper which has been fully considered throughout the Department, with Ambassador Stevenson and his staff, and with the Secretary./2/

Last year our objective was to get certain activities started or restarted in the United Nations: to begin disarmament talks on a new basis, to get the United Nations and some of its constituent agencies into the outer space business, and to put more vigor into economic and social activities under a UN Decade of Development.

This year, the Organization needs a breathing spell in which to consolidate its strength, get its finances in order, and improve its executive capacity for peacekeeping and nation-building. In general, we believe the United States should not try to add significant new tasks to its load this fall, except a new emphasis on the development and use of peaceful settlement procedures under the United Nations. The successful conclusion of the ticklish negotiations over West New Guinea helps re-emphasize the importance of the "third man" in international politics.

Nearly every element of United States foreign policy enters into planning for a General Assembly. But in our meeting on Tuesday, I suggest we focus on the following issues on which we need a clear signal from you as a basis for the wide consultations on many subjects which will be undertaken between now and September 18 in New York and with Foreign Offices all over the world:

The themes of the opening United States speech in the general debate should be (a) the further development under the United Nations of the machinery of pacific settlement, and (b) the opportunities for growing prosperity as the more advanced nations work with the less-developed nations in a broad United Nations framework which makes possible a relationship of equality and mutual respect between stronger and weaker members of the international economy.

United Nations resources for "quiet diplomacy" need to be developed as a real alternative to acrimonious public debate. The strategy paper includes suggestions for reforms in General Assembly procedures, the use of rapporteurs, establishment of a United Nations institute in this field, and the development of international law.

The General Assembly will have to face up to the question, "After the Bond Issue, What?". Presumably we want to expand the regular budget to take care of as much of the peacekeeping expense as possible. Beyond a rise in the regular budget, there is a fork in the road: one road leads to a special scale in which the United States would probably have to pay 44% or so; the other is to finance each United Nations peace-and-security operation by special voluntary contributions from a smaller number of countries which would, however, have more explicit control over the operations to which they are contributing. We need to make a political judgment, in consultation with the Congress, which of these roads best serves the United States national interest.

Our objective should be to keep the Geneva discussions alive and use them to prevent irresponsible exhortations from being passed as resolutions in the General Assembly. We will want to make clear that we don't want other nations to develop national nuclear capabilities, but clearly leave the door ajar to a multilateral NATO nuclear deterrent. We should support any moves by other countries (for example, the Africans) to pass self-denying ordinances against nuclear weapons in their zones. And, we should press in the General Assembly for a nuclear test ban along the lines we finally decide to recommend in Geneva, resisting again (as we did last year) any uninspected moratorium. (In addition to the comprehensive test ban, ACDA is considering a recommendation to revive the atmospheric test ban idea in some form.)

The fact that the Soviets put two men in space last week changes the political atmosphere without changing the basic problem. Our objective in the United Nations should be to push along the arrangements for wide cooperation in the use of space for weather services and weather research, and for communications. One United Nations "operation" can probably be started, an international rocket sounding facility near the geomagnetic equator, probably in India.

Defense of our space program will also be high on the agenda. A clear pronouncement on our part as to the peaceful motivations of our military space program will be essential.

We will face a series of dilemmas with mounting pressures from the Africans and Asians for rapid solutions to the most complicated "hard core" colonial problems, including not only those created by South Africa and Portugal policies, but a growing attention to British decolonization plans, particularly in the Federation.

One troublesome issue is the irresponsible way in which the Committee of 17 has developed; we would like to consider with you the advantages and the disadvantages of forcing the Soviets off the Committee of 17 by getting off the Committee ourselves.

We will face this year, for the first time in a serious way, the question of sanctions by the General Assembly to express its dissatisfaction with policies of colonial powers. The sanctions issue may arise in various forms requiring on our part various types of response. In the foreseeable cases, we should vigorously oppose sanctions as a way of dealing with Portuguese colonial policy and South African race policy; if the sanctions issue is brought up in connection with Katanga, it is not quite so clear that we would want to rule out United Nations legislation on the subject.

6. Congo./3/

If, as is not improbable, the present "Course of Action" fails to produce a reconciliation between Leopoldville and Elisabethville, we will have to work out some other way of disengaging the United Nations from its peacekeeping responsibility in the Congo before the United Nations runs out of Bond money, energy, and will to cope with the problem.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency comes up for extension this year. Our bet will presumably be on the Johnson proposals. We will need to protect them from diversionary resolutions from both sides; but we should avoid the appearance of opposition to direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states whenever in the future that becomes possible.

The Hungary item has become very unpopular in the General Assembly because of its repetitive character and its status as a "Cold War" issue. On the other hand, it is an important issue to some of the nationality groups in this country. The problem is to make clear our continuing opposition to Communist oppression in Hungary while eliminating the item as a hardy perennial on the General Assembly agenda.

Berlin is not on the General Assembly agenda. Khrushchev may decide to use the 17th General Assembly to present the Soviet case either before or after a "Peace Treaty" with East Germany. We have developed a separate contingency paper on this topic./4/

Ambassador Stevenson will be in Washington August 21 for the meeting in your offices on these matters.

George W. Ball/5/

Washington, August 21, 1962.

SUBJECT
United States Strategy at the 17th General Assembly

PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Secretary
Harlan Cleveland--IO
Ambassador Stevenson
Arthur Schlesinger
Joseph J. Sisco--UNP

The following principal points emerged from the discussion with the President on US strategy in the United Nations at the 17th General Assembly.

The President felt we could not advise U Thant to oppose Khrushchev's attendance at the General Assembly. He agreed U Thant might be asked to indicate to Khrushchev that if he decides to come to the General Assembly it might be for only a few days. While the President thought it was probably inevitable that other chiefs of state and government would want to attend if Khrushchev came to the Assembly, he agreed that U Thant might also be advised to tell Khrushchev it would be desirable not to make this matter a big show and that he should not encourage attendance of Tito, Nasser, Castro, etc. As to the President's plans, the matter would be kept open pending U Thant's return from Moscow. Governor Stevenson felt the President, without a lot of the build-up of last year, should come to the General Assembly, make a temperate, moderate speech, and that this would help maintain public confidence in the United Nations in this country. The Secretary felt that the President's attendance again, and on more or less a regular yearly basis, might be resented by other delegations. He thought that if Khrushchev does not come then perhaps the President might go to the General Assembly and meet the delegates at a reception or possibly go up later in the session to make a major speech on disarmament. The President felt that if Khrushchev comes to the Assembly in the latter part of September he himself should go at the beginning of the session and speak before Khrushchev. If Khrushchev does not come to the General Assembly, the President is reserving judgment as to his attendance. In general, he was disinclined to go to the Assembly just twelve months after his last appearance. While leaving open whether he would attend in the absence of a Khrushchev appearance, the President asked that a possible draft speech be prepared for him so that he could make a determination on whether something worthwhile could be said. As to what might be included in such a speech, the Secretary suggested one section should be devoted to the settlement of disputes, citing in particular the role played by the United States on both the Laotian and West New Guinea issues. The Secretary felt also that some of the suggestions contained in the strategy paper/2/ for strengthening the UN in the peaceful settlement field might be incorporated in the speech. Governor Stevenson said emphasis in the speech should be given to economic and social programs, trade, the Common Market and that this general area might provide one of several useful themes. Governor Stevenson also felt the speech should include a section on disarmament. In addition, he felt a strong pitch should be made in favor of responsible and moderate action on the part of the General Assembly as a way of increasing public confidence in the United Nations in this country.

The President asked that a memorandum be prepared for him suggesting the ways in which such visits should be handled. Should they be invited to Washington? Should the President see them in New York?

Mr. Cleveland posed the question, "After the bond issue, what?" He said that there were two possibilities: a special scale in which the United States would probably have to pay 44% or so; the other is to finance each UN peace and security operation by special voluntary contributions. The President felt it was easier to get money from Congress to support peace-keeping operations in specific crises than to get it to agree on the specific percentage contribution the United States would make for all peace-keeping operations. He agreed preliminary consultations could be undertaken with members of Congress and with delegations at the United Nations on the question of long term financing. However, such consultations would be undertaken on the assumption there would be no formal Assembly action until late in the session or at a special session in the spring of next year.

The President reviewed the delegation list and found it satisfactory. The formal papers nominating the members of the delegation will be sent to the President for approval in the next few days.

The President agrees we should oppose sanctions as a way for the Assembly to deal with Portuguese colonial policy and the South African questions. He also agrees we should attempt to get the Soviets off the Committee of 17 on the assumption that we would also do the same. The Secretary reported we had made no progress in our negotiations with the Portuguese on the Azores base and that they have linked this question with the United States position in the United Nations on colonial questions. The Secretary said we want to make a strong effort to get the Azores base negotiations completed before the General Assembly gets involved in a number of the Portuguese colonial questions. The President agreed we should see how far we can get with the Portuguese on this matter, although he was not disposed to make concessions on the colonial issues if the Portuguese were not going to make any movement towards moderation and were going to use the base negotiations as a means of exerting pressure on us.

The President was interested in having this item come up late in the session. He hoped any procedure to keep this question under review, while at the same time eliminating it as a formal item on the agenda in the future, could be justified as a more effective way to deal with this matter now than in the past.

The President agreed we should make a vigorous defense of various aspects of US space programs on which we anticipate Soviet attacks. He agreed with the Secretary's suggestion that the State Department, in consultation with the other interested departments, be asked to develop the lines of our response in speeches in the General Assembly on the four areas which the Soviets will attack: our alleged plans to "militarize" outer space; our alleged "contamination" of space through nuclear testing and project West Ford; our reconnaissance satellite program; and our alleged plan to achieve "US private monopolies" of space communications. The President agreed also we should try to secure Assembly approval for constructive measures of international space cooperation.

The President agreed with the Secretary we could not now determine whether Berlin would be brought to the United Nations and/or whether we should take an initiative ourselves if it appeared the Russians were about to do so. The Secretary reported contingency discussions were in train among the Four Powers on this question.

Washington, August 24, 1962, 6:57 p.m.

456. Ref: Your 561, 562./2/ Subject: ICJ Opinion. Dept is firmly of view ICJ opinion must be accepted by 17th GA and expects broad support for res to this effect. We will not agree to postponement this action to 18th GA.

Reftel does not make clear whether LA's contemplate payment in installments would apply to entire amount of indebtedness due to UN, or whether such mode of payment be applicable merely to arrearages in excess of amount equal to or exceeding contributions due for preceding two full years. Even after ICJ opinion holding UNEF and ONUC expenditures are "expenses of the Organization" within meaning Art. 17, it is not anticipated arrears of Members will lead to loss of voting rights at 17th GA. Further, the amounts by which Members are likely to exceed the Art. 19 limit in 1963--and therefore must pay to avoid loss of vote--will be small enough so no installment payments plan required or advisable for those excess amounts. Unless unexpected 17th GA financing resolutions adopted, USSR and those with like arrearage situation will have until January 1964 to pay relatively small arrears before Art. 19 becomes operative. Real problem is to get additional payments or arrears within Art. 19 limit in order to pay UN debts and improve UN cash position. As USUN knows, important US objective (once ICJ opinion adopted) is to assist and ensure arrears collection by SYG.

Dept believes it extremely undesirable consider special scale of assessments "in conjunction with" consideration ICJ opinion. Past UNEF and ONUC expenditures have already been assessed and ICJ rendered opinion under these circumstances. For GA to reconsider assessments already made would set plainly awkward and unworkable precedent and would make sound financial planning impossible. As to future scale of assessments, USUN aware US problems in proposing or agreeing with special scale without full, prior, specific Congressional consultation. Any special scale should be considered on its own merits in any event, and should in no way be tied to GA acceptance ICJ opinion.

Ball

RSB-148

Washington, August 27, 1962.

SUBJECT
Soviet Tactics on Some Major Issues at the 17th UN General Assembly

This memorandum assessing probable Soviet tactics at the forthcoming UN General Assembly was prepared in response to a request from Mr. Harlan Cleveland.

Without attempting to exhaust the list of more than one hundred items on the General Assembly's agenda, this paper singles out those subjects on which Soviet initiatives or responses will be of particular concern for US policy.

We note the possibility of a Soviet initiative on Berlin in the UN and of Khrushchev's heading the Soviet delegation. The Soviets will almost certainly give major emphasis to a series of disarmament questions and attempt to make up for the relatively poor showing of their delegation at the Geneva talks.

The space exploit of Nikolayev and Popovich in addition to contributing a note of self-confidence to Moscow's foreign policy generally may foreshadow more pointed Soviet attacks on US space programs at the General Assembly. The Soviets will doubtless continue to exploit issues on which they can pose as the leaders of anti-colonialism and may attempt to present their proposal for an international trade conference as a means for underdeveloped countries to reply to the threat posed by the EEC.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Looking forward to the 17th session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviets do not expect the Assembly to endorse completely the Soviet line on any major issue before the UN. However, the Soviets probably do hope to use the forthcoming Assembly session to enhance their ability to influence neutralist opinion while at the same time attacking and if possible embarrassing the West on a number of issues.

UN Finances. The July 20 decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) affirming the legality of expenditures for peace-keeping operations carried out on the Assembly's initiative was a major setback for Soviet UN policy. The Soviets had taken the unprecedented step of participating in oral argument before the ICJ in their effort to stave off the decision. While Moscow may possibly hope to avoid either paying its arrears for peace-keeping expenses outside of the regular annual budgets or suffering the loss of its voting rights (the Soviets may reckon that the number of countries in arrears would make immediate imposition of the sanction envisaged by article 19 of the Charter politically impractical), the USSR nevertheless will probably wish to recoup the loss to its prestige occasioned by the ICJ decision by skillfully exploiting other issues before the General Assembly.

II. SPECIFIC ISSUES

It is possible that the Soviet Union will bring the question of Berlin and Germany before the UN General Assembly this year. Humiliated when the German question was last debated at the UN a decade ago, the Soviets have been chary of opening up a debate of which they might easily lose control. However, in recent years Moscow appears to have been giving increasingly serious consideration to raising the issue before the UN, and this year Khrushchev, personally, appears to have been engaged in policy discussions on such an initiative.

The Soviet Union probably has no hope that the General Assembly would rubber-stamp the USSR's position on Berlin and Germany, but Moscow may now hope that the General Assembly--many of whose members have little interest in what appears to them to be a purely European problem--would tend to seek a "compromise" resolution which would be more damaging to the Western than to the Soviet position.

The Soviets might pose the question in terms of a Western threat to the peace in hopes of ultimately securing a "compromise" resolution enjoining both sides from the use of force in the Berlin dispute. The Soviet Union would hope that such a resolution would help to inhibit a vigorous Western response to unilateral changes in the local situation which the Soviet Union and the GDR might impose either in preparation for or by way of implementing a separate peace treaty. The Soviet Union might also believe that the UN General Assembly would be a favorable forum in which to plead the bloc's case for a free-city. The USSR might calculate that proposals to turn West Berlin into a free-city under UN auspices can be made to appear natural and reasonable to many members of the Assembly (if not to the two-thirds majority needed to carry a resolution), even though such proposals would seriously undermine Western rights. By appearing to make concessions by providing for continued US, UK and French troop presence as UN forces, Moscow might hope to make it difficult or even impossible for the West to reject the Soviet proposal and to maintain its position that Western presence in Berlin is not a negotiable question.

For the moment the Soviets do not appear to have decided yet whether or not to raise the Berlin issue at the 17th General Assembly.

If the Soviets decide to take a major initiative on Berlin at the UN, Khrushchev very probably would attend in order to present it in person. Khrushchev may decide to come in order to lend maximum dignity to Soviet participation, even if there is no Soviet move on Berlin. There have been hints and rumors that Khrushchev may be coming to the 17th General Assembly at some time during its deliberations, but at the present time there is no firm basis for predicting that he will attend.

Unless there is a dramatic move on Berlin, disarmament will probably be the central issue at the UN General Assembly, and Moscow apparently hopes to exploit the UN as a favorable forum to recover from its relatively poor showing at the Geneva disarmament conference.

From Moscow's point of view, the General Assembly, where disarmament debate is necessarily limited to generalizations, is a better forum than the disarmament conference, where the discussion gets down to details, for the Soviet Union's propagandistic approach to disarmament issues. While Soviet diplomats have indicated that the USSR will not risk another rebuff by the neutrals by repeating its June proposals for a prolonged recess in the disarmament conference with its reconvening in New York rather than Geneva, the possibility cannot be excluded that the Soviets will again seek to reconvene the conference in New York where it is likely to be overshadowed by other UN business.

General and Complete Disarmament. Moscow's principal objective will be to develop the image that it sincerely desires disarmament while the West is frustrating the will of world opinion by dragging its feet in disarmament negotiations. The Soviet Union will probably use its now standard propaganda line alleging US aggressive intentions (e.g., quoting out of context a remark attributed to President Kennedy in the Alsop article in the March 31 Saturday Evening Post to prove that the US administration advocates preventive war and citing the remark in Defense Secretary McNamara's June 16 speech about attacking military rather than civilian targets as an effort to sell the American people on the desirability of nuclear war) in order to lend the appearance of substance to their argument that US demands for controls are in reality schemes to develop espionage agencies on Soviet territory.

Moscow will probably continue to argue that the US plan is deficient because it prolongs the danger of nuclear war by not providing for the elimination of delivery vehicles in Stage I, because its provisions on transition from stage to stage (despite US willingness to forego having a veto over transition), do not guarantee that the disarmament process--once begun--will be carried through to completion, because failure to provide for abolition of foreign bases would give the US a strategic advantage and because the peace-keeping arrangements envisaged by the US would both throttle the national liberation movement and violate the UN Charter.

On the other hand the Soviets will attempt to create the impression that they are earnestly seeking disarmament by emphasizing the concessions they have made at Geneva where the USSR has accepted the US figures for Stage I reductions in conventional arms and has said that it was prepared to accept a five-year rather than a four-year overall time period for general and complete disarmament.

The Soviets will also use amendment of their draft treaty to include measures for the prevention of war by accident or miscalculation (exchanges of military missions and establishment of rapid communications among heads of governments and the UN Secretary General) as "evidence" of their effort to meet the US halfway. At the same time the Soviet Union can use its proposal to provide in the treaty on a general and complete disarmament for a ban on combined military maneuvers of two or more states as a vehicle for attacking NATO maneuvers such as last year's Checkmate exercises which were alleged to be "provocative." Moscow may well use other standing propaganda arguments--for example, anecdotes in the press about false US alerts resulting from communication failures and radar errors, the unreliability of the American rockets used for lifting nuclear weapons to be tested in space, charges that US planes have buzzed Soviet ships and examples of neurosis among US military personnel--in order to create the impression that "irresponsible" practices of the US military create a threat to the peace of the world.

To the present the Soviets remain firmly opposed to the American plan for zonal inspection, arguing that it would jeopardize Soviet military secrecy before the disarmament process had gone far enough to protect the Soviet Union from the possibility of attack by the West. However, the Soviet Union appeared earlier this year to have considered the idea of introducing some form of statistical sampling into its control proposals and a bloc delegation in Geneva has spoken of a modified zonal plan. The Soviet Union has long been vulnerable on the control issue, and the possibility of a move to enhance the Soviet position cannot be excluded.

The Soviets appear to have considered--and a Polish diplomat recently mentioned once more--the possibility of a separate agreement on the first stage of disarmament, and there exists the possibility of such a Soviet move at the UN General Assembly.

Test Ban. Clearly the Soviets do not wish to pay a high price (in terms of control) for a test ban, and it is problematical whether they have any interest at all in reaching a test-ban agreement. The USSR does not in any case expect to negotiate such an agreement at the UN, and Moscow's objective in discussing the test-ban issue at the General Assembly will be to make the West bear as large a share as possible of the opprobrium for the continuation of nuclear weapons testing. The Soviets appear to believe that their position on this question has improved over last year when the USSR was guilty of ending the de facto moratorium.

The Soviet Union can be expected to continue their rejection of the latest US proposal to consider scaling down control requirements on the basis of new scientific data resulting from the Vela test series if the USSR would agree to recognize in principle the need for on-site inspection. Moscow can be expected to hold to its position that the US proposal is not a significant concession since the US insists on the need for obligatory inspection. The USSR will probably continue to argue that national means of detection are adequate to police a test ban, and that on-site inspection is not necessary.

Moscow will continue to claim that the Soviet Union and not the United States has genuinely accepted and correctly interpreted the compromise memorandum (of April 16, 1962) of the 8 unaligned members of the Geneva disarmament conference. The Indian delegate at Geneva, Arthur Lall, has been informally circulating a draft treaty on testing-based on the memorandum--which supports the Soviet contention that inspection would be voluntary and not compulsory; Moscow at the General Assembly would welcome such a treaty--whether put forward by the eight or by India alone--as "proof" that the USSR and not the US was responsive to neutral opinion on nuclear testing.

Because the USSR claims that national means of detection are adequate to monitor observance of a test ban, the Soviet Union is free to support any appeals for an uncontrolled moratorium on testing. In supporting such a proposal, Moscow might well link its endorsement of a moratorium with a demand for Western recognition of the USSR's claim that because the US began nuclear testing the Soviet Union has the "right" to be the last country to carry out nuclear weapons tests.

Moscow is likely to respond to any proposals for a ban on tests in the atmosphere by calling--as it has in the past--for the end of tests in all environments.

Soviet propaganda has made much of US nuclear weapons tests in space, and Moscow will probably seek--either in the context of debate on disarmament or outer space--to stigmatize these US tests.

Non-dissemination. In discussing non-dissemination of nuclear weapons at the forthcoming General Assembly, the Soviet Union will apparently make a point of attacking potential creation of a NATO nuclear force.

Heretofore, Moscow has in two previous sessions voted in favor of the Irish resolution which referred to transfer of control over nuclear weapons, and left aside the question of arrangements within alliances. Moscow has publicly broached the issue by including a specific provision against transfer of nuclear weapons to alliances in its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament tabled at the opening of the Geneva disarmament talks. The Soviets will probably demand that a UN resolution contain a similar provision and may hope to win neutral support for its position, thus forcing the West to vote against a widely supported disarmament resolution.

In future negotiations the Soviet Union may be persuaded that it must either accept the creation of a NATO force or be faced with the prospect of an independent West German nuclear force. If Moscow becomes convinced that such a choice cannot be put off, and, further, if it is assured that creation of a NATO force would not in fact be a step toward an independent West German force, it may well sign a non-transfer agreement worded along the lines of the Irish resolution, i.e., one which would permit creation of a NATO nuclear force. For the present Moscow does not appear to be prepared to accept a NATO force, and will probably use the General Assembly debate to press its case against NATO and play upon anti-German prejudices by charging that NATO arrangements are a forerunner of nuclear weapons for the West German army./2/

While the Soviet Union may have an interest in using the non-dissemination issue as a justification for not granting further nuclear assistance to the Chinese Communists, this appears to be a purely secondary consideration. Soviet delegates are hardly likely to discuss Communist China in debates on non-transfer, but the bloc delegates may not be above mentioning the CPR to lend emphasis to the importance of non-dissemination in lobbying for support of the Soviet position.

Presumably, the Soviet Union shares with the US a desire to prevent the emergence of other potential Nth countries, not members of either Eastern or Western alliances. However, this consideration does not appear to have actively motivated Soviet policy makers in dealing with this issue. Moscow will almost certainly avoid statements which might offend potential non bloc Nth countries (excepting Israel).

The Soviets will almost certainly raise or support initiatives for the creation of nuclear-free zones as well as proposals along the lines of last year's Swedish resolution for the creation of a "club" of countries which pledge neither to develop their own nuclear forces nor to allow foreign powers to station nuclear weapons on their territory. The bloc may attempt to revive the Polish proposal of 1960 for a freeze on foreign bases together with a ban on transfer of nuclear weapons.

This year the Soviet Union will almost certainly support proposals for a ban on the use (or first use) of nuclear weapons. While statements in Soviet journals about the inevitability of escalation of local wars and Khrushchev's remark to Sulzberger last September that someone who signed such an agreement in good faith would in the exigency of war be proved a liar show that the Soviets have no illusions about the effect of such a declaratory agreement. Moscow has long advocated such a ban as a means of detracting from the credibility of the Western nuclear deterrent. This year Moscow's advocacy of such a ban will probably be used as a backdrop for further propaganda exploitation of the Soviet distortion of the Alsop article in the March 31 Saturday Evening Post.

Moscow may also raise the issue of a ban on the use of other weapons of mass destruction, i.e. chemical and bacteriological weapons. Soviet propaganda has already commented upon the use of defoliants in South Vietnam and in several instances has described them as causing injury to persons and as an attempt to produce famine by destroying crops. The recent death of a British scientist who had been working on bacteriological agents--an event duly recorded by TASS--affords another point of departure for a possible Soviet attack on alleged Western preparations for aggressive war.

The Soviets will approach the UN General Assembly discussion of outer space matters with its prestige greatly enhanced by the recent exploits of Nikolayev and Popovich. They can be expected to use the occasion to glorify Soviet scientific achievements, to project the image of Soviet peaceful intentions and willingness to cooperate with other countries and to set forth once more Soviet criticisms of American space programs. Moscow does not appear to have added very much to its repertoire of propaganda arguments since the meetings of the UN Outer Space Subcommittees in Geneva last summer. However, it appears likely that the Soviets will state their case in sharper terms at the General Assembly this autumn. While using a harsher tone in its criticisms of the US, Moscow will probably continue to exercise a measure of restraint to avoid jeopardizing its public posture of seeking more active cooperation with the free world in this field, to minimize the risk of spoiling prospects for agreements with the US on possible joint projects and to avoid statements which might embarrass Soviet programs for use of space for military purposes.

Reconnaissance Satellites. Most principal interest in attacking US space efforts would appear to be to inhibit (or make as politically costly as possible) US development of reconnaissance satellites. Until last year Moscow gave little publicity to the subject of reconnaissance satellites, apparently because it was reluctant to make a public display of Soviet impotence. However, this inhibition appears to be diminishing as the Soviet Union develops a reputation for being well on the way to early acquisition of an anti-satellite capability. Along with the voicing of Soviet anti-missile claims (with the implication of a possible anti-satellite missile) there has been more frequent references in Soviet propaganda to the need for a ban on espionage satellites. Soviet success in putting Vostok III into orbit close to Vostok IV has produced widespread press speculation that Soviet capability for shooting down reconnaissance satellites and provides a favorable context for a Soviet political attack on the US.

In addition to demanding a ban on spies in the sky, the Soviets may attempt to embarrass the US by demanding that it register with the UN data on all satellite launches. The Soviet news agency, TASS, has made a point of meticulously reporting announcements of launchings of US satellites whose purpose is not announced and the USSR may use these as a talking point in attempting to embarrass the US. However, in demanding registration of data the USSR will almost certainly wish to include some limitations in order to avoid undertaking (even by implication) an obligation to reveal certain information about its own space efforts.

US Militarism in Outer Space. The enhancement of the USSR reputation for military prowess in space resulting from twin manned satellites will also make it possible for the Soviets to denounce American military space programs from a position of apparent strength. Soviet media have been increasingly picking up and exploiting articles in the US press on use of space for military purposes, and the Soviets may attempt to accuse the US of attempting to launch an arms race in outer space.

At the Geneva disarmament conference the Soviets reacted coolly to suggestions that disarmament in space be considered as a topic for separate measures of disarmament. And while the Soviets will doubtless remain opposed to arrangements entailing control over rocket launchings outside the context of general and complete disarmament, pejorative references in Soviet propaganda to American schemes for bombardment satellites suggest that Moscow may be considering a proposal for a declaratory ban on stationing nuclear weapons in orbit.

Moscow will probably renew its charges that the US programs have contaminated outer space, referring in particular to the West Ford project for putting a large number of copper needles into orbit and to US nuclear tests which leave radioactive fallout in space.

In discussing communications satellites the Soviets will probably again advocate a ban on the use of satellites for the transmission of war propaganda and may reiterate the bloc's argument that capitalistic private business not be allowed to operate in space.

Soviet long-range ambitions in the UN appear to be predicated upon the hope that the USSR may with time gain sufficient influence over non-aligned members to assure the Soviet Union of the one-third vote necessary to block resolutions detrimental to Soviet interests while affording the Soviet Union an increasingly great opportunity to shape resolutions aimed against the West. Obviously, the colonial issues occupy a key place in Moscow's attempt to win over neutralist sentiment and to direct it into anti-Western channels.

Committee of 17. The Soviets appear to have been gratified by the work of the 17-member committee established last year to oversee implementation of the UN declaration on granting independence to colonial countries. Gratified by the anti-Western bent of many of the Committee's decisions, the Soviets appear to be developing ambitions for enhancing the committee's importance and the Soviet role in it.

The USSR will very likely resist strongly any attempt to deprive it of its seat, and may attempt to secure greater Asian and African representation. In addition a Soviet official in New York has indicated that the Soviet Union is preparing to propose some form of enlarged program of work for the committee; Moscow may argue that the committee should deal directly with governments rather than report to the General Assembly and might propose that it undertake visits to non-self governing territories.

The Soviets may hope that the committee--a promising new institution from the Soviet point of view--can ultimately become the principal UN organ in the field of colonialism to the detriment of the present role of the more conservative Trusteeship Council and Fourth Committee of the General Assembly.

Policy lines. Little change is to be expected in the now standard Soviet approach to issues to which it can give an anti-imperialistic cast. Moscow will doubtless avail itself of opportunities to embarrass Western colonial powers, and probably believes Portugal to be the most vulnerable of them. The Soviet Union will welcome, and attempt to claim credit for, the "liberation" of West Irian. The Soviets will probably urge greater vigor in dealing with Katangan separatism in the hope of later similarly claiming credit for the reunification of the Congo. The USSR can be expected to welcome discussion by the General Assembly-either in general debate or as a separate agenda item-of Cuban charges of American aggressiveness both as an opportunity to embarrass the US and as a means of creating an impediment to any potential US move against the Castro regime.

Soviet Colonialism. The Soviet delegation would probably prefer to avoid discussion of Soviet imperialism, and will doubtless react sharply to any mention of the subject. Moscow probably believes that, because most of the former colonies regard Soviet affairs as remote and are preoccupied with their own problems, the best Soviet rebuttal is to brand the Western charge a "cold-war" tactic and a stratagem to absolve the West from its guilt.

The Soviet Union will probably carry its fight against the Common Market to the General Assembly this autumn and attempt to brand the EEC as an imperialist device for discriminating against the less developed countries.

On May 30 Khrushchev publicly called for a world trade conference and a resolution endorsing such a conference was passed at the ECOSOC meeting in July.

In light of the Cairo conference's resolution endorsing the idea of a trade conference (though it made no reference to the USSR) and the favorable reaction of the underdeveloped countries to the resolution on a possible trade conference at the General Assembly last year, the Soviet Union may hope to capture leadership of a popular cause and use the international-trade-conference issue in attacking the EEC.

The Soviet Union by demanding inscription on the Assembly agenda of an item on the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea has indicated that it hopes to take the offensive on the Korean issue this year. If the Soviet Union can focus the debate on the presence of US troops, it may hope to popularize arguments which mutatis mutandi can support the Soviet case for withdrawal of US troops from foreign bases as a disarmament measure, for withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin and for withdrawal of US forces from other areas including South Vietnam.

Moscow's ability to manipulate successfully the Korean issue at the Assembly, and possibly to effect changes in the composition of UNCURK favorable to it, is seriously circumscribed by Soviet and North Korean unwillingness to take a cooperative attitude toward the UN and their rejection of a UN role in Korea.

Moscow almost certainly hopes eventually to replace the single Secretary General with a "troika" or some other arrangement which will afford the Soviets an effective veto over UN executive actions. The Soviet Union, must, however, take into account the climate of opinion in the UN; the Soviets probably do not expect to secure early adoption--presumably including amendment of the UN Charter-of their "troika" proposal. Moscow must realize that prolonged obstruction of the question of filling the Secretary General's office will be counterproductive; the Soviet Union would bear the onus for not cooperating with the UN.

In the immediate future Moscow will probably avoid committing itself either to support U Thant's election to a regular term or to oppose him. The Soviets would apparently wish to put U Thant in the position of having to seek Soviet favor (perhaps by not exercising his authority in applying Article 19 of the Charter to deprive the Soviet Union of its vote because it is now in arrears in its contribution to the UN). At the same time they would retain their freedom of action while assessing the parliamentary situation in order to determine what Soviet proposals for downgrading the status of the Secretary General (increasing authority of his deputies, for example) might stand a chance of being accepted by the Assembly.

The Soviet Union will probably resist efforts to carry out the July 20 decision of the International Court of Justice. But, if Moscow expects that it may be defeated on a resolution on this subject, it may hope that the General Assembly will not recommend and the SYG will not take immediate action under Article 19 to take voting rights from members who are in arrears.

The Soviet bloc will doubtless again go on record as favoring a change in Chinese representation, both for the purpose of making a friendly gesture toward Communist China and in order to avoid making a show of intra-bloc differences at the UN. But, the Soviets are probably comforted by the calculation that their efforts are not likely to succeed, for while Moscow may be constrained to fight for Communist China's claims, it probably has little desire to see the Chinese Communists become members of the UN.

If demands for Chinese participation in disarmament agreements are raised--Indian delegate Lall has begun referring to the need to have all militarily significant powers participate from the very first stage-the Soviet Union will probably repeat its disavowal of being empowered to negotiate for the Chinese which was voiced by Gromyko at the Supreme Soviet last April 24.

The USSR will probably continue to oppose proposals for charter revision on the ground that new arrangements cannot be made until after the Chinese Communists take their rightful seat.

Moscow thus far has shown little interest in improving General Assembly procedures, and the USSR does not appear to regard the subject as particularly important.

Washington, August 29, 1962.

SUBJECT
Enlargement of the Security Council

Following your discussion with the Nigerian Foreign Minister you asked that the legal people take a new look to see if there is any way of enlarging the Security Council without amending the Charter. Their conclusion is negative and the alternatives short of full membership they suggest as possibilities are not promising (Tab A)./2/

In this situation and given the history of our efforts to enlarge the Council (also described in Tab A) the only solution to the problem created by the Afro-Asian demand for greater opportunities of representation seems to lie in 1) continued pressure on the USSR to permit enlargement and 2) pending enlargement, an adjustment in the geographic allocation of elective seats on the Council. As you will recall, the Nigerian Foreign Minister made it clear that he would seek to pre-empt for Africa at the forthcoming General Assembly either the West European seat or one of the Latin American seats. Neither would be in the United States interest. He has also evidenced some interest in seeking enlargement of the Council (Tab B)./3/ In view of his insistence at the 15th General Assembly on coupling immediate reallocation of existing seats with enlargement, however, it is not clear that he is now prepared to concentrate on enlargement to the exclusion of reallocation.

The readjustment that would do the least damage to the Western position in the Council, provide a seat each for black Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, and maintain the maximum pressure on the USSR would be to shift the Commonwealth seat to Africa and the East European seat to Asia. The difficulties in this proposal are 1) that the Afro-Asians have been reluctant to put pressure on the USSR by depriving Eastern Europe of its seat and 2) that the British have been reluctant to let the Commonwealth seat go. However it appears from my recent consultations in London that they may now be prepared to consider this possibility. A decision to make this concession might be used to persuade the Afro-Asians that Eastern Europe should also be denied its seat so long as the USSR blocks enlargement. This plan could, however, not be put into effect until the 18th General Assembly when elections will be held to fill both the Commonwealth seat and the seat originally allocated to Eastern Europe.

Adoption of this plan would in no way preclude our support of any efforts by Wachuku or others directed toward enlargement, which continues to present the only really satisfactory solution of the problem. The prospects for success of any such efforts, however, do not appear sufficiently good for us to rely upon them exclusively to head off the Afro-Asian drive for reallocation at the expense of Western Europe and/or Latin America.

Recommendation/4/

1. That we promptly resume our consultations with the British on this matter and if they are responsive, extend these consultations to other friendly states with a view to a) reaching agreement on the scheme for reallocation outlined above, or some variant thereof, which could be put to friendly African and Asian delegations early in the 17th General Assembly and b) persuading the Afro-Asians thereby not to try to "raid" either the WE or LA seat at the 17th session.

2. That we continue to encourage and support any efforts by the Nigerian Foreign Minister or others directed toward a reasonable increase in the number of non-permanent members on the Security Council.

CA-2368

Washington, August 30, 1962, 8:02 p.m.

SUBJECT
Committee of 17 in the Seventeenth United Nations General Assembly

REF
Department Circular Telegram 328/2/

At the Seventeenth General Assembly the United States expects to lay considerable stress on the need for responsible and moderate action by the GA, particularly on colonial questions. For example, it is expected that the major speech by the United States at the opening of the Assembly will stress this theme. As part of this overall approach, we, and hopefully others, shall also make a major effort to reconstitute the Committee of 17 in the hopes that it will act more moderately and responsibly than in the past year.

The United States continues to favor the achievement of self-determination by dependent peoples throughout the world, and we believe that the United Nations has a vital role to play in the process of decolonization. Moreover, we recognize and sympathize with the strong feelings against colonialism held particularly by the Afro-Asians and Latin Americans. However, we believe that the United Nations Committee of 17, the committee established by the Sixteenth General Assembly to oversee the implementation of the Colonialism Declaration, has often demonstrated an unjustified doctrinaire extremism and impracticality in its proceedings and recommendations. This attitude is, in large part, due to the presence of the USSR on the Committee and its patent attempts to use the Committee as a "cold war" instrument with which to belabor the West, in general, and specifically, to link the United States with European colonial powers pursuing what the Soviets, for propaganda purposes, describe as "aggressive and repressive colonial policies." With the USSR consistently pressing for the most extreme "anti-colonial" positions in the Committee, most of the other members, with the exception of Australia, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, are usually reluctant to lag behind the Soviets' propaganda position lest they appear to be "soft on colonialism." This has appeared especially the case with the Afro-Asians. Unfortunately, the Latin American members of the Committee have tended to be unwilling to take a stand contrary to that of the Afro-Asians while admitting privately the impracticality and questionable legality of some Committee action. We fear other Latin Americans may follow this tendency. The result has been the passage of a number of irresponsible resolutions with unworkable recommendations.

The Department believes that, in the interest of having the United Nations' contribution toward ending colonialism progress on a sound basis, an intensive effort is justified to moderate and improve the Committee's future performance and behavior by ridding it of the USSR. While we continue to support the Committee's objectives and purpose, we believe that the United States, together with the USSR, should be replaced, considering this to be the best method of minimizing the "cold war" issue in the Committee's colonialism debates. The elimination of the USSR from the Committee of 17 might best be achieved through a broader reconstitution by the General Assembly of the Committee's membership (this would not rule out the continued membership of such present members as Australia and the United Kingdom).

The Department accordingly believes that an intensive effort should be made as soon as possible to gain support for this measure among UN delegations in New York and in key capitals. While the Department is opposed to United States withdrawal from the Committee if the USSR retains its membership, this should not be revealed to foreign governments, except the United Kingdom, since knowledge of this might undermine our main goal of getting rid of the Soviets.

Addressee Action Posts, unless they perceive overriding objections, are requested to take up this matter on an urgent basis and at an appropriately high level with the respective governments to which accredited. Embassy London should inform the Foreign Office of these demarches and urge the UK Government to make similar approaches.

USUN should also discuss this matter with United Nations delegations representing both Action Post and Info Post member states, except the USSR and Ethiopia. (The demarche to Ethiopia should be made exclusively in Addis Ababa.) Info Post countries include those whose UN delegations in New York tend to have the major voice in the fixing of their governments' positions on this issue. In the case of such countries, we believe, the demarches should be made exclusively in New York. As the support of the Africans, Asians and Latin Americans is of utmost importance if our effort is to succeed at the Seventeenth General Assembly, the approaches made in these countries, and with their United Nations delegations, will be of particular importance. The approaches should be made verbally.

Action Posts are requested to report Foreign Offices' reactions telegraphically, with messages repeated to USUN. The Department would appreciate receiving any comments Embassy Moscow cares to make on this matter.

Action Posts' presentations should include the following six points, and Posts may draw on the background information contained in Annex I to this Airgram and the examples given in Annexes II and III/3/ to the extent considered necessary. Citation of the examples contained in Annexes II and III will obviously have to be tailored according to the country or delegation being approached.

1. The United States will continue its policy of encouraging and contributing to practical actions which should result in the achievement of self-determination by dependent peoples as soon as possible. We support the principles contained in the United Nations' Colonialism Declaration, particularly the principle that "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." The traditional United States position on colonialism was summed up by President Kennedy speaking before the General Assembly last fall when he said: "My country favors a world of free and equal states . . . Within the limits of our responsibility in such matters, my country intends to be a participant, and not merely an observer, in the peaceful expeditious movement of nations from the status of colonies to the partnership of equals." We continue to believe that the United Nations can play a vital and constructive role in the liquidation of colonialism.

2. In line with the above, the United States supported the establishment of the Committee of 17 and agreed to serve on it. We continue to believe that the Committee can make an important contribution toward the decolonization process. While we have differed with the majority of its members in some of their recommendations and the procedures they have employed, we are prepared to cooperate with the Committee whether we are members or not.

3. Up to now, however, the Committee's record has been clouded by the Soviets' exploiting it for propaganda purposes. Their participation in it has not been for the legitimate purpose of contributing to the orderly termination of colonialism, but rather to exploit the Committee of 17 as a "cold war" forum. While posing as the most ardent champion of dependent peoples, the Soviets have attempted to lump the United States with European colonial powers allegedly following "aggressive and repressive policies." We do not believe that it is in the interests of countries sincerely desirous of contributing to colonialism's demise for them to provide a forum for such "cold war" propaganda exercises against the United States when the record of concrete US assistance in the United Nations and elsewhere to dependent peoples gives the lie to such false propaganda.

4. In order for the Committee of 17 to fulfill its potential constructively and to avoid, if possible, further "cold war" maneuvers, we believe that the USSR should be replaced on the Committee and ask the governments being approached to support this measure when the future of the Committee of 17 is being discussed in the Seventeenth General Assembly. We have no wish to see the Committee used for "cold war" purposes and are also prepared to withdraw in the interests of improving the Committee's work.

5. In addition to replacing the USSR and the United States, we believe further changes in the Committee's membership might be desirable so as to give countries which have not yet had a chance to serve the opportunity of making their contribution to the work of this important body. The Committee's membership should be equitably balanced geographically, and it should continue to include member states which have recently become independent as well as some member states which administer colonial territories. FYI. Posts should avoid entering into a more detailed discussion about the future membership of the Committee. End FYI.

6. (Posts have discretion in presenting the following points.) We believe that the Committee of 17 can be made a more effective instrument in the decolonization process if it begins to proceed on a more responsible and realistic basis to consider the actual problems faced by an Administrating Authority in advancing individual territories toward self-determination. The practice of unrestrainedly criticizing all Administering Authorities and the adoption of impractical and intemperate resolutions have the following negative results:

(a) Extremism and lack of realism in the United Nations on the colonial question, as well as other issues, tend to undermine the effectiveness of the General Assembly--the only body in which all member states have an equal voice. Intemperate debate and the lack of realism in resolutions may very well create a situation in which Administering Authorities, instead of heeding the United Nations, will come increasingly to look upon it as a forum for oratory only, thereby diminishing the authority and effectiveness of the United Nations in colonial matters.

(b) In the United States, the country on which so many crucial UN operations depend for political and especially financial support, the passage of unrealistic resolutions, drafted more for their anticipated propaganda impact than for their contribution to a solution of colonial problems, tends to make important segments of American public opinion, and consequently Congressional opinion, question United States support for the United Nations and its operations. Therefore, the extent of our future cooperation with the Committee of 17 may well depend on the degree of realism and responsibility which that body displays.

(c) The adoption of extreme and unworkable measures tends to undercut United States efforts to influence colonial powers to adopt policies regarding their dependent territories in line with the wishes of the world community as expressed in the United Nations. Such measures also tend to strengthen the hands of the more conservative elements in countries administering colonial areas, often encourage negative approaches to solutions of problems and thereby impede the achievement of the goals we and other opponents of colonialism support.

Rusk

Washington, September 6, 1962, 9:27 p.m.

1341. Security Council.

1. Dept has been giving intensive consideration problem created by Soviet blocking of SC enlargement. As Mission aware original geographic allocation non-permanent seats makes no provision for Asian other than Commonwealth members and entirely inadequate provision for Africa given large number new African members. While we have had limited success in using seat originally allocated Eastern Europe to provide some opportunities representation non-Commonwealth Asian members, situation in which there only one seat available for entire Middle East-African area, with 40 members, cannot in Dept's view continue indefinitely and can only lead increasing threat to retention LA and WE seats, which of major importance to Western voting position on SC. While situation mitigated slightly by existence Commonwealth seat, this not regarded as any solution by non-Commonwealth African and Asian members.

2. Given present and potential size UN, enlargement SC presents only really satisfactory solution problem, and Dept believes US should continue strongly support any efforts by Africans or others directed toward reasonable increase number non-permanent SC seats. However prospects early success any such efforts do not appear sufficiently good permit us continue rely exclusively on enlargement to head off Afro-Asian drive for reallocation existing seats at expense WE and LA. Mission will recall this drive gained substantial momentum at 15th GA under leadership Wachuku (Nigeria) and there every indication, as Mission aware, he intends pursue same tack at forthcoming session.

3. Dept has given some thought to possibility providing additional opportunities non-voting participation in work SC through some form of "regional" or "associate" representation under Article 31 of Charter. Any such arrangement however would probably be regarded by new members as unacceptable in that it would give them "second class" status and is therefore unlikely deter them from seeking election to regular seat.

4. Dept has therefore concluded it necessary explore possibility agreement on some acceptable readjustment in present allocation of seats. Ideal solution which would involve least damage Western voting position in SC; provide seat each for Africa (excluding Arab States), Middle East (including African Arabs), and Asia; and maintain maximum pressure on USSR permit enlargement, would be shift of Commonwealth seat to Africa and EE seat to Asia. Principal difficulties this proposal are a) reluctance UK and other Commonwealth members relinquish Commonwealth seat; b) reluctance LAs and some WEs depart "gentlemen's agreement" in interest preservation own seats under original allocation; and c) reluctance many A-As put pressure on USSR by depriving Eastern Europe of seat.

5. Dept recognized these difficulties present formidable obstacle obtaining any general agreement (exclusive Soviet bloc) to such reallocation. However, British appeared recognize this as possibility when Cleveland broached matter in London recently. Old Commonwealth members, while likely oppose surrender Commonwealth seat in first instance as Australians have already indicated they do, might be persuaded on grounds they stand better chance election SC if eligible WE seat (as in General Committee) than if eligible Commonwealth seat given present UN membership and lack other seats for Asia and Africa. Incorporation old Commonwealth with WEs would also serve buttress latter's claim to seat. New Commonwealth members might be persuaded relinquish exclusive claim to seat in interest relations their African and Asian neighbors.

6. Dept would hope WEs and LAs could be persuaded recognize that best hope preserving WE and LA seats in present situation lies in shifting two seats to A-As, that accommodation A-As should not be made at cost West exclusively, and that best means exerting pressure on USSR permit enlargement is to deprive Eastern Europe opportunity representation pending enlargement. Finally Dept would hope sufficient number A-As might be persuaded agree deprive Eastern Europe of seat in interest obtaining two seats for themselves to make plan workable.

7. Mission should therefore urgently consult with British along above lines so that if they at all responsive they might undertake discuss matter at Commonwealth meeting next week. Depending on outcome these preliminary consultations, Dept would then have in mind extending consultations to other friendly WE and LA delegations with view reaching agreement on this scheme of reallocation, or some acceptable variant thereof, which could if this appears tactically advisable be put to friendly African and Asian delegations early at the 17th General Assembly in effort forestall A-A "raid" on WE or LA seat during forthcoming session. Plan of course could not be put into effect until 18th GA when Commonwealth and "floating" seats must be filled.

8. Dept recognizes launching this proposal now could prove prejudicial Norway's current effort obtain Soviet bloc support its election this GA session. If in Mission's view and that UK Del this constitutes overriding consideration, further consultations could be delayed until it possible assess more accurately progress Norwegian candidacy and strength expected A-A drive to "raid" Western seat.

Rusk

New York, September 12, 1962, 8 p.m.

743. Reelection SYG. SYG told me he loath be candidate for reelection and preferred not commit himself re his availability until it clearer that problem of Congo would be resolved satisfactorily. He foresaw possibility of period of real difficulty ahead in Congo leading to further strain being placed on already over-burdened UN financial condition and consequent forced disengagement of UN from Congo. At same time, however, he understood difficulties with which UN would be faced if he appeared be unwilling accept reelection.

In any event, he planned await Gromyko's arrival and some disclosure of Sov attitude towards his reelection. He thought he might not be able obtain such indication before approximately Oct first. If Sovs prepared support him unconditionally, his reelection could proceed immediately. On other hand, if Sovs imposed unacceptable conditions, situation would become more difficult. In meantime, he has dissuaded AsAfs from publicly proposing his name. He hoped for early disposition this matter, agreeing with us that otherwise whole GA would be clouded and positive action on other matters be difficult to achieve.

SYG indicated US position supporting his reelection was well known. He thought it preferable if he not appear to be US candidate and therefore suggested we should remain inactive with respect his candidacy. He made no reference to length of his term of office.

Foregoing jibes with report Dean (UK) gave us confidentially yesterday. Dean said he had had long talk with U Thant regarding his reelection. SYG indicated he not anxious be reelected both for personal reasons and because he foresaw period of real difficulty ahead. He recognized, however, that there is no other candidate and in interests of UN he was prepared to stand for reelection. At same time, he indicated that full five year term was too long a commitment and was leaning towards three year term. He implied that possibly Russians would come forward with such suggestion, believing for their own reasons that five year commitment under present circumstances was too long. We agreed with Dean that it be mistake for either UK or US give any indication we prepared consider reduction in present five year term of SYG. Term fixed by GA and in any case could not be changed by SC. It would be mistake for it to be shortened at will of any candidate for office and even worse mistake for it to be shortened at insistence of Sovs. Dean suggested that as possible fall-back, if necessary, we might come to rest on pre-dating of SYG's election so that five year term would start on date of Thant's election as acting SYG of year ago. This would in effect give him three and half year term. It was agreed we would consider this as possibility but in interim should resist any such suggestion at this stage.

During conversation with Mission officer, Natarajan (former SYG of Indian UN Del, now employed in Secretariat) believed that while Sovs had no alternative to voting for reelection of U Thant due to latter's ASAF support, they would attempt nevertheless to limit his term and his power. Natarajan said just prior to SYG's trip to Moscow, he (Natarajan) had been approached by three different individuals (one a member of Sov Del, another a member of Rumanian Del and a third a Sov national in Secretariat) who asked him what Indian Govt reaction would be to proposal for reelecting U Thant for only a two to three year period rather than for five years and to continue his status of Acting SYG for that period. Natarajan said he told questioners that in his opinion India would support U Thant for full five year term as SYG. Natarajan said, however, that he had reason to believe Sovs would continue their efforts in this regard and would therefore attempt delay action on election in hope of achieving their objective.

Narasimhan (SYG's Chef de Cabinet) also told us today Secretariat had received hints from Eastern Europeans that Sov bloc might support U Thant for three year term. Narasimhan strongly opposed to this, believing that five year term should be maintained. We of course strongly supported this position.

Stevenson

Washington, September 13, 1962, 4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Tour d'Horizon--UN Matters

PARTICIPANTS
U Thant--Acting Secretary General of UN
Philip Dean--Director, UN Information Center
Mr. Ball, Under Secretary (in part)
Mr. McGhee, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Governor Stevenson, US Representative to UN
Governor Harriman, FE
Governor Williams, AF
Mr. Cleveland, IO
Mr. Talbot, NEA
Mr. Wallner, IO
Mr. Godley, AFC
Mr. Sisco, UNP

After Mr. McGhee welcomed the Acting Secretary General, the following principal points emerged from the conversation:

1. Palestine Refugees. Mr. Talbot outlined our approach to the Johnson Mission, emphasizing in particular that what was being sought was acquiescence of the parties and not necessarily approval. (From Thant's reaction it was clear he had not previously understood this point.) Thant, who was obviously fully familiar with recent developments, said he did not intend to express a public view on this matter at this stage, particularly since the principal parties concerned had not yet reacted. However, if at a later stage an expression of his support would be helpful he would give this sympathetic consideration.

After agreeing generally with the views expressed by Mr. Talbot regarding the Johnson Plan and the steps envisaged, Thant said he thought it would be difficult to go ahead if one of the parties should disagree. Mr. McGhee stressed we cannot let this problem drift since it would become even more difficult in the future. Mr. Cleveland said there is increasing unwillingness in this country to continue the "UNRWA retail operation" indefinitely and that if the Johnson Plan does not work we will have to look to ways and means to have the host governments undertake responsibilities for the refugees.

2. West New Guinea. After Mr. McGhee complimented U Thant on the role he played in bringing about a settlement of the West New Guinea issue, the Secretary General in turn said modestly that a settlement would not have been possible without the vigorous support of the United States. He paid special tribute to Ambassador Bunker. In response to Governor Harriman's inquiry, U Thant said Indonesia has suggested a Mexican, Osorio-Tafall, who has been heading up the UN Technical Assistance program in Cairo, as the UN Administrator in West New Guinea. U Thant is now awaiting the Netherlands' response on whether Osorio-Tafall is acceptable.

3. Thai-Cambodian Question. After Governor Harriman outlined our views on the Thai-Cambodia question, U Thant reviewed his conversations with the Thais and Cambodians in New York. After receiving the Thai request for sending either a representative or team to investigate the facts, the Secretary General communicated this request to the Cambodians on September 6. He received a favorable Cambodian reply last Sunday (Sept. 10), but they have suggested that the UN role not be limited to Thai-Cambodia but also include South Viet Nam. U Thant said this placed him in a delicate position since South Viet Nam is not a member of the United Nations.

U Thant reported Sihanouk prefers a Burmese as a UN representative in the area and the Secretary General has discussed two possible Burmese diplomats with Ambassador Barrington, Burma's UN Permanent Representative in New York. The Secretary General expects to get the Burmese Foreign Minister's reaction this coming weekend, and assuming an affirmative reply from the Burmese Government, he intends to send a UN representative to the area as soon as possible, probably by the end of this month. He will also send a UN staff official along with him. If the UN presence is limited to a UN representative or so, the Secretary General intends to defray the costs out of the present UN budget. If, however, a UN Commission is sent, the Secretary General intends asking the two governments to pay the costs equally. When the Secretary General indicated that he was thinking of sending a UN representative for a period of 3-6 months, Governor Harriman asked that he keep the period of time open since it would probably be necessary for such a presence to remain for an extended period. Governor Harriman also pointed out the difficulties which would be involved if South Viet Nam were included within the area of responsibility. He expressed the hope Thant could convince Sihanouk to go ahead with a UN presence dealing with the Thai-Cambodian area and to defer its possible extension to South Viet Nam.

4. Laos. Governor Harriman sketched briefly our present thinking on Laos, including the "growing pains" which the agreement is experiencing and explaining why more of a UN presence has not been possible to date. He expressed the hope that the UN Representative in Laos could act with more vigor. Thant informed us he intends to replace the present representative with an individual who could be expected to act more vigorously and decisively. U Thant agreed with Governor Harriman that the UN presence can have a salutary effect, although he felt Souvanna Phouma has certain obsessions and suspicions which will have to be dispelled. According to Thant, Souvanna Phouma sees the UN role limited to technical assistance. Thant said it would take sometime to breakdown some of the adverse psychological factors prevalent in the present situation.

5. Congo. Mr. Ball joined the group as the conversation turned to the Congo and asked the Secretary General to give his present assessment of the situation.

Thant gave a detailed interpretation of the events of the last 48 hours in the Katanga in which he maintained strongly that Tshombe had contrived the incident in which two Katangese were killed for the purpose of influencing the Congress on the UN bond issue. U Thant placed great emphasis on the need for the British to apply pressure on Welensky. U Thant is convinced that Welensky is in an excellent position to influence Tshombe and that the British in turn can contribute greatly by exercising influence on Welensky.

Thant said he was thinking in terms of about 30 day period (Oct. 10) in which the reconciliation plan should be put into effect. He detailed the steps taken by the UN experts in consulting with the various provinces on the Constitution, indicating a much more optimistic time schedule than our own as to how long it would take to achieve changes and complete the ratification process in the provinces. He said UN experts have consulted all provincial parliamentary leaders, including the Katanga (we do not have confirmation of this and are making further inquiry). He predicted the main problem would be where the residual powers reside; Adoula wants them to be maintained in the Central Government, whereas Tshombe wants them in the provinces. U Thant predicts we will know within a short time whether the reconciliation plan will work, the first test being whether the Katangese cooperate with the various commissions.

Once again Thant returned to the need for the British to get Welensky to influence Tshombe. In response to U Thant's inquiry, Mr. Ball informed him that Mr. Streulens' visa has expired and under our procedures it would be necessary for him to reapply if and when he left the country.

The conversation concluded with Mr. Ball and others emphasizing in particular the importance of full consultations with the Katangese on the question of the constitution.

SecDel/MC/59

New York, September 29, 1962, 5 p.m.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

US
Secretary Rusk
Mr. Richard Sanger, USDel
Mr. Robert Oakley, USDel

Foreign
Foreign Minister Jaja Wachuku of Nigeria
H.E. Chief S.O. Adebo, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to United Nations

SUBJECT
An African Seat on the Security Council, and the Election of U Thant

Foreign Minister Wachuku of Nigeria then said that the African States were conscious of the fact that in spite of their number they did not have a seat on the Security Council. Other bodies of the UN have recently been enlarged by geographical area and it was the intention of the Africans to raise this matter and try to get two more non-permanent seats added to the Security Council, both of which would be allocated to Africa.

The Secretary said that the US would support the idea of expanding the size of the Security Council and wondered if "someone else" could go to Gromyko and talk to him about this matter, asking him to abandon the Soviet position on Communist Chinese representation for this one question and permit enlargement.

Wachuku said that he personally would like to talk to Gromyko and explain to him that while other parts of the world such as Latin America, Europe and the Middle East, are represented on the Security Council, Africa, with the largest single membership in the General Assembly, is without a vote there.

When Mr. Oakley suggested that there is in fact an African seat on the Security Council at present the Foreign Minister said that neither he nor his African colleagues saw things that way. Morocco and the other North African states were not considered to be African for this purpose due to their membership in the Arab League.

Secretary Rusk then said that in spite of the possibility that the Russians would again bring forward the idea of a troika the United States hoped U Thant would be elected for a full term. He did not think the Russians would push the troika idea hard at this session, but he felt Russia might agree to keep U Thant on only as Acting Secretary General. The first choice of the United States in this matter was to have U Thant become Secretary General for a full term with the approval of the Security Council. If the Russians should block this the General Assembly could vote to have U Thant stay on as Acting Secretary General for a full five-year term in order to keep the machinery of the Secretariat running.

Wachuku replied that what counted was the man, and the work he did, rather than his title. It was essential, however, that the man be able to carry out freely his responsibilities under the Charter and that he be appointed for a full term.

Washington, October 2, 1962.

SUBJECT
Meeting with The President--United Nations Matters

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations
Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland

Governor Stevenson reported on a relatively quiet and orderly beginning of the General Assembly, with Zafrulla Khan proving to be an admirable Chairman. He said there seemed to be a widespread awareness by Assembly members of a political season in the United States, and predicted that major excitement would be withheld until after the U.S. Congressional elections.

The President of Cuba, Dorticos, will speak in the Assembly next week. Governor Stevenson said he was tentatively planning to speak under the Right of Reply Assembly procedures. The President warmly commended Governor Stevenson on his quick reply to the Gromyko speech last week, and suggested that this time, in addition to the U.S. reply, a Latin American be recruited to chime in if possible.

The President commented that at the Sunday, September 30 luncheon with Lord Home,/2/ the British did not indicate any inclination to take any new steps, but wanted to hold things still until after the spring elections, because they thought that would best serve the purpose of keeping Whitehead in power. Governor Stevenson and Mr. Cleveland discussed the desire of most members of the General Assembly for assurance that the British would not leave Southern Rhodesia to become an independent country until the franchise had been broadened to include many more Africans. Governor Stevenson said he had suggested to Lord Home a simple statement which the British might make, giving this assurance in a way that should not upset the political prospects of Whitehead in Southern Rhodesia.

After some discussion of the arrangements for the debate on nuclear testing, the President indicated he thought it would be appropriate for Governor Stevenson to make the opening U.S. speech in Committee I on that subject; the presumption is that Arthur Dean will make a major speech on Disarmament, and will of course handle the day to day debate on both of these, and related subjects, in Committee I.

5. Johnson Plan./3/

A discussion of the present state of the Johnson Plan produced ready agreement that the present purpose of the exercise, from our point of view, is to keep the matter open until November, and meanwhile to discuss with the Israelis some of the specific problems involved, including the point they have raised on the ceiling of the number of Arab refugees who would be repatriated to Israel.

Governor Stevenson expressed the hope that what would be kept open would be the substance of the Johnson proposals, and not merely the manner in which they might be buried. In the course of the discussion, Mr. Cleveland described the essence of the Israeli position as an unwillingness to make a side arrangement with us on a ceiling (for example, one refugee being repatriated for every nine resettled outside of Israel) if this crucial part of the arrangement was not known and at least acquiesced in by the Arab states concerned.

In this connection, Governor Stevenson reported on a conversation yesterday with Foreign Minister Fawzi of the UAR, who had seemed prepared to discuss the matter of a ceiling on repatriation but was anxious to discuss two other questions:

a. the number of refugees who would be accepted by Israel, and
b. some indication of how they would be treated when they went to Israel.

Governor Stevenson reported that the Israeli Delegation in New York seemed to be recruiting co-sponsors for the "Brazzaville Resolution" calling for direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The President expressed his understanding that the Israelis had undertaken not to introduce it. Mr. Feldman, who joined the meeting for a few minutes at this point, said the Israelis had assured him that they would not introduce it unless there was a major change in the situation. An illustration of a major change would be if the U.S. decided to support a pro-Arab resolution such as the Arab Custodianship Proposal or the reconstitution of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC). The President asked Mr. Feldman to convey to the Israelis his (the President's) understanding that they were not going to introduce the resolution and the President's desire that they let him know if this understanding was, or turned out to be, incorrect.

Governor Stevenson reported that the vote on inscription of the Hungary item had gone rather badly; the item had been inscribed, but with a considerably smaller vote than in previous years. He thought there was some possibility of negotiations with the Hungarians on amnesty for political prisoners, but that the vote might stiffen their resistance again.

Governor Stevenson said that Foreign Minister Spaak of Belgium is about to go back to Brussels and consider with his government whether they should now move to a decision to consult with Union Miniere that revenues would be paid only to the Central Government and that in the event of Tshombe's resistance to reconciliation, the mines would be shut down. He thought that Spaak might add withdrawal of Belgian technicians to the agenda of possible measures. He commented that Ambassador MacArthur believes that there is only a fifty-fifty chance they could take such measures in the present state of Belgian politics. The consequence of failure in the Congo, Governor Stevenson said, would be extremely serious. Adoula would fall and his successor would be far less satisfactory from our point of view. There would be pressure in the UN, particularly from the Africans, for some kind of military action against Tshombe. If the U.S. refused to go along with such action, it would be like breaking faith with the United Nations action and its own Congo policy. The prospect of U Thant's reelection or indeed his willingness to run for reelection would be dimmed. And on the ground in the Congo, there would be a break-up of the Congo, continuous civil war, and a golden opportunity for the Soviets.

Governor Stevenson mentioned the idea of Wachuku and possible other African moderates' coming in as conciliators, but referred to it as a last resort after the West's and the UN's efforts to bring the situation to a head had seemed doomed to failure.

The President hoped the Belgians would be willing to use as much influence as they have, but did not indicate what the U.S. policy would be in the event of failure of the present efforts toward reconciliation. He indicated he would await a report from Under Secretary McGhee, particularly on his trip to Elisabethville this week.

The President asked Mr. Cleveland to secure from the Defense Department an up-to-date appraisal of the military balances in the Congo, taking into account the latest information available on the apparent build-up of both ground troops and air capability on the part of Katangese forces.

CA-3524

Washington, October 3, 1962, 10:15 a.m.

[Here follows a paragraph explaining that the purpose of the paper was to "provide useful background on the complexities of what will continue to be a troublesome problem for the United States in future General Assemblies."]

SECURITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS

Three members are elected to the Security Council annually for a term of two years. Security Council elections are by secret ballot without nominations or discussion. Members customarily announce their candidacies but voting is in no way restricted to announced candidates. United Nations members simply write the names of their three choices on a single ballot. Any country receiving a two-thirds vote (74 on the basis of 109 members and barring invalid ballots and absences) is elected. If all three members are not elected on the first ballot, this is followed by two "restricted" ballots limited, as the results of the first ballot may require, to the two, four, or, conceivably, six members having received the highest vote short of two-thirds on the first ballot. If the necessary number of elections do not result from those two ballots, there is another "unrestricted" ballot, followed if necessary by two more "restricted" ballots and so on ad infinitum until three members are elected. If the election deadlocks, as it has on occasion, a split-term compromise, arranged privately but announced and endorsed publicly, may be necessary to achieve the requisite two-thirds vote.

At the first General Assembly in 1946, it was agreed that the six elective seats on the Council would be allocated geographically as follows: 2 seats for Latin America, 1 seat for Western Europe, 1 seat for the Commonwealth, 1 seat for the Middle East and Africa, and 1 seat for Eastern Europe. This was an equitable distribution at that time when there were only three African members--Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia--besides the Union of South Africa (eligible for the Commonwealth seat) and only one Asian member--the Philippines--besides China (a permanent SC member) and India (eligible for the Commonwealth seat). Until recently, despite the expanding UN membership, this pattern has continued to enjoy very substantial support, primarily because each area saw in it the best means of protecting its own seats under the original allocation. United States efforts since 1955 to use the seat originally allocated to Eastern Europe to provide for Africa and Asia have, therefore, been only partially successful. This seat was split between the Philippines and Yugoslavia in 1956-57, occupied by Japan in 1958-59, split between Poland and Turkey in 1960-61, and split between Rumania and the Philippines in 1962-63. The only other departure from the "gentlemen's agreement" of 1946 was in 1960 in the case of the West European seat, when Liberia contested the Portuguese candidacy and Portugal eventually withdrew as part of a compromise reached between the West Europeans and the Africans splitting the term between Ireland and Liberia.

Chile, Ireland, and the UAR leave the Council at the end of this year. Brazil is the LA choice to succeed Chile; Norway is the WE choice to succeed Ireland; Morocco is the Arab League choice to succeed the UAR. This latter seat, however, is not an Arab League seat but, as noted above, a Middle East-African seat; and Afghanistan, Iran, Ethiopia, Mauritania, and Nigeria from this general area have also all announced candidacies. Ethiopia has now withdrawn its candidacy. Reports indicate that the UAM states at their recent meeting decided to withdraw the Mauritanian candidacy. Nigeria has specifically stated that it is a candidate for any of the three seats to be filled. The Nigerian Foreign Minister, Wachuku, and other Africans argue that Latin America, with two of the six elective seats on the Council, and Western Europe, with Britain and France permanent SC members, are both over represented on the Council in terms of the present UN membership. Reports from the recent UAM meeting also indicate that in deciding to withdraw the Mauritanian candidacy those states further decided to seek to reach agreement in New York on a single Monrovia group candidate, with Nigeria the most likely choice. If this agreement is reached, there will be four serious contestants for the three seats to be filled this year. There is no indication that the Afghanistan or Iranian candidacies have attracted any substantial support.

[Here follows a section on the relative strength of the candidates.]

On the basis of the above analysis:

1. Norway could be elected on the first ballot if it gets the Soviet bloc vote or if it gets a sufficient number of neutralist and/or Monrovia group votes.

2. If, however, the Monrovia group makes a concerted attack on the WE seat and therefore votes as a bloc for Morocco, and the Soviet bloc and the neutralists support this attack by voting for the Monrovia candidate instead of Norway, the end result is likely to be a split-term between Norway and the Monrovia group.

3. If, on the other hand, the Latin Americans split as between Morocco and the Monrovia candidate and the Monrovia powers either vote as a group for Norway or split as between Morocco and Norway, the end result could be a split term between Morocco and the Monrovia candidate, depending on how the splits were divided.

4. Morocco could be elected on the first ballot if it gets either all the Latin American or all the Monrovia group votes or a substantial number of both.

In order to protect the Western voting position on the Security Council, the primary US objective in this selection is to preserve intact the LA and WE seats to be filled, without seriously jeopardizing UAM support of our position on other Assembly issues and with as little damage as possible to our relations with Morocco and the other Arabs and with Iran. If the WE seat, which appears the most vulnerable, is again split, a split-term tradition for this seat will be well on the way to becoming established as it has been for the seat originally allocated to Eastern Europe.

We have taken no position among the various Middle East and African candidates. Iran would undoubtedly be the most helpful on the Council but its candidacy appears to have little chance of success. In the United Nations context, we see nothing to be gained by a vote for Morocco, which has one of the poorest voting records in the General Assembly from our standpoint. Moreover, with Ghana already on the Council, our vote for another Casablanca power against a Monrovia power is certain to be deeply resented by the Monrovia group, whose voting record generally is more favorable to us than that of the Casablanca group and which includes the UAM on whose support we depend heavily on certain vital issues in the Assembly such as Chinese representation. Moreover, a United States vote for Morocco would not appear to have any value in obtaining additional votes for Norway. However, we have acquiesced tacitly in Norway's deal with Morocco, i.e., 15 WE votes for Morocco in return for 15 Arab votes for Norway, and we are therefore not in a position to undertake any active campaign either against the Moroccan candidacy or in support of any rival candidate.

In this situation, we would appear to have the choice of either voting for Iran as an ally in the absence of any Middle East-African agreement on a single candidate (if the Iranian candidacy is maintained) or voting for the Monrovia group candidate (if it is clear that the group's objective is not the WE seat and that our vote for the Monrovia candidate would in no way prejudice Norway's chances). The situation is in fact so delicate that we may wish to keep our vote secret. In any event we are not in a position to make any decision until the intentions of the Monrovia group and trend of developments in New York are clearer.

Unless it is clear that any Monrovia group drive is directed toward the Middle East-African seat and not the WE seat, it will be to our advantage to have the elections held as early in the session as possible, thus giving the Monrovia group as little time as possible to organize a drive against the WE seat. Liberia's successful drive in 1960 was greatly assisted by two facts--1) that Portugal was the WE candidate, and 2) that the elections were held very late in the session.

We will also be in a better position to try to ward off an African drive against the WE seat if we can assure the Africans that there will be one elective seat available for Africa south of the Sahara next year and thereafter. The African drive for a seat this year is more emotional than reasonable since with Ghana already on the Council, Africa south of the Sahara is assured of representation in 1963 whoever succeeds the UAR and with the Philippines succeeding Rumania, the Afro-Asians will hold half of the elective seats on the Council next year, which is roughly equivalent to the proportion they represent of the total United Nations membership.

At the same time, we are sympathetic with the aspirations of the Africans for a designated seat of their own and we have under consideration some scheme of reallocation next year. One possibility would be to try to shift the Commonwealth seat to Africa. Given the present composition of the Commonwealth, the loss of this seat would do less damage to the Western voting position on the Security Council than the loss of the WE or an LA seat. As part of this plan we would also have to try to shift the original East European seat to Asia. In the absence of such a shift and with the Commonwealth seat allocated to Africa, Asian members would have no chance of representation except through the permanent SC membership of China.

Charter amendment is necessary to increase the size of any UN Council and amendments do not become effective until ratified by two-thirds of the members including the five permanent members of the SC. The enlargement question first came before the Assembly in 1956 and was debated at every session thereafter through 1960. While there was generally support for enlargement throughout this period, any Assembly action was discouraged by the consistent Soviet position, reiterated as recently as September 5 of this year, that it would not ratify any amendment of the Charter in the absence of the Chinese Communists. In 1960 it was decided to put the Soviets to the test by Assembly resolutions amending the Charter to increase the number of non-permanent seats on the Security Council and the number of seats on the Economic and Social Council. These resolutions failed of adoption in committee (majority vote) after they had been amended on a Nigerian initiative to provide for the immediate reallocation of existing seats. Nigerian Foreign Minister Wachuku said that to "bring up the question of amending the Charter was simply a delaying tactic".

The United States continues strongly to support reasonable enlargement of the Councils to accommodate the new members. The extent to which the Russians have succeeded in focusing attention on the Chinese representation issue rather than on enlargement has operated to the disadvantage of the United States. In this situation any United States initiative on enlargement is likely to be regarded as insincere by the Africans. For example, the Ghanaian representative in the 1960 debate equated the United States and USSR position, pointing out that while both supported enlargement "they made it impossible for reasons of national policy". This of course is a distortion of the facts. It is the USSR, not we, which is making conditions. We have consistently reiterated this in our discussions of the Russian position. However retention of the African support we now have for our position on the Chinese representation issue is crucial to the successful maintenance of this position in the General Assembly. There is a danger that the Africans, to whom the issue of equitable representation in the Council is of greater importance than the question of who represents China in the UN, may reach the conclusion that the quickest and least costly way of obtaining more seats on the Council, would be to pull the rug out from under us on Chinese representation.

The Department wishes to emphasize that the foregoing is particularly sensitive background material. It is of course obvious that we do not wish to indicate in any way that we are even contemplating that the Africans might make such a move.

Rusk

On October 17, 1962, Brazil and Norway were elected as non-permanent members of the Security Council for 1963, receiving 91 and 85 votes respectively. A second ballot, restricted to Morocco and Nigeria, resulted in Morocco's election by 73 votes to 35. (Memorandum from Woodruff Wallner to Secretary Rusk, October 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960-63, 330/10-1762)

New York, October 19, 1962, 11 a.m.

1355. Re-election SYG. Stevenson discussed with SYG yesterday his intentions concerning re-election.

SYG said that, despite indications Sovs might seek have him once more named Acting SYG and limit his term to two or three years, he intended make clear he would serve only as full SYG and that principle five year term must be preserved. On other hand he admitted prospect five more years after Apr 1963 unwelcome to him on personal grounds and he would accept as maximum compromise five years from Nov 1961 when he was first elected, perhaps extended two more months so that close his term would not fall in midst GA sessions. To Stevenson's suggestion he might take full five year term from Apr 1963 and, if he so desired for personal reasons, resign after three years, Bunche, who was present, argued it would be impossible for SYG to resign before end his term without "walking out on the world."

Thant also said he is being urged by many Afro-Asian friends to permit presentation his candidacy in near future and many, including even Yugos, urging he not make this dependent on Congo developments. He is therefore inclined authorize action as soon as UAR replaces Sovs in chair Nov 1.

SYG also said he has told Bunche his final decision on candidacy will be affected by whether or not latter also agrees to stay on.

Comment: We urged Thant to move forward rapidly lest developments after mid-Nov complicate UN situation. While we would prefer full five year term from Apr 1963, we consider five years from Nov 1961 acceptable in view his strong personal preferences. Unless Sovs prove unexpectedly difficult, we would expect, in light strong GA sentiment, they would accept this "compromise" and election might be carried through rapidly by mid-Nov.

Stevenson

Washington, October 31, 1962.

SUBJECT "
Analysis of the General Assembly Vote on Chinese Representation

On October 30, 1962, the General Assembly defeated the Soviet draft resolution which would have replaced the Republic of China in the UN by the Chinese Communist regime. The vote was 42 in favor, 56 against, with 12 abstentions. (A detailed voting list is attached.)/2/ The vote on a similar draft last year was 37 to 48 with 19 abstentions.

The big gain for our position this year consisted of winning the affirmative votes of the seven UAM states which abstained in 1961 (Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, and Upper Volta). The defection of Laos was to be expected; on the other hand the defections of Malaya and Tunisia are disappointing. (Malaya moved from a negative vote on the Soviet draft to abstention, while Tunisia shifted from abstention to an affirmative vote.)

Of the six new members who voted, Jamaica and Rwanda voted in our favor; Algeria, Burundi and Uganda supported the Soviets; and Trinidad abstained.

A-923

New York, December 5, 1962.

SUBJECT
Private Meeting of SC to Recommend the Appointment of a Secretary General

The UN Security Council held its 1026th meeting at 11:00 Friday, November 30. Since no official records are kept of private SC meetings, the following is transmitted for information and Department records.

The President of the Council for November, Mahmoud Riad of the UAR declared that under Rule 48 of the SC Provisional Rules of Procedure the meeting would be held in private and that the requirement for consecutive translation would be dispensed with.

After exchanging compliments with Amb Zorin on the latter's conduct as October's SC President (this being the first--and only--meeting in November), Riad ascertained that there was no objection to the adoption of the agenda. He then called attention to the draft resolution sponsored by Chile, Ghana, Ireland, Romania, United Arab Republic, Venezuela which reads as follows: "The Security Council, having considered the question of the appointment of the Secretary General of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 97 of the Charter, recommends to the General Assembly to appoint U Thant as Secretary General of the United Nations for a term expiring on November 3, 1966." There followed a lengthy dissertation on the parliamentary situation with regard to the election of Secretaries General. Riad noted that the Council was acting under Article 97 of the Charter, the text of which he read. He then cited the General Assembly Resolution deciding to fix the term of the Secretary General at five years and the resolution of November 3, 1961 appointing U Thant Acting Secretary General to fill out the unexpired term of the late Dag Hammarskjold extending until April 10, 1963.

The import of Riad's remarks was to convey the idea that the power to deal with the term of office of the Secretary General resided in the General Assembly.

Having completed his introductory remarks Riad then called on the members in the order in which they had inscribed starting with Ghana, Venezuela and Chile all of whom made pro forma speeches in favor of Thant's election.

The next speaker was Professor Haseganu of Romania who observed, among other things, that the entire structure of the United Nations must in due course reflect the major transformations which had taken place in the world over the past 17 years and specifically that the Secretariat must in time give full recognition to the "principle of equal representation" among the three groups of states in the world. Meanwhile Professor Haseganu assured the Council that Romania had only the highest regard for U Thant and would vote in favor of the draft resolution.

Mr. Tadgh O'Sullivan of Ireland then spoke in place of Ambassador Boland who was, O'Sullivan said somewhat unconvincingly, absent because he thought the meeting would be held in the afternoon.

Ambassador Stevenson spoke next. The text of his speech is appended as an annex./2/

Ambassador Seydoux then spoke followed by Sir Patrick Dean of the UK who loyally associated himself with the reservation entered by Ambassador Stevenson as to the propriety of the SC expressing itself on the question of the term of office of the Secretary General. Sir Patrick said, ". . . while the Security Council may wish to recommend a specific term it is for the General Assembly to determine the length of that term."

The next speaker was Ambassador Zorin of the USSR who recalled turgidly the well-known Soviet position on the proper constitution of the organs of the UN, as stated by Chairman Khrushchev at the 15th GA and by other Soviet speakers thereafter. To leave no one in any doubt as to his drift, Zorin stated that the USSR favored entrusting the direction of the Secretariat to three individuals. He said the USSR would continue to strive for the arrangement as being the only one consonant with reality. But in the meantime, the USSR was prepared to support the election of U Thant, taking into account the good job he had done in the preceding year, and especially the "positive action" he had taken to meet the "dangerous crisis in the Caribbean." Thant, Zorin said, had demonstrated his ability, in this and other crises, to take into account the legitimate interests of the main groups of states. Hence, the USSR had been prepared to support Thant's election to a full five year term but was willing to support the draft resolution which recommended a shorter term.

Ambassador Liu of China then spoke followed by President Riad of the UAR who praised Thant in glowing terms including more than perfunctory references to the UAR's friendship with Thant's homeland, Burma.

The meeting ended with an elaborate and lengthy minuet wherein Riad requested the Under Secretary Kiselev of the USSR, first to read the draft communiqué. This Kiselev did in fluent, Cairo-accented English. The communiqué was then solemnly assented to by the Council. At Riad's request Kiselev then read for the Council's approval the text of a letter notifying GA President Zafrulla Khan of the Council's action. The Council assented and Riad signed. Finally came a letter to U Thant, read by Kiselev, assented to by the Council and signed by Riad.

The meeting ended at around 12:15 p.m.

Stevenson