Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
The 17th General Assembly: A Summary Round-Up

I.

The 17th General Assembly shaped up rather better than we predicted in the Strategy Paper which formed the basis for the United States Delegation's marching orders. Our main objectives for this session were achieved. We avoided predicted trouble in the debates on nuclear issues and outer space. We successfully walked the tightrope on such ticklish matters as Palestine Refugees, Angola, and Population policies. We had predicted trouble on colonialism in the form of extreme resolutions on Portugal and South Africa which were adopted over our opposition. Above all, we succeeded in strengthening the Organization's capacity to act in several significant ways.

We hope that part of the reasons for this outcome was the major effort we put into advanced planning both in Washington and in New York; the thorough consultations we had in Europe and elsewhere on specific issues ahead of time; the three intensive months of first-rate politicking and advocacy by an outstandingly professional delegation in New York; and the speed with which both the White House and the Department were prepared to consider and decide the major policy issues on which Ambassador Stevenson required guidance from Washington.

But perhaps the most important reason for the good results in this Assembly, from the United States point of view, was the effect inside the General Assembly of two external events: the Cuban crisis and the invasion of India. To be realistic, the 17th General Assembly must be described in terms of the impact of these two concurrent peace-and-security crises. This much at least can be said:

--The normal Soviet stridency was muted. The Soviet Delegation was in some disarray; it seemed to go back to Moscow more frequently than before for instructions on small points. This was particularly noticeable on the nuclear issues and in the outer space debate.

--The damage which the Cuban missiles did to the credibility of Soviet statements was pervasive. By contrast, it helped to increase confidence in the words, and the actions, of the United States.

--The Latin American caucus, confused and leaderless before the Assembly got under way, coalesced into a more effective political grouping after the demonstration of unanimity in the OAS vote on Cuba. This was particularly notable on issues like Disarmament and Nuclear Testing where the security of the free world was more obviously at stake. The Latin American consensus fell apart, however, on some colonial issues.

--The Western Europeans were much more active this year than last, and much more successful in getting their way-except on some colonial matters. This was quite directly the result of our working, bilaterally and through the North Atlantic Council, to energize our European allies on General Assembly matters.

--There was sharp shift in the sub-surface attitude of the Indian Delegation. Where, as on Chinese Representation, a cultural lag resulted in a neutral Indian vote, the Delegation's lack of enthusiasm for its own role was evident. India voted with us on Hungary and Korea for the first time.

--The dramatic demonstration, in Cuba, that aerial photographs could contribute to maintaining world peace took the fire out of the predicted Donnybrook Fair over observation satellites during the Outer Space debate.

--The Assembly was somewhat more willing to stand up and be counted on the "anti-Communist" issues. The Soviet position on Korea took an exceptional drubbing. And there were more references to Soviet colonialism and imperialism, with fewer Communist rebuttals and less neutralist yawning, than in recent years.

--The neutrals were busily engaged in agonizing reappraisals of their own policies. The outcome is unclear, but the reassessment will doubtless reinforce the central place which the United Nations occupies in protecting the interests of the world's smaller and weaker nations.

Thus while events in the Cuban sunshine and the Himalayan mists never reached the agenda of the General Assembly, the drama of that Security Council confrontation and the spectacle of the world's leading neutrals appealing for Western military aid was deeply felt on all the major items of parliamentary diplomacy this season.

II.

Our Strategy Paper emphasized that we should look upon the 17th General Assembly as a period of consolidation as distinguished from a platform of new initiatives-that we should concentrate on strengthening existing machinery for nation-building, peaceful settlement, and peacekeeping.

Much of this machinery, of course, goes on without requiring Assembly action from year to year except to finance it. United Nations Technical Assistance activity was carried on in 109 countries; the expanding Special Fund (of which Paul Hoffman was reelected Managing Director by this General Assembly) touched 88 countries; and the effort to make sense out of the Specialized Agencies' work, country by country, has now placed a coordinating UN technical aid "presence" in more than 50 countries; many of these UN representatives also serve in practice as informal political advisers to new governments trying to decide how to use what kinds of external aid.

The several United Nations peacekeeping operations have continued--without much attention from the Assembly--in the Congo, the Middle East, Korea, and Kashmir. The idea of a UN presence to help resolve secondary security threats continues to spread--the UN's executive attention has been engaged this year in the West New Guinea transfer, and in the Thailand-Cambodia dispute; the Secretary General may also be asked to supervise the disengagement of the UAR and Saudi Arabia from Yemen. And the 17th General Assembly extended the concept of a UN presence to British-protected Oman and South Africa's mandated territory of South West Africa.

In strengthening the United Nations machinery, the high-light actions were these:

--The unopposed election of U Thant for a full term, with an eloquent silence about the Troika, except for a plaintive "history will prove us right" from the Soviets.

--The consequent assurance that there will be no radical upset in staffing patterns in the Secretariat.

--The World Court's opinion on UN peacekeeping expenses in the Congo and the Middle East was accepted by an overwhelming majority (76-17-8) in spite of French and Soviet opposition.

--Unanimous approval of steps toward a UN Institute to train international operators, conciliators, and peacekeepers.

--An increase (from $25 million to $40 million) in the UN's Working Capital Fund.

III.

On disarmament, nuclear testing, and outer space, United States objectives were fully achieved and the 17th General Assembly behaved in a noticeably more restrained manner than the 16th Assembly did.

The disarmament debate was referred back to Geneva, where we wanted it.

On nuclear testing, one resolution clearly endorsed the US-UK comprehensive test ban proposal. The other, which started out as an uninspected ban, was amended to make it acceptably ambiguous; we even got in a reference to verification.

On outer space, the Assembly pushed along the cooperative arrangements in scientific research, meteorology, and communications. The Soviets started with a proposal for "general principles" of space law, but was discouraged from pressing the matter when we came up with our own set of "principles".

IV.

Colonialism is the only area in which we emerged with a spattering of egg on the face. We had to vote against an extreme resolution on apartheid (because it called for sanctions) and another extreme resolution on Angola (because it called, in effect, for ejecting Portugal from NATO). Our effort to get a United Nations rapporteur for the Portuguese territories brought the Portuguese a little farther than they had intended to go--but not far enough to satisfy the dominant opinion among the Africans.

The continuing fireworks between the Africans and the colonial powers, focusing more and more in the Decolonization Committee (formerly the Committee of 17, now 24), will continue to present our most difficult UN dilemmas. We may soon need to face the question whether we should get into the middle of each colonial question at the committee stage.

But outcroppings of moderation about the unfinished business of decolonization were also in evidence. We were able to help get a relatively mild resolution on South West Africa (which proposes a UN presence there), and we succeeded again in eliminating from the annual omnibus resolution against colonialism a dangerous section calling for target dates to be set for each territory not yet free.

The General Assembly continued to make quite a distinction between South Africans and the Portuguese as unregenerate, and the British who are regarded as trying, though not hard enough, to get on with the decolonization process. We abstained on two resolutions about Southern Rhodesia, which urged the UK to do what it was unwilling (and now, with Whitehead's surprising defeat will be unable) to do.

As the number, if not the intensity, of colonial issues declines, the Soviet empire stands out more and more prominently on the horizon. Last year our long and careful statement on Soviet colonialism was well received but not widely echoed. This year during the debates on colonialism, some ten delegations made a point of referring to the dependent status of Soviet satellites, and to the subject peoples inside the Soviet Union itself.

V.

The Chinese Representation vote came out even better than last year, with no challenge to the "important question" issue.

The Soviet move to seat a representative of North Korea during the debate on the Korean item was resoundingly defeated. Our resolution reaffirming the United States position on Korean unification attracted 55 votes, against the 45 with which it was passed last year.

The Hungarian item was kept on the UN's action agenda in a way that should be both more popular and more effective. The Secretary General will not try to achieve at least an amnesty for the 1956 Freedom Fighters.

VI.

Under the general umbrella of the Decade of Development, the United Nations in 1962:

--Joined with the FAO in the World Food Program;

--Completed plans for the UN Conference in Geneva in February, on the application of science and technology for the benefit of less developed areas;

--Called a world trade conference for 1964 that will present major political dangers and also opportunities for the Atlantic nations;

--Started building regional economic development institutes in Latin America, Africa, and Asia;

--Struggled with the population dilemma by formally recognizing its importance but voting against UN technical aid for population control;

--Completed the UN Convention on Marriage; and

--Passed a remarkably good declaration on "Sovereignty Over Natural Resources" which affirms the importance and the legal rights of private investors in the less developed countries.

A detailed summary of the main issues in the 17th General Assembly is appended for your information./2/

Dean Rusk/3/

Washington, undated.

MEMORANDUM ON UN FINANCING

1. A Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly will convene in May or June to consider the problem of financing UN peace and security operations beyond June 30, 1963. In the meantime, starting at the end of January, a twenty-one member working group including the United States will begin meeting to produce a financing proposal to be put before the Assembly. The purpose of this memorandum is to review briefly UN financial developments over the past year and to indicate the present thinking of the Administration as to how the United States should seek to influence the working group's proposal and the Assembly's action on this matter.

2. When U Thant was elected in the fall of 1961 to serve out the unexpired term of Dag Hammarskjold, he turned at once to an interim solution of the financial crisis of the United Nations, caused by non-payments of assessments for peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and the Congo. Such non-payments now amount to about $100 million. After consultation by the Secretary-General with the World Bank and the U.S. and other delegations it was proposed that the General Assembly:

a) assess all members for the cost of the peace-keeping missions in the Middle East and Congo for the first six months of 1962.

b) request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice as to whether the assessments for the Middle East and the Congo operations were legally binding on members.

c) authorize a $200 million issue of UN Bonds, repayable out of regular budget assessments, to provide stopgap funds until more durable arrangements could be made.

3. These things were done. The six-month assessment was passed by the Sixteenth General Assembly--using as a basis the regular administrative budget scale, modified by substantial reductions for the poorer countries and supplemented by voluntary contributions from the U.S. and, as to the Middle East, the UK. The World Court rendered a favorable advisory opinion, and the 17th General Assembly accepted the opinion by a vote of 76 to 17 with 8 abstentions. As of January 9, 1963 about $148 million of bonds have been sold or pledged, including presumed U.S. matching of pledges already made by others.

4. Meanwhile additional steps are being taken to put UN finances on a better basis. The Secretary-General has secured the services of Mr. Eugene Black as financial adviser to the United Nations; an energetic campaign to collect arrearages, based on the World Court opinion, is getting underway; and the UN Working Capital Fund has been increased by the General Assembly from $25 to $40 million.

5. Thus bankruptcy has been at least temporarily averted; the peace-keeping missions in the Middle East and Congo have been maintained; the legality of the assessments for these operations has been affirmed; delinquent members are now confronted with Article 19 of the Charter, which provides that any member with arrearages totalling more than the last two years' assessments loses the right to vote; and the twenty-one member working group has been established to grapple with the problem of financing further peace-keeping costs.

6. The regular UN scale of assessments was developed for meeting administrative expenses: the present U.S. percentage is 32.02%. The majority of UN members have taken the position that this regular scale should not be applied to the costs of substantial peace-and-security operations like those in the Middle East and the Congo. They contend that the regular scale was intended to apply only to the ordinary budget, that its application to peace and security operations of this magnitude is inconsistent with the primary peace-keeping responsibility of the five permanent members of the Security Council under the UN Charter (particularly in operations where all troops are furnished by smaller nations) and with relative capacities to pay. Besides, they believe, it would impose too heavy a financial burden on the smaller members, particularly the developing nations.

7. In financing any international operation there are two main alternatives: to levy an assessment on all countries, or to depend on voluntary contributions from some countries. During the past few years, peace and security operations have in practice been financed by a combination of these methods. The Administration and the Congress have already determined that they do not wish to continue this past practice.

8. If the remaining peace and security expenses in the Middle East and the Congo were to be financed only by voluntary contributions, our judgement is that the United States would probably have to pay considerably more than half of the total amounts required. If these costs are to be met by assessment, the experience of the past five years has shown that it is not politically feasible to get a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly for meeting them according to the regular administrative scale. Consequently a special scale for these peace and security operations (or different special scales for each of them) would have to be developed, which would put a relatively smaller load on the smaller and poorer countries and a relatively larger load on the financially stronger countries.

9. Since we cannot predict the nature of any future peacekeeping operation, it would not be desirable to establish ahead of time a peace and security scale for unknown contingencies. Some operations might be of sufficient interest to the United Nations as to justify a somewhat higher share, others might be regarded by the United Nations as not justified unless they could be financed on the regular budget scale. The United Nations should, therefore, oppose any general decision to establish a peace and security assessment scale for all purposes, but should participate in developing special scales for meeting the necessary costs of the Middle East and Congo operations for the coming year or so.

10. After months of consultations with experts in and out of the government, therefore, we are inclined to work for a program which:

a--encourages, whenever special circumstances make it possible, the financing of peace-keeping operations primarily by the nations most directly concerned (for example, the cost of the West New Guinea operation is being split between The Netherlands and Indonesia);

b--continues, as at present, to finance minor peacekeeping operations through the Regular Budget at the regular scale (as is now done for armistice supervision teams in Kashmir, Korea, and the Middle East);

c--adopts no "peace-and-security scale" for more than a year or so in advance, and makes no advance financial decisions about future costs of unknown peacekeeping operations;

d--maintains for the Middle East and the Congo the principle of collective financial responsibility of all UN members (this means a general assessment against all states rather than a resort to voluntary contributions);

e--assigns to small and developing states smaller shares of the costs of such operations than they pay under the regular scale (this means a "special" scale in which the major powers are assessed more than in the regular scale); and

f--gives a greater voice--in view of their greater contributions--to the larger contributors as to the establishment of any special peace-and-security scales in the future (which means a new mechanism such as the peace-and-security financing committee described below).

11. Specifically, the United States would be prepared to work with the other members of the United Nations in meeting Middle East and Congo costs after July 1, 1963, through a program that would combine these two elements:

a. Special scales of assessment for the Middle East and Congo operations which provide somewhat larger percentages for the U.S., other major powers, and those which can afford it; and provide smaller percentages for the developing countries. (Such increased assessments on the U.S., above the present 33-1/3% Congressional limitation, should be considered in light of (i) the cost to the U.S., in dollars and in American lives, if the U.S. were required to conduct, directly, similar operations in its own interest; and (ii) the capacity to pay and special responsibilities of the stronger UN members).

b. The establishment of a new peace-and-security financing committee of the GA, in which larger contributors would have relatively stronger representation than in the GA. This Committee would be established by a new rule of procedure of the GA, which would give it the sole authority to recommend to the GA special scales of assessments for peacekeeping operations, and provide that no such special scale can be established by the GA without the committee's concurrence.

New York, February 1, 1963, 11 a.m.

2937. Policy. Possible SC problems.

1. As we have indicated in previous tels we may find ourselves in unusually difficult situation in SC this year on colonial issues.

2. Balance voting in SC on such questions is obviously different than on questions in which US has direct political interest, as LAs, Norway, China and Philippines will all be reluctant to oppose African initiatives or to see SC sessions on colonial questions end without any action. China would find it particularly difficult avoid voting for reses desired by French-Africans. Not inconceivable therefore that we could find ourselves in position where, under Moroccan-Ghanaian sponsorship, these issues would come to SC and reses be put through with 7 votes which we did not like at all but which many of our friends would support and we would not voting against (veto).

3. Way to meet this is to develop policies for SC action which we could support and which could either be put forward by us or be floated through friendly small powers. Such policies would unquestionably have to go beyond positions which South Africans or Portuguese would accept and possibly also somewhat beyond what UK or French (or even we) would prefer. But this might be opportunity make SC function at its best through eliminating extremism among African demands while inducing some movement from administering authorities.

4. Hope therefore Dept can give early attention to steps we could advocate on main colonial questions which we likely to face in SC.

5. In terms GA reses these questions are specifically Angola and apartheid, with possibility also of sessions on other "Portuguese territories" or on issues which may be referred from Comite of 24. Pertinent sections of reses read as fol:

Angola: SC is requested "to take appropriate measures, including sanctions" to secure Portugal's "compliance" with pertinent reses.

Apartheid: SC is requested "to take appropriate measures, including sanctions" to secure South Africa's compliance with pertinent reses and "if necessary, to consider action under Art 6 (expulsion)." Special Comite on South Africa also requested to report to SC as appropriate on South African "racial policies."

Portuguese Territories: SC requested, in case Portugal refuses to comply with pertinent reses, "to take all appropriate measures" to secure "compliance of Portugal with obligations as member state."

Comite of 24: Requested to apprise SC of any developments which may threaten international peace and security.

6. UKDel also very much concerned with this problem and raised it with respect to apartheid on their own initiative in our talks yesterday. They already realize that unless UK policy can go at least as far as recommendations for arms embargo they will be in real difficulty. They are therefore anxious for close consultation with us on this whole SC problem.

Stevenson

New York, February 5, 1963.

Dear Dean,

As you may have noticed from some of our recent telegrams, the Secretary-General and some of his senior staff officers, particularly Ralph Bunche, are becoming increasingly sensitive about any appearance that their actions are dictated or unduly influenced by the United States. The Secretary-General has as you know proved remarkably cooperative and has been willing to accept our counsel to a degree which none of us could have predicted when he was first elected. His guiding principles and main objectives are close to ours and I am confident he will continue his cooperation providing we do not embarrass him by revealing how close it is. As you well know he must, as the world's principal international civil servant, maintain a public posture of impartiality and, to the extent he may have felt he has been publicly exposed as cooperating too intimately with the United States, he may come to feel he has either to reduce that cooperation or to balance it by actions more pleasing to the Soviet bloc.

Unfortunately a number of cases have recently occurred in which we have either taken up with other Governments or revealed to the press matters of UN concern on which we assumed his cooperation would be forthcoming but about which he either had not yet been consulted or had not reached a decision.

For example, in a number of our diplomatic consultations concerning the Congo, concerning the Bunker mediation on West New Guinea, concerning a UN Representative to Thailand-Cambodia and, most recently, concerning Yemen, the Department has on occasion moved rapidly ahead before he was aware of or had approved our plans. As a result he had been asked from time to time by other Delegations about plans which are supposedly his but about which he is only vaguely aware and which are in actual fact our plans for him. This is understandably embarrassing to him.

Similarly, press statements and background briefings in Washington or elsewhere have sometimes revealed prematurely the Secretary-General's plans or our plans for cooperation with him in ways which have not only been embarrassing but have occasionally resulted in his abandoning a course we favored which he had intended to pursue. There were several such cases in the closing stage of the Katanga affair, at least one in connection with Yemen, and most recently a statement by the Cleveland Mission in Leopoldville which gave Bunche the mistaken impression the Mission was injecting itself between UNOC and UNNY.

The problem is not really one of substance, since the Secretary-General has generally approved and appreciated what we have been doing and has been more than willing to cooperate if given time and appropriate diplomatic cover. I suggest, therefore, that we refrain, despite the urgency of a particular problem, from negotiating a solution with other Governments before the Secretary-General has approved our proposed solution and requested our cooperation. In the second place we must exercise extreme caution in public statements (including backgrounding) on matters on which we are working in cooperation with the UN, and particularly on matters in which we have asked the Secretary-General to play a leading role.

Above all we must avoid the natural temptation to let it be known that a projected future action or a successful past action by the Secretary-General was really our idea in the first place. A few more such revelations will, I fear, make him shy away from future U.S. assignments for him no matter how sensible and desirable they may be.

It would be most helpful to me if you could at some point review this problem with the senior officers in the Department and ask them to pass the word down through the ranks. I am sure the main difficulty arises from the fact that it is not always appreciated how circumspect we have to be about our close relationship with an international official of the stature and responsibility of the Secretary-General.

Sincerely,

Adlai E. Stevenson/2/

New York, February 7, 1963, 7 p.m.

2985. Deptel 2084./2/ Working Group of 21 re financing UN peace-keeping operations.

Mtg held this morning with Reps of UK, Canada, Netherlands, Australia, Japan, and Italy. Plimpton outlined major points of US position contained in memo of Jan 21, 1963,/3/ and asked for reactions.

All reps of above-mentioned states said they were without instructions and would have refer Plimpton's remarks to govts before indicating official reactions. However, personal reactions summarized as fol:

1. There appeared be general doubt we could secure complete acceptance of concept of ad hoc approach to future financing of peace-keeping operations. Barton (Canada) indicated his govt felt rather strongly there should be decision now which would govern future operations. However, from discussion, appeared likely we could convince states represented go along with this approach, at least for present.

2. Several reps indicated we must have better definition of states entitled to lower percentages in special scale than that used in past. We indicated we recognized this problem and hoped be able solve it.

3. There appeared be general acceptance of idea that special scale be treated in segments with under-developed countries receiving smaller percentage assessments as total cost of operations increased.

4. There was no stated objection to our view that all states represented at mtg must expect increased assessment percentages in any special scale. However, several reps, particularly those of Canada, UK, and Australia, pointed to fact that their govts considered they were already overassessed in regular scale of assessments because of US ceiling. They indicated that they would have to know specific percentage increases which we contemplated for them before committing themselves to acceptance of increase.

5. Doubts were expressed as to possibility of our success in securing acceptance of comite on financing of major peace and security operations. Barton said he believed Canadian Govt would be strongly opposed to including on comite states such as USSR and France, which had significant arrears.

6. Appeared to be majority view there was little hope we could secure acceptance of position that $10 million of expenses for each of existing UN operations be financed on basis regular scale of assessments in 1963. Consensus seemed be that, while we should try for this result, we could not realistically hope to finance on regular scale more than a total of $10 million; that is, $5 million per operation.

Reps present extremely anxious have firmer and more detailed statement US position so that common view can be introduced into Working Group as soon as possible. Other reps had fear, which we share, that it dangerous permit Working Group proceed very much longer with only extreme views of China and LA's serving as basis for discussion.

Stevenson

Washington, February 14, 1963, 4:07 p.m.

2147. For Plimpton. Revised draft instructions.

Consultation with number of Congressional leaders, several friendly governments and further consideration within Executive Branch, lead to following conclusions and instructions which should govern USUN on UN financing issue under consideration in Committee of Twenty-One:

UN Congo and Middle East operations continue to serve national interest of U.S. and our financial support must be continued even in face of opposition by communist bloc members, certain non-communist powers, and financial incapacity or limited sense of responsibility of certain less developed governments. Support for this assistance will be on increase as favorable developments continue in Congo and size and cost of UN Congo forces are reduced.

However, measure of support for our financial assistance for Middle East and Congo operations, particularly in Congressional arena, will also be influenced by extent to which our negotiations successfully

(a) enable substantial reductions from level of 47-1/2% (assessed and voluntary contributions) to a maximum contribution of less than 40% for U.S.,

(b) eliminate system whereby our voluntary contributions have, in effect, provided reductions to smaller countries--including communist countries,

(c) provide for increased contributions over regular budget scale for other major powers, including USSR,

(d) establish ad hoc "peace and security scale or scales," to apply not beyond 1964 and only for existing operations, and

(e) provide for a control mechanism which affords greater voice to the U.S. in UN financing of large scale peace-keeping operations.

USUN is urged support general criteria which recognize: that whenever special circumstances make such financing possible, peace-keeping operations shall be financed primarily by the nations most directly concerned (for example, the present split in costs for West New Guinea between the Netherlands and Indonesia); that minor peace-keeping operation shall, as at present, be financed through the regular budget at the regular scale (as is now done for armistice supervision teams in Kashmir, Korea, and the Middle East); and the collective financial responsibility of all UN members for approved operations.

Ideally, U.S. contribution based on regular UN scale, should be used as basis for supporting UN peace-keeping operations. Dept. fully aware of conditions that will not enable achievement this objective. USUN should, however, stress our strong views this position in view all other U.S. contributions to international organization, magnitude our foreign assistance and support regional defense arrangements.

Mission should seek to secure acceptance of principle that a minimum amount for Congo and Middle East operations should be financed at regular budget scale rates. Dept. believes this minimum should be set at $10 million for each operation.

Basic point of departure for amounts above $10 million per operation should be effective rates which experience has shown to be maximum which could be assessed, by nation, in 1962 for Congo and Middle East. (For example, 1962 Afghanistan regular budget rate was 0.05%. Effective assessment peace-keeping rate was 0.01%.)

Remaining unassessed percentage (after above computations) to be distributed over UN membership based on criteria which assures that costs are shared as widely as possible among major contributors and holds the U.S. percentage of total costs as close to 32.02% as possible. In no event should U.S. cost reach 40% of total cost.

USUN should urge 21-Committee to ask SYG for forecast soonest of budget requirements, separately for Congo and Middle East, for periods July thru December, 1963; January-June 1964; and July-December, 1964. Magnitude believed partial key to construction of special scale.

Every effort shall be made to provide a control mechanism which affords greater voice to the U.S. in the financing of large-scale peace-keeping operations. (A small Committee, preferably of 15 nations or less, seems preferable.)

P.L. 87-731 (bond authorization legislation),/2/ especially sections 1, 4, and 5 contain guidance and prohibitions and are to be considered a part of these instructions. They should be strictly construed. Similarly the law restricting budget commitments to 33-1/3% must be carefully observed by USUN in its negotiations and public statements.

USUN shall urge the inclusion of a strong section in 21-Committee's report on the need for immediate, effective emphasis on collection of back debts and 1963 assessments. Consider also whether a formal recommendation from the Committee for a "Finance Minister" is advisable.

USUN authorized use own discretion in discussing these instructions in advance with friendly nations and reporting reactions prior unveiling position in 21-Committee.

Rusk

Washington, February 21, 1963.

I want to express genuine concern over several points in cable #3065 from Ambassador Plimpton to the Department on February 18 concerning UN financing./2/

1. The proposal that we provide for the Congo operation in excess of our 33% financial contribution through "goods and services" is not a legitimate alternative unless authority can be cited for providing the goods and services. I would appreciate any information you have on legal authorization for that course.

2. Congress should be consulted before U.S. representatives even privately urge the Committee of 21 to adopt such an approach, regardless of whether we reserve our right later to oppose it. You will recall that much of the Congressional suspicion over the UN loan proposal stemmed from the belief that the U.S. had launched the idea in New York before consulting with principal members of the Foreign Relations Committee in Washington. This consideration is wholly apart from the damage I would think would be done in the UN if we "steer a group toward a solution" and then find out Congress won't go for it.

3. I must take strong exception to the statement that "special scale may be imposed on us over our objection." Congress is in no mood this year to have the UN impose anything on the U.S.

4. Congress will not likely agree to even the 33% levy if Cuba, Albania and others get their contribution decreased, as proposed in the cable. I realize that we should not allow communist policy to determine whether or not we will support the UN--but that is exactly the psychological situation confronted on the Hill this year. If there is a reduction in the assessments for Cuba, Albania, etc. I anticipate an amendment will be offered on the House floor to reduce our contribution by the same percentage.

5. I find the talk under paragraph #2 in the cable about a voluntary U.S. contribution to make up for any deficiency caused by non-payment by communist bloc as unrealistic at best. The cable indicates that there is considerable sentiment in the UN to reduce the level of the UN Congo forces. Exactly the same sentiment prevails in the U.S. Congress.

Fred

New York, February 21, 1963, 7 p.m.

3102. Department pass O'Brien at White House. Working Group of 21. We are informed Dept is considering instructing USDel take position in Working Group that US Govt will not contribute in excess of 33-1/3 per cent-whether by assessed or voluntary contribution-to cost of ONUC and UNEF for second half of 1963.

We fully understand that such position would be desirable in light of general Congressional attitude towards unsatisfactory UN financial situation and past reliance of that organization on what are thought excessive contributions from US. We appreciate that this attitude has been aggravated by such factors as continued failure majority UN members pay their arrears despite GA acceptance of ICJ opinion, failure of UN members fully to subscribe UN bond issue, Special Fund project in Cuba, and UNESCO pamphlet.

Despite this Congressional attitude, we find it difficult relate insistence on 33-1/3 per cent limitation on such US contributions to vital US interest in UN operations in Middle East and Congo. This vital interest was clearly expressed in Cleveland's memo of Jan 21 to Secy concerning UN financing./2/ This memo pointed out that in "the real world of international politics . . . there will doubtless be cases where the US interest would call for US support beyond its 'fair share'-despite the cost in dollars and damage to the principle of collective responsibility." It indicated that there was "compelling ration-ale for . . . recognizing that, for other major operations (those not financed by countries directly concerned), we can use UN for peace-keeping (in larger operations) only if we are prepared to pay more than one-third of cost."

We agree completely with foregoing statements. Accordingly, we have very grave doubts about wisdom of position Dept now considering if US really desires continuation of ONUC and UNEF operations in second half of 1963. Further, in our view, such position likely adversely affect rather than improve UN financial position.

Our reasoning is as follows:

1. US is one of rather small minority of UN member states interested in continuing ONUC and UNEF operations at anything like their present levels. Indeed, there is undoubtedly absolute majority of states which believe it would be better for organization discontinue both operations immediately. We realize that it difficult for US Govt accept this assessment of situation because of its belief that these operations have been extremely important to US and vital to UN itself if its peace-keeping ability were to be maintained. Nevertheless, we are convinced that our assessment is sound and that sizeable majority of members would prefer have UN spend its available funds on economic assistance rather than use them for UNEF and ONUC. Certainly this is and always has been position of all LA states.

2. It is for foregoing reason that it has been necessary, in effect, for US to "buy" votes for Congo and UNEF financing reses over years. There has simply not been any possibility of securing two-thirds majority for assessment on basis of regular scale of assessments of any sizeable amount of money for two UN military operations. As result, US has made substantial voluntary contributions in order secure necessary two-thirds by ensuring reduction of assessment percentages of many states. Fact that US alone made such voluntary cash contributions in case of ONUC, despite our efforts to convince others to contribute, is clear evidence of fact that few, if any, of major powers consider operation to be as important as we did.

3. It has been largely because of US willingness to make these very large contributions for ONUC that this govt has been able call tune. By and large, Congo operation has been run by SYG exactly as we wished, and other countries (except Sov bloc) have been prepared accept this in silence so long as they were not required pay large amounts for operation. It cannot be expected that this acquiescence in US domination of Congo operation can continue if we now take position that we have no greater responsibility for financing costs of this operation than we have for financing regular budget.

4. If we now insist that all costs of ONUC and UNEF for second half of 1963 ($50-60 million) be financed on basis of regular scale of assessments, it will mean that we are requesting less-developed countries to contribute at five times rate at which they have contributed for last two years. There is absolutely no possibility of securing two-thirds votes in Assembly on this basis.

5. It has been proposed that only portion of UNEF and ONUC costs be assessed on basis of regular scale and that balance be secured by voluntary contributions with US share of voluntary contributions being at 33-1/3 per cent. First of all, on this basis it unlikely that more than total of $10 million, if that, could be assessed on basis of regular scale: balance would have be raised by voluntary contributions. Even assuming, which we believe impossible, that $30 million could be assessed on basis of regular scale, there is no chance securing necessary $30 million balance from voluntary contributions from other govts if US can offer no more than $10 million. Most members, including particularly other potential contributors, namely, Commonwealth and Western Europe, simply do not accept proposition that US fair share is only 33-1/3 percent. It important that we face up to this fact when making our calculations. This proposal is in our view highly unlikely to produce desired results, and if we stood on it we must be prepared to see UNEF and ONUC soon brought to halt.

6. Apart from causing wind-up of ONUC and UNEF, proposed US position is likely worsen UN financial situation and our ability to deal with it. It will antagonize less-developed countries, and make it less likely they will pay arrears and less likely they will support US in applying Art 19 when it becomes applicable in 1964 to USSR. It will antagonize other major powers, who, as mentioned above, simply do not accept proposition that US share of UN peace-keeping operations should be no more than 33-1/3 percent. Certainly these countries will not be encouraged to buy additional UN bonds.

7. In our view, UN financial situation today is better than it was year ago and is likely improve if we take constructive action in Working Group, and if we avoid kind of action described above. In considering failure of UN sell entire $200 million bond issue, we must recognize that any real chance of selling entire issue was almost surely lost as result of long delay on part of US Govt in deciding that it would purchase UN bonds. Failure sell entire issue should not be taken as indication of lack of responsibility on part of other UN members, particularly when it is noted that fifty-eight countries have made purchases or pledges and that number of these are buying bonds in relatively greater amounts than is US. With respect to arrears, we must recall that Assembly accepted advisory opinion of ICJ only on Dec 19, 1962, and that we cannot reasonably expect that govts which were awaiting this event could take necessary legislative action to commence payment of arrears by this date. As matter of fact, however, Greece, which had made no payment on UNEF and ONUC since 1957, has not paid up all its arrears totalling almost $300,000. Further, all LA govts, which until last Assembly had refused make payments for ONUC and UNEF, have now announced publicly they will pay their arrears. In our view, this is real progress, and indeed as much progress as we could hope for at this stage. We do not think that we should now jeopardize further progress by taking position which cannot be accepted by countries in arrears and will in fact antagonize them.

8. We must recognize that major cause of financial predicament of UN today is amount of arrears owed by Communist bloc, China, and France. Vast majority of UN members consider that they are in no position contribute to solution of these arrears problems until they are called upon to vote on application of Art 19 of Charter to countries in arrears. They believe that only US is possibly in position at this time to deal with countries in question and bring about payment of arrears owed by them. We cannot see how position Dept now considering can favorably affect this situation.

9. Finally, in our opinion there is reasonable possibility of securing in Working Group majority support for financing formula which will be more palatable to Congress than that used in past, in that it will reduce US percentage significantly below past 45-49 per cent and will provide that other major contributors come along with us in paying either by assessments or by voluntary contributions an amount in excess of regular budget percentages. We believe this can be worked out either on basis of regular scale of assessments or on basis of assessed plus voluntary contributions.

10. In our view it is important that we choose immediately which of these courses to follow. It would be most difficult to negotiate two alternative proposals either of which might be satisfactory to us. It would be unwise to expend heavy energies now to work out satisfactory formula for special scale including committee, etc., and be faced with possible necessity within two or three months of attempting to scrap it if it then appeared it would run into Congressional difficulties. We would much prefer to choose now even though choice were to give up special scale for present. This would provide best chance of preventing adoption of special scale calling for US assessment of over 33-1/3 percent and would permit US to focus Working Group's attention in next two or three weeks on constructive proposal along lines previous financing patterns.

11. Suggest that our course of action in Working Group be as fol:

That we make strong statement along lines of draft submitted Dept, indicating our serious dissatisfaction with present financial situation of UN and attitudes of members; that we indicate that as long as this situation continues US will not be in mood to be particularly forthcoming supporting future UN peace-keeping operations and that in particular we are unable to accept for 1963 special scale of assessments in which US percentage is in excess of 33-1/3 percent; that we indicate we would like to see UN work its way out of its difficulties and are prepared to work in cooperation with others towards constructive solution of immediate problem of providing finances for UNEF and ONUC during last six months 1963; that we are prepared to support our normal percentage of such costs but that our willingness to go further than this will depend on present conditions being substantially improved; that subject to this condition being fulfilled we would be prepared to negotiate assessment res for costs of ONUC and UNEF for second half of 1963 along general lines of past reses which combine assessments with voluntary contributions but with certain modifications as fol:

(A) That for last six months 1963 all UNEF expense (estimated $10 million) and first $10 million of ONUC (estimated $40-$50 million) be assessed on basis regular scale of assessments;

(B) That assessment percentages for less developed countries beyond initial amount assessed on regular scale should be at least 50 percent of those in regular scale rather than 20 percent as in assessment res for ONUC in 1961. We would base this argument on fact that costs to be financed in 1963 are less than half of those which had to be financed in 1961;

(C) That US will consider making voluntary contribution (subject to Congressional approval) towards deficit resulting from assessment of less than 100 per cent of costs, provided burden is shared by other larger countries, and it does not increase total US percentage above, say, 38 percent of total costs.

12. Given (A) strong pressure in Working Group for special scale of assessments and (B) our need secure voluntary contributions from other "developed" states, it occurs to us that fol "compromise" might be possible. Instead of having GA merely appeal in general terms as in past for voluntary contributions to fill gap resulting from assessment of less than 100 percent of costs, GA might recommend that, or invite, the 15-20 developed member states, which are assessed significant percentages, to make voluntary contributions sufficient bring their total contribution to certain specific percentages which would be above regular scale percentages. For example, GA might invite US make voluntary contribution sufficient to bring its total percentage to 38 percent. Thus, GA res would specify percentages totaling 100 percent, but contributions in excess of regular scale percentage would be voluntary. This approach would avoid our 33-1/3 percent limitation problem and at same time be more likely bring contributions from such countries as Canada and Australia which have found difficulty in past in responding to general appeal for voluntary contributions.

13. Crucial element in our thinking is need to have respectable negotiating position which can attract support of our friends from beginning. We must be able to hold out hope that US will be prepared to contribute more than 33-1/3 percent of total costs if we are to exert any real leadership toward constructive results.

Stevenson

New York, February 22, 1963, 4 p.m.

3120. United Nations Financial Situation.

Plimpton spent forty-five minutes with Secretary General describing very serious concern of Congress and executive branch of US Govt at lack of improvement in UN financial situation and necessity for immediate steps to be taken in attempt to bring about improvement. He gave SYG up-to-date figures as to arrears and bond purchases, pointing out lamentable number of countries which have not paid anything for peace keeping operations or subscribed for bonds.

Plimpton pointed out that in his consultations with Congressional leaders re US contribution to UN peacekeeping operations, he found acute awareness of failure by many member states to pay arrears or purchase bonds. Question being asked why US should do far more than its fair share in supporting UN if institution itself not making determined efforts to put its house in order and if its members, particularly the uncommitted states to whom the UN should be far more important than it is to the US, are not doing their share. Many members of Congress doubt wisdom of US continuing to contribute at anything like past level for UN operations in Middle East and Congo. As result of this Congressional attitude, US was finding it extremely difficult to take a position in Working Group of 21 on question of how peacekeeping operations should be financed. It appeared almost certain that US could not accept a mandatory assessment in excess of 33-1/3 percent.

Plimpton then pointed out importance of Secretary General taking personal interest in this matter and giving it very highest priority. He argued that while Secretary General could probably do little directly with the Communist countries and France, he could take strong lead, particularly with the UN-committed countries, to develop an atmosphere which would emphasize necessity that all countries support the UN financially, evidence GA's intent to apply Art. 19 of the Charter to the Communist countries and France when appropriate, and pressure them through feeling of diplomatic isolation. He should use Eugene Black as much as possible to induce the smaller countries to commence to pay their arrears and to make bond purchases. It was vitally important that some signs of progress be evident within the next month or two.

The Secretary General said that he was in full agreement with the US attitude on this matter and assured Plimpton he would give his personal attention to it. He pointed out, however, that the primary cause of most of the arrears was political and not the failure to press governments for payment.

Turner (UN), described discussion which had already taken place between Black and Secretariat officials (previously reported to Department)./2/

Secretary General closed by saying that he would have a further discussion with Black February 28, and would report to Plimpton the following week what action was being taken.

Stevenson

Washington, March 1, 1963.

The proposed cable to Plimpton on financing UN peacekeeping operations/2/ is generally excellent-but I have several minor objections:

1. The language near the top of page 2 that "our national interest would cause us not to favor abrupt phasing out of UN Congo operation" is irrelevant to the limited purpose of this first cable and prejudges a matter that deserves far more attention. Before Congress would approve any voluntary contribution or other special UN support in excess of 33-1/3%, key members would closely examine the Department as to whether a sharp reduction of UN forces in the Congo had been undertaken promptly on removal of Tshombe from the picture there. There is a strong possibility that we will be charged with deceit (and with some foundation for it) if we now try to keep UN forces there for a half year or more in order to supplement the local army or "do nation rebuilding" after going to Congress for funds for a year and a half allegedly to get Katanga re-integrated. Many in Congress will say the Department keeps changing its grounds for asking for these funds and this will be the third time we have shifted the basis of the UN being in the Congo.

USUN reports have said practically all UN members want the organization's forces there quickly phased out. The Secretary over three weeks ago/3/ seemed to me to have indicated in a direct statement that a sharp reduction could be made in a month or so and a further drop to no more than a third of the present forces by early summer. For the present cable to say that no reduction is intended now (or perhaps for even six months) creates a record and confirms a policy that will cause vigorous Congressional objections that could impede if not checkmate later appropriations above 33-1/3%. At the least, the reference on page 2 should be deleted. Far better, the proposed policy behind the statement should be examined and that has not been done for key members of Congress as yet.

2. Reference to "whatever formula" near the bottom of page 2 seems to me to be extraneous and could be construed as an instruction to allow far more discretion to negotiators than I think should be left open. Our maneuverability with Congress is not potentially that open-ended.

3. In order to keep the record straight, I think it would be useful for Plimpton to have specifically stated at this stage (even though it would not come up in negotiations for the present) that even if voluntary contributions are made above 33-1/3%, Congress would almost certainly attach at least two conditions to them. Only damage would be done by Plimpton negotiating or USUN agreeing to a compromise which could not be gotten through Congress because it failed to raise two limitations that would almost certainly be imposed by the legislative branch in the domestic environment that will exist here for at least the next year and a half. Those two conditions are following:

(a) That the contributions by small nations will have to be raised so that the U.S. would not, by any construction, be making up for amounts that Cuba and Albania should pay. Regardless of the strength of the small nations in the UN, no Congressman that is up for election in 1964 is going to to on record as providing contributions that allow Cuba and Albania to contribute less than their share of the regular UN budget for the Congo operation.

(b) Any voluntary contribution by the US to make up a deficit will be put on a matching basis with increased commitment from other large nations so as to be sure that any Congo deficit is actually met in full and there is not a second round when we would go back to Congress to ask for more money. In brief the matching formula imposed in the loan measure would almost certainly become a standard part of special U.S. contributions provided by Congress hereafter.

Fred

Washington, March 5, 1963.

I want to comment briefly on incoming telegram #2383 from USUN concerning the meeting of the Working Group of 21 in New York yesterday./2/ The telegram indicates we are still not effectively communicating the adamancy of Congress on this problem and the fairly intractable problem we have. We still need to get across to Plimpton the urgency of our situation before his Wednesday meeting.

The following points in the telegram are particularly bothersome:

1. The next to last paragraph indicates little recognition of the importance of cutting the ONUC forces and overhead within the next several months.

2. The scale charges for the smaller countries cannot be reduced under any circumstances without payments by us in excess of 32.02% appearing to help Cuba and Albania, at least in some small amount.

3. I do not see how Plimpton can hold open the possibility of a voluntary contribution until we have gotten a Presidential decision and undertaken Congressional consultation.

Looking beyond tomorrow's meeting, we should have a prompt report on how much in military supplies the Defense Department can advance to the UN Congo forces and the President could then direct the Pentagon to write off. After we know the dollar value of that, we will know whether we can permanently stand fast at 32.02%, have to go to 38%, or will have to hit some figure in between.

A staff member of the Foreign Relations Committee told us today that the Secretary will shortly receive a letter from Fulbright indicating the Senate at this session will not agree to any contribution in excess of the 32.02%. We will be on the lookout for this letter.

Fred

Washington, March 5, 1963, 8:22 p.m.

1517. Re: Working Group of 21 on Financing UN Peacekeeping Operations./2/

You requested approach Government to which accredited at high level and advise that U.S. plans make speech in Working Group of 21 on March 6 along following lines:

Since 1957 when UNEF began, UN been unable find single solution peacekeeping financing satisfactory to all.

Believe current session Working Group must-because of time and impossibility of knowing nature of future-limit future financing discussion to Congo and Middle East operations.

Solution must be found by Working Group by March 31 and by GA by June 30 or face necessity discontinuance operations.

Strong case can be made for financing entire cost present operations at regular budget rates:

(a) rates broadly based on capacity to pay

(b) U.S. in past had no assistance through voluntary contributions of other members on Congo operation

(c) U.S. has 33-1/3% legal limit for assessed contributions

(d) 32.02% U.S. assessment rate is more than twice second largest contributor (USSR)

(e) U.S. contributions to entire UN family of agencies was 47% of budgets in 1962, both assessed and voluntary

(f) U.S. has paid (when voluntary contributions included) 44-49% of Congo and Middle East costs since 1947

(g) U.S. cannot agree tha "token" or "symbolic" contributions from developing countries will meet the need this year: nothing token about keeping the peace.

Lack of demonstrated financial support by other members creates great difficulty for U.S. continuing contributions above 32.02%:

(a) Only 52 countries have paid regular budget in full for 1962; UNEF, only 41; Congo, only 32

(b) Total arrears $121 million

(c) Only $74 million of $200 million bond issue subscribed by other nations than U.S. (and $14.3 million of this by non-UN members).

Conclusion: U.S. will assist other members in formulation of cost-sharing proposals to solve financial peacekeeping difficulties, but not in position at this time to accept mandatory assessments in excess regular budget percentage. Contribution of even a little more by U.S. through voluntary contributions dependent on whether vast majority of membership has the will to give financial support absolutely essential to survival. End speech summary.

FYI. Fuller details of U.S. position and support desired Gov'ts expected follow shortly to all non-Bloc posts. Background facts sent all diplomatic posts circular airgram 9150, Feb. 26./3/ Present instruction intended give short advance notice to member Gov'ts Working Group of 21 of position U.S. plans take in Plimpton speech March 6 before closed meeting Working Group. Advance notice to capitals Working Group members believed necessary because importance continued financing these peacekeeping operations. Realize some UN missions may report inadequately, if at all. End FYI.

This message being sent U.S. diplomatic posts all Working Group countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroun, Canada, China, France, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, USSR, UAR, UK. (Mongolia and U.S. other two Working Group members.)

Parliamentary situation in Working Group is that Group is expected come up with solution to future financing of peacekeeping operations, especially UNEF and Congo, by March 31 looking to Special Session of General Assembly in May to deal solely with peacekeeping financing problems. Little progress has been made. Developing nations are urging reductions in assessments for peacekeeping (similar to those they received in the past) through special scale of assessments which would (a) reduce their assessments by 80% or more from regular budget scale and (b) assess U.S. and others they consider able pay higher percentages to make up difference. Friendly nations that more able pay favor combination of assessing portion of budget on regular scale for all nations and either (a) assessing balance on special scale with reductions for developing nations, or (b) making up balance through voluntary contributions from wealthier states. U.S. position stresses reasons why entire budget should be financed on regular scale. USSR, Bulgaria, and Mongolia so far refuse agree or sponsor any method meeting these costs in which they pay any amount. France, although full member, sitting as observer.

FYI. Strong position being taken by U.S. in line with public opinion as to contribution U.S. should make and legal limit on mandatory assessment Executive Branch can accept of 33-1/3%. Only slight hint being given to Working Group at this time that if the member states put their house in order by paying past assessments U.S. might request authority to make additional voluntary contributions above regular budget percentage. U.S. position expected to shake Working Group and hope result will be more businesslike approach and recognition that financial support of peacekeeping collective responsibility of membership. End FYI.

For Ambassadors Moscow and Sofia: Approach Government at your discretion.

For USUN: Use discretion in advising delegations members of Working Group of general outlines Plimpton speech before delivery.

Rusk

New York, March 6, 1963, 8 p.m.

3236. Financing UN Peace-keeping Operations.

Stevenson and Plimpton called on U Thant yesterday and informed him of US statement to be given in Working Group of 21 today, outlining US position, and reasons therefor.

U Thant limited his reaction to statement he understood reasons for US position. Said his present intention cut Congo forces to 6,000 by July 1 and continue them at that level for balance of year should result in expenditure $5 million per month for July 1-Dec 31 period. Did not believe this figure could be reduced despite force reduction because of need retain at least eight fighter aircraft and transport equipment and because of high-level of civilian air costs (now $2 million per month). Said some fighter aircraft must be retained because of threat of former Katanga aircraft now in Angola and since only 25 per cent of Katanga gendarmerie had surrendered weapons. Said he saw little chance reducing UNEF cost unless character of operation changed or units of force drawn only from countries charging smaller amounts in reimbursable costs. He doubted political wisdom of changing "geographical distribution" in force units.

Turner argued that maintenance of UNEF at present level had little financial impact and that main problem was ONUC. He questioned whether USG could face possibility of financing ONUC even at $30 million level if US maintained its newly announced position re financing. He pointed to projected "net deficit" figures of $127 million at June 30, 1963, and $130-$150 million at Dec 31, 1963, unless extraordinary developments occurred and asked what us thought SYG should do when faced with these circumstances. He also made point that US was perhaps overstating lack of voluntary cooperation among member states in connection with ONUC and UNEF if it overlooked fact that the many countries furnishing troops were making voluntary contributions of services of these men and paying their salaries. He believed this element had never been taken fully into account when calculating cost-sharing for these peacekeeping operations.

At suggestion Narasimhan, it was agreed that SYG would immediately organize arrears-collection campaign in addition to efforts of Eugene Black, which would probably involve sending some senior staff members to various Finance Ministries in attempt collect arrears. Said he would report further re this within next week or two and hoped that some substantial results could be achieved by May.

(In separate conversation of Plimpton with Black, latter said he commencing writing of letters to Finance Ministers and planned visit some major capitals in attempt collect arrears.)

Stevenson

Washington, March 7, 1963.

SUBJECT
Meeting with William Benton

William Benton is calling at the White House Saturday, March 9, 1963 at 12 noon to discuss with the President his nomination as United States Member of the UNESCO Executive Board.

In connection with this meeting, there are a few points about our policy towards UNESCO which the Department believes it would be useful for the President to emphasize to Mr. Benton and which he should understand in taking the Executive Board position. Additional background information on UNESCO is attached./2/

The Department has recently been following a hard-hitting, critical but constructive policy vis-a-vis UNESCO in an attempt to make the Organization more efficient and effective. We have been endeavoring to suggest to UNESCO that it achieve a clearer direction of effort by curtailing activities of marginal and questionable value, so that the Organization may achieve an increasing capability to deal with the more urgent needs of the developing nations. In this regard, we have stressed that UNESCO, along with the other Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, should redirect its program so as to make its maximum contribution to the UN Development Decade; and that, in this connection, it should concentrate its efforts on educational development in the context of over-all economic and social development.

While UNESCO has the potential for making a tremendous contribution to educational development, it must be realized that, even in this field, there are serious limitations on the magnitude of the tasks it can assume--limitations imposed not only by the capacity of the Organization but by the unwillingness of Member States to increase their contributions to UNESCO in any appreciable degree. Most of the large contributors--the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and the Soviet Union-will undoubtedly continue to channel most of their assistance to under-developed countries through their own bilateral programs; and the United States cannot be in the position of contributing more than its fair share of the Organization's budget. In addition, we feel that UNESCO has not achieved the high operating standards of some of the other Specialized Agencies, particularly with regard to its management and the efficient implementation of its programs.

As you are aware, UNESCO is not a particularly popular organization in the United States. Much of the criticism directed against it is based on misconceptions. On the other hand, there is some criticism of it which is legitimate, as for example the recent outcry over the publication by UNESCO of a booklet on "Equality of Rights between Races and Nationalities in the USSR," a publication used by its Soviet authors for political purposes and blatant Soviet and anti-Western propaganda.

Senator Frank Church's Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a session on the UNESCO booklet early this week at which Assistant Secretary Battle was called to testify. The Subcommittee was reassured by Mr. Battle's statement that the U.S. is doing its utmost to discourage publication by UNESCO of documents of this sort and that the Department is trying to effect basic reforms in UNESCO. The Subcommittee was critical of UNESCO's activity, seriously questioned the usefulness of some of it, and indicated that it would continue to keep a close eye on the Organization.

As indicated above, the Department believes it important that Mr. Benton, in assuming his new duties, be aware of the critical but constructive approach the U.S. is taking in UNESCO and that he be sympathetic toward it.

Robert Kent/3/

New York, March 7, 1963.

SUBJECT
Financing UN Peace-keeping Operations

1. The first steps have now been taken in our current efforts to improve the financial condition of the UN. Ambassador Plimpton has made a strong statement to the Working Group and the Department has sent out a series of circular telegrams to the non-Communist capitals urging that Member States agree that the regular budget scale percentages be used for assessing the Middle East and Congo expenses for the last 6 months of 1963./2/ It will now be necessary to wait for reactions to these approaches before we will be in a position to assess where we are and exactly what course we should take.

2. The purpose of this memorandum is to explore with you now the basic alternatives that lie before us and their relative advantages and disadvantages so that as we receive the replies from various capitals we will have an agreed basis for making our final choice.

3. Let me clear away immediately a number of points on which I think we are all agreed. Our objective is to obtain by June 30 a General Assembly resolution which finances the UNEF and ONUC operations for the last 6 months of 1963 on a reduced basis but not so far reduced as seriously to damage any political interests of the United States. We have decided and said to the Working Group that for this year we will oppose the use for this purpose of a compulsory special scale of assessments which would carry the United States beyond the present regular scale of 32.02% of the total cost (or the Congressional limitation of 33-1/3%). We have left open the possibility of other means of raising these funds, including some combination of compulsory assessments and voluntary contributions. We have so indicated to the Working Group, but have said that the United States is not prepared to make any commitment with regard to a voluntary contribution unless there is improvement in the UN financial situation and unless we are joined by a sizeable number of other countries for sizeable amounts. We are all agreed that the total contribution by the United States should not exceed 38%--needless to say, no indication of this figure has been given to the Working Group.

4. The problem that causes us concern is that under our present instructions we see no practical alternatives available to us at the end of the road which will enable us to attain our basic objective. There are only three means, as we see it, of obtaining the necessary funds. In our view two of these will almost certainly turn out to be impractical and the third may be barred by our present instructions.

5. The first means is to utilize the regular scale of assessment for the full cost of the operation. The second means is to use the regular scale of assessments to the maximum extent possible and to rely on voluntary contributions for the remainder. The third means is to utilize some form of the three-bite approach which involves utilizing the regular scale up to the maximum extent possible, then the regular scale with certain reductions for smaller states, and finally the larger states voluntarily contributing the shortfall caused by the reduction to the smaller states. An alternative three-bite approach would be to provide that the shortfall be funded out of the UN's Miscellaneous Income which is running around $6 million per year.

6. We have been assuming that the total costs we are dealing with here will probably amount to $50 million for UNEF ($10 million) and ONUC ($40 million) during the last half of this year. This may be reduced and to the extent that it can be the problem will be eased.

7. Our view has been and remains that it will not be possible to raise this much money on the regular scale of assessments. We may be wrong; the returns from the capitals will soon tell us. If we are right, we must fall back on either the second or the third alternative. If we are right that the first alternative is not practical, the reason will be that, as some 6 years' experience has shown, the small states are not willing to be assessed for these large peace-keeping expenses under the regular scale of assessments. In other words, they will be insisting, as they have in the past, on adjustments making their part of the burden relatively smaller than under the regular scale, which necessarily means that the larger countries would pay a proportionately larger portion of the burden.

8. The regular scale would be applied to the maximum amount possible and voluntary contributions would be solicited for the balance. For example, $10 million would be assessed on the regular scale; assuming that the smaller states are willing to pay at the rate of, say, 50% of the regular scale as to the $40 million balance (this is optimistic), do not assess the $40 million balance at 50% of the regular scale but assess 50% of the balance, namely $20 million, under the regular scale, leaving a $20 million balloon for voluntary contributions. These are the difficulties:

(a) This approach was tried in 1957 and discarded as unsatisfactory.

(b) The small countries want percentage relief rather than dollar relief, since only the former openly recognizes the principle that they should pay a lesser share of large peacekeeping operations.

(c) The larger countries are unwilling to make the large voluntary contributions involved.

(d) The Communists, French and other non-volunteers are not assessed as to the $20 million balloon and get off completely Scot free as to that part of the cost.

(e) If all the $20 million balloon is to be raised, the United States would have to put up, say, 80% of it, which would bring the U.S. total contribution to some 51% of the $50 million total, and it is extremely doubtful whether the balance could be obtained from others.

(f) If the U.S. contribution is to be limited to 38% of the $50 million total, this would mean it could only contribute $9,400,000 of the $20 million balloon, and, assuming (optimistically) that others would contribute as much as 25% of the U.S.'s contribution, there would be an unassessed and irretrievable shortfall of some $8,250,000 which could never be recovered from anyone. The operations would have to be cut down accordingly.

Finally, we do not think this formula could obtain the necessary 2/3rd vote in the General Assembly.

9. The only advantage that has been put forward in support of this formula is that it does not in form provide a "reduction" to the small states which the larger states make up. It is true that it does not, but it is also true that in substance it does: the smaller states pay less of the total than the regular scale would provide for, and some of the larger pay more. Furthermore, the price of avoiding the form of "reductions" is to give the same percentage reduction to all other member states, including the large Communist countries and France, and therefore either to leave a very substantial unassessed and irretrievable shortfall or to make it necessary for the United States, if the operation is to be funded, to pay much more than 38% of the total cost.

10. It would appear to us that the disadvantages from the point of view of the United States would far outweigh the advantages. We therefore wonder whether the Congress is really concerned with form rather than substance and whether it would not be wiser to explain the situation to them fully and try to persuade them to our view rather than take a disadvantageous position because it is on the surface consistent with their views.

11. This involves assessing an initial amount, as large as possible, on the regular scale and assessing the balance on the regular scale except that the percentages of the smaller countries are lowered. The balance is provided by voluntary contributions. Thus, of a $50 million total cost, $10 million might be assessed on the regular scale and the 18.47% aggregate regular scale percentages of the smaller states reduced, as to the $40 million balance, by 50% to 9.24%. This would produce a shortfall of $3,692,000, which would be met by voluntary contributions by the U.S. and other friendly developed states. Assuming that the U.S. put up 80% of the shortfall, its total contribution, assessed and voluntary, would be 35.5% of the $50 million total.

12. This is obviously much cheaper for the United States than the second alternative, and, indeed, seems to us the only means by which we can obtain the desired results within the 38% limitation.

13. It is, of course, similar to the approach used last year, which involved a "reduction" to Albania, Cuba, etc., and resulted in Congressional criticism. However, in that case the entire shortfall was taken up by the United States; we believe it possible, as regards the last 6 months of 1963, to get a sizeable number of other States to join in voluntary contributions to take care of a shortfall of this size.

14. The three-bite approach has made some headway in the Working Group. It is being carefully considered by some of our important friends, including the Australians and the Canadians. We think it might be possible to negotiate some such solution before the end of June within the 38% limitation. My feeling is therefore that we should concentrate our attention on the construction of a formula along the lines of the three-bite approach which would present the least difficulties to Congressional opinion. We have suggested several devices for this purpose.

15. The first would be to provide that voluntary contributions can be made in goods or services acceptable to the Secretary General. The United States could provide such goods and services and the President could waive reimbursement therefor under the Participation Act, in case it were decided that it would be inadvisable to ask for a Congressional appropriation of more than 32.02%. (This point is discussed in the last paragraph of our telegram 3130.)/3/

16. The second would be to ensure that other states make substantial voluntary contributions, which would differentiate the formula from that criticized by Congress last summer-where the United States made up for all of the reductions. This could be done by prior agreement between the developed states or by the United States making its contribution on a matching basis.

17. A third possibility would be to provide that no reduction would be afforded to any state which has refused as a matter of principle to pay its peace-keeping assessments. Such a provision, if it could be put through, might well eliminate Congressional criticism, as no reduction would go to any Communist countries. However, it would cause serious difficulties as regards the Arab States, who have refused to contribute to UNEF.

18. It would, of course, be possible to arrange that the three-bite approach be presented to the world without the use of the word "reductions" appearing in any texts. There are many ways this could be done, and they should be fully explored, but the fact of the matter is that no formula has any chance of acceptance by the General Assembly which does not in fact provide relief to the smaller states and add correspondingly to the burdens of the larger states.

19. As things stand, our instructions, although they envisage the possibility of the United States going up to 38% and contemplate our entering into consultations with the Working Group, preclude the "reductions" which alone, we think, would make it possible for us to negotiate the financing of these peace-keeping operations on a U.S. 38% basis.

20. The alternative three-bite approach is the same as the above, except that the shortfall resulting from lower assessments for underdeveloped countries would be financed from the miscellaneous income of the UN for 1964, which should amount to more than $6,000,000.

This approach would appear to have the advantages of avoiding voluntary contributions and of assuring the full collection of the shortfall. It is true that by reducing the miscellaneous income of the UN it would add to the dollar amount assessed against the United States as well as all other members in 1964. This method of dealing with a subject matter distasteful to the United States would be similar to that used for many years in dealing with the tax reimbursement of US nationals employed by the UN and in paying the awards made in 1953-54 by the Administrative Tribunal to the US nationals dismissed from the Secretariat. In both cases miscellaneous income of the UN has been used for these purposes without objection by the United States.

It appears possible on the basis of hasty calculations that this method could be used in connection with UNEF and Congo financing resolutions at the May Special Session of the General Assembly (and repeated at the Regular Session in the fall if these operations are to be continued into next year). The present level of miscellaneous income would appear to be sufficient for this purpose but it could perhaps be supplemented by having the UN issue a special series of UN stamps commemorating its peace-keeping operations.

21. Finally, let me share my concern that we are permitting ourselves to get bogged down in technicalities so that neither the Administration nor the Congress is able to take a clear view of our national interests in relation to the UN. We will, after all, have an annual financial problem in connection with the UN. We do need in the long pull to carry Congress with us in our broad view of those national interests. This broad view should, it seems clear to me, include the idea that the US should not allow the opposition of the Communist states or the inferior sense of responsibilities of others to stand in the way of our using the UN for such peace-keeping operations as we determine are in our national interest. This undoubtedly will mean, as it has in the past, that we will be called upon to pay more than one-third of the cost of these operations. It would, in my opinion, be a shame if through lack of real leadership with the Congress we allow ourselves to get permanently boxed in so that our true national interests cannot be served.

Washington, March 18, 1963.

SUBJECT
U.S. Participation in the UN Committee of 24

The following memorandum provides information concerning the current meetings of the UN Committee on Decolonization.

General Assembly Resolution 1810 (XVII) (enclosed)/2/ enlarged the Special Committee on the Implementation of the Colonialism Declaration from 17 to 24 members and requested it "to seek the most suitable ways and means for the speedy and total application of the Declaration to all territories which have not yet attained independence." A list of members is enclosed./3/

At the 17th General Assembly the United States voted for Resolution 1810 (XVII) after defeating an attempt to have the Committee's mandate include the setting of target dates for the achievement of independence by the remaining dependent territories.

Our objectives are to have the Committee: (a) Operate by consensus rather than by voting; (b) Make factually accurate and politically realistic recommendations which we will be able to support; (c) Foster cooperation between the UN and Administering Authorities; and (d) Eliminate the Cold War from the Committee. In corridor conversations we have let it be known that we reached our decision to serve on the Committee again only after serious soul-searching and that our participation will be kept under review pending the actual operations of the expanded Committee. We should be prepared to take a walk if the Committee degenerates into a sounding board for the Soviet bloc, Mali, Iraq, Tanganyika and others who place a higher value on strident anti-colonial propaganda than they do on serious and constructive initiatives.

When votes are taken on what we consider to be unrealistic proposals, the prospective voting lineup is even more unfavorable than the one we faced last year. We must anticipate lopsided votes on the order of: 19 (Afro-Asians, Latin Americans and Soviet bloc)-5. On some of the more extreme proposals we will try to induce the three Latin Americans to abstain if they cannot vote with us. In view of the Committee's composition, we shall, so far as possible, concentrate on moderate and constructive policies rather than expand political capital in trying to increase the minority in which we will find ourselves on a number of issues.

The Committee held its first meeting on February 20 and to date has displayed unusual moderation. Coulibaly of Mali was elected Chairman and we succeeded in having a Western power, Uruguay, elected as first Vice-Chairman over Soviet objections. Cambodia was elected second Vice-Chairman. Syria was re-elected rapporteur. What promised to be a donnybrook if the Afro-Asian majority attempted to draw up a definitive list of all remaining dependent territories has not yet developed. This highly contentious issue, which might have involved Okinawa and might have obliged us to press for inclusion of certain Soviet non-self-governing territories, has thus far been avoided when the Committee adopted a practical work program approach.

In another display of initial moderation, the Committee decided to operate on the basis of consensus as much as possible. The Committee's current and prospective work program is as follows:

Portuguese Territories. As requested by the 17th Assembly, the Committee has decided to give priority to Portugal's African territories. Although the Soviets advocated going directly to the Security Council, Mali and other Afro-Asian Members have shown interest in reviving our rapporteur proposal which they rejected last fall. Chances are slender that some kind of UN role, e.g. a variation of our rapporteur proposal at the 17th General Assembly or a mission by the Secretary-General or his representative, can be developed in which Portugal and the Committee of 24 would acquiesce. We will nevertheless make an effort in this direction in order to keep it from an extreme tack. Portugal has declined an invitation to participate in the Committee's discussions of Portuguese Territories and has told us it cannot cooperate to any degree with the Committee, although it has left the door open for informal contact. Portugal has stated that it would be willing to have the rapporteur proposal reintroduced in the General Assembly.

If some form of Portuguese-UN cooperation cannot be worked out in the near future, we face the probability of a Security Council meeting where the African Members (Ghana, Morocco) might seek enforcement action including diplomatic and economic sanctions. In the absence of renewed large-scale violence in Angola, there is little prospect that seven affirmative votes could be mustered for such proposals. Should fighting erupt in the territories, the pressures for some kind of action in the Council (including a UN presence) would be considerably greater. We also face Security Council meetings on apartheid, inside or outside of South West Africa, particularly if large-scale violence develops.

Southern Rhodesia. The Secretary-General is awaiting a substantive reply to his letter of February 28 to the UK in which he offered to play a good offices role among the various elements concerned with Southern Rhodesia as requested by the resolution adopted by the 17th General Assembly. The UK appears to favor the Secretary-General's involvement; however, given Winston Field's overall approach and his antipathy toward African appeals to the UN, we should not be optimistic that his attitude will be favorable. Together with the UK we should counsel moderation in and outside of the Committee and should point out the dangers of creating a situation in which Southern Rhodesia would declare its independence.

South West Africa. We and the UK have urged the South African Government to cooperate with the resolution adopted at the 17th General Assembly to the extent of admitting some kind of UN executive presence into South West Africa. While South Africa will not permit the establishment of a political UN presence, we hope that it will agree to a resident UN technical assistance mission prior to the Committee's consideration of this item.

Spanish Territories. Since the Committee of 17 did not have time to take up Spanish Territories, we believe the Committee of 24 will wish to consider them. We hope that a spirit of cooperation will evolve between Spain and the Committee. Spain has recognized its Charter obligations to submit information on its territories to the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. While the Spanish Government has accepted the principle of self-determination and has instituted vigorous economic and social development programs for its territories, this problem remains a highly controversial and sensitive one within the Government. US policies in Africa are viewed with suspicion in Spain and in any discussions with the Spanish in the Committee of 24 context we must realize that our motives may be misconstrued. The likelihood that discussions of the future of the Spanish territories would bring out competing claims for them among various African countries may reduce resolutions of the Committee to vague generalities.

British Guiana. Developments will depend on what use if any Jagan believes he can make of the Committee of 24. Burnham appeared as a petitioner on March 7 and made a favorable impression, especially on the African members. Burnham clearly and succinctly made his case for a plebiscite on the question of proportional representation.

US Territories. In spite of the lobbying of the Pro Independencia group in New York we believe that we can prevent Committee of 24 consideration of Puerto Rico on the ground that the Assembly has already recognized its present form of self-government. If the Committee wishes to consider some US territories, we plan to steer it in the direction of the Virgin Islands, Samoa, and Guam.

Grant G. Hilliker/4/

New York, March 20, 1963.

Dear Dean,
I appreciated very much your bringing to the attention of your staff my letter of February 5 which concerned our relations with the Secretary-General./2/ This is a matter which I continue to think is of central importance for our effectiveness with the Secretary-General. I am afraid we are in a comparable situation now on the Yemen negotiations.

On the Department's instructions and with considerable difficulty we finally persuaded the Secretary-General to assume the major role in resolving the United Arab Republic-Saudi Arabia disagreement problem. He also accepted our suggestion of using an American (Bunche) to do the job but politely refused to use Bunker, despite our repeated suggestions, because he preferred to have the mediator in the UN family. He and Bunche had just gotten started when--with only a few hours notice to him--we sent Bunker out ourselves. We assured him, however, that Bunker was essentially concerned with our bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia and that we wanted the United Nations to do the main job. However Bunker was in fact instructed to present to Faisal a concrete and detailed disengagement proposal, which he did with his usual skill and effectiveness. After Bunker's return to the U.S. we dispatched him to Jidda a second time--again with only a few hours notice to the Secretary-General--when difficulties arose over Faisal's invitation to Bunche. We are moreover now engaged in trying to persuade a reluctant Nasser (who has already conferred with Bunche on this subject) to receive Bunker and in fact would appear to be endeavoring to negotiate a whole disengagement process ourselves under a supposed UN umbrella which U Thant has in fact never offered us.

I realize of course the reasons for the most urgent handling of this problem and also recognize that the UN, in its initial attempt to do so, has not been as brisk or as skillful as we had hoped. Whether it will, because of Nasser's attitude, prove the better instrument for resolving this problem, remains to be seen. What I wish to bring to your attention is the inappropriateness and indeed impracticality of in effect pulling and pushing the Secretary-General in and out of a problem. Not only will this jeopardize his effectiveness, and perhaps ours as well, in dealing with that particular problem, but he is certain to be sufficiently annoyed so that he will be extremely reluctant and perhaps unwilling when next we seek his intervention on a matter in which we find it most difficult for us to act ourselves. I believe that we should follow the general principle, once we have asked the Secretary-General to take on a role of this kind, of allowing him to carry it out with only discreet advice and assistance on our part, unless and until he and we agree his efforts require a U.S. supplement or substitute.

I realize you are very much aware of this general problem but wish to bring to your attention this latest example which shows once again how easy it is for us, in our zeal to get a job done, to cause serious and perhaps lasting damage in our relations with the Secretary-General.

Sincerely yours,

Adlai E. Stevenson/3/

Washington, March 21, 1963, 8:28 p.m.

2412. We are concerned at reports reaching us indirectly that Secretary General and some members of his inner cabinet are becoming discouraged at prospects of obtaining sufficient financing operations in Congo and are inclined to blame us for failure Working Group 21 to produce funding formula.

You should make early occasion review frankly with Secretary General our overall objectives, which we believe to be identical with and in support of his own (i.e., to enable the Organization to carry out effectively existing peace-and-security operations) and the tactics we are pursuing to this end in Working Group and in capitals. We believe that these tactics which are calculated to create a crisis atmosphere are most likely to achieve these common objectives.

He should understand that the hard line we are pursuing on the assessment scale and unprecedently wide-spread and intense diplomatic efforts we are making in almost 90 capitals are an indispensable prerequisite to continuance of U.S. contributions at satisfactory level. Doubts about proportion of our contribution will continue to exist as long as large number UN members continue press for sizable reductions in contributions, fall further in arrears and evidence no real signs of collective responsibility. We continue believe our two-pronged diplomatic campaign in Working Group and in capitals will achieve objectives common to ourselves and SYG. We believe our actions, together with efforts of Secretary General, will produce positive results in coming weeks.

Rusk

Washington, April 9, 1963, 7:45 p.m.

1740. Ref: Purchase of UN Bonds by New Members. Depcirtel 1526,/2/ CA-9150./3/

The United Nations financial condition continues to be difficult because many members have not paid their Congo and UNEF assessments and because only 59 members have subscribed $148.7 million in bonds, leaving over $50 million yet to be pledged. The country to which you accredited, being a new member of UN, has not as yet been assessed for any UN costs.

If the new members could make even token purchases (range $10-$25 thousand) this would jump the number countries participating into the mid-60s. You can point out importance of UN to newer and less developed countries. A token bond purchase would tangibly demonstrate interest and value they attach to their membership.

To be effective, pledges should be made by May 14 when Special Session begins. Even though increasing the number of bond subscribers is important, further approach is in your discretion and should be weighed in view your total efforts with govt you accredited on UN financing efforts.

Ball

Washington, April 11, 1963.

SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON FINANCES

We are developing our strategy for the upcoming Special Session of the General Assembly on finances which opens on May 14. Our objective will be to get the Assembly to adopt a financial plan, satisfactory to us, which will defray the costs of the peacekeeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East for the last half of calendar year 1963. Our recommendations to this end will be forwarded to you sometime next week at which time the replies being received to our circular will have been evaluated as to support for our position that these costs should be financed at the regular budget assessment rates. We will also know more clearly what other governments plan to do to pay arrearages and buy more bonds.

As a corollary to the foregoing, we will also wish to make every effort to assure that the principles of Article 19 are applied in accordance with the Charter if our present efforts fail to get such delinquents (Argentina, Bolivia, China, Haiti, Honduras, Paraguay and United Arab Republic) to make enough of a payment to avoid the Charter sanction. Guatemala has just paid up; Cuba and Hungary are also delinquent, but we are making no approaches to either. Indeed, there may be advantage in having one or two less contentious cases come up now to set the precedent-both procedurally and substantively--in the Assembly and thereby help to reinforce our position for the future when the tougher cases (USSR, France) come within the range of Article 19.

There are also a number of organizational and substantive political questions on which our planning is proceeding.

From a practical point of view, there is no doubt that our regular staff at USUN under Ambassador Stevenson, with some augmentation from the Department, can readily handle the Special Session. The key question is whether we should ask Senators Gore and Allott to join the Delegation for the duration of the Session. We see real political advantage if the Senators could be prevailed upon to participate, even on a limited basis. We will need all the Congressional support we can get in the future and their participation with the Delegation should be helpful in this regard. They may well feel that the demands on Capitol Hill preclude their participation with the Delegation. Moreover, Senator Allott might have a reservation about serving if our position allows for any cost-sharing plan other than the regular scale. I believe they should nevertheless be given the opportunity to "turn down" the offer. Assuming you agree with this approach, I would like to discuss this initially with Ambassador Stevenson, and, if he agrees, subsequently with Senator Fulbright before approaching Senators Gore and Allott. I should also like to explore as an alternative the possibility of asking two members of the Senate and House Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees respectively as "special advisers" to the Delegation. This would be of symbolic importance and offer possibilities for education of key Congressional representatives.

We have normally followed the practice of seeking to have the Assembly at any of its Special Sessions organize itself in the most expeditious and non-contentious manner. To this end, the practice has developed of electing the same officers at a Special Session as served in the previous regular session. This would mean re-electing Zafrulla Khan as President and the other officers who served last fall. Where the individuals themselves are not present, as may be the case in some instances, the chiefs of their delegations would serve. Moreover, we should seek to have the same Credentials Committee appointed as served at the Seventeenth Session (Canada, El Salvador, Greece, Guinea, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, USSR, and United States).

We do not expect the Soviets to raise the Chinese representation issue in any formal way, but we will be prepared with the appropriate tactics to cope with it should it arise. We would hope the Credentials Committee might meet very late in the Session and send forward a perfunctory report which would be adopted in plenary without debate.

We will, of course, be confronted with a major decision regarding the question of Hungarian credentials. As you know, we are reasonably satisfied that the amnesty announced by the Hungarians is bona fide and that this represents a constructive step on their part. We also continue to believe it would be symbolically important for the Secretary-General to agree to visit Hungary some time before the opening of the Special Session. This would be interpreted as an additional step on the part of the Hungarians to accommodate themselves to United Nations opinion.

While it does not appear that the Secretary-General will be able to fit such a trip into his schedule prior to the Special Session on finances, we hope he can at least announce some time in May his intention to visit Hungary during the month of July.

The amnesty is likely to be broadly interpreted in the world as a reasonable step on the part of the Hungarians, and we can expect a further erosion of support for our position if we decide to pursue once again the "no decision" procedure at the coming Special Session. In view of the delicate considerations involved in this question-both domestic and international--it will be necessary, should we decide not to pursue the "no decision" procedure, to undertake appropriate consultation with a very few interested Congressional members and key opinion leaders among the Hungarian refugee groups in this country. I do not believe a change in our policy on Hungarian credentials will have a major impact on public opinion at home, but, nevertheless, we need to prepare the ground and our tactics carefully. In general, our feeling is that such a change should be played in the lowest possible key and that our consultations here and at the General Assembly should not have the effect of magnifying the change.

Kuwait has indicated it wishes to become a member of the United Nations at the earliest possible moment, and the way now seems clear since the USSR has apparently dropped its past opposition. We can expect, therefore, that a Security Council meeting will be held in early May to recommend approval of Kuwait's application and that the Assembly will admit Kuwait, probably before getting substantive consideration of the item on finances. This can be done very easily under the rules, and we do not expect any major difficulties on this question.

As you know, a subcommittee of the Committee of 24 is expected to visit London April 22 to discuss current developments on Southern Rhodesia. We can expect pressure to increase on the United Kingdom to state categorically its unwillingness to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia as Prime Minister Field has requested. In these circumstances, we are likely to be confronted with a major campaign by the Africans and the Asians to add the Southern Rhodesian item to the agenda of the Special Session. While we will wish to forward specific recommendations in light of the results of the consultations between the United Kingdom and the subcommittee of the Committee of 24, our present tentative assessment is that, even though a two-thirds vote is required, we would probably have great difficulty preventing the inscription of this item. The United Kingdom will probably agree with our assessment that the prime focus of our efforts should be to channel the substantive consideration of the Southern Rhodesian question toward as moderate an outcome as possible rather than to expend considerable prestige on the procedural question of inscription, where the odds are very much against our winning. This, of course, does not represent any final assessment on our part, and we will wish to consult fully and closely with the United Kingdom should there be a move to add Southern Rhodesia to the Special Session's agenda.

There is also the possibility of a move to add the Congo item at the Special Session. The Secretary-General, who has expressed serious reservations regarding a possible United Nations administrative umbrella over the Congolese military training program, thinks that it might be desirable to have the Special Session of the General Assembly consider this matter. He is looking for ways to absolve the Secretary-General from the requirement in General Assembly Resolution 1474 that military assistance in the Congo be given only at the request of the United Nations through the Secretary-General. He believes a resolution could be adopted which would empower the Adoula government to enter into bilateral arrangements for ANC retraining. We believe consideration by the Special General Assembly would only serve to delay the start of ANC retraining and open a needless debate on the whole Congo question which would not serve our objectives. Moreover, no such resolution of the Assembly is needed since we believe the Congolese government has the sovereign right to ask whomever it pleases to assist it in training its own forces. We are, therefore, seeking to discourage the Secretary-General from pursuing this course of action./2/

Washington, April 17, 1963.

SUBJECT
Presidency of the Eighteenth General Assembly

In response to your inquiry concerning the presidency of the next General Assembly, it is correct that, in accordance with the tradition of regional rotation, it is generally accepted that this year's president will be a Latin American.

The Venezuelan United Nations Delegation has announced the candidacy of Sosa Rodriguez, head of the Venezuelan Delegation, for president of the Eighteenth General Assembly. Sosa claims the support of nine other Latin American Delegations and appears to have the inside track. Guatemala has put forward the candidacy of Flores Avendano, and Benites of Ecuador apparently has a latent interest. The Brazilians have recently made informal approaches to certain Latin American Delegations in New York to explore the chances of launching ex-President Kubitschek as a candidate. There are unconfirmed rumors that the USSR may be behind this move.

It is not surprising that Kubitschek may be interested in the presidency of the General Assembly. Kubitschek wants to become President of Brazil again and running for the General Assembly's top office would be helpful to his campaign. However, never in the history of the United Nations has the Assembly elected an individual as president who has not had considerable previous U.N. experience and who is not widely known to other Delegates.

It is normal practice, in the selection of Latin American candidates for U.N. posts, for the Latin Americans, jealous of their prerogatives, to agree among themselves to endorse a single candidate who is then normally accepted by the United States and the rest of the members.

In this case, because of the possible emergence of Kubitschek and because Sosa seems over-confident and is not yet actively campaigning, we are seeking discreetly to stimulate Sosa to greater activity and to encourage the Latin American countries to reach early agreement. We feel it would be counter-productive, however, for the United States to undertake an active campaign for him at this time. Ambassador Stevenson, with whom we have discussed this matter, agrees with this approach.

DR

Washington, April 29, 1963.

SUGGESTED COMMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS
ON FINANCING THE UNITED NATIONS

1. Sales of the UN Bonds will just about cover the Middle East and Congo peacekeeping operations for the twelve months from July 1962 to June 1963.

2. The UN's deficit is still fluctuating around $100 million. The arrears owed on the Middle East and Congo operations are also about $100 million, of which two-thirds is owed by the Soviet bloc. (The other big debtors are France, the Republic of China, Belgium, and the Arab States.)

3. There is no provision for financing peacekeeping costs after July 1, 1963.

4. The UNEF must continue to sit on the lid in the Middle East which is more dangerously explosive right now than at any time since Suez--witness the precarious state of Yemen and Jordan and the recent coups in Syria and Iraq.

5. The Congo Force will be down from 19,000 troops last December to under 7,500 by July 1. We do not yet know whether some part of this Force will need to be maintained in the Congo in 1964; but the Congolese National Army is not nearly well enough trained and disciplined to risk eliminating the Congo Force now.

6. A Special General Assembly of the UN has been called for May 14th, to consider UN financing. Unless we take the lead, the small countries will try to put through a new assessment scale for peacekeeping under which we would be obligated to pay more than forty percent of the cost of any future peacekeeping force.

7. We have been opposing, and will continue to oppose

(a) any general arrangement for the financing of peacekeeping that would apply to unknown future operations.

(b) a "special scale" for peacekeeping by which the United States would be assessed at more than our Regular Budget percentage (32.02%).

8. The President is instructing the State Department and the United States Delegation to take the lead in developing a common position among the main Free World contributors. The framework for this position would be a modified version of an earlier British proposal, which has come to be called "Three-bite" approach.

(a) Bite one would finance a minimum amount on the Regular Budget scale of assessments.

(b) Bite two would assess the developed countries in the Regular Budget scale, but assess the less-developed countries at a lower rate-perhaps fifty percent of their Regular Budget share.

(c) Bite three would cover the resulting shortfall through small voluntary contributions from the developed countries.

9. We will try to make some arrangement whereby those countries (like Cuba) which are unwilling to pay on principle, or which failed to pay on time, would not get the benefit of the lower rate in bite two. Thus Cuba and Outer Mongolia, among the Soviet Bloc countries now considered as "less developed" in UN terminology, could be disqualified, and we would hope not to be in the position of helping reduce assessments for communist countries.

10. The total amount of money we are trying to raise in this somewhat complicated manner is around $40 million for July-December 1963. On this basis, we would need about $12.8 million to cover our thirty-two percent, plus a voluntary contribution in the range of one to one-and-a-half million dollars. (FYI. On the basis of these figures, our share of the total, would come out to just under thirty-six percent. However, it is not recommended that the matter be discussed in terms of percentages.)

11. The assessed amount would be funded in the usual way by a supplemental appropriation request, after the bargain is struck in the Special General Assembly next month.

12. The small voluntary contribution could be met under existing authority by Presidential Waiver of the cost of airlift services which the United States provides the United Nations for UNEF and the Congo. While we would of course make perfectly clear to Congress what the whole arrangement entails, the Congress would not need to vote the amount above our regularly assessed share.

13. The only section the Charter provides for nonpayment of dues is Article 19 which says a country will lose its vote in the General Assembly "if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years."

14. Lumping regular peacekeeping dues together (which is the way the Article 19 liability is figured), there were until recently ten countries to which this sanction would have been applied this next General Assembly. It now seems that all ten of these countries will pay enough to get within the two-year rule, before the Assembly meets two weeks from now. Two of the ten countries are Cuba and Hungary; whether they pay or not will be some indication of Soviet willingness to face a loss of vote under Article 19.

15. The Soviets are continuing their financial boycott of both UNEF and the Congo operation. If they fail to pay current assessments and nine million dollars more they will be subject to an automatic loss of vote in the General Assembly next year. We intend to campaign vigorously to make sure we have the necessary majority to deprive the Soviet Union of its vote if it continues its financial boycott of the UN. If they are faced with certain defeat on this issue, the Soviets would probably find a way to wriggle off the hook on which they have placed themselves. The alternative would be for them to leave the UN.

USUN will be consulting with other governments during the next couple of weeks. At the same time, the State Department will explain the present position to key members of the Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Appropriations Committees in both Houses of Congress.

Our bargaining position in the UN will be weakened by an outbreak of public debate on this subject in Congress during the next couple of weeks. We would hope the Leadership can help us create the conditions for striking a bargain in the General Assembly which both gets these two important operations (UNEF and Congo) financed for the rest of the year and does it at the very minimum cost to the United States.